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National hero, Javanese mystic, pious Muslim and leader of the ‘holy war’ against the Dutch 
between 1825 and 1830, the Yogyakarta prince, Dipanagara (1785-1855), is pre-eminent in the 
pantheon of modern Indonesian historical figures. Yet despite instant name recognition in 
Indonesia, there has never been a full biography of the prince’s life and times based on Dutch 
and Javanese sources. The power of prophecy is a major study which sets Dipanagara’s life history 
against the context of the turbulent events of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century when 
the full force of European imperialism hit Indonesia like an Asian tsunami destroying forever 
Java’s ‘old order’ and propelling the twin forces of Islam and Javanese national identity into a fatal 
confrontation with the Dutch. This confrontation known as the Java War, in which Dipanagara was 
defeated and exiled, marked the beginning of the modern colonial period in Indonesia which lasted 
until the Japanese occupation of 1942-1945. 
 The book presents a detailed analysis of Dipanagara’s pre-war visions and aspirations as 
a Javanese Ratu Adil (Just King) based on extensive reading of his autobiography, the Babad 
Dipanagara as well as a number of other Javanese sources. Dutch and British records, in 
particularly the Residency Archives of Yogyakarta and Surakarta currently kept in the Indonesian 
National Archives, provide the backbone of this scholarly work. The book will be read with profit by 
all those interested in the rise of Western colonial rule in Indonesia, the fate of indigenous cultures 
in an age of imperialism and the role of Javanese Islam in modern Indonesian history. 
Peter Carey, Laithwaite tutor in History at Trinity College, Oxford, has made a lifetime study of 
Dipanagara and the history of early nineteenth-century Java. His many works include the two-
volume Archive of Yogyakarta (1980, 2000), The British in Java, 1811-1816; A Javanese account (1992) 
and Babad Dipanagara; An account of the outbreak of the Java War (1825-1830) (1981). He is one of 
Britain’s foremost historians of Southeast Asia and has also published on Cambodia, Burma and 
East Timor.
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The Java War (1825-1830) was a watershed in the history of Java and of all 
Indonesia.1 For the first time a European colonial government faced a social 
rebellion covering a large part of the island. Most of central and east Java, and 
many of the pasisir (north coast) areas were affected. Two million Javanese, one 
third of the total population, were exposed to the ravages of war, one fourth of 
the cultivated area of Java sustained damage and about 200,000 Javanese died 
(Carey 1976:52 note 1). In securing their pyrrhic victory over the Javanese, 
the Dutch also suffered: as well as 7,000 Indonesian auxiliaries, 8,000 of their 
own troops perished and the war cost their exchequer an estimated 20 million 
guilders (De Graaf 1949:399). The end of the conflict left the Dutch in undis-
puted control of the island and a new phase of colonial rule began with the 
inception of Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch’s ‘cultivation system’ 
(1830-1870). This proved immensely profitable for Holland. The war thus 
marked the end of a process, maturing since the period of Marshal Herman 
Willem Daendels (1808-1811), involving the change from the era of the Dutch 
East Indies Company,2 when contacts between Batavia and the south-central 
Javanese kingdoms had had the nature of ambassadorial links between sove-
reign states, to the ‘high colonial’ period when the Principalities occupied a 
clearly subordinate position to the European power.
This transition should be borne in mind by those who approach the early 
chapters of this book expecting the Dutch to loom large as the colonial mas-
ters of Java (Chapters I-IV). In the late eighteenth century, the island was not 
a Dutch version of the British Raj. A declining power in Europe, Holland 
seemed to be on its way out in Java while the south-central Javanese rulers en-
joyed de facto sovereignty. The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War of 1780-1783 was the 
turning point for the Dutch as a colonial power. Faced with mounting debts, 
which peaked at 134 million guilders, the VOC was declared bankrupt and 
its assets taken over by the Dutch state on 1 January 1800 (Boxer 1979:101-2). 
1 For the purpose of this volume, the term ‘Indonesia’ will be used to refer to the Netherlands 
Indies, and ‘Indonesian’ to the inhabitants of the archipelago. The colonial capital will, however, 
be referred to as ‘Batavia’ throughout rather than ‘Jakarta’.
2 Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC, 1602-1799, see Boxer 1979.
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Four years earlier control of the Dutch possessions in the East had been ta-
ken out of the hands of the Directors of the VOC, the so-called ‘Heeren XVII’ 
(Gentlemen 17), and vested in the new Committee for the Affairs of East Indies 
Trade and Colonies.3 The fact that during the international crises which led to 
the VOC’s demise the governor-general and Council of the Indies in Batavia 
had to turn to the south-central Javanese rulers to help them to defend their 
colonial capital against possible foreign attack, illustrates the scale of the 
courts’ military and political independence. Such requests for assistance oc-
curred during the British attack in 1781, and again in 1793 when the Dutch 
Republic entered the War of the First Coalition (1792-1797) against France.4 
Following the occupation of Holland by the French Army of the North in 
December 1794-January 1795, the Republic became a satellite of the grande 
nation. This had implications for Java. As one of Holland’s overseas possessi-
ons, it was included in the policy announced by the exiled Dutch Stadhouder 
(head of state). This stated that the Republic’s colonies should be handed over 
to the British to prevent them falling into the hands of the French.5 So began 
a twenty-year period in which Indonesia was drawn into the global conflict 
between Britain and France. Fought out during the Revolutionary (1792-1799) 
and Napoleonic Wars (1799-1802, 1803-1813, 1815) in Europe, the archipelago 
became a battle ground on land and sea. Between 1795 and 1797, British naval 
forces operating from Madras and Pulau Pinang captured most of the Dutch 
possessions outside Java. Although returned to Holland under the terms of 
the Peace of Amiens (1802), all were recaptured by the British in the seven 
years which followed the renewal of hostilities in Europe (May 1803) when 
Indonesia was placed under strict naval blockade. So tight was this interdic-




(Board of Asiatic Possessions and Establishments) (1800-1806).
4	 On	 the	1781	situation,	 see	UBL,	BPL	616,	Port.	3	pt.	1,	W.H.	van	IJsseldijk	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	
P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 8-10-1793. On the Dutch response to the sighting of French 
warships	 in	 the	Sunda	Straits	 in	September	 1793,	 see	W.H.	van	IJsseldijk	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	P.G.	
van Overstraten (Semarang), 28-9-1793, 5-10-1793, 8-10-1793, 30-10-1793 and 4-11-1793. Hameng-
kubuwana II had insisted that his 1,000 men should be considered as ‘auxiliaries’ (hulptroepen) not 
as mercenaries, even though they were being paid at the rate of four Spanish dollars a month per 
man	by	the	VOC.	In	1781,	during	the	Fourth	Anglo-Dutch	War,	the	VOC	had	paid	five	Spanish	
dollars a month per head for Hamengkubuwana I’s troops who were being kept on standby to 
defend	the	colonial	capital	against	possible	British	attack.
5 The exiled Dutch Stadhouder (head of state), Prince William V of Orange (reigned 1766-1785 
and	1787-1795),	had	sanctioned	these	British	conquests	through	his	so-called	‘Kew	letters’.	Signed	
in	his	place	of	exile	in	England	in	February	1795,	these	ordered	VOC	officials	to	place	the	Compa-
ny’s possessions in Asia in British hands in order to prevent them falling to the French.
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as governor-general from Napoleon’s younger brother Louis6 in January 1807, 
he was sent out to Java with a replacement governor-general, Rear-Admiral 
A.A. Buyskes, following on a separate fast frigate in case the marshal fell 
into British hands (Chapter V note 46). As we will see in Chapter V, the par-
lous financial and military situation of the Dutch was well understood by the 
south-central Javanese rulers. So much so that one senior former VOC official 
even suggested in 1808 after Daendels’ arrival that the European government 
should employ some holy men and ascetics to make favourable prophecies 
on behalf of the Dutch to disguise their vulnerability. In the same year, an 
unusual event at one of the regular tiger and buffalo fights staged in honour 
of the visit of a high Dutch dignitary to the Yogyakarta court may have been 
interpreted as an indication that Holland would soon be placed hors de combat 
in terms of their rule in Java (Chapter V).
The tragedy for the Javanese was that just as all the signs seemed to be poin-
ting in the direction of a Dutch collapse, half a world away in Europe events 
were taking place which would change the Javanese ‘old order’ for ever. The 
twin political and industrial revolutions then tearing the ancien régimes of eight-
eenth-century Europe apart would hit Java with the force of an Asian tsuna-
mi. In the space of just four years (1808-1812), the relationship between the 
European government7 and the south-central Javanese rulers was transformed. 
Yogya bore the brunt of these changes. In quick succession, the re-energised 
Franco-Dutch regime of Marshal Daendels (1808-1811) and the British-Indian 
administration of Thomas Stamford Raffles (1811-1816), forced open Yogya’s 
eastern outlying territories (Chapter VI), plundered its court and exiled its reig-
ning monarch (Chapter VII). After the fall of the kraton (fortified royal capital; 
court) in June 1812 and the imposition of new treaties, the relationship between 
Batavia and the princely states came to resemble that of the post-Plassey era in 
India when the British replaced the Mughal emperors in Lower Bengal (Chapter 
VIII). The returned Dutch administration of Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van 
der Capellen (1816-1826) continued this process. Its desperate need for money 
6 Louis Bonaparte had been installed by his elder brother as king of Holland, reigning from 
1806 to 1810, when the former Batavian Republic was annexed to France, see Chapter VII.
7	 	Since	there	were	so	many	changes	of	colonial	regime	involving	different	European	powers	
(Dutch, British, French, Belgian) in the period covered in the present volume, it has been decided for 
the purposes of succinctness to refer to the colonial power in Batavia as the ‘European government’ 
throughout. The principle regimes which governed Java in the period 1785-1855 were: 1. the Dutch 
East	Indies	Company	(to	1796);	2.	the	Batavian	Republic	(1796-1806)	through	its	two	Committees	
(note 2); 3. the Franco-Dutch kingdom of King Louis of Holland (1806-1810) and the French Empire 
(1810-1813), when Holland was annexed to Napoleon I’s France; 4. the British-Indian interregnum of 
lieutenant-governors	T.S.	Raffles	and	John	Fendall	(1811-1816),	when	Java	was	under	the	authority	
of the governor-general of India; 5. the returned Dutch administration of the three commissioners-
general G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen, C.Th. Elout, and Rear Admiral A.A. Buyskes (1816-1818), who 
reported	directly	to	the	Director-General	of	Trade	and	Colonies	(Johannes	baron	Goldberg,	in	office	
1815-1818) of the new United Kingdom of the Netherlands (present-day Holland and Belgium) 
(1814-1830);	and	finally	6.	the	government	of	the	Netherlands	Indies	(from	January	1818),	which	
from 1830 was under the direction of the Dutch crown and – from 1848 – the States-General.
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and lack of understanding of the effects of its policies on ordinary Javanese pre-
pared the ground for the Java War (Chapter IX). Adverse environmental and 
health conditions, in particular the May 1821 cholera epidemic, coupled with 
soaring rice prices provided the triggers for the massive popular uprisings of 
July-August 1825 which heralded the outbreak of the Java War (Chapter X).
For the Javanese, this five-year conflict had far-reaching implications: for 
perhaps the first time a rebellion had broken out at one of the south-central 
Javanese kraton which had at its heart social and economic grievances rather 
than dynastic ambitions. The emergence of a strong charismatic leader in the 
person of Pangéran Dipanagara (1785-1855), who took the title of the Javanese 
messianic Ratu Adil (‘Just King’), served to bring many disparate social ele-
ments under the single banner of Javanese Islam. Widespread millenarian 
expectations caught the imagination of the peasantry and acted as a catalyst 
for social and economic grievances, accumulating since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. The concept of holy war (prang sabil), imagery from the 
Javanese shadow-play (wayang), and Javanese nativist sentiments, made up of 
an intense longing for the restoration of an idealized traditional order – which 
Dipanagara described as ‘restoring the high state of the Islamic religion in 
Java’8 – all helped to forge a common identity amongst the prince’s follo-
wers. In this fashion, nobles, dismissed provincial officials, religious teachers, 
professional bandits, porters, day labourers, tax-paying farmers (sikep) and 
artisans were brought together briefly in a common cause (Chapter XI). The 
Java War was thus of immense significance for Indonesia’s future. The subtle 
interplay of economic grievances and millenarian hopes created a movement 
of unique social breadth which in some respects anticipated the nationalist 
movement of the early twentieth century (Carey 1976:52-3). These nationalist 
antecedents were noted by F.G. Valck (1799-1842) , a senior Dutch official 
who served in a number of residency postings in south-central Java during 
the two decades which spanned the Java War and its immediate aftermath 
(Christiaans 1992-93:129-30). Writing in 1840, he observed:
[My] nearly twenty years of administrative service in various Residencies has 
taught me that the spirit of the ordinary Javanese is against us, not because we 
Netherlanders treat him badly but because he is imbued with a feeling of natio-
nality […]. Despite all the benefits which he gets from us, he cannot suppress the 
wish to be governed by his own rulers and chiefs even though they would admi-
nister him worse [than we would] […]. He continues to see in us foreign tyrants, 
who in morals, customs, religion and clothing etc differ so much from his own 
[…]. The sight of every European reminds him of his humiliating situation [and] 
he cannot refrain from giving him looks of hatred or contempt whenever he feels 
he can get away with it without incurring punishment.9
8 The Javanese phrase used by Dipanagara and his supporters was: mangun luhuripun agami 
Islam wonten ing Tanah Jawi sedaya, see Carey 1974b:285.
9	 Dj.Br.	18,	F.G.	Valck,	 ‘Geheime	memorie	behoorende	bij	het	algemeen	verslag	der	residentie	
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Valck’s views were not alone. Acute observers like the lawyer, Willem van 
Hogendorp, who served as a senior official in Commissioner-General L.P.J. 
du Bus de Gisignies’ administration (1826-1830) during the Java War (De 
Prins 2002:113), confided similar misgivings in his correspondence with his 
father,10 in 1827-1829 (Van Hogendorp 1913:170):
It is not the war as such or the number of our enemies which constitutes my 
greatest concern about Java and our rule here […] but it is the spirit of the whole 
population of Java from one end to the other, and I include here the spirit of [the 
inhabitants of] our most important outer island possessions in Borneo, Makassar 
and throughout Sumatra […]. They are tired of us. 
This strand of anti-Dutch ‘nationalism’, if such it can be called at this early 
date, will be explored more fully in the chapter which deals in detail on the 
Java War (Chapter XI). 
The cultural dislocation wrought by the impact of the new European im-
perialism of the early nineteenth century on south-central Java is one of the 
key themes of this book. It also seeks to explain events through the eyes of its 
central protagonist, Dipanagara. A key transitional figure, he lived through 
the shift from the old order of late eighteenth century Java to the new ‘high 
colonial’ era based on the twin political and industrial revolutions which 
were transforming Europe in his lifetime. In many ways a traditional figure 
steeped in the values of pre-modern Java, particularly the world of the south-
central Javanese courts, Dipanagara also pointed to the future. One thinks 
here of his use of Javanese Islam, particularly its millenarian traditions, as 
a way of forging a new identity for Javanese Muslims in an era when the 
old Javanese order was crumbling. Dipanagara lived in a world increasingly 
divided between those who were prepared to accommodate themselves to 
the new European dispensation and those who saw the Islamic moral order 
(agami Islam) as the lodestar in a society which had lost its traditional moor-
Djocjocarta	over	het	jaar	1839’	(henceforth:	Valck,	‘Geheime	memorie’),	31-3-1840.	Valck	was	a	fluent	
Javanese speaker who had served in postings in central Java since the 1820s and had fallen in love 
with	Hamengkubuwana	V’s	favourite	unofficial	wife	(selir) whom he had taken as his young mis-
tress (Houben 1994:109). His knowledge of Javanese society was thus personal as well as admin-
istrative. His rather convoluted Dutch text reads: Het bijna twintig jarig bestuur van onderscheidene 
residentiën heeft mij geleerd dat de geest van den gemeenen Javaan tegen ons is, niet omdat wij Nederlanders 
hem niet goed behandelen maar omdat hij met gevoel van nationaliteit bezield is, en omdat alle der voordee-
len die hij van ons erlangd, den wensch bij hem niet kunnen onderdrukken om door zijne eigene vorsten en 
hoofden alware zulks slechter geregeerd te worden, terwijl hij in ons steeds vreemde overheersers ziet die in 
zeden, gewoonten, Godsdienst, kleding enz. zoo zeer van de zijnen verschillen dat hij aan zijne vernederende 
toestand bij het aanschouwen van iederen Europeaan herinnerd wordt en dan ook niet nalaat om hem blijken 
van haat en minachting te geven wanneer hij zulks slechts ongestraft vermeend te kunnen doen.
10	 This	was	Gijsbert	Karel	van	Hogendorp	(1762-1834).	One	of	the	founders	of	the	kingdom	of	the	
United	Netherlands	(1815-1830),	he	exercised	a	significant	influence	on	the	development	of	Dutch	
colonial policy during the reign of King William I (reigned 1813-1840) (Prins 2002:45-6, 185-6).
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ings. The Java War gave impetus to a process which is still working itself out 
in modern Indonesian society today: namely, the integration of Islamic va-
lues into contemporary Javanese and Indonesian identity. Dipanagara’s world 
view also came to encompass a distinctly contemporary concern with how 
Javanese Muslims should live in an age of Western imperial domination. For 
Dipanagara, unlike present-day Indonesian Muslims, the answer seemed to 
lie in the waging of holy war and the development of a clear distinction, which 
developed during his five-year struggle, between the wong Islam (‘people of 
Islam’; Muslim believers), the European kapir laknatullah (heretics accursed 
by Allah), and the Javanese kapir murtad (apostates; Javanese who had allied 
themselves with the Dutch). But there was also a deep concern on the prince’s 
part for the preservation of specifically Javanese values as expressed in langu-
age, dress and cultural codes which can be seen most clearly in his treatment 
of Dutch prisoners during the Java War. We will see in the chapter on the 
war (Chapter XI), how they were expected to adopt Javanese dress and speak 
to their captors not in the reviled language of the new colonial state – ‘ser-
vice Malay’11 – but in High Javanese (krama), the medium of the court elite. 
Despite his adoption of Ottoman dress and titles such as ‘Ali Basah’ (‘The 
High Pasha’) for his military commanders (Chapter III), Dipanagara was no 
Islamic reformer. Instead, he was a traditional Javanese Muslim for whom 
there was no inherent conflict between the spirit world of Java, and mem-
bership of the international ummat (community of Muslim believers) and its 
spiritual and politico-cultural centres in the Hejaz (present-day Saudi Arabia) 
and Ottoman Turkey. Dipanagara did not prevail in achieving his goal of re-
storing the high state of the Islamic religion in Java. Indeed, the dignity and 
integrity which he fought for on behalf of the Javanese ummat would only be 
achieved in outward form ninety years after his death with the declaration 
of political independence from the Dutch in 1945. His wider moral vision of 
securing an honoured place for Islam in the life of the nation, however, is still 
being negotiated at a time of unprecedented global conflict between what the 
Islamic community see as the ‘materialistic’ values of the West and the fis-
siparous loyalties of the worldwide Muslim ummat.
In any other culture, such a key figure would have been the subject of nu-
merous biographies and historical studies. Every aspect of Dipanagara’s life 
would have been researched in detail, his understanding of Islam and of his 
Javanese inheritance the subject of weighty monographs. Indeed, one might 
have expected that his own writings, in particular his impressive autobiograp-
hy written while in exile in Manado (1830-1833), the Babad Dipanagara, which 
runs to over 1,000 pages in manuscript, would have long since appeared in a 
copiously annotated modern text edition. The situation is unfortunately very 
different. History seems to have little honour in present-day Indonesia and 
11  On this Dienstmaleisch,	see	Hoffman	1979:65-92.
Preface xvii
the results of this have been painfully evident in Jakarta’s abysmal handling 
of its East Timor adventure (1975-1999) and its belated understanding of the 
particular society, politics and culture of Aceh. There is little money for re-
search or government funds – let alone the scholarly attention and respect 
needed – for the preservation of manuscripts. The result is that the original 
pégon (unvocalised Arabic script Javanese) copy of Dipanagara’s babad in the 
National Library – equivalent to Oliver Cromwell’s common place book or 
George Washington’s diary – is crumbling to dust (Carey 1981a:lix-lx note 76). 
As for the voluminous Dutch Residency reports in the Indonesian National 
Archives (Arsip Nasional), the backbone of the present study, who can be 
bothered to use them today? The result is an historiographical void. It is as 
though the clock stopped at the time when the Dutch military historians P.J.F. 
Louw and E.S. de Klerck completed their magisterial six-volume work on the 
Java War (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909) or the Rusche edition (1908-09) of 
the Babad Dipanagara was published in Batavia before the First World War. 
Indeed, since independence in 1945, only a handful of studies have appeared 
in Indonesian: one thinks here of Yamin (1950), Tanojo (n.y.), Soekanto (1951a, 
1952), Sagimun (1965), and Djamhari (2003). These have all afforded access 
to aspects of Dipanagara’s life and times to a post-independence Indonesian 
readership, but apart from the last, which is primarily a history of the Dutch 
bentheng stelsel (system of fortified strong points) in the last three years of the 
Java War, none have been based on primary research.
The present study should have appeared thirty years ago in the immedi-
ate aftermath of its acceptance as a doctoral thesis at the University of Oxford 
(1975). At that time, on the recommendation of the late Professor M.A.P. 
Meilink-Roelofsz, the thesis manuscript was accepted as the basis for a mo-
nograph publication in the ‘Verhandelingen’ series of the Koninklijk Instituut 
voor Taal-, Land en Volkenkunde (KITLV, Royal Institute of Southeast Asian 
and Caribbean Studies) in Leiden. But Professor Meilink-Roelofsz made three 
important recommendations which were in fact conditions needing to be met 
before publication could proceed: first, that the text edition of the Surakarta 
version of the Babad Dipanagara with its extensive annotations, and the the-
sis preface, which dealt primarily with the Javanese sources for the early ni-
neteenth-century history of Yogyakarta, should be published separately; se-
cond, that much more attention should be paid to the social and economic 
origins of the Java War. In particular, she urged that I investigate further the 
role of the Chinese in south-central Java and the economic relations between 
Javanese and Europeans, as well as the workings of the Javanese apanage sy-
stem. Third, she recommended that the entire structure of the thesis should 
be recast to allow for shorter chapters and greater thematic coherence. These 
three conditions were all valid, but they constituted a considerable challenge 
involving extensive additional research just at a time when I was embarking on 
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an academic career in the University of Oxford teaching British and European 
history. In 1976-1977 and 1978, however, before my teaching duties began in 
earnest with my tutorial Fellowship at Trinity College, I was able to carry out 
some important further research at the Arsip Nasional in Jakarta by kind per-
mission of the former Director, Dra Soemartini and her staff, in particular the 
late Pak Sundoyo whose knowledge of the Dutch East Indies colonial archive 
never failed me. During this period of fieldwork, the British Academy sup-
ported me through the provision of a British Academy Travelling Fellowship 
in Southeast Asia (1976-1977). The bulk of the Dutch archive material used in 
this study, in particular the letters in the Residency archive of Yogyakarta pre-
served in the Arsip Nasional, were gathered in that period (Carey 1978). At 
the same time, the British Academy’s Oriental Documents Committee tasked 
me with preparing a text edition (Carey 1980; Carey and Hoadley 2000) of all 
the documents of a non-literary nature collected by the scholar-administrator 
John Crawfurd, and his close associates in the British administration of Java 
(1811-1816), Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Stamford Raffles (in office 1811-1816) 
and Colonel Colin Mackenzie, surveyor-general of Madras and chief engineer 
officer to the British invasion force. These documents derived in the main from 
the plundered archive of Yogyakarta (Chapter VIII). This allowed me to meet 
two of Professor Meilink-Roelofsz’s conditions: namely, the publication of the 
Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara (Carey 1981a), and the elucidation of 
the social and economic background to the Java War (Carey 1986, 1997). I still 
struggled, however, to meet Professor Meilink-Roelofsz’s third and perhaps 
most important condition: namely, to recast the whole work in a more readily 
accessible format with shorter chapters and greater thematic coherence. This 
daunted me for the best part of twenty-five years from the early 1980s. During 
that time, I was also involved in researching and publishing on a much more 
present-day concern, namely, the Indonesian occupation (1975-1999) of the for-
mer Portuguese colony of East Timor (now the Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste). It has only been since Timor-Leste’s independence in 2002, and in par-
ticular during a recent six-month period of sabbatical leave (2006), that I have 
been able to give my undivided attention to recasting and rewriting my origi-
nal thesis for the purposes of the present publication. Although a considerable 
amount of new material has been added and the format and chapter headings 
of the present volume differ considerably from that of my 1975 Oxford disser-
tation, I have not had the opportunity to conduct sustained research on the pe-
riod of the Java War itself. There are literally thousands of letters in the General 
State Archives in The Hague which deal with the conduct of the war, some of 
which contain important Javanese material. The private collection of the former 
Dutch commander, Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock (1779-1845), 
alone could be the basis for a new study of the conflict, as could the numerous 
Javanese and Malay letters in the De Renesse-Breidbach family archive in the 
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Algemeen Rijksarchief in Brussels, which contains most of the correspondence 
of Burggraaf L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies during his period as commissioner-
general of the Netherlands-Indies (1826-1830) (De Prins 2002:262). The French 
historian Henri Chambert-Loir’s work on the 600-page war diary of Du Bus’ 
fellow Belgian, Comte Édouard Errembault de Dudzeele (1789-1830), has also 
opened up a new and highly personal insight into the life of an infantry captain 
on the Dutch side during the war (Chambert-Loir 2000:267-300). Since fully 
two-thirds of Dipanagara’s own published auto biography is devoted to the war 
years (Rusche 1908-09), there is clearly scope for a new analysis of this crucial 
colonial conflict which could draw on both Dutch and Javanese sources. But I 
am not a military historian and my focus has remained throughout on the po-
litical and economic history of pre-1825 Yogyakarta as well as on Dipanagara’s 
own life history until his death in exile in Makassar in January 1855. Louw 
and De Klerck’s magnum opus together with the numerous books on the Java 
War in Dutch as well as Djamhari’s recent Indonesian publication (Djamhari 
2003), all make the five years of the war the most extensively researched period 
of the prince’s life. It thus seemed otiose to attempt a new survey of such a 
comparatively well studied topic. But I recognise that some readers may still 
consider a study of Dipanagara without a detailed chapter on the Java War as 
a bit like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. If so, then there will clearly 
be scope either for a second volume or an updated and revised second edition 
of this work in which greater space is given to the war itself. A new study will 
also need to be made of the original pégon manuscript of Dipanagara’s autobi-
ographical babad in the A.B. Cohen Stuart collection in the Musium Nasional in 
Jakarta (Carey 1981a:xxv, lix-lx note 76).
Another consideration for not embarking on new research at this stage has 
been the need to get this book out in time for the 2008 Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE). This UK Government Higher Education Funding Council 
body grades every Faculty in the country every seven years according to 
their publication record and research output. At the last RAE in 2001 Oxford 
History Faculty famously scored only a 5, compared to its much smaller for-
mer polytechnic rival, Oxford Brookes, which achieved a coveted 5*. Since 
there is a 31 December 2007 cut-off point for the next RAE, I have been un-
der considerable pressure to complete on time. In a sense, the RAE assessors 
should be recognised as the immediate inceptors of this publication and I 
owe them thanks, as well as my RAE adviser in the History Faculty, Professor 
Richard Carwardine, and the Faculty chairman, Dr Christopher Haigh, for 
forcing me to see a long-delayed research project through to the publication 
stage. But I must also acknowledge here many other even more important 
debts. First and foremost to the KITLV Press, in the person of its principal 
commissioning editor for the ‘Verhandelingen’ series, Dr Harry Poeze, for 
having stood by me all these years and kept the opportunity for publication 
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open. Wat in het vat zit, verzuurt niet (‘what sits in the vat, never goes sour’) 
was his own pithy comment when he learnt that after twenty-five years of 
constant postponement, I might at last be serious about getting something 
into print. I would also like to thank the marvellous editorial team of the 
KITLV Press, Kees Waterman, Bregtje Knaap, Marjan Groen, and Dan Vennix, 
who saw a monstrous manuscript into print.
Second, I am grateful to Professor Merle Ricklefs, now of the National 
University of Singapore, for having acted as my informal supervisor when 
my thesis was first written in 1974-1975, and then having continued to in-
spire me with his remarkable flow of works on the history of seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century Java, most recently on the process of Islamisation since 
the fourteenth century (Ricklefs 2006). Third, I owe a considerable obligation 
to the late Kangjeng Radèn Tumenggung Puspaningrat, sometime wedana of 
Bantul, who undertook all the preliminary transliterations of the Javanese do-
cuments and chronicles which I have used for my work. It was also thanks to 
Pak Puspaningrat that I was put in touch with Pak Sastrasuganda of Daengan 
Lor in Yogyakarta who transliterated all the Javanese texts in pégon script. 
These included the two volumes of Dipanagara’s Makassar manuscripts dea-
ling with the history of Java and Javanese legends and his own disquisitions 
on Islam, as well as the proclamation from Kyai Iman Sampurna which I dis-
cuss in Chapter IX. Such relationships between Western scholars and Javanese 
scribe-informants have not always been a happy one: in the days of Raffles 
and Crawfurd and the subsequent ‘high colonial’ period in Java (1830-1942), it 
was often downright exploitative. I trust that it has not been so in this case.
In Leiden, I was privileged to receive help and encouragement from a 
distinguished older generation of Dutch scholars of Java, amongst them 
Professor C.C. Berg†, Dr Th.G.Th. Pigeaud†, Professor G.W.J. Drewes†, Dr 
H.J. de Graaf†, Dr B.J. Boland†, Rob Nieuwenhuys†, and Dr J. Noorduyn†, as 
well as those who have only recently retired such as Professor Cees Fasseur, or 
are currently in post such as Professor Leonard Blussé, Dr Dick van der Meij 
(Leiden University/Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta), 
and Professor Vincent Houben (now of the Humboldt University of Berlin). 
Besides having the thankless task of reading through my original manuscript, 
Professor Meilink-Roelofsz was also quite extraordinarily helpful as head of 
the Tweede Afdeeling of the Algemeen Rijksarchief (now Nationaal Archief, 
General State Archives) in opening out to me the vast resources of their colo-
nial collections, as were her colleagues Mr M.G.H.A. de Graaf and Francien 
van Anrooij. The bibliographic treasures of the KITLV were made available 
courtesy of Dr E. van Donzel, acting head of the KITLV when I returned from 
my first period of fieldwork in Indonesia in June 1973, and by F.G.P. Jaquet† 
and Dorothée Buur, both of whom greatly extended my knowledge of Dutch 
colonial life and literature. At the same time, the incomparable Javanese ma-
Preface xxi
nuscript holdings of the Universiteits Bibliotheek in Leiden were facilitated 
through the former adiutor interpretis of the Legatum Warnerianum, Dr R. 
Roolvink† and Mrs E.M.L. Andriessen-Lück†, to both of whom go my sincere 
thanks. In Indonesia in 1971-1973, I was honoured to receive the assistance 
and cooperation of His Royal Highness, the late S.D.I.S. Kangjeng Sultan 
Hamengkubuwana IX, who made available to me the historical resources 
of his court. His Royal Highness Bendara Pangéran Harya Poeroebojo, Drs 
Mudjanattistomo, and Kangjeng Radèn Tumenggung Widyakusuma, all now 
deceased, also enabled me access to certain manuscripts in the Widya Budaya 
(Yogya kraton) library, and in Drs Mudjanattistomo’s case taught me Javanese. 
While in Yogyakarta and Jakarta, I also received important assistance from 
Professor	Stuart	Robson,	Professor	P.J.	Zoetmulder	S.J.†, G.J. (‘Han’) Resink†, 
Professor Sartono Kartodirdjo†, Aji Damais and Dr Onghokham†. 
Professor Oliver Wolters†, Professor Ben Anderson, and Professor George 
McT. Kahin† of Cornell University were the first to open my eyes to the pos-
sibility of becoming an historian of Southeast Asia during an unforgettable 
year spent at Cornell University (1969-1970). It is an honour to be able to 
acknowledge my debt to them here.
My research in England, the Netherlands and Indonesia from 1970-1978 
was made possible by generous support from the aforementioned British 
Academy fellowship, as well as the UK Social Science Research Council and 
the British Council. The Bryce and Arnold Funds of the Modern History 
Faculty at Oxford enabled me to employ the exceedingly talented Dr Soe Tjen 
Marching, a scholar of modern Indonesian literature, as my research assistant 
in transferring all the appendices onto computer-text format, as well as see-
ing that the entire manuscript was read through by an expert copy editor, 
Michael Perrott. Trinity College, Oxford, sustained me as a graduate student 
when I was conducting my initial historical research in the Netherlands and 
Indonesia in 1970-1973, and Magdalen College, Oxford subsequently gave me 
a Prize Fellowship (1974-1979) which supported the writing up of the subse-
quent Jakarta archive materials. The present book was finished in the spacious 
beauty of the Sléibh Bearna mountains in rural East Clare in the former county 
constituency of Ireland’s independence heroes, Daniel O’Connell and Eamon 
de Valera, during the long dry summer of 2006, as good a place as any to con-
template the passing of colonial regimes, the fate of born leaders in changed 
times, and the abiding influence of the past on humanity’s increasingly uncer-
tain future. It is being published exactly 200 years after Marshal Daendels set 
foot in Batavia to begin what Dipanagara had been warned by a disembodied 
voice heard while sleeping at Parangkusuma during his circa 1805 pilgrimage 
to the south coast of Java would mark ‘the beginning of the ruin of the Land of 
Java’ (Chapter IV). That prophecy, whose accuracy would be startlingly fulfil-
led in the following years of Franco-Dutch (1808-1811), British (1811-1816) and 
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post-1816 Dutch rule, has suggested the title of the present volume.
For the encouragement, advice, criticisms and unstinting support of all 
those named above I shall always be grateful. That this preface resembles a 
First World War battlefield in the sheer number of crosses for the deceased 
indicates that a whole generation of scholars, archivists and librarians has 
passed on before they could even be properly thanked for their assistance 
through the presentation of a copy of this volume. I hope I have done justice 
to their memory. Those who read this book should realise that I stand on the 
shoulders of giants. My own shortcomings, particularly in the field of mili-
tary history, remain all too obvious. For these I beg your indulgence. Nuwun 
pangapunten gunging pangaksami!
Preface to Second Edition 
A bare four months has elapsed since the first edition of this book was laun-
ched at the KITLV in Leiden on 19 December 2007 with a celebratory glass of 
Dipanagara’s favourite South African white Constantia wine. A second edi-
tion then seemed a distant prospect. A volume of 964 pages on Indonesia’s 
national hero hardly seemed destined to be a bestseller. Yet so it has proved. 
Unfortunately, time has not permitted a detailed revision of the text be-
yond correcting some infelicities of style, adding a few more cross-references 
and replacing two of the maps (xxvi-xxx) and one of the illustrations (Plate 
31). Two reviewers, Roy Jordaan and Amrit Gomperts, kindly suggested 
some small improvements. Cornelis P. Briët, sometime judge of the Joint High 
Court of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, now researching a 
history of the Supreme Court of the Dutch East Indies (1819-1849) and of the 
Rijck van Prehn affair (1819), also shared with me his impressive knowledge 
of the genealogical and family histories of early nineteenth-century VOC and 
Dutch East Indies personnel. The corrections in this second edition to the 
dates and names of these officials owe much to his expert guidance. Readers 
who would like to know more about the protracted genesis of the present 
book and my original interest in its stormy petrel protagonist can read an 
interview in Itinerario, the Bulletin of the Leiden Centre for the History of 
European Expansion, conducted by Leonard Blussé at the time of the original 
book launch (Itinerario 2008:7-18). This adds some personal details to what I 
outlined briefly in the preface to the first edition.  
I wish to place on record once again my continuing appreciation for the 
support of the KITLV Press director, Harry Poeze, and his brilliant editorial 
team, in particular Kees Waterman and Dan Vennix. 
Matur nuwun sèwu!
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chapter i
the south-central Javanese world
circa 1792-1825
The ‘Versailles of Java’: Yogya in the early nineteenth century
Willem van Hogendorp (1795-1838), a Leiden trained lawyer and eldest son 
of Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp, was a member of Commissioner-General 
Du Bus de Gisignies’ inner cabinet and served as his right-hand man (De 
Prins 2002:112-3). On a visit to Yogyakarta in 1828 after nearly three years of 
warfare had laid waste many of its finest buildings, he wrote: ‘Sala [Surakarta] 
had already made an unusual impression on me, but Djocja [Yogyakarta] in 
its glory must have been the Versailles of Java. Not a tenth of it remains, but 
[what it once was] is visible from the massive stone ruins’.1 
In the view of a mid-nineteenth century Dutch Resident of Yogya, the sul-
tan’s capital had reached its apogee in about 1820, some five years before the 
outbreak of the Java War (1825-1830):
Then Yogya was prosperous, rich and beautiful, the land fertile and fortunate, the 
capital clean and handsome, boasting many beautiful buildings, fine gardens and 
magnificent hunting lodges. Everywhere there was an abundance of food and 
water. Then trade, handicrafts and production flourished. Then the Javanese [of 
Yogyakarta] had pride in the place of [their] birth.2
Although this mid-nineteenth century official was about ten years too late 
in dating the sultanate’s zenith given the events of 1811-1812 (Chapter VII), 
it is true that as a city pre-1825 Yogya was almost unique in Java at this time 
because nearly a quarter of its buildings were constructed of stone brought 
1 Van Hogendorp 1913:174. Many of the Yogya princes and high officials had destroyed their 
residences before going over to join Dipanagara in July-August 1825, Carey 1981a:291 note 233, 
1988:56, 105 note 95.
2 Dj. Br.19¹, A.H.W. Baron de Kock, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 17-5-1851. On Albert Hendrik 
Wendelin de Kock (1808-1891), who was a son of the Dutch army commander during the Java 
War, Hendrik Merkus de Kock (1779-1845), see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:291 note 2; 
Genealogie De Kock 1996-97:22-3.
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Plate 1. View of the Yogyakarta kraton from the northern square (alun-alun) 
sketched by A. de Nelly, one of Johannes Rach’s pupils, in circa 1771. 
Courtesy of the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
from the limestone quarries at Gamping to the west of the town.3 Even 
Dipanagara’s country residence at Tegalreja was built in this fashion much 
to the wonderment of a post-Java War Dutch visitor.4 Even those houses 
built of bamboo and wood were kept whitewashed and clean, often being 
surrounded by low stone walls enclosing a yard with fruit trees and shrubs.5 
Another perceptive traveller and high Dutch government official, Jan Izaäk 
van Sevenhoven, also commented on the cleanliness and orderliness of the 
place on a visit in 1812. At that time, the main avenue leading to the kraton 
was lined with tall and shady banyan trees with the residences of the princes 
and court officials as well as the dwellings of the ordinary Javanese inhabit-
ants being set back at some distance on either side of the road. Further down 
the avenue was a row of Chinese shop-houses which to the west gave onto 
3 On the limestone quarries and ovens at Gamping which were run by Chinese workers and 
produced some 600 pikul (1 pikul = 61.761 kgs) a month in 1820, see Carey 1981a:238 note 21. 
The control of these quarries and their Chinese labour force would become one of the casus belli 
between Dipanagara and his opponents in the Yogya court in July 1825, see Chapter IX. 
4 See Chapter II.
5 Nahuys van Burgst 1852:135; KITLV H 503, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen 
gehouden op eene reis over Java van Batavia naar de Oosthoek in […] 1812’ (ed. F. de Haan), 6-
4-1812 – 2-8-1812 (henceforth: Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’), 107, noted that the only other 
towns in Java with a large proportion of stone houses were Batavia and Gresik.
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the site of the spacious residency house, seat of the senior Dutch representa-
tive in the sultan’s capital, fronted by an ornamental garden and three large 
ponds. Immediately opposite stood the fort, Vredenburg,6 completed in 1795 
with cannon mounted on its four triangular bastions, the whole giving an 
impressive appearance. In the thoroughfares around the fort, there were also 
tall banyan trees in whose shade the main market of the city was held.7 
Less impressive, according to Van Sevenhoven, were the Chinese and 
European quarters behind the fort where the narrow houses, shut off from 
the street by very tall brick walls, seemed jumbled on top of each other, 
the streets outside small and dirty. The Indo-European burgers (‘citizens’) 
domiciled there appeared to live very poorly, eking out a bare existence from 
money-lending and petty retail trade.8 At the same time, the local Chinese 
inhabitants, who engaged mainly in money-lending and petty trade, were, in 
Van Sevenhoven’s view, neither as numerous nor so well established as their 
compatriots in Surakarta.9 The situation in the European and Chinese quar-
ters thus formed something of a contrast with the Javanese urban settlements 
(kampung), each clustered around the residence of one of the Yogya princes or 
senior court officials, which were intersected by broad shady roads and had 
large squares planted with trees. Each kampung formed a community in its 
own right, often having its own mosque and being surrounded by a low stone 
boundary wall.10 The Javanese inhabitants of Yogya, in Van Sevenhoven’s esti-
mation, were cleaner, better clothed and had much more sense of their own 
worth than the inhabitants of the rival court city of Surakarta.11 There were 
also fewer bands of ‘shabby idlers and beggars whiling away their time in 
games of chance or at roadside food stalls’, a situation the Dutchman ascribed 
to the better police force in the sultan’s capital,12 an explanation we will have 
occasion to reconsider later in this chapter.
6 Sometimes referred to in contemporary accounts as ’Rustenburg’.
7 Lettres de Java 1822:100; Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 105-10. The market is now 
called Pasar Beringhardjo (‘Prosperous Waringin Market’). On the completion of the buildings in 
the Dutch fort in 1795, AvJ, Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten 
(Semarang), 4-3-1795.
8 Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 110; Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to President 
Hooge Raad van Justitie (Batavia), 7-4-1823, mentioned that the value of the 70 houses in the 
European quarter ranged from f 4,000 to f 220. The number of ‘European’ males over the age of 
16 in Yogya in 1819 was 102, MvK 3124, ‘Register van het Europese personeel op Java en Madoera 
(Djokjokarta)’, 1-1-1819.
9 According to Van Sevenhoven, there were only two or three Chinese houses worth f 1,500, 
the rest were small shop-houses of very simple construction, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 
110. In 1808, there were 758 Chinese males over the age of 14 in the sultan’s capital compared to 
1,282 in Surakarta, Carey 1984a:16.
10 Raffles 1817, I:83; Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 110.
11 Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 110.
12 Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 116. For a contemporary description of Surakarta in 
circa 1812, Mack.Pr. 86(1), Colonel Alexander Adams, ‘Some observations respecting Souracarta’ 
(henceforth: Adams, ‘Souracarta’), 1812, 63-73.
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The Yogya kraton itself stretched across the southern boundary of the 
northern maidan (alun-alun), an open field some 1,200 metres wide which had 
been cleared on the first sultan’s orders but which had since been encroached 
upon by European and Chinese houses to the north and east.13 The fenced 
banyan and other trees near the paséban or meeting place for the Yogya officials 
outside the kraton, were well maintained and carefully trimmed by the court 
coolies. The whole approach formed a marked contrast to that of Surakarta 
which appeared ‘extremely messy and neglected’.14 The great fortified wall of 
the kraton with its extending buttresses (pojok baluwerti; Carey 1992:399 note 
4a, 400 note 6) dominated the approach from the north. Encircling the entire 
area of the court, it contained within its girth the numerous dwellings of the 
sultan’s retainers (abdi-dalem) and the members of his bodyguard regiments, 
whose houses formed a veritable city in miniature clustered around the court 
pavilions. This was the nagari, the royal capital proper, impressive even to the 
supremely confident British Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Stamford Raffles 
(in office 1811-1816) who wrote (Raffles 1817, I:84): 
The circumference of the wall of the kraton of Yúgya-kérta [Yogyakarta] is not less 
than three miles, and it was estimated that at the time of the [British] assault in 
[June] 1812, it did not contain fewer than from ten to fifteen thousand people. That 
of Súra-kérta [Surakarta] is neither so extensive nor so well built. 
Close by the kraton to the west, stood the great Taman Sari (Water Palace) 
complex, which had been built supposedly by Portuguese architects during 
the reign of the first sultan (1749-1792) for religious and military purposes 
(Dumarçay 1978:589-623). Although its structure was fast falling into decay 
as a result of earthquakes during the first decade of the nineteenth century, its 
massive walls and secret passageways still afforded many natural defensive 
positions in case of attack.15 Prior to the British assault in June 1812, the sul-
tan’s armaments foundry was situated in its grounds (Thorn 1815:185, Plate 
XIX no. S; see p. 334 Map 5).
13 AvJ, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia), 24-4-1823.
14 Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 110.
15 Ricklefs 1974a:84-6; D’Almeida 1864, II:128-32. A serious earthquake caused by the erup-
tion of Gunung Guntur in west Java on 7 September 1803 damaged the Taman Sari’s foundations 
draining the water from the ponds, although Hamengkubuwana II again went boating there on 
9 November 1803, Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 
8-9-1803, 9-11-1803. A further earthquake struck on 19 March 1806 which destroyed much of the 
Yogya fort, IOL Mack.Pr. 2, ‘Surakarta Sengkala list’, entry for 28 Besar AJ 1732; vAE (aanwinsten 
1900) 235, Nicolaus Engelhard, ‘Speculatieve Memorie over zaken betreffende het bestuur over 
Java’s N.O. Kust’ (henceforth: N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’), 14-5-1808. Another earthquake dam-
aged the fort at Klathèn on 28 February 1808, so it is possible that this might have had similar 
effects in Yogya a mere 30 kilometres away, Dj.Br. Lieutenants Schraag and Detelle (Klathèn) to 
Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta), 1-3-1808. It was not used after 20 June 1812, when British cannon 
fire damaged its superstructure, Thorn 1815:292. By the time Willem van Hogendorp visited in 
1828, it was infested with thousands of bats, Van Hogendorp 1913:175.
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The Yogya military establishment
The architecture of many of the principle buildings of Yogyakarta underlined 
the military spirit which animated the sultan’s court and administration, 
itself the outcome of the fashion in which the first sultan had secured his 
kingdom by conquest (Van Hogendorp 1913:141). Although in Raffles’s view, 
this military spirit had been gradually subsiding between the end of the mid-
eighteenth-century wars of succession and the British interregnum (Raffles 
1817, I:84-5), the court establishment in Yogya in the first decade of the nine-
teenth century was still overwhelmingly military in character. In 1808, for 
example, the second sultan had at his disposal some sixteen kraton regiments 
numbering 1,765 men, of whom 976 were armed with muskets and the rest 
with pikes. These regiments formed the personal bodyguard of the ruler and 
were salaried in land and domiciled in the immediate proximity of the court. 
Some of the members of these elite companies were Balinese or Bugis soldiers 
of fortune who had taken service with the Yogya ruler.16 The sultan also had 
an entourage of female soldiers, a sort of Amazon corps of about 300 women, 
known as the prajurit keparak èstri, who were drawn from the daughters of 
prominent officials or village gentry families. They were armed with spears 
and were agile on horseback.17 
By the early nineteenth century, many of the functions of these bodyguard 
regiments were of a ceremonial nature, but they could still take to the field 
as witnessed during the expedition against Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III in 
November-December 1810,18 and the defence of the kraton against the British 
in June 1812.19 Apart from these elite bodyguard troops, the sultan could 
also call on a quasi-feudal levy of 7,246 men from the princes of the blood, 
in particular his heir apparent (Pangéran Adipati Anom), who had apanages 
or land given in fief in the core districts (nagara agung) close to the court. A 
further 2,126 men were provided by the district administrators (bupati) from 
the eastern outlying districts (mancanagara). Until June 1812, when many of 
these areas were annexed by the British, the sultan could also use these lev-
ies for construction work on various court buildings and fortifications when 
the eastern mancanagara administrators came to the royal capital to celebrate 
the major Javanese-Islamic festival of The Prophet’s Birthday – known as the 
16 The entire Yogya military establishment in 1808 is listed in dK 145, Matthijs Waterloo, 
‘Memorie […] van het Hof van Djocjocarta […] aan zijn Successeur […] P. Engelhard’(henceforth: 
Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’), 4-4-1808. Two of the court regiments, the daëng Secadipura and 
the Bugis with 106 and 40 men apiece, were recruited from South Sulawesi (Bugis, Makassarese), 
whereas the Blambangan sepuh and panakawan Blambangan, both with 100 men each, were recruit-
ed from Bali and the Oosthoek. See further Remmelink 1994:20.
17 Thorn 1815:293; Carey 1992:413 note 73. See also Chapter II note 29.
18 See Chapter VI.
19 See Chapter VII.
Plate 2. Lithograph of a member of the sultan of Yogyakarta’s bodyguard in the early 
nineteenth-century. Taken from J.J.X. Pfyffer zu Neueck, 1829: Plate IX. 
Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
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Garebeg Mulud – to pay their annual land-rent (Carey 1986:71-2; Houben 
1994:52 note 9; Remmelink 1994:17).
In cases of military emergency, the sultan could thus muster a force of 
about 10,000 men within a short space of time to guard the kraton and take part 
in offensive operations. Some of these troops were undoubtedly of limited 
military value, but Raffles commented favourably on the quality of the body-
guard regiments and levies which were mustered to provide an honour guard 
for his official entrance into the capital on 27 December 1811 (p. 309):
The roads and streets were lined with about ten thousand armed men of various 
descriptions, mostly cavalry, dressed and accoutred according to the fashion of the 
country, but by no means making as a body that despicable appearance which I 
had been led to encounter.20
Although most of the troops were mounted and some carried muskets, cav-
alry carbines and other firearms, the most effective armaments were the more 
traditional Javanese weapons such as pikes, slings and stabbing daggers or 
kris with intricate meteorite metal inlays. The majority of the muskets used 
by both Javanese and European soldiers in Java at this time were antiquated 
flintlock models dating from the mid-eighteenth century which were difficult 
to load, susceptible to damp conditions, and usually jammed after a number 
of rounds (Chapter XI, note 7). Contemporaries noticed that Javanese soldiers 
were not skilled in musket drill but were far more dexterous in the handling 
of their long Javanese pikes. During engagements with European troops, 
especially cavalry, Javanese pikemen operating in disciplined formation were 
often found to have a distinct military advantage over their European adver-
saries. They could sometimes dismount their assailants and engage them in 
hand-to-hand conflict before the latter had had time to reload their small cav-
alry carbines.21 Slingers were also reasonably accurate at short range and they 
were used to good effect against the British in June 1812 (Raffles 1817, I:295; 
Carey 1992:406 note 34a) and the Dutch during the Java War (Van der Kemp 
1896a:405). At the same time, the kris culture of the central Javanese courts 
had been carried to such a sophisticated art by the early nineteenth century 
that Javanese smiths (empu) could forge a wide range of stabbing and cutting 
blades for use in every exigency of hand-to-hand combat.22 
20 BL Add MS 45272, T.S. Raffles (Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-1812.
21 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:228, II:380; Carey 1992:406 note 34a, 427 note 138. The 
Javanese dexterity with pikes is also mentioned in Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to 
H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 2-6-1808. For a less favourable view, Crawfurd 1971:409 sub: ‘spear’. 
See further p. 333. See also Remmelink 1994:19 on the Javanese lack of skill with muskets.
22 Tanojo 1938:1-20. On Dipanagara’s heirloom (pusaka) kris and other weapons, see Appendix 
XI.
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Artillery was also known and used by the Javanese; prior to the fall of 
the Yogya kraton in June 1812, the second sultan had cast iron and brass 
cannon, probably at the royal foundry at Taman Sari, and at Kutha Gedhé 
where gunpowder and small shot were manufactured during the Java War. 
Light cannon of Javanese manufacture known as kalantaka, about the size 
of a half-pounder, were occasionally used by the sultan’s troops on military 
expeditions.23 Heavier brass cannon were imported from Gresik in east Java 
where there was a thriving armaments industry supervised by the local Arab 
and Chinese communities who could draw on traditional skills in the field of 
ballistics.24 Large numbers of cannon were later captured by the British from 
the battlements of the Yogya kraton in June 1812, but it seems that during 
the British assault itself the sultan’s gunners were not effective in the use of 
their artillery pieces and some of the guns disintegrated when fired (Carey 
1992:206-7, 400 note 8). This suggests that many of the sultan’s heavier can-
non were acquired as much for ceremonial as for battlefield use (Ricklefs 
1974a:304; Crucq 1938:78:93-110, 1940:80:49-59).
The landed base of the military establishment
The basis for the upkeep of this large military establishment was the tribute 
and corvée services produced by the agricultural population. Some of the 
income from the lands administered directly by the sultan (bumi pamajegan-
dalem) in the core regions was used to maintain and equip his personal 
bodyguard. At the same time, the grants of land made to the sultan’s family 
and officials specifically stipulated that armed levies were to be produced 
whenever the sultan required them (Raffles 1817, I:294; Carey 1986:67-70). 
This essentially military foundation of the central Javanese apanage system 
can be discerned in the ancient official titles of the district officials, panèwu, 
panatus, panèket, penglawé, namely chiefs of 1000, 100, 50 and 25, titles which 
referred not so much to units of land but to equivalent numbers of armed 
men (Carey 1986:67). Even some of the older names for the districts and bupati 
of south-central Java, such as ‘land of the pikes’ (tanah sulastri) for Bagelèn, 
23 Raffles 1817, I:296; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:283 note 1; Poensen 1905:158; Gericke 
and Roorda 1901, I:485. For references to Kutha Gedhé as an armaments centre during the Java 
War, BD (Manado) III:276, XXIX:42; UBL BPL 616 Port. 12 no. 8, ‘Verklaring van Radèn Mas 
Machmoed, een gevangen muiter’, 1-8-1829. On the capture of kalantaka from Radèn Rongga 
Prawiradirja III’s residence at Maospati in December 1810, Dj.Br. 46, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus 
(Madiun) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 7-12-1810; and on the stationing of cannon in Rawa 
by Hamengkubuwana II in 1826, Dj.Br. 6, ‘Vergadering bij den raad uitmakende het bestuur over 
het rijk van Djocjocarta’, 23-12-1826.
24 Stockdale 1812:383, 387; Raffles 1817, I:296, 471; Gomperts and Carey 1994:16, 25. Purchases 
of cannon and saltpetre from Gresik by Hamengkubuwana II are mentioned in UBL BPL 616 Port. 
3 no. 1, W.H. van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to Anthonius Schwenke (Gresik), 10-12-1792, 22-1-1793.
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Arung Binang (‘lord of the red pikes’), and Sawunggaling (‘the golden fight-
ing cock’) for its local bupati, underscored the original military character of 
the Mataram polity (Rouffaer 1905:610 note 1, 620; Ricklefs 1974a:423 note 1; 
Carey 1992:93). So too did the tumbak (lance length) name for the one rood 
(1,210 square yard) land measurement in the Principalities, supposedly 
derived from the fifteenth-century kingdom of Demak (Rouffaer 1905:617). 
By the early nineteenth century this military basis had been somewhat 
modified and martial exigencies no longer loomed so large. The term cacah, 
for example, had come to refer more to the numbers of cultivators or their 
families – usually reckoned as comprising five active members – who could be 
maintained on a particular plot of irrigated rice-land, rather than to the number 
of armed men that area could sustain. It was thus no longer so much a military 
term as a unit of economic measurement.25 But the princes of the blood (putra 
sentana), high Javanese nobility and the sultan’s senior officials, literally the 
‘younger brothers’ (para yayi) of the ruler, who were often linked to him by ties 
of marriage and blood, were still required to parade with their troops on impor-
tant ceremonies such as the Garebeg, the thrice-yearly Javanese-Islamic feasts, 
and to take part in major military exercises and reviews. One such was held 
at the royal retreat at Rajawinangun (Arjawinangun) to the east of Yogya on 1 
June 1808 in which the young Dipanagara (then Radèn Antawirya) participated 
(pp. 179-80). This involved over 5,000 men including troop detachments from 
the eastern outlying districts and was held as a response to Daendels’ military 
manoeuvres in central Java aimed at strengthening the island’s defences against 
the British.26 Later, during the Java War (1825-1830), Dipanagara was able to 
make use of some of these levies, brought over by the princes and officials who 
rallied to his cause, in his struggle against the Dutch and what he termed their 
‘apostate’ local supporters. Thus the original military character of the central 
Javanese apanage persisted until 1830 when the annexations and reforms of the 
post-Java War period dismantled it for good (Houben 1994:17-69).
The royal apanage system
According to the Javanese concept of sovereignty derived from Java’s Hindu-
Buddhist past, the ruler was the overlord of all the land in his kingdom. But 
this right was delegated by him to his officials and family members in order 
that they could support themselves together with their household, retainers, 
subordinate officials and assorted hangers-on. The apanage or ‘seat’ (lungguh) 
varied in size according to the seniority of the official or his relationship to the 
25 Rouffaer 1905:617-8; Kāno 1977:22 note 43; Carey 1986:68; UBL BPL 616 Port. 22 no. 4, H.G. 
Nahuys van Burgst, ‘De Montjonegorosche-Djocjokartasche landen’, n.y. (? 1826).
26 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 2-6-1808.
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ruler. Quasi-hereditary rights to certain apanages were sometimes admitted 
in the case of close family members or of trusted officials who were linked to 
the sultan by ties of marriage. They were also accorded to scions of eminent 
‘spiritual’ dynasties such as the Sérang family in north-central Java, who sup-
posedly traced their lineage back to the famous apostle of Islam (wali) Sunan 
Kalijaga and who would become strong supporters of Dipanagara during the 
Java War.27 
But officials, however senior and well-favoured in terms of marriage alli-
ances with the ruler, were liable to lose their landholdings and their means of 
family support when they were dismissed from office. This happened with 
Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura, a favourite of the second sultan who was 
appointed as a nayaka, senior official in charge of the court administration, in 
1797, whose landholdings were completely broken up when he was dismissed 
from office in December 1810 for illegal currency deals and trading in opium 
during the military expedition against Radèn Rongga in Madiun (Carey 
1980:189-90). Similarly the dependants of Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma, 
another nayaka and a member of the prominent Danurejan family, were 
reduced to penury after his murder on the sultan’s orders in January 1812. 
The fact that Danukusuma’s wife was a daughter of the first sultan and well 
connected in Javanese-Islamic circles afforded them no protection.28 
The precariousness of office holders and their utter dependence on the rul-
er’s favour can be seen in the Javanese words – gadhuhan (‘a temporary [land] 
grant’), anggadhuhi (‘to loan provisionally’), and anggadhuhaké (‘to give as a pro-
visional grant’) – which were written into their official letters of appointment 
(Carey 1986:74). In the central apanage regions, the Javanese landed system 
was thus firmly subordinated to the requirements of the royal administration 
and never acquired the character of a contractual relationship between ruler 
and ruled such as could be found in Tokugawa Japan (1603-1867), still less the 
status of private property which had begun to develop in Europe since the 
fifteenth century (Neale 1981:91). At the most, it was a classic usufruct system 
which allowed officials rights of appropriation of produce (Hall and Whitmore 
1976:222) without the prospect of allowing them to acquire full-blown ‘feudal’ 
tenure such as had grown up in medieval Europe where prominent families 
held ‘fiefs’ on behalf of the ruler (Rouffaer 1905:621; Carey 1986:74). The only 
possible area where such a ‘feudal’ system operated in early-nineteenth-cen-
tury Java was in the eastern outlying districts to which we shall come shortly.
The apanages granted to the sultan’s blood relations and his senior offi-
cials were all in the core districts which were governed directly from Yogya. 
27 See Chapter VI and Chapter XI.
28 Rouffaer 1905:619; Carey 1992:489 note 424; Carey and Hoadley 2000:144-5, 155-6. See fur-
ther Chapter III on Dipanagara’s links with this family, especially R.T. Danukusuma’s widow, 
Radèn Ayu Danukusuma, a daughter of Hamengkubuwana I. See further Remmelink 1994:25-7.
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In the early nineteenth century, these districts included parts of the provinces 
of Banyumas,29 Bagelèn, Kedhu, Mataram, Pajang, Sokawati and Gunung 
Kidul (Rouffaer 1905:589-92), areas which had come under early seventeenth-
century Mataram’s control by treaty arrangements and marriage diplomacy 
in contrast to the eastern outlying districts which had been largely acquired 
by military conquest (De Graaf and Pigeaud 1974:116; Carey 1992:93-4). The 
apanages granted in these core areas were never contiguous but were spread 
out over a wide area. John Crawfurd, the Resident who served in the sultan’s 
capital throughout most of the British interregnum (1811-1816), remarked 
that it was common for a senior court administrator holding over 1,000 cacah 
(units of land cultivated by productive peasant families), to have as few as 
twelve cacah grouped together and the rest scattered in small pieces over a 
distance of 200 miles.30 Dipanagara’s 700 jung31 granted to him in July 1812 
when he received his princely title (Carey 1992:284, 442 note 211), spanned 
the western and south-central Javanese districts of Banyumas, Bagelèn, 
Kedhu, and Sokawati, as well as core areas to the south of Yogya in the vicin-
ity of Bantul (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:745; Carey 1981a:238 note 20). 
Even Pangéran Natakusuma (post-22 June 1812, Pangéran Adipati Pakualam 
I), who was accorded 4,000 cacah of hereditary tenure by the third sultan 
under orders from the British, found that his holdings were parcelled up 
between Bagelèn and Mataram with many being situated in infertile, marshy 
or inaccessible areas. Only at the end of the Java War, following the 1830-1831 
revision of the boundaries of the Principalities, were the Pakualaman land-
holdings grouped together in the Adikarta area of southern Kulon Praga.32
One of the main reasons for this highly dispersed nature of apanage 
allocation in the central districts was to prevent a prince of the blood or 
influential high-ranking official from establishing a power base from which 
he could challenge the position of the ruler. Indeed, all those holding lands 
in the core areas, including the central area bupati, were required to reside in 
29 Banyumas refers here to the post-1830 district of that name: the older and much smaller 
area of Banyumas proper around the district capital was under Surakarta administration in this 
period and was the seat of the chief administrator (bupati wedana) of the Surakarta western man-
canagara regions until 1773, Rouffaer 1905:591.
30 Carey 1986:74-5; IOL Mack.Pr. 21 pt. 7, John Crawfurd, ‘Remarks on the nature and con-
dition of the landed tenures of the native government of Java with some suggestions for the 
improvement of the land revenue in the territories of the European power’, 17-5-1813 (hence-
forth: Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’), 234.
31 Land measurement usually reckoned at 600 square feet of irrigated sawah (ricefields) but 
variable according to the quality and productivity of the land. Other sources give Dipanagara’s 
land grant in July 1812 as 500 cacah, see Chapter VIII.
32 Rouffaer 1905:593-4; Carey 1992:458 note 286, 458-9 note 288, 483 note 397; Houben 
1994:65; GKA, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, ‘Verbaal van de verrigtingen van Commissarissen 
te Djokjokarta en aanteekeningen gehouden in de comparative ter zake hunne commissie met 
onderscheidene personen’ (henceforth: ‘geheim verbaal’), interview with Pakualam II, 24-4-1830. 
On the drainage problems in Adikarta, see note 109.
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the capital where they could be supervised by the ever suspicious monarch.33 
The only exceptions to this rule were the eastern outlying bupati, who were 
given contiguous areas to govern and allowed to reside in their kabupatèn for 
two-thirds of the year (Carey 1986:71-2). But even these officials were con-
strained to journey to the sultan’s court once a year on the occasion of The 
Prophet’s birthday to pay the yearly tribute in cash and kind which were due 
from their districts. As we will see in more detail at the end of this chapter, 
they were also required to bring a sizeable labour force with them to work 
on royal building projects in the royal capital and its environs, for three or 
four months, a period which under the second sultan was nearly doubled 
(Onghokham 1975:44; Carey 1986:71 note 43). On these occasions, the eastern 
bupati were entirely dependant on the sultan’s favour and could be relieved 
of their office if their labour force deserted. Many were also heavily in debt to 
the ruler, another way in which the sultan kept them under control.34 
The rather unique position of the administrators of the eastern districts 
owed something to the historical rivalry between the kingdoms of east Java 
(especially Surabaya) and Mataram in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries (Carey 1992:93-4; Ricklefs 1993a:41-2). At the same time, the sheer 
distance between Yogya and Madiun, separated as they were by nearly 200 
kilometres of difficult terrain with execrable dirt roads which turned to mud in 
the rainy season (Milaan 1942:205-39; Schrieke 1957, II:105-11), gave the east-
ern bupati, especially the chief administrator of the eastern outlying districts 
at his administrative centre of Madiun, a certain feeling of independence. Cut 
off from the sultan’s capital by the towering bulk of Mount Lawu, the tiger-
infested forests of east Java35 and the broad expanse of the Sala River valley, 
the influential bupati families in these sparsely populated regions developed 
a strong sense of local identity even though they hailed originally from other 
regions. None more so than the family of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (in 
office 1796-1810), whose low-born grandfather Mas Rongga Wirasentika, also 
known as the ‘champion’ (gegedhug) of Sokawati, had served as the first sul-
33 Dj.Br. 86, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 8-6-1808, stating that 
the Yogya bupati of Kedhu (also known as Bupati Bumija), Bagelèn, Mataram, Sokawati and 
Pajang, all resided in the sultan’s capital.
34 See Chapter V; and Remmelink 1994:17 for examples from the eighteenth century.
35 On the tiger-infested forests of east Java in early to mid-nineteenth century, Dj.Br. 23, 
Corporal Pieter Gulin (Bunder, Surabaya) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 19-7-1808 (reference 
to travelling for two days without seeing people but many tigers in the forests of Kertasana 
during his investigation of 25-5-1808 attack on the Chinese trading community at Bunder); 
D’Almeida 1864, II:32 (Ngawi and Madiun countryside so full of tigers that often seen by inhab-
itants crossing the road and lapping water from the ditches besides the main highway); KITLV 
H 395, ‘Rapport van de assistent-resident [P.F.H.] Chevallier over de werking der tolpoorten’, 
15-6-1824 (henceforth: Chevallier, ‘Rapport’; reference to Surakarta bupati of Nganjuk being more 
afraid of the Chinese-run tollgates on the main roads than the tigers in the forests through which 
he had to pass in order to get to round these tax-posts). See further pp. 475-8.
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tan’s army commander during the Giyanti War (1746-1755) and had married 
his sister. He had been sent to Madiun to replace an unsatisfactory predeces-
sor deemed too close to the previous Kartasura (post-1745, Surakarta) court, 
and had founded a dynasty whose members would continue to administer 
Madiun until well into the nineteenth century.36 Prophesied as a future ruler 
(Adam 1940:333), the gifted but headstrong third Radèn Rongga, as we will 
see below, would chose to die in rebellion rather than agree to be delivered 
into the murderous hands of Marshal Daendels in November 1810.37
A more basic reason for the scattered nature of the apanage holdings in the 
central districts as opposed to the contiguous character of the administrative 
units in the eastern areas was the nature of the territorial settlement at the 
treaty of Giyanti in 1755. This stipulated that lands and even villages in the 
richer central regions should be divided up in a haphazard fashion between 
the courts of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, a situation which was complicated 
still further by the creation of the Mangkunagaran and Pakualaman semi-
independent Principalities in 1757 and 1812. Just why the Giyanti settlement 
should have been so complicated is not entirely clear. Dipanagara later ascribed 
it to the devious tactics of the kafir Dutch and their ‘divide and rule’ policy.38 
But, according to a Dutch report, it was the first sultan himself who insisted on 
the minute sub-division of land in the core regions, first in order to ensure that 
the most fertile areas were shared equally and secondly to make it impossible 
for the Sunan to plot an invasion of his territory without his prior knowledge 
(Van der Kemp 1896b:545-6). Whatever the reason, the administrative results 
were chaotic. The ‘patchwork quilt’ of landholdings and villages, sometimes 
internally divided between the two courts, created insuperable problems for 
irrigation, agriculture and law enforcement. Rouffaer pointed out some of the 
more serious effects in his famous article on the princely territories, namely, 
the sub-division of ricefields and common lands in the villages, the increase in 
the number of local officials from both courts salaried in land, the heavier tax 
burdens and the aggravation of the security situation in country areas due to 
the multiplication of disputes about land and offices (Rouffaer 1905:624 quot-
ing Nahuys van Burgst 1835, I:205). It is undeniable that the Giyanti settlement 
exacerbated these difficulties by involving the courts in a complex process of 
redrawing village and territorial boundaries in south-central Java: in Bagelèn, 
for example, the local peasantry in the mid-nineteenth century referred to 
Giyanti as the tumpang paruk, the time when everything was ‘heaped together’ 
36 Balé Poestaka 1939:14 sub: ‘Gata’; Adam 1940:331-2. See also Appendix Vb.
37 See Chapter VI.
38 Makassar Notebooks (Sejarah Ratu Tanah Jawa) I:170: iku awitnya rusak ing Tanah Jawa, sabab 
kapir wus mélu masésa sarupané Tanah Jawa, padha sabar iku saparoné ing Tanah Jawa ginadhuh dènatu-
raken pametuné marang kang jumeneng Ratu ing Pajang [Surakarta] lawan Mantaram [Yogyakarta], 
kang saparoné kang jumeneng bumi Jawa iku dènpara padha, rasané kaduwé ing ratu loro. Iku akalé kapir 
laknatullah.
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(Kollmann 1864:354). But there were perhaps some concealed advantages for 
the common man not touched on by Rouffaer.
The most important of these advantages was the very fact that especially after 
Giyanti most of the larger apanage holders resided in the royal capital. They 
thus had less scope for living off the land than they might have done had they 
actually resided on their landholdings. According to Crawfurd, some apanage 
holders never bothered to visit their usufruct lands and others were even igno-
rant of their geographical location.39 Indeed, with landholdings spread out over 
a wide area, the actual process of visiting them at a time when communications 
were so poor, would have been quite an undertaking. Conscientious landlords, 
like Radèn Mas Said (Mangkunagara I, reigned 1757-1795), and his successor 
Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II, reigned 1796-1835) in Surakarta, 
or Dipanagara in Yogya, who took a personal interest in the lands under their 
charge and visited them regularly, were the exception not the rule.40
The role of the tax collectors
Apanage holders domiciled in the kraton towns left the administration of 
their lands to local tax collectors (bekel), who collected the land-rents (pajeg) 
and other levies on their behalf and exercised some judicial authority in their 
name (Carey 1986:75). They were usually responsible for one village or part of 
a village with areas of agricultural land ranging between a half and six jung. 
They were entitled to retain one fifth of the land-rent as well as a portion of 
the other taxes, including the pacumpleng or ground rent tax for houses. They 
also had rights over personal services: it was customary, for example, for bekel 
to take a few villagers with them when they visited the capital in order to 
enhance their own authority and enable them to undertake small tasks for the 
apanage holders when they made the half-yearly tax payments at Mulud and 
Puwasa (Rouffaer 1905:625; Carey 1986:75). On festive occasions celebrated 
by the apanage holder’s family, such as marriages, circumcisions and births, 
the tribute-paying peasant cultivators or sikep – sometimes referred to as kuli 
sikep – were expected to make presents of chickens, eggs, coconuts and other 
farm produce. They also undertook, or delegated their dependant lodgers 
(numpang) to undertake, the above-mentioned personal services for the land-
holder.41 Building materials such as wood, bamboo, rattan and thatch were 
also demanded for the upkeep of the apanage owner’s residences (Raffles 
39 Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 229. See further p. 521 on the Yogya regional bupati’s ignoran ce 
of the lands under their administration; and further Remmelink 1994:26-7 for earlier examples.
40 Pringgodigdo 1950:18 note 2. On Dipanagara’s supervision of his lands, see Chapter II.
41 GKA, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Panembahan 
Mangkubumi, 18-4-1830; interview with Haji Ngisoh [Ngisa], 21-4-1830.
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1817, I:302). It was these fringe benefits, as well as the ‘homage’ of their peas-
ant cultivators, which caused apanage holders to resist accepting money pay-
ments from the courts during the post-1812 period when the British annexa-
tions drastically reduced the area of land available, and to desist from leasing 
their lands to European and Chinese land-renters in the period 1816-1823 
when foreign capital began to flow into the Principalities to fund cash crop 
production of coffee and indigo.42
In Crawfurd’s view, the modicum of authority which the bekel possessed 
was not such as to render their power dangerous or oppressive. It was rather 
in their interests to treat the local cultivators with moderation and consult 
with them over the yearly division of village land or on matters of irriga-
tion.43 On these occasions, the tax-collectors would address the tribute-pay-
ing farmers as ‘comrade’ or ‘colleague’ (kanca). Indeed, their social position 
does not seem to have set them apart from their village neighbours since for 
the most part the bekel were drawn from the tax-paying farmer class or from 
established village-head (lurah) families (Carey 1986:76).
It is likely that Crawfurd was drawing too favourable a picture of the 
village tax collectors as a group in order to persuade his superior Raffles to 
use them as the basis for his land-rent scheme in 1812-1813 rather than settle 
directly with the peasant cultivators themselves (Bastin 1954:94-104, 118-9; Day 
1972:180 note 3). Even Crawfurd admitted that the bekel’s insecurity of tenure 
and the practice of paying part of the tribute payments in advance encour-
aged some tax collectors to resort to unscrupulous methods.44 Furthermore, it 
was often the case that, on the replacement of an apanage holder, the former 
incumbent’s bekel would be removed by the new appointee in order to make 
way for his own tax collectors. On such occasions, it was not uncommon for 
the old bekel to refuse to accept the authority of the new man and for a local 
conflict to break out in the village. The issue would then frequently be settled 
by force of arms. These disputes over tax-collectorships were the most com-
mon reason for the numerous ‘village wars’, or prang désa, which scarred the 
face of the south-central Javanese countryside in the decades preceding the 
Java War (Van Kesteren 1887:1268-9; Chapter X note 132). One Dutch travel-
ler referred to them as an almost daily occurrence in the months leading up 
to Dipanagara’s rebellion.45 Another contemporary witness, a Yogya prince, 
42 According to Van Sevenhoven, ten jung of Mangkunagaran land brought in an annual trib-
ute (pajeg) of 500 Spanish dollars, but fringe benefits such as the additional services and presents 
were worth another 200 Spanish dollars, S.Br. 55, J.I. van Sevenhoven, ‘Nota over de landver-
huringen aan partikulieren in de Vorstenlanden op Java’, 16-3-1837. On land-rent by Europeans, 
see Chapter IX.
43 Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 242.
44 Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 226.
45 Büchler 1888, II:3. Numerous references to these village wars can be found in the Surakarta 
Angger Gunung (Village Police Law Code) of 1840, especially articles 80-2 and 89, the last stipu-
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stressed the numerous differences of opinion between the apanage holders, 
the bekel and the villagers themselves over questions of tribute payments 
and corvée demands during these years, a situation compounded by the fact 
lating that no village wars were to be allowed without the permission of the first minister (patih) 
and the Resident. Copy in AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 17-2-1841 no. 16. See also 
Soeripto 1929:163-7.
Figure 1. The Javanese apanage system in the early nineteenth century showing 
the major administrative levels of land tribute division
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that the villages themselves were frequently divided up between the various 
apanage holders who each appointed their own bekel to look after their inter-
ests.46 According to Onghokham (1977:632-4), the tax-paying peasants also 
switched their loyalties and played court official apanage holders off against 
each other. In his words, ‘factionalism was so rife in the dynastical politics [of 
the central Javanese courts] that the peasant could switch his loyalties among 
the [members of the] elite in order to get [the best] terms from his overlord’. 
In Onghokham’s view, ‘a sort of frontier society’ was created at this time due 
to the deep instability in the Javanese countryside.
We will return to this insecurity shortly when we consider the criminal 
world of rural south-central Java. In the meantime, the system of using bekel 
as the direct agents of the apanage holders in the villages seems to have been a 
lot less onerous than the practice of administering those areas through various 
intermediate officials. The latter arrangement arose because many landowners 
resident in the royal capitals were either too indolent or too disinterested in 
having dealings with the numerous bekel on their lands. Instead they appoint-
ed intermediate tax-collectors, known as demang or mantri désa, who gathered 
in the rents from between ten to thirty bekel according to the size of their 
apanage. In return, they were allowed to retain one-fifth of the rents as their 
own remuneration becoming in this fashion the main link between the apan-
age holder and the bekel, a situation which presented great opportunities for 
personal enrichment. According to Crawfurd, some demang administered as 
much as 100 jung of agricultural land in rich core provinces such as Kedhu.47 
They were also rather more distant socially from the peasant cultivators than 
the bekel since they were often drawn from the families of lower officials with 
court connections (Carey 1986:77-8). Social distance seems to have made them 
less constrained in their use of rapacious administrative methods.
A particularly egregious example of such a man was the Surakarta mantri 
désa of Karang Bolong on the south coast of Java within the boundaries of the 
pre-1825 province of Bagelèn, an area known for its birds’ nest rocks on the 
coastal cliffs.48 The local inhabitants protested to the Surakarta chief minister 
(patih) that this official, known as Juni, had refused to cooperate with his 
colleague. He never placed the proper offerings on the ceremonial bed of 
the goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul), an omission which, in the 
villagers’ view, had caused a series of exceptionally poor birds’ nest harvests 
46 GKA, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Pangéran Mangkudining-
rat II, 13-4-1830.
47 Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 228-9.
48 The details are taken from S.Br. 131, ‘Translaten en Verbalen Solo, 1816-1819’ (Surakarta 
Notarial Archive annotated by J.W. Winter; henceforth: ‘Verbalen Solo’), 1-2-1817 (complaint 
against Demang Juni of Karang Bolong). He was eventually dismissed in June 1825, AN, Besluit 
van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 12-6-1825, no. 22. On the weaving industry in Karang 
Bolong, see further Chapter V note 88.
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during the period of his tenure.49 Furthermore, he always insisted that the 
villagers offer him any large fish which they might catch and ordered them to 
purchase rotting buffalo flesh when one of his animals died. At the same time, 
he forced all the local families to weave coarse striped linen cloth (ginggang) 
which he bought at scandalously low prices in order to make a handsome 
profit when he traded them in Surakarta. He also expected villagers to pur-
chase provisions – such as pungent fish paste (trasi) and gambir, a plant with 
astringent leaves used in the preparation of betelnut – at inflated prices when 
he returned from these trading journeys to the capital. Finally, he was said 
to have constantly adulterated the supply of opium for the coolies at Karang 
Bolong, to have paid their wages tardily in debased copper coinage and to 
have been hand-in-glove with local bandits. This litany of abuse, overdrawn 
though it may have been by local villagers successfully seeking Juni’s dis-
missal, gives an insight into the sort of practices an unscrupulous sub-district 
tax collector could become involved in.
Even more miserable, according to Crawfurd, who sometimes had dif-
ficulty disguising his sinophobic prejudices, was the plight of those peasant 
49 On the relationship between Ratu Kidul and the harvest of birds’ nests, see Hadiwidjojo 
1972:131-2; Jordaan 1984:104-5.
Plate 3. Lithograph of a Javanese provincial official (priyayi-dhusun mantri-désa) travel-
ling through the Javanese countryside in the early nineteenth-century. In the back-
ground peasants can be seen harvesting the ricefields near a high watch tower for 
guarding the fields against birds and other predators. Taken from J.J.X. Pfyffer zu 
Neueck, 1829: Plate V. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
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cultivators who were subjected to the extortions of Chinese demang. Such 
men were often appointed by impecunious apanage holders at the courts, 
who had either contracted debts to Chinese moneylenders or mortgaged 
their lands or both. Chinese tax-collectors were also sometimes preferred 
to Javanese because, in Crawfurd’s words, ‘their skill, frugality and extor-
tion’ enabled them to pay higher rents.50 Large tracts of fertile provinces 
like Kedhu were let to them (Afdeling Statistiek 1871:78; Carey and Hoadley 
2000:111, 155, 176-9), and they were also numerous in the eastern outlying 
districts (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:379; Carey 1986:79; Carey and 
Hoadley 2000:259-61). Crawfurd urged Raffles to modify their leases as much 
as possible, a plea which was later heard from contemporaries in Yogyakarta 
at the end of the Java War.51 We shall see below, how similar complaints were 
levelled against European land-renters, who moved into the Principalities in 
larger numbers after 1816 and effectively assumed the role of ‘white’ demang 
for court apanage holders. Their harsh corvée demands and their introduc-
tion of cash crops in a predominantly rice-growing economy created localised 
hardship for peasant cultivators and was one of the precipitating factors for 
the growing peasant unrest in the build-up to the Java War.52
The western mancanagara: Banyumas
Despite all the difficulties, Javanese peasants in the core areas were undoubt-
edly better off than their countrymen in the outlying districts. Not only were 
they spared the demands of the resident bupati, but the scattered nature of the 
apanage holdings shielded them from the grosser aspects of fiscal exploitation. 
The situation in the eastern outlying areas of the sultanate will be described at 
the end of this chapter, but a comparison between Banyumas and Bagelèn may 
be illustrative here of the very different conditions prevailing in the central 
and outlying districts in the half century before the Java War.
Banyumas proper had been administered as a western outlying province 
of Surakarta until 1773 when its status was changed to that of a core region in 
order to assuage Sultan Mangkubumi who resented the fact that Yogya had 
very little land in the western extremity of the old Mataram polity (Rouffaer 
1905:591). The official population of the province in that year when a new 
land register, the Serat Ebuk Anyar (‘New Book’), had been drawn up,53 
50 IOL Mack.Pr. 21 pt. 8, ‘Report upon the district of Cadoe by Mr Crawfurd’ (henceforth: 
Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’), 15-11-1812, 300-1.
51 GKA, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830, no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Pangéran Mang-
kudining rat II, 13-4-1830; interview with Haji Ngisoh (Ngisa), 21-4-1830. 
52 See Chapter IX.
53 The registers were signed and sealed by the patih and the Residents on behalf of the rulers 
in Semarang on 2-11-1773 and ratified by the rulers on 26-4-1774, see Ricklefs 1974a:158.
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numbered some 6,160 cacah (productive family units) or 30,800 inhabitants if 
one cacah is reckoned as supporting a family of five (Rouffaer 1905:591), but 
this was a gross underestimate, the real population being probably closer to 
260,000.54 Banyumas’s change of status, essentially an administrative sleight 
of hand, did not alter its style of administration. It continued to all intents 
and purposes to be governed as an outlying area given its distance from the 
capital and the structure of its administrative hierarchy. 
Captain Godfrey Phipps Baker of the 7th Bengal Light Infantry Volunteer 
Battalion, who surveyed the area for Raffles in 1815,55 commented on the 
wilful rule of the Surakarta ngabèhi (sub-district heads) of Ayah and Adipala. 
Their extortions had led to the emptying of half the twenty large villages 
along the fertile valley of the Serayu River. In Baker’s words:
Not only are their pajegs [land-rent/taxes] too high in money, but besides there is 
no end to every species of extortion under the head of ‘feudal services’, that is con-
tributions of cattle, provisions and materials […] whatever [in fact] the Ngabehis 
[ngabèhi] think fit to call them.56
These sub-district officials collected a money rent of 1,000 Spanish dollars, 
but were able to retain another 800 Spanish dollars for themselves out of the 
profits of their administration. They had some twenty village heads and 100 
bekel under them charged with policing and revenue matters. 
In a potentially rich area like southern Banyumas, it is no surprise that the 
‘vexatious services and contingents’ demanded by the ngabèhi were greatly 
complained of by the local inhabitants.57 Furthermore, the population suffered 
terribly from the depredations of Balinese, Bugis and Timorese pirates, who 
anchored their ships in the lee of the great island of Nusa Kambangan and 
paddled up the creeks and inland waterways in their small dug-out canoes 
54 On this gross under-estimate, see Raffles 1817, II:289, who reckoned the population at 
176,947 in 1815, and the Resident of Surakarta, D.W. Pinket van Haak, who put it at 261,090 in 
1816 (report in S.Br. 37:1213). By the time of the administrative reorganisation in 1830-1831, the 
population stood at 370,000, AN Kab, 13-9-1832 no. 1599, J.E. de Sturler (Banyumas) to Johannes 
van den Bosch (Batavia), 5-9-1830.
55 Baker’s survey had a political aim in that Raffles ordered the survey to identify places 
where a British-Indian force could be put ashore on the south coast of Java in the area of the 
Principalities in order to link up with the central Javanese rulers in the event of renewed hostili-
ties with the Netherlands following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, T.S. Raffles (Batavia) to G.P. 
Baker (Surakarta), 20-5-1815, in IOL Map Room MS no. 24, G.P. Baker, ‘Memoir of a survey of 
the prince’s dominions of Java’, Calcutta, 25-11-1816 (henceforth: Baker, ‘Memoir’). This seems 
to justify Dutch concerns, expressed most forcibly by Johannes van den Bosch in private corre-
spondence with King William I during his period as governor-(post-1832, commissioner-)general 
(1830-1834), that prominent exiles like Dipanagara should be sent back to the Netherlands to 
prevent them falling into British hands in the event of a conflict over Belgium in Europe, AN, 
GKA, Exhibitum, 9-12-1834 La R geheim, and Chapter XII.
56 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 104-6. Baker was superintendent of forts, public buildings and roads in the 
Principalities at this time, De Haan 1935a:491-2.
57 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 33.
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to carry off people and provisions, the former being pressed into service to 
crew the pirate vessels58 or for sale to British sea captains in Melaka.59 Baker 
reported that only three of the twelve villages around the important market 
centre of Jeruk Legi, which once had a population of 13,000, were still inhabit-
ed, the rest having ‘never recovered from the invasion of pirates’ twelve years 
earlier.60 Since that time, two Hungarian sergeants had been posted to Nusa 
Kambangan to give advance warning of further attacks, although the local 
inhabitants suggested that the lack of incursions over the three-year period 
prior to Baker’s 1815 visit was more due to the fact that there was nothing left 
to take than to the watchfulness of the Central European NCOs.61
Banyumas district capital was described by Baker as the most important 
of the western outlying district towns in terms of population and resources. 
Governed by two influential local bupati, it suffered severely from the misrule 
of the bupati wedana, the head of the erstwhile outlying province administra-
tion. This official, Radèn Tumenggung Yudanegara, who was to be relieved 
of his office in the aftermath of the September-October 1815 Sepoy conspiracy 
in south-central Java (Carey 1977:308), was described in the blackest terms by 
the British Resident of Surakarta, Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson:
When he is in Banyumas his whole time is spent either in gambling or with tandak 
[tandhak; dancing women, prostitutes], whilst the duty of the district, the largest 
in the emperor’s [Sunan’s] territory, is totally neglected or left to sons and depend-
ants, men as profligate as himself, whose whole study is how to exact money from 
the population in order to supply their own extravagance.62
In the face of such administrative irresponsibility, the agriculture and trade of 
the province languished. Reports from the immediate post-Java War period 
indicate that there was little money in circulation and outside the fertile river 
valleys, where there some wet-ricefields, the local inhabitants existed mainly 
58 A Javanese, who escaped by swimming ashore from a pirate ship at Segarawedhi (Rawa), 
described how he had been captured on the Cirebon coast with twenty others, mostly women 
and children. His captors were Timorese pirates who spoke Malay and were commanded by two 
captains who may have been Bugis, Raja Datuk Namak and Raja Datuk Unus. More Javanese 
were captured at Cilacap, Dj.Br. 38, Relaas of Mas Reksamerta, in Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) 
to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 8-5-1805. See further Chapter V note 20.
59 Dj.Br. 86, Relaas of Sarip Husein, 12-12-1805, Husein, an Arab, on a voyage from Java to 
Trengganu (east coast Malaya) described how Javanese captured by Riau and Lingga pirates in 
Cirebon and Banyumas were sold for 16 ronde real a head to British sea captains at Melaka to 
make up their crew complements. They were said to have been well treated and had no desire to 
return to Java.
60 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 28-9, 107; AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Bogislaus Friederich von 
Liebeherr (Surakarta), 27-10-1807. Baker noted that the former Chinese tollgate keeper of Jeruk 
Legi, who had amassed a 2,000 Spanish dollar fortune by trading in pearls, had lost all his assets 
in the same pirate raid.
61 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 28.
62 Dj.Br. 23, Major J.M. Johnson (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia), 6-3-1816.
Plate 4. A Javanese singer-dancer (ronggèng or talèdhèk). Taken from Hardouin and 
Ritter 1853-55:219. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV.
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on mountain rice or root crops such as potatoes and tubers.63 Rice even had 
to be imported from neighbouring Bagelèn and the north coast residencies 
in order to feed the population.64 In the lowlands, particularly in the marshy 
areas (rawa) during the dry season (Toestand van Bagelen 1858:72), important 
quantities of raw cotton were produced, but this was mainly exported to 
the thriving cottage industries of neighbouring Bagelèn, the cloth woven in 
Banyumas being used only for local consumption.65 Even Chinese traders, 
a sure yardstick of the prosperity of an area, were few in number and those 
who had settled in the region were generally very poor.66 The province’s 
economic potential, which was widely recognised by contemporaries (Raffles 
1817, I:20; Lettres de Java 1829:73), was thus far from being realised.
The western nagara agung: Bagelèn 
How different indeed was the prospect which greeted Baker as he journeyed 
to the east across the broad expanse of the crocodile-infested Cingcingguling 
River into the neighbouring central apanage province of Bagelèn, the so-
called kaki-tangan (arms and legs) of the Principalities.67 During his sixty-mile 
ride to the ferry town of Brosot on the Kali Praga, the sepoy captain was 
struck by the ‘most luxurious and highly populous country’ through which 
he passed, and the well-maintained coastal high road with its good level sur-
face, ‘the finest in Java’ in his estimation.68 In his words:
The population is truly surprising, it being in fact an almost continuous village 
the whole way. On the northern side [of the high road] there is scarcely an interval 
or boundary between the villages which run in an almost uninterrupted line the 
whole distance […] the country is a perfect garden.69
63 AN Kab 13-9-1832, J.E. de Sturler (Banyumas) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 5-9-1832.
64 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:245. On the fertility of Banyumas, Raffles 1817, I:20; Lettres 
de Java 1822:73.
65 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 33, noted that Banyumas women wove considerable quantities of striped 
cloth (lurik), batik and white cloth (kain putih).
66 AN Kab 13-9-1832, J.E. de Sturler (Banyumas) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 5-9-1832.
67 The term kaki-tangan is difficult to translate because it has different meanings in different 
contexts: in contemporary Indonesian idiom it means ‘accomplice or henchman’, Echols and 
Shadily 1968:161, but in the early nineteenth-century it referred to ‘coolies, porters and labourers’ 
who were sent from Bagelèn to work in the porters’ guilds (gladhag) at the courts.
68 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 109. For a less favourable view of the road, AN Kab 18-4-1837 no. 62 
ge heim, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to D.J. de Eerens (Batavia), 11-3-1837, who warned the governor-
general on the occasion of Prins Hendrik De Zeevaarder’s visit to central Java in 1837 that the 
numerous sand dunes on the road sometimes made it difficult for carriages. See further Toestand 
van Bagelen 1858:72.
69 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 109. The total population of Bagelèn at this time is not known: Raffles 
(1817, II:289-90) estimated the Yogya areas including Rèma (modern-day Karanganyar), the 
patrimony of the Danurejan family, at 122,214 persons in 1815, but the figures for the Surakarta 
districts are amalgamated with other provinces.
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Nearly the entire district seemed to be under cultivation except at the height 
of the rains and there was pasture in the immense rawa or fens, which lay to 
the northward, for great herds of cows and buffalo. These fens also abounded 
in fish which were dried locally and traded extensively along the south coast 
and as far west as the mouth of the Serayu River.70 Salt was likewise pro-
duced in the coastal villages for local consumption and export to landlocked 
sub-districts like Ledhok (present-day Wonosobo) and Gowong in the north-
ern part of the province, and to Kedhu.71 The strength of the local economy 
derived primarily from its rice production and thriving village cloth indus-
tries. Western Bagelèn, in particular the area around the Rawa Tambakbaya, 
produced major surpluses of rice as well as soybean, and together with 
Kedhu, was the principal exporter of grain and foodstuffs to the more east-
erly regions of south-central Java such as Mataram and Pajang.72 At least a 
quarter of western Bagelèn’s rice crop was exported or traded internally to 
parts of eastern Bagelèn, which were subject to harvest failures as a result 
of droughts and floods due to the poor drainage on the local red clay soils 
(Toestand van Bagelen 1858: 75-6; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:234, 245-7). 
Surprisingly little use was made of the rivers for bulk transport outside the 
province, although there was some internal riverine and cross-fen (rawa) traf-
fic for locally traded goods (Toestand van Bagelen 1858:71, 76).
Cotton and linen weaving were the mainstay local industries: linen cloth, 
batik cotton shawls, ladies blouses, head-dresses and sarongs made up in 
Bagelèn villages were traded to all parts of Java as well as to the islands of 
eastern Indonesia via the north coast port of Semarang.73 The three most 
important weaving centres in pre-Java War Bagelèn were Jana, Wedhi and 
Tangkilan (near Gombong) all of which were home to considerable numbers 
of Chinese involved in the cloth trade.74 When Baker visited in 1815, the 
provinc e was nearing the peak of its prosperity as a cloth-producing region. 
But its glory days were drawing to a close. Already in late 1814 and early 1815, 
British machine-manufactured textiles had begun to enter the Javanese market 
70 Raffles 1817, I:20; Toestand van Bagelen 1858:70; Baker, ‘Memoir’, 109. The main rawa were 
Tambakbaya in the west and Wawar in the east, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:Map. Coastal 
fishing was difficult because of the heavy surf on the south coast. On the fish-farming of guramé 
(a kind of carp), which were caught in pools at the junction of the Opak and Oyo rivers, and 
raised in fish farms at Kutha Gedhé from whence they were sold to Kedhu and Semarang, Dj.Br. 
3, ‘Algemeen Verslag der Residentie Djocjocarta over de jare 1833’, 30-11-1834.
71 AvJ, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to Inspector of Finances (Batavia), 31-8-1820.
72 AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 29-12-1804.
73 Toestand van Bagelen 1858:74; Dj.Br. 61, R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta) to H.A. Parvé (Semarang), 
4-12-1818. On ginggang, Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:641.
74 Raffles 1817, I:20; Toestand van Bagelen 1858:70; dK 145, Matthijs Waterloo, ‘Memorie van 
Overgave’, 4-4-1808. Jana later became part of the apanage of the Yogya kapitan cina, Tan Jin Sing, 
when he was appointed as a Javanese bupati in December 1813, see Carey 1992:484 note 399; 
Chapter VIII.
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with printed batik patterns based on models supplied by British Residents of 
Crawfurd’s ilk to Paisley and Lancashire cotton masters.75 Although the local 
market proved surprisingly resilient, especially when many of the early British 
imports were found not to be dye fast (Raffles 1817, I:216-7; Chapter VIII), the 
local weaving industry would be severely damaged by the disruption caused 
by the Java War, the flight of the local Chinese merchants (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, II:332-3, V:433), and the post-war import of textiles from the nas-
cent Dutch cloth industry around Twenthe.76 Interestingly, given the strong 
anti-Chinese sentiments evinced at the time of the outbreak of the Java War, 
the local population of eastern Bagelèn were soon begging the Chinese cloth 
merchants to return not as ‘market tax collectors but as traders, saying that they 
now [June 1829] had problems producing their goods […] having to pay over 
the odds for the [inputs] required’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:433).
The province also produced special labour services for the courts – hence 
its ‘arms and legs’ epithet. The most important of these were recruits for the 
porters’ guilds (gladhag) in the royal capitals, where Bagelèn labourers served 
for a six-month period before returning to their villages (Kollmann 1864:355, 
359, 361). In return for their labour services, the local areas which produced 
such recruits were given a remission in the level of land-rent (Toestand van 
Bagelen 1858:74). The heavily afforested and sparsely populated northern dis-
tricts, such as the Yogya area of Gowong, were liable for blandhong or forest 
services and the supply of building materials to the courts.77 Other regions, 
like the Surakarta territories of Wolo (Ambal) and Tlogo, which were directly 
taxed for the upkeep of the ruler’s court, paid part of their yearly tribute to 
75 On the sale of English cloth printed with Javanese patterns in Semarang on 15 February 
1815, see S.Br. 23, Charles Assey (Batavia) to Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson (Surakarta), 24-12-
1814. The British government’s sale of such imported cloth in other locations in Java is mentioned 
in IOL, G21/26, Java Public Consultations, 22-12-1814, 1298-9. Crawfurd had apparently sent 
parang rusak and kembang cina patterns as well as Javanese head-dresses to British manufactur-
ers and these had been copied and found a good market in Yogya, where they were imported 
by the British firm Deans, Scott & Co in Semarang and sold through Chinese middlemen. Local 
consumers apparently prized them because the colours did not run, see Dj.Br. 51A, H.G. Nahuys 
van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 10-12-1819. On the small role 
played by Dutch textile producers in this trade, see AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 
4-9-1819 no. 9. See further Rouffaer 1904:6-7; Van Deventer 1891:cxvi.
76 Burger 1939:102-3. By 1838, public sales of European-manufactured cloths in Yogya, espe-
cially high quality Dutch chintzes, had begun to cut into the Javanese market, Dj.Br. 3, ‘Verslag 
van de Resident ter gelegenheid der inspectie reis der Gouverneur-Generaal in de maand Juni 
1838’. During the Java War itself, Gent in the southern Netherlands (post-1830, Belgium) was the 
main source of textile exports to Java, see De Prins 2002:236.
77 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:19; Toestand van Bagelen 1858:73; Leiden UB, BPL 1346, 
‘Brieven van en aan Mr J.B. de Salis’, ‘Approximatieve staat van inkomsten van het landschap 
Gowong sorteerende onder Sourakarta’, 22-10-1826; ‘Approximatieve staat van inkomsten 
van de landschappen Gowong, Selomanik, Ledok en Kalibeber sorteerende onder het rijk van 
Djokjokarta’, 25-10-1826, in J.B. de Salis (Magelang) to Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta), 
28-10-1826.
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 Map 1. Central Java showing the main areas of cash crop production in the 
pre-Java War period. Map outline taken from Raffles 1817, I  and adapted 
by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
the Sunan in local delicacies for the Sunan’s table: the first in dried fish and 
trubu (salt roe or shad, a type of Javanese caviar) and the second in dhèndhèng 
or dried deer flesh (Kollmann 1864:360-2). We will see how, on the eve of 
the Java war, Sunan Pakubuwana VI (reigned 1823-1830) became especially 
exercised over the Dutch annexation of the Surakarta area of Jabarangkah 
between Kedhu and Pekalongan on the north coast because of the loss of its 
durian dodol, a fruitcake delicacy sent every year in the pikul load to Surakarta 
in lieu of tax (Chapter X note 168).
Given all these assets, it is hardly surprising that the courts should have 
considered Bagelèn a central part of their patrimony. So much so that in 1824, 
when the Dutch government made a move to annex the province as part of 
a proposed indemnity for the abolition of the tollgates in the Principalities, 
both first ministers at the courts protested strongly to the Dutch negotiators. 
The latter reported (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:19):
They pointed out to us that […] Bagelen especially, was considered in their naive 
expression the arms and legs [kaki tangan] of the kingdoms of Surakarta and 
Yogyakarta, for the various chiefs and nobles [at the courts] derived their livelihood 
from it [and] it served for the production of men for the gladhag [porters’ guilds]. 
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Similar sentiments were expressed at the end of the Java War by the Surakarta 
patih, Sasradiningrat II (in office 1812-1846), when the Dutch were again con-
sidering the annexation of the area. On this occasion, Sasradiningrat observed 
that he was prepared to surrender Banyumas and the eastern mancanagara, 
but not Bagelèn because, if that province was lost to the court, it would be 
as though the Surakarta grandees had forfeited their key means of support – 
again the ubiquitous epithet ‘arms and legs’ was used. In his view, the peopl e 
of the region were uniquely well suited for work in the porters’ guild for 
although other Surakarta areas – for example Banyumas – produced many 
dependable soldiers, this was one of the few districts which produced really 
good coolies.78 Official kraton recognition of the importance of this heavily 
populated province can be seen in its formal administrative appellation as 
the siti sèwu (the ‘thousand land’), and of the senior bupati in charge of it as 
the wedana bumi sèwu (the chief administrator of the ‘thousand land’).79
Social groups and the village community
In view of the striking prosperity of Bagelèn at this time, it is pertinent to 
consider the situation at the village level in the core regions such as Bagelèn to 
build a picture of the village structure and the key social groups who made up 
the village or désa in the core regions before the Java War. Material from other 
central territories such as Kedhu, Mataram and Pajang will also be referred to.
Most contemporary observers were agreed that each village constituted a 
separate entity during this period embracing a population of between 50 to 
200 people. In Raffles’ words (Raffles 1817, I:81-2):
Every village forms a community in itself, having each its village officers and 
priest, whose habitations are as superior to those of others as their functions are 
more exalted.
On the basis of the statistics available to him for Kedhu, Raffles came to the 
conclusion that the average Javanese village in the core regions comprised 
about twelve families, each numbering four to five adult members, and that 
the total amount of irrigated rice-land available for each village was about 
seven jung (Raffles 1817, I:146). This would indicate that an individual peasant 
cultivator had at his disposal one quarter of a jung or one hectare of ricefields, 
although Crawfurd, who supervised the land-rent survey in Kedhu in 1812, 
78 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:108-9. On Dipanagara’s view of the fighting qualities of 
the men of Bagelèn, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743; and for a modern view of the people 
of Banyumas as the ‘Prussians of Java’, Simatupang 1972:76.
79 Rouffaer 1905:609. One of the most prosperous districts (near the post-Java War provin-
cial capital of Purwareja) was also known as Urutsèwu, Dumont 1917:400; Toestand van Bagelen 
1858:69.
     Plate 5. A tayuban (dance) party with tandhak/ronggèng (professional dancing girls/prostitutes)        and a Javanese gamelan orchestra. Watercolour by John Newman, circa 1811-1813. 
                                                                                                         Courtesy of the British Library,         London, WD953, f. 90 (101).
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pointed out that it was often as little as one sixteenth of a jung.80 Moreover, the 
size of these jung varied considerably according to the fertility of the area, the 
availability of irrigation and population pressure in a particular area. In the 
western core regions, for example, where there had been a great increase in 
cultivation since the mid-eighteenth century, the jung had been frequently sub-
divided. Smaller areas of land now had to support a much larger population 
than in the poorly governed outlying regions where it was possible to traverse 
large tracts of land without finding a single peasant cultivator.81 
In similar vein, the Yogya Resident, Matthijs Waterloo (in office 1803-1808),82 
remarked that in Mataram at least as many as fifty peasant cultivators could 
get their livelihood from a well irrigated jung in the vicinity of the royal capi-
tal, whereas a corresponding quantity of land would only support between 
two to four farmers in the impoverished southern hills (Gunung Kidul).83 
Although some jung in this mountainous district were barren and infertile, 
Waterloo was of the opinion that there was enough land in the Yogya area for 
every villager to have rights over a small strip of wet ricefield or sawah. He 
pointed out that the only truly landless members of south-central Javanese 
society at this time were the mountain dwellers, those who worked in the 
royal teak forests (blandhong), and the porters on the roads who often took up 
their occupation in order to escape from onerous village obligations.84
Waterloo certainly gave too favourable a picture of the structure of land-
holding in the central district villages in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century. He glossed over the fact that there were distinct classes or groups in 
the south-central Javanese désa in this period, classes which enjoyed hugely 
unequal shares and access to village ricefields and local labour. A Surakarta 
report of 1832, for example, referred to three main social groups: the sikep 
(literally ‘users of the land’), who bore the tax burden in the form of land-rent 
(pajeg) payments for the village; ngindhung, often close relations of the sikep, 
who owned their own houses and yards, but had no access to the village 
ricefields; and finally the wong numpang, unmarried strangers, who lived in 
the yard (pekarangan) or the house of the sikep and performed a range of agri-
cultural, corvée and menial duties for him.85
This last group approximated most closely to a class of landless labour-
ers in south-central Java at this time. Unlike the ngindhung who could often 
80 Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 221.
81 Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 220. See also Van Kesteren 1887:1267 note 1, quoting Nahuys 
van Burgst, who noted that jung became smaller and more productive the closer to the royal 
capitals.
82 On Waterloo’s career see Chapter V note 15.
83 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
84 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
85 S.Br. 2a, ‘Statistieke beschrijving der Residentie Soerakarta’, 1832. See further Kollmann 
1864:366-8 on the situation in Bagelèn, and Carey 1986:81-2.
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improve their lot by marrying into sikep families, the numpang had very little 
chance of raising their social status unless they were prepared to leave the 
village entirely and open up new ricefields in hitherto uncultivated areas. But 
such opportunities were becoming increasingly rare in the pre-Java War coun-
tryside of south-central Java as perceptive observers like Waterloo himself 
acknowledged when he noted that although there was some ‘waste’ ground 
in the more remote parts of Mataram, most of the land was scrupulously 
cultivated.86 Indeed, Crawfurd reported from Kedhu in 1812 that population 
pressure had led to a much greater use of dry crop fields (tegal) in the poorly 
irrigated central plain and that mountain rice was being cultivated at ever 
higher reaches of the foothills of the volcanoes surrounding the province.87
Besides this shortage of suitable agricultural land in the core regions, 
Crawfurd noted that even if an enterprising numpang did open up new rice-
fields in a waste area, his right of possession after three successive harvests 
as laid down in the Javanese agrarian law codes was not assured.88 Good 
land pioneered in this fashion would often be claimed back by the sultan 
(Carey 1986:82 note 81). Furthermore, numpang and other landless peasants 
were often deterred from trying to set themselves up as peasant cultivators 
(sikep) because of the prospect of having to meet the onerous corvée and 
tax requirements which sikep status necessarily involved. For these reasons, 
numpang who wished to break out of the cycle of poverty and rural servitude 
as day labourers to well-established sikep families would sometimes adopt 
the course of leaving the land entirely. Some drifted into marginal employ-
ment as porters on the main trade routes, others joined the numerous bands 
of vagabonds and robbers which terrorised the Javanese countryside, still 
others took service in the entourage of influential noblemen, who sometimes 
used them for criminal activities, a phenomenon which persisted right into 
the late nineteenth century as Isaac Groneman (1832-1912), kraton cognoscenti 
and personal physician to the seventh sultan, so vividly portrayed in his short 
story ‘A robbers’ history’ (‘Een kètjoegeschiedenis’) depicting links between 
court officials and the criminal underworld of Yogya in the mid-1880s.89
In Kedhu alone, Crawfurd estimated the number of porters at 20-30,000 or 
nearly ten percent of the total population.90 In his words:
86 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806. 
Crawfurd observed in 1812 that a traveller could journey over 100 miles in south-central Java 
without encountering an uncultivated spot, IOL Mack.Pr. 21 pt. 4, ‘Sultan’s country by Mr 
Crawfurd in 1812. Observations on the nature and resources of the territories under the authority 
of the Sultan of Mataram’ (henceforth: Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’), 71, 148.
87 Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 274, 278.
88 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 73.
89 Groneman 1887; Nieuwenhuys 1973:204; Onghokham 1975:68-9; Carey 1981a:243 note 36; 
Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
90 Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 283; MvK 3054, ‘Statistieke beschrijving der residentie 
Kedoe’, 1836, estimated the total population at 300,000.
Plate 6. A Javanese woman of the lower class. In her left hand she holds a skein of 
cotto n (the most important manufacture in the central Javanese villages in the early 
nineteenth century). To the right of the picture there is a rice stamper (alu) and block, 
and in the background a country ox cart (pedhati). Taken from Raffles 1817, I: p. 86 
facing.
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They have no fixed abode, and by the wandering and unsettled life they pursue, 
[they] have contracted the most inveterate habits of idleness, dissipation and prof-
ligacy. No sooner is their hire paid to them than they may be seen in groups to 
gamble it away and they are altogether so improvident that they go nearly naked. 
With such habits it is no wonder that they are accused of being the principal 
agents of crime and irregularities which are so prevalent in the countryside […] a 
good road would dispense [with] such people.91
The golden age of the sikep?
The structure of landownership in the core regions in early-nineteenth-centur y 
south-central Java seems to have been heavily weighted in favour of a small 
but influential sikep class of peasant cultivators. They held rights over the fields 
cultivated by the village in common since they were either the first farmers 
of the land (cakal-bakal) or their immediate descendants. As such they were 
directly responsible for the land-rent and the payment of the other village taxes 
in money and kind to the apanage holders through their tax-collector s (Carey 
1986:84). At the same time, they provided the candidates for the position of 
village head and other offices. They also exercised joint control over the yearly 
division of the communal ricefields as well as the village commons which often 
covered extensive areas of woodland and pasture (Carey 1986:84 note 87). They 
also appear to have had a say in the appointment of the local tax-collectors and, 
as we have seen, many of these bekel were drawn from the sikep class.
The lands cultivated by the sikep were often passed from father to son and 
sikep families of long-standing were found in many south-central Javanese 
villages.92 Lands controlled by the sikep were of two sorts: tanah pusaka or 
‘heirloom’ lands, which were part of the original patrimony of the village 
and could be bequeathed to their heirs – hence the pusaka (heirloom) epithet 
(Carey 1986:84) – and tanah yasa or individually developed lands. These last 
had been opened up on the initiative of the sikep themselves using their resi-
dent labour force of family dependants/boarders (ngindhung) and numpang. 
As far as the heirloom lands were concerned, the sikep only had usufruct 
rights and not full ownership for their tenure was conditional on their per-
formance of corvée services and payment of the land-rent/tribute to the ruler 
or his apanage holder. The central Javanese sovereigns retained residual 
rights over the eventual disposition of the land and a sikep could in theory 
be dispossessed if he failed to meet his labour and tax obligations. Thus his 
tenure of tanah pusaka was more akin to the lungguh or land grants given to 
the royal officials at the courts than to any species of private property. Such 
insecurity of tenure on heirloom lands was a major hazard for the sikep but 
91 Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 283; for similar views in the 1836 statistical report, MvK 
3054, ‘Statistieke beschrijving der residentie Kedoe’, 35.
92 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
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unlike the situation at the courts where, as we have seen, there are frequent 
references in the records to the dismissal of apanage holders and the redistri-
bution of their lands (Carey and Hoadley 2000:144-5, 153, 155-6), the sources 
are largely silent on the dispossession of sikep. 
The individually developed lands, on the other hand, were more truly the 
sikep’s own property since these had been established by their own endeav-
ours. Although the ruler could sometimes seek to reclaim such lands or 
impose new tax burdens on them, this was seldom done because, as we will 
see at the end of this chapter, the cadastral registers of the royal administra-
tions were not revised after 1773-1774 to take account of the changes in land 
use at the village level (Carey 1986:109). The numpang and other dependants 
or rayat were extremely important for the sikep in this context: their labour 
was at his sole disposal and could be used at will to carry out daily agricul-
tural duties, to perform the required corvée duties, and to extend the sikep’s 
rights over adjacent waste lands. Indications that the numpang and rayat were 
used extensively to develop new land can be seen from a late-nineteenth-
century Dutch report on landrights. This stated that in circa 1830 there were 
quite a few sikep with as much as ten bau of irrigated ricefields or about seven 
hectares of which only about a fifth was tanah pusaka (Onghokham 1975:170, 
186 quoting Bergsma 1876-96, I). Just how wealthy an individual sikep could 
be at this time is illustrated by a list of stolen possessions drawn up after a 
robbery in 1808 at the village of Pedhalangan in the Béji district near Klathèn, 
a fertile and well-irrigated area where much cotton was grown. Amongst the 
individual losses reported by one sikep was a cache of 180 silver ducatoons, a 
very sizeable sum, then worth £ 65, which calculated at £ 3,000 in the money 
of the mid-1980s (Carey 1986:86 note 93). 
The period of the most rapid extension of agricultural land by the sikep 
appears to have been the latter part of the eighteenth century when popula-
tion pressure was less intense than it came to be in the immediate pre-Java 
War decades as we will see shortly. Although much more research needs to 
be done on the subject, it is clear that sikep acted in an independent fashion in 
their localities and exercised great control over their numpang. A Dutch writer 
spoke of the quasi ‘patron-client’ which prevailed in Bagelèn before the Java 
War where a small number of sikep had rights over most of the ricefields and 
enjoyed the services of large numbers of dependants who had no hope of set-
ting themselves up as independent cultivators (Kollmann 1864:368), observa-
tions which were echoed by Willem van Hogendorp in Kedhu in 1827 when 
he commented on the large amount of ‘private property’ belonging to peasant 
cultivators and the practice of inheritance in peasant families, both of which, 
in his view, contributed to the prosperity of the province.93 
Such a system permitted sikep to act as virtually self-sufficient farmers 
93 Hogendorp 153¹, Willem van Hogendorp, ‘Over den Staat van Java’, no. 2, 1827.
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having only the loosest of links with the local village community. In Kedhu, 
Crawfurd noted that each cultivator farmed the lands which he had rented 
for his own advantage, shared no property in common and only gathered 
together in village associations in order to get some protection in a deeply 
insecure countryside: ‘peasants who live as close neighbours in the same 
village’, he wrote, ‘often have as little to do with each other as those who 
live at a distance of twenty miles’.94 Crawfurd’s remarks may have been 
exaggerated and the situation in Kedhu somewhat unique, but it is clear that 
the pre-Java War village with its loose association of peasant cultivators and 
dependants was a very different entity from the closely ordered community 
of the late nineteenth century, shaped as the latter was by the economic exi-
gencies of the Cultivation System (1830-1870) and the administrative policies 
of the late Dutch colonial government with its passion for uniformity and 
social control (Kāno 1977:34-5; Breman 1980:38-9; Carey 1986:87). It was also 
different because of the steps taken in the post-Java War period to break up 
the more extensive peasant farms and extend ownership to a wider group of 
cultivators in order to make more people liable for tax responsibilities and 
corvée services to the colonial administration (Onghokham 1975:185; Fasseur 
1977:146). In this fashion, the golden age of the sikep came to an end and with 
it a unique peasant ‘landowning’ society which was such a salient feature of 
the core regions of south-central Java in the years before the Java War.
Extension of ricefields and development of irrigation
The golden age of the sikep was mirrored in two linked developments in 
Javanese agriculture in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: the 
rapid extension of irrigated ricefields and the construction of ever more elabo-
rate irrigation systems in the core regions. European observers of rural Java 
were unequivocal about the impact of this great enlargement of sawah in the 
aftermath of the 1755 Giyanti treaty which had brought peace to south-central 
Java after nearly seventy years of war. In another of his prolific reports to the 
governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, Waterloo reported that the increase in rice 
production was visible everywhere in the central regions: ‘one only has to direct 
one’s eyes to those lands which [now] produce rice and which just twenty years 
ago were still waste and uncultivated’. In particular, he was impressed by the 
wooded areas of the Jambu hills on the northern border of Kedhu and neigh-
bouring Semarang which had recently been turned into the most magnificent 
sawah.95 Similarly, many ricefields had been laid out in the adjacent province 
94 Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 221.
95 Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 31-1-1804; AvJ, 
Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 29-12-1804; vAE, Nicolaus 
The power of prophecy36
of Grobogan which had become a major rice producer for the Dutch establish-
ments on the north coast.96 Commenting on the same phenomenon just under 
a decade later, Crawfurd was struck by the amount of recently opened sawah in 
the vicinity of the sultan’s capital in areas which older inhabitants remembered 
as having been ‘impenetrable jungle and the haunt of tigers’.97
The first two sultans had led the way in encouraging their subjects to open 
up new land in the recently established Yogya kingdom. A report penned 
shortly after Sultan Mangkubumi’s death on 24 March 1792 by the governor 
of Java’s Northeast Coast, J.G. van Overstraten (De Jonge and Van Deventer 
1884-88, XII:260) praised the tireless zeal of the inhabitants of the sultanate in 
restoring ruined lands at the end of the Giyanti Wars and quietly appropriat-
ing unclaimed areas, zeal which stood in marked contrast to the nonchalance 
of their neighbours in Surakarta. In particular, Sunan Pakubuwana IV (reigned 
1788-1820), had shown gross dereliction of duty of his care as ruler by allowing 
a key aqueduct built by his father, Pakubuwana III (reigned 1749-1788), which 
carried water from Pengging and the old kraton of Kartasura to his capital, to 
fall into disrepair.98 Mangkubumi’s large stone dam in the Winongo River to 
the south of Yogya provided much needed irrigation for the royal ricefields at 
Krapyak and lasted until the great storm of 22 February 1861.99 His successor, 
Sultan Hamengkubuwana II, followed suit, constructing a number of irrigation 
channels and dams to the east and west of the royal capital in areas adjacent 
to his numerous royal retreats.100 Most notable here was the dam in the Kali 
Bedhog between Gunung Gamping and Ambarketawang which irrigated 
‘numerous skilfully laid out sawah’,101 which were under the supervision of a 
kraton official known as mantri jurusawah (‘ricefield inspector’), who doubled 
as the manager of the royal limestone ovens at Gamping.102 These irrigation 
Engelhard, ‘Speculatieve memorie over zaken betreffende het bestuur van Java’s N.O. Kust’, 5-
1808. For a later published description of agricultural development in the Jambu hills, see Lettres 
de Java 1822:111.
96 Raffles 1817, I:268-9; Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 12-9-
1809.
97 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 146.
98 De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:129. On this aqueduct, see further Mack.Pr. 86 (1), 
Adams, ‘Souracarta’, 65.
99 Dj.Br. 1, C.P. Brest van Kampen, ‘Politieke verslag der Residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 
1861’, 24-3-1862, mentions the destruction of this dam in a great storm on 22-2-1861. Dj.Br. 18, 
‘Statistieke der Residentie Djocjokarta’, 1838, indicates that this dam at Badran irrigated 120 bau 
of ricefields.
100 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806. 
Dj.Br. 18, ‘Statistieke der Residentie Djojcjocarta’, 1838, gives a total of 2,870 bau of sawah as hav-
ing been irrigated by these newly laid out dams and channels, including Hamengkubuwana I’s 
dam at Badran. See also Appendix VI.
101 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) op Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.Dj.Br. 
18, ‘Statistieke der Residentie Djocjocarta’, 1838, mentions two dams in the Kali Bédhog in the 
Bantul Karang sub-district: Pendhawa and Gesikanreja irrigating 600 and 1,000 bau respectively.
102 Carey and Hoadley 2000:48-9. See also note 3.
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systems, built partly on the second sultan’s initiative, had led, in Waterloo’s esti-
mation, to a 25 percent increase in wet-rice cultivation in the Mataram region in 
the space of a decade (1796-1806). On a tour to Gamping, the Resident noticed 
that the main road westwards was so thronged with traders and pack-horses 
making for Yogya that he could hardly get through on horseback.103
Royal initiatives in irrigation were paralleled at the local level by the 
efforts of thousands of peasant cultivators who laid out their own simple 
networks. In the remote district of Pacitan on the south coast, many new 
ricefields had been pioneered in this fashion along the fertile valley of the 
Grindulu River.104 Meanwhile, in the sub-districts of Lowanu in northern 
Bagelèn and Menorèh in southern Kedhu, the cultivators living along the 
main Brèngkèlan to Magelang highway had been so zealous in the construc-
tion of new sawah that they had even dug up the road and planted it in many 
places!105 North of Yogya, the greater part of the irrigation systems based on 
the flow from the Merapi-Merbabu watershed were the work of farmers liv-
ing in the Slèman and Kalasan districts, and similar activities were noted in 
Pajang and Kedhu.106 In the latter province, Crawfurd pointed out that most 
of the best sawah was produced by simple irrigation ditches at the foot of the 
western volcanoes (Mount Sumbing and Mount Sundoro), writing:
The whole [of this area] has the appearance of an extensive and beautiful garden 
[irrigated by] numerous streams and rills which have their source in the high 
mountains and which, with some art, are directed into a thousand little canals and 
water courses [...] thus fertilis[ing] the [entire] country.107
Not all the core apanage lands were so fortunate and Waterloo’s assertion 
that nothing more needed to be done in the Yogya area in terms of opening 
out new ricefields was clearly wide of the mark.108 There were still many 
potentially productive areas which continued to be dependant on rain water 
to irrigate their fields: the Sendhang Pitu region between Slèman and the Kali 
Praga, for example, only began to receive adequate irrigation in the early part 
103 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806. Apart 
from the trade in rice to Yogya, many cloth merchants from Bagelèn passed through the tollgate at 
Gamping, Dj.Br. 27, Tan Jin Sing (Kapitan cina of Yogya) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 22-5-1810.
104 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 54-5, who estimated that the total amount of sawah developed by these 
initiatives was 108 jung supporting a population of 8,000. Further details can be found in Dj.Br. 
81, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 20-8-1824.
105 Dj.Br. 45, Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 
13-1-1793.
106 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:242-3; Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to 
Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
107 Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 272-3. Baud 91, ‘Copie verslag over de Residentie Kedoe van 
de Resident P. le Clercq’, 30-3-1824, also mentions the extensive local irrigation systems in pre-
Java War Kedhu.
108 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
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of the twentieth century.109 The same was true of both Gunung Kidul and 
Kulon Praga where only the most basic irrigation was attempted during the 
course of the nineteenth century and where water was still mainly obtained 
from the few available wells and dew ponds.110 
An 1836 report on the post-Java War Residency of Yogyakarta observed 
that whereas nine-tenths of the available agricultural land in Mataram proper 
was under cultivation, two-thirds of it sawah, only one hundredth of Gunung 
Kidul was farmed. The forest corvée services in the royal teak forests in the 
southern hills bore hard on the local population and many were forced to 
seek seasonal employment on the Mataram plain during the east monsoon 
(May-September) rice harvest.111 Other areas which depended on locally built 
irrigation systems, suffered severely from flooding during the rainy season 
(November-April). This was especially the case with the low-lying lands of 
Bagelèn in the vicinity of the great marshes (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
I:246), the Adikarta area of southern Kulon Praga between the town of Wates 
and the sea, and many parts of Grobogan and the eastern mancanagara which 
were under water for months on end. In these regions irrigation walls and 
dikes had to be strengthened and rebuilt nearly every year.112 Even when 
good drainage and irrigation networks had been established in productive 
areas such as Ampèl near Boyolali, the system of dividing water was often 
so complicated that numerous disputes had to be referred for arbitration to 
court officials from the patih’s office or special irrigation supervisors like the 
Surakarta pengulu banyu (‘water overseer’).113
Despite the many shortcomings, developments in irrigation during this 
period from the Giyanti treaty (1755) to the Java War wrought a profound 
change to the agriculture of the central districts. Whereas in the pre-Giyanti 
period, dry fields, mountain rice and rain-fed ricefields (sawah tadhahan) 
had been the norm, by the eve of the Java War many of the lowland areas of 
109 Proyek Irigasi Kali Progo 1973:1. Attempts had been made as early as 1847 to irrigate this area 
(Dj.Br. 3, ‘Algemeen Verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1847’), but the engineering 
work was too difficult and it only received an irrigation channel in 1909 when the Van der Wijk 
canal was opened.
110 Dj.Br. 5, ‘Algemeen Verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1876’ (on the wells and 
dew ponds in Gunung Kidul); ‘Algemeen Verslag’, 1889, 1890 (on the construction of a banjir 
canal in the Adikarta area of southern Kulon Praga in 1888 and the opening of the irrigation 
channel at Sélagiri in Gunung Kidul in 1890).
111 MvK 3055, ‘Statistieke beschrijving der Residentie Djokjokarta’, 1836.
112 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
113 Soeripto 1929:142, 145-6, 251-2; Dj.Br. 37, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius 
(Surakarta), 16-9-1810; Dj.Br. 27, Kyai Muhamad Jayiman (Ampèl) to Radèn Adipati Danureja 
II (Yogyakarta), 13-9-1810, relating a quarrel over water supplies to Jacob Andries van Braam’s 
estate at Ampèl (later taken over by J.A. Dezentjé), supplies which had to be divided up equally 
between Yogya and Sala and the porters’ guild (gladhag) at Ampèl. On the pengulu banyu, see art. 
61 of the Angger Gunung (Village Police Code) in AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 
17-2-1841 no. 16.
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south-central Java boasted large areas of irrigated sawah. This shift can be seen 
most clearly in the Javanese tax system and the method of rendering the land-
rent in two instalments at Mulud and Puwasa, which according to Rouffaer 
(1905:617-8) was only introduced in the mid-eighteenth century in response to 
the changing agricultural patterns in the core regions. Whereas earlier only one 
harvest a year had been produced on dry ricefields, the considerable extension 
of irrigation systems in the core regions had permitted an additional harvest 
of secondary crops (maize, cassava) to be gathered in many places. The central 
Javanese rulers had exploited this to raise the tax obligations of the sikep, who 
were also required to meet the costs of the additional journeys of the tax-col-
lectors (bekel) to the royal capitals. In the eastern outlying regions, however, 
where irrigation systems had not been so widely developed, the tribute was 
paid only once a year at Mulud, and the produce of any second harvest was 
kept by the cultivator (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:380). 
In the light of the available evidence, it is thus possible to modify the state-
ment of a recent historian of Madiun who wrote that ‘the Java we know today 
covered with ricefields was mainly the achievement of the nineteenth-century 
peasantry’ (Onghokham 1975:200). While this may have been the case for cer-
tain depopulated parts of east Java (p. 59), which only began to undergo signifi-
cant agricultural expansion after the end of the Java War, south-central Java was 
really transformed by the labours of the three generations of peasant cultivators 
who lived during the seventy years of peace which followed Giyanti.
Demographic growth, 1755-1825
The opening up of new lands and extension of sawah in the core regions mir-
rored a steady population growth in the south-central Java in the seventy 
years between 1755 and 1825. Although reliable population figures for the 
Principalities are not available for this period or indeed for any period up to 
1940 (Gooszen 1999:9), most European accounts point to a figure of between 
1.4 and 1.6 millions in the decade 1806-1816.114 In fact, this was probably 
somewhat of an underestimate. Crawfurd spoke of one million inhabitants in 
Yogya alone even after the British territorial annexations of August 1812,115 
which would suggest an overall figure well in excess of two million for the 
Principalities given Surakarta’s greater density of population. Estimates of 
general demographic trends, however, can be established by comparing the 
number of households recorded at the time of the cadastral survey (‘Book 
114 Daendels 1814, I:13; Raffles 1817, I:62. Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus 
Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806, suggested a total population of 1.4 millions for the Principalities 
in 1806. 
115 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 150.
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of Klepu’, 1756) which followed the Giyanti settlement (1755) with those 
registered in the ‘New Book’ (Serat Ebuk Anyar) of 1773-1774. This shows an 
increase of seventeen percent over eighteen years or around 0.9 percent per 
annum (Ricklefs 1974a:159-60). However, if this is projected for the period 
until 1795 on a compounded annualised increase basis, then a growth of 
more than 58 percent is indicated.
As Ricklefs has pointed out, however, the 1755 cacah figures were undoubt-
edly too high since they were based on conventionalized figures from the mid-
seventeenth century and bore no relationship to the demographic realities of 
mid-eighteenth century Java when the population had declined sharply due 
to years of warfare and political instability between 1675 and 1755 (Ricklefs 
1986:28-9). Given this artificially inflated 1755 figure, Ricklefs suggests that 
the population in the Javanese kingdoms and the European-controlled areas 
of the north coast was certainly growing in excess of one percent per annum 
and probably substantially more than that in many areas in the late eighteenth 
century.116 This may have some important implications for recent scholars of 
Java’s demographic history who have tried to explain the island’s remarkable 
‘population explosion’ entirely in nineteenth-century (especially post-1830) 
terms (Peper 1970:71-84; Widjojo Nitisastro 1970:1-26; Boomgaard 1980:35-52).
European observers were particularly struck by the age structure of 
the population in the Principalities and the large number of children born 
between 1785 and 1805, exactly the same period which, as we have seen, wit-
nessed the greatest extension of agricultural land and the foundation of new 
villages in the core regions. In these two decades, live births in the Yogya area 
had apparently exceeded deaths by a factor seven to five. Children under the 
age of five seemed especially numerous although it was precisely this age 
group which was most prone to the very high rate of infant and child mortal-
ity in Java during these years.117 
In the outlying provinces, however, the population actually fell by about 
five percent between 1755 and 1773. This was partly due to the fact that these 
regions were never able to recover from the depredations caused by the war-
fare of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It was also a result of 
the move to include large areas of the mancanagara such as Banyumas in the 
core regions in order to provide more apanage land for the growing court 
populations. This redesignation of territory, which occurred in 1773-1774 
(Ricklefs 1974a:159), also had an effect on the demography of the outlying 
areas. But even if this had not taken place, the figures for population growth 
116 Ricklefs 1986:29-30; Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard 
(Semarang), 28-2-1806, estimated (on the conservative basis of five adults per cacah) that the 
population of the Principalities had risen from 905,000 in 1755 to 1.4 millions in 1806.
117 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806. In 
1823, about two-fifths of the estimated 328,921 inhabitants of Kedhu were said to be children 
under the age of twelve, Baud 91, P. le Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag der Residentie Kadoe over het jaar 
1823’ (henceforth Le Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag’), 30-3-1824.
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in the outlying areas would still show a slower rate of increase than the 
central districts. Raffles’ statistics in his History of Java seem to confirm this. 
Thus in 1815 the ‘eastern mancanagara and distant areas’ only accounted for 
ten percent of the total population in Surakarta and slightly under twenty 
percent in Yogyakarta (Raffles 1817, I:62, 228). The densest population at 
the time of the British government census of 1815 was Semarang with 281 
inhabitants per square miles, followed by Kedhu with 239. Yogyakarta and 
Surakarta, both with a population of 147 per square mile came sixth in den-
sity after Pekalongan, Batavia and its environs (Bataviasche Ommelanden), 
Priangan and Rembang. The average for Java as a whole was a little over 100, 
but the mancanagara regions were even below that. The causes for their demo-
graphic deficit were probably local: the prevailing insecurity in the outlying 
territories which we will explore in more detail shortly, and the structure of 
the royal administrations which delegated power to the bupati in the outlying 
areas but ruled directly through the patih in the core districts. 
Public health
Apart from the long period of peace which followed the Giyanti settlement 
together with the incentives for farming and opening up new land, the steady 
population growth in south-central Java in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries seems to have been encouraged by a number of benign condi-
tions: first, the lack of large-scale epidemics and the health of the peasant popu-
lations; second, the availability of adequate food supplies and the balanced diet 
of families in country areas; third, the very early marriages in rural communi-
ties and the importance of children in the Javanese peasant economy.
The generally healthy condition of the Javanese peasantry at this time 
was referred to by Raffles (1817, I:69). Although he was attempting to draw a 
favourable picture of the five-year British interregnum (1811-1816), it is clear 
that there were no large-scale epidemics until April 1821 when the first of a 
cycle of virulent Asiatic cholera infections reached Java from Bengal and the 
Malay Peninsula.118 The only serious ailment in terms of mortality in pre-1821 
south-central Java was smallpox, which wrought such havoc amongst infants 
and children that it was nicknamed the ‘child’s disease’ or lara bocah by the 
Javanese (Winter 1902:78; Peper 1975:51). A Dutch report on Kedhu in 1823 
noted that although two-fifths of the total population of 330,000 were under 
twelve, one-third of these children succumbed to smallpox and other related 
diseases before their twelfth birthday. Forty-five percent of all deaths in the 
province were apparently accounted for by children.119 
118 Muller 1832:1-111; Schillet 1832:115-81; Crawfurd 1971:120-1; Carey 1986:123, 132.
119 Baud 91, Le Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag’, 30-3-1824.
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Despite its virulence, smallpox never reached serious epidemic propor-
tions as in some European countries in the eighteenth century because of the 
fact that the Javanese rural population mainly lived in scattered village set-
tlements and large and densely inhabited urban centres were rare. Moreover, 
Javanese parents usually made provision for the high infant mortality by 
having more children (Raffles 1817, I:72). In the words of the aged patih (first 
minister) of Yogya, Danureja I (in office circa 1755-1799):
Too long a period of peace was just as disastrous as a time of [prolonged] warfare 
for the inhabitants [of south-central Java] and people regarded child deaths as a 
wise provision of Providence.120
A start was made on smallpox vaccination in the Principalities in 1804, 
although the number of children immunised remained extremely small until 
well after the Java War.121 
120 Baud 306, Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk, ‘Nota voor den Prov. Res. den Majoor Nahuijs te 
Djocjocarta’ (henceforth: Van IJsseldijk, ‘Nota’), 22-10-1816, in ‘Rapport van W.H. van IJsseldijk 
omtrent de vorstenlanden’, 11-12-1816.
121 Peper 1975:49-70. The second sultan of Yogya supported vaccination when it was first 
Plate 7. Sketch by the Belgian artist, A.A.J. Payen (1792-1853) of a south-central 
Javanese scene with a weaver carrying his spinning wheel talking to a female jamu 
(herbal medicine) seller. Photograph from the A.A. Payen collection (sketchbook 
WE/76). Courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden.
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Diet and peasant lifestyles
This absence of pandemics until the third decade of the nineteenth century 
was partly the result of good fortune: Java’s situation as an island was cer-
tainly important here. But it was also due to a greater resistance to disease 
amongst the Javanese population as a whole, itself the outcome of the greater 
availability of foodstuffs in this period. In this respect, it is no coincidence 
that the cholera epidemics of the 1820s should have occurred during years of 
drought, harvest failure and warfare. The localised famines which resulted 
from the deteriorating agricultural situation during this third decade of the 
nineteenth century led to a sharp decline in the health and dietary patterns of 
the rural populations of south-central Java. In the 1820s, for example, observ-
ers noted an increased consumption of less nutritious secondary food crops 
such as maize, cassava as well as other tubers and vegetables gleaned from 
forests and waste lands.122 But until that decade of economic crisis, disease 
and conflict, most of the inhabitants of the south-central Javanese country-
side could enjoy a mainly rice diet and times of dearth were rare.123 The only 
exception was the yearly ‘hungry gap’ when the new season’s rice crop was 
being planted with the onset of the rains in November. At those times, accord-
ing to a report from Bagelèn, the price of padi (unhusked rice) could exceed 
by 200-300 percent that which a farmer could get for his crop at the time of 
the rice harvest (Toestand van Bagelen 1858:76).
A detailed insight into the dietary habits of the various social classes in 
Java at this time was given by J.W. Winter who served as Residency translator 
introduced from Mauritius in December 1804, but a failed vaccination on the fourth sultan in 
1820 turned the court against it, Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard 
(Semarang), 27-12-1804; Dj.Br. 51B, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Inspector of 
Vaccine (Batavia), 10-8-1820; Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja 
IV (Yogyakarta), 22-7-1823. Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen’s 1820-1821 decrees 
on smallpox vaccination (Reglementen op de uitoefening der koepokinenting in Nederlandsch-Indië in 
Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-4-1820, 19-4-1821 no. 16) had some effect on 
vaccinations in government-administered areas: the number of children vaccinated in Kedhu 
rose from 1,745 in 1820 to 5,273 in 1832, but in Yogya vaccinations were completely halted during 
the war years and hovered at between 1-3,000 in 1830-1847 when there was still great distrust of 
the measure, Dj.Br. 58, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Commissarissen ter regeling der vorsten-
landen, 16-6-1830; Dj.Br. 3, ‘Algemeen verslagen over der residentie Djokjokarta’, 1833-1847. See 
further Winter 1902:78; Chapter VIII.
122 Raffles 1817, I:123; Winter 1902:49; Dj.Br. 51c, R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta) to Director of 
Finances (Batavia), 26-6-1821. Dj.Br. 4, ‘Algemeen Verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het 
jaar 1855’, on the consumption of palawija crops after a long drought and the failure of the rice 
harvest.
123 Raffles 1817, I:99, 108, 123. There is no evidence to support the assertion by Sollewijn Gelpke 
and Scheltema that palawija crops and not rice were the staple food of the Javanese peasantry in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Peper 1975:42-3. For general observations on 
food consumption amongst peasants in early nineteenth-century Java, see Crawfurd, ‘Landed 
tenures’, 237; and Raffles 1817, I:99.
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at both Yogyakarta (1799-1806) and Surakarta (1806-1820). Winter reported 
that the usual food of the Javanese ‘middle class’, by which he probably 
meant the inhabitants of the court towns, was rice with some dried fish and 
vegetables. This fare would be considerably more lavish on festive occasions 
when chicken and meat were consumed (Winter 1902:47). The ‘common’ 
Javanese, meanwhile, had a much more ‘sobre’ lifestyle, but still possessed 
enough to purchase a sufficient quantity of daily sustenance. According to 
Winter, 12 duit (copper farthings) a day were adequate for an unmarried 
man.124 These would be spent as follows: three duit on betelnut and tobacco, 
three duit on vegetables, salt and soybean cake, and six duit on rice. A farmer 
with a wife and children could exist on 25 duit a day with the wife contribut-
ing about four duit a day to the family budget by her activities at the loom 
or by acting as a tradeswoman carrying goods produced by the family to the 
local market (Winter 1902:47-8). In this context, the sale of produce from the 
farmer’s fruit and vegetable gardens was often of some economic significance 
in supplementing the family budget as Raffles noted (Raffles 1817, I:110):
What can be spared of the fruits of their joint industry […] is carried to market and 
exchanged for a little salt fish, dried meat or other trifling comforts, hoarded as a 
store for the purchase of an ox or buffalo, or expended in procuring materials for 
repairing the hut and mending the implements of husbandry.
Although Raffles mentioned the purchase of salt fish and dried deer meat, 
these did not form a staple part of the ordinary Javanese peasant diet except 
in areas close to the sea coasts such as Pacitan and Bagelèn or in the more 
heavily afforested outer regions where there was an abundance of livestock 
(buffalo), as well as wild deer and game.125 Only rice and salt were regarded 
124 Payments for day labourers varied considerably at this time: Yogya coolies working on the 
post road (postweg) in Pekalongan received two duit a day with one kati of rice (1 kati = 0.617 kgs) 
and one-tenth of a kati of salt, Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja 
IV (Yogyakarta), 3-4-1823; workers in the Chinese-run sugar factories at Ampèl were given 15 
duit (18 cents) a day and government coolies in Semarang as much as 25 duit (30 cents), Dj.Br. 
30, Dr Daniel Ainslie (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia) 30-11-1815; Journal 1854:158; whereas 
those working in the Chinese-run sugar factories in Kedhu earned 25-30 cents, and those in 
Bagelèn 35 cents a day, Residentie Kadoe 1871:103. Members of the porters’ guild (gladhag) in 
the court towns were paid a retainer of eight duit (10 cents) whether they worked or not, Van 
Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 49-50. During the Java War, daily wages for coolies rose to 30 duit 
(40 cents) in Yogya and 25 duit (30 cents) in outlying Dutch forts (bènthèng), but fell back to half 
those figures in 1830, Dj.Br. 58, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Commissarissen ter regeling der 
vorstenlanden, 3-6-1830. See further Chapter IX note 72.
125 Dj.Br. 46, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806; 
Büchler 1888, I:415 (on trade in buffalo from mancanagara to Yogya and Sala for slaughter); 
Mack.Pr. 21 (5), J. Crawfurd, ‘Report upon the District of Pachitan’, 1812-13:170 (on consumption 
of dried fish); Mack.Pr. 21 (10), Lt. H.G. Jourdan, ‘Report on Japan and Wirosobo’, 28-4-1813:350; 
Berlin SB MS. Or. Fol. 568 (Radèn Adipati Cakranagara I, ‘Diary of the Purwareja Regency, 
1833-60’) (henceforth: Cakranagara, ‘Diary’), 5, 17 (on wild buffalo [banthèng], deer, hogs, jungle 
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as being the two necessities of life in south-central Java and of the latter, the 
local inhabitants preferred the stronger tasting south coast variety to the 
cheaper product from the north coast.126 There were, however, many regional 
differences in eating habits: in Kedhu, for example, where a wide range of 
local fruit and vegetables were grown, the inhabitants were noted as having 
a better diet than in some of the neighbouring districts such as Karang Kobar, 
Ledhok, Gowong and Sélamanik where such commodities were scarce.127 
More specialised delicacies, such as fish and shrimp sauces, prepared on 
the north coast, were eaten widely in south-central Java at this time as were 
chicken and duck eggs, particularly salted Muscovy duck eggs which were 
useful on long journeys (Raffles 1817, I:98-9). The only foodstuffs which do 
not seem to have been properly exploited were dairy products for which the 
Javanese apparently had an aversion.128
A description of the ‘sobre’ lifestyle of the Javanese peasant cultivator and 
day labourer in early nineteenth-century south-central Java is given by Winter 
in his account of Surakarta between 1806 and 1820 (Winter 1902:49). He related 
how a farmer would usually leave singing for his fields before sunrise at five 
o’clock every morning. His first meal would be eaten at noon. A second repast 
would be taken shortly before sunset on his return home, but some cultivators 
only ate once a day. He would rarely burn an oil lamp, but would rely instead 
on the light of his hearth fire which was usually situated in the centre of the 
house and was lit both for night-time warmth and to protect him from the 
clouds of mosquitoes. The houses and huts used by the Javanese peasantry at 
this time were usually of a very simple construction: the single-hipped roof 
dwelling (omah limasan) being preferred. In this respect, the style of peasant 
architecture in the central and eastern parts of Java was less elaborate than in 
the mountainous western (Priangan) regions because of the greater scarcity 
of suitable building materials. This was also partly due to Dutch encroach-
fowl [ayam alas], and peacocks hunted by local inhabitants and sent to the courts and Purwareja 
[Bagelèn] kabupatèn as delicacies for the rulers’/bupati’s table).
126 Dj.Br. 3, F.G. Valck, ‘Algemeen Verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1836’, 31-3-
1837, where Valck noted that even though south sea salt was almost ten times as expensive as 
the north coast variety (a government monopoly since 1814, IOL G21/69, Order of Lieutenant-
Governor [T.S. Raffles] in Council establishing salt monopoly, 29-11-1814), Javanese in the 
Principalities preferred it because of its greater flavour. One can only speculate that both these 
‘staffs of life’ – rice and south sea salt – would have had a spiritual resonance for Javanese coming 
as they did from the realms of the rice goddess, Déwi Sri, and the goddess of the southern ocean, 
Ratu Kidul. See further Houben 1994:89; Chapter VIII note 126.
127 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:234-7, 245-6; Hogendorp 153¹ pt.b, Willem van Hogendorp, 
‘Over den Staat van Java’ no. 1 (Kedhu, 1827), 80 (better diet of Kedhu population and export of 
onions and cauliflowers to northeast coast/pasisir); Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 75-7 (on fruit, 
vegetables and peanuts [kacang] grown in Merapi-Merbabu area). See further Chapter IX note 80.
128 Raffles 1817, I:96; Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 90; ‘Report on Pachitan’, 194 (on astonish-
ingly low milk yield of Javanese cows and lack of dairy products in diet); Carey 1977:310 (on 
dairy trade between Kedhu, Boyolali and the courts by ex-Sepoy soldiers).
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ments on the teak forests in the eastern mancanagara regions bordering the 
north coast, an issue to which we shall return in later chapters.129 According 
to Winter, the ambitions of the average Javanese peasant cultivator were very 
modest, being limited to saving enough money for the purchase of a buffalo 
which would give him sufficient independence to work his lands by himself 
for half a day. ‘Then’, in Winter’s words, ‘he [counts himself] rich and more 
satisfied than the wealthiest man’ (Winter 1902:48). 
The lifestyle of a Javanese coolie or member of the porters’ guilds in the 
court towns was even more spartan. Winter noticed that they would often 
sleep out in the open at night when they were carrying loads on the highways, 
and even when their duties were discharged they would only have a tumble-
down shed or hut to return to. Their bed was usually a coarse mat of woven 
coconut leaves laid out on the bare ground. A simple set of clothes comprising 
a head-dress, jacket and breeches, all woven out of rough cloth and purchased 
once a year from a second-hand clothes dealer, would constitute their entire 
wardrobe. When these were being washed in a convenient river once every two 
months, the coolie would stretch himself out in the sun until his clothes had 
dried. Despite the simplicity of his attire and livelihood, the porter was better 
off, in Winter’s view, than the impoverished mountain dweller in the isolated 
hill regions whose only dress was a simple loin cloth (Winter 1902:48).
Early marriage and the value of children
Although the Javanese peasant lived in a plain fashion, there were few 
restraints against marriage and European observers noted that it was custom-
ary for Javanese in country areas to marry early: the men at around sixteen 
and the women at between thirteen and fourteen.130 This was because mar-
riage had distinct financial advantages: women were generally recognised 
to be more dexterous than men in money matters and they would usually 
make an important contribution to the household budget by their market-
ing activities (Raffles 1817, I:353). Celibacy was also viewed with distaste 
in Javanese peasant culture: Crawfurd related that ‘an old maid is quite 
unknown amongst Javanese women because however old or ugly, they never 
find difficulty getting a husband’.131 Divorces were also frequent in Javanese 
rural communities and couples would part with very little ceremony in order 
129 See Chapters V and VI.
130 Raffles 1817, I:70; Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 149; ‘Report on Pachitan’, 169. The same 
situation was true of the court communities, see Chapter II on the age profile of Dipanagara’s 
mother and father at the time of his birth on 11-11-1785. Geertz 1961:56, describes early marriages 
amongst women in contemporary Java.
131 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 149.
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to choose new partners. The practice was apparently so common that on his 
inspection journeys Crawfurd was shown individuals of both sexes who had 
had as many as ten or twelve different ‘marital’ (namely, sexual) partners.132
Modern rural sociologists have pointed out that frequent divorces usually 
mean fewer births per woman and longer gaps between them, but it is clear 
that children were highly valued by peasant cultivators in rural south-central 
Java at this time and played a vital role in the Javanese peasant economy (White 
1975:127-46). According to Raffles (1817, I:70, 109), most peasant cultivators 
would raise families of between eight and ten children, only half of whom 
would survive into adolescence. Infants were an economic burden on their 
parents for only a very short time and, provided they survived the scourges 
of endemic diseases like smallpox, they soon became valuable assistants in 
the houses and fields. Boys were sometimes given a short period of Qur’ānic 
education with a local kaum or modin (village ‘priest’), but most started work 
immediately after they reached the age of eight.133 At that stage, boys were 
taught the rudiments of agriculture, while girls received instruction from older 
female family members in spinning and weaving, an occupation at which 
they would be active, in Winter’s words, ‘day and night’, turning out coarsely 
woven clothes for their families and more finely worked materials for the local 
market (Winter 1902:50; Raffles 1817, I:86; Lettres de Java 1829:101). Some also 
took part in agricultural duties, particularly the transplanting and harvesting of 
rice, activities which were regarded as the particular preserve of women. Thus 
a large family was an undoubted asset to peasant cultivators who had oppor-
tunities to open out new land but continued to face increasingly onerous fiscal 
and corvée demands from the rulers and apanage holders (Raffles 1817, I:70).
Rural criminality, social bandits and fighting cocks
Two elements, however, were working against the prosperity of the core 
regions in this period: the lack of security in the countryside and the increas-
ingly burdensome demands of the royal administrations, especially in the 
second sultan’s Yogya. The issue of insecurity has already been touched on 
132 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 150; Jourdan, ‘Report on Japan and Wirosobo’, 349 (on the 
frequency of divorces and the unfaithfulness of the women in the eastern mancanagara).
133 Dj.Br.19¹¹, F.V.H.A. de Stuers (?), ‘Inleiding tot de geschiedenis van den oorlog op Java’ 
(henceforth: De Stuers, ‘Inleiding’), n.y., 37 (on the education of village boys in Qur’ān repetition 
[turutan], Arabic prayers and the study of Arabic letters [alip-alipan] from their seventh year); AN, 
Kabinet 1431, 19-9-1831, Secretary of Kedhu Residency (Magelang) to Johannes van den Bosch 
(Batavia), 29-9-1831 (on the reluctance of parents to leave their children long at local religious 
boarding schools [pesantrèn] because they needed them for agricultural duties); Winter 1902:49 
(on neglect of formal education for children by peasant families and concentration on instruction 
in agriculture and weaving).
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in connection with the volatility of tenure arrangements, the village wars, 
and the activities of the numpang or day labourers. We have seen how some 
of these landless labourers drifted into semi-criminal activities after they had 
left their villages. Others joined the bands of robbers and highwaymen which 
roved country regions. These were often led by men of local influence and 
charisma. Known as jago (‘fighting cocks’), they had a popular reputation 
for magical invulnerability (kebal) and innate spiritual power (Onghokham 
1975:63-9; Anderson 1972:9). In the years before the Java War, such village jago 
provided local leadership in the numerous village wars, or helped to expand 
village boundaries and defend its interests. During the war itself many were 
appointed as army commanders in their local areas by Dipanagara (Carey 
1981a:243 note 36). A few of these men were what Eric Hobsbawm has called 
‘social bandits’: rural leaders ‘who remained within peasant society, and were 
considered by their people as heroes, champions, fighters for justice, perhaps 
even leaders of liberation’. Oppressive landlords and government agents, 
especially Chinese tollgate keepers or bandar, were their natural enemies and it 
would have been unthinkable for them to snatch the peasants’ harvest in their 
own territory. Others were more clearly freebooters, rural criminals who were 
prepared to commit any crime on the orders of a superior or for personal gain. 
They thus lacked the special relationship with the local population which 
made banditry social (Hobsbawm 1969:13-5).
A good description of a jago figure, probably based on a real character 
who became one of Dipanagara’s henchmen in Kedhu,134 can be found in 
the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara. During the confrontation with 
the prince’s supporters over the construction of the road across his estate at 
Tegalreja in July 1825, the immediate casus belli for the Java War,135 this man 
is depicted in the chronicle boasting of himself in bravado fashion (Carey 
1981a:28-9):
III. 18 Come on men of the Dipanagaran
  fall back immediately!
 19 It is as if you have not heard the news yet
  that I am a picked champion,
  a [robber] chieftain [and] leader in Kedhu
  of the bandits of Parakan.
  No forged weapon is strong enough for me!
The elements of bombast and magical invulnerability which lay at the heart of 
the jago’s charisma are here nicely depicted. A more historical example of a jago 
134 For a description of a bandit chief in northeastern Kedhu who rallied to Dipanagara and on 
whom this figure may have been based, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:90-1.
135 See pp. 597-600.
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figure and the popular awe which he could arouse can be found in a Dutch 
report on a rebel leader or kraman from Cirebon who took refuge in Bagelèn 
in 1808. Described as being small in height with long sideburns and dressed 
in a flowing tabard of checked linen cloth (kabaya ginggang), this man evoked 
respect because of his presumed magical power and the royal authorities 
found it difficult to get locals to touch him still less cooperate in his arrest.136
Some local jago held important positions in the provincial administration 
and the Dutch Resident of Yogya complained in 1807 that a number of district 
chiefs were placing themselves at the head of robber bands.137 The martial 
and energetic spirit of the Yogyakarta inhabitants when compared to their 
more easygoing compatriots in Surakarta was noted by a later Dutch official 
who remarked that most of the successful bandit leaders in south-central Java 
were from the sultan’s dominions (Van der Kemp 1897:14 note 1). Demang 
Jayamenggala, the tax-collector of the rich désa of Samèn to the south of 
Yogya, was an example of just such an enterprising sub-district official who 
doubled as a social bandit. Renowned as an expert in gunpowder manufac-
ture, he later became leader of all Dipanagara’s bandit supporters to the south 
of the sultan’s capital (Carey 1981a:243 note 36, 275 note 166).
Some villages strategically situated on roads, river crossings and border 
areas, where opportunities for smuggling and plunder were great, were used 
as the headquarters of brigands and highwaymen. One of these villages in 
the foothills of Mount Merbabu, which belonged to Yogya and had a sizeable 
population, was apparently so totally controlled by robber leaders that all the 
inhabitants, even down to the village ‘priest’, were involved in sorties into 
adjacent Dutch-controlled territory.138 The désa of Témpèl in the Slèman area 
athwart the main Yogya-Magelang post-road was another such bandit centre: 
its inhabitants apparently preyed on the busy highway traffic (the stone walls 
on each side of the post-road providing convenient hiding places) and later 
terrorised European leased estates and villages on the flanks of Mount Merapi 
in the years immediately preceding the Java War.139 It was the same with the 
settlements along the Praga River, which commanded certain key crossing 
points, such as Mangiran and Kamijara whose local bandits were supposedly 
136 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 2-8-1808; Nagtegaal 
1996:190-1, 209-12 (on the role of the santri as kraman and bandit leaders).
137 Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 10-12-
1807.
138 Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 3-12-1807. 
On the greater incidence of banditry in frontier regions, see Hobsbawm 1969:16-7; Nagtegaal 
1996:182-3, 190-1, 209-12.
139 Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (Batavia), 5-9-1823; A.H. 
Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillavry (Surakarta), 6-9-1823. The stone walls were later 
taken down during the Java War to prevent Dutch convoys being ambushed by Dipanagara’s troops, 
Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 11-8-1825.
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summoned by Dipanagara in mid-July 1825 to coordinate resistance before 
the outbreak of the Java War (Carey 1981a:243 note 36). Jelegong and another 
settlement further to the north, which had inhabitants who were feared and 
respected, were also reported to have rendered assistance to the prince (Carey 
1981a:262 note 112, 282 note 197). Known as ‘elders of the hunt’ (tuwa buru), 
they made their living by trapping tigers for the tiger spearing or rampog macan 
contests at the courts, a difficult and dangerous occupation which involved 
the use of secret charms and great personal bravery (D’Almeida 1864, II:35-7; 
Brandes 1900:184; Kartomi 1976, V:9-15, VI:7-13; Carey and Hoadley 2000:31). 
The numerous links between the local jago/bandits in the Yogya area and 
Dipanagara – links which are even today the subject of critical comment by 
Yogya contemporaries140 – underline an important aspect of rural criminality 
in Java in the early part of the nineteenth century, namely the close associa-
tion between certain robber chiefs and court notables. Certain members of 
the sultan’s family earned themselves notorious reputations as paymasters 
of bandits in the early nineteenth century.141 One young nobleman, Pangéran 
Mangkudiningrat II, a nephew of Dipanagara, who would later report the 
support given his uncle by the criminal elements in Javanese rural soci-
ety (Chapter IX), even had some of his lands confiscated during the reign 
of the fourth sultan (1814-1822) because of his brazen use of jago in raids 
on Chinese-run tollgates.142 Although most of the connections established 
between priyayi and bandits were for financial gain, some had a political 
purpose. Dipanagara’s reliance on bandits as auxiliaries during the Java War 
has already been noted. They were also implicated in his uncle, Pangéran 
Dipasana’s, revolt in Kedhu in February 1822.143
The second sultan himself employed bandits for both purposes. An 1801 
report noted that he seemed loathe to curb his father-in-law, Kyai Adipati 
Purwadiningrat, the bupati of Magetan’s (in office 1797-1810) sponsorship of 
bandits in his district because he derived such a substantial cut from them.144 
140 Dipanagara is still compared unfavourably with his great-grandfather, Sultan Mangkubumi, 
in some Yogya circles because the latter did not rely on bandits during his war against the Dutch 
(1746-1755), interviews with B.P.H. Adinegara, Yogya, 8-12-1971; W.S. Rendra, Yogya, 24-2-1972.
141 Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 3-2-1807; 
Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808, refer to the following Yogya pangéran as having had 
links with bandits: Ngabèhi, Pamot, Demang, and Abubakar/Dipawijaya I. On their relationship 
to the sultan’s family, see Appendix VIII.
142 GKA, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Pangéran Mangkudining-
rat II, 13-4-1830; Dj.Br. 9B, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 22-4-
1831; AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 6-12-1831 La F, Note of F.G. Valck, 22-10-1831; 
Meinsma 1876:131.
143 NA, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 7-3-1822 no. 34.
144 Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 8-11-1801, 
29-9-1802, 22-11-1802, where Van den Berg noted that robber bands were more active in the dry 
monsoon (May-November) than in the rainy season (November-April).
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Six years later, the sultan was suspected of having been involved with a par-
ticularly well accoutred robber band which was rounded up by Dutch cav-
alry after an attack on a Chinese tollgate keeper at Salatiga.145 Meanwhile, the 
ambush by a group of bandits in the area of the Jambu hills in northern Kedhu 
of the unpopular and sickly Yogya Resident, Pieter Engelhard (in office 1808, 
1810-1811) as he journeyed to Semarang to relinquish his post in mid-Novem-
ber 1811 was clearly a politically motivated action sanctioned by the ruler.146
In the eastern mancanagara districts the political authority of the local bupati 
was largely dependant on their use of criminal elements in the countryside. 
Here robbery for profit was widespread and bandit leaders were less selec-
tive about their targets. As we have seen, the prestige of the powerful Yogya 
bupati wedana of Madiun, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (?1779-1810; in office 
1796-1810), himself the grandson of an influential jago figure from Sokawati 
was largely derived from his adroit use of robber bands.147 Indeed, the scale 
of bandit activities in the eastern provinces was so extensive that in some 
areas such as Jipang the population had begun to fall drastically. In 1813, the 
British Resident, Lieutenant George Richard Pemberton, reported that ‘family 
after family’ had quit the district because ‘it was so infested with thieves that 
it was unsafe to sleep’. Good agricultural land had reverted to an uncultivated 
state leaving the area ‘most wild and desolate’ in many places.148 It was appar-
ently the same in the neighbouring Surakarta mancanagara province of Jagaraga 
where robber bands, based in the mountain regions, plundered local villages 
and smuggled opium.149 An insight into the sheer scale of the banditry in these 
eastern outlying districts can be gained from the description of an attack on 
a Chinese-run customs’ post and settlement referred to as ‘Bunder’ (from the 
Javanese-Malay bandar, tollgate, customs’ post) on the borders of Kertasana and 
Surabaya on 25 May 1808 which involved no less than 250 bandits armed with 
pikes, clubs and blazing torches.150 The security situation in these areas was 
rendered even more critical by the second sultan’s policy of banning all petty 
145 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 15-6-
1808, who reported the capture of a fine musket worth 200 Spanish dollars as well as numerous 
Japanese (samurai) broadswords.
146 Hageman 1857:414; BL Add MS. 45272, T.S. Raffles (Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-
1812. On a similar action by a Yogya band which was suspected of plundering the baggage train 
of the British Resident of Surakarta, Hugh Hope, in November 1812, S.Br. 24, John Crawfurd 
(Yogyakarta) to Hugh Hope (Surakarta), 2-11-1812.
147 See pp. 219-21; and Nagtegaal 1996:184-5 for use of armed guards by north coast priyayi and 
Madurese rulers in early eighteenth century.
148 Mack.Pr. 21 (9), G.R. Pemberton, ‘Report on Djiepan [Jipang]’ (henceforth: Pemberton, 
‘Djiepan’), 1-4-1813, 335-6; IOL Eur. F 148/23 (Secret & Political no. 1), T.S. Raffles (Batavia) to 
Lord Minto (Calcutta), 6-8-1812. On the disposition of the Jipang population, which P.H. van 
Lawick van Pabst described as being ‘amongst the worst and most difficult to rule in the whole 
of Java’, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:360.
149 S.Br. 127, ‘Oostelijke montjo-negorosche landen’, 1830.
150 Dj.Br. 38, Relaas of spy Ranawijaya (Bunder) to Radèn Adipati Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 
31-5-1808. On this Bunder raid and its aftermath, see pp. 195-6.
Plate 8. A Jayèng Sekar (mounted constabulary) in the early nineteenth century. 
Taken from Hardouin and Ritter 1853-55:236.
52
I The south-central Javanese world 53
criminals from Yogya to the eastern districts, and making the bupati wedana 
responsible for their supervision.151 We will see below how, during the period 
of Marshal Daendels’ administration (1808-1811), the whole issue of rural crim-
inality and the border raids into adjacent European-government controlled ter-
ritories would involve the Yogya court and the head of the eastern mancanagara 
districts in a crisis which would cost the bupati wedana his life.152
The forces of law and order
Few steps were taken by the courts or even by the European government 
to establish an effective system of police.153 In 1808, Daendels, drawing on 
Majapahit precedent (Stutterheim 1948:65), established a corps of mounted 
constabulary known as Jayèng Sekar, which was recruited from the sons 
of well-to-do Javanese court official families and was trained by European 
instructors. But it was organised on far too small a scale to have much impact 
in rural areas. Indeed, the duties of the Jayèng Sekar were mainly restricted 
to mounting night patrols in European-controlled towns, serving as escorts 
for prisoners and treasure convoys and accompanying officials when they 
went on inspection journeys. When serious trouble broke out, as for example 
in February 1822 in Kedhu when the sultan’s uncle went into revolt, a regular 
cavalry unit of European hussars had to be called up from the nearest Dutch 
garrison in Semarang in order to reinforce the meagre constabulary forces in 
Magelang.154 Police methods in both the Principalities and government areas 
relied heavily on a network of police informers and spies. Judicial torture 
rather than detective work was used to extract confessions, particularly in 
the Principalities where trial by ordeal was a common feature of the judicial 
process up to its abolition by Raffles in August 1812 (Van Deventer 1891:319, 
329; Carey 1987:296; Chapter VIII). An insight into the police methods used 
in the Principalities at this time can be seen from the Surakarta version of the 
Babad Dipanagara’s account of the behaviour of the Macanan (‘tigers’) police 
unit responsible for security in the sultan’s capital (Carey 1981a:20-1, 28-9, 
249 note 55):
II.  15 They did exactly as they wished
  Their duty was to make the rounds at night
  [and] make tours inside the capital.
151 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806, 
who noted that Radèn Rongga was so afraid of incurring a heavy fine if any of the banished 
criminals slipped back to Yogya that he put most of them to death.
152 See Chapter VI.
153 Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 309; Jourdan, ‘Report on Japan and Wirasaba’, 356.
154 Raffles 1817, I:299; Lettres de Java 1822:20; Van der Chijs 1895-97, XV:164-6, XVI:545-6; pp. 
495-9 (on Pangéran Dipasana’s revolt in Kedhu in February 1822); Baud 91, P. le Clercq, ‘Copie-
Verslag Kedoe’, 1823, 8-9 (on the 35 Jayèng Sekar stationed in Magelang at that time).




























  The evil folk they saw,
  if it was daytime, were prohibited
  from [playing] gimer, keplèk and kubuk [games of chance with 
    dice and coins].
  As a matter of fact they were old hands at the trade,
  [and] if the alarm sounded 
  at the first thump, a Macanan would arrive,
 16 and at the third thump
  the Macanan would descend like drizzle:
  […] young Macanan all at once
  would be ready to gather evidence,
  in high spirits,
  as if they expected to encounter 
  gold dinars of a dhacin in weight.
  [...] 
III.16  [...] 
  They were puffed up with flattery and self-glorification.
  Their daily task
  was to strike people guilty of theft and robbery
  when they lay face down and bound on a bench,
  [then] they hit them time and again. 
Plate 9. A Chinese tailor and his assistant in early nineteenth-century Java. Sketch by 
the Belgian artist A.A.J. Payen (1792-1853). Photograph from A.A.J. Payen collection 
(Sketchbook E no. 778). Courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden.
I The south-central Javanese world 55
The courts also appointed a special group of officials, known as gunung in 
Surakarta and tamping in Yogyakarta, to oversee policing in the country-
side. But they were required to combine these duties with a range of other 
responsibilities and their salaries were paid out of the taxes they raised in 
their assigned districts. They were thus more often a burden than a help to 
the local population and moves were undertaken to abolish them completely 
during the administrative reforms of the third sultan in 1812-1814.155 Police 
matters were likewise complicated by the close juxtaposition of Yogya and 
Sala lands in the core districts which meant that criminals could easily slip 
across jurisdictions and seek asylum in lands belonging to another court. 
Investigations of crimes committed in areas situated far from the royal 
capitals also usually entailed the dispatch of lengthy commissions by the 
patih. This was the case with all incidents of a serious nature in the outlying 
districts and was sometimes necessary in the central regions as well. As we 
will see in greater detail in Chapter V, some attempts were made to establish 
better cooperation between officials of both courts in security matters during 
this period, most notably by the agreements signed between the Yogya and 
Sala chief ministers at Klathèn in 1804 and 1808.156 But there was no lasting 
improvement until the complete separation of the territories owned by the 
courts in the core regions in 1830-1831 (Houben 1994:143-50).
Security matters were thus left largely in the hands of private individuals 
and communities. Most villages in south-central Java were fortified with thick 
bamboo palisades which were sharpened when bandits were reported to be 
in the vicinity. In the district of Prabalingga in southern Kedhu, the security 
situation was so bad that the villages were ringed by stone walls.157 Many 
local communities also had their own stocks of weapons and Javanese farmers 
would often carry a kris (stabbing dagger) with them for personal protection 
when they went to their fields. They were also usually well versed in the use 
of traditional Javanese weapons such as clubs, pikes and slings, and this local 
military expertise later proved of immense value to Dipanagara during the Java 
War.158 Chinese tollgate keepers in isolated areas depended for protection on 
their own private bodyguards who were drawn from the mixed race Chinese 
coolies attached to the tollgate. In the troubled eastern provinces, for exam-
155 Toestand van Bagelen 1858:77; Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:550-1; Winter 1902:33; Rouffaer 
1905:614.
156 Dj.Br. 42 (ii), ‘Kopij boek van contracten Djokjo, 1755-1812’, 79-84 (contract of 26-9-1808), 
87-96 (contract of 27-9-1804). See IOL Eur. F 148/18, ‘Memoirs of Java at the time of the capture. 
Collected by Captain [William] Robison’, 24-9-1811, for an English translation. See further pp. 
196-7.
157 Dj.Br. 19¹¹, De Stuers, ‘Inleiding’, 2-4.
158 Raffles 1817, I:295; Dj.Br. 19¹¹, De Stuers, ‘Inleiding’, 9.
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ple, where tollgate keepers often had their own stocks and prisons to detain 
criminals, a Dutch report referred to influential bandar maintaining their own 
‘private armies’.159 The houses used by Chinese and Europeans in south-cen-
tral Java were also fitted with heavy wooden shutters and doors to enable the 
occupants to barricade themselves in the event of a sudden attack, a fact which 
did not escape the notice of the bandits who often carried axes with them when 
they mounted robberies on the property of foreigners.160 In the royal capitals, 
where there were large numbers of porters, beggars and unemployed people, 
court dignitaries had the habit of processing with extensive retinues as much 
for personal safety as for ceremonial display.161 The dangers inherent in a vio-
lent countryside were also reflected in trading patterns: Crawfurd noted that 
the most successful merchants at this time were the rulers themselves, not so 
much because of their business acumen but more because they were able to 
arm their trading flotillas on the Sala River against pirates and provide power-
ful escorts for their merchant convoys of bullock carts to Semarang.162
The Yogya taxation system and the eastern outlying districts
Besides the endemic security problems, a second problem for peasant culti-
vators in this period was the increasing burden of taxes imposed by the rul-
ers. They were liable for four main royal imposts, the first of which we have 
already encountered, namely, the pajeg (from the Javanese ajeg = ‘fixed’), a 
fixed tax on the produce of the land usually rendered in kind and referred to 
as ‘land-rent’ (Rouffaer 1905:618; Onghokham 1975:171; Carey 1986:75-6). We 
will return to this shortly in connection with the revisions introduced by the 
second sultan to boost his revenues in the early 1800s.
In addition, there were three lesser levies: the pacumpleng (‘door tax’ from 
the Javanese cumpleng = ‘an opening’), a tax on each sikep household which 
in the eastern mancanagara districts at least was paid partly in hanks of weav-
159 KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 15-6-1824; Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 281, referring 
to the great expenses incurred by the Chinese tax farmers in protecting their lives and property 
‘in a country where they are neither liked nor respected’; S.Br. 89¹¹, H.J. Domis (Semarang) to J.I. 
van Sevenhoven (Surakarta), 25-4-1824, on the 40-strong Chinese and Bengali bodyguard main-
tained by J.A. Dezentjé on his Ampèl estate.
160 Nahuys van Burgst 1858:102; Bataviasche Courant 41, 12-10-1825:1; S.Br. 131, ‘Verbalen 
Solo’, entry for 8-2-1819 (on axes used to chop down the door of the house of the widow of the 
Brunswick-born surgeon, Friedrich Willem Baumgarten, in Yogya); Dj.Br. 51B, R.C.N. d’Abo 
(Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta), 23-6-1820 (on axes carried by wong durjana 
plundering European estates on Mount Merapi).
161 Mack.Pr. 86 (1), Adams, ‘Souracarta’, 71-2.
162 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 93-4, who noted that the rulers also benefited from the privi-
lege of customs’ free lighters (prau pengluput) on the Bengawan Sala and oxen to carry loads to 
Semarang. 
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ing cotton or cotton yarn;163 the kerigaji (literally ’ruler’s gathering or attend-
ance’, hence ‘royal corvée’), a labour obligation for the upkeep of roads in the 
Principalities which was usually commuted to a money payment fixed at one 
Spanish dollar per jung in the mancanagara, but only half or a quarter of that 
in the core regions (Carey and Hoadley 2000:339-44); and finally a variety 
of irregular taxes and corvée duties known by a number of names such as 
taker tedhak, wang bekti, gugur gunung, and pegawéyan (Winter 1902:68, 108-9; 
Rouffaer 1905:625-6; Carey and Hoadley 2000:344-8). There are indications 
that these last were not unduly onerous in the core districts, but did consti-
tute a very heavy burden in the outlying areas where they were administered 
by the local bupati. 
As we have seen, before August 1812, when the corvée duties of the 
eastern mancanagara bupati in the royal capitals was abolished,164 very heavy 
labour demands were made on the work forces from the outlying regions. 
This was particularly the case in Yogya where the second sultan under-
took ambitious construction projects. In August 1803, the outgoing Yogya 
Resident, J.G. van den Berg, informed his successor that whereas the first 
sultan had only detained the mancanagara administrators for four – or at the 
most five – months in the royal capital following the Garebeg Mulud festivi-
ties, the second sultan would often keep them for double that period.165 The 
labourers were extremely hard worked and Van den Berg noticed that when 
the sultan grudgingly delegated about 200 men to carry out repairs on the 
Dutch fort and other government buildings, they executed their tasks ‘with 
the lethargy of an exhausted people’.166 Moreover, their long sojourns in the 
royal capital meant that the men from the eastern districts could not return 
home in time to attend to the rice harvest, which in turn had an adverse affect 
on agricultural production in the mancanagara. Although the total numbers 
of cultivators brought to Yogya each year for these labour services from the 
eastern regions was not large – in 1808 they amounted to just over 2,000 
163 Raffles 1817, I:134; Kollmann 1864:365; Rouffaer 1904:12-3; Carey and Hoadley 2000:240, 
244, 257; Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 223.
164 UBL BPL 616 Port. 22 no. 4, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Montjonegorosche-Djocjokartasche 
Landen’, n.y. (? 1826) on the abolition of these corvée duties in 1812, possibly at the instigation of 
the third sultan. See also Chapter VIII.
165 KITLV H 97 (8), J.G. van den Berg, ‘Memorie op het Hof van Djocjocarta, onder den Sultan 
Hamengcoeboeana den tweede […] aan zijn Successeur […] M. Waterloo’, 11-8-1803 (hence-
forth: Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’). The mancanagara bupati were required to arrive in Yogya in the 
Javanese month of Sapar, ten days before the Garebeg Mulud, when they were ordered to render 
their pajeg, and they would sometimes not be allowed to return to their districts until Puwasa or 
Besar, a full 6-9 months after their arrival, AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to J.G. van den 
Berg (Surakarta), 24-1-1805; Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to B.F. von Liebeherr (Surakarta), 
12-11-1806.
166 Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803.
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men spread throughout the entourages of fifteen separate bupati167 – this still 
amounted to about six percent of the adult male inhabitants given the small 
population of the eastern regions at this time (Raffles 1817, II:290).
The eastern bupati also experienced difficulties in supporting themselves 
during such extensive periods away from home. Van den Berg remarked that 
they would almost always return to their districts in an impoverished state. 
Indeed, it was sometimes only due to the help of their relatives in Yogya that 
they could make the journey at all, often travelling back like ‘common men’ 
stripped of their money and escort.168 Faced with these demands, the bupati 
tried to meet the very heavy financial burdens placed on them by requesting 
increases in the journey money paid by the mancanagara inhabitants to assist 
their district administrators in their sojourns in the royal capital.169 Thus the 
local population found themselves doubly burdened: both by the corvée 
requirements and the increased fiscal demands of their bupati. This left a 
legacy of bitterness which manifested itself in the region’s political affilia-
tions in the early nineteenth century. Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III’s revolt 
in Madiun in November-December 1810, for example, attracted consider-
able local sympathy because it was a regional movement directed as much 
against Pakubuwana IV (and to a lesser extent the second sultan) as against 
the Dutch.170 At the same time, many of the mancanagara bupati supported 
Dipanagara’s father, the Yogya Crown Prince (later Sultan Hamengkubuwana 
III) against the second sultan during the power struggles at the court in 1810-
1812,171 because the former was much more lenient in his corvée demands 
(Carey 1992:508-9 note 532). Even as late as August 1826, when the second 
sultan was briefly reinstated as ruler during a difficult period for the Dutch in 
the Java War, his exactions were still remembered. In the Yogya Resident, Jan 
Izaäk van Sevenhoven’s words (Louw and De Klerck, 1894-1909, II:421-2):
One [only has] to visit the sixteen or eighteen country seats which he constructed, 
mostly with stone buildings, ponds with brick sides and other extensive pieces of 
masonry, and to think how these constructions as well as a large part of his kra-
ton were put up at the cost of the sweat and tears of the inhabitants of his entire 
kingdom.
167 Dj.Br. 45, Matthijs Waterloo, ‘Accuraate aanthooning van zodanige contingent troupes […] 
die gezaamentlyk uitmaaken den sulthan’s oostersche of mantjanagarasche regenten’, 22-3-1808, 
gives a total of 2,126 men, of whom 1,025 were pikemen, 1,025 musketeers, 38 pennant bearers, 
19 drummers and 19 pipers.
168 Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803.
169 Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803. Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:382-3 for the list of 
the wang pesangon levies given in P.H. Lawick van Pabst’s 21-8-1830 report on taxes in the eastern 
districts, full citation, note 172.
170 See Chapter VI.
171 See Chapter VII and VIII.
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Hardly surprising then, in view of the continuing memory of the second 
sultan’s labour requirements, that the mancanagara inhabitants as a whole 
showed little sympathy for Dipanagara’s rebellion in 1825-1830, which they 
probably saw as essentially a ‘Mataram’ affair.
Besides the burden of the labour obligations to the rulers, the population 
of the outlying regions also had to contend with a number of more minor 
levies and labour services to local dignitaries, impositions which the cultiva-
tors in the core regions did not experience so acutely. The main reason for 
this was because the bupati and their subordinate officials actually resided in 
their districts whereas the apanage holders in the nagara agung lived mostly 
in the royal capitals. The former thus had more opportunity to insist on a 
wide variety of personal services and taxes.172 When the Dutch annexed 
Madiun in 1830, they found some 65-70 separate impositions rendered by the 
local inhabitants besides the main taxes due to the rulers and the provincial 
administrators.173 Although none of these impositions were levied on all tax-
able members of the local communities, the Dutch calculated that a wealthy 
sikep in the eastern districts rendered the equivalent of f 50-60 a year in corvée, 
kind and money taxes, a substantially higher fiscal burden than for peasant 
cultivators in adjacent government-controlled areas (Onghokham 1975:173). 
Many of these minor taxes, such as those paid for the slaughter of live-
stock (tugel gurung) or levied by irrigation officials for the use of water (pamili 
toya), as well as the craftsmen’s patents and tribute in lieu of building mate-
rials (wilah welit), were common throughout the core and outlying regions 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:381-4). But the amount of corvée and 
special duties associated with the upkeep of a bupati and his entourage were 
almost certainly greater than the services demanded by resident officials in 
the nagara agung. Throughout the eastern districts, for example, it was usual 
for district administrators to demand that sikep work for certain periods 
without payment in their fields, an obligation sometimes commuted to a 
172 S.Br. 127, Pieter Merkus, ‘Verslag’, 21-8-1830, in ‘Oostelijke montjo-negorosche landen’ 
(henceforth: Merkus, ‘Verslag’), quoting a report of P.H. Lawick van Pabst, who noted that the 
bupati’s scope for demanding personal services and taxes was ‘virtually unlimited’. They also 
had sole responsibility for the appointment of lesser officials and controlled justice in the area, 
see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:378-84; P.H. Lawick van Pabst, ‘Beschrijving der onder-
schiedene belastingen welke in de oostelijke montjo-negorosche landen geheven worden’, 21-8-
1830 (henceforth: Van Pabst, ‘Beschrijving’).
173 Merkus, ‘Verslag’, 21-8-1830; Van Pabst, ‘Beschrijving’, 21-8-1830; Onghokham 1975:172. 
According to Merkus, the total amount of taxation paid by the population of the eastern mancana-
gara (estimated at 56,540 families or about 281,700 people) in 1830 was f 725,657. Of this f 126,758 
was paid to the courts, f 186,162 was given to subordinate officials and f 408,747 kept by the 
bupati. The total figure was certainly much larger because the local tax collectors took substantial 
cuts at source. The average amount of taxation per head worked out at f 2.34 compared to f 1.10 
to f 2.00 in adjacent government areas. The fiscal demands of the Surakarta court were apparently 
more onerous than those of Yogya. 
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money tax known as kuduran. Moreover, the residences (dalem) of the bupati 
also required considerable labour for their maintenance (Nagtegaal 1996:187), 
especially in the case of a dalem such as that of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja 
III at Maospati just to the west of Madiun, which had been laid out ‘like a 
kraton with thick stone walls’.174 Special tributes in rice were likewise levied 
from the sikep for the support of members of the bupati’s personal staff such 
as grooms, gardeners, dancers, musicians, goldsmiths, saddle-makers and 
payung (state parasol) carriers (Onghokham 1975:140-1 note 71). Indeed, the 
lifestyle of many of the senior officials in the mancanagara emulated that of the 
central Javanese rulers albeit on a reduced scale and had to be maintained by 
numerous extra levies on the local inhabitants. We will see below how one of 
the principal grievances against Rongga was that he had used a local bandit 
to furnish him with fine Javanese gamelan orchestras which he had carried off 
from the adjacent Surakarta-controlled territory of Panaraga.175
The ‘pancas’ revisions of the second sultan and their impact
If the tax-paying peasant cultivators in the core regions escaped some of 
these extra levies and labour demands, they were still faced with major fis-
cal challenges. The key problem for the sikep in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries was that the level of tax payments demanded by the 
rulers was steadily increasing. This was especially the case in Yogya, where 
the second sultan instituted a practice known as pancas – literally ‘cutting 
through’ or ‘pruning’ – whereby the size of the jung in his dominions was 
diminished while the tax obligations on each land unit remained at the same 
level (Rouffaer 1905:593; Carey 1986:115-6). 
The background to this initiative lay in the lack of up-to-date cadastral 
registers at the courts. This meant that there could be no annual reassessment 
of tax burdens which took account of the rapid extension of sawah and irriga-
tion systems in late eighteenth-century south-central Java (Rouffaer 1905:618; 
Carey 1992:440 note 205). We have seen above how no new cadastral surveys 
were compiled by either of the courts after the completion of the ‘New Book’ 
(Serat Ebuk Anyar) in 1773. Both the second sultan and his Surakarta counter-
174 UBL BPL 616 Port. 22 pt. 4, Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Montjonegorosche-Djokjokartasche landen’, 
n.y. (? 1826) (on various dalem built by Yogya bupati wedana at Wanasari and Maospati); Merkus, 
‘Verslag’, 21-8-1830 (on their maintenance); S.Br. 37:87, Relaas of Surakarta spy, 9-12-1810; Dj.Br. 27/
Dj.Br. 46, P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang) to Carl von Winckelmann (Inspector General of 
Forests), 30-11-1810, 1-12-1810; Carey 1980:38 note 1, 39 note 4; Madioen 1855:3. Adam 1940:334 (on 
Rongga’s stronghold at Maospati with its stone perimeter wall or pager banon armed with cannon, 
which in 1940 was still known to locals by the name of ‘kraton’, a toponym which appears on the 
1922 Dutch ordnance survey map of the eastern side of Maospati near the old posting station).
175 Pp. 220-1.
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part, Sunan Pakubuwana IV, steadfastly refused to countenance a new survey 
proposed by the Dutch in April 1792 because they feared that the Dutch East 
Indies Company would either seek to even out the landholdings between the 
courts or annex to itself all the new lands opened up since the 1773 meas-
urement (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XII:260; Rouffaer 1905:591; 
Carey 1978:123, 146). Even the Dutch seem to have treated this cadaster 
and its predecessor, the ‘Book of Klepu’ (1756), as quasi-pusaka (heirlooms) 
keeping them both in a locked secret chest in the archives of the governor of 
Java’s Northeast Coast in Semarang.176 Although subsequent attempts were 
made both by the British (1811-1816) (Blagden 1916:107-12) and the post-1816 
restored Dutch administrations177 to compile accurate statistical accounts of 
the Principalities, they proved abortive. Indeed, it was not until 1865-1866 
that the first detailed topographical maps of Surakarta and Yogyakarta were 
completed.178 Eighteenth-century land registers were thus all the central 
Javanese rulers and the European government had to go on until well into 
the nineteenth century.179
The accounts kept by the sultan – at least in the form they have come 
down to us – give the impression of a somewhat disordered administration 
(Carey 1980:4-5; Carey and Hoadley 2000:441-3). Land grants to royal officials 
and lists of revenue payments are mixed up with documents of a very eclectic 
nature: political correspondence between the sultan and the Dutch Residents, 
royal prohibitions on apparel and etiquette, notes on disputes over villages, 
payments for pradikan santri (tax free benefices for men of religion) and court 
176 Java NOK 1, ‘Memorie met derzelver bylaagen tot naricht voor den Heer Johan Frederik 
Baron van Reede tot de Parkeler aankomend Gouverneur en Directeur van Java’s Noord-Oost 
Kust ingericht en overgegeven door Mr Pieter Gerardus van Overstraten geeligeerd Commissaris 
en Gouverneur over gehele Nederlandsch Indië en afgaand Gouverneur en Directeur by vertrek 
naar Batavia Anno 1796’ (henceforth: Van Overstraten, ‘Memorie’), 13-10-1796, 1.
177 Van der Kemp 1913:24; AvJ, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen 
(Batavia), 19-4-1823 (on the difficulty of compiling statistical survey of region because of juxtapo-
sition of landholdings in nagara agung); A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Curator Militaire School 
(Semarang), 26-10-1823 (on the absence of key maps of the Yogya kraton and landholdings which 
were thought to have been sent to Semarang prior to the British attack in June 1812).
178 Dj.Br. 1, ‘Politieke Verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1865’, on topographi-
cal survey of Yogyakarta by K.F. Wilsen (1865). A similar map was produced for Surakarta by 
Beijerinck and Okerse in 1866. Copies of these maps can be found in BL, IOR X IX 3 (Wilsen), IOR 
X IX 7 (Beijerinck and Okerse).
179 S.Br. 14B, Col. Alexander Adams (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia), 20-7-1812 (dispatch 
of Surakarta copy of ‘Book of Klepu’, Serat Buk Kalepu, drawn up in 1756-1757 after the Giyanti 
treaty, to help Raffles form an impression of the landholdings in the Principalities before his 
negotiation of August 1812 treaties with the courts); Dj.Br. 58, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) 
to Commissarissen ter regeling der vorstenlanden, 25-6-1830 (reporting that Radèn Adipati 
Danureja IV had admitted that the Book of Klepu given to Van Nes by Panembahan Mangkurat 
[ex-Pangéran Mangkubumi] gave more detailed statistics for landholdings in Pajang and 
Mataram than he could provide from his own archive). See further Houben 1994:45.
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haji, reports from spies in government districts, letters from provincial offi-
cials to Yogya senior court bupati, as well as items of a more intimate nature 
such as challenges to cockfights, instructions on fasting and personal letters 
with imagery from the wayang. 
We have the looting British to thank for much of this mess given the disorder 
in which everything was carted off from the kraton after its fall on 20 June 1812 
(Carey 1980:12 notes 1-4, 1992:94-6, 248-51, 421 note 111-2). But the nature of 
the sultanate’s administrative system was also to blame. As Mason Hoadley has 
pointed out, it was in no sense a Weberian rational bureaucratic polity. Instead, 
its underdeveloped administrative structure and lack of functional chain of 
command meant that orders from the sultan were filtered through a whole 
hierarchy of intermediaries, none of whom had autonomous authority over a 
region or an administrative department. The final version of a royal command 
could thus be very different from the original, a system made even more peril-
ous by scribal error in the cross-checking of documents.180 Temporary absence 
of key intermediaries with privileged access to the ruler due to sickness, and 
the existence of a number of ministers known as miji answerable directly to 
the sultan and thus outside the normal bureaucratic hierarchy compounded 
these problems (Carey and Hoadley 2000:442). This meant that the strength 
and weakness of the kingdom depended very much on the character of the 
monarch: a strong authoritarian ruler could overcome the system’s centripetal 
tendencies, a weak one would fall prey to them (Remmelink 1994:23).
What is clear is that post-June 1812, the already disordered Yogya admin-
istration of the second sultan began to sink into even greater disarray under 
a succession of short-lived (Hamengkubuwana III, reigned 1812-1814), and 
under-age rulers (Hamengkbuwana IV, reigned 1814-1822; Hamengkubuwana 
V, reigned 1822-1826, 1828-1855). Even the most basic land registers and rev-
enue lists were not maintained.181 In September 1823, the parlous state of the 
kraton archive was graphically illustrated in a letter from the mother of the 
fourth sultan, Ratu Ageng, to Pangéran Dipanagara in reply to the latter’s 
request for the copy of a legal document from the British period (Chapter VII 
notes 235-6; Chapter IX note 170) which he had originally lodged with the 
court. Ratu Ageng excused herself as follows:
As regards the letter of contract from the British, which came from you, I do not 
know where it is because the stack [in the kraton archive] consists of many letters 
which are in complete disorder spread here and there.182
180 See Carey and Hoadley 2000:302, 365 (for care taken by court scribes, carik-dalem, in draw-
ing up land grants and revenue lists and references to use of rough drafts, serat rèngrèng, as well 
as cross-references to financial registers – buk); Carey 1980:152-3 (for letters from carik begging 
forgiveness for scribal errors).
181 vAE (aanwinsten 1941), A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen 
(Batavia), 25-11-1824.
182 Yogya kraton MS A.62 (Babad Dipanagaran), 62, Ratu Ageng to Dipanagara, Sura, Dal AJ 
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Indeed, it was not until the early years of the twentieth century that an effec-
tive reform of the sultan’s treasury and financial affairs was carried out under 
the supervision of a Jewish accountant appointed to the kraton staff on the 
recommendation of the Dutch Resident.183
This combination of administrative disorder and reliance on antiquated 
cadastral surveys proved an insuperable barrier to the functioning of a fair 
taxation system at the central Javanese courts in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. However, whereas in Surakarta, the financially incompe-
tent Sunan, Pakubuwana IV, took no new fiscal initiatives beyond demanding 
forced loans from his subjects to pay off his debts,184 in Yogya, the second sul-
tan wished to see the great increase in the productiveness of his lands reflected 
in steadily rising tax returns, and was prepared to use arbitrary methods to 
achieve his ends. This led eventually to the twin fiscal revisions of 1802 and 
1808-1811, the background to which is necessary to consider in some detail. 
Amongst his royal officials, the Yogya ruler disposed of a handful of ‘vil-
lage surveyors’ known as abdi-dalem priksa dhusun or mantri papriksan negara 
whose main task was to supervise the tax-collectors to see that they did not 
take too much land.185 They may have had a wide knowledge of agrarian con-
ditions, but they were far too few in number to keep the sultan fully informed 
about developments in land use in his far-flung dominions. The Yogya ruler 
thus had to rely on reports from individual apanage holders and mancana-
gara bupati as to the productivity of the lands under their charge (Carey and 
Hoadley 2000:65-6). This led to frequent notifications regarding cacah which 
had become uncultivated or depopulated, especially in the eastern outlying 
areas, where a distinction began to be made in land grants between cacah gesang 
(inhabited or cultivated cacah), and cacah pejah (depopulated or uncultivated 
cacah; Carey 1986:11; Carey and Hoadley 2000:69-74, 240-50), but understand-
ably few admissions concerning increased productivity on established sawah 
or the opening up of new lands. And naturally so – every one of the sultan’s 
subjects from the grandest apanage holder to the lowliest sikep was loathe to 
face new fiscal demands. This was remarked on by the Dutch Resident, W.H. 
van IJsseldijk (in office 1786-1798), in Pacitan where peasant cultivators had 
made a point of not informing the courts about the great increase in irrigated 
1751 (AD 9-1823): bab layang kuntrak pranjanji nawarawan Inggris kang saka sira, ingsun nora weruh 
pangonané, amarga tumpukan layang luwih akèh, sarta pating baléngkrah kalèwèran. See further p. 545 
for confirmation of the state of the kraton archive in 1823.
183 AN, Algemene Secretarie archive, J.H. Liefrinck, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, Yogyakarta, 
11-10-1913, referring to the appointment of J.L. Israël as kraton accountant in 1911.
184 vAE (aanwinsten 1900) 235, N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie, 14-5-1808, refers to Pakubuwana IV’s 
forced loan of 100,000 Spanish dollars in 1807-1808, but states that the Sunan kept most of it for 
himself rather than pay his creditors.
185 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:594; Carey 1986:110-1; Carey and Hoadley 2000:81, 310-1; 
GKA, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Mas Tumenggung Sindujaya 
(mantri papriksan negara), 13-4-1830.
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sawah along the Grindulu River in the late eighteenth century because they 
were afraid that new lands would be appropriated by the rulers.186
Faced with this situation, the sultan responded by threatening the apanage 
holders with royal disfavour if they refused to send in accurate reports. In the 
Yogya archive, there is an important royal order, unfortunately undated but 
probably issued around the time of the first fiscal revision in July 1802, in which 
recipients of lands were commanded to inform the ruler within two months of 
any discrepancies between the lands listed in their piagem (official land grants) 
and the actual extent of their apanages after new clearances had been account-
ed for. If no replies were forthcoming in the appointed time, the sultan warned 
that he would dispatch his village surveyors to make independent enquiries, a 
threat he must have known he could not enforce given the limited number of 
them available to him (Carey 1986:110-1; Carey and Hoadley 2000:81).
In a vain attempt to address the issue, the second sultan continued the 
resurveying of some of the most fertile landholdings in the Mataram area 
begun by his predecessor in 1791 when the old agrarian unit of the Majapahit 
rood had been reintroduced into the core regions (Rouffaer 1905:593, 617; 
Carey 1986:114). The second Yogya ruler had encouraged the extension of 
this measure in order to create more ‘unity’ in the size of the Yogya fields and 
to discover undeclared apanage ground, thus enhancing his tax income. The 
survey seems to have aroused little opposition amongst the apanage holders 
but it proceeded too slowly to make any real impact on revenue returns. The 
impatient sovereign thus embarked on a much more drastic plan: sometime 
before the Garebeg Mulud of 14 July 1802, he carried out his first fiscal revision. 
Known as the pancas, this reduced the size of the old Majapahit rood consider-
ably while making the new measure applicable throughout all Yogya territories 
both in the core regions and the outlying areas (Carey 1986:114-5). According 
to Nahuys van Burgst (1835, I:8 note 1) and Jan Isaäk van Sevenhoven,187 who 
both served as commissioners for the land settlement in the Principalities after 
the Java War (Houben 1994:17-71), a further revision followed some years later 
during the period of Daendels’ governor-generalship (1808-1811). 
The effects of these – possibly two – fiscal revisions was the artificial crea-
tion of twenty percent more apanage land in the sultanate from the pared off 
landholdings of members of the sultan’s family and Yogya officials. Crawfurd 
estimated that at least 10,000 new size Yogya cacah were added by the meas-
ure188 and in the pajeg returns of 1808, the Yogya ruler is listed as having 
186 Dj.Br. 45, W.H. van IJsseldijk, ‘Eerbiedige bericht aangaande de landen van Z.H. den Sul-
thaan van Djocjocarta’, in W.H. van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 
15-1-1793.
187 S.Br. 55, J.I. van Sevenhoven, ‘Nota over de landverhuringen aan partikulieren in de vor-
stenlanden op Java’, 16-3-1837. The usual Majapahit land measurement was the fathom (dhepa), 
the length of the chest whit both arms outstretched, Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:360; Carey 
1981a:26-7. Rood may be a Dutch translation of this.
188 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 120.
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enjoyed an extra 20,000 ronde real (1 ronde real = £ 2)189 in rent from the new 
royal domain grounds created by the first pancas.190 From this time onwards 
a considerable discrepancy existed between the size of Yogya and Sala jung, 
which was commented on by a number of European land-renters in the 
Principalities during the course of the nineteenth century.191
The pancas revisions were the equivalent of a debasement of the cur-
rency as Rouffaer (1905:593) pointed out and they aroused bitter opposition 
amongst Yogya apanage holders, who were quick to pass on the fiscal burdens 
entailed by the new measure to their sikep when resistance proved useless.192 
This undoubtedly led to a significant increase in the amount of tax borne by 
sikep in Yogya areas and compounded the difficulties faced by poorer farmers 
and numpang who had ambitions to set themselves up as independent culti-
vators. Most important of all, the pancas sharpened the inherent differences in 
the tax burdens on individual jung which were already fixed in a most hap-
hazard fashion by the apanage holders and the sovereign. Thus, in the lands 
around Nanggulon in the Kulon Praga area, which were administered direct-
ly by the Dutch government between 1833 and 1851, government surveyors 
found huge discrepancies both in the size of jung and the pajeg levied on 
each unit, with no obvious connection being made between population den-
sity, the fertility of the soil and the level of pajeg payments (Carey 1986:112). 
Even then, the new land measurement inaugurated by the pancas does not 
seem to have been applied to all Yogya lands even in the core regions and 
as late as 1830 there is evidence that the old measurement of the Majapahit 
rood was still being used in some Mataram villages.193 In this context, the 
third sultan’s attempts to revert to his grandfather, Sultan Mangkubumi’s, 
189 The value of the ronde real, a silver coin also known as the real batu or rix dollar (rijksdaalder), 
had a notional exchange rate of 64 stuivers or f 3.20, although the value varied according to the 
silver content (it was usually worth between f 2.40 and f 2.56). The sterling (English currency) 
equivalent was four shillings and sixpence, Carey 1980:200.
190 Van Kesteren 1887:1315; dK 145, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard 
(Semarang), 22-3-1808.
191 Dj.Br. 51C, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia), 18-5-1821 
(estimated that Sala jung were four times as large as those of Yogya after pancas); S.Br. 88¹¹, Dr 
Harvey Thomson (Rajawinangun) to R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta), 6-1-1823 (reckoned that pajeg 
from a jung of sawah in Surakarta averaged 120 Spanish dollars as opposed to 50 Spanish dol-
lars in Yogya); MvK 3054, ‘Statistieke beschrijving der residentie Kedoe’ (1836), 29 (reported on 
two sizes of jung in the province – 2,000 and 1,952 square roods – which may have originated in 
different Yogya and Sala land measurements); Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 15-9-1844 
no. 3 (land grant of 80 Yogya jung – equivalent of 64.25 Surakarta jung – to European land-renter 
Timmerman Thyssen in Slèman).
192 Dj.Br. 49, J.G. van den Berg (Surakarta) to Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta), 26-9-1803; Van 
den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803.
193 GKA Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Tumenggung Malang-
negara, 15-4-1830.
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administrative methods, both during his period as Prince Regent (Raja Putra 
Naréndra) in January-September 1811 and during his brief reign (1812-1814) 
(Carey 1980:21), must have created yet further complications in the already 
dizzyingly complex Yogya tax structure. Local migrations away from areas 
of high taxation to those regions where the fiscal burdens were lighter can be 
seen as partly the outcome of this fiscal imbalance. Although the pancas ena-
bled the second sultan to tap some of his subjects’ additional wealth, it was 
implemented in such a rough and ready fashion that it exacerbated agrarian 
problems at the village level and in the longer term prepared the ground 
for the widespread rural uprising in south-central Java which accompanied 
Dipanagara’s revolt in July 1825.194
Conclusion
In assessing the taxation structure of the Principalities at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, certain key themes can be singled out. The most obvious 
was the difference in tax burdens between the core regions and the manca-
nagara. This goes far to explaining the declining population in the outlying 
districts in the latter part of the eighteenth century and provides insights into 
the area’s affiliations after 1800. Another important theme was the general 
trend for corvée services to be replaced by money taxes. This was happening 
nearly everywhere in the Principalities except in the mancanagara, and it was 
a development which appears to have been welcomed by the independent 
peasant cultivators (sikep). It also suggests a lively cash economy in some 
rural areas of south-central Java at this time. A third theme was the inexorable 
rise in pajeg demands, especially in Yogya where the second sultan’s pancas 
revision had drastic effects at the local level. Taken together with the numer-
ous extraordinary levies such as the taker tedhak and uang bekti pasumbangan 
raised by both the apanage holders and the rulers, they amounted to sharply 
increasing tax burdens on the sikep. Despite these difficulties, it is certain that 
many independent peasant cultivators were able to hang on to much of their 
wealth in this period. The inefficiencies of the royal administrations, the lack 
of accurate cadastral surveys and the paucity of village surveyors all meant 
that their newly opened lands could be concealed. It was only in the five 
years preceding the Java War when harvest failures were common and the 
operation of the Chinese-run tollgates began to have a devastating effect on 
local trade that agrarian conditions in south-central Java became intolerable 
for cultivators. These conditions would precipitate the widespread agrarian 
uprising in south-central Java which was the most significant feature of the 
outbreak of the Java War in July 1825.
194 See pp. 498-9.
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Socially and culturally, Yogyakarta and its Surakarta counterparts presented 
a generally confident and prosperous aspect in this period. They were still 
predominantly military societies, but martial requirements were assuming less 
prominence in an age when there were fewer major conflicts. In this respect, 
Yogya retained more of its original character than the Surakarta court in large 
part because of the legacy of the first sultan. But even here there was a tendency 
for cacah to become units of economic measurement rather than the basis of gen-
eral military enlistment, and the calling up of auxiliary levies declined except 
in situations of emergency. In the countryside, besides the existence of a class 
of more or less wealthy peasant cultivators, the main features were numerous 
landless labourers (numpang) and an even larger group of tax-collectors (bekel, 
demang) acting on behalf of apanage holders resident in the royal capitals. 
This was the world into which Dipanagara was born in 1785. It was a 
place full of tensions and dynamism, at once violent, insecure and prosperou s 
where one could encounter great social differences and extreme geographica l 
variety. In the span of just under five hundred kilometres from the furthest 
western to the most easterly outlying provinces, one could traverse aban-
doned landscapes as well as fertile and densely populated core regions where 
Java seemed like a tropical Eden. This was a society where a wealthy sikep 
could have a personal fortune in silver ducatoons kept for display under 
his bed and where a landless labourer or porter had but the secon d-hand 
clothes he wore on his back. This was frontier Java, a very different world 
from the ordered agrarian society of the post-Java War era with its cultivation 
systems (1830-1870) and Delft and Leiden-educated colonial administrators, 
a society no longer geared for war but for the world market in international 
cash-crop production. Culturally too, the days were numbered when the 
high court etiquette of the south-central Javanese kraton set the tone, a place 
where the villages had their customs and the court centres their order.195 
This would soon give way to a new native elite exemplified by the post-1830 
Dutch-appointed priyayi, an indigenous bureaucratic class more at home in 
the butchered cadences of ‘Service Malay’ than the refinements of high court 
Javanese (Sutherland 1979; Hoffman 1979:72). For the Europeans too, as we 
will see in Chapter IX, the post-1816 returned Dutch government would mark 
a social and cultural watershed. The great Indies families, who had domi-
nated the higher echelons of the Dutch East Indies Company administration 
in the eighteenth century, would be swept aside by the flood of placemen, 
adventurers and former Napoleonic War officers who came to the Indies on 
the coat-tails of Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen’s administra-
tion (1816-1826). The days of the mestizo, mixed race slave-ownin g Indo-
Portuguese elite, evoked so vividly by Jean Gelman Taylor (1983) in her study 
195 The original Javanese expression is: désa mawi cara, nagara mawi tata.
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of colonial Batavia, were numbered. Soon, a new type of Dutch Indies official, 
members of the post-Revolutionary Dutch bourgeoisi e, born and educated 
in the Netherlands, would rule Java. Over a century would pass before the 
Indonesians, led by those who had benefited from a Dutch education, would 
have the opportunity to shake them off.
For a Javanese prince born fifteen years short of the new century, how was 
it possible to surmise all this? For such a person it must have seemed that 
the Javanese ‘old order’ of the south-central Javanese Principalities, successor 
states to the once mighty Mataram Empire of the seventeenth century, was a 
fixed entity, culturally secure even if politically and socially turbulent. In the 
imaginings of such a man, especially if like Dipanagara he was brought up 
to be a pious Javanese Muslim, the faded glories of the Ottoman Empire and 
the holy mosques (haraman) of Medina and Mecca, the very places trod by the 
feet of The Prophet, were what mattered. If there was a sacred centre on this 
earth, it was in Arabia where the heart of the Muslim community of Believers 
beats. In such a universe, who could have imagined that it would not be the 
Sublime Porte or the holy places of the Hejaz (present day Saudi Arabia) 
which would shape his future, but the political and industrial revolutions 
even then germinating in the bleak mill towns of Lancashire or the teem-
ing artisan quarters of Paris? Protean energies would flow from these twin 
revolutions leading to what historian Kenneth Pomeranz has aptly termed 
‘The Great Divergence’ (Pomeranz 2000), when the technical efficiency and 
standards of living in Europe and Asia – in particular China – began to part 
company. But at this early stage it would take a genius to perceive them.196 
In the meantime, before the two divergent worlds smashed into each other 
and south-central Java felt the full force of the new European order, it would 
be vouchsafed a brief period in which its own ancien régime would remain 
intact. In those twenty-three years, Dipanagara would grow to manhood and 
find his own place in the spiritual and cultural universe of his native Yogya. 
That coming of age in the unusual surroundings of his great-grandmother’s 
country estate at Tegalreja will be the subject of the next three chapters.
196 One such genius was the German Romantic poet, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (died 1832). 
Surveying the surprise rout of the Prussian army at the battle of Valmy (20 September 1792) at 
the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars by the newly engineered precision field artillery of 
Jean-Baptiste Vacquette de Gribeauval, he wrote that he had told the Prussian generals: ‘This spot 
and this day mark the beginning of a new epoch in world history, and you can say that you were 
there’ (‘Von hier und heute geht eine neue Epoche der Weltgeschichte aus, und ihr künnt sagen, ihr seid 
dabei gewesen’), J.W. von Goethe, Campagne in Frankreich 1792 (1822), in: Erich Trunz, Goethes Werke, 
Hamburger Ausgabe in 14 Bänden. X: Autobiographische Schriften II, p. 235. Hamburg: Wegner. 14 vols. 
I am grateful to Dr Kevin Hilliard of St. Peter’s College, Oxford, for this reference. The application 
of reason and experiment to the development of a new weapons system which could bombard 
targets accurately at up to 1,100 yards, the range of the advancing Prussians at Valmy, combined 
with the industrial capacity of late eighteenth-century France and the nationalist zeal of the French 
Revolutionary armies had transformed the nature of warfare, McNeill 1982:170-1, 197.
chapter II
Dipanagara’s youth and upbringing 
1785-1803
A prophetic birth
Dipanagara – who was given the childhood name of Bendara Radèn Mas 
Mustahar (Dwidjosoegondo and Adisoetrisno 1941:102) – was born in the 
Yogyakarta kraton on 11 November 1785 just before sunrise.1 In Javanese chro-
nology, the date of the future Java War leader’s birth was especially auspicious 
because it fell in the Javanese month of Sura, the first month of the Javanese 
year when traditionally new kingdoms are founded and new historical cycles 
begin (Carey 1981a:261 note 108). The day was also significant in modern-day 
Javanese almanac literature because the combination of the day of the week 
and that of the five-day Javanese market week, Jumungah Wagé (Friday 
Wagé), is said to indicate a person of great fluency and power of speech, gen-
erosity of heart, and the character of a sage, but one who would encounter 
great hindrances in his life because of his frank and argumentative manner.2 
It is interesting to note here that Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno (1901-
1970), was also a child of the dawn and of the new century and saw himself as 
being endowed with a special destiny because of it.3 Even the Arabic year of 
the prince’s birth – AH 1200 – seems to have been significant: it is mentioned 
in some of the more self-consciously Islamic versions of the prophecies tra-
ditionally ascribed to the twelfth-century king of Kedhiri, Prabu Jayabaya, as 
1 BD (Manado) II:114, XIV (Sinom) 44. Ing taun eBé punika/ wulan Mucharam nujoni/ tanggal 
ping wolu kang dina/ Jumungah Wagé puniki/ Alip ingkang lumaris/ Kulawu mapan anuju/ wektu saur 
babarnya; ‘In the year Bé/ just in the month of Muharam/ on the date the eighth. The day being/ 
Friday Wagé/ in the [Javanese year] Alip/ in the wuku [one of 30 seven-day periods which make 
up 210-day Javanese year] Kulawu/ his delivery was at saur [Muslim meal just before daybreak in 
the fasting month]’.
2 Tanojo 1966:31. Tanojo’s description for no. 20 (Friday Wagé birthdays) reads: wong lamun 
lair ing dina Juma’at Wagé, wataké bisa amicara juwèh rècèh pratitis watak pandhita, cetha nanging ceng-
kiling, lilan nanging kerep kesandhung.
3 Adams 1965:17, who quotes Soekarno as saying: ‘We Javanese believe that one born at the 
moment of sunrise is pre-destined […] with me [Soekarno] it wasn’t only the dawn of a new day, 
but also the dawn of a new century’.
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the year in which the Javanese Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) would appear.4
Dipanagara’s father was the eldest son of the second sultan of Yogya, 
Hamengkubuwana II (reigned 1792-1810, 1811-1812, 1826-1828), by his official 
wife (garwa padmi), Ratu Kedhaton (circa 1750-1820), who was of Madurese 
royal ancestry and distinguished in court circles for her Islamic religious 
piety (Carey 1980:173-4, 1992:187, 382, 401 note 12). His father was a little 
over sixteen at the time of Dipanagara’s birth, but already had the reputation 
of being a charming and prepossessing young man beloved by many for his 
mild character and quiet sense of humour. As a keen amateur historian and a 
budding littérateur in his own right, Dutch sources report that he was often 
called by his grandfather Sultan Mangkubumi, the first sultan (reigned 1749-
1792), to read to him from old Javanese tales and histories.5 It is not known 
how much influence Dipanagara’s father had on the young prince during his 
youth because at the age of seven he was taken away from the women’s quar-
ters in the kraton to live with his great-grandmother at her estate of Tegalreja, 
some three kilometres to the west of Yogya across the ricefields.6 But later the 
two were to be close during the 1811-1812 crisis, precipitated by the confron-
tation between the Yogya court and the European government, and during 
his father’s own short reign (1812-1814). 
It is possible that through his father – the favourite grandchild of the ageing 
first sultan – Dipanagara was brought to the notice of the founder of the Yogya 
kingdom when he was still a baby in arms. In his autobiography, Dipanagara 
described how he was presented to Sultan Mangkubumi by his mother, and 
the ageing ruler had foretold that he would cause the Dutch greater destruc-
tion than he had done during the Giyanti War (1746-1755), but that only the 
Almighty knew the outcome.7 The anecdote provides an insight into the 
4 Drewes 1925:167. The particular recension of the Jayabaya prophecies referred to by Drewes 
derived from west Java and was of late nineteenth-century origin. Ricklefs notes that although the 
prophecies were traditionally ascribed to Jayabaya, a real twelfth-century king, he may have had 
nothing to do with them, Ricklefs 2006:92.
5 KITLV H 97 pt. 7, W.H. van IJsseldijk, ‘Korte schets van de gesteldheid van Sultans Hoff, 
tot narigt van den pl. Opperhoofd I.G. van den Berg’ (henceforth: Van IJsseldijk, ‘Korte schets’), 
31-8-1798, quoting from his predecessor, J.M. van Rhijn’s (in office 1773-1786) final memoran-
dum, ‘Beschrijving der toestand van Sulthan’s hof’, 21-2-1780 (Ricklefs 2006:159). So taken was 
the first sultan with his grandson that, according to Van IJsseldijk, he placed himself in charge of 
his education and taught him to appreciate Javanese history and legends, drawing, painting and 
the courtly arts of literary composition and the chanting (macapat) of chronicles (babad). For a less 
sympathetic view, see Thorn 1815:291, quote cited in Chapter VII note 242.
6 Veth 1896-1907, III:572 noted that Javanese royal children were usually kept in the women’s 
quarters (keputrèn) in the kraton until they were circumcised.
7 Carey 1974a:30-1; BD (Manado) II:114, XIV (Sinom) 45-6. Kangjeng ibu ingkang bekta/ prapta 
ngarsaning Sang Aji/ pinarak Prabayeksa/ pan lajeng iling-ilingi/ Jeng Sultan ngandika ris/ Bok Ratu 
buyutirèku/ besuk wruhanira/ wus karsaning Hyang Widhi/ pan pinasthi iya karya lampahan. 46. Pan iku 
luwih lan ingwang/ rusaké Walonda bénjing/ wekasan Walahu Alam. See further Chapter VIII.
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importance which Dipanagara attached to the charismatic figure of the first 
sultan, and the way in which Mangkubumi’s example inspired family mem-
bers who were close to the prince during the Java War (1825-1830).8 The first 
sultan’s prophecy can also be linked to another prediction, ascribed to the great 
seventeenth-century ruler of Mataram, Sultan Agung (reigned 1613-1646), 
which Dipanagara also relates in his autobiography. This had foretold that 
after the death of Agung in February 1646, the Dutch would rule in Java for 
300 years and that although one of the Mataram ruler’s descendants would rise 
against them, he would be ultimately defeated.9 It seems almost certain that 
Dipanagara identified himself with this descendant indicated by Agung, thus 
providing what might be seen as a prophetic context in which to understand 
his later failure against the Dutch. We will see below how these predictions 
would be reinforced by the enigmatic prophecy of the disembodied voice 
heard by the twenty-year-old Dipanagara as he slept at Parangkusuma on the 
south coast: ‘You alone are the means, but that not for long, only to be counted 
amongst the ancestors’.10
Female relatives and influences
Although Dipanagara’s male forbears were of considerable significance to the 
8 Pangéran Jayakusuma I (Ngabèhi) (circa 1787-1829) (Chapter III note 3), one of Dipanagara’s 
principle commanders during the Java War, almost certainly echoed the prince’s opinion about the 
first sultan when in a letter to Hamengkubuwana II in 1826 he referred to the founder of Yogya as 
a ‘wandering knight’ (satria lelana), whom they had sought to emulate during their five-year strug-
gle, Dj.Br. 42, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, ‘Nadere toelichting en vervolg van de nota bevattende een 
kort overzicht van den staat der vorstenlanden en van het rijk van Jocjocarta in het byzonder […]’, 
4-12-1826, enclosing a report from Mas Selaya, a Javanese spy employed by the Dutch, 17-10-1826. 
See also AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 10-10-1834 no. 4 (Decision by Governor-General 
Jean Chrétien Baud to exile Dipanagara’s eldest son to Sumenep), Report of Mas Sumadipura on 
Pangéran Dipanagara II, 10-1833, reporting the latter to have said: wataké wong Mentaram […] telung 
prakara […] kang dhingin bisa simpen, kapindho gelem mbuwang, kaping telu kenceng agamané. Niku adaté 
sok dadi becik. Sinuwun Suwarga mawon kadospundi, ngluwihi saking gerah, nanging kenceng agamané, 
katrima dadi nurunaké; ‘The people of Mataram [Yogya] have three characteristics: first they can keep 
things to themselves, second they are generous, and third they are strict about their religion. That is 
the sort of adat [custom] which frequently produces quality. [As for] the late sultan [Hamengkubu-
wana I] how about him? He suffered great pains, but was firm in his religion – something which has 
been received as a transmission [to this day].’
9 Carey 1974a:30. The present author was wrong to ascribe the phrase in Dipanagara’s babad, 
bénjing sapengker kula, as referring to the date of the failure of Agung’s second siege of Batavia 
(1629), when the Mataram ruler attempted to force the Dutch out of their fortress. It is clear that 
Agung is referring instead to the period after his death. This would in fact fit better with the 
period of foreign rule in Java which lasted well beyond the Japanese capitulation on 15 August 
1945 and the Indonesian declaration of independence two days later (17-8-1945) to the Dutch 
‘police actions’ (politionele acties) of July 1947 and December 1948, when large areas of Indonesia 
were taken back under temporary Dutch control. See further Tjantrik Mataram 1966:76-8.
10 See Chapter IV note 58.
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young prince on a personal and inspirational level, his female relatives were 
perhaps even more important in moulding his unique social outlook during 
his childhood and young adolescence. This outlook was rooted in deep reli-
gious convictions and extensive connections with the santri (pious Muslim) 
communities in south-central Java, connections which were somewhat unique 
for a person of his birth. Both were to be critical to his style of his leadership 
during the Java War and the nature of his personal charisma. The fact that 
Dipanagara was mainly brought up under the care of strong females until the 
age of eighteen may also have contributed to the development of those femi-
nine aspects of his character which were to mark him out as unusual amongst 
his Javanese contemporaries. One thinks here of his sensitivity and intuition 
which manifested in his gift for the reading of character through the study of 
facial expression – what the Javanese call ngèlmu firasat (p. 108) – as well as 
his physical resilience. It may even have informed his supposed disgust at the 
bloody nature of battle to which we will return in the next chapter.
Through the female members of his family Dipanagara could claim blood 
links with some of the most prominent kyai (country gentlemen, and teachers 
of religious and spiritual disciplines) in Java. Some of these could trace their 
ancestry back to the legendary wali sanga or ‘nine apostles of Islam’ of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Others were renowned as religious leaders 
and scholars in their local communities. Dipanagara’s mother, Radèn Ayu 
Mangkarawati, an unofficial wife (garwa ampéyan) of the future third sultan, 
who gave birth to him at the age of fifteen,11 was descended from Kyai Ageng 
Prampèlan, a revered contemporary of the first Mataram ruler, Panembahan 
Sénapati (reigned 1575-1601). Another of her forbears was Sunan Ngampèl 
Dentha of Gresik, one of the first wali in Java, who had founded an Islamic 
community in east Java before the final fall of the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom 
of Majapahit in circa 1527.12 Although the evidence about his mother is some-
what fragmentary, she appears to have been born in the pradikan (tax-free 
11 In 1849, when there was talk of her coming out to Makassar to join Dipanagara in exile (pp. 
74, 747-52), she is mentioned as having been 82 years of age, AN Kab Geheim La V, 11-5-1849, 
P.J.B. de Perez (Surabaya) to Governor-General Jan Jacob Rochussen (Batavia), 20-3-1849. If this 
refers to Javanese years – which is likely – she would have been born in AJ 1696 (AD 1770-1771). 
She would thus have been barely 15 at the time of Dipanagara’s birth.
12 Padmasusastra 1902:209-10; BNg I, 13:III (Pangkur) 15. sing Dyah Mangkarawatya/ trahing 
Kyageng Prampèlan rumuhun. The information that Ki Ageng Prampèlan lived at the time of Pan-
embahan Sénapati was provided by the jurukunci (keeper of the keys) of Ki Ageng’s gravesite 
which lies nine kilometres to the south of Sragèn near Surakarta, interview, jurukunci pasaréyan 
Ki Ageng Prampèlan, 2-4-1973. See also Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoerejan n.y.:27, which 
mentions a Kyai Tumenggung Prampèlan of the kraton of Pajang who became a ‘true believer’ 
(mukmin kas) with the title ‘Ki Ageng’; Mandoyokusumo 1977:15, who refers to a ‘Tumenggung 
Parampilan’ [sic] as amongst the immediate ancestors of Hamengkubuwana I’s mother, Mas Ayu 
Téjawati; Padmasusastra 1902:210 who lists a ‘Ki Ageng Prempuhan’ of the Karang Lo dynasty as 
a tenth generation descendant of Sunan Ngampèl Dentha.
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village set aside for men of religion) of Majasta close to the famous religious 
centre of Tembayat in the Pajang area.13 Both these places had been settled 
by descendants and supporters of Panembahan Kajoran, a major opponent 
of the Mataram dynasty in the seventeenth century. The area had apparently 
remained a potential centre of opposition to the central Javanese courts right 
up to the time of Dipanagara’s birth.14 The fact that Dipanagara’s father had 
chosen a wife from this potentially troublesome region is a good illustration 
of the courts’ policy of containing the threat to their authority from the inde-
pendent-minded religious communities by marriage alliances and generous 
grants of tax-free land and villages.15 These ties of family and courtly patron-
age were later to produce considerable support from this area for Dipanagara 
during the Java War.16 
Dipanagara made few references to his mother in his autobiography 
beyond mentioning that she was ‘strong’ (kuwat) and ‘unusually beautiful’ 
(luwih bagus), but he seems to have been attached to her: between 1825 and 
her capture on 14 October 1829 while hiding in a village in the Adikarta area 
of Kulon Praga, they shared the vicissitudes of war together, and immedi-
ately after the war, when she had returned to the kraton, there is a touching 
description of her weeping bitterly at the homage paid by five of Dipanagara’s 
children to the dowager queen, Ratu Ageng (formerly Ratu Kencana), the 
mother of the fifth sultan, rather than to herself as their grandmother, when 
they made their formal submission in April 1830.17 As late as 1849, when the 
13 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 6, where he reported Dipanagara as saying that his mother was born in 
the village of Madèsta in het district van Padjitan [sic], which immediately suggests the remote 
south coast district of Pacitan, but is more likely to have referred to Pajang, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 
24, where he uses the phrase in het Padjitaansche to refer to Kyai Maja’s campaign in Pajang in 1828. 
‘Madèsta’ was almost certainly Majasta. On the location of the latter, which is often referred to as 
‘the hill of Majasta’ see Rinkes 1911:449; and IOR X IX 7, ‘Topographische Kaart der Residentie 
Soerakarta opgenomen ingevolge gouvernements besluit dd. 9 Junij 1861 no. 6 en 13 November 
1862 no. 26’, where Majasta is placed almost exactly due south of Surakarta on the Kali Dankang 
in the Tawangsari sub-district, see further Balé Poestaka 1939:66.
14 De Graaf 1940:273-328, 1962:38.
15 Carey 1981a:258 note 101. Rinkes 1911:454 and Mandoyokusumo 1977:21 no. 31, both men-
tion that one of Hamengkubuwana II’s daughters married the spiritual lord of Tembayat, Sayyid 
Ngabdani, who later joined Dipanagara during the Java War, see Bataviasche Courant, 22-12-1827. 
See further Remmelink 1994:18 on marriage politics in early eighteenth-century Mataram.
16 Carey 1974a:23. There were reports at the beginning of the Java War that Dipanagara would 
go to Majasta to rally support, AvJ, Haji Ali (Tembayat) to Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 18-7-1825. 
See also Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:532; Bataviasche Courant, 29-11-1826, on the campaign 
of Radèn Mas Papak (later Pangéran Adipati Natapraja) around Tembayat in 1826; and Batavi-
asche Courant, 20-12-1827, on the campaign of the ’priestly’ Pangéran Sumendi, a relation of the 
family of Pangéran Sérang, around Tembayat in 1827.
17 BD (Manado) II:240, XVIII.154 (on Mangkarawati’s appearance and character); Louw and De 
Klerck 1984-1909, V:412-3 and Chambert-Loir 2000:274 (give details of Mangkarawati’s capture 
along with one of Dipanagara’s daughters, Radèn Ayu Gusti [Appendix IV pt. 1], at the village 
of Karangwuni near Wates in the Adikarta area of Kulon Praga); Houben 1994:23 (on obeisance 
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prince had been in exile for nearly twenty years first in Manado (1830-1833) 
and then Makassar (1833-1855), he received correspondence from her which 
caused him to hope that she would come out to join him in exile (she declined 
saying that at 82 Javanese years she was too old to make the sea voyage from 
Semarang to Makassar).18 She apparently died of dropsy in Yogya in 1852 
only three years before her son passed away in Makassar (8 January 1855).19 
During his boyhood and adolescence, Dipanagara probably saw less of his 
mother than he would normally have done had he remained in the kraton. 
But his great-grandmother’s estate at Tegalreja lay within easy reach of Yogya 
so it is likely that frequent family visits were made and they remained in 
close contact. Dipanagara appears to have been her only son by the future 
third sultan according to the official Yogya genealogy (Mandoyokusumo 
1977:29-33).
Another female relative mentioned above who may well have helped 
to shape Dipanagara’s outlook in his youth was his grandmother, Ratu 
Kedhaton, a descendant of Panembahan Cakraningrat II of Madura (reigned 
1680-1707). In his autobiography, Dipanagara refers to her with respect.20 
Her staunch attitude towards Islam, for which the Madurese are noted, may 
have impressed him. At the same time, according to a contemporary Dutch 
Resident, the Ratu had ‘a strong Madurese spirit which seemed to flag little in 
her old age’. Her husband, the second sultan, according to this same source, 
‘with his usual Javanese thought patterns’, was completely unable to under-
stand her.21 As an unwavering protagonist of her son, the future third sultan, 
she had a spectacularly volatile marital relationship with the Yogya ruler, 
who favoured his offspring from another queen.22 On four separate occasions 
in January-June 1812, she was subjected to twenty-four hour detentions in 
the Bangsal Kencana (Golden Hall) in the kraton to try to break her spirit and 
force her to divulge the nature of the ‘intrigues’ between the British and her 
made by Dipanagara’s children to Ratu Ageng, the mother of Hamengkubuwana V). There seems 
to be a mistake in Houben, or in the sources he cites, because when Dipanagara’s children made 
this obeisance in April 1830, neither of the mothers of the previous two rulers (Hamengkubuwana 
III and Hamengkubuwana IV) were still alive: Hamengkubuwana III’s mother, Ratu Kedhaton 
(post-1814, Ratu Ageng), had died on 12 July 1820 (AvJ, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to 
G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen, 12-7-1820), and Ratu Ibu (post-18-5-1822, Ratu Ageng), the mother of 
Hamengkubuwana IV, had died on 20-6-1826, Chapter VIII note 46. There is even a question as to 
whether Hamengkubuwana V’s mother, Ratu Kencana (post-August 1826, Ratu Ageng) was still 
living as she is known to have suffered from a severe psychological illness (p. 412) and may have 
died before the end of the Java War.
18 AN Kab, 11-5-1849 no. La V, Dipanagara (Makassar) to Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati (Yogyakarta), 
25 Rabingulakir AJ 1777 (AD 20-3-1849); Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati (Yogyakarta) to Baron A.H.W. 
de Kock (Resident of Yogya), 24 Jumadilawal AJ 1777 (AD 11-4-1849). See also Appendix XIII.
19 Dj.Br. 4, ‘Algemeen Verslag over de Residentie Djokjokarta’, 1852.
20 BD (Manado) II:164, XV.135.
21 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 12-2-1807.
22 See pp. 322, 331.
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son (Chapter VII), but this only hardened her resolve.23 Her son’s Madurese 
ancestry was also remarked on by European observers. In early September 
1811, for example, when news of the capture of Madura by the British inva-
sion force reached Yogya (p. 286), it was said by the Dutch Resident to have 
‘fermented his Madurese blood’.24 The fact that Dipanagara was himself one 
quarter Madurese through his father’s family may well have had an effect 
on his personality and contributed to his volatile temper and sudden rages, 
which we will encounter quite often in these pages. 
Easily the most important influence on the young prince was his great-
grandmother, Ratu Ageng, sometimes referred to as Ratu Ageng Tegalreja. 
When Dipanagara was seven, she became his guardian. Her motives for 
adopting him are not discussed in the sources. Perhaps she recognised in him 
a certain spiritual depth which set him apart from other family members and 
made him fit for serious religious study. Perhaps the youth of Dipanagara’s 
mother – still in her mid-teens when she gave birth to him – influenced the 
old lady’s decision, although in this pre-modern era in Java teenage brides 
were the norm, at least in court circles. Perhaps she just wanted to have the 
company of a young child as she set off to open out new lands – part of the 
late eighteenth-century expansion of sawah in the core regions which we dis-
cussed in the previous chapter – around the royal estate where she settled just 
to the west of Yogya. Certainly the practice of ‘adoption’, or more accurately 
‘lending’ children, was not unusual in Javanese society (Geertz 1961:36-41). 
Dipanagara’s own father, as we have seen, was largely brought up by his 
grandfather, the first sultan, and there were many instances of royal children 
being lent to older relatives to ensure they received an education.25
Whatever the reason, Dipanagara found himself as a pre-pubescent boy 
living with a remarkable old lady who had a very critical view of develop-
ments at the Yogya court under the wayward and unskilful rule of her son, 
23 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto correspondence, vol. 24) no. 14, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) 
to T.S. Raffles (Batavia), 22-3-1812; Dj.Br. 19¹, A.H.W. Baron de Kock, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 
Yogya, 17-5-1851.
24 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Jan Willem Janssens (Semarang), 11-9-1811.
25 See KITLV H 97 pt. 7, Van IJsseldijk, ‘Korte schets’, 31-8-1798, who mentioned that Dipanaga-
ra’s uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi (born circa 1781), had been brought up by Hamengkubuwana 
I’s daughter, Ratu Bendara I, the divorced and childless former wife of Mangkunagara I (reigned 
1757-1795). Dipanagara’s younger brother, Pangéran Adinagara (post-1825, Pangéran Suryènga-
laga; born circa 1788), had been apparently adopted by Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat who 
had no children by his official wife, Ratu Bendara II, a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II and Ratu 
Kedhaton, Carey 1981a:238 note 20. Meanwhile, in Surakarta, Pakubuwana IV’s sister, Radèn Ayu 
Sekartaji, had been entrusted to Ratu Bendara I’s former husband (Mangkunagara I) until his 
death in December 1795, Java NOK 47, W.H. van Overstraten (Semarang) to Willem Arnold Alting 
(Batavia), 2-1-1796; and the future Pakubuwana VI (reigned 1823-1830), Radèn Mas Saperdan, 
was brought up by his maternal uncle, Radèn Adipati Sasradiningrat II (in office 1812-1846), after 
the death of his mother following his delivery on 27-4-1806, see Chapter X note 160.
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the second sultan. The daughter of a prominent kyai in the Sragèn district26 
– the same district where Dipanagara’s mother hailed from – Ratu Ageng 
Tegalreja could trace her descent to the sultan of Bima in Sumbawa, a fiercely 
independent Islamic principality in eastern Indonesia (now province of 
Nusa Tenggara Barat) (Serat salasilah para leloehoer in Kadanoerejan n.y.:127). 
Other close relations were linked to the court religious hierarchy in Yogya: 
Ratu Ageng’s sister, for example, was married to the Yogya pengulu (head 
of the religious hierarchy), Pekih Ibrahim (Appendix Vb), and another fam-
ily member was a Yogya santri, Haji Ibrahim, who carried secret messages 
between the central Javanese rulers during their doomed attempt to mount a 
conspiracy against the British in 1811-1812 and later travelled to Sumbawa to 
engage in the slave trade where he was again suspected of acting as a secret 
emissary for the then exiled second sultan.27 These latter relations – less than 
scrupulous though some undoubtedly were – stood Dipanagara in good 
stead when he began to forge closer links with established religious officials 
in the sultan’s capital as a young man.
By all accounts, Ratu Ageng was an exceedingly tough lady: she followed 
the first sultan throughout all his campaigns against the Dutch during the 
Giyanti War (1746-1755), and gave birth to the future second sultan while 
her husband’s forces were bivouacked on the slopes of Mount Sundoro in 
Kedhu – hence the future second sultan’s childhood name of Gusti Radèn 
Mas Sundoro.28 After the foundation of Yogyakarta in 1755, she became com-
mander of the elite female bodyguard or royal Amazon corps, the only mili-
tary formation to have impressed Marshal Herman Willem Daendels during 
his visit to the Yogya court in July 1809 (p. 210).29 At the same time, she was 
26 This was Ki Ageng Derpayuda, see Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoerejan n.y.:125-7 
(which gives an account of Ratu Ageng Tegalreja’s ancestry); Mandoyokusumo 1977:11 and 
Appendix I. Very little is known about Derpayuda apart from the fact that his burial site at 
Majangjati near Sragèn is visited by pilgrimages sent out from the Yogya court and that in Yogya 
he is revered as the patron saint of gamblers, Musium Nasional (Jakarta), MS 933 DJ, Ir Moens, 
‘Platen Album’ no. 8 (‘Slametan cèmbengan bij de Gunung Gamping [Jogja] met offers’), 42 (pic-
ture 25) and 90 (picture 86). Further details can be found in Sumahatmaka 1929. De Graaf 1961:61, 
refers to a Kyai Demang Derpayuda at the time of a VOC ambassadorial mission to Mataram. See 
further p. 190.
27 Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoerejan n.y.:127; Carey 1980:55 note 1. While in Sum-
bawa, Haji Ibrahim was suspected by the Dutch authorities of carrying secret messages from 
Hamengkubuwana II, then in exile in Ambon (1816-1826), to the Sultan of Tidore, S.Br. 87, Besluit 
van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 10-10-1818 no. 13, cited in Assistant-Resident Caspers (Ambon) to 
H.J. Domis (Semarang), 15-4-1823. See further Chapter VII note 87.
28 Yogya kraton MS A62 (Babad Dipanagaran):1; Mandoyokusumo 1977:17.
29 Poensen 1905:144. The one-hour of mock tournaments performed by the Amazon corps 
(pasukan Langenkusuma) before Daendels on the morning of 30-7-1809 is mentioned in Dj.Br. 24, 
J. Groenhoff van Woortman, ‘Dagverhaal van het voorgevallene ter gelegenheid van de komst 
alhier van Z.E. den Heer Maarschalk en Gouverneur-Generaal, Herman Willem Daendels’, 17-
9-1809 (henceforth: Groenhoff van Woortman, ‘Dagverhaal’). Presumably, this ‘tournament’ 
was performed on horseback on the northern alun-alun, because Daendels later mentioned how 
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renowned, according to one Yogya court chronicle, for her Islamic piety and 
the pleasure she took in reading religious texts, as well as her firm insistence 
on preserving traditional Javanese adat (customs) at court.30 Her unshake-
able commitment to Javanese adat would pass in full measure to her great-
grandson who would later be described by the veteran VOC official Nicolaus 
Engelhard as ‘in all matters a Javanese [who] followed Javanese customs’ 
(Van der Kemp 1896a:415; p. 510). By the time Dipanagara was taken away 
to live with her at Tegalreja, she remained even in her mid sixties an exceed-
ingly strong-willed lady who must have been quite redoubtable for a young 
boy of seven. There is an interesting passage in the Surakarta version of the 
Babad Dipanagara where the prince is made to comment that ‘in my childhood 
people used to make me afraid when giving an order’, a reference which has 
a brief resonance in his own autobiographical account (Carey 1981a:78-9, 271 
note 145). If Ratu Ageng did indeed occasionally act the stern step-mother, 
the portrait which Dipanagara draws of her in his babad is overwhelmingly 
affectionate. In two short verses, he evoked the rigorously simple life she led 
amongst the farming communities around Tegalreja and the numbers of visit-
ing santri who were drawn there:
XIV. 50  We describe the Ratu [Ageng]:
  [how] she delighted in farming
  and in her religious duties.
  She made herself anonymous
  in her profession of her love of God.
 51  [...]
  Tegalreja became extremely prosperous
  for many people came to visit.
  All sought food
  [while] the santri sought [religious] knowledge.
  There was much devotion and prayer,
  moreover, there were also farmers.31
impressed he had been by the female bodyguard’s handling of their cavalry carbines while on 
horseback, Poensen 1905:144. A vivid description of the appearance of the Surakarta Amazon 
corps in 1821 is given in KITLV H 788, ‘Verzameling van documenten, meest brieven aan Jos. 
Donatien Boutet, particulier te Jogjakarta’, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Resident Surakarta) to J.D. 
Boutet (Yogya), 5-1-1822, une quarantaine de femmes assises en rang immédiatement en dessus du trône 
et littéralement armé jusqu’aux dents: outre une ceinture garni de kris chaqu’une tena à la main un sabre 
ou un fusil […]. Il faut avouer qu’elles sont une singulière garde de corps; ‘forty or so women seated 
immediately below [the Sunan’s] throne and literally armed to the teeth: besides a belt with a kris 
tucked into it, each one held in their hand a sabre or a carbine […] one has to admit that they are 
a remarkable bodyguard’. For an early reference to Hamengkubuwana II’s interest – while still 
Crown Prince – in this corps, see Ricklefs 1974a:304 note 42; and on his unscrupulous methods of 
recruitment, see Carey 1992:413 note 73.
30 Yogya kraton MS A62 (Babad Dipanagaran):3 (on Ratu Ageng’s study of the wédha).
31 BD (Manado) II:116, XIV (Sinom) 50-1. Kangjeng Ratu winarni/ pan tetanèn remenipun/ sinambi 
lan ngibadah/ kinarya namur puniki/ lampahira gèn brongta marang Yang Sukma. 51. […] / langkung kerta 
The power of prophecy78
The atmosphere in which Dipanagara was brought up could not have 
been more different than that of the Yogya court under the second sultan. 
The rural simplicity which was late eighteenth-century Tegalreja taught him 
from an early age to mix easily with all levels of Javanese society and to do 
so in an easy and unpatronising manner. Ratu Ageng’s careful administrative 
methods and her willingness to engage in trade may likewise have made an 
impression on him.32 We know from later Dutch accounts that Dipanagara 
was nearly unique amongst contemporary Yogya princes in that he derived 
substantial income from his lands without having to engage in extortionate 
practices, and that his personal wealth later helped him to finance the early 
stages of the Java War.33 He was also careful with his money to the point 
of miserliness in the estimation of the Dutch Resident of Manado, D.F.W. 
Pietermaat (in office 1827-1831), who first oversaw his exile (Van der Kemp 
1896a:331; Chapter IX note 64). European contemporaries were likewise struck 
by his ‘common touch’. In the words of Willem van Hogendorp (1913:154):
A special characteristic about Dipanagara in the view of the Javanese, who are 
always extremely exalted and distant in their dealings between superiors and 
inferiors, is that he consorts as easily with the common man as with the great ones. 
Because of this he has made himself much loved everywhere. 
Dipanagara later mentioned that ‘in emulation of what the priests do, I often 
went to Pasar [Kutha] Gedhé, [Ima]giri, the south coast [Guwa Langsé] and 
to Selarong […] to the [last] two places I always took a large mounted escort 
with me […] to help cut and plant padi [rice] which [helped] popularise 
the chiefs with the people’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Carey 
1981a:240 note 27).
From the point of view of the contemporary Yogya court, Dipanagara may 
have been regarded as a village dweller because he was brought up outside the 
bounds of the sultan’s capital.34 But for the rural inhabitants of south-central 
Tegalreja/ mapan kathah tiyang prapti/ samya angungsi tedhi/ ingkang santri ngungsi ngèlmu/ langkung 
ramé ngibadah/ punapa déné wong tani. We know from the administrative records of the Yogya court 
that the produce of the Tegalreja estate in the year 1798-1799 was some 74 amet (1 amet = 150 kgs) 
of rice, of which some had been used for religious feasts (ajat) and the support of men of religion 
(abdi-Dalem pradikan) via tax-free benefices from the state, Carey and Hoadley 2000:135-6.
32 For details of the produce of the Tegalreja estate, see Carey and Hoadley 2000:135-6; and for 
references to Ratu Ageng’s trading factors (juragan-Dalem) and business agents (abdi-Dalem suda-
gar), see Carey 1980:118-26; Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoerejan n.y.:307. It is clear from the 
murder of one of her agents in northern Kedhu that she was trading the produce of the Tegalreja 
estate as far afield as the pasisir (northeast coast of Java).
33 Dj.Br. 18, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, ‘Nota over de landverhuringen aan particulieren in de 
Vorsten Landen op Java’, 16-2-1837. See further pp. 594, 606-7, 650-3.
34 Interview with B.P.H. Adinegoro, Yogyakarta, 10 December 1971; and Kota Jogjakarta 200 
Tahun 1956:23 on the western boundary of the old royal capital which lay to the east of the Tegal-
reja estate and the Kali Winonga, see Map 2.
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Java at this time the prince’s unusual upbringing only enhanced his charisma 
as a popular leader. Furthermore, the country gentry-origins of Dipanagara’s 
female relatives who had the most influence on him in his youth, namely his 
mother and great-grandmother, were a distinct advantage when it came to 
assuming a leadership role during the Java War. Not only did it relate him 
to influential village-based religious leaders, but it almost certainly endowed 
him with some robust genes. In general, marriages between scions of ruling 
dynasties and country gentry produced more enterprising offspring than the 
inbred alliances between families of high court nobility. It is no coincidence 
in this respect that some of the most effective leaders in Javanese history 
during this period were children of unofficial wives – most of whom hailed 
from rural gentry stock. One thinks here of the first sultan Mangkubumi, of 
Dipanagara himself and of his cavalry commanders, Ali Basah Senthot and 
Pangéran Jayakusuma (Ngabèhi),35 Dipanagara’s kinsman. In the post-Java 
War period, two other sons of low-born wives, one a daughter of a court pup-
peteer, Pangéran Suryanagara (1822-circa 1886), and Radèn Gandakusuma 
(Patih Danureja V),36 both made important contributions to the cultural 
and literary life of mid-nineteenth century Yogya (Behrend 1999:388-415; 
Carey 1974a:8 note 23, 9-10, 1981a:xxviii-xxix). Even amongst Dipanagara’s 
own offspring this same pattern was visible. Thus his eldest son, Pangéran 
35 On Jayakusuma (Ngabèhi), who was killed in September 1829 together with his sons in 
a bloody encounter in the Kelir mountains, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:393-5; Carey 
1974b:275-6. On Senthot, see Soekanto 1951a:5, 1959:10-1; Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoe-
rejan n.y.:130-1. These all mention that Senthot was the child of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III 
by a selir, something which I have accepted in Appendix III. However, it should be noted that a 
contemporary source from the Java War period indicated that Senthot’s mother was a sister of Ratu 
Maduretna, Hamengkubuwana II’s daughter who died on 16-11-1809, dK 119, ‘Reports of spies: 
Note of Ngabèhi Nataraja on Radèn Mas Tumenggung Rongga (Senthot)’, 15-5-1826. This would 
mean that Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III married two daughters of Hamengkubuwana II, his 
second marriage thus dating from post-1809. The Pakualam babad does indeed state that soon after 
Ratu Maduretna’s death, Hamengkubuwana II offered Rongga another of his daughters, Radèn 
Ajeng Suratmi, so that he would remain as his son-in-law. This young woman (born circa 1797), 
who was only thirteen at the time of her betrothal to Rongga, was the second daughter of Hameng-
kubuwana II by his third and favourite consort, Ratu Kencana Wulan, dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie 
van Overgave’, 4-4-1808; Poensen 1905:154-5, 188-9. But even though the ratu provided Rongga a 
substantial dowry in the shape of jewels and other precious ornaments, which he took with him 
when he went into rebellion (Chapter VI note 166), it does not seem that the marriage was consum-
mated. There is also no mention of this second marriage in the official Yogya court genealogy, Man-
doyokusumo 1977:24 no. 58, where Ratu Kencana Wulan’s second daughter, Ratu Timur, is cited 
as having married the Yogya bupati, Radèn Tumenggung Jayawinata (Appendix VIII) and after his 
death (? during the Java War), Pakualam II (reigned 1829-1858), the husband of her deceased elder 
sister, Ratu Anom. Even if Rongga had married this other daughter of Hamengkubuwana II in 
1810, she could not have been the mother of Senthot, who was born in 1808. Senthot’s mother may 
well have been the bibi (‘aunt’, low-born unofficial wife) Dayawati whose demise Rongga reported 
to his brother-in-law Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat on 12-3-1810, Carey 1980:35.
36 On Danureja V who served as patih from 1847-1879, see LOr 11089 (1), R.M.P. Santadilaga, 
Lelampahanipoen Kangjeng Pangéran Arja Djoeroe:1; Appendix II.
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Dipanagara II, born of an unofficial wife at Tegalreja, whom we shall meet 
below, was apparently the most impressive of his children, far outshining his 
younger brothers, who had mothers of more eminent lineage.37
A Tegalreja childhood
The reasons why Ratu Ageng left the Yogya kraton so suddenly in the 
early part of the second sultan’s reign are not entirely clear. According to 
Dipanagara, she had become saddened and embittered by the conflicts with 
her children and the incessant domestic intrigues of the court. As he put it in 
his babad:
XIV. 49 We now tell of the Ratu Ageng
   how she was often at odds 
   with her own sons.
   She therefore broke away in anger and cleared new land:
   the waste fields were opened up,
   [and] then she settled there.
  The distance from the town of Yogya
 50  was a journey of one hour [on foot].
   When it was ready,
   it was called Tegalreja [‘Fields of Prosperity’].38
37 On Pangéran Dipanagara II, see AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 3-4-1834 no. 
19 (Governor-General Baud’s decision to exile Dipanagara II to Sumenep), F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) 
to Jean Chrétien Baud (Batavia), 15-3-1834, who described him as ‘the only one of Dipanagara’s 
five sons who played an important role in the Java War. During the last year of the war, accord-
ing to Valck, ‘he showed signs of enterprise, courage and perseverance in the Ledhok [north-
ern Kedhu] area’. Dipanagara’s second son, Pangéran Dipaningrat was referred to by Valck as 
‘insane’ (he had apparently tried to murder his housekeeper and his wife – a daughter of Radèn 
Tumenggung Danuningrat – had separated from him); Dipanagara’s third son, Dipakusuma, was 
in Valck’s opinion ‘through and through a bad character who gambles away all his possessions’; 
and his fifth son, Radèn Mas Jonèd, also behaved ‘strangely’ and was later killed in a brawl with 
a Dutch officer in 1837 (see further Hageman 1856:412). Only Dipanagara’s fourth son, Radèn 
Mas Raib, showed signs of ‘good character’: according to a Dutch report, he later became a pious 
Muslim during his period of exile in Ambon (post-April 1840) where he lived apart from his 
two elder brothers (Dipaningrat and Dipakusuma), AN Ambon 1189b, ‘Staat der te Amboina 
aanwezige staats gevangenen onder ultimo December 1841’. For a discussion of Dipanagara’s 
two surviving adult sons, Radèn Mas Kindar (born 4-1-1832) and Radèn Mas Dulkabli (born cicra 
1836), born to him in Manado and Makassar respectively by his official wife, Radèn Ayu Retnan-
ingsih, a daughter of a Madiun bupati, see pp. 731, 753-4; and Appendix IV note 1.
38 BD (Manado) II:116, XIV (Sinom) 49-50. Kangjeng Ratu Geng winarna/ pan sering selayanèki/ 
lan kang putra pribadi/ dadya mutung adudhukuh/ babad kang ara-ara/ mapan lajeng dèndalemi/ tebi-
hira saking nagri ing Ngayogya. 50. mapan lampahan saejam/ mengkana pan sampun dadi/ winestanan 
Tegalreja. See also BNg I:13-4, III.17-20, where Ratu Ageng is described as having lived in a small 
pavilion (pacangkraman) called Tegalbener before the fields were cleared and the residence (dalem) 
of Tegalreja constructed, see further Map 2. The ‘one hour’s journey’ which Dipanagara referred 
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It is likely that Ratu Ageng did not approve of the lifestyle of her son, the 
second sultan, in particular his nonchalant attitude towards Islamic religious 
observance. He appears to have rarely visited the great mosque, Mesjid Ageng, 
the official worshipping place of the Yogya rulers,39 although he seems to have 
been rather more diligent about dispatching court santri to undertake pilgrim-
ages to Mecca and to various holy sites in south-central Java and the north 
coast.40 The Dutch Resident’s report about the deathbed speech which Ratu 
Ageng addressed to her son before her demise on 17 October 1803 affords an 
insight into her disapproving attitude towards the Yogya ruler and his entou-
rage. It also casts light on Ratu Ageng’s exceptional humility and deep-rooted 
faith, a rare combination indeed in the court circles of her day:
Sultan! The path I have to lay aside is difficult and now I feel that I am essentially 
no more than an ordinary person. My son, keep that in view and do not believe 
that, although you are now ruler, after your death you will be anything more than 
a common coolie. So live accordingly!41
is the journey on foot from the kraton. J.F.G. Brumund, who visited Tegalreja in the 1840s, men-
tioned that the carriage journey took ‘a good half-hour’ perhaps because of the state of the roads 
in the rainy season when he visited (Brumund 1854:181).
39 dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808; Dj.Br. 9A pt. 8, F.G. Valck, ‘Overzigt 
der voornaamste gebeurtenissen in het Djocjokartasche rijk sedert dezelfs stichting tot aan het 
einde van den […] oorlog in den jaren 1825-30’ (henceforth: Valck, ‘Overzigt’), Yogyakarta, 1-8-
1833, 96. It is possible that Hamengkubuwana II may have attended Friday prayers at his private 
(Suranatan) mosque in the kraton, but there is no record of this. On his greater diligence in attend-
ing Friday services (salat Jumungah) at the Mesjid Ageng during the Java War after his second 
restoration (1826-1828), see Van den Broek 1875:284.
40 Carey 1980:171-4. Pilgrimages from Yogya to Mecca are recorded in the years 1788 (Ricklefs 
1974a:313), and in 1805-1806. In the latter year, the pilgrims encountered great difficulties with 
shipping because of the stringency of the British naval blockade and the opposition of the Dutch 
authorities, see Van der Chijs 1895-97, XIV:194-5; Besluit, 12-7-1805, which refers to nine ‘priests’ 
sent by Hamengkubuwana II in an entourage of 35 who were brought from Semarang to Batavia 
by the VOC at Company expense because the Raad van Indië was unwilling to allow them to 
have too much contact with local traders by travelling on ‘native’ ships. They were still in Batavia 
in January 1806 and seven of the pilgrims asked to be allowed to go back to Yogya because they 
had heard that the grave of The Prophet had been ‘destroyed’ by the Wahhābī (in fact, they had 
destroyed the grave of The Prophet’s companion, Zayd bin al-Khāttāb). The remaining two with 
an undisclosed number of followers eventually departed on an Arab brig bound for Jeddah from 
Tegal, Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 29-7-1806, 
A.A. Cassa (Tegal) to Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta), 4-8-1806. Amongst the duties performed 
by the Yogya pilgrims when they eventually reached Mecca was the religious feast (sedhekah) to 
mark the thousand-day memorial for the recently departed Ratu Ageng (Tegalreja). This was held 
on the plain of Arafat, a particularly auspicious location. The cost of the ceremony was partly 
borne by Ratu Kedhaton and other female members of the Yogya court, Carey 1980:173; Carey 
and Houben 1987:31. In June 1811, another 24 kraton santri asked permission to go on the haj, but 
the Franco-Dutch government refused to allow them to take ship from Semarang because of the 
British blockade and the threat of imminent invasion, see Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) 
to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 10-6-1811, 24-6-1811.
41 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-10-1803. 
Ratu Ageng apparently used the expression batur (porter, coolie).
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In his autobiography, Dipanagara later reflected on the religious climate in 
Yogya at this time and the way in which many of its inhabitants ignored 
the precepts of Islam. In particular, he was highly critical of the second sul-
tan’s three sons-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat, Radèn Adipati 
Danureja II and Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III, all of whom were to meet 
violent ends.42 In his babad, he described these three as ‘incorrigible sinners’ 
even though he had close family relations with at least two of these men’s 
families:43
XIV.56  The three officials were all young;
 the desires of the sultan
 were greater than those of his father
 as also were [the desires] of these three officials,
 who all sinned
 against religion.
 The pengulu and
 all the people in Yogya as well,
 from the highest to the lowest, rarely followed the truth.44
It is likely that Ratu Ageng’s bitterness towards the frivolity, religious laxity 
and self-serving politics of the Yogya court left a lasting mark on the mind of 
the young prince. At the very end of the Java War, he was to confide to the 
senior Dutch officer accompanying him to Batavia that ‘if I had continued to 
insist on my known demands [to be recognised as the regulator of religion] 
then it was out of the conviction that people at the courts did not follow the 
old customs as scrupulously as before [and] above all that people neglected 
religion’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744). Indeed, in his babad he was 
to speak of it being ‘the will of God’ that ‘he should follow his great-grand-
mother, for it was his wish to be absorbed in religion’.45
42 Sumadiningrat, who served as wedana jero (1797-1812), was killed on 20-6-1812 in his resi-
dence when the British stormed the kraton (Chapter VII; Carey 1992:90-1, 419 note 94), Danureja 
II, the patih of Yogya (1799-1811), was murdered in the kraton on Hamengkubuwana II’s orders 
on 28-10-1811 (Chapter VII; Carey 1980:60-1, 76-7, 184), and Radèn Rongga, the bupati wedana of 
Madiun (1796-1810), was hunted down and killed on 17-12-1810 during a brief rebellion in east 
Java in November-December 1810 (Chapter VI).
43 Dipanagara was later (1814) married into the Prawiradirjan family, and two of his younger 
brothers and two of his children married into the Danurejan, see Appendices II and III.
44 BD (Manado) II:118, XIV (Sinom) 56. katiga samya nemira/ déné karsanya Sang Aji/ pan lang-
kung saking kang rama/ tanapi punggawa katri/ maksiyat carub sami/ kalawan agamanipun/ Ki Pangulu 
mengkana/ kabèh lan wong Ngayogya sami/ ageng-alit awis ingkang lampah nyata.
45 BD (Manado) II:119, XIV (Sinom) 49. wus karsaning Suksma/ Pangéran Dipanagari/ kedah 
mumuri kang eyang/ buyut mapan karsanèki/ kerem marang agami.
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Already in her mid-sixties when she moved to the Tegalreja estate in the 
early 1790s,46 Ratu Ageng seems to have led an active life almost until the end. 
Then in late September 1803, when she was long past seventy, she developed a 
serious fever after falling heavily by one of the ponds at Tegalreja.47 This was a 
rather dramatic time for the inhabitants of Yogya for the great volcano behind 
the city, Mount Merapi, had started to erupt on 22 September with more minor 
eruptions noted on the twin Kedhu volcanoes of Mount Sumbing and Mount 
Sundoro – the last especially appropriate given Ratu Ageng’s experience of 
giving birth there in March 1750 when she had been delivered of the second 
sultan.48 Although she was moved to the crown prince’s quarters in Yogya and 
rallied somewhat in early October, her condition soon deteriorated. The end 
came at three o’clock on the afternoon of 17 October after she had whispered 
the previously noted trenchant last words to her son, the second sultan.49 She 
was then laid in state in the kadipatèn (the crown prince’s residence) and buried 
at sunset the following day at the royal graveyard at Imagiri some four hours 
journey on foot to the south of Yogya.50 Her cortège was followed by all the 
members of the sultan’s family (including no doubt the young Dipanagara), 
with the exception of the second sultan himself and Dipanagara’s father, the 
crown prince, who accompanied his grandmother’s coffin only as far as the 
southern meeting place on the alun-alun (open square) before the court.51 
Inheriting the Tegalreja estate
The Dutch Resident reported that both the sultan and the crown prince were 
very distressed at the old lady’s passing, but it must have been a particularly 
heavy blow for the eighteen-year-old Dipanagara.52 He now remained alone 
46 If it is assumed that Ratu Ageng was in her late teens when she gave birth to the second sultan 
on 7 March 1750, she would have been in her early sixties when she moved to the Tegalreja estate 
in circa 1793. She would thus have been in her early seventies by the time of her death in October 
1803. AvJ Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 27-9-1803 referred to 
Ratu Ageng as already an ‘old woman’ by the time of her last illness in September-October 1803.
47 AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 27-9-1803. Waterloo 
did not specify whether the fall occurred in Tegalreja or in Yogya, but the former seems most 
likely. In his babad, Dipanagara describes Ratu Ageng’s death as due to ‘old age’, BD (Manado) 
II:118, XIV (Sinom) 57, dhasar wanciné wus sepuh.
48 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-9-1803; 
Mandoyo kusumo 1977:17.
49 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 18-10-1803.
50 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 25-10-1803, 
29-10-1803.
51 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 25-10-1803.
52 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 29-10-1803. 
Dipanagara had turned 18 (Javanese) years on 15 April 1803, although according to the Western 
calendar he was still just over three weeks short of his eighteenth birthday when Ratu Ageng died 
on 17 October 1803.
Map 2. Plan of Tegalreja estate and its surroundings, circa 1830, on a scale of one 
inch to 100 metres. Adapted from Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I: ‘Plattegrond 
van de hoofdplaats Jogjakarta omstreeks 1830’, by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford. 
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at Tegalreja and succeeded his great-grandmother in charge of the estate.53 
Although he was soon to marry the daughter of a local kyai54 and was even 
threatened for a time with having yet another elderly female relative – his 
grandmother, the redoubtable Ratu Kedhaton – sent out to live with him,55 
his life in Tegalreja continued to run its quiet course. 
What then of Tegalreja itself? What did this estate which went by the aus-
picious name of ‘Fields of Prosperity’ look like? By the time of Ratu Ageng’s 
death in 1803, it was probably already an impressive complex including an 
extensive residence with gardens, orchards and ponds (one of which Ratu 
Ageng had fallen besides at the start of her fatal last illness), as well as many 
hectares of adjacent ricefields. A Dutch visitor who inspected the ruins (the 
residence had been burnt at the start of the Java War)56 in the 1840s described 
it in admiring terms (Brumund 1854:184-5):
The princes of Yogyakarta were apparently better lodged than at present. At least 
I know of no princely residence in Yogya which can compare to the earlier one at 
Tegalreja. The [princes’] houses are [now] mostly [built of] wood [and are] low, 
small and insignificant. Dipanagara’s [residence], [however], was large, spacious, 
high and entirely built of stone. On both sides there ran rows of no less large and 
spacious stone outhouses. There [Dipanagara’s] friends lodged and the priests 
who came to visit him. There were also his warehouses and repositories [for 
storing the products of the Tegalreja estate], and the places where his immediate 
followers and retainers lived. The other followers lived in the village which sur-
rounds the dalem [princely residence]. 
The visitor went on to describe in detail the lay-out of the house itself, which 
included the remains of a large open-sided pavilion/audience hall and an 
adjoining gallery suitable for staging shadow-puppet performances which, 
along with the Javanese gamelan orchestra of stringed, wood-wind and per-
cussion instruments, we know from other sources were much appreciated by 
Dipanagara.57 The visitor also noticed the high stone wall which surrounded 
53 BD (Manado) II:118, XIV.57-8.
54 See Appendix IV pt. 1. It is not known when this marriage took place, but a pre-25 February 
1807 date (when Dipanagara married his second wife, the daughter of the Yogya bupati of Pano-
lan) is clear, and judging by Dipanagara’s eldest son’s study at Kyai Maja’s pesantrèn in the period 
1816-1822, he must have been born in circa 1803. So an 1803 marriage – when Dipanagara would 
have been nineteen Javanese years old – is likely.
55 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 5-4-1805. 
Hamengkubuwana II apparently made an attempt to give the Tegalreja estate to Ratu Kedhaton 
to get her away from the kraton, but nothing came of this because the redoubtable Ratu refused to 
move.
56 According to Brumund 1854:191-2, part of the estate was being used at the time of his visit as 
a fruit and vegetable garden by Dipanagara’s uncle Panembahan Mangkurat (pre-1825, Pangéran 
Mangkubumi). It was later used as grazing land for horses by the Dutch Resident of Yogyakarta, 
R. de Fillietaz Bousquet (in office 1845-1848), AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 24-11-
1848 no. 1.
57 Carey 1974a:10-6. On Dipanagara’s gamelan orchestra which he kept at Tegalreja, see Knoerl e, 
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the yard of the residence and the many fruit trees which were planted on the 
estate (Brumund 1854:185).
Although the original residence and estate garden were laid out on Ratu 
Ageng’s orders, Dipanagara seems to have had a hand in some of its later 
features. In his babad, he related how many of the buildings were improved 
and enlarged after his great-grandmother’s death, presumably to house the 
increasing number of visitors, especially wandering santri and other Islamic 
divines who came to engage in prayer and religious discussion.58 According 
to the prince, the amount of religious observance at Tegalreja ‘exceeded that of 
his great-grandmother’s days’.59 It was probably at this time that plans were 
laid to build a stone mosque at Tegalreja, a building which had been almost 
completed at the time of the outbreak of the Java War. As Dipanagara later 
reflected (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Van der Kemp 1896a:418; 
Carey 1992:495 note 464):
I always had the desire to have a really fine mosque [and] I spent much money on 
the one I had at Tegalreja which was very nearly completed when I had to leave 
[in July 1825] […] a mosque has always been a delight for me: one does not always 
have to pray in it, but it directs the heart towards religious sincerity. 
Like the Ratu Ageng before him, Dipanagara took an interest in the arrange-
ment of the trees and ponds on the estate, and later built himself a retreat at 
Sélareja just outside the northeast wall of Tegalreja, where he often withdrew 
to meditate and pray (see Map 2). This was encircled by a moat filled with 
different kinds of fish, and the island where Dipanagara’s meditation seat60 
was placed was planted with various types of fruit trees, especially kemuning 
(Brumund 1854:192-4; Carey 1981a:236-7 note 14). With its white pungently 
scented flowers, this tree, which is favoured in Java for shading graveyards 
‘Journal’, 4; and for a reference to what seems to have been a wayang and tayuban (Javanese dance 
with professional dancers) at the time of Dipanagara’s marriage to Radèn Ayu Maduretna in circa 
September 1814, see BD (Manado) II:72, XVIII.58; Carey 1974a:11 note 33; Chapter VIII.
58 BD (Manado) II:119, XIV (Sinom) 60-1. mengkana Tegalarja/ langkung duk kang eyang swargi/ 
kang ngibadah tenapi kathah ing tiyang. 61. miwah ingkang wewangunan/ sedaya mapan wus salin. See 
also Ricklefs 1974b:251.
59 BD (Manado) II:119, XIV.59-60.
60 According to Brumund 1854:194, Dipanagara’s meditation seat was made up of six large 
stone yoni (female Sivaitic symbols) arranged in threes with one row slightly higher than the 
other to form a sitting place, which he referred to as a séla gilang (a stone which radiated light), 
see also Carey 1974a:26 note 86; Chapter X note 175. We know from a report made by the Resi-
dent of Yogya A.H. Smissaert in 1823 that many statues and stone artefacts had been taken from 
Prambanan and other Hindu-Buddhist sites in south-central Java by members of the Yogya 
court to beautify their residences and he later specifically mentioned the ‘Brahmanical images’ 
which Dipanagara had taken from temples around Yogya to adorn Tegalreja, AvJ, A.H. Smissaert 
(Yogyakarta) to President of Antiquities Commission in Java (Japara), 10-7-1823; vAE (aanwin-
sten 1941), ‘Stukken betreffende het ontslag van A.H. Smissaert als Resident te Djokjokarta 1828-
29, met retroacta’ (henceforth: ‘Stukken Smissaert’), A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William 
I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (?-9-1828) (on Dipanagara’s acquisitions).
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and holy sites, would have spread a ‘canopy of white flowers’ over the 
prince’s head as he sat meditating (Brumund 1854:188; Van Raay 1926-27:51). 
There was also apparently a banyan tree (waringin) which gave its name to 
the island, Pulo Waringin (Chapter X note 208).
The prince took similar pains to lay out fruit orchards, vegetable gardens 
and shrubberies on his lands at Selarong near the cave of Secang in the Bantul 
district to the south of Yogya which he likewise used as a place of retreat dur-
ing the fasting month Puwasa and which he would later extend significantly 
in terms of its facilities (Carey 1981a:238-9 notes 20-5; Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, I:435-7; Chapters VIII and X). He subsequently boasted that ‘there 
is nothing on earth that does not grow luxuriantly on the soil of Java’.61 Like 
many Javanese, Dipanagara had a great affinity with nature: some of the most 
lyrical passages in his autobiography describe the retreats which he set up in 
caves, mountain fastnesses or in the midst of fast-flowing streams, or at his 
garden in Selarong, where a Dutch report noted the construction of a wall 
the height of a man.62 He also referred with affection to the different types of 
animals which kept him company during his periods of silent withdrawal: 
the fish at Sélareja, the turtles, turtle-doves, crocodiles63 and tigers during his 
jungle retreats during the Java War, and his beloved cockatoos while in exile in 
Manado and Makassar.64 Such affinity with nature and the animal kingdom, 
in the Javanese view, was a reflection of the sensitivity and spiritual wholeness 
of a human being, a state best expressed in the descriptions of the wandering 
knight (satria lelana) in Javanese wayang literature (Boedihardjo 1923:28).
Dipanagara’s preoccupation with religious matters and the development 
of his own spiritual practice through periodic retreats and meditation clearly 
placed a strain on his relationship with the Yogya ruler, Hamengkubuwana II. 
By his own admission, the prince rarely attended audiences at the court and 
only brought himself to come to Yogya for the thrice yearly Garebeg ceremo-
nies which celebrated The Prophet’s birthday (Mulud), the end of the fasting 
61 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 24.
62 Carey 1974a:24. On the small prayer house (langgar alit) which Dipanagara had constructed 
in a river (Kali Praga?) under the sloping flanks of a mountain where he undertook ascetic prac-
tices (tapa) in the Kulon Praga area after the death of his beloved wife, Ratu Kedhaton (pre-1825, 
Radèn Ayu Maduretna) in February 1828, see BD (Menado) III:320, XXX.78-80; and Carey 1974a:25 
note 82. On his use of a white gauze veil to hide his face during his journey into exile, see Van 
Doren 1851, II:328 note 1. See further p. 701 (on Dipanagara covering his face with the end of his 
turban).
63 On the crocodiles which Dipanagara used to watch besporting themselves in the Kali Cing-
cing guling during his campaigns in Bagelèn towards the end of the Java War, see BD (Manado), 
IV:110, XXXV (Dhandhanggula) 30. Sang Nata winuwus/ nèng Bagelèn apan lama/ sring meng-ameng 
dhateng lèpèn Cingcingguling/ apan ningali baya.
64 Kielstra 1885:408; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:151; Carey 1974a:26-7. Turtle-doves are 
used for divination in Java (Pigeaud 1967-80, I:269, 277); and tigers are believed to harbour the 
souls of men at night (when they are known as macan gadhungan), Winter 1902:85. See further 
Chapter IX note 138.
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month (Puwasa), and Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son as well as the 
Great Day (Ari Besar) of the pilgrims in Mecca (Besar) (Groneman 1895:40; p. 
373). These latter attendances, Dipanagara described as a ‘great sin’, perhaps 
because the Garebeg were more Javanese than Islamic in character.65 But he 
forced himself to take part out of fear for his grandfather, the second sultan, 
and his father, the crown prince.66 He also relates how he came to the capital on 
certain special occasions such as on 3 September 1805 when at the age of twenty 
(Javanese years), he received his adult name and title of Radèn Antawirya,67 
and on 25 February 1807 when he married the daughter of a Yogya outlying 
region bupati, an unhappy union to which we will return shortly.68
The Tegalreja circle: early contacts with the Islamic religious communities
Dipanagara clearly grew up in an environment dominated by religious dis-
cussion. Already, during his boyhood in the kraton, he had probably mixed 
with santri. The Suranatan corps, a group of armed religious officials at 
65 For a discussion of whether Dipanagara really meant to refer to the Garebeg or to his fre-
quent absences from the court as the principal reason for his ‘great sin’(dosa ageng), see Ricklefs 
1974b:231 note 17, who argues for the latter pointing out that Dipanagara’s absence would have 
been a destabilising factor in court affairs. The present author favours the former explanation, on 
the basis of the stress in Dipanagara’s babad that the Garebeg were major court festivals when all 
members of the sultan’s family were required to be present. On the role of the Garebeg as tradi-
tional fertility ceremonies, see Lind 1975:30-5. See further p. 406 on Dipanagara’s annoyance at 
the magico-religious practices used by one of his great-uncles at the time of his father’s death on 
3 November 1814.
66 BD (Manado) II:119, XIV.60.
67 AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Johannes Gerardus van den Berg (Surakarta), 3-9- 
1805. Dipanagara was appointed Radèn at the same time as two of his younger brothers: Bendara 
Radèn Mas Said, who became Radèn Sumawijaya (later Pangéran Adinagara, post-1825, Pan-
géran Suryèngalaga), and Bendara Radèn Mas Sabandi, who became Radèn Poncakusuma (later 
Pangéran Purwadiningrat, post-1825, Pangéran Suryabrangta).
68 Dj.Br. 21, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 5-9-1807, 
‘List of marriages in Yogya since 1801’; and on Dipanagara’s father-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung 
Natawijaya III, bupati of Panolan (also known as Jipang-Kepanolan; in office 1803-1811), at that 
time one of the most depopulated districts in east Java (it was later annexed by the British in June 
1812), which suggests that he was either a very poor administrator or just rather unlucky with 
his allocated kabupatèn, see Carey 1992:255 note 264; Carey and Hoadley 2000:240-4. Dipanagara’s 
bride’s name was Radèn Ajeng Supadmi and the wedding took place on 27-2-1807. Natawijaya 
III’s official wife – and the putative mother of Dipanagara’s bride, Radèn Ajeng Supadmi – may 
have been a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II by one of his favourite unofficial wives, Mas Ayu 
Sumarsonowati, who was of partly Chinese descent and was renowned for her beauty, Man-
doyokusumo 1977:23 no. 47; Carey 1984a:20-1. According to LOr 6488 (Babad Dipanagara, Surya 
Ngalam):5, I.15-6, Dipanagara had only met her three months before his marriage and, as he never 
mentions her in his babad, it does not seem to have been a very happy union. She became known 
as Bendara Radèn Ayu Antawirya (also spelt ‘Ontawirya’) and is mentioned as in receipt of an 
annual court allowance of six seka (f 3) in circa 1807, see Carey and Hoadley 2000:395-6.
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the Yogya court, for example, formed part of the military establishment of 
Dipanagara’s father’s residence, the kadipatèn,69 and there were also members 
of the kaum (firm Islamic community) in receipt of tithe (zakat) payments from 
the court who are listed in the kraton records as having been domiciled at both 
the kadipatèn and at Tegalreja in the late 1790s (Carey 1980:170). 
Ratu Ageng had also encouraged members of the Yogya religious hier-
archy to visit or take up residence at Tegalreja. Amongst these were her 
own pengulu (head of religious establishment), Kyai Muhamad Bahwi, after 
August 1825 known as Muhamad Ngusman Ali Basah, who had previously 
served as the presiding ulama (religious scholar) of the Suranatan mosque 
(the sultan’s private mosque) in the kraton,70 and Haji Badarudin, a com-
mander of the Suranatan corps who had twice made the pilgrimage to Mecca 
on behalf of the Yogya court and was considered knowledgeable about 
Ottoman administrative practice in the holy cities.71 Furthermore, both the 
two Yogya pengulu, who served in the sultan’s capital during Dipanagara’s 
youth, were attached to the Tegalreja ulama circle through their links with 
the Suranatan.72 One of them, Kyai Rahmanudin, even came to live with 
Dipanagara for a year at Tegalreja after his abrupt dismissal in September 
1823.73 We shall see below (pp. 626-9) how these contacts, formed between 
the young prince and the Yogya religious establishment in the late 1790s and 
1800s, operated during the early stages of the Java War when many kraton 
santri rallied to Dipanagara’s cause.74
Besides the members of the court religious hierarchy, Dipanagara almost 
certainly met many of the main independent teachers in the Yogya region 
69 Carey 1980:173 note 4, 1981a:259 note 105, 1992:404 note 26; Carey and Hoadley 2000:287; 
BD (Manado) II:114, XV.44, 117, XV.53. On the origins of the Suranatan, see De Graaf and Pigeaud 
1974:68, 100, 214, 257 note 66, 268 note 103. See further p. 208.
70 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:468. BD (Manado) II:341, XXI.11; see also Appendix 
VIIb.
71 BD (Manado) III:55, XXIV.90, 95, XXV.42; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 21; dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal 
van Prins Adiwinotto van hetgeen den opstand van Diepo Negoro heeft veroorzaakt’ (henceforth 
‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’); see also Appendix VIIb. It is not known when Haji Badarudin 
made the haj, but there are records of Yogya court-sponsored pilgrimages to Mecca in 1788, 1805-
1806 and 1811. In 1788, Haji Abdul Wahid was dispatched with four others to the Holy City to 
seek ‘priestly investiture’ for Hamengkubuwana I and to repair a ‘consecrated house’ (possibly 
a mosque or langgar for Yogya pilgrims) (Ricklefs 1974a:313), returning in June 1792 via Ceylon, 
UBL BPL 616 Port. 3 no. 1, Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to J.G. van Overstraten 
(Semarang), 21-6-1792. On the 1805-1806 pilgrimage which numbered four Yogya haji under 
the leadership of Haji Muhamad Mataram, see note 40. Badarudin may have been one of these. 
Although there was an attempt to send pilgrims in 1811, the enterprise was cancelled because of 
the strength of the British blockade. There are no records of further court-sponsored pilgrimages 
in the post-1811 period.
72 BD (Manado), II:316, XX.21-33, 330-4, XX.59-68; Appendix V pt. 3.
73 Carey 1981a:259 note 103; BD (Manado), II:316, XX.22-3. On Rahmanudin’s appointment as 
pengulu, see p. 370, and on his dismissal in September 1823, see pp. 545-7.
74 See Appendix VIIb.
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during his boyhood at Tegalreja. The estate was close to three of the four main 
centres for scholars of Islamic law known as pathok negari (literally ‘pillars 
of the state’), namely those at Kasongan (near Bantul), Papringan (between 
Yogya and Prambanan), and Melangi.75 Dipanagara would later marry the 
daughter of the kyai guru (revered teacher) of Kasongan during the Java War76 
and may well have passed through the centre on his way from Tegalreja to his 
lands at Selarong to the south of Yogya. But compared to Kasongan and the 
other pathok negari, Melangi seems to have been by far the most important at 
this time. It lay just three kilometres north of Tegalreja and the land was part of 
the patrimony (tanah tiyasa) of the Danurejan family with whom Dipanagara 
had close family ties (Appendix II). They maintained a religious teacher at 
Melangi, who served as mentor to members of the Yogya court community. 
One teacher in particular, Kyai Taptajani, whose family may have hailed from 
Sumatra, achieved considerable local recognition as a scholar and translator 
of difficult Islamic texts (Carey 1974b:272-3). We know from Dutch sources 
that Dipanagara greatly respected this kyai, whom the Dutch described as a 
‘prominent priest’ whom the prince always took care to treat well. Taptajani’s 
pathok negari at Melangi was intentionally spared any damage during the Java 
War on Dipanagara’s express instructions and the prince accepted the kyai’s 
sons into his wartime service. In October 1826, when Taptajani was involved 
in brokering the first peace negotiations with Dipanagara’s key religious 
adviser, Kyai Maja, he was said to have been in his ninetieth year.77
It is unclear whether Dipanagara ever studied under him, but there is a 
reference in the prince’s autobiography to the locally renowned teacher as 
the guru of his younger brother, Pangéran Adisurya, who took the name of 
Ngabdurakim during the Java War and was said to have died a ‘remainder-
less’ (moksa) death on Mount Sirnabaya in Bagelèn in 1829 (Carey 1974b:273). 
In the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara, there is also a passage in 
which Taptajani is described as having visited Dipanagara at night at the 
head of all the ulama from the tax-free (pradikan) areas, as well as the mosque 
officials and experts in Islamic law, and having given him advice as to the 
right moment for the Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) to proclaim himself and for the 
prang sabil (holy war) to begin (Carey 1981a:43-7, 261 note 108; Chapter IX). 
Although there is nothing in the contemporary Dutch sources to confirm that 
particular visitation, the links which Dipanagara maintained with Taptajani’s 
family during the early stages of the war indicate that the ageing kyai contin-
ued to command the prince’s respect.
After Taptajani fled to Surakarta in 1805 following a dispute with the 
Yogya pengulu regarding his influence over the princes of the court (Carey 
75 Carey 1981a:258 note 99. See Appendix VIIa, where other minor centres listed as pathok 
negari in a pre-1832 list include Plasa Kuning, Purwareja and Dhongkèlan.
76 See Appendix IV pt. 2.
77 J.F.W. van Nes (Surakarta) to L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies (Batavia/Bogor), 13-10-1826.
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1974b:273) – in itself a telling reflection on his local renown – he settled in 
the Sunan’s territory and continued to maintain contacts with his family rela-
tions scattered throughout central and east Java. These included prominent 
religious scholars residing in tax-free areas in Kedhu,78 and a highly placed 
royal official in Madiun who had links with the famous pesantrèn (religious 
boarding school) of Tegalsari.79 Furthermore, he was also on intimate terms 
with Kyai Maja’s extensive family, who were settled in the tax-free villages 
of Maja and Badhèran in the Pajang area just to the north of Delanggu, and 
at Pulo Kadang near Imagiri to the south of Yogya.80 These far-flung connec-
tions, which pivoted around Taptajani’s influential position as a legal scholar 
and teacher, were clearly vital for Dipanagara when he appealed for support 
from ulama in Pajang, Madiun, Kedhu, Bagelèn and Pacitan at the start of the 
Java War (Chapter X note 124; pp. 626-9).
During the time Dipanagara was reaching early manhood in Tegalreja, 
it seems that Surakarta was much more important than Yogya as a spiritual 
centre. One of the reasons for this may have been that there were more 
generous patrons of the religious communities at the Sunan’s court than in 
the sultan’s capital. Pakubuwana IV himself was described by the Surakarta 
Resident J.G. van den Berg in 1806 as ‘a great friend of the ulama who can get 
him to do anything’.81 In 1812, he was said to have no less than 24 court haji 
(returned Mecca pilgrims) and some 51 ulama in his pay.82 At the same time, 
a senior Dutch official who was travelling through Surakarta just before the 
British attack on Yogya (20 June 1812) spoke of ‘the priests who are here [in 
Surakarta] in large numbers’.83 The Garebeg Mulud and Garebeg Puwasa 
ceremonies, appear to have attracted droves of haji, kaum (lower ranking 
village religious officials), and pradikan (men of religion from tax-free areas) 
who made their way to the Sunan’s capital from all over Java.84 This was not 
the case in Yogya which only attracted santri from the immediate neighbour-
hood, probably because the sultan was less generous than the Sunan about 
78 These were Kyai Musa and his son, Kyai Gajali, see Jayadiningrat, ‘Schetsen’, 100; LOr 2168 
no. 108, ‘Kiai Modjo, zijne afkomst’, n.y.; Appendix VIIb.
79 This was Radèn Suradirja, who was serving as chief minister (patih) to the bupati wedana 
(senior bupati/administrator) of Madiun, Pangéran Adipati Prawiradiningrat (in office 1822-1859), 
in 1828, LOr 2168 no. 46, ‘Report on the mission of Tumenggung Sasradilaga to Madiun’, 5-8-1828. 
According to Madioen 1855:15-6, there were 42 pesantrèn in the Madiun area before the Java War 
with upwards of 1,800 students (santri). This number increased greatly during the period of the 
war itself when religious fervour was at its height in central and east Java.
80 Carey 1981a:261 note 110; dB 412, J.F.W. van Nes (? Surakarta) to L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies 
(Batavia), 30-10-1826.
81 vAE (aanwinsten 1900), J.G. van den Berg, ‘Copia memorie op het hoff van Souracarta’ 
(henceforth: Van den Berg, ‘Copia memorie’), 8-1806.
82 S.Br. 14B, Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Yogyakarta), 17-6-1812.
83 KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 50.
84 vAE (aanwinsten 1900), Van den Berg, ‘Copia memorie’, 8-1806.
Plate 10. Kyai Maja (circa 1790-1849), Dipanagara’s principal religious adviser during 
the Java War, who came from the Surakarta pradikan village of Maja just to the north-
east of Delanggu, and died in exile in the Kampung Jawa, Tondano, Sulawesi Utara. 
Although he had never made the pilgrimage to Mecca (haj), he commanded great autho-
rity amongst Dipanagara’s santri followers because of his intimate knowledge of the 
Qur’ān and his forceful character. Uncoloured lithograph by Jean Augustin Daiwaille 
(1786-1850) and Pieter Veldhuizen (1806-1841) based on a sketch made by the Dutch 
army officer, Major F.V.H.A. Ridder de Stuers (1792-1881), in Salatiga in December 1828 
after Kyai Maja had given himself up to the Dutch with over six hundred of his follow-
ers who later accompanied him into exile in Minahasa (North Sulawesi). Taken from De 
Stuers 1831. Photograph by courtesy of KITLV, Leiden.
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bestowing largesse at religious feasts. 
Nor was it only the Sunan, who gained a reputation for largesse. The 
Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Danuningrat (in office 1804-1810), was 
renowned as a ‘great friend and champion of santri’ and took part in daily 
prayers as well as going to the Great Mosque every Friday.85 Another such 
patron was the Sunan’s younger brother, Pangéran Buminata. Described in a 
French source as ‘a tall dessicated man with an officious and artful manner’ 
(Lettres de Java 1829:70), he was known for his generous support of religious 
teachers, amongst whom was Kyai Maja. The kyai guru apparently held the 
Surakarta prince in high esteem and often discussed religious matters with 
him.86 Indeed, so wide was Buminata’s renown in santri circles that even 
before he fled to Surakarta, Kyai Taptajani (known as Bagus Taptajani in 
the Surakarta kraton) decided to send his sons to study in Surakarta where 
they received minor positions from the prince.87 Reflecting on this case, the 
Yogya Resident, Matthijs Waterloo (in office 1803-1808), remarked that when 
young men left the Yogya area to receive a religious education in Surakarta, 
they usually became more attached to the Sunan’s capital than to the area of 
their birth.88 Much later, another Yogya Resident, A.H. Smissaert (in office 
1823-1825), whose behaviour so alienated Dipanagara on the eve of the Java 
War, would remark that there were many more princes in Surakarta than 
in Yogyakarta who were known by the Dutch authorities to be ‘fanatical’ 
about their religious duties.89 It is perhaps relevant here that Dipanagara’s 
eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, who subsequently adopted the santri 
name of Radèn Mantri Muhamad Ngarip and who was almost certainly the 
most intelligent of his offspring, decided after long peregrinations to sit at 
the feet of a Surakarta teacher, Kyai Maja, rather than one of the many guru 
he had visited in the vicinity of the sultan’s capital. The favoured position 
which Kyai Maja later acquired amongst the ranks of Dipanagara’s numer-
ous religious supporters underscored Surakarta’s ascendancy as a centre of 
85 vAE (aanwinsten 1900), Van den Berg, ‘Copia memorie’, 8-1806.
86 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 22-6-1805; dK 
111, H.M. de Kock, ‘Beschrijving van het karakter en die hoedanigheid van de keizer, de prinsen 
en de rijksbestuurder van Soerakarta’, 21-11-1829; Büchler 1888, I:419 (where Buminata is des-
cribed as ‘the best educated and most intelligent member of the Surakarta court’), II:32 (where 
Büchler speculated that he might have been of Dutch descent!); Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
III:62. Buminata later played a major role in the secret correspondence between the courts in 
1811-1812 by negotiating with the Yogya santri messengers, see IOL Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto 
correspondence, vol. 24), ‘Information given to Mr [Herman Warner] Muntinghe by Radèn Adi-
pati Tjokro Negoro [Cakranagara], the late prime minister of Surakarta’, n.y. (? late July 1812). See 
further Chapter VII.
87 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 22-6-1805.
88 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 22-6-1805.
89 vAE (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I 
(The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (?-9-1828).
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religious instruction in the early nineteenth century.90 It would also help to 
fuel the latent tensions between the prince’s aristocratic and santri followers. 
The former, nearly all Yogyanese, tended to view Kyai Maja and his Surakarta 
fellow ulama and pradikan with deep suspicion, an attitude which was recip-
rocated amongst the Sala santri (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Carey 
1987:279-84; Chapter XI). 
In the early 1800s, however, all this lay in the future. At this time, the 
prince’s personal links seem to have been largely confined to the immedi-
ate Yogya area. They remained this way until the period of H.G. Nahuys 
van Burgst’s residency (1816-1822) when, according to Dipanagara’s own 
testimony, he travelled out of the Yogya area for the first time on foot along 
back country roads to the village of Maja to seek out his eldest son (born 
circa 1805), who had then become a pupil of the kyai guru, later the prince’s 
bane and inspiration during the Java War (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
V:744; Carey 1981a:261 note 110; Chapter III, Chapter X note 184, Chapter XI). 
Shortly thereafter, Kyai Maja visited Dipanagara at Tegalreja, arriving accord-
ing to the prince of his own accord and unbidden shortly after the prince 
himself had returned from one of his personal retreats at Selarong (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744-5), probably during one of his fasting month 
(puwasa) sojourns at Guwa Secang.
Conclusion
Dipanagara’s upbringing at Tegalreja under the formidable and pious Ratu 
Ageng fixed the bearings for his future life. The old adage ascribed to the 
Jesuits, ‘give us a child until he is seven and we will have him for the rest 
of his life’ did not quite hold in Dipanagara’s case since he only joined his 
great-grandmother at her country estate at the age of seven in the early 1790s, 
but even before his departure from the Yogya kraton it is very likely that he 
began to feel the influences which would later shape his character and per-
sonality. The links between his father’s establishment, the kadipatèn, and the 
court santri communities may have already begun to tell. At the same time, 
the young prince would have certainly been influenced by the presence of his 
mother and great-grandmother, both offspring of prominent kyai, during his 
young boyhood in the female quarters. These influences would become even 
more pronounced during the critical 1793-1803 decade when he grew into a 
young man under Ratu Ageng’s watchful and discerning eye. A prince raised 
90 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:742, where Dipanagara remarked that, although Kyai 
Maja had never been to Mecca so perfect was his knowledge of the Qur’ān and the rules laid 
down in it that even santri who had made the haj (pilgrimage) deferred to his authority. For a list 
of Dipanagara’s religious supporters, see Appendix VIIb.
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in a village environment and instilled from his youth with a sense of shared 
identity with the common man; an offspring of the ruling family with an 
intimate knowledge of the life of the Javanese peasantry as well as the world 
of the rural santri and religious teachers, these were indeed rare combina-
tions. Is it any wonder that such a young person would have had an unusual 
destiny? While the prophecies supposedly uttered by the first sultan and 
subsequently during the prince’s pilgrimage to the south coast in circa 1805, 
to which we will come shortly, foretold tragedy – ‘You alone are the means 
but that not for long, only to be counted among the ancestors’91 – the shadows 
which these evoked still lay some way ahead. The immediate future for the 
eighteen-year-old,92 who now had sole charge of the Tegalreja estate, seemed 
bright. Living comfortably removed from the incessant intrigues of the Yogya 
court, and beginning to come into his own as a young adult with a growing 
sense of commitment to the religious path, Dipanagara could look forward 
to a life of spiritual and personal fulfilment sustained by his ever widening 
circle of santri and pious priyayi associates. It is to these links and the forma-
tion of the prince’s intellectual character and understanding of Islam that we 
must now turn.
91 BD (Manado), II:125, XIV (Sinom) 80. tan ana malih-malih/ nanging sira srananipun/ mapan iku 
tan dawa/ nanging kinarya leluri. See further Chapter IV.
92 I am continuing to calculate Dipanagara’s age at the time of Ratu Ageng’s death in Javanese 
years, see note 52.

chapter III
Young manhood: marriage, education, and 
links with the santri community, 1803-1805
First marriage and development of the Tegalreja community
It is likely that in the period immediately following his great-grandmother’s 
death in October 1803, Dipanagara deepened his connections with a number 
of intimate associates among the ulama who resided in the villages around 
Tegalreja. Some of these he would later dispatch on pilgrimages to local 
shrines and holy sites in the period before the Java War.1 Such relationships 
were undoubtedly strengthened through the prince’s first marriage (circa 
1804) to the daughter of a prominent religious teacher from the Slèman area 
to the north of Yogya. 
This young woman, Radèn Ayu Retna Madubrangta, was the second 
daughter of Kyai Gedhé Dhadhapan from the village of Dhadhapan near 
Tempèl in the Turi sub-district close to the Yogya-Kedhu border.2 She was the 
mother of Dipanagara’s eldest and most able son, whom the prince always 
favoured amongst his other children (Javasche Courant 92, 6-8-1829), and who 
would later take his father’s young adult name of Radèn Mas Antawirya, sub-
sequently being appointed as Pangéran Dipanagara II in August 1825. Under 
his post-war Javanese Muslim name of Radèn Mantri Muhamad Ngarip, he 
would write a prophetic-historical account of his life and times – the Babad 
Dipanagara Surya Ngalam – in which his mother is described in glowing terms 
as a very devout woman who took pleasure in accompanying her husband in 
his religious duties. According to Dipanagara II, they remained close until the 
elder Dipanagara was prevailed upon by his father, the third sultan, to make 
a more prestigious ‘political’ marriage to Radèn Ajeng Supadmi (post-1807, 
Radèn Ayu Retnakusuma), the possibly part-Chinese daughter of the Yogya 
bupati of Panolan, Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya III, on 25 February 1807.3 
1 See Plate 14 and Appendix VIIb, sub: Jaèlani, Muhamad, Jayamustapa (alias Sukbatuliman), 
Mopid, Mudha. One of Dipanagara’s sons, Radèn Mas Alip (see Appendix IV note 1), mentioned 
the names of two other close associates, Wiryakusuma and Jaya Muhamad, Nahuys van Burgst 
1835-36, I:13.
2 LOr 6488 (Babad Dipanagara, Surya Ngalam):14, I.14.
3 The bride’s mother may have been a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II by one of his favour-
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This was an elaborate affair – a double wedding ceremony in fact since the 
prince’s younger sister was also married on that day – and the gifts from 
the Surakarta court alone amounted to over 1,600 kati (one tonne) of rice, 16 
buffaloes and 200 ronde realen (480 guilders).4 The Dutch Resident, Matthijs 
Waterloo (in office 1803-1808), even gave the prince and his younger sister 21 
ells (just under five feet) of parchment in addition to his other more predict-
able wedding presents such as lengths of chintz and prestigious silk patola 
cloth from the former Dutch trading post of Surat in western India, the last 
of which was often used as bride wealth. This gift of parchment must have 
assumed a certain level of literacy on the part of the newly weds.5 
This second wife had only met Dipanagara three months before their mar-
riage and their union does not seem to have been a particularly happy one 
since the prince never once referred to her in his autobiography.6 She also 
behaved, according to Dipanagara II, in an arrogant and unjust way towards 
his more lowly-born mother,7 and one can only surmise that this may have 
driven the latter to an early grave. The elder Dipanagara made only one men-
tion of Madubrangta in his babad and that was late in the Java War, when he 
wrote that she had died during his time at Tegalreja (namely, pre-July 1825), 
referring to her as bibi (auntie), a term often used in Javanese court circles to 
designate mothers of less elevated social standing.8 Her father Kyai Gedhé 
ite unofficial wives, Mas Ayu Sumarsonowati, who was of partly Chinese descent, Chapter II note 
68. This would explain Dipanagara’s very close relationship with his uncle Pangéran Jayakusuma 
I (post-1825, Pangéran Ngabèhi Ngabdulrahman) (circa 1787-1829), who later became one of his 
principle army commanders during the Java War and lost his life in a skirmish in the Kelir moun-
tains on 21-9-1829, see Chapter XII note 4. Mas Ayu Sumarsonowati was also Ngabèhi’s mother, 
Mandoyokusumo 1977:21 no. 30; Carey 1984:20-1. There is a reference to one of Sumarsonowati’s 
daughters marrying into the Natayudan family of Yogya bupati of Kedhu, but then styling herself 
as Bendara Radèn Ayu Natawijaya, which suggests that she had a connection with the family of 
the bupati of Panolan, see Dwidjosoegondo 1941:100 no. 47 (where Bendara Radèn Ayu Natayuda 
[Crèma] is described as changing her name to Bendara Radèn Ayu Natawijaya [Slèman]); Man-
doyokusumo 1977:23 no. 47. On Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya III (in office 1803-1811), see pp. 
99-100, 195, 255-6, 512; and Carey and Hoadley 2000:294, 352, 360, 378, 383.
4 Dj.Br. 38, Hamengkubuwana II to Pakubuwana IV, 10 Sura AJ 1734 (AD 20-3-1807), and see 
Appendix IV pt. 1. Dipanagara’s sister, Radèn Ajeng Murtinah married a son of Radèn Tumeng-
gung Danukusuma I, the husband of Dipanagara’s aunt Radèn Ayu Danukusuma, who became 
one of the prince’s closest friends at Tegalreja, see Appendix II (on family connection between 
Dipanagara and Danurejan).
5 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo to Nicolaus Engelhard, 1-3-1807. The other gifts were two pairs 
of allegrassen (? coverlets), two large silk patola cloths (patholen), two pieces of chintz (chitzen) 
and two red armozijnen, presumably another type of fabric. I am reckoning 1 ell at 27 inches. 
On the use of patola cloth as bride wealth and on ceremonial occasions, see Bühler and Fischer 
1979, I:287-90; Nabholz-Kartaschoff 1989:181-97; Barnes 1989:82-7, 107-8. Bühler and Fischer 1979, 
II:248-53 have illustrations of patola being worn by court officials in Yogya as well as being used 
to decorate the cushions on a ceremonial bed in the kraton. 
6 See Chapter II note 68.
7 LOr 6488 (Babad Dipanagaran, Surya Ngalam):14, I.16. edir lan siya-siya/ iya marang maru.
8 BD (Manado) IV:4, XXXII.24-5.
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Dhadhapan is not specifically mentioned in Dipanagara’s babad, although 
there are references to a certain Kyai Dhadhapan in the group of close ulama 
(Islamic scholars) around Kyai Maja in 1828.9 He is even mentioned as Maja’s 
key ‘adviser and confidant’ at this time.10 It is possible this may have been the 
same man, although the Kyai Dhadhapan referred to in the prince’s autobi-
ography is described as a pupil (murid) of Kyai Maja, which would not seem 
to fit Radèn Ayu Madubrangta’s father who already appears to have been an 
eminent kyai by the mid-1800s and could hardly have been the ‘pupil’ of a 
man seven years’ Dipanagara’s junior.11 
Besides the village-based ulama, Dipanagara also had friends among the 
Yogya court official and royal related families who were interested in Islam 
and had private collections of Islamic texts. The Danurejan family,12 whom 
we have met above, was particularly important here. They were to provide 
all but one of the chief ministers in the nearly two centuries following the sul-
tanate’s establishment in 1755,13 and their links with the pathok negari (centre 
for experts in Islamic law) at Melangi and its locally renowned kyai, both of 
which connected them with the circle of ulama at Tegalreja, put them at the 
very centre of the santri world of south-central Java. One family member in 
particular, Radèn Ayu Danukusuma, a daughter of Sultan Hamengkubuwana 
I and the mother of Danureja II (in office 1799-1811), seems to have been 
especially appreciated by the prince. She is mentioned in his babad as his 
chess partner, a game he greatly enjoyed.14 More significantly, she was known 
for her knowledge of Javanese-Islamic literature and her facility with pégon 
(Carey 1992:157, 343, 489 note 425), both skills which would have resonated 
with Dipanagara, who likewise wrote in pégon. Amongst the texts in her 
private collection were Nūruddīn ar-Rānīrī’s Malay work Bustān as-Salatīn 
9 He is reported to have been a leading participant in the negotiations which led to Maja’s sur-
render to the Dutch with a 600-strong force on 12 November 1828, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
IV:604; BD (Manado) IV:94-5, XXXIV.89-90. 
10 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:628 (quoting General H.M. de Kock). A certain Kyai 
Gajali from the village of Dhadhapan is listed along with other followers of Kyai Maja who were 
captured by the Dutch at this time, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:889; Appendix VIIb.
11 Kyai Maja is thought to have been born in circa 1792, see De Stuers 1833:15, who refers to 
Maja as 36 years old in 1828, and Roorda van Eysinga 1832, IV:327, writing in February 1830, gives 
his age at 38. So it would have been almost impossible for him to have been the teacher of Kyai 
Gedhé Dhadhapan, whose daughter married Dipanagara in circa 1803.
12 The original family name was Gandakusuma, but they also used the name Yudanagara after 
the title of the district administrator (bupati) of Banjarnegara in Banyumas, which office the first 
Yogya chief minister, Danureja I (1755-1798), had held before his appointment in circa 1755, see 
Appendix Va.
13 Pigeaud 1931-32, 11-4:126-32, 12-1:34-40; Carey 1975:347-9; Appendix II. The only patih who 
was not from the Yudanegaran line was Danureja IV (in office 1813-1847), see Appendix Va. The 
family continued to provide all the subsequent Yogya chief ministers until the abolition of the 
post in 1943, see Selosoemardjan 1962:51.
14 BD (Manado) II:307, XIV:96; Carey 1975:343. See further p. 512.
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(‘Garden of kings’; Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:48) and Muhammad ibn Fadl 
Allāh al-Burhānpūrī’s al-Tuhfa al-mursala ilā rūh an-Nabī (‘Gift addressed to the 
spirit of the Prophet’; Ricklefs 1973:347-9; Carey 1975:341-4), precisely the sort 
of texts which Dipanagara is reported to have studied in his youth. 
Other priyayi dynasties with strong interests in Islam included the Wiragunan 
and Kertadirjan families, both of whom were closely connected with the prince 
by virtue of their service as senior officials of his father’s establishment, the 
kadipatèn (see Appendix Vb). Radèn Tumenggung Wiranagara, the son of 
Mas Tumenggung Wiraguna I, the much respected patih of the kadipatèn in 
Dipanagara’s youth, ‘could write letters in the style of a priest (santri)’, namely 
had mastered pégon script, and was the pupil of Kyai Taptajani,15 with whom 
he had studied Islamic legal and mystical texts (Carey 1981a:245 note 41). He 
was described in a Dutch source as a ‘lettered Javanese, acquainted with the 
history of his land and well versed in the Qur’ān’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-
1909, I:599). His santri name was ‘Mas Mukidin’. Many of his relatives were 
santri and some joined Dipanagara during the Java War (Carey 1981a:245 note 
41). Married for a time to the prince’s eldest sister, we will see below (Chapter 
VIII, Chapter IX) how he would later incur Dipanagara’s bitter enmity by con-
ducting an affair with his stepmother, Ratu Ageng (official wife of the third 
sultan), and by taking her side and that of the Yogya chief minister, Danureja IV 
(in office 1813-1847), against the prince in political disputes over the land-rent 
and other matters in the troubled decade preceding the Java War.
The prince’s relations with the Kertadirjan family, who briefly succeeded 
Mas Tumenggung Wiraguna in the office of patih kadipatèn (Appendix Vb), 
appear to have been rather closer and more mutually supportive. A member 
of this family, Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja II, who served as one of the Yogya 
bupati in the Sokawati area (1812-1821),16 had many Islamic works in his pos-
session at the time of his dismissal in December 1821.17 A personal friend 
of Dipanagara, he subsequently took up residence at Tegalreja and became 
15 dB 412, J.F.W van Nes (Surakarta) to Commissioner-General (L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies), 
30-10-1826. Wiranagara (post-1829, Pangéran Adipati Prabuningrat), also had various other lead-
ing Javanese ulama as his teachers, friends and counsellors, including Kyai Muhamad Ngarip 
(also known as Ahmad Ngarip) of Melangi (Appendix VIIb), Kyai Melangi (Kyai Iman Ngali) 
(Appendix VIIb), Haji Usman (Waru, Surakarta), Haji Asro (Gabudan, Surakarta), Haji Idris 
(pengulu of the land raad /Javanese-Islamic religious law court), Kyai Plasa Kuning, Kyai Karang 
(Appendix VIIb), Kyai Daud (Gegulu, Kulon Praga, former apanage of Dipanagara) and Kyai 
Pekih Ibrahim (also known as Kyai Muhamad Kusèn, pengulu of Dipanagara [1828-1830], Appen-
dix VIIb), AN, Exhibitum, 20-9-1832 no. 1, interview with Kyai Ahmad Ngarip, 11-8-1832.
16 Kertadirja II was the son of the patih of the kadipatèn, Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja I (in office 
1807-circa 1810), and served as Yogya bupati of Kerja and Masaran (Sokawati) until his dismissal 
in December 1821, see pp. 543-4.
17 Dj.Br. 9B, Hendrik MacGillivray to Pieter Merkus, 16-2-1832, in: ‘Aankomende Geheim 
Stukken’, enclosing a ‘List of belongings given to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst by [Mas Tumenggung] 
Kertadirja’, 8 Jumadilakir AJ 1755 (AD 27-12-1821), which mentions six Qur’ān and nine other 
texts in his possession at the time of his dismissal.
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one of his principal army commanders in the Madiun area of east Java at the 
time of the outbreak of the Java War lasting out six months before his capture 
on the slopes of Mount Lawu in January 1826 (p. 544; Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, I:523 note 2, 559, 576; Carey 1981a:284-5). 
The prince also had non-Javanese priyayi connections amongst his intimate 
circle at Tegalreja. One such was Sèh Abdul Ahmad bin Abdullah al-Ansari 
(alias Ahmad Ansar Sharif, alias Sèh Habib Ahmad al-Ansari), an Arab from 
Jeddah who had married into the family of Pangéran Blitar, a son of the first 
sultan (Nahuys van Burgst 1835-36, I:13; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
III:570-1; Carey 1974a:35 note 116). Sèh al-Ansari apparently earned his liv-
ing as a trader between Semarang and Yogya, and there are references to 
him travelling between the two cities in January 1824. He may have kept 
Dipanagara informed of developments outside the Principalities.18 As a 
Sharif (presumed descendant of the Prophet) he may even have exercised 
some religious influence over him. His son-in-law, also known as Ahmad, 
was likewise part of the prince’s pre-Java War Tegalreja circle and later died 
defending Dipanagara’s headquarters at Selarong in October 1825.19 One 
of Dipanagara’s sons, Radèn Mas Alip, claimed that these two Jeddah-born 
Arabs were amongst his father’s most important councillors in the lead up 
to the Java War and both supported him during the war itself, Sèh al-Ansari 
only giving himself up to the Dutch early in 1828.20
Unsurprisingly, Dipanagara is silent in his autobiography about another 
group of ‘friends’ who may have formed part of his wider Tegalreja circle, 
people who would be of considerable assistance to the prince at the time 
of the outbreak of the Java War. These were the members of the Yogya 
criminal underworld made up of local jago (literally: ‘fighting cocks’, thugs), 
wong durjana (highwaymen, robbers) and ‘social bandits’, men like Demang 
Jayamenggala, the tax-collector of Samèn to the south of Yogya, who was 
18 Sèh al-Ansari’s travels between Semarang and Yogya are referred to in Dj.Br. 67, H.J. Domis 
(Semarang) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 23-1-1824. He gave himself up to the Dutch in early 
1828 and was rewarded with a pension of f 250 a month after the Java War, see Javasche Courant 
31(11-3-1828), 80 (5-7-1828), 82 (10-7-1828), Bijvoegsel (11-8-1828); GKA, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, inter-
view with Ahmad Ansar Sharif, 15-4-1830. His wife, Radèn Ayu Sèh Ansari, appears on a Dutch 
list of stipends and incomes paid to members of the Yogya court in February 1830 as receiving 
f  100 a month, a very high stipend, and being domiciled (? with her husband) in Palembang, 
Dj.Br. 19¹¹, F.G. Valck, ‘Voordragt voor de uitgaven ten behoeve van Z.H. den sultan zoomede 
van de inkomsten en toelagen aan de prinsen, hoofden en andere personen tot het hof van Djok-
jokarta behoorende’ (henceforth: Valck, ‘Voordragt’), 20-2-1830. See further note 20.
19 Dipanagara mentioned the death of a ‘Sèh Ahmad from Jeddah’ in the fighting around 
Selarong on 25-10-1825, see BD (Manado), III:22-3, XXIII.146-52.
20 UBL BPL 616 Port. 9 no. 2, ‘Proces-Verbaal van Radeen Maas Alip’, 3-8-1825; Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, III:570-1, 573, on Sèh al-Ansari’s surrender to the Dutch, his request to settle in 
Surakarta and the f 600 given to him by Nahuys to pay for a house for himself and his family. See 
note 18.
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renowned as an expert in gunpowder manufacture, and who would later 
become the leader of all Dipanagara’s bandit supporters to the south of 
the sultan’s capital (Carey 1981a:243 note 36); or the ferry-crossing bandits 
of Mangiran and Kamijara on the Praga River who were reported to have 
been summoned to Tegalreja to give the prince assistance during his mid-
July 1825 confrontation with the Yogya authorities over the planned road 
across his property (Carey 1981a:243 note 36); or even the tiger hunters of 
Jelegong who were ordered to prepare their arms and give him lodging at 
the time of the outbreak of the Java War (Van der Kemp 1896a:390; Carey 
1981a:262 note 112; 282 note 197). Some of these people seem to have come 
from apanage lands controlled by the prince or from villages adjacent to 
his landholdings or from areas through which he may have passed during 
his many journeys and pilgrimages through the countryside to the south 
of Yogya (Carey 1981a:238 note 20; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909:744-5; 
Chapter VIII). Others, like local robber chieftain in northeastern Kedhu, 
Wirapati, who joined him during the course of the war (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, III:90-1), were clearly not part of his pre-1825 Tegalreja 
‘circle’. Even today, as we have seen, Dipanagara is compared unfavourably 
to his great-grandfather Sultan Mangkubumi in some Yogya circles because 
the latter eschewed the use of such elements in his campaigns against the 
Dutch during the Giyanti War (1746-1755),21 criticisms which are found too 
in the babad literature (Carey 1981a:244).
Education and literary interests
These then were some of the prince’s friends, advisers and underworld associ-
ates during his youth and early manhood at Tegalreja. What now of his edu-
cation and intellectual formation over the same period? Compared with the 
upbringing of most of the sons of the Javanese nobility at this time, Dipanagara’s 
intellectual and spiritual development at Tegalreja was unusual: a post-Java 
War Dutch report mentioned that the education of the Javanese nobility at the 
time was normally arranged on an informal basis whereby a ‘house’ ulama 
(Islamic scholar) would teach Arabic prayers and Qur’ān exegesis,22 but we 
know from J.W. Winter’s description of the kraton of Surakarta in 1824 that 
21 See Chapter I note 140.
22 MvK 3055, ‘Beschrijving en statistieke rapport betreffende de Residentie Djokjokarta’, 1836. 
For a list of religious teachers in Yogya in circa 1831, see Appendix VIIa. The Dutch govern-
ment conducted two surveys of local Javanese-Islamic education in Java in 1819 (AN Besluit van 
den Gouverneur-Generaal, 8-3-1819 no. 9) and 1832 (AN Kabinet 2065, 31-12-1832), which elicited 
reports from Residents throughout Java to governor-generals G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (in 
office 1816-1826) and Johannes van den Bosch (in office 1830-1834), some of which can be found 
in Van der Chijs 1864:212-323.
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the education of the court elite at that time was rather a hit and miss affair 
(Winter 1902:39-40). The situation in the Yogyakarta kraton must have been the 
same. Against this background, Dipanagara’s education in Javanese-Islamic 
literature and his more formal pesantrèn (religious boarding school)-style 
instruction at the hands of visiting ulama in the Qur’ān and Hadith (traditions 
of The Prophet) at Tegalreja was considerably more impressive. Indeed, it was 
something he took care to try to pass on to his own children both at Tegalreja 
and in Makassar, at least four of whom – Pangéran Dipanagara II, Radèn Mas 
Raib, Radèn Mas Kindar and  Radèn Mas Dulkabli – followed in his footsteps 
by gaining a pesantrèn education and devoting themselves to Islam (Louw and 
De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Sagimun 1965:359-60; Carey 1981a:lxiii note 112; 
Chapter II note 37). Dutch contemporaries, would later remark on the greater 
‘refinement’ of Dipanagara’s family when compared to others in the Yogya 
court in the Java War period, and no less a person than Governor-General 
Johannes van den Bosch would conclude that only a ‘narrow-minded person’ 
like the pre-Java War Resident of Yogya, Anthonië Hendrik Smissaert, could 
have misjudged such a man.23
From Javanese sources, it is possible to gain a glimpse of the sort of texts 
Dipanagara may have studied at Tegalreja with his circle of friends and 
associates.24 Amongst his favourite Islamic works was the Kitab Tuhfah, a 
Sufi ontology on the doctrine of the ‘seven grades of being’ which was much 
appreciated by the Javanese when speculating on God, the world and man’s 
place in it (Drewes 1966:290-300). He also seems to have been familiar with 
treatises on Islamic theology and mysticism, such as Usul and Tasawwuf, as 
well as Javanese mystical poems such as suluk. The history of the prophets 
(Serat Anbiya) and Tāfsir, a Qur’ān exegesis, likewise formed part of his liter-
ary curriculum,25 as did didactic works on Islamic political philosophy such 
as the Sirāt as-salātīn and the Tāj as-salātīn. The latter was even prescribed 
by the prince as a text for his younger brother, the fourth sultan (reigned 
1814-1822), when he was completing his education in the kraton.26
Another special area of interest seems to have been Muslim jurispru-
23 Van Nes 1844:136; dK 111, ‘Beschrijving van het karakter en de hoedanigheid van den 
Sultan, de prinsen en den Rijksbestierder van Djokjokarta’, 20-12-1829; dK 161, J.F. Walraven van 
Nes, ‘Korte verhandeling over de waarschijnlyke oorzaken die aanleiding tot de onlusten van 
1825 en volgende jaren in de vorstenlanden gegeven hebben ‘ (henceforth: Van Nes, ‘Korte ver-
handeling’), 28-1-1830; Van der Kemp 1896a:416 (on Van den Bosch’s comment).
24 References in Javanese sources can be found in BNg, II:149, XXXVI.15-9; and KITLV Or 13 
(Buku Kedhung Kebo):47-8, IV.32-8.
25 BNg, II:149, XXXVI.17; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):47, IV.35-6. See also Ricklefs and 
Voorhoeve 1977:69, where a copy of the Serat Anbiya (IOL Jav 74) which originally belonged to 
Ratu Ageng (? Ratu Ageng Tegalreja, the great-grandmother of Dipanagara) is described. 
26 BNg, I:388, XC:26-7; II.149, XXXVI.18, where Dipanagara is described as having read the 
texts at Tegalreja. The Tāj as-salātīn was one of the first works re-copied in the Yogya kraton after 
the library had been plundered by the British in 1812, Mudjanattistomo 1971:63 no. 235 (copied in 
1831).
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dence: the Taqrīb, Lubāb al-fiqh, Muharrar and Taqarrub (a commentary on the 
Taqrīb) were all known to Dipanagara, and he later mentioned with pride his 
personal collection of Javanese-Islamic law codes which had been kept for 
him by a friend in Yogya during the Java War.27 In this connection, he was 
extremely critical of the 1812 legal reforms introduced by the interim British 
administration of Thomas Stamford Raffles (1811-1816) which curtailed the 
power of the Javanese religious courts (surambi) in criminal cases (Carey 
1987:299-301; pp. 386-7). Such works on Muslim jurisprudence, scholastic the-
ology, grammar and explanations of the Qur’ān seem to have been in general 
use for instruction in religious boarding schools (pesantrèn) in Java during this 
period according to the official surveys on vernacular education conducted in 
1819 and 1832.28 Amongst these, the Taqrīb, Usul, Nahwu and Tafsir featured 
prominently.29 We also know that these texts were consulted in the various 
centres for Islamic law with which the prince was connected.30 His special 
interest in works on Muslim jurisprudence was thus not so unusual given the 
context of contemporary pesantrèn education in south-central Java just before 
and immediately after the Java War. 
Despite the range of his reading and supposed expertise in Javanese-
Islamic legal matters, it is striking that Dipanagara did not feel secure enough 
in his own knowledge of the holy scriptures to carry out the mandate given 
him by his pre-war vision of the Javanese Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) to fight 
on the basis of the Qur’ān. Instead, he decided to summon ulama whom he 
judged especially well versed in the Qur’ān to his headquarters at Selarong 
at the beginning of the war to give him the necessary advice. Lacking confi-
dence in the scholars and religious teachers whom he had met and studied 
with in the immediate vicinity of Yogya, he decided to invite Kyai Maja and 
another much older Pajang-based ulama, Kyai Kuwaron, to join him as his 
senior religious advisers (Chapter X note 184), a decision which later sparked 
many jealousies amongst his local supporters (p. 634).
Besides these Javanese-Islamic texts, Javanese sources relate that Dipanagara 
also studied – or had read to him – works of a more moralistic and Javanese 
literary nature. These included edifying tales on kingship and statecraft 
adopted from Persian and Arabic classics such as the Fatāh al-Muluk (‘Victory 
of kings’), the Hakik al-Modin and the Nasīhat al-Muluk (‘Moral lessons for 
27 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 30-1, where Dipanagara mentioned that ‘these lawbooks […] contain 
everything that had been instituted in an excellent and exalted spirit by The Prophet and his 
caliph s [wali]. They were particularly made for Java and have been in use for a thousand years’. It 
is likely that Dipanagara was referring to compendia of jurisprudence of Old Javanese origin such 
as the Jugul Mudha, Surya Ngalam, and Praniti Raja Kapa-Kapa, see Pigeaud 1967-80, I:308; Raffles 
1817, I:279-80; pp. 387-8.
28 Van den Berg 1887:518-55. See note 92.
29 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 8-3-1819 no. 9, F.E. Hardy (Resident of Kedhu) 
to Algemeen Secretaris (Jean Chrétien Baud), 15-4-1819.
30 See Chapter II.
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kings’),31 as well as Modern Javanese versions of Old Javanese classics like the 
Serat Rama, Bhoma Kāwya, Arjuna Wijaya and Arjuna Wiwāha.32 The prince was 
likewise well versed in Modern Javanese wayang (shadow puppet) literature 
and made numerous allusions to characters in the Javanese show theatre in 
his autobiography (Carey 1974a:12-37). It is interesting in this respect that 
amongst the texts which Dipanagara asked the Dutch government to copy 
in Surakarta for the education of his children who had been born to him in 
exile in Manado (1830-1833) and Makassar (1833-1855), was the whole of the 
Purwa cycle of wayang plays down to the great ‘brothers’ war’ (Bratayuda).33 
Other texts requested by the prince at this time included the famous Islamic 
epic tale, Ménak Amir Hamza, the Asmara Supi, a romance related to the Ménak 
cycle, the Serat Manikmaya, a text on cosmogony dating from the Kartasura 
period (1680-1745) which deals with agricultural myths and wayang tradi-
tions (Pigeaud 1967-80, I:154; Carey 1992:495 note 466), the Serat Gandakusuma 
(Angling Driya) and the Serat Angrèni, an episode from the Panji cycle.34
A copy of the popular Javanese romance, Jaya Lengkara Wulang, written on 
treebark paper was found at Dipanagara’s headquarters at Selarong in October 
1825 and may have formed part of the prince’s private collection.35 The text 
deals with various aspects of statecraft in the form of a tale of a young prince 
wandering (lelana) through Java and meeting many masters of secular, reli-
gious and arcane lore. This was a theme which had universal appeal amongst 
the courtly elite at this time epitomising as it did the ideal education of the 
young satria (warrior nobleman) (Pigeaud 1967-80, I:230; Ricklefs 1998:271). 
We shall see below how Dipanagara gave practical expression to this satria 
lelana ideal during his pilgrimage to the south coast in circa 1805.
Character, intellectual ability and relations with Europeans
While the list of works on Islam, Javanese-Islamic law and Javanese literature 
reportedly studied by Dipanagara seems impressive, their bare enumeration 
affords few real insights into the prince’s character. How really intelligent and 
discerning was he? Can we believe the post-Java War Dutch sources which 
31 BNg, II:149, XXXVI.18; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):21-3, II.47-54.
32 BNg, II:149, XXXVI.19; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):43, IV.13, 48, IV.37; BD (Manado), 
II:304, XIX.87; Carey 1974a:10-6.
33 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 25-10-1844 no. 6, P.J.B. de Perez 
(governor of Makassar) to Governor-General (Pieter Merkus), 29-1-1844. See pp. 743-4.
34 The texts, with the exception of the Ménak Amir Hamza, which the government deemed too 
expensive, were copied for Dipanagara in Surakarta, mainly from kraton MSS, see AN, Besluit van 
den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 25-10-1844, Assistant-Resident of Surakarta to Algemeen 
Secretaris, 10-6-1844, 10-10-1844. For brief descriptions of these texts, see Pigeaud 1967-80, I:154, 
212-5, 223-4, 235. See pp. 743-4.
35 Pigeaud 1967-80, IV:86 (sub: LOr 12.586). The original is in dK 222, see VROA 1905:76. On 
the capture of Dipanagara’s papers at Selarong, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:399.
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suggest that he was somewhat unique amongst his Yogya contemporaries? 
How much formal education did he really have? Could he read and write? 
What was his understanding of Islam, and how deep was his spiritual com-
mitment?
The answers to some of these questions can be found in the records of 
some of the European officers who spent time in his company, in particular 
the diary of Second-Lieutenant Julius Heinrich Knoerle, the German officer 
who accompanied the prince for seven weeks on his journey into exile in 
Manado.36 Knoerle, a lawyer by training, who had been born in Stargard in 
West Pomerania (Prussia), had been in Java for just four years (1824-1828) 
before personal sickness forced him to return to Holland. The veteran VOC 
official Nicolaus Engelhard, who got to know him during his three-month 
recuperative stay at Engelhard’s villa at Pondhok Gedhé near Cililitan in the 
Bataviasche Ommelanden in 1828 (Heuken 2000:280), spoke well of Knoerle’s 
character and recommended him to the minister of the Colonies, C.Th. Elout 
(in office 1824-1829), describing him as a man closely acquainted with the 
language, manner and customs of the Javanese, as well as with the colonial 
system and the current political situation in Java.37 This seems to have had 
the desired effect for the second-lieutenant had apparently come back to Java 
with Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch (in office 1830-1834) on 2 
January 1830 as his military adjutant. However, P.J.F. Louw and E.S. de Klerck 
(1894-1909, V:604, 752-3), the Dutch military historians of the Java War, are 
contemptuous of his character and abilities describing him as a pushy and 
dishonest ‘careerist’. They noted that he had risen to only the most junior 
commissioned rank in the colonial army,38 and referred to an official govern-
36 For a discussion of Knoerle’s journal, whose full title is, ‘Aanteekeningen gehouden door den 
2e Luit. J.H. Knoerle, adjudant van Z.E. den gouverneur-generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië, betref-
fende de dagelyksche verkeering van dien officier met den prins van Djocjakarta, Diepo Negoro, 
gedurende eene reis van Batavia naar Menado, het exil van den genoemden prins’, Menado, 
20-6-1830 (‘Notes kept by 2nd Lieutenant J.H. Knoerle, adjutant of His Excellency the governor-
general of Netherlands-Indies, concerning the daily contacts of the above officer with the prince of 
Yogyakarta, Dipanagara, during a journey from Batavia to Manado, the exile of the aforementioned 
prince’), a copy of which, with underlining by Johannes van den Bosch, is in the Van den Bosch 
private collection no. 391 in the Nationaal Archief in The Hague, see Carey 1981a:xxxv. 
37 NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 3195, ‘Rapporten en andere stukken van A. de Wilde en N. 
Engelhard betreffende de cultures op Java, houtbosschen, afstand van land &c, 1816-30’, Nicolaus 
Engelhard (Pondhok Gedhé) to C.Th. Elout (The Hague), 30-9-1828. After a period of leave in 
Europe (1828-1829) to restore his health (‘Journal’, 45), Knoerle appears to have accompanied Van 
den Bosch to Java on the sailing ship Z.M. Rupel which sailed from Texel on 24-7-1829 arriving in 
Batavia on 2 January 1830, see Chapter XII note 38.
38 As a second-lieutenant, Knoerle had served briefly (2-2-1826–16-6-1827) as an infantry 
officer in the 19th National Infantry Division during the Java War before returning to Batavia 
to work as assistant editor of the government newspaper, the Javasche Courant (1827-1828). His 
request to be given an honourable discharge from military service on health grounds – he was 
suffering from a liver complaint – was refused partly because of his dishonest representation of 
his war record, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:752-3. By 9-7-1830, was signing himself as 
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ment decision which censured Knoerle’s fitful grasp of Javanese (even his 
Dutch was far from perfect) which made it difficult for him to command 
native troops in the field (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:752). The young 
German also had problems in dealing with the local population more gener-
ally. He would later meet a violent end while serving as Assistant-Resident 
in Bengkulèn in July 1833 at the hands of the local chiefs and inhabitants 
who had been goaded to murder by his ‘hot-tempered and wilful’ character 
and by his ‘often brutal and immoral’ actions which may have included the 
embezzling of f 4,000 earmarked for the relief of famine in his district (Sartono 
Kartodirdjo 1971:99; Carey 1981a:lxvi note 147; Fasseur 1993:81-2). All this 
means that his record of his conversations with the prince needs to be treated 
with circumspection. But the fact remains that his journal – part of which has 
been published (Knoerle 1835:137-85) – is by far the most complete European 
account of day-to-day encounters with Dipanagara over an extended period 
(May-June 1830), so it needs to be cited. 
At the time of his mission to Manado with Dipanagara, Knoerle was still 
serving as military adjutant to Van den Bosch, and his journal was personally 
written for the governor-general who had to consider the pressing political 
implications of the prince’s exile at a time of looming war in Europe over 
Belgian independence.39 According to Knoerle, the prince ‘appeared as a 
noble, but at the same time proud man, gifted with shrewdness, a strong 
[and] enterprising character, and penetrating judgement such as is rarely 
found amongst high-born Javanese’ (Knoerle 1835:171). He seems to have 
little formal education and his writing – at least in Javanese characters – was 
extremely untidy and full of grammatical errors (De Hollander 1877:192-
6; Kielstra 1885:408; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:151). Similarly, in 
Knoerle’s words, the prince’s style of speech was ‘unusually unmannerly 
[…] and inaccurate’. But the force and vitality of his personality showed 
through in the vividness of his ideas, which were, according to Knoerle, ‘in 
themselves rich, powerful and very clear’ (Knoerle 1835:172). This enabled 
him to make a deep impression on people after even a short meeting: at the 
Magelang ‘peace conference’ in March 1830, the Dutch supreme commander, 
Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock, and his staff, none of whom 
were initially well disposed towards the prince, all spoke with praise about 
his ‘open-hearted and intelligent’ character when they had been in his com-
pany for only a few days.40
The prince apparently spoke some Malay, but always avoided using the 
‘first-lieutenant adjutant’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:751) so he may have been given a 
promotion in recognition of his services in escorting Dipanagara to Manado.
39 See pp. 734-8, where fears of a European conflict over Belgium, and a possible British attack 
on Indonesia, caused Van den Bosch to recommend Dipanagara’s transfer to the Netherlands.
40 Van der Kemp 1896a:416; Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia) to Minister of Marine and Colo-
nies (Den Haag), 14-3-1830, in GKA, 30-7-1830 no. 32k.
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language in European company because he found it so distasteful and was not 
fluent in it.41 He also had an excellent memory: during his conversations with 
Knoerle he was able to recall developments in pre-Java War Yogyakarta with 
great clarity and he later set down the whole of his life history in babad form 
during his exile in Manado. This was apparently done in under nine months 
(May 1831-February 1832) entirely without notes, but with remarkable chrono-
logical rigour and attention to detail (Carey 1981a:xxiv-xxvi). Another facet of 
Dipanagara’s intelligence was his intuitive ability to discern other people’s char-
acters from their facial appearance (ngèlmu firasat; the science of physiognomy 
and physical traits, from the Arabic ilm al-firāsa, Drewes 1966:335-6, 356-7). At 
the beginning of the Java War, he is depicted in one of the babad as having picked 
his officials, army commanders (basah), and religious advisers entirely on the 
basis of his ngèlmu, his choice of subordinates usually being a good one. Even 
his uncle, Pangéran, known after August 1825 as Panembahan Mangkubumi, is 
described as deferring to his superior judgement.42 Dipanagara also appears to 
have been rather careful and astute with money, as we will see in his negotia-
tions for the indemnification of the European land-renters in Yogya in 1823 (pp. 
537-43) and his management of his administration and finances during the Java 
War and subsequent exile (pp. 606-7, 650-3, 726-7). 
The prince’s judgement of European officials with whom he came into 
contact during his pre-Java War life in Yogya and subsequently was also 
penetrating and critical. Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (1782-1858), the 
bluff Harderwijk lawyer, administrator and ‘pseudo-military’ man (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:386-7; Chapter IX), who served as Resident of 
Yogya immediately after the Dutch restoration in 1816, he dismissed as a 
person who ‘merely enjoyed eating and drinking and the spreading of Dutch 
ways’,43 and he correctly described the hapless Jonkheer Anthonië Hendrik 
Smissaert (1777-1832), the Yogya Resident (in office 1823-1825) immediately 
preceding the outbreak of the Java War as a ‘good man but weak’ (Louw and 
41 On Dipanagara’s distaste for Malay, see Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers to Johannes van den Bosch, 
31-3-1830 Kab. no. 65, in GKA, 20-9-1830 no. 58k; and on his poor command of the language, see 
vdB 391, ‘Voorstellen [van den] Pangerang Diepo Negoro aan den Luitenant Adjutant Knoerle in 
de tegenwoordigheid van den […] Luitenant [C.] Bosman’, Manado, 19-6-1830.
42 KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):107, X.16-8. sapepaké para bekel sami/ demang-dema[ng] nga-
bèhi lan rongga/ Kangjeng Pangéran karsané/ tata-tata Sang Bagus/ ingkang pantes dadi bupati/ ngabèhi 
kliwon rongga/ demang lan tumenggung/ kang abdi-abdi sedaya/ sapantesé karsané jinu[n]jung linggih/ 
tuwin wong désa-désa. 17. kang prajurit dènpantes prajurit/ tuwin lurah tanapi wedana/ bekel tuwin 
kebayané/ semana Sang [A]bagus/ matur marang kang rama aglis/ kang rama lon ngandika/ bener putran-
ingsun/ punika sumongga rama/ pernatané pantesé sedaya sami. 18. ingkang rama angandika aris/ aku 
tholé mapan nora bisa/ apa karsanira anggèr/ ingkang putra gumuyu/ rama datan kénging tinari/ nanging 
kajeng kawula/ sampéyan kang sepuh/ wus putus ngèlmi wirasat/ awon-saé jujur-sendhet tekon jalmi/ 
sampéyan naté garap.
43 BD (Manado), II:271, XVIII (Kinanthi) 130-1. Inggris wus salin Walanda/ Résidhèn Nahis namèki. 
131. karemanya mangan-minum/ lan anjrah cara Walandi.
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De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743). As for Frans Gerhardus Valck, who served as 
Resident of Kedhu (in office 1826-1830) at the time of his meeting with De 
Kock at Magelang in March 1830, the prince found him ‘extremely wearing 
because of his stupid and piffling questions […] he commanded no respect 
and […] had not the appearance of a Resident who has to govern large num-
bers of Javanese’.44 Dipanagara reserved his highest praise for John Crawfurd 
(1783-1868), who served as Resident of Yogya (in office 1811-1814, 1816) dur-
ing the British interregnum, stating that:
He had never known any Dutch [official] endowed with the same love of his fel-
low man and with the same noble-hearted character as Crawfurd. [….] Crawfurd 
spoke about everything with his father or with himself, and he had made the 
Javanese language his own in under six months because the Malay language is the 
language of chickens which no ruler in Java wished to hear.45
Perhaps in the dour but talented Scotsman, Dipanagara had found a kindred 
spirit, someone who was as abstemious and frugal as Nahuys van Burgst 
was hearty and bombastic?46 ‘In everything he said,’ Knoerle later noted, 
‘Dipanagara’s attachment to Crawfurd shines through and the latter must 
have been particularly well suited to win the esteem and attachment of the 
rulers of Java’.47
On another level, it is clear that Dipanagara had an enquiring mind and 
a wide-ranging knowledge of eclectic topics, especially Javanese history and 
legends. This can be seen in his Makassar notebooks which deal with wayang, 
Javanese mythology, legendary heroes and holy sites (Carey 1981a:xxx-xxxi). 
In his conversations, Knoerle noted that the prince talked at length about the 
goddess of the southern ocean (Ratu Kidul), the kingdoms of Pajajaran and 
Majapahit, the first sultan of Demak, Radèn Patah (reigned circa 1500-1518), 
and the late seventeenth-century Balinese mercenary-adventurer, Untung 
Surapati (circa 1645-1706), as well as more general topics of commerce, 
navigation, and European dynastic history.48 At the same time, he showed a 
lively interest in the illustrations of books lent to him during his voyage into 
exile which covered topics as diverse as Singhalese Buddhism and the First 
Crusade (1095-1099).49 On all occasions, Dipanagara showed himself perfectly 
44 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 17.
45 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 41. Knoerle’s text reads: dat hy nog geenen Hollander had gekend die met 
het menschlievend en hooghartige karakter van Crawfurd was gesmeekt geweest. Since Knoerle’s first 
language was German not Dutch, it is certain that he used hooghartig not in the Dutch sense of 
‘arrogant’ or ‘haughty’, but in the German sense of hochherzig, ‘dignified’ or ‘noble’. Gesmeekt is 
likewise a neologism derived from the German geschmückt, ‘adorned’. I am grateful to the late Dr 
Th.G.Th. Pigeaud for these clarifications. 
46 See Chapter IX.
47 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 41.
48 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 8, 21, 25, 32, 45.
49 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 11, 19. Amongst the books lent to him during his voyage to Manado were 
Edward Upham, The history and doctrine of Buddhism popularly illustrated with notices of Kappoism 
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at ease in the company of Europeans and his first escort, Major François 
Vincent Henri Antoine Ridder de Stuers, De Kock’s son-in-law, even spoke 
of his ‘genteel manners’ (in zijn omgang zeer fatsoenlijk) (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, V:746).
Understanding of Islam
Dipanagara’s understanding of Islam can be best assessed from the vantage 
point of his own writings, most notably his autobiographical babad and his 
Makassar notebooks. We will look at these shortly, but first it may be helpful 
to hear how those Europeans with whom the prince came into contact at the 
end of the war saw his practice and understanding as a Javanese Muslim. 
Knoerle, for example, commented favourably on his understanding of Islam 
and the depth of his religious commitment:
Dipanagara is very closely acquainted with the spirit which pervades the religious 
system of [The Prophet]. I believe he judges all miracles achieved by Muhammad 
from a fair point of view and knows very well how to distinguish [their super-
natural aspects from] the [historical] circumstances in which Muhammad found 
himself.50
Later, during a discussion about the Old Testament prophets, the German 
officer declared himself surprised by the prince’s ‘correct opinions’.51 Towards 
Christians, Dipanagara evinced a certain tolerance, although he viewed their 
concept of the trinity as a ‘blasphemy’ and bitterly blamed them for persecut-
ing other religions. In his words:
No matter who should be given preference between Jesus and Muhammad, 
the spirit of patient endurance was to be found more in the Qur’ān than in [….] 
[Christian] works. Muslims had included many of the teachings of Jesus in the 
Qur’ān […] [and] they also considered him a man chosen by God and born from 
the breath of the Almighty. Christians, on the other hand, had soiled the Divine 
Sending of Muhammad with contumely and sought to show the Prophet as an 
impostor.52
or Demon worship and of the Bali, or planetary incantations of Ceylon (1829); and a Dutch translation 
with illustrations of Torquato Tasso’s epic poem set at the time of the First Crusade, Gerusaleme 
Liberata (‘Jerusalem delivered’) (1581). Dipanagara seems to have favoured books with illustra-
tions and later asked that the wayang texts and other MSS which he ordered for his children 
in Makassar should be copied with the original drawings and figures, see AN, Besluit van den 
Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 25-10-1844 no. 6, P.J.B. de Perez (governor of Makassar) to 
Governor-General (Pieter Merkus), 29-1-1844.
50 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 46. For a less fabourable view, see p. 676.
51 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 14-5.
52 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 15.
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As regards Dipanagara’s doctrinal position as a Muslim, it can be seen from 
his writings that he was more a typical Javanese mystic than an orthodox 
Muslim reformer. This was recognised early in the Java War by his princi-
ple religious adviser, Kyai Maja, himself a possible adherent of Shat tārīyya 
mystical brotherhood (tarekat), who pointed out that the prince seemed to be 
striving for the mystical unity of the Sufi.53 Despite an impressive display 
of quotations from the Qur’ān in his Makassar notebooks, Dipanagara laid 
the greatest stress on the use of dhikr (short prayers for the glorification of 
Allah which are endlessly repeated in ritual order) and on various forms of 
meditation (Carey 1981a:xxx-xxxi). In the same passages where he praises the 
efficacy of dhikr, he also refers to daérah (diagrams for regulating breathing 
during prayer) and to some of the rituals adopted by the Naqshabāndīyya and 
Shattārīyya mystical brotherhoods.54 Similarly, when he was giving advice to 
his younger brother, Pangéran (Ngabdurakim) Adisurya, on religious matters 
he recommended him to use the fourfold dhikr (napi-isbat, isim, isim gaib, isim 
gaib-ginaib), which befitted the ‘perfect man’ (insan kamil) and would lead to 
the end of separation between Lord and servant (kawula lan gusti).55 
According to Dipanagara, the repeated use of such dhikr would enable 
the ‘name of majesty’ (isim jalalah), which is Allah, to become ‘engraved’ on 
the innermost heart (ati sanubari).56 Finally, he took a mystical view of the 
fundamental dogma of Islam, namely tokid (Arabic tawhīd), the profession of 
Allah’s unity and uniqueness. He considered that all man’s efforts should be 
directed towards living up to this profession of unity by denying being to all 
that exists, inclusive of himself, and striving after union with the Eternal and 
53 BD (Manado), IV:13, XXXII (Maskumambang) 85-6. Ki Maja malih turira. 86. Paduka Ji kekad-
hangan jalma Supi/ kantawis punika/ kang kresa naming satunggil. On Kyai Maja’s doctrinal position, 
see further LOr 8652k, Diponegoro, ‘Salasilah Kiai Modjo Tondano’, Manado, 15-12-1919. This 
genealogy, drawn up by a descendant of Dipanagara (? son of Radèn Mas Raib) who had been 
exiled to Ambon, purports to show that Kyai Maja and his father Kyai Abdul Ngarip had used the 
teachings of the Shattārīyya tarekat in their religious instruction. The same source also refers to the 
possible presence of Qadiriyyah and Naqshabāndīyya tarekat in Ambon in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. For a modern reference to Kyai Maja’s elder brother, Kyai Hasan Besari, 
as a member of the Shattāriyya tarekat, see Hamka 1973:5.
54 Makassar MS, II:26. istilah Naksabandiah wus nora nganggo obah badané, déné kang dènpandhang 
sarupané zhikir thoriq iku, iya wus nora ana liya daérah Satariyah iku. For references to contemporary 
Shattārīyya salsilah (genealogies) in MSS collections made by the British in 1811-1816, see Ricklefs 
and Voorhoeve 1977:69 (IOL Jav. 69), 70 (IOL Jav. 83). 
55 BD (Manado), IV:213, XXXVIII (Mijil) 69-71. déné dikir papat aranèki/ mapan iku dhingin/ napi-
esbat iku. 70. yèn wus tutug ing niskaranèki/ mapan isim mangko/ iya edat adhiku arané/ mapan nuli 
dikir isim aib/ lan aib-ginaib/ iku papatipun. 71. papat iku mulih mring san-kamil/ kang kinarya gedhong/ 
marma yèn wus teka san-kamilé/ adhi ilang arané pan iki/ kawula lan Gusti. Sufi teachings on the ‘per-
fect man’, the al-Insān al-Kāmil of Arabic mystical literature, seem to have been derived in Java 
from the fifteenth-century author ‘Abd al-Karim b. Ibrāhim al-Jīlī’s al-Insan al-Kāmil fī ma’rifat 
al-Awākhir wa’li-i Awā’il, see Ricklefs 2006:197.
56 BD (Manado) IV:212-3, XXXVIII (Mijil) 67-8. iya isim mangko/ mapan isim jalalah arané/ iya 
ingkang anèng jronèng ati/ mapan dènarani/ sanubari iku. 68. pan ing janthung mengko lahirnèki.
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Plate 11. A page from the second book of Dipanagara’s Makassar manuscript depict-
ing a daérah (mystical diagram) for the regulation of the breath and the utterance of 
dhikr (short religious phrases) during prayer. Probably taken from the Shattārīyya 
tarekat (mystical brotherhood). Hikayat Tanah Jawa, p. 22. Photograph by courtesy of 
R.M. Yusuf Diponegoro, Jl Irian no. 83, Makassar. 
Maka iku dudu dènwaspada sira 







Only Being (Kang Jati Purbaning Sukma). The development and progress of 
the mystic, in the prince’s view, ran from iman (faith) via tokid and ma’ripat 
(gnosis) to true islam, the most absolute surrender of the individual, and the 
effacement of the human personality and its being in the Divine. Significantly, 
there was no mention of the sharī’a (Islamic law) as the container for such 
mystical striving, precisely the sort of oversight which so struck the teachers 
of the Jâwah (Indonesian) community in Mecca in the later nineteenth century 
(Snouck Hurgronje 1931:271) and led to the trial of the pasisir mystic, Kyai 
Haji Ahmad Mutamakin, in early 1730s Kartasura for having ‘disclos[ed] the 
essence of the mystical science of Reality [haq] […] but [having] reject[ed] the 
stage of the law [sharī’a]’ (Ricklefs 1998:127-62, 2006:115-7).
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As Dipanagara put it in his autobiography:
XXXIII. 27  Iman means ‘acceptance’
  because man is granted life
  by God Most High.
  The meaning of tokid is truth
  that one has to observe
  God’s ordinations [as stipulated in the law]
  be they onerous or light to fulfill.
 
 28  Ma’ripat means to reject duality;
  as this body is bound to perish,
  do not take it into account.
  Its [being] is an illusion, too absurd to endure.
  Strive only after the primordial
  Essence of the All-Pervading One.
  The meaning of islam
 29  is surrender, the avowal of man’s nullity.
  All comes from God,
  man has only to accept humbly.
  Equally in this world and the hereafter,
  there is nothing but the grace of God, Lord of the Worlds,
  creature being transitory.
  That is my view.
 30  These four together are [also] called tokid.
  They are evidence of earnest application [to the striving after God].57
For readers familiar with Javanese mystical literature, it will be evident that 
there is nothing unusual about this fourfold path towards unity propounded 
by Dipanagara. Indeed, it is typical primbon (divination almanac) material. 
Moreover, the prince’s repeated references to the mystical practices of the 
tarekat cannot be taken as an indication that he was in touch with the centres 
of the mystical brotherhoods in the Middle East. Both the Naqshabāndīyya 
and Shat tārīyya had long been established in Indonesia – the latter having 
been introduced by the great seventeenth-century Sumatran Sufi Abdurrauf 
of Singkil (circa 1615-1693) and spread in Java by his pupil Shaikh Abdul 
57 BD (Manado), IV:40-1, XXXIII (Durma) 27-30. ingkang iman tegesé pan panarima/ rèhning pinar-
ing urip/ mring Alah Tangala/ tokit tegesé sang nyata/ olèhé angelakoni/ maring paréntah/ abot-enthèng 
tan nampik. 28. kang makripat wus ora roro paningal/ badan pan rusak iki/ tan tinolih ika/ cipta mongsa 
kariya/ nging karep maring Kang Jati/ Purbaning Sukma/ islam tegesnèki. 29. mapan pasrah wus tan derbé 
apa-apa/ kabèh Purbaning [Widi]/ nging karya sumongga/ dunyakérat wus padha/ nging sihing Rabil 
Ngalamin/ [makluk wus sirna/ iku pangrasa mami].* 30. kumpulira papat tokid aranira/ pratondha wus 
ngantepi. The last two lines of this verse in brackets (*) are missing in the BD (Manado) MS so I 
have taken them from Rusche 1908-09, II:42.
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Muhyi (circa 1640-1715) – and by the early nineteenth century the Shattārīyya 
in particular had become degenerate, serving as a receptacle for many old-
fashioned mystical teachings as can be seen from a study of the Serat Centhini 
(1815), the great encyclopaedia of Javanese manners, history and belief sys-
tems in the early nineteenth century (Ricklefs 2006:195-206). It had also died 
out in Arabia by this time.58 Thus Dipanagara drew on traditional sources for 
his religious inspiration and remained unaffected by the fanatical Wahhābī 
reform movement which for nearly a decade (1803-1812) in the early nine-
teenth century controlled a large part of the Arabian peninsula including 
the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and which later had such a profound 
influence on the course of events in West Sumatra both before and during 
the Padri War (1821-1838).59 There was nothing in Dipanagara’s vision which 
involved the creation of an Islamic society along the lines of the Padri reform-
ers, nor did he have any problems with reconciling his experience of the 
Javanese spirit world with his own unshakeable commitment to Islam. Even 
his desire to end his days in Mecca after making the haj (pilgrimage) should 
be seen more as a way of arranging an honourable retirement in the aftermath 
of the Java War than a wish to imbibe the teachings of leading Islamic divines 
in the holy city.60 This is what Ricklefs has termed the ‘mystic synthesis’ of 
pre-colonial Java, a synthesis which reached its most remarkable flowering in 
the life and career of the young Dipanagara (Ricklefs 2006:206-20).
58 Personal communication Professor G.W.J. Drewes, Leiden, 24-9-1977. On the tarekat in Indo-
nesia in the late nineteenth century, see Sartono Kartodirdjo 1966:157-65; and in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century, see Ricklefs 1998:255 note 41, 2006:178, 204.
59 The Wahhābī were a fanatically puritan and fundamentalist Muslim sect founded in the 
1740s by Muhammad ibn Άbd al-Wahhāb which by the beginning of the nineteenth century con-
trolled much of Arabia: in 1793, the Wahhābī leader Άbd al-Aziz had taken control of Nejd and 
later (1803-1804) captured the holy cities (Mecca and Medina). These were only reconquered by 
Muhammad Ali Pasha, Ottoman governor of Egypt in 1812-1813, see Dobbin 1983:128-30; and on 
the impact of the Wahhābī on the Padri movement in West Sumatra, see Dobbin 1974:319-56. See 
also Ricklefs 2006:231.
60 Van Hogendorp 1913:159 (reporting from Du Bus’ peace negotiations with Kyai Maja in 
Salatiga in late September 1827 that Dipanagara would be prepared to make peace if he was to be 
allowed to make the haj to Mecca); Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 4, 33 (refers to Dipanagara’s intention to ask 
Governor-General J. van den Bosch for a boat and money to make the journey to Mecca and to 
settle there permanently after buying land from the Sherif of Mecca); AN, Exhibitum 2-7-1831 no. 
15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831 (reporting that 
Dipanagara had confided to his scribe, Tirtadirana [Appendix XII no. 4], that he was still hoping 
that Captain Johan Jacob Roeps would come with a boat to take him to Mecca and that he was 
saving money from his f 600 a month stipend for the trip); BD (Manado) IV:418-9, XLIII.249-50 
(Dipanagara reports that shortly after his capture at Magelang on 28 March 1830, he had been 
told by Captain Roeps that Van den Bosch had a problem with his making the haj because no one 
of his status in Java had made the pilgrimage before and that he would have to seek permission 
from the Dutch king, William I: yèn bab kaji ika/ ingsun tan wani ngrampungi/ sawab durung ana iya. 
250. ingkang adat yèn wong gedhé munggah kaji/ ingsun ayun nerang/ mring nagara Londa dhingin).
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Appearance, personality, family and pleasures
Apart from the nature of Dipanagara’s religious convictions, what were the 
main traits of his personality? What did he look like as a young man and was 
he attractive to women? Did he have a sense of humour? Did he have any 
special interests or pleasures? Was his religious zeal tempered by compassion 
and humanity?
A sketch of the prince drawn by a Yogya court artist when he was about 
twenty years old, possibly at the time of his second marriage to the daughter 
of the Yogya bupati of Panolan on 27 February 1807, shows him dressed in 
an iket (head-dress) and high-collared Javanese jacket (surjan) fastened at the 
neck with six gold buttons. A gold cord hangs over his shoulders on which 
a pen-knife may have been fastened and tucked into his jacket. The face is 
still young with tightly pursed lips, a slightly splayed nose and powerful 
downcast eyes.61 Even in advanced old age, according to a witness who met 
Dipanagara in exile, the prince’s eyes still retained the fire and energy of his 
youth (Schoemaker 1893:409; Van der Kemp 1896a:358). The whole appear-
ance gives the impression of concentrated energy and cahya (internal spiritual 
power; personal radiance). The sketch is unique: it is the only drawing from 
life by a Javanese artist showing the prince in Javanese dress. All the other 
known portraits are by Dutchmen and show him in santri garb, in particular 
the dress which he adopted during the Java War, namely, the open-necked 
kabaya (tabard), black jacket, shawl and turban under which one can just dis-
cern that the prince has shaved his head in the manner of the paras Nabi (The 
Prophet’s tonsure). They also unwittingly give the prince’s face a European 
cast, although the sketch by the bailiff or chief magistrate of Batavia, Adrianus 
Johannes Bik (1790-1872), which now hangs in the Musium Kota (Jakarta), is 
especially fine.62 
According to Dutch sources, the prince was heavy in build and of middling 
height.63 But he apparently had great reserves of energy and a remarkably 
61 The original sketch to which this description refers was owned by Ibu Dr Sahir of Kota 
Baru, Yogyakarta, a great-great-granddaughter of Dipanagara (descended through his eldest son, 
Pangéran Dipanagara II, who was exiled to Sumenep in 1834). I am grateful to Ibu Dr Sahir for 
allowing me to take a photograph of this sketch, September 1972.
62 The best known sketches of Dipanagara by Dutchmen are those by Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers 
and A.J. Bik, the first drawn at Semarang on 2 April 1830 before Dipanagara’s departure for Bata-
via on the steamship ‘Van der Capellen’ (De Stuers 1833:Atlas) and the latter at the Stadhuis (Town 
Hall) in Batavia before Dipanagara left to board the Pollux on 1 May 1830 (Plate 75). A number 
of prints and lithographs were subsequently made of these sketches, see Bastin and Brommer 
1979:13-4, 139 note 228, 140 nos. 230-2, 141 nos. 236-7.
63 GKA 11-10-1828 no. 208 L geheim, A.M.Th. de Salis, ‘Pro Memorie over de Javasche Vorsten-
landen’, The Hague, 8-5-1828, described Dipanagara as van lichaamsgesteldheid log and as someone 
who led a ‘lazy and indolent life’ at Tegalreja. See further Smissaert’s view of Dipanagara’s ‘indo-
lence’, in Chapter X. Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers related that Dipanagara was of middling height, 
see Dj.Br. 19¹¹, ‘Inleiding’, n.y., 17.
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robust constitution. Dutch officers who were given the task of tracking him 
down in the jungles of Bagelèn at the end of the Java War were all impressed 
by his perseverance and will-power: in De Kock’s words, ‘Dipanagara must 
be made of iron when one reads the descriptions of the terrain in which he is 
holding out and of the shacks in which he rests his exhausted body – every-
thing is [utterly] desolate’.64 Dipanagara himself reflected in his babad that he 
had never walked such distances in his life and was literally ‘on his last legs’ at 
this time.65 During his youth, however, he had accustomed himself to making 
long journeys on foot (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744). We have seen 
in the previous chapter how he walked from Tegalreja to Kyai Maja’s pesant-
rèn in the Pajang area – a distance of some thirty-five kilometres – to find his 
eldest son in the post-1816 period, and we shall see in the next chapter how 
in circa 1805 he embarked on a seventy-kilometre pilgrimage to various caves 
and holy sites to the south of Yogya. On these journeys, or when he withdrew 
to his cave at Secang (Selarong) for retreats, known in Javanese as tirakat, he 
either travelled alone or with his two intimate retainers (Carey 1981a:246 note 
44). He also carried a special pilgrim’s staff which had been given to him in 
circa 1815 and was supposed to have been made in the sixteenth century for 
one of the rulers of Demak. This staff was said to have had a wrought iron 
handle in the shape of a cakra (solar disc), the weapon of Wisnu which in 
Javanese mythology is particularly associated with the ‘Èrucakra’ title of the 
Javanese Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) (Plate 65) which Dipanagara would assume 
at the start of the Java War.66
Dipanagara’s robust constitution and ability to endure great privations, 
including severe bouts of tropical malaria at the end of the Java War,67 made 
64 Hendrik Merkus de Kock (Magelang) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (commanding the army in the 
field), 6-1-1830, quoted in Kielstra 1896b:298-9.
65 BD (Manado), IV:220, XXXVIII (Mijil) 106-7. kawarna Sang Katong/ mapan langkung remben ing 
lampahé/ sabab ingkang pada Sri Bupati/ mapan rempu kalih/ datan naté iku*. 107. pan lumampah dharat 
Sri Bupati/ marma [sangsaya doh]**/ ingkang pada Sang Nata kalihé/ mapan ngrémpong ing samargi-
margi. (*) Rusche 1909:145 gives an alternative reading here: dadya rendhetipun. (**) Text in square 
brackets is taken from Rusche 1908-09:145, the BD (Manado) MS has marma samya adoh. For a 
modern comparison of Dipanagara’s situation at the end of the Java War, see General T.B. Sima-
tupang’s description of Panglima Besar Sudirman’s desperate journey to Pacitan during the last 
stage of the Indonesian Revolution, Simatupang 1972:151-60.
66 Baud 1036, ‘Description of Dipanagara’s pilgrim’s staff by Pangéran Adipati Natapraja 
[Radèn Mas Papak]’, 7-1834. According to stories still current about Dipanagara in Sulawesi, when 
he was in the market in Manado and felt that he was not being shown due respect, he flung his 
walking staff on the ground and the whole market ‘rocked’ as though in an earthquake, interview 
with Pak Abdurrachim, Makassar, 8-9-1972. See further Kielstra 1885:409, where the legend that 
Dipanagara could wander over the sea from Manado to Ternate is recounted. On the capture of a 
‘priestly staff’from Pangéran Dipanagara II in July 1828, see Javasche Courant 83, 12-7-1828.
67 On Dipanagara’s sometimes heavy bouts of malarial fever which he endured every 3-4 days 
during the voyage from Batavia to Manado, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 7, 11, 14, 21, 24, 39. A.J. Bik’s 
sketch of the prince, which now hangs in the Musium Kota in Jakarta, also shows him with the 
sunken cheeks of a man who has suffered the ravages of prolonged malaria.
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him a firm believer in traditional medical treatments. During the Java War, he 
had his own personal physician, a Muslim Bengali by the name of Nurngali 
who may have perhaps been a former Bengal sepoy who had stayed on in 
Java after the British departure in 1816 (Carey 1977:310, 322 note 117; Chapter 
VIII). He ministered to the needs of the prince and his family as well as his 
key army commanders.68 Later, during his voyage to Manado, Dipanagara 
expressed his contempt for Western medicine to Knoerle:
How can you speak to me about your Dutch doctors and medicines […] [when] 
every day we have dead men on board this vessel who are thrown into the sea? 
How suspicious [you] Europeans are about [your] doctors!69 
Throughout the journey, he continued to treat himself with Javanese herbal 
potions (jamu) such as beras-kencur and kedawung70 and restricted his diet on 
some days to dry sweet potato to counteract the effects of sea sickness.71
In terms of physical appearance, Dipanagara could not be described as 
handsome in the sense that Arjuna – the wayang hero with whom the prince 
particularly identified – can be recognised as good-looking in Javanese terms 
(Carey 1974a:16). But it is likely that he had a strong personal magnetism 
which made him attractive to women and enhanced his personal charisma. 
Dipanagara himself related that one of the main ‘impeding qualities’ (sipat nga-
ral) in his youth was that he was ‘often tempted by women’ and during the Java 
War, as we will see shortly, he ascribed one of his most serious defeats (Gowok, 
15 October 1826) to an illicit dalliance he had had with a Chinese girl, who 
had been taken as a prisoner-of-war at Kedarèn and acted as his masseuse.72 
Even in exile, he apparently boasted of his conquests: the Resident of Manado, 
Daniel François Willem Pietermaat (in office 1827-1831), reported that ‘his 
greatest conversation is about women of whom he seems to have been a great 
68 On Dipanagara’s Bengali doctor, referred to in BD as Benggala Nurngali or dhukun Nurngali 
and his ministrations to Dipanagara’s mortally wounded bodyguard commander, Ali Basah Iman 
Muhamad Ngabdulkamil, who died in early August 1828, see BD (Manado) IV:21-3, XXXII.145-
55. There is also a ‘Nurngaliman’ mentioned as one of those who came to Tegalreja along with a 
number of kyai and ulama from Dipanagara’s close circle of santri advisers on 18-7-1825 just before 
the outbreak of the Java War, see BD (Manado) II:350, XXI.52. It is not clear whether this is the 
same man.
69 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 11, to which Knoerle had reflected ‘I did not know quite how to answer 
him because in the space of five days we had had four dead on board’.
70 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 32. Kedawung is the Javanese name for the tree Barkia roxburghii G., the 
seeds and leaves of which are used as a well-known Javanese remedy for colic and other stomach 
ailments, see Sastroamidjojo 1967:196 no. 160, illustration 51.
71 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 7.
72 BD (Manado), II:120, XIV.62. nanging sipat ngaral maksih/ asring kénging ginodha dhateng wano-
dya. See further Carey 1974a:15. On Dipanagara’s dalliance with his Chinese masseuse, see Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:517 note 1; Carey 1981a:260 note 106, 1984:2 note 6. There are signifi-
cant issues involved with this episode which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter XI (pp. 
618-20). See also Carey 1984:1-47.
Plate 12. Charcoal sketch of Dipanagara as a young man probably made by a Yogya 
kraton artist at the time of his marriage to his first official wife (a daughter of the 
Yogya bupati of Panolan, in east Java, Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya III, ? died 1811) 
in March 1807. It is the only known sketch of the Pangéran which shows him dressed 
in Javanese kraton style in a surjan and blangkon. Photograph by courtesy of Ibu Sahir 
(great-great granddaughter [canggah] of Dipanagara), Jl. Nyoman Oka 7, Kota Baru, 
Yogyakarta.
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lover’ (Kielstra 1885:408; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:151). He even made 
an attempt to marry a local woman, the daughter of a leading Muslim citizen 
of Manado, Lieutenant Hasan Nur Latif, who objected to the union – as did the 
Dutch authorities – saying that it would bring his child ‘ill fortune’.73
Certainly, in his pre-exile period, as we have seen, Dipanagara had an 
active family life. During his time at Tegalreja, he had four wives, whose 
names are known, and perhaps some unofficial ones as well (Brumund 
1854:188). One of these latter was attractive enough to catch the roving 
eye of the Dutch Assistant-Resident of Yogyakarta and serial lecher, P.F.H. 
Chevallier (in office 1823-1825), who took her as his mistress for a few months 
(Chapter X). The prince had nine children (five sons and four daughters) by 
his wives, at least two of whom died young at Tegalreja. During the Java War, 
he took three new consorts, one of whom, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, a daugh-
ter of the Yogya bupati of Kenitèn in the Madiun area, Radèn Tumenggung 
Sumaprawira, accompanied him into exile where she bore him two sons. She 
was quite a beauty according to Knoerle, who met her while she was still in 
her early twenties during the voyage to Manado in May-June 1830, and had 
a beautifully formed face and large eloquent eyes.74
Although Dipanagara clearly had a great deal of personal charm, which 
may have enhanced his attractiveness to the opposite sex, the sources are 
silent about his sense of humour. European contemporaries in particular 
tend to portray him as a rather dour and forbidding figure: Willem van 
Hogendorp (1913:146), the lawyer son of Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp who 
served in Commissioner-General L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies’ administration 
(1826-1830), spoke of his ‘sombre and intense’ character, and A.M.Th. de Salis, 
a pre-war Resident of Yogya (in office 1822-1823), described his appearance 
as ‘stupid and mysterious’.75 But neither knew Dipanagara well. In fact, Van 
Hogendorp had never met him. A Javanese contemporary, the prince’s great-
uncle, Pangéran Panular, author of a major chronicle on the British interreg-
num (1811-1816), referred to the prince as ‘behaving almost like a ruler’ and 
‘making himself little liked generally’ (Carey 1992:144, 327). But his testimony 
is contradictory; in other passages he describes his great-nephew in rather 
flattering terms (Carey 1992:119, 290; pp. 373-4). Dipanagara later acknowl-
edged that very few of his relations in the kraton dared to make jokes with 
him.76 But he did have a light-hearted side. His clown-retainers constantly 
73 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) 
to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831. There is a tradition in Manado that the 
Ménot family are descended from Dipanagara, but I have not been able to substantiate this.
74 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 8-9. See Appendix IV note 7 on Retnaningsih’s possible family connection 
with the Prawiradirjan family.
75 GKA, 11-10-1828 no. 208 L geheim, De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’, 8-5-1828, where he described 
Dipanagara as dom en raadzig.
76 BD (Manado), II:319, XX (Dhandhanggula) 29, where Dipanagara’s uncle, Pangéran Mang-
kubumi’s eldest wife, Radèn Ayu Sepuh, is described as one of the very few who dared to make 
jokes with him: mapan Dèn Ayu Sepuh/ ingkang purun gujengan iki/ lawan Kangjeng Pangéran.
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engaged the prince in frivolous banter77 and Knoerle noted that occasion-
ally Dipanagara infected those in his company with a sense of irrepressible 
joy.78 He was also able to see the comic side of the most awkward situations: 
one such was when he found the Yogya Resident, Nahuys van Burgst, a true 
ladies man, in a rather compromising position with the wife of his Assistant-
Resident at his country house at Bedhaya on the flanks of Mount Merapi. At 
the time, the prince showed acute embarrassment, but when he related the 
incident to Knoerle, he laughingly asked whether it was not a rather eccentric 
ménage when two prominent European officials shared the same woman in 
common.79 On another occasion, he wrote humorously in his babad about an 
episode during the disastrous battle of Gawok (15 October 1826), when he 
found himself contesting a hiding place behind a very small fruit tree with 
a rather stocky uncle.80 But frequently the prince’s humour was tinged with 
savage irony: during the Java War, he seems to have had the habit of send-
ing women’s clothes to his army-commanders deemed guilty of cowardice 
with handwritten notes pointing out that these became them better than the 
77 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 13.
78 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 20: ‘A bark hove into view [and] Colonel Eeg [captain of the vessel on 
which Dipanagara was travelling] sent a sloop with an officer on board to the vessel. Dipanagara 
went up to the fore-deck and asked me to accompany him. The speedy passage of our sloop, 
which cleft, as though it were flying, through the mirror-like surface of the calm sea, aroused the 
attention of the prince and he laughed at the picturesquely fine view of the crew all dressed in 
white, transmitting his joy to all of us.’
79 Houben 1994:108; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 7. The woman in question, née Anna Louisa van den 
Berg, a lady from Padang, was the wife of the Eurasian assistant-resident, Robbert Christiaan 
Nicolaas d’Abo (in office 1816-1823, died in Padang 1824). She was the daughter of J.G. van den 
Berg (1762-1842), the former Resident of Yogya (1798-1803) by his wife Maria Elisabeth Coert 
(1772-1848), Genealogie Van de Berg 1918:32. She had married D’Abo in April 1805 and was later 
reported to be involved in divorce proceedings with him, see KB, Cornets de Groot private col-
lection, IXe pt. 4:39, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Surakarta) to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr. (Gresik), 
26-11-1822. After her estranged husband’s death in Padang in early 1824, she married Nahuys van 
Burgst on 12-9-1824 in Yogya, accompanied him to Europe where she gave birth to a son who died 
short after delivery. She died soon after in Passy (Paris) on 8-8-1825, Genealogie Nahuys 2000-1:39. 
Her younger brother, C.L. van den Berg, who was brought up in Padang and had been trained 
as an élève voor de Javaansche taal in Yogyakarta (1826-1832), served with intermissions as acting 
translator in Yogyakarta between 1847-1849 and 1851-1862, but his career was compromised by 
the fact that he was seen as too close to the Javanese and exercised too much local influence even 
as an élève, Dr.Br. 17, ‘Minuten van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van 
den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 2-2-1831 no. 5 (suggesting he be sent to Kedhu as assistant-resident 
of Jetis); Houben 1994:121, 123-4. There is an interesting reference to D’Abo in Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van 
den Berg (Surakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 6-9-1803, stating that D’Abo, who ‘has a 
ready intelligence [for a Eurasian] […] had insinuated himself’ into Van den Berg’s entourage in 
Surakarta and that he would be kept on to learn Javanese and ‘copying’. 
80 BD (Manado), III:236, XXVIII (Sinom) 39-40. kang pélor langkung dresipun/ bubar kang ponaka-
wan/ ampingan kajeng kuwèni/ Sri Naléndra semana tumut ampingan. 40. lawan kang paman satunggal/ 
ingkang nama Pangran Wijil/ pan langkung dhap-alitira/ rebatan kajeng kuwèni/ lawan Sri Narapati/ mapan 
gegujengan iku/ mengkana aturira/ gih kula sampun nèng wingking/ alah kayu déné katingal Naléndra.
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Javanese prajuritan (fighting dress) they wore into battle.81 He was also feared 
for his ability to place curses on those who did not deliver on their promises 
or who otherwise betrayed him (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:251; 
Chapter VIII). Even the places frequented by him, such as his Guwa Secang 
retreat at Selarong (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:435-7), and his personal 
belongings such as his walking staff, were thought to be kramat (supernatu-
rally charged) and imbued with power, misfortune being the fate of those 
who wittingly destroyed them or abused their owner (see note 66; Van Rees 
1867, II:66-8; Van den Broek 1873-77, 22:40-2). During the period of his exile in 
Sulawesi, the very leftovers of his food were considered to have the capacity 
to cure sickness (Kielstra 1885:409). Here was a man not to be trifled with, a 
spiritually powerful individual steeped in the Javanese mystical arts.
Popular belief in his spiritual powers also extended to the battlefield, 
where he was thought to be invulnerable to bullets. The Resident of Manado, 
Pietermaat, noted that although he was struck twice, once above the left chest 
and once in his right hand during the battle of Gawok (15 October 1826) (p. 
634), none of the shots had left a trace on his body (Kielstra 1885:409; Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:517). According to Dipanagara the bullet that 
hit his left chest bounced back (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:745) and 
that which penetrated his right hand had already broken into fragments by 
the time it reached him (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:517). There was 
speculation in Dutch sources that the prince may have been wearing body 
armour (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:517, quoting Hageman 1856), 
although there is no mention of the use of such protective devices anywhere 
in the Javanese sources. In the section of his babad which deals with this inci-
dent, Dipanagara has a revealing take. In particular, he seems to have been 
keen to stress the lightness of his wounds to reassure his wife that he had not 
been unfaithful to her, Javanese popular belief holding that invulnerability 
and other powers would be neutralised if the individual possessing them 
indulged in immoral or unsuitable acts (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
II:517 note 1). Since he had indeed been unfaithful just before this battle when 
he had slept with his Chinese masseuse (note 72), he was anxious that his 
wife, Ratu Kedhaton (formerly Radèn Ayu Maduretna) would not make the 
link between his wounds, his battlefield defeat and his sexual conduct. We 
will return to this issue in the chapter on the Java War (Chapter XI).
Dipanagara’s pleasures were modest and typically Javanese. His two main 
ones have already been alluded to, namely gardening and the keeping of 
song birds, especially turtle-doves (perkutut) and cockatoos. Even in exile he 
spent much of his time in the company of his cockatoos (Louw and De Klerck 
81 Dj.Br. 18, Valck, ‘Geheime memorie’, 31-3-1840, reporting on Dipanagara’s dispatch of such 
clothes to his younger brother, Pangéran Suryèngalaga, during the war. For a modern account of 
the dispatch of such ironic presents in time of war, see Anderson 1972:142.
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1894-1909, I:151) and while in Manado he was given permission to lay out a 
garden retreat on a nearby river and a meditation pavilion on the hill over-
looking it.82 As we have seen, he was also an avid chess player, and like many 
of his kraton contemporaries was an accomplished horseman, keeping a large 
stable at Tegalreja.83 This expertise in the saddle later stood him in good stead 
during the Java War when he was frequently able to elude pursuers over dif-
ficult terrain. Betelnut chewing was one of his few habits; he appears to have 
done this constantly, so much so that he even reckoned the passage of time 
by how long it took him to masticate mouthfuls of the lime, leaf and betelnut 
mixture.84 Indeed, amongst the few personal belongings to survive from his 
time of exile in Makassar (1833-1855) there are some heavily stained patterned 
scarves which the prince used to wipe the betelnut juice from his mouth.85 
Later, it appears he drank wine in European company though he never took 
this habit to excess as so many other princes did at the central Javanese courts 
at this time.86 According to Knoerle, he held that it was not an offence against 
the Qur’ān to drink sweet white wine in view of the fact that Europeans at 
the time drank it as a form of ‘medicine’ whenever they were intoxicated 
with Madeira or red wine, a view which indicates that Dipanagara had his 
own independent interpretation of The Prophet’s injunctions.87 Knoerle also 
noticed him smoking Javanese rokok (hand-rolled thick cigarettes/cigarillos 
made of local tobacco wrapped in maize leaves).88 As for opium, which dur-
ing Radèn Adipati Danureja IV’s administration (1813-1847) came to be more 
widely used in Yogya kraton circles (Chapter VIII note 147) and was later sup-
82 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 12-4-1831 no. XI, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Resident 
Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 13-1-1831.
83 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 19, who related that Dipanagara had some 60 grooms to look after his 
horses at Tegalreja, where the large stone drinking troughs to water his horses could still be seen 
on a visit by the present author in January 1972. On the training of the sons of the Javanese nobil-
ity in horsemanship from the age of twelve, see Winter 1902:43. At the time of his flight from 
Tegalreja on 20 July 1825 at the start of the Java War, Dipanagara’s superb black mount (Kyai 
Githayu) and dexterity in the saddle were both noted by a European observer, Payen 1988:51, 96 
note 49. See further p. 602.
84 Carey 1981a:277 note 170; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 14 refers to Dipanagara’s request to purchase 
sirih at Surabaya or Madura during his voyage to Manado.
85 Interview with Radèn Mas Jusuf and Radèn Saleh Dipanagara, Jalan Irian no. 83, Makassar, 
8-9-1972.
86 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743. Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 35-6, quoted Dipanagara as saying 
that he had drunk ‘much sweet wine at the Loji [Residency House] and that Resident Smissaert 
on the occasion of every midday meal had also given him sweet wine’. See further Chapter X.
87 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 35-6, citing Dipanagara’s use of the word tombo for ‘medicine’. Knoerle’s 
text reads: ‘Dipanagara told me that he would willingly drink some sweet [white] wine because 
he felt weaker daily, and that although it was forbidden by The Prophet to drink wine, that could 
be applicable only to wines which had an intoxicating quality such as Madeira and red wines’.
88 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 37; see also Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:332 sub: rokok; ‘thick Javanese 
cigars with maize-leaf covering (wiru) which the Javanese high court nobles smoke’.
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plied by Chinese to the prince’s followers during the Java War itself,89 there is 
no evidence that the prince ever touched the drug.
Despite his religious zeal, Dipanagara gave Knoerle the impression that 
his spiritual commitment was tempered by a deep sense of humanity and 
compassion. When he heard of the suicide of a Dutch sailor who had killed 
himself on the voyage to Manado rather than undergo punishment for a 
crime he did not commit, the prince expressed pity and indignation, asking:
How was it possible to punish a man of whose guilt people were unconvinced? In 
Yogya, when either his father [the third sultan] or himself had tried to bestow jus-
tice on the Javanese, they had always started from the principle that no one should 
be punished who was not clearly convicted of committing a crime.90
‘In everything Dipanagara said during the course of our conversation about 
this matter’, Knoerle noted, ‘he gave evidence of deep religious feelings. He 
steadfastly pitied the sailor whom he said must be a man with a pure heart 
who could certainly reckon on God’s mercy.’91 The prince also told Knoerle 
that he had never been able to bring himself to bear arms during the Java 
War and was revolted by the sight of battlefield carnage. After an ambush at 
Kasuran (28 July 1826) in the Slèman area when all but seventeen of a fifty-
strong Dutch-Indonesian platoon had been killed (Louw and De Klerck 1894-
1909, II:380-3), Dipanagara described how ‘he had rode over the [battlefield] 
and was deeply moved by the sight of the dead and wounded’. Indeed, so 
terrible was the scene, he said, that he covered his eyes.92 He also stated that 
he had always given orders to his army-commanders to spare Dutch prison-
ers but that his commanders had not always obeyed him strictly enough.93 
Later, we will see how in his visionary encounter with the Ratu Adil (‘Just 
King’) in May 1824, he begged to be excused from his summons to lead the 
Ratu Adil’s armies because he was ‘unable to fight’ and ‘could not bear to see 
death’.94 The prince’s credentials as a wartime leader were even questioned 
by the Dutch military historian, E.S. de Klerck, given his reluctance to involve 
89 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:263, 450, II:215; Carey 1984:35. See the report of the cap-
tured Mangkunegaran legion cavalry officer, Captain Radèn Mas Suwangsa, about the situation 
at Dipanagara’s headquarters at Selarong at the beginning of the war, ‘the princes usually sleep 
until nine or ten o’clock in the morning and several are enslaved to the smoking of opium’, cited 
in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:263; original in dK183, ‘Verklaring van den Radeen Maas 
Soewongso, Kapitein der Dragonders, bij het Legioen van Pangerang Adipati Ario Mangkoe 
Negoro’, Surakarta, 7-8-1825.
90 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 30.
91 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 30, referring to Dipanagara as having said that the sailor’s heart was 
‘pure’ (ingkang manah wonten suci).
92 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 21.
93 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 20-1. 
94 BD (Manado), II:314, XX (Dhandhanggula) 16-7. amba nuhun tan kuwawa jurit/ lawan tan 
saged ika. 17. aningali dhumateng pepati. See further Chapter X note 181.
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himself in any of the fighting (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:676-7). But 
this is perhaps to miss the point. In the eyes of his followers, it was as the liv-
ing embodiment of the Ratu Adil – a human jimat (amulet) – rather than as a 
battlefield commander per se that his leadership was prized.
At the same time, there may have been some special pleading on 
Dipanagara’s part when he talked of his compassion and abhorrence of vio-
lent death. True, Dutch prisoners were spared and some offered ranks and 
responsibilities, but in the latter case only after they had agreed to embrace 
Islam.95 As for bearing arms, Dipanagara may well not have fired a gun in 
anger or wielded a sabre in a cavalry charge, but he omitted to mention that 
he had an extensive collection of pusaka (heirloom) weapons most of which 
he distributed amongst his close family members, but one of which – the kris 
(stabbing dagger) Kyai Ageng Bandayuda – he forged from other pusaka in 
the second year of the war more perhaps as a jimat (amulet) than as a fight-
ing weapon.96 He also had inherited a kris, Kyai Abijaya, from his father 
probably at the time of his appointment as Radèn Antawirya in September 
1805 (Appendix XI note 2). So the idea of a weaponless prince is stretching 
the truth a bit, especially when it is clear from his babad that he was con-
scious to the last of his dual rule of Ratu Tanah Jawa (‘ruler of Java’) and as 
a prajurit (soldier), and even considered what the consequences might be of 
an amok attack on General De Kock at Magelang at the time of his arrest 
on 28 March 1830 (Carey 1982:14, 22). Finally, according to Dutch sources, 
there is evidence that Dipanagara was not averse to demanding sanguinary 
punishments against civilian officials and others who aided and abetted the 
Dutch cause: De Stuers, for example, relates the supposed order given by the 
prince in late 1825 to behead all the village chiefs to the west of the sultan’s 
capital who had assisted in the rebuilding of the main highway from Yogya 
to the ferry town of Brosot on the Praga River. Their severed heads were even 
reported to have been displayed on long bamboo poles as a warning to others 
(De Stuers 1833:58-9; Chambert-Loir 2000:284-5). 
Conclusion
Separating man and myth in Dipanagara’s case is difficult. The most valu-
able sources are the rarest, namely Javanese babad written by contemporaries 
who knew the prince before fame or notoriety – depending on perspective 
95 Carey 1981a:259 note 106, 294 note 244. The process required for Dutch prisoners embracing 
Islam apparently involved circumcision and the learning of the confession of the faith (sahadat) 
and other Islamic prayers.
96 See Appendix XI. Kyai Ageng Bandayuda (Sir Duelling without Weapons) is now part of the 
divisional emblem of the Central Javanese Diponegoro Division.
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– skewed his image for ever during the Java War. One such is his great-uncle’s 
chronicle of the British interregnum (Carey 1992). But there are no others 
known to the present author. Instead, we have been forced to construct a 
portrait of the prince and his world from the most varied material. That so 
much of this derives from the Java War and its immediate aftermath should 
not surprise us given the seismic shock of that event both for the Dutch and 
the central Javanese courts. But it remains inevitably coloured – if not flawed 
– by hindsight. It has also required us to range far beyond early-nineteenth-
century Tegalreja and the prince’s world as a young man. In so doing, we 
have built a portrait of the prince which is almost like a pointilliste sketch of 
the Post-Impressionist school, a number of tiny dots which put together give 
an illusion of depth, movement and colour but which at the end of the day 
is just that, an impression if not a trompe l’oeil. The fact that since Indonesian 
independence in 1945, Dipanagara has become an official Indonesian pahlawan 
nasional or ‘national hero’, his name gracing the main thoroughfares of numer-
ous Indonesian towns and cities, not to speak of the Indonesian army (Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia/TNI’s) Central Java division, makes the task of the con-
temporary historian even more difficult. A flawed and all too human prince is 
certainly not in accord with ‘national history’ in present-day Indonesia. 
The present work is, however, about early nineteenth century realities, not 
contemporary myth making. Indeed, just as there is but one truly contempo-
rary chronicle presently known to this author in which the prince features, 
so there is but one contemporary sketch – that by the unknown Yogya court 
artist of circa 1807. All the others are of Java War vintage and by Europeans – 
iconic but distorted. It is now time to return to the period of that early sketch 
and take up once again the prince’s own story as he set out for one of the most 
significant journeys of his life – his pilgrimage to the south coast in circa 1805 
and his encounter with the guardian spirits of Java and some of its greatest 
rulers. These encounters would provide further prophetic perspectives on the 
prince’s future as a born leader in changed times, a leader who would also be 
counted among the ancestors even if for such a brief and tragic time.

chapter IV
pilgrimage to the south coast, circa 1805
Lelana: spiritual wanderings as rite de passage
Dipanagara’s emergence into manhood, as we have seen, was marked by 
a number of significant events: the passing of his great-grandmother on 17 
October 1803, his inheritance of the Tegalreja estate, his investiture with his 
new adult name of Radèn Antawirya on 3 September 1805, and finally his 
lavish kraton nuptials with the daughter of the Yogya bupati of Panolan on 
27 February 1807. These last could be perceived as something of an official 
court rite de passage between his teenage years under the tutelage of Ratu 
Ageng and the beginning of his young adult life as a Javanese nobleman. But, 
whereas for most of his contemporaries such a young adult life would most 
likely have entailed family and official responsibilities around the Yogya 
kraton, for Dipanagara there was an added dimension. A second and more 
meaningful rite de passage – this time an extended form of lelana1 or spiritual 
wandering – was now required for him to come into his own and confirm the 
spiritual practices of his youth as well as to clarify his prophetic destiny. Just 
exactly what this entailed has been well expressed by the celebrated historian 
of pre-colonial Java, Soemarsaid Moertono (1976:20-1):
To set off on wanderings when one’s age was approaching adulthood meant to 
find wisdom in the sense of finding a teacher who could guide one’s development 
in a fashion in which one’s powers would outstrip those of ordinary men. It also 
sometimes entailed acquiring tranquility […] so that on one’s return one would 
be able to withstand all temptations. It was even occasionally a time of testing of 
the knowledge and wisdom which one had already acquired [through youthful 
spiritual and meditative practice]. This tradition was continued during the Islamic 
period in Java when people set off on long journeys – sometimes from west to east 
Java and back again – to find esoteric knowledge at religious schools.
We have already seen how the first sultan, Mangkubumi’s, image as a satria 
lelana (wandering knight), so impressed Dipanagara’s contemporaries.2 We 
1 For a general discussion of lelana in Modern Javanese literature, especially wandering stu-
dent romances, see Pigeaud 1967-80, I:227-35.
2 See Chapter II note 8.
The power of prophecy128
also know from inscriptions on Radèn Mas Said (Mangkunagara I’s) heir-
loom sword (pedhang) and his court gamelan, Kyai Kanyut-Mèsem (‘Venerable 
Attempted to Smile’), that he also set great store by his wanderings in the 
time before his appointment as an independent ruler in 1757.3 Such testing 
journeys were the making of both his and Mangkubumi’s spiritual power. So 
it was with Dipanagara.
The exact timing of the prince’s wanderings away from Tegalreja and his 
pilgrimage to the south coast is unclear. In his autobiography, he states that 
he started visiting pesantrèn at the age of twenty (Javanese) years, hence some-
time after April 1805, visits which led on to his pilgrimage. The next events 
related in his babad after his return to Tegalreja following his description of 
his journey to the south coast are the description of the changes in the posi-
tion of the Dutch Residents (post-July 1808, ministers) at the courts brought 
about by Marshal Herman Willem Daendels’ (in office 1808-1811) decrees 
– Ordnance on Ceremonial and Etiquette – of 25 February and 28 July 1808.4 
If the chronology in Dipanagara’s babad is correct – and we have no reason to 
doubt it – then his journey to the south coast must have taken place sometime 
before the early months of 1808. In the present author’s view, it is likely to 
have occurred even earlier, namely before his 27 February 1807 marriage after 
which date he may have spent more time at Tegalreja and visited Yogya more 
often. We can thus surmise that his journey took place in circa 1805, probably 
in the dry season (May-October) when travelling was easiest.
Preparations for a pilgrimage
In preparation for his journey to the south coast, Dipanagara described in his 
babad how he departed at the age of twenty (Javanese years, post-April 1805) 
on a series of visits to mosques and religious schools in the Yogya area. The 
importance of these visits was to complete his education as a student of reli-
gion and to find appropriate teachers to guide his further spiritual and reli-
gious development. The prince also prepared himself for his spiritual quest 
by taking a new name, Sèh Ngabdurahim, which he was to use on his wan-
derings. This was derived from the Arabic Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahim (Ricklefs 
1974b:231-2), and may have been suggested to Dipanagara by one of his re -
3 Gomperts and Carey 1994:22. See S.Br. 37, 719, for a reference to the special Mangkunagara 
pusaka pedhang with the inscription Jeng Gusti Pangéran Adipati ingkang rawuh saking lelana (‘His 
Lordship the Pangéran Adipati who has returned from his wanderings’); and the Kyai Kanyut 
Mèsem gamelan inscription on the bronze bars of the saron demung, satriya kang lalana, 1700 (‘the 
knight who went on his wanderings, AJ 1700 [AD 1774-1745]’). Radèn Mas Said’s original nom-
de-guerre in 1745 when he began his campaigns in the Panambangan area to the east of Surakarta 
was: Sultan Adiprakasa Lalana Jayamisésa, Pringgodigdo 1950:354.
4 BD (Manado) II:120-5, XIV.62-5, 84.
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ligious advisers – perhaps even Sèh al-Ansari – at Tegalreja.5 The adoption 
of such a second ‘Islamic’ name – which became the norm for Dipanagara’s 
princely and priyayi supporters during the Java War6 – was not so unusual 
amongst members of the Javanese nobility at this time especially those who 
wished to apply themselves to religious study or undertake the pilgrimage to 
Mecca. Thus one Surakarta prince adopted the ‘religious’ name of Pangéran 
Abdul Arifin when he came to Yogya to study theology under the Yogya 
pengulu, Mas Muhamad Sapingi, in 1807,7 and another prince, this time from 
Yogya, changed his name from Pangéran Dipawijaya I to Pangéran Muhamad 
Abubakar in preparation for making the haj to Mecca in 1810.8 Dipawijaya 
I/Abubakar also shaved off his hair – which was traditionally worn long by 
the Javanese nobility at that time (Carey 1981a:254 note 79, 1992:462 note 
300a) – as a sign that ‘he wanted to become a santri’,9 something which both 
Dipanagara and his followers also emulated during the Java War.10
Although there is no reference to this in his babad, the prince may well have 
shaved his head before setting out on his wanderings to pesantrèn in order to 
pass unnoticed in the communities of common santri. Certainly, he seems to 
5 See Chapter III. Perhaps the prince knew of the name from his study of Javanese litera-
ture, in particular the well-known romance of the three brothers – Abdurahman, Abdurahim and 
Radèn Aji – who set off in search of a cock which crows the name of God, but this story is perhaps 
better known in west Java rather than the Principalities, see Pigeaud 1967-80, I:221, 226.
6 dK 158, ‘Lyst der personen die zich als muitelingen hebben opgeworpen’, n.y., gives some of 
the Arabic names and titles (Basah, Dullah) adopted by the Yogya princes and high officials who 
fought for Dipanagara, see further Appendix VIII.
7 Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Bogislaus Friederich von Liebeherr (Surakarta), 
18-2-1807; Radèn Adipati Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danuningrat (Surakarta), 10 
Besar AJ 1733 (AD 18-2-1807), and see Padmasusastra 1902:162, who gives Natapura’s genealogy 
as a son of Pakubuwana IV (reigned 1788-1820). There is also a reference to a certain Pangéran 
Ngabdularipin receiving an allowance from the Yogya court pre-January 1803 but it is unclear 
whether this is the same man, see Carey and Hoadley 2000:411.
8 Carey 1992:291-2, 336, 340, 400 note 5. See also Appendix VIII. Dipawijaya I/Abubakar was 
not allowed to embark on his haj by Hamengkubuwana II because there was ‘no past precedent’ 
(ing kina datan ana) for members of the sultan’s close family undertaking it, Carey 1992:291.
9 Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 3-11-1810. Engelhard 
also related that he had made the move to hold himself aloof in the coming conflict between 
Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III and Daendels, see below Chapter VI.
10 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:497. Dipanagara apparently cut his hair in honour of a 
vow he had made before the battle of Kasuran on 28-7-1826 that he would shave his head if he 
was victorious. His supporters then followed suit as a sign of their commitment to Islam and 
to distinguish themselves from the ‘apostate’ (murtad) Javanese with their flowing locks who 
still supported the Dutch. Dipanagara wrote that even the grooms/grass-cutters, day-labourers 
and beggars followed suit even though they had received no express order, see BD (Manado), 
III:205, XXVII (Pocung) 114-7. Kangjeng Sultan nulya sampun paras iku/ ing bakda Jumungah/ dadya 
samya béla iki/ sagung Islam pan sampun cukur sadaya. 115. ing Mentaram Pajang kalawan ing Kedhu/ 
Pagelèn sadaya/ Ledhok Gowong Jawi-kori/ pan weradin samya béla cukur ika. 116. myang pakathik buruh 
kéré samya cukur/ punika sadaya/ datan mawi dèndhawuhi/ kadya sampun karsaning Allah Tangala. 117. 
sagung Islam tinengeran samya gundhul/ murtad réyab-réyab/ bathilan sagung wong kapir/ wektu iku 
mengkana tengreranira.
Map 3. Dipanagara’s pilgrimage to the south coast of Java (circa 1805), showing 
the main places he visited. Adapted from Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I 
by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
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have disguised himself in simple attire so that few people would recognise 
him.11 Thus he discarded his princely clothes – the high-collared Javanese 
jacket, hand-drawn batik wrap-around and head-dress – for the coarsely 
woven sarong, buttonless open-necked white coat (kabaya) and turban which 
were the normal dress for nineteenth-century santri.12 After the Java War, his 
eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, would seek to emulate his example by 
going around in Kedhu dressed in the garb of a common farmer to emphasise 
his closeness with the people.13
When the preparations were complete, Dipanagara departed from 
Tegalreja and began to lead a typical wandering santri existence visiting 
many religious schools and mosques, and living together in the same pesant-
rèn dormitories with students of humble background.14 It is not certain which 
religious schools he visited but they may have included Gadhing, Grojogan, 
Sèwon, Wanakrama, Jejeran, Turi, Pulo Kadang and the two pathok negari of 
Kasongan and Dongkèlan, all of which are to the south of Yogya.15 
Tirakat: solitary withdrawal and first visions
After a time, according to the testimony in his babad, the prince ceased visit-
ing pesantrèn and departed far from inhabited areas to engage in asceticism 
and meditation. There now began a very crucial stage in Dipanagara’s wan-
derings during which he sought out some of the most important shrines and 
holy places associated with the Mataram dynasty (Ricklefs 1974b:232). This 
period of withdrawal and self-negation, as we have seen in the passage from 
Soemarsaid Moertono, had much of the quality of tirakat, the retreat from 
the world of a man who wished to prepare himself for a serious undertaking 
(Winter 1902:87; Carey 1974a:15). It afforded an interval of solitude in which 
to purge himself of pamrih (selfish or concealed personal motives and ambi-
tions) and to legitimize his actions by contacts with his departed ancestors 
and the spiritual guardians of Java.
11 BD (Manado), II:120, XIV.63. angagem kang sarwa gaib; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo), 
21, II.46 also mentions that Dipanagara wore ragged clothes: 46. tanpa busana éndah/ luwas kang 
rinasuk. 
12 Raffles 1817, I:90; Djajadiningrat 1936:20. For references to the ‘priestly’ clothes used by 
Dipanagara during the Java War, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:384; Carey 1981a:276-7 
note 169; Payen 1988:51, 95-6 note 48.
13 AN Kab, 8-3-1834 no. 166, C.L. Hartman (Magelang) to Jean Chrétien Baud (Batavia), 22-2-
1834.
14 The passage in Dipanagara’s autobiography (BD [Manado], II:121-6, XIV.65-83) which deals 
with his wanderings in 1805-1806 has been extensively analysed by Ricklefs 1974b:227-58 with 
some clarifications in Carey 1974a:12-36, 1981:237 note 17-9.
15 See Appendix VIIa and VIIb (Map).
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Dipanagara’s first vision occurred at the cave of Song Kamal in the Jejeran 
district to the south of Yogya (see Map 3). Sunan Kalijaga, one of the nine 
apostles of Islam (wali), appeared before the prince in the shape of a man 
‘who shone like the full moon’. He informed the prince that it had been 
determined by God that in the future he would become king (ratu). After 
delivering this warning prophecy, the vision immediately disappeared.16 The 
appearance of Sunan Kalijaga and his prophecy of kingship was clearly of 
great importance for Dipanagara. Not only was the wali especially revered 
in south-central Java as the adviser of kings and the spiritual protector of 
Mataram, appearing in visions to royalty and commoners alike,17 but legend 
has also ascribed him a key role in the spread of Islam in the area (De Graaf 
and Pigeaud 1974:28-30; Solichin Salam 1963). Moreover, in Javanese political 
history, he was viewed as the agent who had presided over the division of 
Java at Giyanti (1755) (Ricklefs 1974b:233-7), something which does not seem 
to have weighed particularly heavily with Dipanagara who saw himself as 
transcending such political divisions by aspiring to govern the whole of Java 
as a pandhita-ratu (priest-king). 
Sunan Kalijaga’s grave at Kadilangu, together with the great mosque at 
Demak, were regarded by Javanese rulers as the two indispensable pusaka 
(heirloom) of Java and pilgrimages from the courts were regularly dispatched 
there.18 During the Java War, distant descendants of the wali, namely Pangéran 
Sérang (circa 1794-1854) and his mother, the redoubtable Radèn Ayu Sérang 
(circa 1769-1855), were both held in high esteem by Dipanagara’s followers as 
16 BD (Manado) II:121, XIV.66-7; Ricklefs 1974b:232-7. The last two lines (XIV.67, verse 11 in the 
Ricklefs translation) should read: 67. lamun sira ing bénjing/ dadi ratu ngiring-iring nuli musna; ‘that 
in the future you/ shall become king. Warning, he vanished’. There is thus no need to speculate, 
as Ricklefs does (1974b:236 note 27), on the term Ratu Ngiring-iring as indicating some sort of 
special ruler (Ratu Ngérang-ngérang), see further Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:65, sub: ngiring-
iring, I:66, sub: ngérang-ngérang; Carey 1974a:16 note 56. I am grateful to the late Professor P.J. 
Zoetmulder S.J. for having pointed this out to me.
17 For a post-Java War description of a vision of Sunan Kalijaga, who is said to have appeared 
to Bagus Santri, a wandering mystic who headed a brief religious rebellion in south-central Java, 
see Dj.Br. 19¹¹, Interview with Bagus Santri, 10-1832, who described the wali as appearing to him 
in a green turban, green jacket and black sarong, and ordering him to distribute letters calling 
for a religious rebellion. He had also given him a three-pronged (trisula) lance head, the weapon 
of Wisnu, which Bagus Santri had turned into a pike. On the weapon received by Dipanagara 
during his pilgrimage, see below note 68. On Panembahan Sénapati (reigned circa 1574-1601), the 
first ruler of Mataram’s, visionary encounter with Kalijaga as related in the Babad Tanah Jawi, see 
Olthof 1941a, I:82, 1941b:79.
18 Carey 1980:171. For another reference to a Yogya court pilgrimage to Kadilangu in 1804 
during a tour by court santri (ketib, modin and members of the Suranatan) from Tegalarum (site 
of the grave of Sunan Amangkurat I, reigned 1646-1677) to Madura to strew flowers (sajèn) and 
present money for the upkeep of the holy gravesites, see AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) 
to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 22-10-1804. On Hamengkubuwana II’s dispatch of money 
to repair ‘the great mosque’ at Demak, see Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus 
Engelhard (Semarang), 19-4-1803. See further Chapter IX note 152.
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persons imbued with unusual kasektèn (inner spiritual power) (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, I:361-3; Carey 1981a:284 note 205). 
Indeed, there was even a rumour that Dipanagara was preparing to del-
egate some of his authority to one of Radèn Ayu Sérang’s grandsons – Radèn 
Mas Papak (Pangéran Adipati Natapraja) – in the event of his victory over 
the Dutch.19 This was because the descendants of the Kalijaga line were 
regarded as being most fit to wield spiritual power in Java. Thus the vision 
of the revered wali and the support of his descendants helped to legitimize 
Dipanagara’s subsequent rebellion.
But the vision was important on another level for the style of political lead-
ership represented by Sunan Kalijaga and the other eight wali served as an 
example for the prince, who came to see himself not merely as a temporal ruler 
but also as a spiritual overseer of the sovereigns of Java much in the same fash-
ion as the legendary wali were said to have acted in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries (Carey 1974a:16-7, 21-2, 1974b:285-8). Indeed, the example of the wali, 
especially those of Kudhus, Demak and Giri, were often debated by Dipanagara 
and his advisers when they were striving for consensus during the war regard-
ing their overall political and religious aims (Carey 1974a:19-22). Furthermore, 
the dream which Dipanagara had just before the outbreak of the Java War in 
which he described meeting eight wali wudhar, namely wali exercising both 
temporal and spiritual office, confirmed him in his conviction that he had been 
chosen to rule as a latter-day wali or priest-king in Java.20 Dipanagara’s experi-
ence at Song Kamal must therefore be interpreted in the light of later develop-
ments, pointing as it did to the sort of state which the prince would have striven 
to establish in Java had he been successful in the Java War.
Following his stay in the Jejeran district, Dipanagara walked across the 
countryside to Imagiri, the royal gravesite or pasaréan of the Mataram rul-
ers. There at Bengkung by the pond at the top of the great stairway leading 
to the royal graves, he spent a week in meditation. He then observed the 
Friday prayer at the mosque at Jimatan, the mosque of the keepers of the keys 
(jurukunci), known officially as jimat, of the royal graveyard which stands 
some 230 feet below the summit of the hill at Imagiri. In his babad, Dipanagara 
related that all the jurukunci recognised him despite his ragged appearance 
and ‘paid him honour with all they possessed’.21 It was perhaps an indication 
19 Dj.Br. 18, F.G. Valck, ‘Geheime Memorie’, 31-3-1840; on an earlier occasion at the time of the 
arrest of Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II in Yogya in December 1831, there had been a rumour that 
Natapraja would be made ‘Sultan of Demak’ by Mangkudiningrat if the latter had ascended the 
Yogya throne, see AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 6-12-1831 no. 1, inter-
view with Tumenggung Prawirasenjaya, Yogya, 16-11-1831.
20 See below Chapter X.
21 Ricklefs 1974b:237-8, 254-65; BD (Manado) II:122-3, XIV.71. On the lay-out of the royal 
gravesite, see LOr 8987 no. 1 (Babad Alit), pt. 13, map. For a reference to the five jurukunci from 
the central Javanese courts at Imagiri at this time, see Winter 1902:74 and Van den Broek 1873-77, 
Plate 13. Radèn Ayu Sérang (Nyai Ageng Sérang), circa 1766-1855. A scion of the 
prestigious Sunan Kalijaga wali (apostle of Islam) family, and an ex-official (para nyai) 
of the Yogyakarta court during the reign of Sultan Hamengkubuwana II (reigned 
1792-1810, 1811-1812, 1826-1828), she led a cavalry squadron in the Sérang-Demak 
area during the first months of the Java War. Her fame as a lady of unusual spiritual 
power (kasektèn), acquired through meditation at isolated caves on the south coast, 
enabled her to continue to exercise an influence over the local population of her home 
(Sérang-Demak) region long after formal hostilities finished in March 1830. Painting 
by Anyool Subroto (Institut Teknologi Bandung). Photograph by courtesy of Radèn 
Mas Boedi Oetomo, Nataprajan, Yogyakarta (DIY). 
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of how much Dipanagara was admired by the royal religious officials, many 
of whom were to support him during the Java War.22
Apart from visiting the graves of his immediate and recently deceased 
relations, especially those of Sultan Mangkubumi (Hamengkubuwana I) 
and Ratu Ageng, Dipanagara’s meditation at Bengkung was almost certainly 
directed to Sultan Agung (reigned 1613-1646), the famous seventeenth-cen-
tury Mataram ruler. We know from the description of the construction of 
the royal graveyard in the prince’s babad that he understood that Bengkung 
had been Agung’s special place of retreat.23 In a Javanese source written 
shortly after the Java War under the orders of one of the prince’s pro-Dutch 
protagonists,24 Dipanagara is depicted sending an intimate retainer to Sultan 
Agung’s grave at Imagiri to beg for a sign. After a night spent in meditation, 
the account states that a dark red spot about the size of a plate appeared on 
the curtains surrounding the tomb. The Yogya jurukunci, Kyai Balad, then 
explained that this meant that God had decreed that warfare should break 
out in Java and that much blood would be shed.25
In his own description of his visit to Agung’s grave as reported in his 
autobiography, Dipanagara makes no mention of having received a sign. But, 
as we have seen, the prince did refer to one of Sultan Agung’s prophecies 
relating to the 300-year period of Dutch rule in Java which had a connection 
with his own career.26 Furthermore, in other sources he gave evidence of his 
great admiration for the seventeenth-century ruler referring to him as ‘a spi-
24:136-8, which gives an account of the royal gravesite at the time of Pakubuwana VI’s visit there 
in June 1830 during his flight to the south coast. For references to Dipanagara’s connections with 
Imagiri during the war and the fortified redoubt he built there, see Bataviasche Courant 44, 2-11-
1825; Javasche Courant 143, 29-11-1828; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:219.
22 See Appendix VIIb.
23 BD (Manado), I:403-4, XI (Pocung) 86-8. sampun dadya langkung asri yèn dinulu/ ingkang 
papethètan/ cengkèh jawi nagasari/ saking Ngambon cengkèh iku wijilira. 87. Kangjeng Sultan sigra anim-
bali sampun/ Kyai Manglar Monga*/ kang kinèn tengga puniki/ Kyai Kebo Kemili maksih tinilar. 88. 
kantun tengga pesaréyan ing Mentarum/ kawarna Jeng Sultan/ awis kondur dhateng puri/ anèng Beng-
kung punika panepènira. * Kyai Manglar Munga is the tutelary spirit of Imagiri which has the shape 
of a peacock and gives out piercing shrieks when one of the rulers of the central Javanese courts 
is about to die, see Winter 1902:74; Lettres de Java 1822:99; Musium Nasional (Jakarta) MS 933 DJ, 
Ir Moens, ‘Slametan Cembèngan’, 112 picture 110; S.Br. 131, ‘Translaten en Verbalen Solo, 1819’, 
entry of 27-8-1819, for a report on such a cry before Pakubuwana IV’s death on 1-10-1820, see 
further Chapter IX note 169. On Sultan Agung’s construction of Imagiri in circa 1624, see further 
De Graaf 1958:289-90.
24 For a description of this post-Java War source – the Buku Kedhung Kebo (‘Book of the Buffa-
loes’ Watering Hole’ [a previous name for the seat of the bupati of Bagelèn at Purwareja] – written 
under the orders of Radèn Adipati Cakranegara I, the first Dutch-appointed bupati of Bagelèn 
(1830-1862), see Carey 1974b:259-88, 1981:xxvi-xxvii.
25 KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):69-70, VI.32-9; Carey 1974a:38-9; Van der Kemp 1896a:372-
3, and for a reference to Kyai Balad in a contemporary source (circa 1794-1796), see Carey and 
Hoadley 2000:34, and further Van de Broek 1877:137.
26 See page 71.
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ritual man who did as I did travelling around everywhere’ and as ‘a consum-
mate Islamic ruler who had established the five pillars [rukun] of Islam’.27 
One European account even relates that at the time of the siege of Yogya by 
Dipanagara’s troops in August 1825, Agung appeared to Dipanagara in a 
dream to instruct him regarding the most auspicious time to launch an attack 
on the sultan’s capital (Payen 1988:65, 120 note 161). 
There is nothing to confirm this report – the result of the heated imagin-
ings of Yogya’s fearful European inhabitants during the first anxious weeks 
of the war when they were closely besieged – but there are many other links 
between Dipanagara and Agung which suggest that the latter did serve as a 
major source of inspiration for the prince. It is no coincidence, for example, 
that the prince’s crucial vision of the Javanese Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) on 21 
May 1824 occurred on Mount Rasamuni, a hill on the western escarpment 
of Gunung Kidul traditionally associated with Sultan Agung (pp. 566, 571), 
and that some of the caves visited by Dipanagara during his journey to the 
south coast were close to similar caves and holy sites traditionally thought to 
have been frequented by Agung, and in one case – Guwa Langsé – actually 
visited by him.28 Dipanagara’s links with the holy site of Tembayat and his 
attempt to set up his standard of revolt there on 15 August 1825 (AJ 1 Sura 
1753) (Carey 1974a:23), likewise revived memories of Sultan Agung who had 
been closely involved with the place in the latter part of his reign (Ricklefs 
1974a:17). Finally, during the war itself, Dipanagara appears to have visited 
Agung’s gravesite frequently (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:76, 219, 
V:744; Bataviasche Courant 44, 2-11-1825; Javasche Courant 143, 29-11-1828) and 
also took care to bury his favourite wife, Radèn Ayu Maduretna (pp. 401-5; 
Appendix IV), at the royal gravesite at Jimatan in late February 1828 despite 
the problem of having to cross through Dutch-held territory to do so.29 The 
figure of the great Javanese ruler thus had a continuing importance for 
Dipanagara throughout his life.
27 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Carey 1974a:17. There is a similar reference to Agung 
in Makassar notebooks, I:168. For a later reference to the popular belief in Agung as a great Islamic 
ruler, see LOr 8987 no. 1 (Babad Alit) pt. 14 (henceforth: ‘Babad Alit’). The five ‘pillars’ (rukun) of 
Islam refer to the shahādah (confession of the faith), salāt (five daily religious observances), zakāt 
(religious offerings), haddj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the observance of the fast during the month 
of Ramadhān known in Java as Pasa (or Puwasa), see Juynboll 1930:45. 
28 Sumahatmaka 1981:84-5, 124-5. The caves mentioned in this source, Sumhatmaka’s précis 
of the Serat Centhini, are Guwa Manganti on the Kali Oyo and Guwa Songpati, both caves in the 
Paliyan sub-district of Gunung Kidul, and Kanigara, also in the Paliyan sub-district where Agung 
is supposed to have built a mosque, see Schoel 1931:151.
29 On the burial of Radèn Ayu Maduretna at Jimatan in late February 1828, see BD (Manado), 
III:366-7, XXXI.143-5.
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At the south coast: meetings with Ratu Kidul
After staying at Imagiri, Dipanagara made his way to the south coast, break-
ing his journey to spend one night at the cave of Séluman, home to the spirit 
Genawati (Ricklefs 1974a:406 note 89 no. 85, 2006:209) near the Oyo River, 
and a further two nights at the cave of Suracala, also known as Guwa Sigala-
gala, on the left bank of the Kali Opak in the Gamelan sub-district of Gunung 
Kidul.30 Both these places seem to have been well known to the kraton elite at 
the time and were probably frequented by them as places of retreat and medi-
tation. The second sultan, for example, had built a small pavilion at Séluman 
and maintained two royal site guardians or abdi-Dalem kemit-siti to look after 
the place, which is referred to in contemporary court documents as the kel-
angenan-dalem, the ‘royal retreat/pleasure ground’ of the ‘river source/spring’ 
of ‘Guwa Séluman’.31 Later, one of Dipanagara’s heirloom kris, subsequently 
presented to the Dutch king, William I, as a war trophy, was said to have 
borne the name of Kangjeng Kyai Naga Siluman (Kraus 2005:280-1; Appendix 
XI note 2). At Suracala, there are two hewn rock chambers in the grotto which 
are said to have been used by Sunan Amangkurat I’s (reigned 1646-1677) son, 
Radèn Mas Tapa (later Pangéran Aria Mataram/Sunan Panutup), when he 
was contemplating rebellion against the Kartasura court.32 Both caves have 
associations with the Javanese spirit world and with Javanese legends. The 
first is mentioned in the Kidung Lalembut (‘Song of the spirits’) as a part of 
the ‘palace of the spirits’ ruled over by the goddess of the southern ocean, 
Ratu Kidul, through her deputy, princess Genawati.33 The second is referred 
to in the Bima Raré series of shadow-plays, which deal with the wayang hero 
Bima’s exploits as a young man, as the cave in which he had meditated while 
searching for the ‘water of life’ and in which he had undergone a test by fire.34 
30 BD (Manado) II:123, XIV.72; Ricklefs 1974b:238; and for a description of the site of the cave 
of Suracala, see G.P. Rouffaer’s note to Winter 1902:166 note 77. Both Séluman and Suracala are 
marked on the 1861 Residency Map of Yogyakarta, see IOR X IX7, K.F. Wilsen, ‘Topographische 
Kaart der Residentie Djojokarta’.
31 Carey 1980:112; Carey and Hoadley 2000:409. See also Appendix VI.
32 G.P. Rouffaer’s note in Winter 1902:166 note 77, refers to the name of Kangjeng Susuhunan 
Ratu Amangkurat being cut into the rock wall of one of the cave chambers with the date AJ 1624 
(AD 1700-1701). For the history of the last days of Pangéran Aria Mataram (Sunan Panutup), see 
Ricklefs 1978:197-9.
33 Ricklefs 1974a:406 note 89 no. 85, 1974b:238-9. A cognate manuscript in the Moens collec-
tion, the Sejarah sétan lan jim (‘History of devils and jinn’) describes the term séluman as referring 
to the spirit world, an invisible society, which is an exact replica of human society and like it 
divided into nations and races each ruled over by their individual spirit kings and queens, see 
Musium Nasional (Jakarta), MSS 933 DJ (Ir Moens coll) , pt. 2; and see also Gericke and Roorda 
1901, I: 835, who give the meaning of bongsa siluman as ‘invisible beings’.
34 LOr 12576 (Ir Moens coll. pt. 2):757-820, Bima Raré series of wayang plays as created by the 
Yogya dhalang Kyai Widi Prayitna: Wéja Séna kabesmi wonten Guwa Sigala-gala (‘Wéjaséna endures 
fire in the cave of Sigala-gala’). See further Pigeaud 1967-80, I:205. The name ‘Sigala-gala’ like-
Plate 14. Pangéran Dipanagara (dressed in black) giving instructions to his two followers, Kyai Jayamustapa and Kyai Mopid, before they set out on their pil-
grimage (ziarah) to Nusakambangan. Dipanagara is sitting under a kemuning tree (wit kemuning) on his meditation stone (séla gilang) at his retreat (panepèn) of 
Sélareja just to the north-east of Tegalreja. KITLV Oriental MS 13, Buku Kedung Kebo, f.81v. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
Plate 14. Pangéran Dipanagara (dressed in black) giving instructions to his two followers, Kyai Jayamustapa and Kyai Mopid, before they set out on their pil-
grimage (ziarah) to Nusakambangan. Dipanagara is sitting under a kemuning tree (wit kemuning) on his meditation stone (séla gilang) at his retreat (panepèn) of 
Sélareja just to the north-east of Tegalreja. KITLV Oriental MS 13, Buku Kedung Kebo, f.81v. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
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It is also mentioned in the Serat Centhini, the great early-nineteenth century 
encyclopaedia of Javanese history, lore and legends written in the form of a 
wandering knight romance, as one of the sites visited by its scabrous hero, 
Sèh Amongraga (Sumahatmaka 1981:80-1). In neither of these two caves did 
Dipanagara receive any visitations, however.
The prince then walked across the Gunung Kidul foothills to the cave of 
Langsé which overhangs the thunderous Indian Ocean and is only reached 
by a steep and precipitous path down the limestone cliffs and through an 
entrance which is almost at sea level.35 The cave, and the adjacent sites of 
(Pa)mancingan, Parangtritis, Parangkusuma and Prangwédang, a warm-
water spring, are places of great importance in the local cult of Ratu Kidul, the 
spiritual protector and consort of the rulers of the central Javanese kraton.36 
Mancingan, from example, is known as one of the eight principal residences 
of the spirits (lalembut) of Java and the home of the female hermit, Cemara 
wise recalls the Balé Sigala-gala (Wax Palace) episode in the Mahabharata cycle of wayang plays, 
see Pigeaud 1967-80, I:205, 245, 256, II:160 (sub: LOr 3917), 603 (sub: LOr 9821); Rajagopalachari 
1970:52-4.
35 On the site of Guwa Langsé, see Babad Alit, pt. 28. The cave probably takes its name from its 
particular natural location whereby its entrance is entirely covered by a sheet of rock overhang-
ing the Indian Ocean. The word langsé in Javanese means a curtain or drape, see Gericke and 
Roorda 1901, II:173.
36 See Jordaan 1984:99-102, 107, 2006:14, who equates the sick princess with the primeval fertil-
ity goddess of the Javanese, Śri Devī, and with the Hindu goddess of death Durgā (Ra Nini)/Kālī. 
He argues that her connection with fertility is shown especially by her linkage with the waxing and 
waning of the moon (see below) and with the Nagini serpent goddess. See also Stange 1975:1-2, 26 
note 3, on the supposed association of this part of the south coast with the spirit world (lalembut), 
a connection which, he argues, dated back to the establishment of small kingdoms by former offi-
cials of the Majapahit empire following its fall in circa 1527. According to this theory, Nyai Lara 
Kidul (Ratu Kidul) was the ruler of a small ‘tantric’ state in the Imagiri area who subsequently 
became the overseer of the spirit kingdoms of the south coast. Other traditions (Soemarsaid Moer-
tono 1968:148; De Cock Wheateley 1929:205-11) associate Ratu Kidul with the Pajajaran princess, 
Déwi Retna Suwida, the daughter of Prabu Mundingsari and a descendant of the king of Sigaluh, 
namely the ruler of the spirit kingdoms of west Java. According to legend, she was exiled from her 
father’s court either because she refused to marry or because she had contracted leprosy in her 
feet and had had to be confined either to a leper colony on the south coast or to an offshore island. 
Despairing of her fate she had committed suicide by flinging herself from the high cliffs into the 
sea. She was then restored to her beauty by the curative power of the sea water on condition that 
she remained as queen of the underwater spirit realms until the Day of Judgement. She took the 
name Ratu Kidul and had magical powers appearing young or old according to the waxing and 
waning of the moon. In Javanese popular tradition, she is sometimes referred to as Nyai Rara (or 
Lara) Kidul, an allusion either to her virginity and maidenhood (rara) or to her suffering (lara) from 
leprosy, Hadiwidjojo 1972:126. In other traditions, Nyai Lara Kidul refers to one of Ratu Kidul’s 
patih (chief officials), see further Poerbatjaraka 1962, V:20-4, VI:17-23; and Mulyadi 1983:30, where 
she is known as nènèk penjaga tasik (‘the old lady guardian of the sea’). Dipanagara appears to have 
viewed Ratu Kidul as a Pajajaran princess who had been exiled from her father’s court to an island 
variously named as Pulau Toris, Pulau Putri or Pulau Onrust, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 25. For a dis-
cussion of the connection between Ratu Kidul and the Dutch, see Ricklefs 1974a:375-6.
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Tunggal, who is closely identified with Ratu Kidul.37 The same place is also 
associated with Sèh Maulana Maghribī, a wali said to be from the Demak 
period, who lived and was buried at the top of one of the small hills overlook-
ing the sea.38 Parangtritis, so called because of the water which gushes out 
of the rocks in a petrified grotto, is the spot where Sénapati set out to meet 
Ratu Kidul in her underwater court and where on his return he encountered 
Sunan Kalijaga,39 and from the twin rocks on the seashore at Parangkusuma, 
an offering – known as the labuhan (from Javanese labuh, ‘to throw into the 
water’)40 – is made each year by the sultan of Yogya to his spiritual consort, 
the south sea goddess (Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:143; Groneman 1888:13-4; 
Adam 1930:157-8). The whole site is thus deeply connected with the Javanese 
spirit world and still attracts visitors in their hundreds from all over Java.
At the time Dipanagara visited the place in circa 1805, it was already 
a major pilgrimage site, especially for the Yogya court. The second sultan 
made regular trips there during the first part of his reign and had the habit of 
residing at Mancingan for a number of days.41 Small open pavilions, known 
in Javanese as pondhok, had been constructed by the sea at Parangkusuma, 
Parangwédang and Parangtritis for meditation and the ceremonies associated 
with the goddess of the southern ocean, as well as a larger wooden pesanggra-
han or overnight residence at the last place to house the sultan and his retinue 
during their periodic visits.42 There was also some land set aside for the men 
of religion (wong putihan, literally ‘people [dressed] in white’) who tended 
the grave of Sèh Maulana and saw to the upkeep of the pavilions.43 In 1812, 
37 De Graaf and Pigeaud 1974:248 note 18; Ricklefs 1974a:375 note 33. For references to the var-
ious tutelary spirits guarding the sites around Mancingan, see Musium Pusat (Jakarta), MS 933 
DJ, Ir Moens Platen Album no. 8, ‘Slametan Cèmbengan bij de Gunung Gamping met offers’ (hence-
forth: ‘Slametan Cèmbengan’):114-6; Ricklefs 1974a:405 note 89 nos. 54-7). See also Appendix VIIa.
38 Adam 1930:158-9. See also Babad Alit, pt. 26; Ir Moens coll., ‘Slametan Cèmbengan’, 90 Plate 
87, which refers to the sajèn (offerings) placed on Sèh Maulana Maghribī’s grave by those who 
wished to become priyayi (court officials); Appendix VIIa.
39 Olthof 1941a, I:82, 1941b:79. On the spirit Nyai Gadhung Mlathi, who is the tutelary spirit of 
Parangtritis, see Ir Moens coll., ‘Slametan Cèmbengan’, 116 Plate 120; Babad Alit, pt. 24. For descrip-
tions of the site in circa 1812, see KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ’Aanteekeningen’, 126-30; Thorn 
1815:295. See also Appendix VIIa.
40 See Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:163 sub: labuh.
41 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 24-10-1805, 
28-10-1805, 20-11-1805, referred to three visits made by Hamengkubuwana II to the south coast 
in the space of just two months. On the first visit, the clothes and other offerings made by the 
sultan were thrown back on the beach by the tide supposedly because a slametan (dedication cer-
emony) had not been held before the labuhan (commitment of offerings to the sea), and because 
Hamengkubuwana II had insisted on standing on the beach with a gold payung (sovereign’s state 
umbrella) over his head, thus appearing in an arrogant and unseemly posture to Ratu Kidul. See 
further Groneman 1888:14 for a description of a three-day visit to Parangtritis by Hamengkubu-
wana VII (reigned 1877-1921).
42 Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 125, 131; Thorn 1815:295; and see below Appendix VIIa.
43 Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 131; Appendix VIIa.
Plate 15. Painting by A.A.J. Payen entitled ‘Onweder aan de Zuidkust van Java’          Storm on the south coast of Java), executed after his return to Europe in 1826. From 
the Payen painting collection of the Rijksmuseum voor  Volkenkunde, Leiden        (Inv. No. 200/2). Photograph by courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, 
Leiden.
Plate 15. Painting by A.A.J. Payen entitled ‘Onweder aan de Zuidkust van Java’          Storm on the south coast of Java), executed after his return to Europe in 1826. From 
the Payen painting collection of the Rijksmuseum voor  Volkenkunde, Leiden        (Inv. No. 200/2). Photograph by courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, 
Leiden.
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a Dutch visitor noticed some of these wong putihan meditating with a young 
Javanese ‘in a religious attitude’ at Parangtritis, and was told that people often 
came there to pray for things which they desired or if they were in difficult 
circumstances.44 He was likewise informed about a cave in the mountains, 
perhaps Guwa Suracala or Guwa Langsé, which was frequently visited and 
where the names of those who had meditated there were cut into the rock.45 
Dipanagara was therefore following a well worn route when he arrived at 
the south coast as a young man of twenty. His aim was to prepare himself for 
a meeting with Ratu Kidul and in his babad he described how he remained 
in the cave of Langsé for two weeks ‘striving to purify his desires’. As his 
physical and mental state grew calmer, he began to enter a deep meditative 
trance, ‘a condition that cannot be described’ and was visited by Ratu Kidul 
whose presence was heralded by an aura of light. However, the prince was 
so sunk in his meditation that the goddess realised ‘he could not be tempted’ 
and withdrew, promising that when the time was right she would come to 
him again.46 Twenty years would elapse before the time to which Ratu Kidul 
referred arrived. The Java War was then at its height and Dipanagara was 
encamped at Kamal on a tributary of the Praga River in the Kulon Praga 
district.47 The exact date is unclear in his account, but it seems to have been 
in mid-July 1826, possibly on the night of the full moon which fell on 20-21 
July.48 The following is the description of this second encounter as given in 
the prince’s babad:
44 Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 132.
45 Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 133-4. It appears that Van Sevenhoven was referring 
to Guwa Suracala because he mentioned a certain Javanese ‘sultan’ who had stayed there many 
years earlier, seemingly a reference to Pangéran Aria Mataram (Sunan Panutup), see note 32. 
There are, however, many other caves in the area which were used as retreats, see Carey 1981a:284 
note 205, on Radèn Ayu Sérang’s use of the cave of Trisik (? Sirisik) on the south coast during the 
Java War, and Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten van der uitgaande brieven aan den Gouverneur-Generaal van 
den Kommissaris aan de hoven van Souracarta en Djocjocarta, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, van 
1e Januari tot en met December 1831’ (henceforth: ‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’), J.I. van Seven-
hoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 5-5-1831, for a reference to the cave of 
Suralanang supposedly used by Dipanagara in 1825, and from whence Smissaert attempted to 
summon him for a meeting before the outbreak of the Java War. See further page 543.
46 BD (Manado) II:123-4, XIV.73-6, especially 75. Jeng Ratu Kidul wus prapta/ nèng ngarsa Sèh 
Ngaburahkim / mapan padhang jruning guwa/ nging Jeng Ratu wus udani/ lamun Sèh Ngabdurahkim/ 
lagi suwung tan ciptanipun/ datan kénging ginodha/ dadya umatur ubanggi/ lamun bénjing tekèng 
mongsa badhé prapta; Ricklefs 1974b:239, 256.
47 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:346-8, V:Map. The fact that Dipanagara was encamped by 
a tributary of the Kali Praga when the second visitation occurred may be significant. In Javanese 
popular belief, Ratu Kidul uses the two main rivers (Praga and Opak) as her means of transport and 
outbreaks of disease or sudden deaths in the village communities living along the river banks are 
associated with her sorties, interview with R.W. Hardjanta Pradjapangarsa, Surakarta, 14-2-1972.
48 Ratu Kidul’s beauty and youth are dependant on the waxing and waning of the moon. 
When she is young, namely before the middle of each Javanese month, she is also known as Retna 
Déwati, see Ricklefs 1974a:200.
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XXV.63  Then the sultan [Dipanagara]
   was sitting at night in his pavilion
   unattended by anyone,
   for they were all asleep.
 64  He was sunk deep in meditation with his back against a pillar,
   for heavy was his heart.
   Now it is told that
   swiftly someone came.
   It was as though a falling star had descended on the pavilion.
   Immediately sitting before
   the sultan was the form of a woman.
 65  Two accompanied her,49
   both women with a similar appearance
   which cannot be described.
   But, of the three, one
   was slightly different from those who escorted her.
   For long the sultan did not address her,
   dumbfounded he gazed
 66  and closely observed her.
   She was sitting but did not touch the ground.50
   The sultan said softly:
   ‘I ask [your name]
   for I am quite mystified.’ Ratu [Kidul] said:
   ‘Earlier I
   made a promise to you
 67  that in the future, when the time had come,
   [I] should not fail to meet you.’
   The sultan understood in his heart.
   Thus were his thoughts
   that perhaps her name was Ratu Kidul
   for she was exceedingly young.
   The sultan spoke quietly:
49 These refer to Ratu Kidul’s two lieutenants (patih), Nyai Rara (or Lara) Kidul and Radèn 
Déwi, the tutelary spirit of Guwa Langsé, see Ir Moens coll., ‘Slametan Cèmbengan’, 73, 116.
50 The fact that Ratu Kidul is depicted as sitting ‘above the ground’ is interesting: one medita-
tion leader (pamong) in Java described a visitation from the goddess at night at Parangkusuma in 
which she appeared as a very young woman dressed in wayang costume but invisible from the 
knees downwards, interview with Bapak Darno Ong, Surakarta, 20-3-1972. It is possible that this 
invisibility of her lower body had a connection with those parts of her body affected by leprosy, 
see note 36.
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 68  ‘I now recall it.’
   Ratu [Kidul] then said gently:
   ‘If I am allowed to help you,
   I beg a firm promise
   that once they have all disappeared
   the unbelieving devils [the Dutch],
 69  you will intercede for me
   with Allah the Almighty
   that I may return again
   to be a human being.
   Moreover, all your army
   let there be none who join the battle,
   for it is I who promise
 70  to [bring about] the disappearance of the devils.’
   The sultan said softly:
   ‘I do not ask your help
   against my equals [fellow human beings],
   for in religion there is only the assistance of the Almighty.’
   Ratu [Kidul] immediately disappeared.51
It can be seen from this account that Ratu Kidul’s appearance before Dipanagara 
at Guwa Langsé and later during the Java War had a specific objective. As the 
queen of the Javanese ancestral spirit underworld, she was offering her help 
to the prince on condition that he interceded with the Almighty to enable 
return to the world as a human being and thus bring about her karmic 
51 BD (Manado) III:92-4, XXV (Pangkur) 63-70. mengkana kangjeng sultan/ dalu lenggah anèng 
pesanggrahanipun/ tan ingandhep déning jalma/ [pan] wus samya néndra iki. 64. pitekur séndhéyan saka/ 
apan saking sungkawa ing tyasnèki/ mengkana ingkang winuwus/ nulya ana kang prapta/ kadya daru 
dhateng pesanggrahanipun/ nulya lenggah ngarsanira/ jeng sultan werni pawèstri. 65. kalih ingkang ngir-
ing ika/ samya èstri déné kang warna sami/ pan wus tan kena cinatur/ mapan katiga pisan/ undha-usuk 
lawan kang dèniring iku/ jeng sultan dangu tan nyapa/ kamitenggengen ningali. 66. lawan mespaosken 
ika/ gènnya lenggah datan kangsrah ing siti/ kangjeng sultan ngandika rum/ nilakrama kawula/ langkung 
tambet kangjeng ratu lon turipun/ rumiyin mapan kawula/ lan paduka sampun jangji. 67. ing bénjing yèn 
sampun mongsa/ lan paduka boten wandé kepanggih/ jeng sultan ènget tyasipun/ mengkana ciptanira/ 
baya iki kang ingaran Ratu Kidul/ déné banget anomira/ kangjeng sultan ngandika ris. 68. pan sampun 
ènget kawula/ kangjeng ratu aris aturirèki/ yèn pareng amba tetulung/ inggih dhateng paduka/ nging 
kawula anuwun jangji satuhu/ yèn sampun sirna sadaya/ sagung ingkang lanat kapir. 69. kawula Tuwan 
[suwuna]/ dhateng Alah Ingkang Rabulngalimin/ mantuka malih puniku/ inggih dados manungsa/ déné 
sagung wadya paduka sedarum/ sampun wonten tumut yuda/ kawula ingkang nyagahi. 70. sirnanipun 
lanatolah/ kangjeng sultan mapan ngandika aris/ kawula tan nedha tulung/ inggih mring [sama-sama]/ 
yèn agami aming pitulung Hyang Agung/ kangjeng ratu nulya musna. Words in square brackets in the 
text indicate that because of the demands of the macapat metre a small correction has been made 
on the basis of Rusche 1908-09, I:190-2. 
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deliver ance.52 This is a request which the goddess makes to all her royal lov-
ers. In the Babad Tanah Jawi she is described imploring Sultan Agung to help 
her in similar terms. But, as this text explains, no one can interfere with her 
fate for it has been decreed by the Almighty that she will not escape from 
the spirit kingdoms until the Ari Kiyamat or Day of Judgement when all the 
different planes of existence will be united together as one.53 Such is the Will 
of God. It does not, however, prevent Ratu Kidul from constantly beseeching 
her royal lovers to intercede with the Almighty to alleviate her fate. Indeed, 
for all her magical powers and beauty, the goddess of the southern ocean 
is more a tragic and pathetic figure than is commonly recognised. She is as 
much in need of help herself as she is capable of helping others. Certainly, 
Dipanagara viewed her in this light and resolutely refused her offer of assist-
ance perhaps because he thought at the time that he was close to achieving a 
complete military victory against the Dutch.54
What then was his purpose in including this episode in his babad? One 
explanation is that he wished to put himself on a par with Sénapati and Sultan 
Agung, both monarchs who had enjoyed a special relationship with Ratu 
Kidul and who had brought the Mataram state to the pinnacle of its power. 
We have seen above how Dipanagara was especially keen to draw a parallel 
between himself and Agung in terms of the exercise of spiritual and temporal 
power. At another level, the prince may have referred to his meeting to stress 
that he had no use for the assistance of the spirit realms or unorthodox magical 
powers in his struggle against the Dutch. As a true Muslim, he placed his faith 
in the Almighty. Moreover, as he constantly pointed out in his autobiography, 
52 According to popular Javanese belief (Poerbatjaraka 1962:20), the soul of Ratu Kidul 
and those who have sought her help for the purposes of personal power or worldly gain, are 
entrapped (dikurung) in the Javanese ancestral spirit underworld until the Final Day of Judge-
ment. See further Stange 1975:21-2.
53 Balai Pustaka 1940:31-7. An older version of this story can be found in BL Add MS 12320 
(Babad Kraton), LXV (Kinanthi) f.281v-282r:20-6. Sang Dyah nangis pangkonipun/ sasambaté ngasih-
asih/ umatur dhateng kang raka/ dhuh kakang Sultan Matawis/ amba gusti anenedha/ dadosena jalma 
malih. 21. pan panduka ratu agung/ trus ing tingal tur asekti/ kasusra ing Tanah Jawa/ yèn panduka ratu 
adi/ sakalir kang pangruwatan/ tan waten angker kang sungil. 22. Panjenengan Sang Aprabu/ apan sampun 
dènidèni/ saking negari ing Mekah/ ing Jawi tan wonten tandhing/ jumeneng Sultan Mataram/ sagung ratu 
sami ngabdi. 23. amba ruwaten pukulun/ pan kawula asal jalmi/ Sri Naréndra angandika/ dhuh a[ng]gèr 
pan ora keni/ wus pasthi karsaning Sukma/ datan kena owah gi[ng]sir. 24. déning sira lamun tuhu/ asal ing 
manusa dhimin/ ing bésuk Ari Kiyamat/ sira nunggal lawan mami/ Sang Dyah anangisa lara/ sasambaté 
amlas asih. 25. akathah sasambatipun/ sumu[ng]kem pa[ng]koning laki/ sarwi anyekeli asta/ dhuh kakang 
Sultan Matawis/ ruwaten sarira amba/ kapéngin dadosa jalmi. 26. Sang Nata aglis anulung/ anyendhal 
cindhé sumampir/ Sang Dyah pan sampun ingemban/ rinungrum ing arih-arih/ binekta marang ing taman/ 
ngideraken sarwa sari. I am grateful to Professor Merle Ricklefs for this quote.
54 In July 1826, when Ratu Kidul’s second visitation occurred, Dipanagara was poised to break 
out of the Kulon Praga area and win a series of victories against the Dutch and their Surakarta 
allies which brought his forces by mid-October 1826 to within striking distance of the Sunan’s 
capital, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:368-520; p. 642.
Plate 16. Sketch of a Yogya kraton delegation with offerings to Ratu Kidul at Parangkusuma.  From Musium Nasional (Jakarta), MS 933 DI, Ir Moens, ‘Platen Album’, no. 8, Slametan 
Cembèngan, 116, plate 120. 
Plate 16. Sketch of a Yogya kraton delegation with offerings to Ratu Kidul at Parangkusuma.  From Musium Nasional (Jakarta), MS 933 DI, Ir Moens, ‘Platen Album’, no. 8, Slametan 
Cembèngan, 116, plate 120. 
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his primary aim during the Java War was the furtherance of religion, specifi-
cally ‘the raising up of the high state of the Islamic religion throughout Java’, 
which included not just formal Islamic practice but the moral order in general 
(Carey 1974b:285). 
The prince’s refusal to accept help from Ratu Kidul underscores this 
ideal for which he made so many sacrifices during the war. He nevertheless 
remained fascinated by the ever beautiful goddess and the legends which 
surrounded her. A Javanese to the core, he drew inspiration from the ances-
tral spirit world of the Javanese heartland just as much as from his devotion 
to Islam and the esoteric teachings of the Shat t ārīyya, precisely the type of 
‘mystic synthesis’ which Ricklefs has described as reaching its epitome in 
early nineteenth-century Java (Ricklefs 2006:195-220). On his journey into 
exile, he referred to her at length in his conversations with Knoerle, and 
later his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, would produce a very similar 
account of his own encounter with Ratu Kidul in his allegorical chronicle of 
the Java War. 55
Final instruction at Parangkusuma and return to Tegalreja
After his first wordless encounter with Ratu Kidul at Guwa Langsé, the 
prince described in his babad how he descended to the sea shore and walke d 
back along the beach to Parangtritis where he bathed at the fresh water 
spring grotto. He then slept at Parangkusuma presumably in the small open 
pondhok constructed by the second sultan. During the night a final visitation 
occurred.56 A disembodied voice, perhaps that of Sunan Kalijaga, addressed 
Dipanagara telling him of the coming destruction of Yogya and ‘the begin-
ning of the ruin of the Land of Java’ (wiwit bubrah Tanah Jawi) in just under 
three years’ time. He was instructed to change his religious name from 
Ngabdurahim to Ngabdulkamit and was informed that a sign would be 
accorded him in the shape of the arrow Sarutama. This eventually appeared 
to him like a flash of lightning piercing the stone on which he was leaning as 
he rose from his slumber. He was also enjoined to watch over his father, the 
crown prince, at the time of his accession as sultan and was sternly warned 
not to accept the Pangéran Adipati Anom or crown princely title himself from 
55 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 25: ‘Dipanagara told me in an interesting tone about the history of Ratu 
Kidul, elaborating about the exile of the second daughter of [Prabu] Munding Wangi [Munding-
sari] to Pulau Toris’, see further note 36. The meeting which Pangéran Dipanagara II recounts in 
his post-Java War chronicle follows that in Dipanagara’s babad very closely, see LOr 6488 (Babad 
Dipanagara, Surya Ngalam):24-8, VII.3-VIII.12.
56 Ricklefs 1974b:240-7, 256-8; BD (Manado) II:124-6, XIV.76-81. The way the disembodied 
voice manifested to Dipanagara at Parangkusuma points to a form of wangsit or interior prompt-
ing, see Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:76; Chapter X note 182.
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the Dutch ‘for that would be definitely sinful’.57 Finally, the voice ended on 
this enigmatic note:
XIV.80  There is no other:
 you alone are the means,
 but that not for long,
 only to be counted amongst the ancestors.
 Ngabdulkamit, farewell, you must return home!58
This final statement may have a connection with Sultan Agung’s prophecy men-
tioned at the beginning of Chapter II during the discussion about Dipanagara’s 
babyhood, in particular Agung’s prediction that the Dutch would rule in Java 
for 300 years following his death in 1646 and that althoug h one of his descend-
ants would rise against them he would be defeated, a prediction which was 
relayed to Dipanagara’s mother by the ageing Sultan Mangkubumi. 
The implications of the other passages are slightly more straightforward. 
The reference to the destruction of Yogya in under three years’ time perhaps 
presaged the arrival of Marshal Herman Willem Daendels as governor-gen-
eral in January 1808 and his humiliation of the sultan’s court in the aftermath 
of the November-December 1810 revolt of the bupati wedana of the eastern 
mancanagara, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III, which we shall consider in more 
detail in the next two chapters. This set in train a whole series of events which 
eventually culminated in the fall of the kraton (20 June 1812) to a British-Indian 
army during the administration of Thomas Stamford Raffles (1811-1816), and 
the plundering of the court by the British and sepoy troops. The desecration 
wrought by the theft of the invaluable court heirlooms (pusaka), the removal 
of the entire court archive and manuscript collection, and the unceremoni-
ous deposition and exile of the second sultan really marked the beginning of 
‘the destruction of the land of Java’ prophesied by the disembodied voice at 
Parangkusuma.59
The change of name from Ngabdurahim to Ngabdulkamit was of great 
significance. The latter was the name which Dipanagara bore throughout the 
Java War and which he incorporated prominently in his royal title as Sultan 
Èrucakra in August 1825 (Carey 1981a:287 note 218; Ricklefs 1974b:244). 
He also used it in exile in Manado, where immediately after his arrival 
he asked to be only addressed as ‘Pangeran Ngabdulkamit’ rather than 
57 BD (Manado) II:125, XIV (Sinom) 79-80. ywa gelem sira kinardi/ ya Pangéran Dipati. 80. mapan 
wus pesthi duraka. See further Ricklefs 1974b:245-6, 257. On the full title of the Yogya Crown Prince, 
see Chapter V note 121.
58 BD (Manado) II:125, XIV (Sinom) 80. tan ana malih-malih/ nanging sira srananipun/ mapan iku 
tan dawa/ nanging kinarya leluri/ Ngabdulkamit wus poma sira muliya.
59 BD (Manado) II:125, XIV (Sinom) 77-8. kurang telung taun iki/ ing bubrahé iya Negara Ngayo-
gya. 78. mapan wus karsaning Sukma/ wiwit bubrah Tanah Jawi/ iya kurang telung warsa. See further 
Ricklefs 1974b:240-1, 256.
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‘Pangéran Dipana gara’ a title which he had passed on to his eldest son,60 
and in Makassar where he styled himself as fakir (the religious mendicant) 
Ngabdulkamit in his religious writings.61 According to Ricklefs, the choice of 
this name may have a connection with ‘Abd al-Hamīd I, the late eighteenth-
century Ottoman sultan (reigne d 1773-1787), who was the first Turkish ruler 
to lay claim to the authority of caliph, the protector of all Muslims through-
out the world (Ricklefs 1974b:241, 2006:210). We will see below how ‘Abd 
al-Hamīd I’s pretensions, which were not very vigorously pursued by him, 
may have especially attracted the attention of Dipanagara and his haji advis-
ers because, as Ricklefs has recently pointed out, in advancing this claim the 
sultan was behaving like the Sultan Rum of Javanese legend, like an Islamic 
universal monarch (Ricklefs 2006:210).
 The attempts by ‘Abd al-Hamīd I to reform the Ottoman army and his ten-
tative pretensions to the caliphate may have been reported to Dipanagara by 
returned Mecca pilgrims: Haji Badarudin, for example, who had twice made 
the haj on behalf of the Yogya court and served Dipanagara throughout the 
Java War, is reported to have been consulted by Kyai Maja about examples 
of Turkish administrative practice in Mecca, presumably in the period either 
before or after the occupation of the holy cities by the Wahhābī in 1803-1812/3.62 
Moreover, many Javanese admired the Ottoman Empire at this time as a bul-
wark of Islamic power in the Middle East and as a potential protector against 
the expanding might of Christian Europe (Carey 1979:217 note 93). Dipanagara 
even copied some of the ranks and regimental names used in the Ottoman 
army for his own military formations. Thus his elite bodyguard troops, who 
wore turbans of different colours and had regimental banners with serpents, 
half-moons and inscriptions from the Qur’ān (Van Doren 1851, II:328-9), were 
arranged in companies with names such Bulkio, Turkio and Arkio, which were 
directly modelled on the Bölüki (from bölük, a squad or troop), Oturaki, and 
Ardia Janissary corps regiments of the Ottoman sultans just then undergo-
ing major changes between the failed Nizam-i-cedit (‘New Order’) reforms 
of Sultan Selim III (reigned 1789-1807) and the establishment of the new 
model army of the ‘trained victorious soldiers of Muhammad’ (muallem azakir-i 
mansuri-i Muhammadije) by Sultan Mahmud II (reigned, 1809-1839) in 1826.63 
At the same time, his most outstanding military commanders, such as the sev-
60 See Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 29; vdB 391, ‘Voorstellen [van den] Pangerang Diepo Negoro aan den 
Luitenant Adjudant Knoerle in de tegenwoordigheid van den […] 2e Luitenant [C.] Bosman’, 
Manado, 19-6-1830, proposal 5, which spells his name as ‘Pangeran Abdulhamit’. 
61 Makassar notebooks II:67.
62 Carey 1974a:36 note 117. See also Chapter II note 71; Chapter III note 59.
63 Marsigli 1732:68-9; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:277; Booms 1911:34; Aukes 1935:74 
note 1; Shaw and Shaw 1977, II:22-4. For a reference to similar emulation of Ottoman military 
formations in eighteenth-century Holland, where some schutterij (local shooters’ companies) used 
the name Turkiye, see Schama 1977:81. Even the Javanese term tambur (battalion) derives from the 
Turkish tabur, see Shaw and Shaw 1977:24.
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enteen-year-old Senthot, received the title of Ali Basah, which is derived from 
the Turkish ‘Ali Pasha (the ‘High’ Pasha) (Carey 1974b:287 note 6). The prince 
also mentioned the example of the Ottoman sultan in his babad as the supreme 
authority in Mecca contradicting Kyai Maja who saw this authority as vested 
in the heads of the four law schools or madzhab.64 Dipanagara’s own personal 
battle standard – a three cornered green pennant with a solar disc at the centre 
and crossed arrows (Plate 65) – was also perhaps inspired by Ottoman military 
precedent (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:283).
Apart from these contemporary contacts with Turkey, the figure of 
‘Sultan Ngrum’ – from the Arabic Rūm (eastern ‘Rome’ or Byzantium, hence 
Constantinople, Turkey, the Ottoman sultanate) – was well known in Javanese 
mythical literature. In several Javanese texts, such as the Aji Saka tales and the 
messianic Jayabaya prophecies, Sultan Ngrum appears as a king who organ-
ized the civilising and peopling of Java, and later dispatched a force to drive 
out the foreign oppressors (Pigeaud 1967-80, III:366; Ricklefs 1974b:242-4). 
Such texts incorporating traditions concerning Sultan Ngrum were available 
in the Yogya kraton at the time when Dipanagara was reaching manhood at 
Tegalreja (Ricklefs 1974a:393, 1974b:242-4). Indeed, the prince himself later 
rewrote a version of the Aji Saka tales dealing with Sultan Ngrum’s peopling 
of Java and ridding the island of evil spirits during his period of exile in 
Makassar (1833-1855).65 We will also see how in January 1817 just eight years 
before the outbreak of the Java War, a millenarian movement occurred in east-
ern Bagelèn which looked to the arrival of Sultan Ngrum as the first step in 
the process of the purification of Java from the illegitimate rule of the Yogya 
sultan (pp. 483-4). It is possible to conclude therefore that the assumption of 
the name Ngabdulkamit had a deep significance for Dipanagara both because 
of its contemporary associations with the temporal and religious power of the 
Ottoman Empire, and because of its links with the numerous mythical tales 
in modern Javanese literature featuring Sultan Ngrum.
The gift of the arrow Sarutama, which came to the prince like a flash of 
lightning, again recalls Arjuna, the wayang figure with whom he most closely 
identified (Carey 1974a:12-6; pp. 403-5). In the shadow-play tales drawn 
from the Mahabharata, the same magical weapon was associated with the 
Pandhawa prince during his meditation at Lake Tirtamaya.66 It may also 
have a connection with the period of destruction that Dipanagara would 
bring about in Java as predicted by the disembodied voice at Parangkusuma, 
64 BD (Manado) III, XXIII (Durma) 104. nadyan Mekah […]/ papat iku badan/ déné nyawané iku/ 
samengko anèng Ngrum nagri/ pan Kangjeng Sultan/ ing Ngrum kang misésani.
65 Makassar notebooks I:50-3.
66 LOr 12544 (Ir Moens coll. pt. 2), no. 3, Punika cariyos Sarutama murca dados Ratu Janaka tapa 
wonten ing Sendhang Tirtamaya. The usual arrow associated with Arjuna is Pasopati, see Poer-
batjaraka 1926:263; Hardjowirogo 1965:262; the Ratu title for Arjuna (Janaka) also reads slightly 
oddly here, one would have expected Radèn. See further Plate 65 for Dipanagara’s incorporation 
of the arrow motif on his personal battle standard.
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in much the same fashion as Arjuna’s arrow, Pasopati, served as the agent of 
destruction against the demonic forces in the poem Arjuna Wiwāha (‘Arjuna’s 
victory’; Poerbatjaraka 1926:288-90). Certainly, Dipanagara treasured the 
weapon. On his return to Tegalreja, he fashioned it into a small stabbing 
dagger or cundrik, which was later carried by his fourth wife, Radèn Ayu 
Maduretna (post-August 1825, Ratu Kedhaton), during the Java War.67 In 
about 1827, it was melted down together with two other pusaka belonging to 
Dipanagara to make a single heirloom kris, named Kyai Ageng Bandayuda, 
which was used to rally his troops’ morale during a difficult stage in the fight-
ing against the Dutch.68
Finally, the voice’s injunction to the prince to watch over his father in 
facilitating his accession as sultan and the stern warning to refuse the title of 
crown prince if it was offered by the Dutch had immediate relevance. They 
referred to the political revolution which was about to engulf Yogya between 
the arrival of Marshal Daendels in January 1808, and the gutting of the Yogya 
kraton by Java’s new colonial masters, the British, with their British-Indian 
army as their battering ram, in June 1812. During this four-and-a-half-year 
period, according to the account given in his babad, Dipanagara did indeed 
play a role very similar to that predicted in the prophecy. As we shall see in 
the next chapters, he helped to mediate between his father and his grand-
father, the second sultan, both rivals for political power at court, and later 
acted as a negotiator between his father and the British which resulted in 
the former’s accession as third sultan on 21 June 1812. At the same time, 
according to the prince’s testimony, he was able to deflect attempts made 
by the British to appoint him as crown prince by getting them to recognise 
his younger brother – the future fourth sultan (reigned 1814-1822) – whose 
mother was better born than Dipanagara’s, as heir apparent.
The visitation at Parangkusuma was the last which Dipanagara received 
on his south coast pilgrimage. His period of tirakat was now over. The 
prince made his way on foot back to Tegalreja, stopping for a short while at 
Sawangan, a marshy area at the mouth of the Opak where the river flows 
into the sea. He then went on to Lipura, probably by way of the second sul-
tan’s pavilion at Samas right on the seashore close to Sawangan.69 At Lipura, 
he spent a night at Séla Gilang, the holy black stone – probably a meteorite 
– which is watched over by the spirit Kyai Jangga.70 According to historical 
legend, this stone had descended over Sénapati’s head as he lay asleep, and 
67 BD (Manado) II:126, XIV (Sinom) 83. lajeng dènbusanani/ Ki Sarutama puniku/ rinéka cundrik 
ika. See also Appendix XI.
68 See Appendix XI note 2. The three major pusaka were: Kyai Sarutama (cundrik), Kyai Baru-
tuba (pike), and Kyai Abijaya (kris).
69 Ricklefs 1974b:247; BD (Manado) II:126, XIV.82; and see p. 229 and Appendix VI.
70 On Kyai Jangga, the tutelary spirit of Séla Gilang who is given offerings by Javanese who 
wish to become priyayi (officials), see Ir Moens coll., ‘Slametan Cèmbengan’, 90 no. 88.
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had announced that it was God’s Will that he should become king of Java. The 
place thus had important associations for Dipanagara with the founder of the 
Mataram dynasty and it is still revered today as a site where holy kris blades 
are sometimes struck (Ricklefs 1974b:247 note 59; Chapter IX). Although 
Dipanagara made no mention in his babad of any visionary experiences there 
in circa 1805, his association with the Sénapati would be reinforced later in 
the context of his final vision before the outbreak of the Java War (p. 579). 
The following day he went on to the cave at Secang situated on what would 
become his lands in the Selarong area to the west of the Kali Bédhog (p. 369), 
a spot much frequented by him as a place for withdrawal and meditation, 
especially during the fasting month Puwasa. It would later become his first 
headquarters during the Java War. The ground around the cave had been 
converted into a garden and a special rock chamber hewn out of the cave 
wall with a stone niche for sleeping. Here the prince passed the night before 
setting out on the last stage of his journey back to Tegalreja.71
Dipanagara’s return from his pilgrimage in the latter part of 1805, marked 
the end of a crucial stage in his life. The period of his youth was over, his spirit-
ual apprenticeship complete. He had learnt much from his great-grandmother 
in terms of self-discipline, religious devotion and the ability to mix with all 
classes of Javanese society. Living at Tegalreja had also taught him the advan-
tages of distancing himself from the Yogya court and had turned him into 
an intensely private person, a lover of solitude and that inward peace which 
comes from silent reflection. The prince was now a capable young man, whose 
sense of self-importance was tempered by the insights gained on his pilgrim-
age. In particular, he had begun to understand the significant but fleeting role 
he would be called upon to play in the great events which were about to unfold 
in his native Yogyakarta. As we shall see (p. 543), he would return again to the 
south coast to meditate in its caves and grottos on the eve of the Java War as 
part of his spiritual preparation for his great rebellion. But by then he would 
have received new visions which would make his destiny all the clearer. 
Conclusion
The passages in his babad relating to the visions Dipanagara received on his 
south coast pilgrimage in circa 1805 afford an insight into the way he per-
ceived his place in Java’s spiritual destiny. Much is still obscure, but certain 
key themes stand out. The first is the importance of the historical example of 
the wali or apostles of Islam, especially Sunan Kalijaga, the wali most closely 
associated with the proselytisation of south-central Java, both in legitimizing 
Dipanagara’s subsequent rebellion and in prefiguring the style of leadership 
71 Ricklefs 1974b:247; Carey 1981a:238-40 notes 20-7; BD (Manado) II:126, XIV.82-3.
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which the prince would aspire to during the Java War. The second is the influ-
ence of Sultan Agung, whom Dipanagara viewed as the Mataram ruler most 
worthy of emulation on account of his success in combining the exercise of 
temporal and spiritual power. The third is Dipanagara’s conscious rejection 
of help from the Javanese spirit kingdoms – as represented by Ratu Kidul – 
and his stress on his faith as a Javanese Muslim in the Almighty, references to 
whom are frequently rendered in his autobiography by the Sanskrit-derived 
Hyang Agung (‘The Great One’), Hyang Suksma (‘The Immaterial One’) 
or Hyang Widi (‘The One Who Leads’) rather than the more Islamically 
orthodox Allah Ingkang Rabulngalimin (‘God the Forgiving One’) or Allah 
Tangala (‘God the Sublime’). This was yet another indication of the strength 
of Dipanagara’s Hindu-Javanese cultural inheritance. It can be seen too in the 
final theme of the prince’s identification with the wayang hero Arjuna which 
would be a leitmotif throughout his life. Dipanagara was clearly fascinated by 
the shadow-play hero’s role in the Arjuna Wiwāha tale, particularly the actions 
undertaken by the Pandhawa prince to prepare himself through asceticism to 
achieve invincible power in the world. We shall see below how Dipanagara’s 
brief period as a Javanese Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) bearing Arjuna’s weapon, 
Sarutama, which he had emblazoned on his personal battle standard, would 
be linked with a time of purifying destruction similar to that carried out by 
the wayang hero in the Arjuna Wiwāha story. These four themes, in the view 
of the present author, formed a framework within which the prince’s career 
would later develop. 
At the time of his return from his pilgrimage in late 1805, all this lay in 
the future. What was clear, however, was that he would now return to the 
world with a clearer sense of his prophetic destiny and his place in Javanese 
history. But he would do so just as the old Javanese order in which he had 
grown up was about to be overwhelmed by the forces of a new and hugely 
destructive European imperialism. Born of the twin forces of industrial and 
political revolution in late eighteenth-century Europe, it would reshape the 




the beginning of the ruin of 
the Land of Java
Yogyakarta and Daendels’ new order, 1808
Daendels’ new order
The ‘beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java’ had been the prophetic warning 
delivered to Dipanagara at Parangkusuma just before his return to Tegalreja 
from his south coast pilgrimage in circa 1805. Specifically, the disembodied 
voice had foretold that this would start in just under three years’ time. As 
though on cue, on 5 January 1808, Marshal Herman Willem Daendels arrived 
in Batavia to take up his post as governor-general to which he had been nomi-
nated exactly a year earlier by King Louis (Lodewijk I) of Holland (reigne d 
1806-1810), the younger brother of Napoleon Bonaparte (Stapel 1941:77). ‘The 
last of the tyrants’ in Colonel Henry Yule’s words (Boulger 1897:112), Daendels 
was very much a product of the new Europe forged by the French Revolution. 
Lawyer, revolutionary, politician and career soldier, he had been involved 
with the ‘Patriot Revolt’ against the Stadhouder in Holland (1786-1787), and 
had helped set up (and commanded) the Batavian Legion (1792-1795) which 
had fought alongside French Republican forces in the 1794-1795 invasion of 
the Dutch Netherlands. Later, as head of the pro-French Unitarian Party, he 
had earned himself a reputation as a ‘headstrong, sentimental and obstinate’ 
character (Schama 1977:342-3). A man of few scruples, great energy and 
a penchant for using force to achieve his ends, he was destined to make a 
lasting mark on the history of Java, in much the same fashion as the almost 
equally ruthless Johannes van den Bosch (in office 1830-1834) in the aftermath 
of the Java War.1
1 Stapel 1941:77 (on Daendels, who took over from his predecessor A.H. Wiese on 14-1-1808), 
85 (on Van den Bosch); De Haan 1935a:557, quoting P.A. Goldbach, a senior VOC official, who 
described Daendels as a ‘monster’. On Van den Bosch’s personal brutality, which rivalled that of 
Daendels, see NA, Exhibitum 8-8-1832 no. 1342, Javanese report of Mas Jayasanta about a boat trip 
of Van den Bosch down the Bengawan Sala, 27-7-1832, relating that when the governor-general’s 
boat had got stuck in the shallows in lands abutting Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II’s) territories 
in the Kadhawung area, a pair of demang and their followers had come to push his vessel off, but 
Plate 17. Posthumous portrait of Herman Willem Daendels (1762-1818), painted by 
Radèn Saleh in 1838. Daendels’ hand points to a map of the Mount Megamendhung 
(West Java) section of the famous postweg (highway) which ran from Anyer on the 
Sunda Straits to Panarukan in the Eastern Salient (Oosthoek) of Java, and which was 
built during his administration. Photograph by courtesy of the Iconografisch Bureau, 
The Hague.
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Such character traits were precisely what had recommended him to 
Napoleon who had tasked him – the only non-French marshal – to secure Java 
as a military base against the British in the Indian Ocean. Fortuitously avoiding 
the stringent British naval blockade, Daendels arrived to find the island nearly 
defenceless. In October-December 1806, a British squadron commanded by one 
of Nelson’s former captains, Admiral Sir Thomas Trowbridge (1760-1807), had 
destroyed the remnants of Vice-Admiral Pieter Hartsinck’s fleet in the roads of 
Batavia and disabled a large part of the former Dutch East Indies Company’s 
merchant marine. A year later, another squadron under Admiral Sir Edward 
Pellew (1757-1833) had landed in Gresik to destroy the shore batteries and 
defences, and had attacked remaining Dutch ships in the Oosthoek, briefly pre-
venting the vital trade along the Sala River by blockading the Madura Straits.2 
Although the marshal’s immediate task was a military one, he was also 
vested with sweeping powers to reform the corrupt former Company admin-
istration, the VOC itself having recently passed under the control of the Dutch 
state following its bankruptcy in 1799. The new Colonial Charter of 1803 
envisaged considerable changes to the system of colonial rule in the Indies 
(Day 1972:127-48), and Daendels brought to his new post all the ruthlessness 
and determination which had been the hallmark of his previous political and 
military career. The three years of his administration (1808-1811) laid the foun-
dations for the modern colonial state in Indonesia (Van ’t Veer 1963:107-86).
One of the marshal’s primary strategic considerations in planning Java’s 
defence was the position of the independent courts. Their power and influ-
ence marked them out as potential rivals to the European government and 
as dubious allies in the event of an enemy attack. In this respect, the court of 
Yogyakarta constituted a far more redoubtable threat by virtue of its military 
resources and substantial cash reserves, the latter the outcome of the second 
sultan’s ruthless fiscal innovations and heavy tax demands.3 Writing in early 
1812 after his first bruising encounter with the Yogya court, Raffles reckoned 
that the sultan was the main power in the eastern outlying districts. In a 
because the Javanese officials had refused to spring into the water to help their followers, Van den 
Bosch had drawn his sabre and executed them on the spot. Mangkunagara II had been exception-
ally vexed by the incident.
2 Boulger 1897:80; Van Kesteren 1887:1276-7. References to British naval operations can be 
found in Dj.Br. 86, Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang) to Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta), 28-10-1806 
(capture of Dutch frigate Maria Reigersbergen by HMS Caroline [Captain Peter Rainier] in Bay of 
Bata vi a as well as other VOC ships at Pulau Onrust and Middelburg); Matthijs Waterloo (Yogya-
karta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 3-11-1806 (taking of Dutch prizes to Pulau Pinang by 
Trowbridge’s squadron); 2-12-1806, S.Br. 55, B.F. von Liebeherr (Surakarta) to Matthijs Waterloo 
(Yogyakarta), 3-12-1806 (reappearance of Trowbridge’s squadron – 8 ships of the line – in the bay 
of Batavia and further destruction of VOC shipping); Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to 
B.F. von Liebeherr (Surakarta) 17-12-1807 (Pellew’s attack on Gresik and destruction of remaining 
VOC ships in the Oosthoek), 24-12-1806 (final withdrawal of Pellew’s squadron).
3 See Chapter I.
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secret dispatch to Lord Minto, he speculated that if the European govern-
ment was withdrawn the Surakarta ruler would be unable to maintain his 
authority and the sultan’s power ‘would [then] at once extend over the whole 
of the eastern districts of Java including the sea coasts’.4 Such considerations 
may have already weighed with Daendels. According to Nicolaus Engelhard 
(1761-1831), then governor of Java’s Northeast Coast (in office 1801-1808), 
even before he left Holland, the marshal (Engelhard 1816:257-8):
already had a prejudice against the sultan […] he had the wish to make [him] feel 
his superiority and to attack him at the first opportunity […] some officers [in 
Daendels’ entourage] were of the same opinion and spoke from the moment they 
landed of the sultan and when they could give him a good hiding.
Engelhard also shrewdly observed that Hamengkubuwana II’s well-stocked 
treasury had aroused the jealousy not only of Daendels, but also of the other 
independent rulers in south-central Java – namely Sunan Pakubuwana IV 
(reigned 1788-1820) and Pangéran Prangwedana (post-1821, Mangkunagara 
II, reigned 1796-1835) – who showed themselves only too willing to side with 
the European government to further their designs against the sultan.5
While Engelhard’s views of Daendels should be treated with caution given 
his later position as a bitter critic and opponent of the marshal, it does seem that 
from the start of his administration Daendels was anxious to place the relation-
ship between the government in Batavia and the courts on a new footing. As 
early as 24 February 1808, he had informed Engelhard of his wish for detailed 
information concerning the south-central Javanese kingdoms and intimated 
that the VOC official’s position as governor and director of Java’s Northeast 
Coast would soon be abrogated. Daendels wished to correspond directly with 
the First Residents, namely the senior Dutch representatives at the courts, 
without the interference of the Semarang-based governor.6 In the same letter, 
he recalled the incumbent Residents, Matthijs Waterloo from Yogyakarta and 
Bogislaus Friedrich von Liebeherr from Surakarta, and replaced them with 
more dependable figures, Pieter Engelhard and Jacob Andries van Braam, the 
latter a close political ally and friend.7 These new appointees had been fully 
4 BL Add MS. 45272 (Raffles secret correspondence with Lord Minto, January-March 1812), 
T.S. Raffles (Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-1812.
5 Engelhard 1816:257; Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 
16-12-1805, referred to an Arab ‘priest’ who had fled from Yogya to Semarang and had joined 
the British navy (see Chapter I note 59) helping to spread rumours overseas about the size of 
Hamengkubuwana II’s treasure. See also Chapter VI.
6 Daendels 1814: Bijlage 1, Organique stukken 3.
7 For a less than flattering description of Van Braam’s character (‘a coward, toady, huckster and 
smuggler’, R.G. van Polanen) and his money-grubbing conduct (‘one of the few to make a mint 
out of this most despicable regime’, P.A. Goldbach), see De Haan 1935a:507-9. On Van Braam’s 
peculation of the revenues of the opium and tobacco farms, which he managed in Surakarta on 
behalf of Pakubuwana IV, see Eur F 148/17, Captain William Robison (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto 
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briefed on the new administration’s attitude to the courts and on 25 February 
1808 they received their instructions.8 The fifth article summed up the great 
importance Daendels attached to the honour and prestige of the European 
government stating that:
They should exert themselves in an impassive [ongevoelige] enough way to give the 
rulers an impression of the power and splendour of the present Royal government 
in Holland and of the protection of the great Napoleon, and to inspire them with 
awe and respect for [said] government.9
We will see shortly how this new policy, almost calculated to arouse the 
indignation and suspicion of the rulers, played out at the courts in the course 
of the following year. But first it is necessary to turn aside for a moment to 
consider the new territorial division between the European government and 
the courts which the outgoing Yogya Resident and others were pressing on 
the new governor-general in the early months of 1808.
Plans for annexation of territory in central and east Java
Before they left their posts in central Java, both the outgoing governor of 
Java’s Northeast Coast, Nicolaus Engelhard, and the Yogya Resident, Matthijs 
Waterloo, advanced plans for the annexation of territory in central and east Java 
at the expense of the courts. Engelhard suggested a new boundary between the 
districts controlled by the government on the north coast and the Principalities 
so that productive lands could be brought under Batavia’s control.10 In particu-
lar, he urged the annexation of the pepper and indigo producing areas of Pacitan 
and Lowanu (Bagelèn) as well as the linen weaving district of Tanggung near 
Kedhung Kebo (post-1830 Purwareja) in Bagelèn. Even distant Malang, then 
part of the Surakarta eastern mancanagara, a region which had been extensively 
depopulated by the wars of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
(Ricklefs 1986:28), was slated for take-over in Engelhard’s scheme.11 Noting 
(Batavia), 26-9-1811, who stated that Van Braam had made 80,000 Spanish dollars for himself 
from this source during the course of his three-year Residency.
8 Daendels 1814: Bijlage I, Organique wetten 6.
9 Daendels 1814: Bijlage I, Organique wetten 6, art. 5.
10 vAE (aanwinsten 1900) 235, N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-5-1808.
11 There had been much confusion over who had the right to exercise jurisdiction over Malang. 
In the mid-eighteenth century, the VOC erroneously thought that the district lay east of the merid-
ian of Pasuruan, the boundary of Dutch territory established by the treaty of 11 November 1743 
with Pakubuwana II. But until 1771, the argument was moot because the area was controlled by 
the descendants of the Balinese condottiere Untung Surapati, Ricklefs 1974a:106-7, 129-38. After a 
Yogya army eventually routed these descendants in January 1771, the area seems to have passed 
into Surakarta’s sphere of influence, and it was formally incorporated – along with neighbouring 
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the reluctance of north coast bupati families to marry their daughters into the 
courts on account of the great danger and expense involved,12 Engelhard urged 
Daendels to ‘break the connection between the courts and the north coast for 
good’. This should be done once a sufficiently redoubtable military force had 
been put together to overawe the courts. The incorporation of the annexed dis-
tricts into government-controlled territories could then proceed by dismissing 
all the court-appointed bupati who had family relations with the south-central 
Javanese rulers, but keeping on those who were not bound by such ties, pre-
cisely the policy adopted by the Dutch administration after the Java War (Carey 
1974b:276-7; Houben 1994:54-7). 
The outgoing Yogya Resident, Waterloo, was even more detailed in his 
proposals. Before he relinquished his post in mid-April 1808, he sent an 
exhaustive list of the sultan’s revenue and military strength to Engelhard.13 He 
also committed some of his thoughts to paper in a long letter to the governor 
intended for Daendels’ perusal.14 Drawing on his twenty-year experience in 
central Java,15 he reviewed the whole relationship of the VOC with the Yogya 
district of Antang – into Surakarta territory through Daendels’ treaty with Pakubuwana IV of 6 Janu-
ary 1811, Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, Additionele Stukken 27, art. 6. There it remained until 1830, when 
it was annexed by the Dutch along with all the remainder of the Surakarta mancanagara territories.
12 vAE (aanwinsten 1900) 235, N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-5-1808. According to Engelhard, pasi-
sir bupati families complained that marriage into the ruling families of south-central Java meant that 
they never saw their daughters again because they were kept ‘locked up’ in the princely residences 
(dalem) or at the courts; that the marriage expenses were huge and that their children had to show 
‘inordinate respect’ to their royal-born spouses. Moreover, they were constantly being pestered to 
send produce from their kabupatèn to the kraton. In Surakarta, there were also cases of children of 
pasisir bupati being so badly treated that they died prematurely, see further ‘Verslag der reis van 
N. Engelhard naar de hoven van Souracarta en Djocjocarta, naar den Oosthoek en de Residentiën 
Japara, Rembang en Joana’, 27-5-1803 in De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:147, relating the 
fate of the two daughters of the bupati of Pathi, Radèn Tumenggung Megatsari, who were mar-
ried to Pakubuwana IV’s ‘tyrannical’ younger brother, Pangéran Buminata (Chapter II note 86). 
Another Surakarta source related how Pakubuwana III’s daughter Ratu Timur (Ratu Kudhus), 
refused to allow the daughter of a north coast bupati, Radèn Adipati Panji Padmanegara of Kudhus, 
to return to be with her father after he had fallen seriously ill in February 1811, S.Br. 37, Radèn 
Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 28 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 22-2-1811); 
Padmasusastra 1902:157 no. 35.
13 Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 24-3-1808, letter bound 
in dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808.
14 Dj.Br. 21, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 21-2-1808. 
Many of Waterloo’s ideas were taken up by Engelhard in his memoir for Daendels dated the day 
after he relinquished his post, vAE (aanwinsten 1900) 235, N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-5-1808.
15 Waterloo, born Amsterdam 1769, had studied at the naval college at Semarang (1785-1788), 
starting his career at the age of 19 as a marine cadet and 3rd-class instructor at the college before 
moving to Surakarta in 1789 as an ensign (pennist) and then to Banda as book-keeper (boekhouder) 
(1795-1798). In 1798, in an unexplained career promotion, he was made Second Resident in 
Yogyakarta and then First Resident in 1803. In May 1808, he became a member of the Forestry 
Administration (Administratie der Houtbosschen) and the following year was appointed Resident 
of Cirebon (1809-1812) where he served until his death on 6-5-1812, De Haan 1935a:662. During 
his time in Cirebon, he helped to save the life of Pangéran Natakusuma and his eldest son, R.T. 
Natadiningrat, who were in his care and whom Daendels wished to see murdered, pp. 277-8.
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court, referring to the strandgeld payments (rent for VOC-annexed north coast 
areas) made by the Company for the territories ceded by Sunan Pakubuwana 
II (reigned 1726-1749) in 1743 and the terms of ceremonial address used in cor-
respondence with the kraton. He stressed the deep suspicion and jealousy of 
the two Surakarta courts towards Yogya, in particular the hatred of Pangéran 
Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) for the sultan, an outcome of the memory 
of a previous political crisis in 1787-1790,16 and referred to the ‘expansionist 
tendencies’ of Yogyakarta during that episode. He concluded, as Raffles would 
do in 1812, that if an enemy force landed in Java the attitude of the sultan was 
most to be feared. In a prescient passage, the Yogya Resident surmised that 
once the British had opened up secret relations with the Javanese courts prior 
to an attack things would go badly for the Dutch – all of which indeed came to 
pass during the course of the British invasion of Java in August 1811.
In terms of internal court politics, he portrayed the second sultan as a 
fearful and selfish man preparing to meet the challenges of old age. Neither 
Dipanagara’s father, the Crown Prince, nor the Yogya patih (first minister), 
Danureja II, in Waterloo’s estimation, had the courage to stand up to him 
although they bore him little affection. The Yogya first minister could perhaps, 
in Waterloo’s opinion, be induced to work more closely with the European 
government, but besides him, the only two really important princes in 
Yogyakarta for the Dutch were Natakusuma (Pakualam I, 1764-1829, reigned 
1812-1829) and Mangkudiningrat (circa 1778-1824), a son of the second sul-
tan by his well-born second official wife, Ratu Mas (Carey 1992:401 note 10), 
a granddaughter of Pakubuwana II (reigned 1726-1749). Both were hugely 
talented and ambitious, but in Waterloo’s estimation, they would not act in 
anything where their political advantage was not assured.
He ended his letter by pressing for a new division of central Java between 
the courts and the government. His proposal was for an annexation of all land 
16 The 1787-1790 political crisis, also known as the Pakepung affair after the ‘encirclement’ of 
Surakarta, was precipitated by Pakubuwana IV’s attempt to bring about a change in the balance of 
power in central Java by forcing Dutch recognition of Surakarta as the senior kraton and pressing 
the claims of Mangkunagara I (reigned 1757-1795) to the throne of Yogya. The young Sunan was 
persuaded to this course by his santri advisers, who wielded an important religious influence over 
him, although suggestions that they had connections with the fundamentalist Wahhābī sect have 
been proved groundless. The situation was made more serious for the Dutch by the duplicity of 
their First Resident in Surakarta, Andries Hartsinck. Eventually the sultan (Hamengkubuwana I) 
was able to convince the Dutch to act on Yogya’s behalf and, after joining in a rapprochement with 
the Mangkunagaran troops, both courts took part with a Dutch contingent in the encirclement of 
Surakarta in November 1790. The pressure on the Sunan forced him to part with his advisers, but 
contrary to the first sultan’s expectations it did not lead to any marked change in Yogyakarta’s status, 
nor did the Mangkunagaran receive the recognition it expected for its part in the affair. Although 
the upshot was a resounding vindication for the system of the division of Java between the three 
courts (Yogyakarta, Surakarta and the Mangkunagaran) built up so painstakingly since the 1755 
Giyanti treaty, it left a legacy of bitterness which later manifested itself in the hostile attitude of the 
Surakarta courts towards Yogyakarta during the second sultan’s reign, see Ricklefs 1974a:285-340.
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north of a line running from Boyolali – a key strategic point for the Dutch 
(Houben 1994:111) – as far east as the borders of government-controlled 
regions of Surabaya and the Oosthoek. This would include the Yogya dis-
tricts of Gagatan, Sérang, Seséla, Wirasari, Grobogan, Waru, Teras-Karas 
(Ngawèn), and the Surakarta areas of northern Sokawati and Jagaraga, as 
well as the whole of Blora and Caruban. Part of the sultan’s eastern outly-
ing districts to the north of Madiun was also to be included, including most 
of the mancanagara province of Jipang, which along with Blora,17 would, in 
Waterloo’s view, help to alleviate the desperate shortage of timber in the 
Dutch-controlled areas of the north coast (Map 3). This need to secure new 
supplies from the teak forests of the adjacent eastern mancanagara districts to 
prevent the closure of the Rembang shipyards had been constantly stressed 
by senior VOC officials from the seventeenth century (Nagtegaal 1996:193-9). 
With the effects of the British blockade of Javanese coastal waters now being 
keenly felt, it was essential that these yards continue to function.18
To the west of Boyolali, Waterloo’s proposed annexation plans were even 
more ambitious. He suggested the annexation of parts of the core districts of 
Pajang, Mataram, Kedhu, Bagelèn and Banyumas, together with the whole 
island of Nusa Kambangan and the port of Cilacap. These last were of par-
ticular strategic interest, in Waterloo’s view, for the western entrance to the 
strait which divides Nusa Kambangan from mainland Java called Kali Bujang 
provided the only deepwater anchorage for seagoing vessels along the whole 
of Java’s south coast.19 Furthermore, several of these western districts, in par-
ticular Kedhu and Bagelèn along with Grobogan, provided vital rice supplies 
which the European government relied on to feed their garrisons on the north 
coast and in eastern Indonesia (Nagtegaal 1996:199-204). Like Engelhard, 
Waterloo also recommended the annexation of the south coast district of 
Pacitan to enhance government-sponsored pepper production there and to 
17 On the location of these districts, see Map of central and east Java on pp. xxviii-xxx.
18 NOK 1, Van Overstraten, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 13-10-1796, 34-5; Carey 1984a:9 note 
39 (on the problems of the ship-building industry in Rembang, where three-master schooners 
had been laid down, because of exhaustion of local supplies and the need to import wood from 
Blora); Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 18-12-1802 (on 
attempts to get Hamengkubuwana II’s agreement to felling of timber in Jipang); De Jonge and Van 
Deventer 1884-88, XIII:211-33 (Nicolaus Engelhard’s report of 27-5-1803 on the desperate need for 
new sources of timber, the Dutch-controlled areas of Rembang, Lasem and Tuban having become 
completely worked out and needing 25 years to recover); Dj.Br. 49, Nicolaus Engelhard (Sema-
rang) to Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta), 20-11-1803 (on encroachments being made on wood in 
Jipang and Blora despite resistance of local bupati); Raffles 1817, I:39-41 (on great importance of 
timber reserves in eastern mancanagara, which was reflected in local toponyms like Walikukun 
and Kadhawung – both of which referred to tree species – for local districts); IOL G21/65, ‘Memo-
randum respecting Java’, 1813 (on decline in teak production since 1777 and creation of Forestry 
Board by Daendels in 1808). See further Nagtegaal 1996:193-9 (on VOC exhaustion of pasisir teak 
forests in the seventeenth century); Remmelink 1994:13-4 (on the timber yards of the VOC).
19 For further discussion, see Crawfurd 1971:303.
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improve the road network and fortifications both as a deterrent against enemy 
landings and to prevent pirates from using the bay of Pacitan as a smuggling 
base.20 Some improvements in the fortifications in Yogyakarta and Surakarta 
were also advocated to provide more protection to the European and Chinese 
communities in the event of a British attack. The outgoing Resident likewise 
urged Daendels to demand an increase in the number of porters supplied by 
the rulers to carry goods between the princely territories and Semarang, and 
criticized the chaotic distribution of land between the courts in the core areas 
of Pajang and Mataram which gave rise to so many village wars and criminal 
activities.21
Waterloo’s letter was lengthy and persuasive. Together with the final 
memorandum of his Semarang superior, Engelhard, it constituted a blue-
print for annexation which, if followed, would have completely refashioned 
the political face of Java. It is uncertain how much direct influence it had 
on Daendels, but it served to highlight many of the key issues which drove 
the European government from this point to the end of the Java War. These 
included access to strategic resources (timber, cash crops, manpower), the 
security of Java’s vulnerable south coast in time of war, annexation of rice-
producing districts (Kedhu, Bagelèn and the western mancanagara), greater 
clarity of boundaries between Surakarta and Yogyakarta in the core regions, 
and tighter military and political control of the courts. In fact, many of the 
Yogya Resident’s recommendations regarding annexations in east Java were 
acted upon in the treaties which Daendels later ratified with the courts on 6 
and 10 January 1811.22 But, there were other measures, such as the annexation 
of Pacitan and Kedhu, which did not take place until the British period (Carey 
1980:97-9, 1992:447 note 232; Van Deventer 1891:100), and still others, such as 
the redistribution of land in the central apanage districts and the annexations 
of the remaining eastern and western mancanagara which did not occur until 
after the Java War (Houben 1994:41-69). However, the basis of a possible new 
division of Java and changes in the relationship with the courts had been laid 
out and they were to remain a blueprint for many of the policies pursued by 
the European government over the next four years.
20 Apparently Pacitan Bay and other parts of the south coast were regularly used as smuggling 
bases by pirates from Bali, Sulawesi and other parts of eastern Indonesia: in April 1805, 32 small 
ships were sighted off the south coast in the Surakarta area of Segarawedhi (Zandzee or Sand 
Sea) by the patih of the bupati of Pacitan, AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to J.G. van den Berg 
(Surakarta), 16-4-1805. See further Chapter I note 58, Chapter VI note 179.
21 See pp. 15, 48.
22 Daendels 1814: Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 27-8; Dj.Br. 27, ‘Map of government acquisi-
tions in January 1811’. The measures for the demarcation of the boundaries, however, were not 
finalised before the fall of the Franco-Dutch government in September 1811, see Dj.Br. 22, Pieter 
Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 29-7-1811; NvB Port 4 pt. 12, Jacob Andries van 
Braam (Semarang) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia), 13-12-1811.
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Daendels’ edicts on ceremonial and etiquette and their impact 
While these suggestions for a new territorial division of Java were being 
weighed in Batavia, Daendels’ initiatives for a new relationship with the 
courts began to be implemented. His first move had already been trailed in 
his communications with Nicolaus Engelhard, namely, the abolition of the 
position of governor and director of Java’s Northeast Coast which Daendels 
carried out in person in Semarang on 13 May 1808 (De Haan 1910-12, IV:78). 
The way was now open for direct communications between the governor-
general and the Residents at the courts. This was a key part of Daendels’ plan 
to centralise government on Batavia. Following up his original instruction 
to the newly appointed Residents, Pieter Engelhard and J.A. van Braam, to 
impart to the rulers ‘a striking impression’ of the prestige of the new admin-
istration, Daendels proceeded on 28 July 1808 to promulgate his celebrated 
Edict on Ceremonial and Etiquette (Valck 1844:140; Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, I:33; Van der Chijs 1895-97, XIV:63-5). This did away with some of 
the ceremonial functions previously performed by the Residents for the rul-
ers which Daendels considered degrading (Daendels 1814:94) and accorded 
them various privileges more in accord with their new positions as direct 
representatives of the governor-general and the royal government in The 
Hague. Thus the First Residents now received the title of ‘minister’ with 
new uniforms (blue coats with high collars braided in gold with olives, olive 
branches and flat gold buttons, white breeches with embroidered knee bands 
and white silk stockings, tricorn black hats with black straps and cockade), 
and were allowed to carry a blue and gold state parasol or payung embla-
zoned with the arms of the king of Holland (Van der Chijs 1895-97, XIV:63-5). 
On official occasions, they were not to remove their hats when approaching 
the ruler, who was to rise to greet the Dutch representative and make space 
for him immediately to his left on his throne, thus allowing him to sit at 
exactly the monarch’s level. Likewise, they were no longer required to serve 
the ruler in a menial fashion with drink and betelnut. Various other articles 
regulated the new forms of greeting when saluting the ruler both inside and 
outside the kraton: the minister, for example, was now accorded a military 
escort of mounted dragoons on all official visits to the court and was no 
longer expected to stop his coach when passing that of the ruler on the high 
road.23 A subsequent edict on 16 August 1808 regulated the position of the 
Second Resident, now renamed ‘secretary’ (Van Kesteren 1887:1278-9; Van 
der Chijs 1895-97, XV:87). 
The changes in ceremonial amounted to a very substantial alteration to 
the position of the Dutch representatives at the courts which struck at the 
23 For a full description of the changes in ceremonial, see S.Br. 55, ‘Ontwerp van een vast cere-
monieel van de residenten aan de hoven van Sourakarta en Djokjokarta, 1808’.
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heart of the Javanese understanding of the Dutch presence in Java. This 
Javanese political philosophy has been extensively analysed by Ricklefs 
(1974a:362-413) on the basis of two late eighteenth-century texts, the Babad 
Kraton and the Serat Surya Raja, and an early nineteenth-century version of the 
Serat Sakondhar which deals with the highly mythologized Javanese account 
of the history of Alexander of Macedon. Briefly, these provide evidence that 
by the late eighteenth century the Yogyakarta court had legitimised the Dutch 
presence in west Java, roughly in the Pasundan area, by regarding them as 
legal descendants of the Sundanese kingdom of Pajajaran. This kingdom, 
which was roughly contemporaneous with the great east Javanese kingdom 
of Majapahit (1292-circa 1527), has an obscure history but its memory is 
nevertheless preserved in a mythical fashion in the modern Javanese babad 
literature. For the Javanese, Pajajaran had two important characteristics: first, 
it was a foreign kingdom since it lay in the Sundanese-speaking area of west 
Java, and second it ruled the high mountains of the Priangan region, a place 
closely associated in the Javanese view with the spirit world, hence the deri-
vation of the place name ‘Priangan’ from the Javanese parahyangan or prayan-
gan, meaning the ‘abode of the spirits’ (Ricklefs 1974a:375). This area had an 
important association for the rulers of Mataram for their spiritual consort, 
Ratu Kidul, was, according to courtly tradition, a princess of Pajajaran.24 This 
same tradition held that the Dutch too, by virtue of Governor-General Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen’s (in office 1618-1623, 1627-1629) foundation of Batavia on 
the site of the Sundanese fishing port of Sunda Kelapa (Jayakarta) in 1619 and 
his mythical descent from another Pajajaran princess, who carried the signs 
of legitimacy in the form of flaming female pudenda, were now the lawful 
successors of the foreign kingdom of Pajajaran and rulers over the spiritually 
significant Priangan region (Ricklefs 1974a:399-413). Even Dipanagara in his 
writings in exile in Makassar (1833-1855) reflected this dichotomy between 
Majapahit and Pajajaran as representatives of two royal traditions in Java 
when he related the well-known story of the twin cannon, Kyai Setoma and 
Nyai Setomi, representing the Dutch and the Javanese, and specifically stated 
that Dutch-ruled Batavia had assumed the mantle of Pajajaran.25 
In political terms this meant that the Dutch governor-generals who 
stemmed from Coen – Daendels included – were regarded as being very 
senior sovereign partners in Java, but rulers who carried no rights over the 
Javanese kingdoms of central and east Java. The practical expression of this 
political philosophy lay in the Javanese view of a dualistic hegemony on the 
island with the Dutch ruling the west and the Javanese supreme in the centre 
and east, namely the kejawèn or area of Javanese settlement. While the Dutch 
24 See Chapter IV note 36.
25 Makassar Notebook I:155: Pajajaran pan wus ngalih kuthanira Batawi. On the twin cannon, see 
Crucq 1930, 70:195-204, 1938, 78:93-110, 1940, 80:49-59.
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governor-general was referred to respectfully by the south-central Javanese 
rulers as ‘grandfather’ (ingkang éyang), this did not indicate a close personal 
relationship. On the contrary, although the governor-general was revered as 
a senior ruler, he was not expected to involve himself personally in the affairs 
of the courts and on nearly all occasions when a governor-general visited the 
Principalities up to the outbreak of the Java War difficulties ensued.26 
At the same time, it was considered inappropriate for an incoming gover-
nor-general to receive the sultan’s felicitations at any place except Batavia for 
in the Yogya ruler’s eyes this had the nature of an embassy to a neighbouring 
kingdom (Ricklefs 1974a:247-54, 373). In these circumstances the Dutch repre-
sentative at the courts occupied a position of particular importance for, in the 
Javanese view, he was seen to fit into a dual position consisting of two men, 
the patih (first minister) and the Resident, who owed loyalty both to the Dutch 
and the Javanese. Thus the Resident was treated by the Javanese rulers as an 
ambassador of the Dutch East Indies Company who fulfilled certain ceremo-
nial functions at their court, and even at times acted as their servant, hence 
the pouring of wine and serving of betelnut at state receptions. Conversations 
between the rulers and the Residents, which are recorded in the babad, reflect 
this attitude, for the ruler is usually portrayed addressing the Resident in 
Low Javanese and the Resident replying in High Javanese (Van Kesteren 
1887:1280; Ricklefs 1974a:368). The VOC even appeared to condone this view 
of the Resident as the joint servant of the Javanese ruler and the Company 
by accepting the ruler’s suggestions for promotions at the kraton garrisons or 
for nomination as Resident. Thus in April 1792 at the time of his accession, 
the newly installed second sultan pressed the governor of Java’s Northeast 
Coast, P.G. van Overstraten, to allow Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk (in office 
1786-1798) to remain as First Resident because, as the governor reported, Van 
IJsseldijk ‘had a special talent for getting on with the Javanese and making 
himself beloved by them’, a highly important recommendation given the 
circumstances of his position.27 Furthermore, the Resident even appears to 
26 Ricklefs 1974a:40, 373 refers to Governor-General G.W. Baron van Imhoff’s (in office 1743-
1750) disastrous May 1746 visit to Surakarta which occasioned Mangkubumi (Hamengkubuwana 
I’s) rebellion. Political difficulties also arose over Daendels’ visits to the courts in July 1809 and 
December 1810-January 1811 and again during Raffles’ visits in December 1811 and June 1812, 
the last to accompany the British force which stormed the Yogya kraton. Even Governor-General 
G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen’s (in office 1816-1826) 29-31 August 1819 and 3-5 September 1822 visits 
proved problematic because of his insistence that his wife should take her place beside him on the 
throne during the official receptions (Chapter X note 63), his subsequent decision to abolish the 
European-leased estates and his incautious remarks in Surakarta about his administration’s plans 
for further annexations, Van der Kemp 1897:23-4; Carey 1984b:58; Houben 1994:13 note 14.
27 De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XII:259. Dutch contemporaries were not so charitable: 
R.G. van Polanen criticized his ‘good nature and desire to be in everyone’s favour, [which] always 
stood in the way of his better judgement’ (Poensen 1905:87 note 1), and Daendels dismissed him as 
‘the weakest man and worst financier in Java’ (De Haan 1935a:667). According to the Dutch histo-
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have taken an oath of allegiance to the ruler to whose court he was assigned 
and as late as September 1810, long after Daendels’ edicts, Pieter Engelhard 
was still referring to the sultan as ‘my prince’ in a letter to his colleague in 
Surakarta.28 It was also the case that the Residents were usually in debt to the 
ruler given the exceptional demands of their position at the courts. Waterloo, 
for example, owed Hamengkubuwana II some 8,000 Spanish dollars by the 
time of his departure in April 1808, and the Yogya ruler refused to allow him 
to leave for Batavia until the debt – along with the accumulated compound 
interest of nine percent per annum – was cleared by his successor, who was 
himself constrained to borrow some 50,000 Indies guilders from the sultan to 
cover his costs.29 It was the same in Surakarta, where Waterloo’s counterpart, 
B.F. von Liebeherr, lamented his heavy personal losses due to the European 
war and the fact that his 15,000 Spanish dollar salary was paid in paper while 
his debts to the Sunan had to be serviced in silver.30
Nevertheless, Daendels’ edicts effectively destroyed the finely balanced 
political structure whereby Dutch rule in Java had been sanctioned at the 
courts. If the articles of the edicts were carried out as Daendels wished 
there could no longer be any pretence that the Resident was a joint servant 
of the European government and the ruler. The second sultan’s reaction, as 
recorded in both the Dutch and Javanese accounts, was one of dismay. The 
rian François de Haan, he was a ‘good-looking man but a weak character’ (knappe kop, slap karakter; 
De Haan 1935a:667). Even with the second sultan, he eventually fell out of favour in 1796 over 
his involvement in a quarrel between the ruler and his elder brother, Pangéran Ngabèhi, and the 
Semarang governor was asked to replace him within the year, Van Kesteren 1887:1280; De Jonge 
and Van Deventer 1884-88, XII:435. See further Neve 1995:176-8 (on Van IJsseldijk’s family).
28 Dj.Br. 37, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 1-9-1810. Servatius 
was acting Resident in Surakarta at this time in the absence of his superior J.A. van Braam in 
Semarang.
29 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 14-4-1808. Hameng-
kubuwana II refused to accept the financial guarantee of the Yogya kapitan cina (captain of the 
Chinese), Tan Jin Sing (in office 1803-1813), and only allowed Waterloo to depart when Engelhard 
himself stood surety for him, a poor guarantee given the new Resident’s financial incompetence. 
In fact, when he received notification of his own replacement by Gustaf Willem Wiese in August 
1808, Engelhard begged to be allowed to extend his term as Resident by a few months so that 
he could benefit from the profits of the annual autumn birds’ nests harvest from the south coast 
(see Chapter I, Chapter VII note 219), which could double a Resident’s income of 15,000 ronde 
realen (silver reals) a year. He told Daendels that his salary as a ‘minister’ was ‘not enough to 
run an economical household and he could not even pay for his daily bread’, Dj.Br. 23, Pieter 
Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 11-8-1808. Engelhard’s loan of 50,000 Indies 
guilders from the sultan is mentioned in Dj.Br. 22, J.W. Janssens (Batavia) to Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta), 15-7-1811. It appears to have been covered by a loan for a similar sum which Engel-
hard obtained from his uncle, the former governor-general, Johannes Siberg (in office 1801-1805) 
and which he later repaid, De Haan 1910-12, I pt. 2:97.
30 S.Br. 55, B.F. von Liebeherr (Surakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 1-11-1806. Von 
Liebeherr remarked that only the profits from the annual birds’ nests harvest enabled him to 
make ends meet, neither the administration of the Sunan’s tax-farm nor the VOC opium monop-
oly affording him much financial return. See note 29, Chapter VII note 219.
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new ‘ministers’ at the courts were described in a late nineteenth century 
court chronicle as having taken on the functions of the defunct governorship 
of Semarang, a position which the Javanese rulers had never really accepted 
because it clashed with their dualistic concept of rule in Java.31 According to 
this Yogya chronicle, the sultan entertained few illusions about the serious-
ness of the change:
XVI. 42  The sultan was disturbed at heart
 earnestly pondering over the difficulties.
 He already felt quietly about the future
 [that] the Dutch would rule,
 push aside his royal dignity
 [and] break his authority.
 In the end, they would gather up Java
 like gold carried along by water.32
In his own babad, Dipanagara briefly mentioned the lengthy discussions after 
the news of Daendels’ edicts was received in Yogya. In particular, he referred 
to the new seating arrangements and the right of the minister (Resident) to 
carry a state umbrella,33 an arrangement which was described in the Surakarta 
version of the Babad Dipanagara as putting the Resident on an equal footing 
with the sultan (Carey 1981a:234-5 note 9). Despite the succinctness of his 
references, it is clear that the profound changes wrought by Daendels unset-
tled him as much as his Yogya contemporaries. Indeed, we will see below that 
one of his war aims was to return Java to the state it was in before the 1808 
reforms. Thus, in the negotiations with the Dutch officer who arranged the 
initial ceasefire arrangements with Dipanagara in December 1829, one of the 
prince’s senior commanders gave the Dutch four options in terms of a politi-
cal settlement all of which harked back to the pre-Daendels era. The most 
significant of these was that they should restrict themselves to the north coast 
(pasisir) – including west Java and the Oosthoek – if they wished to remain in 
Java in a private trading capacity.34
31 Ricklefs 1974a:371-2; Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Bata-
via), 22 Jumadilakir AJ 1735 (AD 15-8-1808) (on the minister now having to be treated on the same 
level as the erstwhile Semarang governor); S.Br. 23, Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bata-
via), 1-8-1812 (on Pakubuwana IV’s willingness to receive him as ‘governor of Semarang’ given 
his previous position as ‘civil commissioner of the Eastern Districts’ and landdrost of Semarang); 
BNg, I:62, XVI (Dhandhanggula) 34. Minister sinebut/ pangwasa Delèr Semarang.
32 BNg, I:63, XVI.42. Sang Nata kampitèng tyasé/ ngacipuh ngèsthi kéwuh/ wus rumaos sinangkan 
ririh/ Kumpeni mangrèhira/ andheseg keprabun/ anggegempil panguwasa/ wusanana ngepak ngepel pulo 
Jawi/ lir mas kéntaring toya.
33 BD (Manado), I:126-7, XIV.83-4.
34 Carey 1974b:285-8, the other options were: 1. to remain as soldiers in the pay of the Javanese 
rulers as in the VOC period; 2. to return home to the Netherlands and trade with Java on condi-
tion that they paid the right market prices for Javanese products or the right rent if they wished 
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At first a head-long conflict was avoided. The new Yogya Resident, Pieter 
Engelhard, a cousin of the last Semarang governor and a member of the same 
immensely able Swiss-Dutch family, was according to both Dutch and Javanese 
sources an accomplished diplomat and a person of excellent character (bèrbudi). 
During his time in office, he did much to temper the impetuousness and arro-
gance of Daendels’ demands (Poensen 1905:126; De Haan 1910-12, I pt. 2:97-8). 
However, it was clear that the changes in the position of the courts with regard 
to the European government could not be disguised by diplomatic niceties. 
Engelhard’s pretence that the higher rank accorded to the Resident – the same 
rank, he pointed out, which was accorded to VOC ambassadors to the Manchu 
court in Peking – did the sultan more honour than that of the title of opperhoofd 
(‘chief’) borne by the Residents in the days of the Company, and better reflected 
the new monarchical constitution in Holland, was not accepted by the Yogya 
ruler. In a letter to Daendels, he protested vigorously about the ‘minister’ tak-
ing his place to his left at the same level, on a par with the former governor of 
Java’s Northeast Coast, and indeed seated beside him on his throne on official 
occasions. As for the Resident not stopping his carriage when he crossed that 
of the sultan, this would not happen, the sultan informed Daendels, because 
he would personally alert the Dutch representative to his intended sorties from 
the kraton so their paths would never cross!35 
The Yogya babad describes how immediately upon receipt of the edict, 
the sultan ordered his throne to be changed in order to maintain his more 
elevated position during state functions. This involved making the dhampar 
narrower so that only the ruler could sit on it,36 and having a wooden foot-
stool placed under it so that he would always sit higher than the Resident 
even when he went to visit him in the Residency.37 We will see in a subse-
quent chapter how this procedure nearly resulted in an armed clash between 
the sultan’s entourage and British officers in the Residency ‘throne room’ at 
the time of Raffles’ visit to Yogya on 27 December 1811.38
The reactions of the Surakarta court to the 28 July edict were apparently 
much more accommodating than those in Yogya. On 11 August 1808, Van 
Braam reported that the Sunan had agreed to all the clauses of the new edict 
‘without demur’ and had ordered the court gamelan to play on the Sitinggil 
(‘High Ground’) at the entrance to the kraton as a sign of his acceptance, even 
delegating one of his aged nyai (female retainers) to carry the ‘minister’s’ gold-
to lease lands; or 3. that they should embrace Islam in which case their livelihood and positions 
would be improved. See further below Chapter XII.
35 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 3-8-1808; Dj.Br. 41, 
Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 22 Jumadilakir AJ 1735 (AD 
15-8-1808).
36 B.Ng. I:64, XVII.19-20.
37 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 10-6-1809; Houben 1994:11.
38 See Chapter VII note 174.
Plate 18. Nicolaus Engelhard (1761-1831), governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, 
1803-1808. Frontispiece from De Haan 1910-12, III.
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and-blue state umbrella on his official visits to the court.39 He also lost no 
opportunity to make disparaging remarks about his Yogya rival always seek-
ing to cast himself in a more positive light with the European authorities. On 
receiving the news that Daendels had written a letter to the sultan telling him 
about the reason for his troop build-up in Semarang, he declared archly, ‘That 
gives me real pleasure; now he will at last be convinced of the honest senti-
ments of the Hollanders’.40 Five years’ earlier, during his May 1803 inspection 
tour through south-central and east Java, Engelhard had noticed that the 
Sunan’s court was beginning to dress ‘in European style’ despite the huge 
debts this entailed (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:128; Chapter VI 
note 165), an indication perhaps that the Sunan could see the value of adopting 
the sartorial as well as the political fashions of Java’s foreign rulers.
For those who knew the true character of the Surakarta monarch, this 
behaviour was hard to credit. In his final memorandum as Semarang gover-
nor, Nicolaus Engelhard had warned that although Sunan Pakubuwana IV 
might appear outwardly friendly, he was in fact a cruel and revengeful char-
acter, brimming with suspicion and a master of disguise.41 Painting a horrific 
portrait of his murderous conduct, which included the poisoning or attempted 
poisoning of senior Dutch officials and the strangulation of his own younger 
sister, Engelhard described the Sunan as a dissembling barbarian.42 Indeed, in 
May 1803, two years after his appointment as Semarang governor, Engelhard 
had already observed that (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:128):
for the Company it is always more preferable to have dealings with a resolute 
court like that of the sultan, provided there is an alert Resident there, rather than 
the Sunan’s court, which follows the wishes of the Resident as long as it is able to 
cajole and use him for its own purposes. 
39 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 11-8-1808.
40 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 22-5-1808.
41 vAE (aanwinsten 1900) 235, N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-5-1808. Engelhard drew on reports 
by the Surakarta Residents, in particular those of B.F. von Liebeherr, for his final memorandum
42 vAE (aanwinsten 1900), N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-5-1808, related Pakubuwana IV’s 
attempted poisoning of the Surakarta Resident, B.J. van Nieuwkerken genaamd Nijvenheim (in 
office 1796-1803), and his strangulation of his sixteen-year-old younger sister, Radèn Ayu Sumiyah 
(Padmasusastra 1902:157 no. 26), for an illicit affair after seven attempts to poison her had failed 
and he had pretended to give her a public pardon. Her lover was apparently dismembered and one 
of his ears eaten raw by Pakubuwana IV’s younger brother, Pangéran Mangkubumi, after he had 
been dissuaded from eating his heart and genitals, see also Stockdale 1812:156. On the probable 
poisoning of an earlier Surakarta Resident, Willem Adriaan Palm (in office 1784-1788), see Ricklefs 
1974a:297. The reference in Stockdale 1812:318-9, to the poisoning of thirteen unofficial wives of 
Pakubuwana III by the administration of poison from the upas tree in February 1776 is, however, a 
fabrication, see Bastin 1985:29-44. A more favourable view of Pakubuwana IV can be found in Java 
NOK 1, Van Overstraten, ‘Memorie’, 13-10-1796, who described the Sunan as ‘young, shrewd and 
full of fire’ and not nearly as credulous and superstitious (bijgeloovig) as Van Overstraten’s predeces-
sor, Jan Greeve (in office 1787-1791), had made him out to be in 1790, see Ricklefs 1974a:328-30. For 
another contemporary assessment of Pakubuwana IV, see Chapter VIII note 195.
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In the event of open hostilities, he concluded that there was more to be 
feared from Surakarta than from Yogya. The sultan, in his view, would be 
easily provoked into strong arm tactics, whereas the Sunan would always 
act more underhandedly and once plans were afoot, as in 1790,43 it would 
be very difficult to deter him (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:143). 
Engelhard’s opinions reflected the views of senior VOC officials who had 
served at the courts during the late 1790s and early 1800s: thus J.G. van den 
Berg (1762-1842), a fluent Javanese speaker, who served as First Resident at 
both Yogyakarta and Surakarta, observed in 1801 that ‘despite all his whims 
and caprices, the sultan [Hamengkubuwana II] pleases me better than that 
hypocrite of a Sunan’, and that although less urbane and well-bred than the 
Sunan he found him altogether more engaging.44 Van den Berg’s predeces-
sor in Yogya, Van IJsseldijk (1757-1817), concurred. Writing of the Sunan as a 
‘master of guile who in his heart had an aversion to all Europeans’, he sug-
gested that the Surakarta ruler’s whole reign from 1788 had been dominated 
by plans to bring about a lessening of European power in Java.45
The views of these Dutch officials, steeped as they were in an under-
standing of court politics and with lengthy careers in Company service in 
Java behind them, counted for little with the new administration. Neither 
Daendels nor his close associates heeded their warnings. Indeed, given his 
own blood-drenched career, the odd strangulation or poisoning was hardly 
something that Daendels would have lost much sleep over. What did concern 
him was the prestige of his government. So when both Van Braam and the 
marshal’s deputy, Rear-Admiral Arnold Adriaan Buyskes,46 who visited the 
43 Engelhard had used the phrases altoos met de zaaken voor de vuist uit zal komen and altoos met 
listen zal te werk gaan, De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:143. On the 1790 affair, see note 16.
44 Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 6-12-1801, 
5-7-1802. For biographical details of Van den Berg, see Genealogie Van den Berg 1918:31-4.
45 Baud 306, ‘Rapport van W.H. van IJ sseldij k omtrent de vorstenlanden’ (henceforth: Van IJ s-
seldijk, ‘Rapport’), 11-12-1816.
46 Buyskes had been sent to Java by Louis Napoleon on a separate fast frigate so that in the 
event of Daendels’ capture by the British – a strong possibility given their naval blockade of 
Indonesian waters – Java would have a replacement governor-general. Since both Buyskes and 
Daendels arrived safely in Batavia, for the first year of the marshal’s administration, the rear-
admiral was given the position of lieutenant governor-general, which involved him in chairing 
the Council of the Indies (Raad van Indië) and acting as Daendel’s deputy during the marshal’s 
frequent absences from the colonial capital, Dj.Br. 23, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to 
H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 26 Rabingulawal AJ 1735 (AD 23-5-1808). In 1809, he was replaced 
by Daendels’ ally Van Braam who, while remaining Resident (‘minister’) of Surakarta, was also 
appointed to serve as president der Hooge Regeering, the highest administrative post which 
Daendels had to bestow, and – from 25-10-1809 – as governor-general ad interim in the event of 
Daendels’ death. In the Yogya babad he is sometimes referred to as the ‘little [governor]-general’ 
(jéndral cilik) to distinguish him from Daendels himself. He lost both these positions on 17 July 
1811 after J.W. Janssens had taken over as governor-general, see Van der Chijs 1895-97, XVI:712. 
At that time, Janssens decided to abolish the post of President der Hooge Regering for good, De 
Haan 1935a:507; Van Kesteren 1887:1288 note 1; B.Ng. I:75, XX.28-9. 
V The beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java 175
sultan on 19 November 1808 in his capacity as lieutenant governor-general, 
reported the contrast in the attitude of the Yogya court when compared to 
that of Surakarta, he took notice. 
According to the Yogya babad, Buyskes was put out by the less honour-
able way he was received in the sultan’s kraton.47 Van Braam, meanwhile, 
was struck by the ‘astonishing difference’ in the friendliness of the two courts 
when he visited Yogya in mid-October, pointing out that ‘the sultan cannot 
speak Malay and it is difficult to converse with him. He has a sort of wild 
look in his eyes which indicates suspicion and fear.’48 We will return to Van 
Braam’s visit at the end of this chapter in view of the Surakarta Resident’s 
bruising encounter with the young bupati wedana of the eastern mancana-
gara, Radèn Rongga, soon to become Daendel’s particular bête noire and the 
extraordinary events which attended the traditional tiger and buffalo fight 
staged in his honour. Meanwhile, his report and that of Buyskes helped to 
confirm Daendels’ antipathy towards the Yogya ruler which had already been 
evident at the time of his first arrival on the island. In his subsequent official 
account of his governor-generalship, the marshal wrote that whereas the 
Sunan had accepted the new ceremonial (Daendels 1814:94):
It was quite otherwise with the Sultan of Yogya. The contempt he felt for the Dutch 
Government caused him to disapprove of the new ceremonial […] he easily led 
himself to cause much unpleasantness to the government and he had supposedly 
designed a plan to rid himself of the Dutch.
So the stage was set for Yogyakarta’s confrontation with the ‘Thundering 
governor-general’ or Gupernur-Jéndral Guntur as he was known in Malay 
literature (Carey 1992:461 note 299). Contrary to Daendels’ expectations, how-
ever, the sultanate would survive the encounter rather better than the Dutch 
government.
Military manoeuvres: Javanese and Dutch
The problem for Daendels was that his government was bankrupt because of 
the British blockade and the military forces at his command were unreliable: 
‘a hastily put together rabble’ (Aukes 1935:28) was how one Dutch military 
historian described the marshal’s army of nearly 18,000 mainly Indonesian 
47 B.Ng. I:64, XVII.19-20; AN, Kabinet, 2-3-1837 no. 30, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Algemene 
Secretarie (Batavia), 18-2-1837, enclosing ‘Project ceremonieel voor de receptie van den Heere 
Luitenant Gouverneur-Generaal Buyskes aan het hof van Z.H. den Sultan Hamengkoe Boeono 
Senopatti Ing Ngalogo Abdul Rachman Sahidin Panoto Gomo Kalifatolah’, 19-11-1808.
48 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 17-10-1808, referring to 
Hamengkubuwana II’s verwilderd opslag van het oog.
Plate 19. Rear-Admiral Arnold Adriaan Buyskes (1771-1838). Lithograph by 
L. Springer. Photograph by courtesy of the Iconografisch Bureau, The Hague. 
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troops who by December 1810 were deserting at the rate of 70 a day (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:33; Chapter VI note 82). Not entirely tongue in 
cheek, Nicolaus Engelhard had proposed in his final memorandum of May 
1808 that the government should hire some holy men and ascetics, whom he 
referred to as tapa, to make favourable prophecies for the Dutch given the 
parlous situation which now confronted the former VOC.49 Meanwhile, in 
Yogya, his cousin, Pieter Engelhard, was desperately trying to find out ‘at 
third or fourth hand’ what the second sultan’s reactions might be to the gov-
ernment’s financial plight, ‘a situation which is now known by many Yogya 
courtiers’.50
With the defence of the island a priority, Daendels spent much of the first 
year of his administration attempting to strengthen his military position in 
central and east Java. In early May, he had notified the south-central Javanese 
rulers that he would be arriving in Semarang with a substantial military force 
and required delegations from the courts to meet him there in early to mid-
June.51 According to the Yogya chronicle, Daendels had informed the sultan 
that he would be going on from there to make a ‘tour of [central and east] 
Java’, news which brought the inhabitants of Yogya into uproar (oreg).52 The 
same account describes how the sultan proceeded to make military prepara-
tions, exercising his own troops and calling up the levies or prajurit arahan 
from the eastern mancanagara bupati and the Crown Prince’s establishment.53 
This description is also confirmed in Dipanagara’s babad, where he adds the 
detail that many in Yogya regarded it as unheard of that a governor-general 
was to come any further than Salatiga:54
49 vAE (aanwinsten 1900) 235, N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-5-1808.
50 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 10-10-1808.
51 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 21-5-1808; Dj.Br. 41, 
Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 26 Rabingulawal AJ 1735 (AD 
23-5-1808). Daendels arrived in Semarang on 12 May 1808 and used it as his base until late Sep-
tember while he inspected fortifications and defensive positions along the north coast (pasisir) 
and in east Java (Surabaya, Oosthoek).
52 B.Ng. I:65, XVII.42.
53 B.Ng. I:65-6, XVIII.1-14. The babad gives the date of 6 Rabingulakir AJ 1735 (AD 2-6-1808), 
but it is clear from the Dutch reports (note 51) that the news reached Yogya in early May. On 
the calling up of the prajurit arahan from the eastern mancanagara, see Dj.Br. 23, Radèn Rongga 
Prawiradirja III (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 29 Jumadilakir AJ 1735 (AD 22-8-1808), 
who states that he had given orders to his subjects in Madiun to get arms and horses ready before 
he departed for Semarang on 12 June 1808 so he would have sufficient escort for his journey as 
part of the Yogya delegation to meet Daendels. See further note 69.
54 BD (Manado), II:127, XIV (Sinom) 84-5. nulya Gurnadur ngejawi/ mapan Jéndral Dhandles iku 
namanira. 85. sampun prapta Surakarta/ yun lajeng mring Ngayogyèki/ kangjeng sultan datan arsa/ sabab 
dérèng wonten iki/ adat kang dhingin-dhingin/ Jéndral ngejawiya/ nanging kèndel nèng Semawis/ setun 
tebih mapan kèndel Salatiga.
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XIV. 84  Then the governor[-general] came to [central] Java
  His name was General Daendels.
 85  He arrived in Surakarta
  [and] wished to proceed to Yogya.
  But the sultan did not wish it
  for there was nothing about it
  in previous custom
  that a governor[-general] should come to [south-central] Java.
  Although some had come to [central] Java,
  they had stopped in Semarang,
  or at the very furthest, they had halted in Salatiga.
Dipanagara was, of course, conveniently forgetting here Baron G.W. van 
Imhoff’s May 1746 disastrous visit to Surakarta which had occasioned his 
great-grandfather Mangkubumi’s rebellion,55 although this would have been 
beyond the living memory of nearly all in Yogya in the late 1800s. Nevertheless, 
Dipanagara’s description fits nicely with the Yogyakarta court view of the 
dual division of Java in which the governor-general was expected to reside in 
Batavia and not involve himself in the internal affairs of central Java.
In fact, the prince’s account confuses events which took place over a rather 
longer period between 12 May and mid-August, the time when Daendels 
threatened to come to Yogya with his newly raised cavalry and mounted artil-
lery given that the sultan had shown a lack of ‘steadfastness in his feelings’ 
towards the European government.56 Even the Yogya chronicle is somewhat 
garbled. The military preparations in Yogya may have been in part a response 
to Daendels’ arrival in central Java, but they were also presented by the Yogya 
patih, Danureja II, as practical evidence of the sultan’s intention to come to the 
aid of the Dutch government should Java be attacked by the British, the new 
Daendels’ administration having to rely heavily on locally raised auxiliaries 
to make up its military requirements.57 Moreover, at least some of the troops 
of the eastern mancanagara bupati were in Yogya anyway, the Garebeg Mulud 
(Festival of The Prophet’s Birthday) having just occurred on 8 May.58
By mid-May, troop inspections were apparently taking place two to three 
times a week, according to Engelhard, and he could see Radèn Rongga’s 
eastern levies parading along the great avenue which ran past the Residency 
House, half armed with pikes and the rest with muskets.59 The ruler’s orders 
55 See note 26.
56 Dj.Br. 23, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 22 Jumadi-
lakir AJ 1735 (AD 15-8-1808). The Dutch translation of this letter refers to Hamengkubuwana II’s 
lack of vastigheid in zijn sentimenten.
57 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 12-5-1808.
58 See notes 53 and 63.
59 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 12-5-1808.
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were for half the 10,000-strong military establishment of the sultanate to be 
ready to take part in a grand review at his country seat at Rajawinangun just 
to the east of Yogya on Wednesday, 1 June.60 Dipanagara’s father, the Crown 
Prince, was to oversee the general troop muster in the presence of Engelhard, 
the Yogya garrison commander, and the army chief-of-staff and head of the 
Semarang military division, Colonel F.C.P. von Winckelmann, who had come 
down to Yogya especially for the event.61 We know from a kraton source 
that the young Dipanagara – then still styled Radèn Antawirya – was part 
of this parade commanding a detachment of fifteen mounted troops in the 
Crown Prince’s 763-strong contingent.62 His father-in-law, the Yogya bupati 
of Panolan, Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya III (in office 1803-1811), was also 
present with eighty mounted pikemen and musketeers.63 
Although those taking part were not to know it, this great review at 
Rajawinangun, would be one of the last set piece displays of Yogya military 
might before the dismemberment of the sultanate at the hands of the British 
in June 1812. The beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java would have as its 
curtain raiser a final mustering of at least half the gorgeously caparisoned 
Yogya mounted troops, an event which should have been captured in the 
sepia tint portraits of a court photographer like Kassian Cephas (1844-1912), 
or a great Woodbury and Page daguerreotype. 
What we do have is a vivid report from Pieter Engelhard of the events of 
that June day. This started in the early morning for him at the Crown Prince’s 
residence in the north-eastern corner of the kraton where he was joined by 
nine young unmarried noblemen or panji – bachelor confidants of the ruler 
– who were dressed in yellow silk shirts and trousers over which they sported 
60 Dj.Br. 23, J.G. Dietrée, ‘Translaat notitie van zoodanige troupes van Z.H. den sulthan te 
Djokjocarta also op den 6 van het ligt Rabiolakeer in ’t jaar Dal 1735 oft den 1 Juny 1808 door Z.H. 
den Kroon Prins op ’s vorstens buitenplaats Rodjo Winangoen g’inspecteerd zijn, ten bijweezen 
van den opperkoopman en Eerste Resident Pieter Engelhard, en den Colonel Adjutant Generaal 
en Chef d’Etat Major, Frans Carel Philip von Winckelman, Capitains [sic] S. Mollet, en [Lieute-
nant-Colonel] L.B. de Chasteauvieux, der Lieutenants A.J. Tion en J.H. Nagel, nevens den Opper 
Chirurgien G.W. Sentius’ (henceforth: Dietrée, ‘Translaat notitie’), 2-6-1808. For a description of 
the ruins of Rajawinangun and its ‘tastefully laid out grounds’ in the mid-nineteenth century, see 
D’Almeida 1864, II:122-3.
61 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 28-5-1808. Like 
many senior officers in Java at this time, Von Winckelmann (1757-1820) was a German, born in 
Saxony and a member of the Württemberg regiment, which had been sent out as a reinforcement 
by the VOC with Vice-Admiral Pieter Hartsinck’s squadron in 1805, De Haan 1935a:665-6. He was 
promoted as brigadier-general by Daendels in 1809.
62 Carey and Hoadley 2000:296-7. The Dutch translated list (full bibliographical citation see 
note 60) gives a figure of only 600 for the Crown Prince’s contingent. It should be noted that the 
spelling of ‘Antawirya’ and that of his official wife, the daughter of the Yogya bupati of Panolan, is 
always given as ‘Ontawirya’ in kraton documents, Chapter II note 68.
63 Dj.Br. 23, Dietrée, ‘Translaat notitie’, 2-6-1808 (34 of these troops were armed with cavalry 
carbines and the rest with pikes); Carey and Hoadley 2000:296, gives the smaller figure of 69.
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green velvet cuff-less jackets trimmed with gold and black velvet caps. 
Astride beautiful greys, they rode out with him to the paséban, the official 
meeting place on the northern alun-alun, to see the troops file out of the kraton, 
and then to the southeast bastion where the sultan was sitting with his official 
consorts and court ladies on top of the battlements watching his army as it 
marched out to Rajawinangun. After receiving the ruler’s unusually friendly 
greeting, Engelhard and his exotic bodyguard rode out around the kraton to 
follow the troops to the sultan’s country seat where they took their places in 
the central pavilion (pagelaran).64
After the princes had come forward one by one to pay the Resident their 
respects, a midday meal was served at which Engelhard was able to observe 
the Crown Prince at close quarters, commenting on the pleasing combination 
of the future Yogya ruler’s good character and distinguished and friendly 
appearance ‘which made him loved by great and small’. Profiting from this 
rare occasion when he was away from his father’s jealous gaze and in tempo-
rary charge of proceedings, the Crown Prince sought to prove his pro-Dutch 
sentiments by insisting that his tea should be served with milk like that of his 
Dutch guests,65 and crying out at the top of his voice that the Yogya courtiers 
and officials should speak nothing else but Malay on that day ‘because that 
was the language which the sultan’s friends, the Dutch, used with their peo-
ple!’66 In this fashion, the politics of the Daendelian era began to be played out 
at the level of language and taste as pro and anti-Dutch sentiments became 
increasingly fixed in the factional alignments of the Yogya court.
Following the midday collation, the Crown Prince then ordered the regi-
ments to assemble on the great open field before the country seat and to engage 
in two hours of military exercises and mock battles which allowed them to 
show off their skills with pikes and muskets to the watching Europeans. Yet 
again, according to Engelhard, the Javanese troops were shown to be seri-
ously deficient in the use of their firelocks although their handling of their 
long Javanese lances was second to none.67 At 4 p.m. the muster party came 
to an end and the weary Resident rode back to Yogya bringing to a close what 
in retrospect would prove one of the last full-scale reviews of the Javanese 
‘old order’.
While these events were taking place in Yogya, Daendels, now ensconced 
in Semarang with a 3,000-strong contingent of cavalry and mounted artillery 
64 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 2-6-1808.
65 On the significance of this in Surakarta in the mid-nineteenth century as a way of ‘bowing 
to European taste’, see D’Almeida 1864, II:79. When he succeeded as sultan, the Crown Prince 
(Hamengkubuwana III, reigned 1812-1814) continued his custom of serving European style food 
by including wheat bread (rati gandum) and butter (matéga), foods normally only eaten by Euro-
peans at this time, during entertainments in the kraton, Carey 1992:467 note 320.
66 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 2-6-1808.
67 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 2-6-1808.
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(12 May), decided to impress the sultan’s court with his own display of mili-
tary might. He wrote to the Yogya ruler requesting him to send some of his 
nobles to Semarang ‘to witness the measures he was taking for the defence 
of Java’ and ‘his sentiments towards the Javanese’.68 What the second sultan 
made of that last phrase is not recorded. What we do know from the Javanese 
accounts is that the Yogya visit to Semarang between 12-20 June69 was not a 
success. The delegation met with Daendels and were invited to witness his 
troop manoeuvres (15 June), but the head of the Yogya party, Radèn Rongga, 
is reported to have scarcely concealed his lack of interest in the military dis-
play (Poensen 1905:131). Daendels supposedly reciprocated by refusing to 
bid him farewell in person or send a message of greeting to the sultan.70 
This was all very different from the reception given to the Surakarta del-
egation which had spent a week in Semarang in early June, and had enjoyed 
a meeting with the governor-general which, according to Van Braam who 
accompanied the party, was marked ‘by the greatest friendship and respect’. 
A particular hit was the presence of the Sunan’s youngest son by his official 
consort, Ratu Kencana, a daughter of Panembahan Cakradiningrat IV of 
Pamekasan, whom Mrs Van Braam had educated in Surabaya. Her eleven-
year-old boy, Gusti Timor (Radèn Malikan Salèh, later Pangéran Purbaya), 
who would later reign as Pakubuwana VII (1830-1858), was subsequently 
invested with a commission as lieutenant of cavalry by Daendels, a mark 
of esteem which deeply touched the Sunan and his consort.71 At the same 
time, the marshal elevated the Surakarta ruler’s father-in-law, Cakradiningrat 
IV, as Sultan Sepuh of Madura and wedana (titular head) of the bupati of 
Gresik, Sidhayu, and all the Oosthoek districts as far east as Banyuwangi. 
He announced that this was in recognition of the Panembahan’s services in 
providing Madurese troops for the Dutch garrisons in Batavia, Ambon and 
68 Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 26 Rabingula-
wal AJ 1735 (AD 23-5-1808).
69 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 28-5-1808, 4-6-1808, 
mentions that the Yogya delegation, comprising Radèn Rongga, Pangéran Dipakusuma and the 
Yogya bupati of Rawa, Radèn Tumenggung Pringgakusuma, was due to depart on 12 June. Due to 
sickness, Pringgakusuma was replaced by the aged Pangéran Adinagara (died 1812), a nephew 
of Hamengkubuwana I, who was then serving as a nayaka (Bupati Keparak).
70 B.Ng. I:67, XVIII.32-3.
71 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang/Surabaya), 24-5-1808, 
11-8-1808. On Gusti Timor (Pangéran Purbaya; Pakubuwana VII’s) ancestry, see Padmasusastra 
1902:159, 163 no. 23; Rouffaer 1905:599; Chapter VIII. On Ratu Kencana’s education in Surabaya 
under the aegis of Mrs van Braam (née Ambrosina Wilhelmina van Rijck), see Royal Asiatic Soci-
ety (London), Raffles collection vol. 3. ‘Miscellaneous memorandum on Surakarta’, circa 11-1811. 
Besides Van Braam and Gusti Timor, the Surakarta delegation consisted of Pakubuwana IV’s 
younger brother, Pangéran Mangkubumi, and his recently appointed army commander, the 
youthful Pangéran Cakrakusuma. They were in Semarang from 31 May to 6 June.
Plate 20. Pangéran Prangwedana (post-1821, Kangjeng Gusti Pangéran Aria Adipati 
Mangkunagara II) was in office as head of the Mangkunagaran royal house from 25 
January 1796 until his death on 26 January 1835. The portrait, which was painted 
some time between 1833 and 1835, shows him dressed in Dutch-style military uniform 
as colonel commandant of the Mangkunagaran ‘legion’. On his chest hang the med-
als of the Militaire Willems Orde (Third Class), awarded to him on 30 January 1832 
in recognition for his services to the Dutch during the Java War, and the Orde van de 
Nederlandsche Leeuw (Order of the Netherlands Lion) bestowed on him by the Dutch 
king, William I (reigned 1813-1840), in 1833. Only his headdress (blangkon) is still rec-
ognizably Javanese. Photograph taken from Pringgodigdo 1950:20 facing.
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the Groote Oost (eastern Indonesia),72 but the singling out of this Surakarta-
linked Madurese ruler for such a high honour appears to have played badly in 
Yogya where the sultan was reported to have felt humiliated by the news.73
Daendels’ increasing reliance on locally raised auxiliaries to strengthen his 
garrisons in south-central Java is reflected in his official edict of 19 June 1808 
(Van der Chijs 1895, XIV:836), which refers to the dispatch of 1,000 Bugis from 
Makassar and the purchase of 750 Balinese slaves through the good offices of 
the district commissioner of the Oosthoek, Frederik Jacob Rothenbühler. But 
a rather more reliable local force lay closer to hand. These were the troops of 
the Mangkunagaran. 
In late May, Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) was informed that 
he was to come to Semarang to receive a new commission from the hands of 
the governor-general.74 This was a promotion to full colonel in the King of 
Holland’s armée and his formal investiture with the newly established Royal 
Order of Holland. Henceforth, Prangwedana’s 1,150 troops were to be consti-
tuted as a ‘legion’ in emulation of Daendels’ own Batavian legion, and tasked 
with reinforcing the garrisons in Klathèn and in Yogya.75 In this fashion, 
the forty-year-old Prangwedana’s position as a ‘Company Prince’ was given 
official recognition by the new administration. Apart from the single case of 
Radèn Rongga’s rebellion in the eastern mancanagara in November-December 
1810, he would serve the European government loyally through its many 
vicissitudes and campaigns until his death in January 1835. Henceforth, his 
state dress was to be his European officer’s uniform, his hair cut short in 
72 Dj.Br. 41, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 7 Jumadilawal AJ 1735 
(AD 21-7-1808). Daendels had made the announcement after meeting Cakradiningrat IV during 
his visit to Surabaya in mid-July.
73 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 22-7-1808. 
74 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to Daendels (Semarang), 22-5-1808, reported that 
Prangwedana had already been informed of Daendels’ plans for him on Van Braam’s return from 
Semarang on 21 May and had shown great pleasure, particularly in the provision of two three-
pounders for his mounted artillery. Van Braam later regretted Prangwedana’s departure from 
Surakarta because his source of malicious ‘gossip’ about Yogyakarta dried up, Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van 
Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 23-8-1808.
75 Van der Chijs 1895-97, XIV:775 (on the Koninklijke Orde van Holland), XV:66; Pringgodigdo 
1950:19-20; Soebardi 1971:31 (on the establishment of the Prangwedanan – post-1821, Mangkuna-
garan – ‘legion’ by Daendels’ besluit of 29-7-1808); Van der Chijs 1895-97, XV:66; Rouffaer 1905:604-
5 (on the troop strength of the legion: 800 infantry, 100 riflemen, 200 cavalry, 50 mounted artillery; 
and Daendels’ besluit of 1-8-1808 fixing Prangwedana’s personal allowance at 4,000 Spanish dol-
lars in addition to 6,540 Spanish dollars pay as colonel); IOL Eur. F 148/18, ‘Memoirs of Java at the 
time of the capture collected by Captain [William] Robison’, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to J.W. 
Janssens (Batavia), 11-7-1811 (on Prangwedana’s investiture as colonel in the King of Holland’s 
armée); S.Br. 55, H.W. Daendels, ‘Instructie voor Lieutenant-Colonel Reinking en W.N. Servatius’, 
22-6-1808; Dj.Br. 23, W.N. Servatius (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 28-6-1808 (on dis-
patch of Prangwedana’s troops from Surakarta to Klathèn and Yogya). For further details, see 
Aukes 1935:23-4; Carey 1992:418 note 93.
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the European military fashion, and his social style that of a regimental com-
mander on constant campaign.76
If Daendels thought that the dispatch of Prangwedana’s troops to Yogya 
was a clever way of making the most of his scarce forces on the ground 
in south-central Java, however, he was sorely mistaken. Nothing could 
have been more calculated to arouse the indignation of the Yogya court 
where news of the legion’s imminent arrival caused utter consternation. The 
Javanese chronicles depict the sultan as feeling like a buffalo goaded into 
anger by the stinging branch of the kemadhuh tree, a metaphor which also has 
an allusion to the tiger-and-buffalo fights in the kraton where the buffalo is 
driven to attack its feline adversary through the application of the kemadhuh’s 
excruciating leaf.77 We will see shortly how these fights also had a deeper 
symbolic significance for the Javanese, with the tiger being equated with the 
Dutch and the buffalo with their own more resilient fighting capacity. At the 
same time, the Yogya ruler’s suspicion of the designs of the European govern-
ment was particularly focussed on the newly built fort at Klathèn ‘that place 
of rendez-vous centrally situated to overawe the two courts in consequence of 
the suspicion entertained of them’ in John Crawfurd’s words.78 The fact that 
the government planned to use troops from the Mangkunagaran to garrison 
it made the strongpoint even more threatening from Yogya’s perspective. 
By mid-August, Engelhard was reporting that the sultan had given 
instructions that all his troops should remain in the capital in order to fend 
76 Carey 1992:409 note 57; Van Hogendorp 1913:169: ‘This Mangkunagaran dynasty is a 
strange phenomenon especially in such an effeminate court as Surakarta. They are all heroes, 
who do not know what it is to retreat. Their troops of all types, who are completely accoutred, 
armed and commanded in the European way, have been thoroughly instilled by the same spirit.’ 
See also Lettres de Java 1829:86, on a visit with Prangwedana (then Mangkunagara II) at his coun-
try estate at Karangpandhan on the slopes of Mount Lawu in August 1822, ‘one hardly slept, the 
prince in his colonel’s uniform remained standing all night, only sitting down in his armchair to 
snatch some rest from time to time’. On Prangwedana’s extremely equivocal behaviour during 
Radèn Rongga’s rebellion, see pp. 243, 253.
77 B.Ng. I:69, XVIII.48; Poensen 1905:132; De Clercq 1909:267 (for a botanical description of the 
kemadhuh); Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:541; Berlin SB MS Or 568, Cakranagara, ‘Diary’, 9; Veth 
1896-1907, III:635 (on its use in tiger-and-buffalo fights).
78 IOL Eur F 148/24, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia), 14-5-1812. Permis-
sion to build a fort at Klathèn on land owned by the courts had been negotiated by Nicolaus 
Engelhard while governor of Java’s Northeast Coast in 1802. According to Engelhard, the con-
struction by Engineer Captain H.C. Cornelius under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Karel 
von Woll zogen was completed by April 1806, vAE (aanwinsten 1900), Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-
5-1808; Dj.Br. 39, Captain H.C. Cornelius (Klathèn) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 8-4-1806. 
Mack.Pr. 2, Surakarta Sengkala List, 185, gives the completion date of the fort as AJ 1731 (AD 
1804-1805). Considerable repair work was needed following the 28 February 1808 earthquake 
(Chapter I note 15), and this had still not been completed by late 1810, the Yogya court having 
been especially dilatory in providing assistance, Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to 
Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 14-9-1810.
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off the danger posed by Prangwedana. 79 The Yogya babad even refers to some 
of these forces being deployed to forward defence positions in the ruler’s 
pesanggrahan of Wanacatur, Ngawatreja (Pengawatreja) and Rajawinangun, 
which, with their underground passages and – in the case of Ngawatreja – 
hilltop location, also had potential as military strong-points.80 According to 
Engelhard, the Yogya ruler was convinced that the Surakarta prince had ‘evil 
intentions towards Yogya’, and he was not assuaged by Daendels’ guarantee 
that as colonel commandant of his legion, Prangwedana would only deploy 
under strict government orders.81 Even when the prince’s forces were reas-
signed to guard the south coast port of Cilacap after participating in the oper-
ations to quell Bagus Rangin’s revolt in Cirebon (1808-1812),82 the Yogya ruler 
was still not completely appeased: Engelhard had to use all his diplomatic 
skills to get him to rescind orders to send out a Yogya expeditionary force to 
Bagelèn and Kedhu to keep an eye on the passage of the legion from Cirebon 
to the south coast.83 Perhaps the sultan was right to be concerned. News may 
have reached him of the behaviour of the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati 
Danuningrat (in office 1804-1810), who had accompanied Daendels down the 
Sala River in one of the Sunan’s barges during his journey to Surabaya in early 
July.84 According to the Yogya babad, this garrulous official had exceeded his 
sovereign’s instructions and inadvertently told Daendels that in the event of 
war with Yogyakarta, his monarch hoped to unite all of south-central Java 
once more under his rule.85 We will see in the next chapter that such hopes 
were not far from Sunan Pakubuwana IV’s mind at this time but to articulate 
79 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surakarta), 14-8-1808, referring 
to Daendels’ letter of 12-8-1808 to Hamengkubuwana II written from Surakarta.
80 B.Ng. I:70, XIX.12; Dj.Br. 24, Woortman, ‘Dagverhaal’, 17-8-1809, for a description of the 
underground passages cut into the hills in some of these pesanggrahan inspected by Daendels on 
his visit to the Yogya court on 31 July 1809. See also Appendix VI.
81 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surakarta), 14-8-1808.
82 On these disturbances in Cirebon, see Thorn 1815:124-5, 190; Veth 1896-1907, II:259-62; Van 
den Broek 1891:368-83; Lawick van Pabst 1902:412; Carey 1992:418 note 93. 500 of Prangwedana’s 
troops had been shipped to Cirebon from Tegal in late July 1808 to take part in operations 
against Rangin, who was only captured in early 1812, Dj.Br. 23, W.N. Servatius (Surakarta) to 
J.A. van Braam (Semarang), 25-7-1808. On the 1,000 silver ducatoon reward placed by the govern-
ment on Rangin’s capture, see Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II 
(Yogyakarta), 5 Puwasa AJ 1735 (AD 6-10-1808).
83 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 11-8-1808; Hameng-
kubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 23 Jumadilakir AJ 1735 (AD 15-8-
1808).
84 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 11-8-1808, reference 
to Pakubuwana IV asking whether Daendels still needed his royal barge or prau pengluput for 
another journey because if not he wanted to bring it back to Surakarta from Gresik laden with 
merchandise, see further note 122. Mack.Pr. 2, Surakarta Sengkala List, 185, mentions Daendels’ 
journey down the Sala River to Surabaya via Gresik after his visit to Surakarta in early July.
85 B.Ng. I:70-1, XIX.16-20.
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them in this fashion, if this is indeed what the Surakarta patih did, betrayed a 
stunning political naiveté.
Throughout the dry season of 1808, the Residency letters are full of the 
toing and froing of Daendels’ quartermasters and officials as orders were 
placed for cavalry horses, saddles, uniform cloth, whips, boots, rice, dried 
deer flesh or dhèndhèng and other military necessities.86 Even, the corrupt 
Surakarta sub-district administrator of Karang Bolong87 was brought into the 
act when the Surakarta translator, J.W. Winter, recommended that a skilled 
weaver from his south coast district might be sent to Semarang to help pro-
duce the dark blue linen cloth needed for uniforms.88 Pressure was also put 
on the courts to allow the felling of timber in the eastern mancanagara. Just for 
six months said Daendels. The courts knew that it would be for much longer: 
the construction of fortifications in east Java and the supply of large diameter 
hardwood pillars and stakes needed for the building of the marshal’s coastal 
strongpoint at Fort Lodewijk (Surabaya) guarding access to the harbour of 
Surabaya and the Straits of Madura were long-term projects.89 These demands 
particularly affected the Yogya bupati wedana, Radèn Rongga, who was now 
placed at the forefront of the sultanate’s increasingly fraught relationship with 
the European government. But the Surakarta court was also feeling the pinch: 
Daendels’ request for 500 labourers from the Surakarta district of Banyumas 
to participate in the construction of the Bataviasche Bovenlanden section of his 
island-length post-road caused Sunan Pakubuwana IV much displeasure.90
86 Dj.Br. 23, W.N. Servatius (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Bedharan), 5-7-1808 (on arrival of 
Ridder Colonel Gordon to get examples of cloth patterns from Surakarta); Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta) to Hendrik Veeckens (Semarang), 11-7-1808 (on Lieutenant Detelle of Klathèn gar-
rison’s search for 98 horse pack kits for cavalry); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels 
(Surabaya), 19-7-1808 (departure of Second Resident Groenhoff von Woortmann to Semarang to 
deliver 60 black leather cavalry saddles, boots and whips); 29-7-1808 (receipt of 25 corsjes – twenty 
lengths (De Haan 1910-12, IV:503) – of Javanese cloth sent from Semarang to Yogya for turning into 
military uniforms); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 18-8-1808 (dispatch 
of 380 Javanese kleedje to Semarang for uniforms); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels 
(Semarang), 21-8-1808 (visit of Colonel A.J.A. Gerlach, Semarang cavalry regiment commander, to 
Yogya for provisioning); J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 31-8-1808 (pur-
chase of rice and dhèndhèng in Surakarta for army); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels 
(Semarang), 16-9-1808 (340 lengths of linen from Yogya to Semarang for uniforms).
87 See Chapter I.
88 Dj.Br. 23, J.W. Winter (Surakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 2-7-1808; W.N. Servatius 
(Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Bedharan), 5-7-1808. Winter reported that the mantri désa could 
not send a skilled weaver because no-one in Karang Bolong was able to make the required cloth, 
but that there were enough weavers in the Tanggung district near Kedhung Kebo in Bagelèn to 
undertake the order (on Tanggung’s location, see Map 1 on p. 26).
89 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 24 Jumadi-
lawal AJ 1735 (AD 23-7-1808); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik Veeckens (Semarang), 
27-7-1808; Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 21-8-1808.
90 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya/Semarang), 10-8-1808, 
30-8-1808. See further Chapter VII note 107. On the problems of forced labour in the eigteenth-
century pasisir, see Nagtegaal 1996:204-7.
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But if the courts were planning resistance, Daendels’ military methods 
might have given them pause: when two of the Cirebon rebels, Kyai Kulur 
and Durrahman, were apprehended in early October, their end was swift. 
The first was cut to pieces by Dutch hussars in his hiding place, the second 
burnt alive.91 Meanwhile, hundreds of troops, many of them locally raised 
Indonesian auxiliaries, poured into the south-central Javanese garrisons: 
two companies of grenadiers and three infantry regiments, partly made up 
of Ambonese, arrived in Klathèn and Yogya, where many promptly fell sick 
because of the dampness of the fort.92 Even more were sent to Surakarta where 
the Sunan was forced to build special bamboo barracks to house the 700 rifle-
men and 150-strong mounted artillery unit dispatched from Ungaran.93 
Inevitably, with so many troops billeted in the heart of the old court towns, 
problems occurred. During the over-exuberant celebrations in Surakarta to 
mark the 25 August accession of Louis Bonaparte to the Dutch throne, four 
riflemen attempted to procure a dancing girl/prostitute (ronggèng) for the 
night in the Javanese quarter behind the fort. But their quest ended in dis-
appointment when the girl’s husband slammed the door in their faces after 
receiving the money for her hire. Returning with thirty of their comrades, all 
unarmed, the riflemen were fallen upon by the local inhabitants and four of 
them badly wounded. When the Surakarta patih’s investigations identified 
two of the culprits, both members of the Sunan’s bodyguard, Van Braam 
reported that a public military punishment and execution would take place 
at the meeting place before the court: the two were to walk a gauntlet of 400 
soldiers all armed with canes and were then to be krissed to death. Fearing 
that this might be too mild for Daendels’ taste, Van Braam anxiously asked 
whether the marshal demanded a more severe punishment.94 Daendels’ reply 
is not extant, but since the punishment was carried out he does not seem to 
have ordered any additional torture on this occasion.
The emergence of an anti-Dutch party in Yogya 
The Yogya elite, steeped as they were in the martial culture of Mangkubumi’s 
court, probably needed no reminding that Daendels’ terrifying new order 
posed a challenge to their very existence. While the Crown Prince’s response 
91 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 5 Puwasa AJ 
1735 (AD 6-10-1808).
92 Van der Chijs 1895-97, XIV:836, besluit of 19-6-1808; Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) 
to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya/Surakarta), 9-8-1808, 14-8-1808.
93 Dj.Br. 41, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Bedharan), 11 Jumadilawal AJ 1735 
(AD 5-7-1808).
94 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 26-8-1808, 29-8-1808.
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– as evidenced at the Rajawinangun military review – had been to stress 
his pro-Dutch sentiments, others were deciding on a very different course 
of action. The second sultan was central here. In early August, at the height 
of the crisis over the arrival of Prangwedana’s troops, he had quietly re-
appointed a tough military man, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat, to the 
post of First Inner bupati or patih jero. This was a key position because the 
patih jero in effect controlled access to the sultan. Indeed, in both the Javanese 
chronicles and Dutch final administrative reports, he is sometimes referred 
to as ‘the gatekeeper’ regent (bupati kori).95 Pieter Engelhard for one had no 
illusions about what Sumadiningrat’s re-appearance in the Yogya administra-
tive firmament meant, referring to him as ‘the notorious general’.96 But he 
was not prepared to endorse Daendels’ demands that he should be banished 
from the court.97
A man of high noble birth descended on his mother’s side from the first 
sultan and on his father’s from an old line of Mataram bupati (Carey 1980:191, 
1992:419 note 94), Sumadiningrat had married one of the second sultan’s daugh-
ters by his Madurese official wife, Ratu Kedhaton (Mandoyokusumo 1977:18 
no. 8). This made him a full brother-in-law of two other key court officials who, 
like himself, would lose their lives as the crisis with the European government 
unfolded over the next four years: the Yogya patih, Danureja II, and the bupati 
wedana of the eastern mancanagara, Radèn Rongga (Mandoyokusumo 1977:19 
no. 14, 20 no. 22). He was also the guardian of Dipanagara’s younger brother, 
Pangéran Adinagara (Chapter II note 25), so it is very likely that he was well 
known to the prince. Although he had been briefly demoted from his post as 
patih jero in March 1807 on account of his addiction to strong drink, gambling 
bouts with common Javanese and partiality to cockfighting,98 he remained 
in the words of Van IJsseldijk, until his death during the British attack 
on the Yogya kraton on 20 June 1812, ‘the strongest pillar of the sultan’s 
administration’.99 His very appearance betrayed his aggressive and martial 
spirit. The Chronicle of the Fall of Yogyakarta refers to his moustachioed face 
(Carey 1992:91, 242), while the Yogya court babad states that:
I. 16  His actions were like those of a singa-barong (a monstrous mythical lion)
 terrifying to behold.100
95 AN Algemene Secretarie archive, J.R. Couperus, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, Yogyakarta, 3-3-
1908; Rouffaer 1905:615; Carey 1992:492 note 439.
96 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 3-8-1808, 11-8-1808, 
referring to Sumadiningrat as Hamengkubuwana II’s beruchte veldoverste.
97 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surakarta), 14-8-1808.
98 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 13-3-1807 (on 
Sumadiningrat’s temporary replacement as patih jero by Natadiningrat); dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memo-
rie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808; and on Sumadiningrat’s love of cockfighting, Carey 1980:145-6. 
99 KITLV H 97 pt. 7, Van IJsseldijk, ‘Korte schets’, 31-8-1798.
100 B.Ng. I:4, I (Dhandhanggula) 16. lir singa-barong solahé/ ngajrihi yèn dinulu.
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Sumadiningrat made no secret of his anti-European sentiments and his zeal 
in the upkeep of the sultan’s troops had caused the former Residents at the 
Yogya court real concern. Van den Berg, for example, had characterised him 
as a ‘very turbulent and bold man’ governed by his ‘dim intelligence’.101 He 
apparently could neither read nor write and needed the help of other officials 
in the conduct of his business, yet he adopted a hostile attitude towards the 
young patih, Danureja II, and rarely took part in discussions with the other 
Yogya court bupati or nayaka. Instead, he used his position to dominate affairs 
of state and remained the main channel through which all matters had to 
pass before they could be discussed with the sultan. But he often delayed for 
long periods before acting on vital issues which greatly complicated Dutch 
dealings with the court.102
The return of this pugnacious xenophobe to the sultan’s inner council was 
almost immediately reflected in a tougher attitude over such matters as the 
new ceremonial. On 3 August 1808, Engelhard was reporting that the sultan 
had had a meeting with the nayaka at which Sumadiningrat had counselled 
rejection, warning that the new ceremonial would bring humiliation to the 
Yogya ruler. ‘This affair is still not settled’, Engelhard observed, ‘and very 
much uneasiness reigns [at court].’ In fact, the council was split right down the 
middle with Danureja II and three of the nayaka urging acceptance, and two 
key officials remaining silent. One of these was Radèn Rongga. ‘That sly fox’ 
in Engelhard’s words, ‘came out of the meeting with a tearful face and dejected 
look indicating that he was prepared to counsel acceptance even though he 
was hugely embarrassed about it.’103 For much of the next two and a half years 
until his death in rebellion in December 1810, Rongga would be at the heart of 
Yogya’s confrontation with Daendels. So how did it happen that this youthful 
official – he was still only thirty-one at the time of his death – came to play 
such a key role in the politics of the sultan’s court and through the example of 
his all too brief life become such an inspiration for Dipanagara? 
The youngest and most charismatic of the sultan’s three sons-in-law who 
had married daughters of his Madurese consort, Ratu Kedhaton, Rongga 
saw himself as the scion of martial ancestors whom he revered as ‘warrior 
kings’ (ratu pinarjurit).104 Contemporaries also seem to have regarded him as 
101 KITLV H 97, Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803, referring to Sumadiningrat’s doff begrijp.
102 KITLV H 97, Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803; Carey 1980:154-5; Carey and Hoadley 
2000:442. 
103 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 3-8-1808. The other 
key official was Natakusuma’s son, Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat (Pakualam II, reigned 
1829-1858), who had been appointed a nayaka in 1805 and whom Waterloo described as ‘an excep-
tionally smart and intelligent young man’, dK 145 Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808.
104 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Maospati) to Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat 
(Yogyakarta), 20 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 17-11-1810), where he refers to his desire to have the blessing 
of his royal ancestors who were ‘warrior kings’ (leluhur-Dalem ingkang sami ambeg ratu pinarjurit). 
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a courageous fighter: thus the Pakualam babad refers to him as ‘bellicose’,105 
and Dipanagara later wrote that he was the only ‘champion’ (banthèng) of the 
Yogya state106 and a person who had the calling to die as ‘a commander in 
battle’.107 Through his mother, Rongga was descended from the first sultan 
whom he greatly admired (Mandoyokusumo 1977:12 no. 9; Appendix III, 
Vb). His grandfather, Kyai Rongga Wirasentika was, as we have seen,108 
Sultan Mangkubumi’s most trusted army commander and served as his 
bupati wedana of Madiun (circa 1760-1784; Ricklefs 1974a:86-7) where he 
founded a dynasty of eastern mancanagara administrators. As the son of Kyai 
Ageng Derpayuda, an influential kyai in the Sokawati area, Wirasentika was 
a full brother of Ratu Ageng, Dipanagara’s guardian at Tegalreja.109 This 
formidable spiritual and royal ancestry, combined with Rongga’s sudden 
elevation as bupati wedana in 1796 at the age of seventeen due to his father’s 
blindness, seem to have temporarily turned his head.110 Writing in 1802, after 
the murder of a Surakarta inhabitant at the hands of Rongga at Delanggu,111 
the Yogya Resident, J.G. van den Berg, remarked that the young bupati wedana 
was a ‘lawless, proud and turbulent young man’ who had a very high opinion 
of himself.112 Violent incidents continued to occur and three years later, the 
105 Poensen 1905:162, 179, refers to Rongga as agul-agul. See also De Graaf 1958:148, where one 
of Sultan Agung’s (reigned 1613-1646) commanders during the siege of Batavia in 1628 is named 
‘Sura Agul-Agul’.
106 BD (Manado), II:134, XV (Asmaradana) 8. saicalé Radèn Rongga/ nenggih nagri Ngayogya/ wus 
tan ana banthèngipun. After the disappearance of Radèn Rongga / in truth the state of Yogya/ no 
longer had a champion. The word banthèng literally means ‘buffalo’ but can be translated figura-
tively as ‘champion’, Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:660. In fact, the ‘buffalo’ reference is apt given 
that the traditional arms of the town of Madiun and its principal bupati family is a black bull with 
a large hump couchant on top of a square pillar at a cross-roads, D’Almeida 1864, II:26; Naber 
1938:73-4.
107 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 16, where Dipanagara refers to Rongga’s son, Senthot Ali Basah, as a 
young man who had ‘the calling to die as a commander in battle, just as his father […] during the 
period of Marshal Daendels’. This calling is also reflected in the title taken by Rongga during his 
rebellion, Susuhunan Prabu Ingalaga (‘The king, ruler in war’), see p. 248.
108 Chapter I.
109 Chapter II; Chapter II note 26; Appendix III.
110 KITLV H 97 pt. 7, Van IJsseldijk, ‘Korte schets’, 31-8-1798; Rongga’s age was mentioned as 23 
in 1802, Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 17-6-1802. 
He had earlier been a page (panakawan) of Hamengkubuwana II.
111 Rongga’s young daughter – possibly the same person who later married Dipanagara in 
September 1814 (Chapter VIII) – had wanted a baby goat she saw as the bupati wedana’s entourage 
passed through Delanggu on the Surakarta-Yogyakarta road on its way to the sultan’s capital for 
the Garebeg Mulud of 13 July 1802. Rongga had set his dogs to warn off the ewe and then taken it 
for her. When the deputy village head (wakil demang) attempted to remonstrate, he was attacked 
and one of his colleagues, Kyai Kartasari, killed with seven pike wounds to his body. Rongga 
then plundered some of the local houses, Dj.Br. 48, Radèn Adipati Mangkupraja (Surakarta) to 
Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 27 Sura AJ 1720 (AD 30-5-1802).
112 Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 17-6-1802, 
where he refers to Rongga as een kwajongen.
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sultan had to fine his son-in-law heavily for wounding a royal official, the 
second time he had been involved in such an attack on a colleague. On this 
occasion, the sultan ordered all the subordinate mancanagara bupati to report 
any further actions on Rongga’s part which transgressed Javanese adminis-
trative tact (yudanegari) (Carey 1980:33-5).
But these impulsive acts of youth were gradually tempered by a more 
responsible attitude on Rongga’s part. Subsequent Residents’ reports indicate 
that despite his often arrogant and humiliating attitude towards his subor-
dinates, Rongga was an intelligent man who ran a good administration in 
Madiun and never used extortion on his subjects.113 A later source related 
that during the eight years (1802-1810) Rongga had his seat at Maospati just 
across the river from Madiun, the surrounding area increased greatly in 
population.114 One Dutch official even thought him ‘well-disposed towards 
Europeans’ though Daendels’ treatment of him would soon change that.115 
Rongga’s charisma as bupati wedana was enhanced by his strikingly handsome 
features and his fiery temperament,116 both characteristics later inherited 
by Ali Basah Senthot Prawiradirja, Rongga’s son by a secondary wife who 
became one of Dipanagara’s foremost Java War commanders.117 
Like many of his Yogya contemporaries, Rongga was a minor litterateur. 
A later Javanese source mentions him as the author of one of the tales in the 
Damar Wulan cycle which were especially popular in east Java.118 He also 
maintained close contacts with many of the religious teachers in the Madiun 
and Panaraga areas and had numerous haji and other ‘men of religion’ in his 
entourage at Maospati.119 He apparently built a mosque at his residence at 
Maospati (Kutha Pethik), which was well stocked with religious works,120 
and also endowed a pradikan village at Giripurna to look after his wife’s grave 
following her early death on 16 November 1809 (D’Almeida 1864, II:4; Adam 
113 dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808; Dj.Br. 46, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) 
to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 28-4-1810,who wrote that Rongga has ‘a very lively mind’ (zeer vlug 
en vatbaar van begrijp is) and ‘here in Yogya, he is considered a very good bupati’.
114 UBL BPL 616, Port. 22 no. 4, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst, ‘De Montjonegorosche-Djocjokar-
tasche landen’, no date (? 1826).
115 Dj.Br. 46, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 28-4-1810.
116 Rongga’s good looks are mentioned in dK 119, ‘Notes of spies: Ngabèhi Nataraja on Radèn 
Mas Tumenggung Rongga (Senthot)’, 15-5-1828.
117 Chapter II note 35.
118 LOr 8987 no. 1, R. Prawirawinarsa and R. Arya Jayèngpranata, Babad Alit, I pt. 21, which 
mentions Rongga’s authorship: inggih punika ingkang nyambeti nganggit serat Damarwulan, wiwit 
Damarwulan bégal. On the Damar Wulan cycle, see Pigeaud 1967-80, I:231-2.
119 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Mas Aria Wiryadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung Prawiradirja and Radèn 
Tumenggung Bratanegara (Surakarta eastern mancanagara bupati) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara 
(Surakarta), 20-5-1810, reported that messengers sent by Radèn Rongga to investigate a raid 
in neighbouring Surakarta territory in Panaraga include 40 ‘priests’ headed by two haji, one of 
whom was Kyai Hasan Besari of Tegalsari, see Chapter VI note 70.
120 S.Br. 37, Report of a Surakarta spy, 9-12-1810, referring to Rongga’s kitab.
Plate 21. Ali Basah Abdul Mustapa Prawiradirja (Senthot) (1805-1855), son of Radèn 
Rongga Prawiradirja III, bupati wedana of Madiun (in office 1796-1810) by an unoffi-
cial wife (garwa ampéyan). Senthot became one of Dipanagara’s most effective cavalry 
commanders during the Java War, but gave himself up to the Dutch in October 1829 
because of the increasingly desperate military situation. Uncoloured lithograph by 
Jean Augustin Daiwaille (1786-1850) and Pieter Veldhuizen (1806-1841) based on a 
sketch drawn by the Dutch army officer, Major (later Major-General) F.V.H.A. Ridder 
de Stuers (1792-1881) in Yogyakarta, in April 1830, after Senthot had been given the 
rank of lieutenant-colonel (overste) and placed in charge of his own column of troops 
(barisan). Taken from De Stuers 1831, photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
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1940:333). According to the Babad Pacitan, Rongga’s own religious teacher was 
a kyai from the Pacitan area known as Kyai Kaliyah who had a considerable 
influence over him (Adam 1940:333-4).
In terms of court politics, Rongga was not aligned with either of the main 
kraton factions which were emerging in this period around the person of the 
second sultan and the Crown Prince, and which would later become known 
as the kasepuhan and the karajan.121 His position as bupati wedana was partly 
responsible for this because he had his own interests in Madiun and was 
heavily involved in a number of private quarrels with Surakarta whose terri-
tories closely abutted his in the eastern mancanagara and whose customs’ free 
barges or prau pengluput had to pass through his lands on their way down the 
Sala River to Gresik.122 
121 These epithets refer to the party of the ‘old’ sultan (Sultan Sepuh, the moniker of Hameng-
kubuwana II), and the party of the Crown Prince, which took its name from his title ‘Raja Putra 
Naréndra Pangéran Adipati Anom Amangkunagara’ and was also sometimes known as the 
kanoman. The kasepuhan faction, in particular, backed the claims of Pangéran Mangkudiningrat to 
the Yogya throne over and above those of the Crown Prince.
122 These river craft, of which the Sunan had ten, could weigh up to 200 tons fully laden and 
had such a deep draft that they could only make the journey to Gresik once a year: they usually 
left Surakarta in December or January when the river was in flood and returned before the onset 
of the dry season in May. The downstream passage, when they carried pepper, rice and other 
bulk goods such as wood, only took eight days, but the return journey when the boats were 
laden with salt, coal and paddy chaff, necessitated at least four months because the heavy light-
ers had to be laboriously warped upstream by teams of men or buffalo, Raffles 1817, I:18; Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:560; Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard 
(Semarang), 19-4-1805; Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 9-12-1808. 
Hamengkubuwana II did not use his prau directly but rented them out to Radèn Rongga who in 
turn leased them to Chinese merchants.
Plate 22. One of the royal tax-free barges (prau pengluput) with a carved dragon (naga) 
head and tail on the Sala River near Gresik. Water colour by John Newman circa 1811-
1813. Photograph by courtesy of the British Library, London, WD 965, f.75 (86).
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Sunan Pakubuwana IV in particular was an implacable enemy and later helpe d 
to turn Daendels against him. Although he remained a favourite of the second 
sultan right up to the time of his rebellion in November-December 1810, the 
Yogya ruler undoubtedly harboured fears about his son-in-law’s ambitious 
character. Prophecies that Rongga would one day rule as a king in his resi-
dence at Maospati (Poensen 1905:110; Adam 1940:333), coupled with tangible 
evidence of his royal style in the eastern provinces, prompted speculation 
that he might indeed set himself up as a rival to his Yogya sovereign. The only 
people at court he remained close to were Pangéran Natakusuma (post-1812, 
Pakualam I), who was a full brother of Rongga’s mother (Mandoyokusumo 
1977:12 no. 9, 13 no. 11), and his son, Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat 
(Pakualam II), who was six years his junior. Rongga and Natakusuma shared 
common aims in so far as their private aspirations lay outside the emerging 
court factions. Indeed, at the time of Rongga’s revolt, the Dutch even sus-
pected the two men of coming to a secret understanding about the future of 
Yogya with Natakusuma preparing to take control of the core regions as sul-
tan and Rongga exercising authority over the mancanagara as an independent 
local ruler in the event of the uprising’s success.123 But this assumption was 
never proven. The other Yogya princes kept aloof from the bupati wedana, and 
only called on him out of necessity. Like the Yogya patih, Danureja II, Rongga 
had many debts and spent lavishly.124 Furthermore, Rongga and Danureja II 
found themselves in much the same position with regard to the Dutch. The 
issue of Batavia’s access to the teak concessions in the eastern mancanagara 
and Daendels’ pugnacious reaction to border raids on the pasisir and govern-
ment lands in East Java left them both politically exposed. The bupati wedana’s 
response to what was for him an intolerable situation was a characteristic one 
and, as we will see in the next chapter, he died fighting, the first victim of the 
years of crisis between 1808 and 1812.
The Javanese buffalo confronts the Dutch tiger
During the early part of August 1808, as evidence of the second sultan’s reluc-
tance to accept the new ceremonial began to mount, Daendels threatened to 
come to Yogya with an armed force to impose his will. Accusing the Yogya 
ruler of a ‘lack of steadfastness’, he suggested that everything would be sorted 
out if he could come to talk with the sultan in person. But with 3,000 troops at 
123 MvK 4132, P.H. van Lawick van Pabst, ‘Consideratiën over de Nota van den Heer MacGil-
lavry’ (henceforth Van Pabst, ‘Nota’), 26-8-1826. On Rongga’s friendship for Natakusuma, see 
Poensen 1905:170-1.
124 dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808.
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his back Daendels’ tête-à-tête would hardly have been a meeting of minds.125 
The diplomatic Pieter Engelhard seems to have persuaded the marshal that 
such a visit was unnecessary at this time, so Daendels continued his journey 
to Semarang from Surakarta rather than proceed on to the sultan’s capital.
Meanwhile, the governor-general’s newly appointed president of the 
Forest Administration Board, Gustaf Wilhelm Wiese (1711-1811), wrote from 
Rembang (note 58) to request that the Yogya manacanagara bupati of Padhangan 
and Panolan, whose lands the Dutch authorities needed access to for the felling 
of timber, to present themselves in Yogya along with Radèn Rongga – whose 
Madiun district was also timber rich – to hear Daendels’ instructions regard-
ing the provision of hardwood supplies to the pasisir. It is significant that one 
of these two bupati, Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara of Padhangan, would 
later go into rebellion with Rongga and die fighting alongside him. The other, 
Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya of Panolan, was Dipanagara’s father-in-law. It 
is likely that through him the young prince would have been apprised of the 
political pressures now being applied on the sultanate to open up its timber 
reserves to unrestricted logging by the European government particularly in a 
district as heavily afforested as Panolan.126 Wiese himself, a former VOC offi-
cial, was a younger brother of the former governor-general, Albertus Henricus 
Wiese (in office 1805-1808), would later come to Yogya as Resident to replace 
Engelhard in early December bringing with him his special knowledge of the 
government’s timber requirements in the eastern mancanagara.
Besides securing access to hardwood, Daendels was also anxious to 
restrict raids by the inhabitants of the eastern mancanagara on neighbouring 
government territories. As we have seen,127 on 25 May 1808, a particularly 
spectacular raid involving 250 ‘bandits’ (wong durjana) had taken place across 
the border into Surabaya from Yogya-administered district of Kertasana 
against the Chinese-run customs’ post of Bunder on the Brantas River, home 
to many Chinese who were involved with the tax office there and with local 
trade particularly in cloth. Several Chinese houses had been burnt and much 
property looted.128 Investigations conducted by a commission comprising 
125 Dj.Br. 23, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 22 Jumadi-
lakir AJ 1735 (AD 15-8-1808); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 18-8-
1808.
126 Mack.Pr. 21 (9), Pemberton ‘Djiepan’, 324 (on Panolan’s importance as a regional mart for 
timber and its extensive teak forests); Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels 
(Semarang), 21-8-1808; Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 
23-8-1808; Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 23-8-1808, both 
the latter wrote that they had not given orders to their followers to assemble with arms and horses, 
namely as prajurit arahan, but had only brought their usual ‘workforce’ to Yogya on this occasion.
127 Chapter I notes 35 and 150.
128 Dj.Br. 38, Relaas of spy Ranawijaya (Bunder), 31-5-1808, mentions amongst the items stolen 
five bales of cloth (kapas), five pieces of Surat cloth and five lengths of white mori for making batik.
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junior officials (mantri) from the Yogya and Surakarta kepatihan (chief minis-
ter’s departments) together with a European sergeant, had met with a com-
plete lack of cooperation from the local Javanese population. Despite a joint 
letter from the patih being read out to the approximately 500 inhabitants of 
Bunder appealing for information about the raid, no-one had come forward 
and the local Chinese had complained bitterly that their Javanese neighbours 
had offered them no assistance during their difficulties.129
The problems of establishing effective cooperation between the courts over 
such criminal investigations and the seeming ease with which the perpetrators 
of bandit raids could seek asylum in the jurisdictions of neighbouring kraton 
had convinced Daendels that a new law-and-order agreement, known in 
Javanese as the Angger Gunung law code, was necessary even though the last 
had been ratified between the courts as recently as 27 September 1804.130 This 
was eventually signed on 26 September 1808 by the patih in Klathèn, the mid-
way point between the two courts always used for such joint agreements, in 
the presence of the two Residents, Engelhard and Van Braam.131 As befitted a 
document which had Daendels’ imprimatur, a number of fierce sanctions were 
provided for should local officials or the inhabitants of a village fail to find the 
culprits of a raid. Henceforth, if a tollgate was robbed or burnt, the local inhab-
itants would be answerable for the damage. In the event that the villagers 
could not find the robbers or their goods, the local village tax-collector would 
be staked out in the sun on the village meeting place for a week between 7 and 
11 o’clock every morning. If the selfsame bekel allowed robbers to escape into 
a house, he was allowed 40 days to apprehend them during which time his 
wife and family would be taken from him as hostage until he had made the 
necessary arrests. In the event that local officials, including bupati, were shown 
to have conspired with robbers they were to be punished with death and their 
wives and children taken as booty to the kraton.132 Perhaps the very severity 
of the punishments reflected the impossibility of getting any meaningful law-
and-order measures to work until the hopeless administrative confusion of the 
south-central Javanese courts had been thoroughly reformed. And this was 
not to happen until after the Java War when a comprehensive land settlement 
separated the territories of the courts for good.133 
129 Dj.Br. 23, Sergeant Pieter Gulin (Bunder) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 19-7-1808; Radèn 
Adipati Danuningrat (Surakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 7 Jumadilakir AJ 1735 (AD 31-7-
1808); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 9-8-1808.
130 Dj.Br. 42 (ii), ‘Kopij Boek van contracten Djokjo, 1755-1812’, 87-96. See also Soeripto 
1929:163-7.
131 Chapter I note 156.
132 Articles 1, 3, 4, 6 and 9 from English translation of Angger Gunung of 26-9-1808 in IOL Eur 
F.148/18, ‘Memoirs of Java at the time of the capture collected by Captain [William] Robison’, 
24-9-1811.
133 Chapter I.
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Just over a month after this agreement, another joint understanding 
between the courts was signed at Klathèn regulating the working of the 
porters’ guilds.134 The provision of labourers from Surakarta to work on 
Daendels’ postweg had already caused problems with the Sunan’s court, and 
there was pressure to get a binding agreement between the south-central 
Javanese kraton on the labour issue as quickly as possible. 
The European government needed access to the necessary manpower 
to complete its ambitious building and defence projects ahead of the seem-
ingly inevitable British invasion. But even with these two agreements signed, 
Daendels had not quite finished with the patih. Throughout the early dry 
season months when the marshal had been based in Semarang, there had 
been talk of sending the usual delegation from the courts led by the respective 
Surakarta and Yogyakarta patih to greet the incoming governor-general so that 
they could present their usual ‘homage’ and gifts to him on behalf of their sov-
ereigns.135 Due to Daendels’ extensive travels in July and August, it was only 
in early October that this could be completed.136 But by then he had departed 
for Batavia, leaving his secretary-general, Hendrik Veeckens, to receive their 
‘homage’ in his stead. He also instructed him to read out a statement on his 
behalf to the patih regarding the recent political changes in Europe.
According to Hageman (1855-56:254), this contained such difficult con-
cepts, particularly with regard to the abolition of feudalism,137 that the official 
Javanese translator in Semarang, C.F. Krijgsman (De Haan 1935a:592-3), had 
great problems rendering the text into Javanese. Indeed, even with the faulty 
translation, the two patih appeared not to understand what was being said. If 
they had understood, it is likely that the mere mention of the terms ‘vassal’ 
(leenman), ‘paramount lord’ (leenheer) and ‘feudalism’ (leen), which appeared in 
the Dutch original, would have sent the second sultan into apoplexy. In 1799, 
134 Dj.Br. 42 (ii), ‘Kopij boek van contracten Djokjo, 1755-1812’, 85-87 (Angger Gladhag of 16-
10-1808); English translation in IOL Eur F.148/18, ‘Memoirs of Java at the time of the capture, 
collected by Captain [William] Robison’, 24-9-1811. For the text of the previous Angger Gladhag 
agreed at Klathèn on 17-2-1804, see Soeripto 1929:287-96.
135 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 17-9-1808, referring 
to the payment of homage or hulde to Daendels.
136 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 18-9-1808, refers 
to the Yogya party led by Danureja II and comprising the two nayaka (outer bupati) – Radèn 
Tumenggung Natadiningrat and Radèn Tumenggung Sindunegara, together with the bupati of 
Padhangan, Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara, and the senior court scribe (carik-dalem), Radèn Nga-
bèhi Prawirasastra, leaving for Semarang on 19-9-1808 and returning on 23-9-1808, but we know 
from a subsequent letter that they did not return until 10-10-1808, so the mission was clearly 
delayed, Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 10-10-1808.
137 References to Daendels’ views on feudalism and the necessity for its abolition can be found 
in the proclamation issued on 21-10-1794 before the French invasion of Holland, Schama 1977:180-
1. The leenheer (vassal) concept as it relates to the colonial context is mentioned in Drooglever 
1978:108 note. 
Plate 23. Oil painting by A.A.J. Payen of the governor-general’s carriage being drawn 
up Daendels’ postweg with the aid of a yoke of buffalo in the Priangan highlands 
at Mount Pola near Sumedhang. Payen painting collection, Rijksmuseum voor 
Volken kunde, Leiden, no. 200/22. Photograph by courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor 
Volkenkunde, Leiden.
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at the time of the appointment of Radèn Adipati Danureja II as Yogya patih, he 
had strongly objected to the phrase – apparently taken from Danureja I’s letter 
of appointment shortly after the recognition of the Yogya state by the Dutch at 
Giyanti in 1755 – that the Yogya prime minister was to be patih of all the lands 
which the Yogya ruler ‘held in fief from the Dutch East Indies Company’. So 
strong had been Hamengkubuwana II’s objections at this time that Danureja 
II had functioned without a letter of appointment from the Dutch for several 
years following his elevation on 9 September 1799.138
So what was this proclamation which was the cause of so much incom-
prehension and acrimony? The original does not seem to be extant, but the 
following is an English translation made by a Dutch-speaking British officer 
from a version provided him in September 1811 by Sunan Pakubuwana IV:
I receive with much pleasure and sincerity the homage of the Susuhunan through 
his prime minister and further ambassadors. 
I do not consider this solemnity in the light of homage by a vassal to his lord para-
mount, the feudal system having been abolished in Europe, but I look upon the 
same as congratulations on my safe arrival on this island and on the commence-
ment of the administration of His Majesty’s possessions in India.
The [Dutch] East Indies Company and the Republic of the United Provinces had 
lost their former influence in Europe. But the election of the Emperor’s brother to 
the throne of Holland has caused the political influence of that country to be re-
established by adopting a more energetic mode of administration and by a most 
intimate union with the mightiest Empire in the world. It is the wish of King Louis 
to promote the happiness of his subjects on the island of Java and he offers them 
peace, prosperity and a benevolent government.
And I do solemnly declare in the name of His Majesty, the friend and protector of 
the princes and inhabitants of Java, that I will endeavour to maintain peace and to 
render the island of Java as prosperous as possible.139
As Danureja II and his party made their way back to Yogya with Veeckens’ 
declaration in their hands and Daendels’ compliments to pass on to the sul-
tan (the governor-general had not forgotten such niceties this time) ringing 
in their ears, they must have wondered what exactly was going on. A post-
138 Java NOK 47, ‘Memorie voor Den Weledele Gestrengen Heer Nicolaus Engelhard Raad 
Extraordinair van Nederlandsch Indië en aankomende Gouverneur en Directeur van Java’s 
Noord Oost Kust door den Weledele Gestrengen Heer Johan Frederik von Reede tot den Parkeler 
Raad Extraordinair mitsgaders afgaande Gouverneur en Directeur bij dezelvs vertrek naar Bata-
via gedateerd Samarang ultimo Augustus 1801’, 31-8-1801.
139 Copy of Memorial delivered by Pakubuwana IV to Captain William Robison, 24-9-1811, in 
IOL Eur F.148/18 (‘Raffles-Minto Collection’). Dutch original signed H.W. Gezelschap, English 
translation made by Captain Robison.
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feuda l Java? The happiness of subjects? The mightiest empire in the world? 
How to make sense of all this in the context of an ‘old order’ in Java which 
seemed so immutable? Luckily, symbolic explanation was at hand. No sooner 
had the Yogya delegation returned home, than Van Braam – soon to replace 
Buyskes as Daendels’ deputy140 – came over from Surakarta on an official 
visit with his wife.141 It was usual on such occasions for the court to honour 
their distinguished guest with a tiger and buffalo fight on the southern alun-
alun (open field behind the kraton) and Van Braam was not disappointed. 
However, the particular fight he witnessed had an interesting denoue-
ment: in the first round of the contest, the tiger severed the leg tendons of 
the buffalo and then refused to fight further. In the second, when a new tiger 
was introduced, it jumped clean out of the ring of guarding spearmen and 
was only caught and killed behind the elevated platform on which the sultan 
was sitting with his Dutch guest. ‘This situation, which had never occurred 
before,’ Van Braam reported, ‘caused the Javanese to make many conjectures 
with regard to me […] and the sultan made me a compliment and said that it 
had occurred in my honour!’142
Some compliment, some honour! What Van Braam did not realise was that 
these contests had a deeper meaning. Whereas for a visiting European dig-
nitary like himself, a tiger and buffalo fight might have been seen as a rather 
gruesome form of entertainment, the equivalent of bear-baiting in Europe 
perhaps, for the watching Javanese the contests had a much more profound 
significance. They equated the Europeans with the quick and deadly tiger and 
themselves with the powerful wild buffalo. Although the former was fero-
ciously aggressive, it had little staying power and was nearly always defeated 
by the slower, more cautious and resilient beast (Ricklefs 1974a:274-6, 303-4, 
345-6; Carey 1992:467 note 321; Houben 1994:81-2). In this particular case, 
both rounds had shown the Dutch ‘tiger’ in a rather unflattering light: in the 
first, although able to move in for the kill with the buffalo’s tendons severed, 
it had not done so. In the second, the tiger had jumped clean out of the ring. 
Did this not mean that the Javanese could expect some unusual develop-
ments in terms of their Dutch adversary? At the time of Van Braam’s visit, the 
British invasion still lay nearly three years away. But when it happened, those 
Yogya courtiers who still recalled the October 1808 tiger-and-buffalo fight on 
the southern alun-alun might have been forgiven for surmising that it pres-
aged a time when the once mighty Dutch and their now defunct East Indies 
140 Note 46.
141 Ambrosina Wilhelmina, née Van Rijck. Daendels was supposed to have been in love with 
her, although he had many other liaisons of a more professional kind while in Java, Poensen 
1905:237, 239; De Haan 1935a:507, 613; and was even accused of forcing a married woman on the 
very day of her marriage to become his mistress, Van Polanen 1816:40.
142 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 17-10-1808.
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Company would be placed completely hors de combat as far as their rule in 
Java was concerned by a new and more formidable European enemy.
As if in presage of the tragedy to come, Van Braam’s last day in the sultan’s 
capital was marred by an ugly diplomatic incident. As the Surakarta Resident 
and his wife were being driven out from the Dutch fort in his carriage to 
make the short journey to the Residency House just opposite, his gold-and-
blue payung (state sunshade) clearly visible behind him, who should be rid-
ing down the main avenue but Radèn Rongga making for the meeting place 
in front of the kraton. Instead of stopping, however, to let the high Dutch 
official pass as the new ceremonial demanded, the bupati wedana cut straight 
across Van Braam’s path forcing his coachman to pull up short. Here was an 
affront indeed. Engelhard ever the diplomat suggested that his colleague 
just mention the incident to the sultan as he took his leave later that day and 
ask Rongga to make a personal apology. This he did and Rongga’s apology 
swiftly followed. Was this enough – cukup – the sultan asked in Malay? No, 
Van Braam wanted the bupati wedana to make a public apology in front of 
the entire court. This created a sensation. Amazement was written on every 
courtier’s face as Radèn Rongga, his own visage puce with embarrassment 
intoned the formal Javanese apology in Malay. Then toasts were drunk and 
Van Braam departed. Scarcely a day later at Klathèn (16 October) at the time 
of the signing of the Angger Gladhag (agreement on the porters’ guilds), the 
Surakarta Resident’s path again crossed with that of Rongga who was part of 
the Yogya delegation. Van Braam pretended that nothing had happened, but 
Rongga’s face was a mask of discomfort. ‘That dangerous, irascible, resentful 
and enterprising man who gives in to nothing’, as Van Braam put it in his 
report to Daendels, was now the government’s public enemy number one. 
The denouement would not be long in coming.143
Conclusion
As the year 1808 drew to a close, the Yogya court may have wondered just 
what more lay in store for them. For Dipanagara, the beginning of the ruin 
of the Land of Java promised by the disembodied voice at Parangkusuma 
was every bit as real as his darkest forebodings. With each new humiliation 
visited on the court and with every slight made to its ruling family and sen-
ior priyayi, the brash new world of Revolutionary Europe, which Daendels 
personified, was becoming more evident. This was not just about changing 
a few archaic practices, a little tinkering at the edges to bring the old Dutch 
143 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 17-10-1808, contains the 
complete report on the incident which occurred on the last day of Van Braam’s official visit (13-15 
October 1808).
                                      Plate 24. Sketch of a fight between a tiger and a buffalo, taken from  Pfyffer zu Neueck 1929: Plate XV. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden. 
                                      Plate 24. Sketch of a fight between a tiger and a buffalo, taken from  Pfyffer zu Neueck 1929: Plate XV. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden. 
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East Indies Company into the modern world. This was root and branch 
change. Henceforth, the Javanese political philosophy of two sovereigns and 
the reassuring divide between the kingdoms of Batavia/west Java and Java 
proper – namely the kejawèn – would be well-nigh impossible to maintain. 
In everything that touched the relationship between south-central Java and 
Batavia, from the political demands of the colonial administration, to access 
to labour and economic resources, to military and defence requirements in an 
era of global conflict, it was clear that Java had entered a new age. And yet, it 
was not so easy for those like Dipanagara, born when the Javanese old order 
was still intact, to make this shift in consciousness. Much more would have to 
happen before such a change would be seen either as necessary or inevitable. 
Amongst the south-central Javanese elite few indeed would begin to make 
the necessary adjustments to the new colonial order before the Java War. But 
by then it would be too late. The time for making changes the Javanese way 
would have passed. The colonial government would do it for them. Daendels 
was just a beginning.
chapter VI
the old order’s last champion
the origins and course of radèn rongga’s 
rebellion, 1809-1810
The despoliation of Yogya
On 3 December 1808, Gustaf Wilhelm Wiese was installed by Pieter Engelhard 
as ‘minister’ (Resident) in Yogyakarta a day before the latter’s departure for 
Batavia.1 Although Wiese himself had no previous experience of the south-
central Javanese courts, the fifteen months of his Residency saw a continu-
ation of the careful diplomacy of his predecessor. Introduced to the second 
sultan by Engelhard as a man ‘of soft character and a true heart’,2 the Javanese 
babad concur that during his incumbency matters proceeded ‘calmly’.3 But 
this hardly seems an accurate depiction of the increasingly turbulent rela-
tions between the Dutch and the Yogya court as the second year of Daendels’ 
administration dawned. 
One of the first problems was the delicate matter of Daendels’ demand 
for money from the sultan. On 22 December, Wiese wrote to the Yogya ruler 
asking him to provide a sum of money ‘as a sign of his attachment to the 
[Dutch] government’ for the war treasury the governor-general was setting 
up.4 The sultan’s response is not recorded. But we know from other sources 
1 Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard and G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buiten-
zorg), 4-12-1808.
2 Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surakarta), 22 Jumadilakir 
AJ 1735 (AD 15-6-1808)
3	 Poensen	1905:140;	B.Ng.	I:83,	XXIV.3.	Both	refer	to	affairs	as	‘calm’	(tentrem) under Wiese.
4 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 4 Dulkangidah 
AJ 1735 (AD 22-12-1808); Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 8-2-
1809	(for	reference	to	Daendels’	‘war	treasury’,	which	he	also	got	leading	European	officers	and	
citizens in Yogyakarta – for example, the commander of the garrison Lieutenant-Colonel L.B. 
de Chasteauvieux, the Residency surgeon, Friedrich Willem Baumgarten (born Brunswick circa 
1760)  and burgers (‘citizens’) Emanuel Kläring (born Bürenberg circa 1750) and C.H. Klein – to 
contribute 105,000 ronde realen); AvJ, J.A. van Braam (Semarang) to G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta), 1-3-
1809 reference to  Daendels’ Geheim Besluit of  2-10-1808 decreeing a levy on rich European and 
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that Daendels obtained some 200,000 Spanish dollars from Yogya during 
the course of his administration, the bulk (196,320 Spanish dollars) of which 
was taken as an indemnity to pay for his army and his civilian officials in 
December 1810 after his expedition to Yogya in the wake of Radèn Rongga’s 
revolt.5 According to the Yogya babad, the sultan had already given 50,000 
Indies guilders worth of gold ornaments which were sent to Semarang along 
with various other official presents with the Yogya patih at the time of the 
joint court delegation to Daendels in late September 1808 when the chief min-
isters paid their ‘homage’ to him as an incoming governor-general.6 Wiese’s 
predecessor, Engelhard, had apparently arranged this particular gift, but if 
he did there is nothing in the Dutch sources to confirm it. It may be that the 
babad writer has confused this with the personal loan of 50,000 Indies guil-
ders which Engelhard received from the sultan to cover his debts during the 
course of his two incumbencies as Yogya Resident.7 
Although the full details elude us, it is clear that Daendels began a proc-
ess which the British, who must take first prize as asset strippers and looters 
during their brief five-year administration of Java,8 completed, namely, the 
despoliation of the Yogya treasury. Built up by the second sultan during the 
first sixteen years of his reign, and reckoned by Matthijs Waterloo to exceed 
one million Spanish dollars in gold and silver coins by February 1808 not 
counting ‘a very large sum in diamonds’,9 this entire sum was removed from 
Yogya by force and diplomatic diktat during the course of the next four years 
(1808-1812). Plunder on this scale gave the lie to Daendels’ protestations in 
his declaration to the patih in Semarang in early October 1808 that his admin-
istration represented the new enlightened government of post-Revolutionary 
Europe, a government which had the ‘happiness’ of its subjects at its heart. 
We will see shortly, how the same gap between rhetoric and reality would 
be the hallmark of the British interregnum (1811-1816). Small wonder that 
Dipanagara would later insist in the preliminaries to his March 1830 ‘peace 
Chinese citizens in Java. According to Van Braam, the levy was to be paid in three instalments on 
1-4-1809, 1-5-1809 and 1-6-1809, and the Yogya kapitan cina Tan Jin Sing was also a contributor.
5	 IOL,	Raffles-Minto	collection	(Xerox	copies	of	holograph	letters),	IV:76	(reference	to	200,000	
Spanish dollars); Poensen 1905:135-6; Bataviasche Koloniale Courant 6, 8-2-1811; Daendels 1814:
Bijlage	2,	additioneele	stukken	24	(on	161,260	Spanish	dollars	taken	as	an	indemnity	in	January	
1811	for	his	officers	and	men;	and	35,000	Spanish	dollars	for	his	civilian	officials);	Carey	1992:414-
5 note 80. See further Chapter VII.
6 B.Ng. I:74-5, XX.16-22; p. 199.





the Yogya kraton. At least half of this was shipped back to Bengal, Carey 1992:414-5 note 80.
9	 dK	145,	Matthijs	Waterloo	(Yogyakarta)	to	Nicolaus	Engelhard	(Semarang),		21-2-1808.	On	
the collection of diamonds and jewelry owned by Hamengkubuwana II’s third consort Ratu Ken-
cana Wulan, see Carey 1992:403 note 21.
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negotiations’ with the Dutch at the end of the Java War that the only trade 
which would henceforth be allowed with Europeans would be one in which 
they paid the right market prices for Javanese products and the only land 
leases those in which they paid the right market rents.10
Military preparations and Daendels’ July 1809 visit
While these negotiations over the Yogya contribution to the marshal’s war 
chest were proceeding, the issue of the new ceremonial introduced by the 28 
July 1808 decree remained deadlocked. Wiese warned the patih that he would 
not be able to pay the sultan any official visits in the kraton unless a stool were 
provided for him thus enabling him to sit at the same height as the Yogya 
ruler. But the monarch remained adamant that he had to remain at a more 
elevated position than the Resident through the insertion of a low wooden 
bench under his throne.11 This argument over ceremonial would continue 
right through to the end of Daendels’ administration in May 1811 and beyond 
into the British period (1811-1816). It would also bedevil the arrangements for 
the marshal’s own visit to Yogya in late July as we will see shortly.
Meanwhile, the military situation in Yogya was giving the Dutch authori-
ties cause for concern. In late January 1809, news reached the sultan’s capital 
of an unusually large military exercise in Surakarta. This had apparently been 
occasioned by the Surakarta ruler’s jealousy of the respect paid by senior Dutch 
artillery officers to Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) during a recent inspection 
visit to the south-central Javanese courts.12 The Sunan’s decision to stage his 
own manoeuvres was thus an attempt to demonstrate his independent military 
capacity and his position in south-central Java as the senior ruler.13 But it was 
interpreted badly in Yogya. The sultan gave orders for all male inhabitants of 
Yogya to turn out for a military review and instructions were sent to the eastern 
mancanagara bupati to hold themselves in readiness.14 Wiese hurried to remind 
the sultan of the warning given the previous year by Daendels that any such 
manoeuvres would be interpreted as a declaration of war against the Dutch 
government.15 There was also talk of sending Prangwedana’s forces to Klathèn 
10 Chapter V note 34.
11 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 31-1-1809.
12	 Dj.Br.	25,	‘Dagregister	gehouden	der	comptoire	Djocjocarta	betreffende	het	voorgevallene	
sedert primo Januari tot ultimo Wintermaand [December] 1809’ (henceforth: ‘Dagregister 1809’), 
entries	of	17-1-1809	to	26-1-1809,	referring	to	visits	to	Yogya	of	‘battle	commander’	(commandant 
van oorlog) Lieutenant-Colonel Baillard and Artillery Captain Rauws. Their visit to Surakarta 
appears to have taken place earlier in the month immediately before their arrival in Yogya.
13 Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 26-1-1809.
14 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 31-1-1809, 5-3-1809; Dj.Br. 
22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 1-2-1809, 2-2-1809.
15 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 31-1-1809.
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‘in order to keep the peace in Java’.16 This seems to have had the desired effect. 
But, although the mobilization orders were rescinded, troops continued to 
pour into the capital. On 1 March, the Yogya Resident was reporting an unu-
sually large turnout for the previous Saturday weekly tournament (Setonan) 
on the southern alun-alun with over 2,000 cavalry taking part drawn from the 
contingents of the sultan, the Crown Prince and other Yogya princes.17 By early 
April, large detachments were beginning to arrive from the mancanagara as the 
eastern bupati made their way to Yogya for the Garebeg Mulud (Celebration of 
The Prophet’s Birthday) which that year fell on 27 April.18 Dipanagara reckoned 
that by this time there were upwards of 10,000 troops in the city not counting 
those from the sultan’s own apanage lands. The Yogya babad gives even more 
inflated figures.19 Many of these soldiers were deployed to guard the sultan’s 
pesanggrahan. At the same time, the eastern bupati, who did not have residences 
in the capital, were given temporary accommodation in small pavilions con-
structed of bamboo and palm-leaf.
According to the Yogya chronicle, almost daily exercises took place on 
the great square to the south of the court and the tensest expectations were 
aroused when news came through in early April of Daendels’ intention to 
make an official visit to the south-central Javanese courts later in that dry 
season.20 Many Yogyanese went about dressed permanently in battle array 
(prajuritan) and Dipanagara describes how he was called upon to take com-
mand of the kadipatèn (Crown Prince’s establishment) forces numbering some 
1,000 men. Only two of the smaller kadipatèn regiments, the Suranatan and 
the Trunasmara, the latter comprising panakawan (young unmarried compan-
ions) and grooms (gamel) were left under the Crown Prince’s orders.21 When 
the day of Daendels’ arrival (29 July 1809) dawned, Dipanagara summoned 
two of his father’s military commanders, and together with his two younger 
brothers, Adinagara and Suryabrangta, rode out to Kalasan as part of the 
Crown Prince’s delegation tasked with greeting the governor-general, who 
16 AvJ, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta), 21-1-1809.
17 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 13 Sura AJ 1736 (AD 1-3-
1808), 26 Sura AJ 1736 (AD 14-3-1809), citing report from the commander of the Yogya garrison, 
Lieutenant-Colonel L.B. de Chasteauvieux regarding the 25 February 1809 Setonan. On the Satur-
day tournaments, see Carey 1992:467 note 320.
18 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 18-3-1809; Dj.Br. 22, G.W. 
Wiese (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 2-4-1809, 11-4-1809; Dj.Br. 25, ‘Dagregister 
1809’, entry of 27-4-1809.
19 BD (Manado) II:131, XIV.97-8; B.Ng. I:87-9, XXIV.39-54.
20 B.Ng. I:88-9, XXIV.49-54; Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II 
(Yogyakarta), 4-4-1808 (announcing Daendels’ plans for a visit).
21 BD (Manado), II:129-30, XIV.91-5. Dipanagara may have exaggerated the kadipatèn troop 
strength:	according	to	Dutch	figures	compiled	at	the	time	of	the	1	June	1808	Rajawinangun	review	
(Chapter V), the total establishment was 600, half armed with pikes and half with muskets, Dj.Br. 
23, J.G. Dietrée, ‘Translaat Notitie’, 2-6-1808. On the Suranatan, see p. 89.
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was attired in the full dress uniform of a Napoleonic marshal.22
Although Dipanagara makes no allusion to this in his babad, it is clear that 
the protocol for Daendels’ reception caused many problems for the Yogya 
Resident. A project ceremonial for the five-day visit (29 July-2 August 1809) 
visit seems to have been sent to Yogya for approval in late May.23 But, in early 
June, Wiese was reporting that the sultan was only prepared to come out as 
far as Demangan near Kalasan to greet the marshal. This was the same dis-
tance as he had travelled the previous November to receive Daendels’ deputy, 
Rear-Admiral Buyskes, a visit which, as we have seen, occasioned much 
displeasure.24 A compromise was eventually reached when the Yogya ruler 
agreed to travel somewhat further out to Bantulan near his royal orchard at 
Jenu (present-day Ambarrukmo) to make his first meeting with the governor-
general.25 At the same time, the question of seating arrangements in the offi-
cial receptions in the Residency House and the kraton required much delicate 
negotiation. The sultan was not prepared to allow the Resident to stand in his 
presence, but suggested that he should be seated on a stool next to his throne. 
He also asked that his heir apparent, the Crown Prince, should be allowed 
to sit in a similar fashion rather than remain on the floor as he normally 
did in court receptions. These requests were allowed.26 The sticking point 
was reached, however, when the Yogya ruler insisted that he sit higher than 
Daendels in the kraton reception by having a bench placed under his throne.27 
It was one thing for the sultan to attempt to sit higher than the Resident at offi-
cial meetings, quite another when he tried the same protocol with the gover-
nor-general himself. It was at this point that Daendels threatened to cancel his 
visit to Yogya altogether and restrict himself to the Sunan’s court if his project 
ceremonial was not approved.28 The sultan seems to have acquiesced, but it is 
clear from the Javanese accounts that the visit mortified him deeply.
When Daendels did eventually arrive in Yogya, his presence occasioned 
much curiosity and interest amongst the local population. It was the first ever 
visit by a governor-general to Mangkubumi’s capital (Carey 1984b:58), and it 
raised many expectations as to what it might achieve. The fact that Daendels 
22 BD (Manado), II:129-30, XIV.91-5. The two commanders were Radèn Wiryapuspita and 
Radèn	Jayaminarsa.	Daendels	had	travelled	to	Kalasan	after	an	early	breakfast	at	Prambanan	and	
an inspection of the temple ruins.
23 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 10-6-1809.
24 Chapter V. Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 2-
6-1809. On the location of Demangan, which is the Kenaran sub-district of Kalasan, see Schoel 
1931:84.
25 Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 13-6-1809. On 
the location of Jenu, see Carey 1984a:45 note 4.
26 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 10-6-1809; Dj.Br. 22, 
G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 13-6-1809.
27 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 10-6-1809.
28 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 10-6-1809.
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had brought a sizeable military force with him to the Principalities once again 
underscored the mailed fist nature of his regime.29 But efforts were made to 
turn the visit into a diplomatic success through the scheduling of various 
‘discussions’ between the sultan and Daendels in the kraton and in the throne 
room at the Residency House. Some of these focussed on cash-crop produc-
tion and agriculture in the princely territories, others on the sultan’s duties as 
a ruler.30 At the same time, there were the usual official visits to the sultan’s 
family, tours of four of the royal pesanggrahan (Ngawatreja, Rajawinangun, 
Purwareja and Wanacatur), a rampog macan (tiger spearing), a firework dis-
play organised by the kapitan cina, Tan Jin Sing (in office 1803-1813), on the 
grounds of the Residency House, serimpi dances and a mock one-hour tour-
nament conducted by forty of the Yogya ruler’s cherished Amazon corps, the 
prajurit èstri, on the southern alun-alun.31 This latter display is said to have 
especially impressed Daendels who subsequently expressed his amazement 
that women could ride so adroitly on horseback (Poensen 1905:144). One 
wonders if the male chauvinist governor-general realised that these viragos 
were not just for show but had real fighting capacity as the British would 
later discover when they stormed the Yogya kraton on 20 June 1812 and had 
their only officer casualty, a Scots lieutenant of a British line regiment, knifed 
to death by a court lady whom he had unwisely tried to carry away as booty 
(Carey 1992:414 note 78; p. 349). 
Despite the formal compliments and outward display of friendship, no 
deeper understanding was reached. Dipanagara laconically dismissed the 
visit in a single sentence in his babad, noting that ‘there was much talk but 
nothing came of it’.32 The other Javanese accounts dwell on the humiliations 
which the sultan underwent concerning the seating arrangements and the 
lack of respect paid to him by the governor-general.33 At the end of the day, 
the visit probably confirmed the sultan in his conviction that he should not 
give an inch on matters of ceremonial.
On 2 August at 4.30 a.m., the early start allowing travel in the cool of the 
morning and suited to the governor-general’s military routine, Daendels 
departed for Semarang accompanied as far as Secang in Kedhu by Wiese, 
Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat, and Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara (the 
29 Mack.Pr. 2, ‘Surakarta sengkala list’, entry for AJ 1736 (AD 1809), refers to Daendels’ bring-
ing with him ‘many gentlemen’ and an army of 600 made up of 300 cavalry and 300 infantry.
30 Dj.Br.	24,	Groenhoff	van	Woortmann,	‘Dagverhaal’,	17-8-1809.
31	 Dj.Br.	24,	Groenhoff	van	Woortmann,	‘Dagverhaal’,	17-8-1809	(gives	a	detailed	diary	descrip-
tion of the visit). A rampog macan involves the spearing to death of a number of tigers or panthers 
who	are	released	into	a	circle	of	lancers	and	are	then	speared	when	they	attempt	to	break	out	of	
the circle, Ricklefs 1974a:275-6; Houben 1994:82; Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:365. The spectacle 
had a serious military purpose since it tested the courage of the kraton spearmen. On the prajurit 
èstri and pesanggrahan, see Chapter II note 29 and Appendix VI.
32 BD (Manado), II:130-1, XIV (Sinom) 96. mapan kathah bicara kang nora dadya.
33 B.Ng. I:89-90, XXV 9-16; Poensen 1905:142; Hageman 1855-56:255.
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future patih, Danureja III, in office 1811-1813). There, according to the Pakualam 
babad, Daendels made efforts through his interpreter, C.F. Krijgsman, to attach 
Natadiningrat to the Dutch cause by warning him about what might happen 
if the Crown Prince succeeded to the sultanate (Poensen 1905:144-5). There is 
nothing in the Dutch records to bear this out and it seems that far from cul-
tivating relations with Natadiningrat and his father Natakusuma, the future 
Pakualam I (reigned 1812-1829), Daendels went out of his way to give his full 
support and interest to Dipanagara’s father, the Crown Prince.34 The marshal’s 
subsequent actions in favour of the Crown Prince against Natakusuma and 
the sultan bear this out as we shall see later in this chapter.
The struggle over the teak trade and the crisis in the eastern mancanagara and pasisir
While these events were taking place in Yogya, the situation in the eastern 
mancanagara and the districts bordering the Dutch territories on the north 
coast (pasisir) was deteriorating. As we have seen, increasing pressure had 
been applied on the courts by Daendels from July 1808 onwards to gain 
access to the eastern outlying region’s timber reserves, particularly in key dis-
tricts such as Panolan and Padhangan.35 Initially, his demands had been lim-
ited to hardwood stakes for the construction of his new naval defences at Fort 
Lodewijk in Surabaya.36 But by early 1809, these requirements had broadened 
out to include a ban on the private sale of teak across the border into the 
Dutch-held pasisir territories and the establishment of a de facto government 
timber monopoly. In Blora, for example, the whole of the teak trade was taken 
out of the hands of the local Surakarta-appointed bupati and turned over to 
Dutch forestry officials who relied on European and Chinese contractors to 
extract the hardwood.37 Much the same situation prevailed in the Yogya dis-
tricts of Jipang and Japan (Majakerta) where a consignment of over 500 logs 
was demanded through contracts negotiated directly with the local bupati by 
the acting Inspector-General of Coffee Culture Carl von Winckelmann.38 This 
was naturally resented by the mancanagara bupati who stood to lose a very 
valuable source of revenue from their farming out of the rights to fell timber 




37 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 17-4-1809; Dj.Br. 22, 
G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 30-6-1809.
38 Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surakarta), 24-7-1809; Dj.Br. 39, G.W. 
Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 31-5-1809, 29-7-1809.
39 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 17-4-1809.
Plate 25. A Javanese of the lower class, one of those who suffered directly from 
the restriction on sales of wood from the eastern mancanagara to the pasisir during 
Daendels’ administration (1808-1811). Taken from Raffles 1817, I:84 facing. Photograph 
by courtesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
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Japan (Majakerta), for example, the 500-log consignment was later prevented 
from reaching the coast by the local bupati.40
When they arrived in Yogya for the Garebeg Mulud festival of 27 April 1809, 
the eastern bupati explained the situation to the sultan and also alerted him to 
the desperate plight of the wood-cutter forest population whose entire liveli-
hood depended on their ability to glean wood from the sultan’s forests and sell 
it across the border.41 The effects of the rigid enforcement of the teak monopoly 
by Daendels were later noted by Raffles and other British officials. The British 
lieutenant-governor wrote of the ‘size and comfort’ of local houses being ‘very 
essentially contracted’ by the closure of the teak forests ‘which were formerly 
open to natives of all classes’ (Raffles 1817, I:81), and the first British Resident of 
Jipang after its annexation in August 1812 reported a steep drop in population, 
especially in timber-rich areas like Panolan, with much land lying waste.42 The 
closure of the timber market to the local bupati likewise led to a sharp decline 
in the level of forest maintenance. Even Prangwedana’s beautifully maintained 
teak forests at Karangpandhan on the slopes of Mount Lawu felt the impact, his 
pro-Dutch allegiance affording him no exemption (Hogendorp 1913:167).
In this affair, the sultan apparently took up the cause of the forest inhab-
itants, stipulating that although the teak forests would be leased to the 
European government, the common people should still be allowed to sell 
wood to the pasisir.43 Coming from a ruler who had gained such a notorious 
reputation for his harsh fiscal policies during the first sixteen years of his 
reign this was a change of heart indeed. But it was a change which seemed 
to be replicated elsewhere: even the curmudgeonly Residency translator in 
Surakarta, J.W. Winter, remarked that since Daendels’ arrival, the princes and 
bupati of the south-central Javanese courts seemed to have discovered a new-
found compassion for the wong cilik (little people) (Winter 1902:51). 
Despite this high-level solicitude, the situation for the forest-dwelling pop-
ulations of the eastern mancanagara and the districts close to the north coast 
was not improved. In desperation, many took to petty crime and there were 
a number of incursions across the border. Small affrays took place between 
the inhabitants of the court districts and those in the Dutch-controlled pasi-
40 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 29-7-1809.
41 Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Semarang), 14-4-1809, 
17-4-1809,	23-5-1809,	10-6-1809,	30-6-1809.	On	the	wood-cutter	forest	population	known	in	Java	
as the blandhong people, see further pp. 30, 258.
42 Mack.Pr. 21, Pemberton, ‘Djiepan’, 1-4-1813, 325. The falling population is also noted in S.Br. 
127,	‘Oostelijke	montjo-negorosche	landen’,	1830;	and	UBL	BPL	616,	Port.	22	pt.	4,	H.G.	Nahuys	
van Burgst, ‘De montjonegorosche-Djokjokartasche landen’, n.y. (? 1826).
43 Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 17-4-1809 (‘the 
sultan	is	fixed	on	the	idea	that	if	there	is	no	further	logging	in	his	forests	the	length	and	breadth	
of his land this will bring an easing for his subjects’); Poensen 1905:161. Dutch encroachments on 
the forest reserves of Blora and Jipang had been noted as early as 1803, see Chapter V note 18.
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sir. These were regularly reported to Daendels by Dutch officials. As chief 
administrator of the eastern outlying districts, Radèn Rongga was blamed 
for many of these incidents. According to Dipanagara, the bupati wedana was 
constantly singled out by the Dutch as a scapegoat and often summoned to 
Semarang to answer for the growing number of infringements of government 
territory. But an open break was avoided:
XIV. 89  So gradually
  there was even more talk,
  yet it was Radèn Rongga
  who was constantly discussed.
  So they piled up 
  the affairs of Radèn Rongga
  [and] he was often invited to Semarang.
 90  But Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja
  was wary:
  he understood in his heart
  that he was being picked upon
  by the Dutch,
  so he was continuously
  [and] exceedingly cautious of danger.44
The sense of being picked on aroused in Rongga a smouldering resentment 
which was transformed, as we will see shortly, into a fatalistic resignation 
following the early death of his beloved consort, Ratu Maduretna, in mid-
November.
Difficulties between the sultanate and the Dutch government continued 
throughout the long dry season (May-October) of 1809. In early September, 
the Yogya bupati of Grobogan, Radèn Tumenggung Sasrakusuma, was accused 
of holding up rice supplies to the pasisir and a local kyai (religious leader) in 
neighbouring Surakarta-controlled Blora, Kyai Haji Minhaj, who had collected 
a large group of adherents, was reported to be ‘terrorising’ government forestry 
officials in the area.45 The involvement of ‘men of religion’ in these activities and 
complaints from the Sunan about ‘the many priests who pretend to be descend-
ants of The Prophet, begging and wandering in Surakarta lands’ would lead a 
year later to a decree by Daendels banning the circulation of ‘priests’ between 
44 BD (Manado), II:128-9, XIV (Sinom) 89-90. mengkana pan lama-lama/ saya kathah bicarèki/ 
nanging Radèn Ronggèki/ ingkang tansah dados catur/ mengkana tumpa-tumpa/ Dèn Rongga ingkang 
prekawis/ mapan asring dènundang dhateng Semarang. 90. Dèn Rongga Prawiradirja/ nanging wus pray-
itna galih/ ingkang tyas pan wus uninga/ lamun dipunpengarahi/ dhumateng ing Kumpni/ dadya tan 
pegat puniku/ langkung prayitnèng baya.
45 Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 12-9-1809, 29-9-
1809.
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Surakarta and Dutch-controlled territories unless they carried a government 
travel pass, as well as those from the Principalities who wished to trade with 
the north coast. All those ‘priests’ without such a pass would be sent in chains 
to work at the fortifications in Merak Bay on the Sunda Straits.46
The borders with Tegal and Pekalongan were also the scene of constant 
tension. A returned Mecca pilgrim, Haji Mustapa, who may have witnessed 
the British naval build-up in Pulau Pinang and the Melaka Straits during his 
sea voyage to the Middle East, spread rumours in Pekalongan of an immi-
nent British attack on Java.47 At the same time, numbers of pasisir inhabitants 
fled to the princely territories to avoid being conscripted for labour duties 
on Daendels’ trans-Java post-road which was just then being laid through 
the Dutch-held areas of the north coast.48 Some 12,000 Javanese, it was later 
estimated, would lose their lives in the construction of this infamous highway 
(Thorn 1815:208; Van Polanen 1816:73). In the ensuing confusion a number of 
small incidents and raids on villages and customs posts in government areas 
took place.49 Some of these were more serious: in September, a major incur-
sion occurred in the government-administered district of Brebes near Tegal 
involving a bandit group estimated to be between 500 to 700 strong.50 The for-
est of Kadhawung in the small Yogya-administered Kedhu enclave between 
Pekalongan and Kendhal was reported to be providing cover for numbers of 
these wong durjana (robbers) who preyed on the north coast highway.51 
46 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 14 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 
12-11-1810),	reporting	receipt	of	letter	from	Engelhard	of	22-10-1810	enclosing	Daendels’	order	
of 16-9-1810 in which all those crossing into pasisir henceforth would be required to have passes 





(Batavia), 22-1-1817. Mustapa was arrested and sentenced to six years imprisonment in chains 
(presumably at Merak Bay) by Pinket van Haak, who was then serving as Prefect of Pekalongan 
(in	office	1809-1810).	
48	 UBL	BPL	616,	Port.	9	pt.	3,	H.G.	Nahuys	van	Burgst,	 ‘Onlusten	op	Java’,	1825;	AvJ,	D.W.	
Pinket van Haak (Pekalongan) to G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta), 24-4-1809.
49 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 30-11-1809, G.W. 
Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 28-12-1809, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/
Buitenzorg) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 30-12-1809; Dj.Br. 27, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) 
to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 8-1-1810, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to G.W. 
Wiese (Yogyakarta), 10-1-1810, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 
13-1-1810, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to D.W. Pinket van Haak (Pekalongan), 23-1-1810, Danureja II 
(Yogyakarta) to G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta), 26-1-1810, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. 
Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 5-2-1810, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/
Buitenzorg), 6-2-1810, 12-2-1810.
50 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 24-8-1809.
51 Carey 1980:73 note 2; AvJ, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta), 
11-10-1809.
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The rising tensions underlined the fact that the temporary lull brought 
about by Daendels’ recent official visit was not to last. Sensing that a major 
showdown with the Dutch government could not long be delayed, the sultan 
decided to increase his military preparedness. Shortly after the celebration 
of the Garebeg Puwasa festival marking the end of the fasting month on 
13 November 1809, he took advantage of the presence of Radèn Rongga’s 
workforce from the eastern mancanagara in the royal capital to strengthen the 
kraton defences. The four main bastions were projected by between fifteen to 
eighteen feet,52 and new cannon cast in Gresik and the royal gun foundries at 
Kutha Gedhé to defend them.53
The sultan was right to be concerned. On 30 December, Daendels wrote 
to complain about the repeated incursions and robberies by Yogya inhabit-
ants into Pekalongan. In his view, the Yogya bupati in the area were hand 
in glove with local bandits and were receiving stolen goods. He had given 
‘ample signs of friendship’ by meeting the sultan in person during his recent 
official visit and by greatly reducing his troop strength in Semarang. Now 
he expected the Yogya ruler to reciprocate in kind by taking resolute steps 
against robber bands in the border areas and by handing over the officials 
responsible to ‘Minister’ Wiese (Carey 1980:72-3). He warned that if another 
robbery occurred in this enclave, the sultan would be held personally respon-
sible. The marshal’s army in Semarang was in a position to occupy the sultan’s 
territory within fourteen days, and he intended to annex the Kedhu enclave 
on the north coast if there was any repeat of the border incursions. But he 
hoped it would not come to that (Carey 1980:72-5).
In the face of such an ultimatum, the sultan sought to buy time. He replied 
in emollient terms stating that he had sent out a Yogya mission accompanied 
52 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 14-11-1809. Wiese 
reported that Danureja II had told him that Hamengkubuwana II had made the changes to copy 
the Dutch fort and that Hamengkubuwana I had put up the original kraton wall in less than three 
months in early 1785. In fact, it had been put up in less than two weeks and Hamengkubuwana 
II	(then	Crown	Prince)	rather	than	his	father	had	been	the	driving	force	behind	the	fortifications	
which were seemingly modelled on the Dutch military headquarters in Batavia, which the patih 
of the kadipatèn,	Mas	Tumenggung	Wiraguna	(in	office	circa	1780-1807),	had	seen	during	a	visit	
to Batavia in the early 1780s. Hamengkubuwana II’s former bodyguard commander, Pangéran 
Dipakusuma, was also in Batavia at that time, Dj.Br. 27,  Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van 
Braam (Surakarta), 14-11-1810, Ricklefs 1974a:278-83. B.Ng. I:95, XXV.69 gives 2 Sawal AJ 1736 
(AD 13-11-1809) as the date when the bastions referred to in the Javanese accounts as the pojok 
balowerti were extended.
53 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:283 note 1 (on the capture of an iron cannon from the old 
kraton at Plérèd on 29-5-1826 during the Java War which bore the sengkala (chronogram) inscrip-
tion suwaraning dahana sabdanèng ratu, AJ 1737 (AD 6-2-1810 – 25-1-1811); on Hamengkubuwana 
II’s casting of cannon in Gresik, see Gomperts and Carey 1994:26 note 10. On the 92 iron and brass 
cannon captured from the Yogya kraton on 20 June 1812, including 8 eighteen-pounders and 7 
twelve-pounders, see Thorn 1815:192.
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by a Dutch officer54 to arrest those engaged in criminal activities in the border 
areas. He also promised that if heads of villages dared to ignore the recently 
agreed regulations regarding the suppression of criminals,55 they would be 
arrested and handed over to the Resident who could pass them on Daendels 
if he so wished.56 While this exchange was taking place, on 8 January 1810, 
Daendels gave proof of his determination to enforce his new hard-line policy 
by dismissing the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Danuningrat (in office 
1804-1810), for his dilatoriness in investigating Surakarta official involve-
ment in the Pekalongan disturbances.57 He also sought to strengthen the 
government position in Yogya by appointing a tough new Resident, Johannes 
Wilhelmus Moorrees (in office 9 March-24 August 1810), to take over from 
Wiese when the latter was moved back to his old post as inspector-general 
of Forests in early March.58 Moorrees, who as prefect of Banten (November 
1808-April 1809), had been severely wounded during an attack on his carriage 
and forced to flee in the disturbances which had followed Daendels’ abolition 
of the Banten sultanate,59 came to Yogya with a reputation as a bruiser: the 
Yogya babad refers to him as a ‘minister who exuded forcefulness’,60 while 
the Pakualam account describes him as ‘brawny’ (jarot) (Poensen 1905:147). 
But forcefulness alone was not going to advance the cause of the European 
government in the sultan’s capital as Moorrees would discover in the five 
unhappy months of his residency, a period when all the mistakes of his 
equally short sojourn in Banten would be repeated.
No sooner had Moorrees settled into his new post in early March than 
a new attack occurred on the Pekalongan village of Wonodadi.61 This was 
said to involve a ‘well-known robber band’ which was operating out of the 
Yogya district of Tersana in the above-mentioned Kedhu enclave.62 Daendels 
54	 This	was	Lieutenant	Willem	Driessen	 (born	Yogya	 circa	1760),	 a	fluent	 Javanese	 speaker	
with experience of participating in such commissions, Dj.Br. 27, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. 
Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 8-1-1810. See note 110.
55 This was the Angger Gunung of 26-9-1808 agreed jointly by the patih at Klathèn, see Chapter 
V.
56 Carey 1980:72-5; Dj.Br. 27, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 
13-1-1810.
57	 Van	der	Chijs	1895-97,	XV:10-4.	The	Surakarta	ngabèhi of	Delimas,	Jayèngpati,	was	the	official	
implicated in the cross-border raids and he was later murdered under pressure from Daendels. 
On the location of Delimas in present-day Limpung sub-district, Batang kabupatèn, Pekalongan, 
see Schoel 1931:105 sub: ‘Dlimas’.
58 Poensen 1905:147 note 3. Wiese appears to have combined his post as Inspector of Forests 
with that of Resident of Rembang. He died in Semarang on 7-10-1811 (Dudok van Heel 2002:142), 
his	widow,	Catharina	Gasparina	 Beijlon	 (or	 Beijlen)	 (1776-1821),	 remarried	 on	 19-11-1816,	De	
Haan 1935a:614.
59 Hageman 1864:227; Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 
29-4-1809.
60 B.Ng. I:95, XXV.73, referring to Moorrees as the Minister bèr purun.
61 Bandar sub-district, Batang kabupatèn, Pekalongan, see Schoel 1931:444.
62 Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 18-3-1810, 23-
3-1810, 26-3-1810.
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demanded that the leader be caught. In the margins of the Yogya Resident’s 
dispatch reporting the incident, he wrote that ‘this affair has become so seri-
ous that I am withdrawing my trust in the sultan and the patih […] I will take 
action if the fugitives are allowed to escape as before’.63 When the inevitable 
happened and the robbers slipped away over the border, the Yogya demang 
of Tersana, Radèn Tirtawijaya, was summoned to the royal capital to take 
responsibility. Daendels demanded that the sultan put him to death, but the 
Yogya ruler was loathe to oblige given that the demang was closely related 
by marriage to two leading figures at the Yogya court, namely, his favour-
ite consort, Ratu Kencana Wulan, and his former bodyguard commander, 
Pangéran Dipakusuma (Poensen 1905:149-50; Carey 1980:185). The most he 
was prepared to do was to send him into exile. But this was not acceptable to 
Daendels. He continued to demand his head. So the unfortunate official was 
bound and delivered to the Resident who sent him in chains to Semarang. 
From there he was taken out on the new postweg and shot at Weleri, his body 
being left by the side of the road until, according to the Pakualam babad, it 
was collected by his children and grandchildren for decent Javanese-Islamic 
burial (Poensen 1905:148-9). 
Moorrees reported that the sultan was deeply ‘ashamed’ at having to 
hand over the demang and he registered his displeasure by refusing to 
receive the Resident with the new ceremonial at the time of the Garebeg 
Mulud on 18 April 1810.64 The only concession he made was to agree to 
drink to the health of Moorrees’ wife immediately after the official toasts to 
the ‘minister’ and the Crown Prince, a concession which infuriated Daendels 
who declared that ‘women have no place in the drinking of toasts – theirs 
is entirely a private affair!’. In the same marginal note, he also insisted that 
Moorrees adhere to the 28 July 1808 ceremonial in all future dealings with 
the Yogya ruler.65
The scapegoating of Radèn Rongga
Daendels clearly intended Radèn Tirtawijaya’s miserable end to serve as a 
warning to all those in Yogya who refused to cooperate with his government. 
But his tactic of using Moorrees to enforce his strong line against the sultan 
in terms of the new ceremonial and the punishment of those responsible for 
cross-border incursions would backfire badly. As far as the Yogya ruler was 
63 Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 26-3-1810 
(Daendels’ marginal annotation).
64 Dj.Br. 36, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 18-4-1810.
65	 Dj.Br.	36,	Daendels’	marginal	note	on	letter	of	J.W.	Moorrees	(Yogyakarta)	to	H.W.	Daendels	
(Batavia/Buitenzorg), 18-4-1810.
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concerned the time for making concessions to the Dutch government had 
passed. The governor-general’s pressure only served to coalesce all those 
groups in Yogya who either out of self-interest or through genuine anti-
European sentiments were moving towards a policy of open resistance.
 Radèn Rongga was a central figure here. Immediately following his return 
from the mid-November 1809 Garebeg Puwasa in Yogya, when his workforce 
had helped to extend the kraton bastions, he had been plunged into inconsol-
able grief at the sudden death on 16 November of his beloved official wife, 
Ratu Maduretna.66 Said to be the most beautiful of the three daughters of the 
second sultan by his part Madurese consort, Ratu Kedhaton,67 and still in 
her early thirties at the time of her death, she seems to have been much more 
than the trophy court princess for her rather younger husband. Certainly, 
Radèn Rongga’s reaction to her loss as recorded in the Pakualam babad was 
dramatic: interring her at his family graveyard at Gunung Bancak, which he 
renamed Giripurna in her honour, a prominent hill overlooking the site of 
his new residence at Maospati, he is said to have spent day and night at her 
gravesite. He even gave out that he wished to follow her beyond the grave 
until his subordinate bupati admonished him to come to his senses (Poensen 
1905:154; Adam 1940:333-4).
No sooner had Rongga recovered somewhat from this bitter personal loss 
than he was implicated in a cross-border raid into neighbouring Panaraga on 
31 January 1810.68 This left two dead, one wounded and the entire population 
of the Surakarta-administered sub-district of Ngebel close to Madiun69 num-
bering some 181 souls forced to flee their homes. According to Rongga, the 
inhabitants of this area were notorious criminals who had repeatedly robbed 
Yogya inhabitants in Madiun. He claimed he had been given permission by 
his Surakarta opposite number in Panaraga, Radèn Mas Aria Wiryadiningrat, 
66 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 20-11-1809; B.Ng. 
I:95, XXV.71. Ratu Maduretna’s title recalls the residence of Trunajaya – Madu Retna near Pacuran 
in west Madura –  and may have been chosen by Maduretna’s Madurese mother, Ratu Kedhaton, 
to recall the great seventeenth-century Madurese rebel, who was also known as Panembahan 
Maduretna, see De Graaf 1961-62:60, 110, 118-9, 124, 132, 175-9.
67 Van den Broek 1873-77, 20:480. Ratu Kedhaton was the daughter of Hamengkubuwana I’s 
former army commander and later bupati of Magetan, Radèn Tumenggung Purwadiningrat, who 
was of Madurese descent from Panembahan Cakradiningrat II of Madura (séda Kamal) (reigned 
1680-1707), see Chapter II. Her other daughters, Ratu Bendara and Ratu Anggèr, were married 
to Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat and Radèn Adipati Danureja II respectively, see Mandoyo-
kusumo 1977:18 no. 5, 19 no. 14.
68	 Dj.Br.	46,	Report	of	C.F.	Krijgsman	(Semarang	Residency	 translator)	and	E.	Diepen	(Pan-
araga) to P.A. Goldbach (Semarang and Demak), 1-10-1810, enclosing statement of Mas Bang-
sataruna (wounded Surakarta inhabitant of Ngebel), 23-9-1810. The published sources place the 
attack	in	February	which	is	too	late,	Valck	1844:145;	Poensen	1905:192.	
69 On the location of Ngebel in the Gunung Ngebel sub-district of Pulung, Panaraga, see 
Schoel 1931:249.
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to trace the robber band back into adjacent Surakarta territory.70 Acting on 
this permission, he had sent out a sizeable 800-strong search party, which had 
tracked them down to the village and sub-district of Sekedok in the Gunung 
Ngebel area. Finding the village deserted except for a number of cripples, his 
investigating force had then been ambushed in what he described as an ‘amok 
attack’ by three of the bandit group and it was during this affray that the two 
Surakarta assailants had lost their lives and the third had been wounded. The 
adjacent district of Ngebel had been subsequently ‘ruined’ in retaliation by the 
investigating party.71 He offered to arrange a meeting with the three Panaraga 
bupati after the Garebeg Mulud of 18 April 1810 to sort out the problem.72 
This comparatively small incident would begin a process which would 
ultimately lead to the bupati wedana’s rebellion the following November. The 
Surakarta ruler, who had an intense personal antipathy for Rongga, eagerly 
seized on the affair to make a formal complaint to Daendels.73 Wiryadiningrat 
for his part levelled a number of counter accusations at Rongga, one of the 
most intriguing being that he had retained a military deserter from Panaraga 
named Bratasena (also known as Bratasentana), as a bandit leader, whom 
the Surakarta bupati wedana said was especially admired by Rongga as a 
descendant of Bathara Katong, the founder of Islam in Panaraga. This man 
had been appointed a lurah mantri (senior local official), given the title of 
Radèn Prawirabrata and provided with light cannon from Rongga’s own resi-
dence at Maospati which allowed him to operate freely across the border in 
Panaraga where there was no such ordnance.74 He had apparently specialised 
in capturing sets of Javanese gamelan (orchestras) from the adjacent Surakarta 
territories for the bupati wedana, no less than five such orchestras having been 
carried off to Rongga’s residence in the past four years.75 
70 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 29 
Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 1-8-1810), referring to the delegation of 40 religious scholars (para ulama) 
lead by Haji Hasan Besari of the famous pesantrèn of Tegalsari (Panaraga) (Appendix VIIb) whom 
he had sent to meet with the Surakarta bupati wedana	of	Panaraga	following	his	letter	to	Radèn	
Mas Aria Wiryadiningrat of 29-1-1810. See further Chapter V note 119.
71 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Madiun) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), n.d. (circa 
5-4-1810).
72 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Mas Aria Wiryadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung Wiradirja, Radèn Tumeng-
gung Bratanegara (Panaraga) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 24 Sura AJ 1737 (AD 
1-3-1810); Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Madiun) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 26 Sura AJ 1737 
(AD 3-3-1810).
73 Dj.Br. 46, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 5 Rabingula-
wal AJ 1737 (AD 12-4-1810).
74 Dj.Br. 37, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 11-3-1810, 22-4-1810, 
28-4-1810, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 12-5-1810; Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 30-1-1811 (acknowledging news of recent arrest of 
Bratasentana in Panaraga); B.Ng. I:146, XXXVII.5-6; Daendels 1814:96; Poensen 1905:189; Carey 
1980:175 note 2.
75 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Mas Aria Wiryadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung Prawiradirja, Radèn 
Tumenggung Bratanegara (Panaraga) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 20-5-1810.
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Such activities speak more of cultural kleptomania – of the kind practised 
by the British between 1811-1816 – rather than the usual round of cross-border 
plunder, but this weighed not a whit with Daendels for whom a gamelan and 
a kettle drum were probably one and the same. Moorrees meanwhile had 
decided to drag out the proceedings and increase pressure on the bupati wedana 
by refusing to send out the normal commission of enquiry from Yogya.76 This 
reflected the governor-general’s desire to make an end to Rongga’s influence, if 
necessary by using the same fateful methods as he had applied to the luckless 
demang of Tersana. ‘I would have hung a European for such vexatiousness!’ he 
wrote in reply to Moorrees’ dispatch informing him of Rongga’s actions.77 He 
ordered the Resident to deliver a letter to the sultan pointing out that unless 
Rongga was punished the Yogya ruler risked falling out with both Daendels 
and Pakubuwana IV at one and the same time. He was also told to cite the 
marshal’s public hanging of a European in Banten during Moorrees’ previous 
residency there as proof that he meant business.78 
The sultan was incensed. He saw the Surakarta ruler’s actions as a way of 
putting bad blood between himself and the governor-general, and he recalled 
the misunderstandings between the sultanate and Daendels during the mar-
shal’s first year in office, misunderstandings which he laid squarely at the 
door of the Sunan. After hearing Rongga’s report delivered during his stay in 
Yogya at the time of the Garebeg Mulud, the sultan concluded that the bupati 
wedana had been well within his rights to strike down three notorious rob-
bers.	Until	further	reports	were	forthcoming	from	Surakarta	about	the	affair,	
he would accept Rongga’s version as substantially correct.79 Henceforth, 
the sultan went out of his way to protect and favour his former son-in-law. 
Anxious to have him linked once more to his family by marriage, he offered 
him a new bride, the thirteen-year-old Radèn Ajeng Suratmi, his second 
daughter by his favourite official wife, Ratu Kencana Wulan.80 Although the 
marriage was never consummated,81 Rongga remained close to the sultan. 
He was not called upon to answer further for the Panaraga incursions, and 
in other matters too he was shown indulgence. These included the ongoing 
government investigation into the alleged camp for deserters from Daendels’ 
army in Japan (Majakerta) and the construction of barges on the Sala River 
for the transport of teak to the pasisir. In both cases, Rongga adopted a dila-
76 Dj.Br. 46, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 3-4-1810,  W.N. Serva-
tius (Surakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 7-4-1810.
77 Dj.Br. 46, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 10-4-1810.
78 Dj.Br. 46, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 22-4-1810.
79 Dj.Br. 46, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 28-4-1810.
80 Chapter II note 35.
81 Radèn Ajeng Suratmi, later Ratu Anom, would later marry the son of Pangéran Ngabèhi, 
Radèn Tumenggung Purbakusuma, Poensen 1905:261-2, below note 98; Chapter II note 35.
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tory policy in which he was fully supported by his monarch.82 He was also 
allowed back to Madiun, as we will see shortly, to attend to the one-year 
commemoration of his wife’s demise during which time preparations were 
secretly laid for his future rebellion.
The April-August 1810 crisis in Dutch-Yogya relations 
While Rongga’s stock continued to rise at court, Moorrees’ attempts to bring 
pressure to bear on the Yogya ruler proved increasingly ineffectual. In particu-
lar, his refusal to forward the letters from the Sunan and the three Surakarta 
mancanagara bupati regarding Rongga’s Panaraga incursions until the sultan 
received him at court with the stipulated ceremonial eventually led to a 
complete breakdown in Dutch-Yogya relations (Poensen 1905:178). The main 
point of dispute remained the question of the sultan’s throne and his right to 
sit higher than the Resident. On this the Yogya ruler would not budge.83 All 
Moorrees’ threats were in vain and the Resident’s forceful policy only under-
mined the position of the Yogya patih, Danureja II, whose task it was to convey 
the unpalatable messages to the sultan. Naturally he was seen by those close 
to the sultan like the bupati wedana and Sumadiningrat as being too closely 
identified with the Europeans. In fact, Moorrees’ public support for Danureja 
did him much harm. The Yogya ruler for his part complained bitterly that his 
patih’s conduct was markedly different from that of his grandfather, Danureja I 
(in office 1755-1798), who had been able to act in a more even-handed fashion 
as his father Sultan Mangkubumi’s trusted prime minister.
82 Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Semarang) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 20-6-1810, J.W. Moor-
rees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 2-7-1810, 4-7-1810, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) 
to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 28 Jumadilawal AJ 1737 (AD 1-7-1810) (on rounding up of 
deserters from Daendels’ army, who included Madurese, Sumeneppers, Makassarese, Malays, 
Bugis, Dayak and Balinese, all of whom could be recognised by their short hair  – sampun sami 
katengaran kapagas); Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III and Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moor-
rees (Yogyakarta), 5 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 8-7-1810) (on Daendels’ demands for laying down 
shipyards (pegalangan baita)	on	Sala	River	for	construction	of	river	craft	to	carry	teak	from	interior	
to north coast and for pasisir	inhabitants,	especially	Chinese,	to	be	allowed	to	settle	in	the	manca-
nagara to provide skilled labour for this process; and on Danureja II and Rongga’s concern that 
‘little	people’	(tiyang alit) be allowed to continue to sell their wares on the north coast although 
the sale of teak logs/planks (balok) would be henceforth banned); Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to 
J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 6 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 9-7-1810) (relating that both he and his 
fellow senior bupati		were	too	afraid	to	deliver	Moorrees’	letter	to	Hamengkubuwana	II	requesting	
Radèn Rongga’s immediate departure for Japan (Majakerta) to clear up the ‘camp’ of deserters); 
Poensen 1905:172.
83 Dj.Br. 37, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 12-5-1810, 19-5-1810; 
Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 5-7-1810, stating that 
Hamengkubuwana II would not agree to abandoning his footstool/bench (voetbankje) which he 
had taken to placing under his throne, see p. 171.
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On 30 April 1810, the sultan went so far as to address a letter to Daendels 
seeking the governor-general’s permission to dismiss Danureja II, whom 
he described as still a ‘boy’, and to replace him by the Outer bupati, Mas 
Tumenggung Sindunagara (post-November 1811, Danureja III, in office 1811-
1813).84 The ruler’s proposal was rejected out of hand by Daendels who stated 
that Sindunagara was far too old and lacking in administrative talents for such 
an important post.85 The Surakarta Resident, Jacob Andries van Braam, who 
had now also been appointed Daendels’ deputy,86 was tasked with undertak-
ing a commission to Yogya to effect the full restitution of the patih, who had 
apparently been restricted in his duties by the sultan in the meantime. But 
Van Braam’s mediation did little to restore confidence in Danureja II.87 
So just what sort of man was Danureja II and why did he so entirely lose 
the confidence of his monarch? We have already met him in the context of 
Dipanagara’s circle at Tegalreja where his family’s strong interest in Javanese 
Islamic mysticism and links with the important religious school and centre 
for fiqh scholars at Melangi brought them into close contact with the young 
prince.88 Indeed, the patih’s connections with religious teachers in Melangi, 
in particular Kyai Taptajani (Carey 1974b:272-3), appear to have elicited criti-
cisms in some quarters in Yogya that he was rather too close to the santri in 
much the same way that Dipanagara would be later ridiculed by critics at the 
time of the Java War (Carey 1974a:50, 1975:342 note 7). Danureja II’s mystical 
interests, his friendship with Europeans and his easygoing character made 
him a natural ally of Dipanagara’s father, the Crown Prince. He would remain 
a staunch supporter of the Crown Prince’s karajan party89 until his death in 
October 1811. According to Van IJsseldijk, he always passed on information 
84 Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 4-7-1810; Dj.Br. 22 pt. 
4 (‘Correspondentie tusschen den Minister aan het hof van Djokjokarta en den Gouverneur-
Generaal in anno 1811’, June-August 1811), Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Bata-
via), circa 6-1811; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:34-5. Hamengkubuwana II had referred to 
Danureja by the familiar and rather derogatory Javanese expression, tholé	(‘little	boy’).
85 Dj.Br. 27 pt. 4, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), circa 6-1811; dK 145, 
Waterloo,	‘Memorie	van	Overgave’,	4-4-1808,	described	Sindunagara	as	fifty	years	of	age	in	1808	
‘but with the appearance of an eighty year old’. See further Carey 1992:490 note 429.
86 Chapter V note 46.
87	 Although	Daendels	 (1814:Bijlage	2,	additionele	stukken	6;	Bataviasche Koloniale Courant 6, 
8-2-1811)	confirms	that	Van	Braam	made	two	visits	(the	latter	from	10-13	November)	to	Yogya	
in 1810 as his commissioner to sort out the political problems at the court, there is some confu-
sion	over	when	exactly	he	made	his	first	visit:	Dj.Br.	22	pt.	4,	Pieter	Engelhard	(Yogyakarta)	to	
J.W. Janssens (Batavia), circa 6-1811, states that he came in July, whereas Dj.Br. 37, J.W. Moorrees 
(Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 30-4-1810, indicates that he was due to arrive from 
Semarang on Friday, 4 May. See further Poensen 1905:178-81. There is nothing in the available 
Residency	letters	for	May-July	1810	period	to	confirm	this	first	visit,	but	I	tend	to	favour	Engel-
hard’s dating.
88 See pp. 99-100.
89 Chapter V note 121.
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about affairs of state to the Crown Prince,90 and the fortunes of the two men 
became inextricably linked: as the Crown Prince fell from favour in the 1800s 
so the position of the patih was increasingly jeopardised. Two of his daughters 
by his royal-born wife, Ratu Anggèr, a daughter of the second sultan and his 
part-Madurese consort, Ratu Kedhaton,91 married sons of the Crown Prince 
(p. 371; Appendix II), and the close family ties between the Danurejan family 
and the karajan, subsequently produced considerable support for Dipanagara 
during the Java War (Appendix VIII).
The patih’s main faults were that he was politically naïve, administratively 
inexperienced and lacked the strength and decisiveness to stand up to his 
critics at court. Many of these weaknesses stemmed from his youth: he was 
barely twenty-eight when he succeeded his grandfather as prime minister. 
But at heart he was too mild a man to shoulder the responsibilities and bur-
dens of his high office. While he was still assistant to Danureja I in the 1790s, 
Van IJsseldijk remarked on his ‘blind obedience and great fear of the sultan’, 
which meant that affairs of state were handled ‘more by the petulant ideas of 
the ruler than by the rules of equity and justice’.92 Second Resident of Yogya 
Van den Berg likewise observed that Danureja II was a ‘terrible bungler’ as 
a young administrator, and although he later grew into his position as patih, 
he remained wanting, in Van den Berg’s view, ‘in that degree of firmness 
necessary to support his dignity […] he is a man of pleasure in the pursuit 
of which he frequently neglects his business’.93 His heavy drinking bouts at 
Residency parties and the bad example he set other Yogya officials on such 
occasions, greatly incensed the sultan who fined him heavily. This kept him 
poor which was an additional disadvantage when it came to manipulating 
court patronage.94 The Pakualam babad, which is a hostile source, even speaks 
of him acting as a ‘procurer’ of young girls for the Crown Prince who had a 
reputation as a womaniser (Carey 1980:86 note 1; Poensen 1905:118). One of 
90 KITLV	H		97	(7),	Van	IJsseldijk,	‘Korte	schets’,	31-8-1798.	See also Poensen 1905:111-2; B.Ng. 
I:35, VIII.61-4.
91 Dj.Br. 9A pt. 8, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 1-8-1833, 101, referred to Danureja II’s marriage to Ratu 
Anggèr as a ‘love match’. She died on 14 Jumadilakir AJ 1755 (AD 3-1-1828), see Van den Broek 
1873-77, 24:12.
92 KITLV	H	97	(7),	Van	IJsseldijk,	‘Korte	schets’,	31-8-1798.
93 Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 6-12-1801; 
KITLV H 97 (8),  Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803.
94 Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 11-1-1802 (on 
the 2,000 ronde real	fine	imposed	by	Hamengkubuwana	II	on	Danureja	II	and	other	court	officials	
who had enjoyed the New Year’s eve party in the Residency so much that they had been too 
drunk	to	attend	the	religious	feast	(slametan) the next day for the recently deceased Ratu Bend-
ara,	daughter	of	Hamengkubuwana	I	and	estranged	wife	of	Mangkunagara	I);	Dj.Br.	86,	Matthijs	
Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806 (on poverty of Danureja II 
and	heavy	fines	imposed	on	him	by	Hamengkubuwana	II);	B.Ng.	I:100-1,	XXVII.1-30;	Van	Kes-
teren 1887:1316; Poensen 1905:118, 124.
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these was supposedly ‘carried off’ from the Surakarta kraton, which if true 
might have been expected to create some sort of diplomatic incident with the 
Sunan.95 But the sources are silent.
He also had powerful enemies at court. One of these was Pangéran 
Natakusuma, the future Pakualam I (reigned 1812-1829), who lost no oppor-
tunity to turn his elder brother, the sultan, against him. He it was who related 
the supposed incident regarding Danureja II’s kidnapping of the girl from 
the Surakarta court, which he had originally heard from Radèn Rongga, to 
the sultan.96 Another was the sultan’s third consort, Ratu Kencana Wulan 
(circa 1776-1859) (Carey and Houben 1987:23, 26), the low-born97 former 
commander of his Amazon corps, whose eldest daughter (born circa 1793) 
had married Natakusuma’s eldest son, Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat, 
in September 1805.98 
95 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 27-10-
1810.
96 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 27-10-1810 
(referring to Natakusuma as a ‘keen enemy’ of Danureja II whom he hoped to replace by his own 
son Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat); Poensen 1905:117, 124.
97 According to John Crawfurd, British Resident of Yogyakarta (1811-1813, 1814-1816), Ratu Ken-
cana Wulan’s father, a descendant of the famous sixteenth-century Mataram kyai, Ki Gedhé Karang 
Lo (B.Ng. I49-50, XIII.22-7), had kept a stall in the Yogya market at which she served and where she 
was noticed by Hamengkubuwana II when he was wandering through the pasar surrounded by 
his retinue, IOL Mack.Pr. 21 pt. 3, ‘State of the court of Djocjacarta by Mr Craufurd’, 6-12-1811. This 
tale of Hamengkubuwana II visiting the main Yogya market has a ring of truth to it given Pangéran 
Natakusuma’s remark to Crawfurd in May 1812 that ‘[the sultan’s] conduct is in all respects like that 
of a child. He goes in person to look at his market at Gadhing which he has enlarged. He is quickly 
angry with his people, but readily forgives them on their asking his mercy’, IOL Eur F148/24 (Raf-
fles-Minto	collection	vol.	24),	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Batavia),	14-5-1812.
98	 Dj.Br.	49,	Matthijs	Waterloo	(Yogyakarta)	to	Nicolaus	Engelhard	(Semarang),	7-9-1805;	Carey	
and Hoadley 2000:368-80, on the marriage of Natadiningrat to Ratu Anom (born circa 1793), eldest 
daughter	of	Ratu	Kencana	Wulan	on	5-9-1805.	According	to	Daendels	(1814:Bijlage	2,	additionele	
stukken 6), Ratu Anom was notoriously lascivious (ontuchtig) and he suggested in November 1810 
that Natadiningrat was coming under pressure from his father to seek a divorce. The Pakualam 
babad	partially	confirms	this	by	speaking	of	the	pressure	which	Ratu	Anom	was	under	at	this	time	
to re-marry, but according to this source she would have none of it remaining constant to her 
husband	during	this	difficult	period	of	his	exile	when	both	she	and	her	two	children	were	in	the	
care of Hamengkubuwana II. See also Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius 
(Surakarta), 12-12-1810, on Ratu Anom throwing herself at Hamengkubuwana II’s feet and beg-
ging his compassion. She was promoted to the more senior title of Ratu Ayu in early 1811, her pre-
vious title going to her younger sister Radèn Ajeng Suratmi (born circa 1797), who later married 
Pangéran Purwanegara (formerly Radèn Tumenggung Purbakusuma), a son of Hamengkubu-
wana II’s elder brother, Pangéran Ngabèhi, note 81; Poensen 1905:261-2; Mandoyokusumo 1977:23 
no. 52. Their daughter became the principal consort of Hamengkubuwana V in circa 1834 with the 
title Ratu Kencana, Mandoyokusumo 1977:43; B.Ng. III:81, XX.45, III:377-8, LXIII.1-5. Meanwhile, 
Ratu Ayu, who subsequently bore the title Ratu Pakualam, outlived her husband and saw her 
fourth son, Pangéran Suryasasraningrat, succeed as Pakualam III in 1858. She died on 14-9-1859, 
Padmasusastra	1902:308;	Rouffaer	1905:603;	Mandoyokusumo	1977:24	no.	58;	Dj.Br.	1,	C.P.	Brest	
van Kempen, ‘Politieke Verslag over de Residentie Djokjokarta voor het jaar 1859’, 24-3-1860.
Plate 26. Daguerrotype photograph of K.G.P.A.A. Pakualam II, born 25 June 1786, 
reigned 1829-1858), earlier Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat, from the G.P. 
Rouffaer Collection, Leiden. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV.
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Described as ‘the only female in Java whom Daendels was afraid of’ (Journal 
1853-54, 8:241) and by the marshal himself (Daendels 1814:95) as ‘a woman of 
outstanding beauty and unusual intelligence who had no difficulty in dominat-
ing the sultan whose favourite she remained’, the Ratu made no secret of the 
fact that she hoped to see her son-in-law installed as the new patih following 
Danureja II’s fall from favour (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:34; Poensen 
1905:166-7). Meanwhile, the birth of a son to Natadiningrat and his bride in 
1807 gave rise to prophecies that he would one day have a royal destiny.99 All 
these personal and factional challenges meant that Danureja II was singularly 
ill-equipped to act as a channel between the European government and the 
second sultan during a crucial period in the sultanate’s history. We shall see in 
the next chapter how the additional pressures imposed by the policies of the 
European government between 1808 and 1812 would later cost him his life.100
Despite Van Braam’s mediation, the restrictions placed on the patih by 
the sultan in late April were not significantly ameliorated. By October, 
Engelhard was reporting that Danureja II had been stripped of all respon-
sibilities for internal administration which were now placed in the hands 
of Natadiningrat.101 The Yogya first minister was left with the regulation 
of affairs in the mancanagara and relations between the Yogya kraton and 
the Surakarta court and with the European government. But even here his 
room for manoeuvre was heavily circumscribed because on all visits to the 
Residency he had to be accompanied by Natadiningrat and Sindunagara who 
were to act as his deputies.102 At the end of August, the sultan appointed 
another close confidant and former personal retainer, Radèn Tumenggung 
Purwadipura, to shadow Danureja II as his official assistant, thus further 
restricting his competence (Carey and Hoadley 2000:78).
Events in the kraton were now moving rapidly in the direction of a con-
solidation of Natakusuma’s power and there were even rumours that this 
politically ambitious prince had offered a large bribe to secure his son, 
Natadiningrat’s, appointment as patih.103 It was clear that the Crown Prince 
and his karajan party were no longer able to exercise any influence over the 
sultan and it would be only a matter of time before he was finally edged 
aside. Already at the start of Daendels’ administration, the Crown Prince’s 
99 Poensen 1905:140-1; B.Ng. I:84, XXIV.9-13, relate that an Arab sayyid (descendant of The 
Prophet), a trader from Semarang who was a friend of Danureja II, had prophesied that the 
child would one day be Crown Prince (patut lunggyèng kadipatèn). In fact, this child, Radèn Mas 
Mahmud (later Pangéran Suryaputra), does not seem to have succeeded to any royal title, being 
passed over in favour of the Ratu’s fourth son Pangéran Suryasasraningrat, see note 98.
100 See p. 292.
101 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 27-10-1810.
102 Dj.Br. 22 pt. 4, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), circa 6-1811; Dj.Br. 
9A pt. 8, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 51; Poensen 1905:166-7 (reference to Sindunagara and Natadiningrat 
acting as Danureja II’s kliwon); Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:34. 
103 Dj.Br. 22 pt. 4, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), circa 6-1811.
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position had been marginal: according to a Dutch source, he had rarely been 
invited to royal state meetings in the Srimenganti pavilion or to the assem-
blies of high court officials. When he did make an appearance he was usually 
dispatched with routine business to the prime minister’s office or just as sum-
marily dismissed according to the caprice of the sultan.104 Now his situation 
was even more precarious. Although he seemed to submit to this cavalier 
treatment with ostensible patience, an insight into his true state of mind can 
be ascertained from the admission of a local religious teacher who later con-
fessed that he had been paid a sizeable sum – 7,000 Spanish dollars – by the 
Crown Prince to ensure the sultan’s speedy demise by poison.105
Meanwhile, the relationship between the sultan and Moorrees was 
descending into open confrontation. In late June, when the Resident was 
about to leave for Semarang to confer with Daendels about the vexed issue 
of the new court ceremonial, his wife was held up in her carriage during an 
outing to the countryside by an armed band operating under the sultan’s 
orders and forced to turn back to Yogya.106 When Moorrees eventually met 
the governor-general, he was urged to make no concessions to the sultan. 
But already relations with the court were in crisis. In May, the Resident had 
held up the official messenger from the Sunan to the Yogya court announc-
ing the appointment of Radèn Adipati Cakranagara as the new Surakarta 
patih in place of the recently dismissed Danuningrat. Pakubuwana IV’s letter 
was dated 9 May (4 Rabingulakir AJ 1737), but by mid-July this had still not 
been delivered.107 Both sides refused to give way: Daendels rejected any idea 
of compromise over the seating arrangements and the sultan remained ada-
mant, for if he gave ground, as Sumadiningrat pointed out to the Resident, 
this would constitute too great a blow to his prestige.108 In the ensuing dead-
lock, Moorrees found himself, in the words of the Pakualam babad, ‘like an 
egg caught between two sharp stones’ (Poensen 1905:178).
Finally, Daendels wrote to the hapless Moorrees ordering him to deliver 
an ultimatum to the sultan demanding concessions over the question of the 
height of his throne. If this was not accepted, he should withdraw to Semarang 
104 dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808.
105	 UBL	BPL	616,	Port.	5	pt.	2,	J.D.	Kruseman,	‘Procès-verbaal of	Kyai	Murma	Wijaya’,	13-11-1816.	
The sum was eventually paid when the Crown Prince temporarily replaced Hamengkubuwana II 
as Prince Regent in January-September 1811. A further 3,000 Spanish dollars, which made up the 
total of 10,000 Spanish dollars originally promised to the kyai,	was	handed	over	after	Hameng-
kubuwana III’s death in November 1814 by his widow, Ratu Ibu. See further pp. 444-5.
106 Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 22-6-1810. The same 
fate later overtook Moorrees’ successor, Pieter Engelhard, Chapter I note 146.
107 Dj.Br. 37, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), circa 23-5-1810 
(arrival of Surakarta gandhèk	Prayamenggala	with	Pakubuwana	IV’s	letter);	Hamengkubuwana	
II	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	Pakubuwana	IV	(Surakarta),	16	Jumadilakir	AJ	1737	(AD	19-7-1810)	 (official	
Yogya	reply	acknowledging	receipt	of	letter).
108 Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 6-7-1810.
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taking the patih with him. Moorrees duly delivered the ultimatum, but the 
sultan paid it not the slightest attention, departing with Sumadiningrat to 
his pesanggrahan at Samas on the south coast for three days by the sea.109 At 
the same time, despite considerable pressure on Danureja II, including from 
Moorrees’ Assistant, Bartholomeus Jacobus Driessen, and his elder brother, 
Lieutenant Willem Driessen, acting commander of the Yogya garrison, both 
fluent Javanese speakers,110 the patih refused to budge. He needed no remind-
ing that to have accompanied the Resident to Semarang at such a time would 
have been more than his life was worth. So Moorrees made the journey alone 
on 13 July.111 Daendels had been outfaced by the sultan. Although Moorrees 
returned briefly to Yogya in early August, his residency was at an end. He was 
replaced by Pieter Engelhard on 1 September after a week’s interregnum in 
which affairs were left in the hands of the Driessen brothers.112 The marshal 
had decided to make concessions and the sultan was allowed to receive the 
109 Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 6 Jumadilakir 
AJ 1737 (AD 9-7-1810) (requesting a meeting before Hamengkubuwana II’s departure for Samas), 
Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 7 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 10-7-1810) 
(conveying Hamengkubuwana II’s refusal to allow Sumadiningrat to meet Moorrees at the Resi-
dency given that it was not his business to deal with the issues Moorrees’ had raised, demanding 
that	the	Surakarta	messenger	should	be	allowed	to	deliver	Pakubuwana	IV’s	letter	according	to	
the old ceremonial, and refusing to negotiate further on the height of his throne: wondéné prakawis 
palenggahan-Dalem gilang, timbalan-Dalem, inggih boten éwah kados ingkang sampun wangsul-wang-
sul), Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Lieutenant Willem Driessen (Yogyakarta), 11 Jumadilakir AJ 
1737	 (AD	13-7-1810)	 (complaining	of	Moorrees’	 neglect	 in	 answering	his	 letter	 of	 6	 Jumadila-
kir (AD 9-7-1810) before his departure for Semarang regarding the various issues including the 
delivery	of	Pakubuwana	 IV’s	 letter,	Lieutenant	Driessen	now	being	 left	 in	 charge	of	 the	Resi-
dency: kang dados chulman wonten ing ngriki), Bartholomew Driessen (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moor-
rees, 13-7-1810 (referring to Hamengkubuwana II’s return from Samas on 12-7-1810). It is likely 
that Hamengkubuwana II’s visit to Samas was for his personal pleasure: Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engel-
hard (Yogyakarta) to P.A. Goldbach (landdrost of Demak and Semarang), 17-9-1810, referred to 
Hamengkubuwana II’s departure for Beliga (Bligo) in the Salam district of southern Kedhu at the 
confluence	of	the	Praga	and	Kalijengking	rivers	(Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	II:339,	III:Map	
Plate	1;	Carey	1984:44)	for	a	spot	of	fishing.	See	note	205.
110 Bartholomew Driessen (born Yogya, circa 1766) appears to have been a younger brother 
of Lieutenant Willem Driessen (note 54) and they are both mentioned in an 1819 list of Yogya 
inhabitants as burger (citizen) and ‘lieutenant’ respectively, MvK 3124, ‘Register der Europese 
personeel op Java en Madoera, Djokjokarta’, 1-1-1819. He took temporary charge of the Residency 
office	when	Moorrees	finally	departed	with	his	 family	 for	Semarang	on	24-8-1810,	his	brother	
Lieutenant Willem Driessen having overall responsibility for security, Dj.Br. 37, J.W. Moorrees 
(Yogyakarta) to W.N Servatius (Surakarta), 25-8-1810.
111 Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Semarang) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 5-7-1810, J.W. Moor-
rees (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 6 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 8-7-1810), Danureja II 
(Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 7 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 9-7-1810), Bartholomew 
Driessen (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 10-7-1810, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) 
to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 10-7-1810, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Lieutenant Commander 
Willem Driessen. (Yogyakarta), 11 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 13-7-1810), Bartholomew Driessen 
(Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 13-7-1810.
112 Note 109.
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new Resident in the Srimenganti hall seated on his throne in the old style 
(Poensen 1905:184-5). The diplomatic Engelhard was also instructed to calm 
the sultan’s ruffled feelings.
The ‘piling up’ of  affairs and preparations for Rongga’s rebellion
The lull was very short. On 10 September, a bare ten days after Engelhard’s 
arrival, news came through of an attack on a Chinese tax-farmer in Demak by 
a band of Yogya robbers from the village of Gabus in the Grobogan-Wirasari 
area.113 Opium, cash and ornaments worth some 10,000 Spanish dollars had 
been taken,114 and it was suspected that some of the members of this gang 
were deserters from the Semarang garrison regiment who had earlier gath-
ered in the province of Japan and against whom neither the sultan nor Radèn 
Rongga had taken any action.115 Daendels was exceedingly angry. Writing in 
his usual ebullient style on 15 September, he instructed Engelhard to press 
for ‘sensational satisfaction’, the ‘complete return of the stolen goods’ and the 
arrest of the robbers within fourteen days otherwise he would occupy the 
Yogya area from which the robbery had originated. The least sign of resist-
ance from the Yogya ruler, the governor-general announced, would be taken 
as ‘a declaration of war’.116
Engelhard’s reply gives an insight into just how invidious the position of 
Yogya Resident had now become as an emissary between two such immove-
able protagonists, one of whom had perfected the art of procrastination. At 
5.30 on the evening of 21 September with Daendels’ letter in hand along with 
the original report on the robbery from the bailiff (landdrost) of Demak and 
Semarang, P.A. Goldbach, Engelhard attended the usual state meeting in the 
Srimenganti pavilion. The Resident asked117 for a private meeting with the 
113 This was a village in the Kayumas district of Wirasari kabupatèn.
114 The list of stolen property included: 31 kati of opium (1 kati = 0.617 kg), 2,000 Spanish dol-
lars in gold and silver ornaments, 2,700 ronde real in silver, 1,650 ronde real in copper duit (Javanese 
dhuwit/copper coins [farthings]), 80 ronde real in Japanese red copper coins and 34 ronde real in kèpèng 
(half duit), Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 26-9-1810; Dj.Br. 41, 
Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 1 Ramelan AJ 1737 (AD 1-10-1810).
115 Dj.Br. 27, P.A. Goldbach (Semarang and Demak) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 10-9-1810, 
15-9-1810, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to P.A. Goldbach (Semarang and Demak), 13-9-1810, 14-
9-1810, 17-9-1810; Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 
11-9-1810, 12-9-1810, 23-9-1810.
116 Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 15-9-1810.
117 Engelhard did not have the Residency interpreter Johannes Godlieb Dietrée with him 
because he had joined the Yogya commission to Grobogan-Wirasari, Dj.Br. 39, Danureja II 
(Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 28 Ruwah AJ 1737 (AD 28-9-1810). But it is likely 
that he brought along his Javanese-speaking secretary, Hendrik Willem Gezelschap, see note 155. 
Many Residents of the pre-1808 VOC period spoke Javanese, some like J.G. van den Berg (p. 174; 
Fasseur	1993:66)	very	fluently.
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sultan and the Crown Prince:
[The sultan] fell silent for a moment and placed his hand behind him on his royal 
[throne] stool. The bupati wedana [Radèn Rongga] and Inner and Outer regents 
[Natadiningrat, Sasradiningrat II and Purwadipura] opposite us were summoned 
to approach him without the sultan answering me anything, so I was obliged to 
repeat my question whether the sultan wished to deliberate on the [Demak] issue 
in the presence of the regents. The sultan then spoke to Natadiningrat and the lat-
ter relayed what he had said stammeringly to me. I took the letters out of my bag 
and handed them to the sultan who passed them on immediately to Natadiningrat 
to read them out loud in the presence of the other regents […]. The sultan heard 
the governor-general’s letter very calmly and afterwards promised to give me a 
written reply.118
The Yogya ruler then departed for four days to his pesanggrahan at Pengawatreja, 
the second such visit out of town since news of the Demak raid had reached 
him.119 Returning briefly to Yogya in mid-week, he left once again for his 
country estate. In the meantime, nothing was decided about the Demak affair 
beyond the dispatch of the usual long-winded commission of enquiry which 
took nearly a month to complete its investigations. Finally, on 30 September, 
Engelhard was vouchsafed another interview. Again the sultan and Crown 
Prince were asked whether they wished to hear Daendels’ ultimatum out of 
earshot of the four court bupati (nayaka). This time the sultan agreed. Calmly 
listening to the governor-general’s threat to occupy the Yogya villages in 
Grobogan-Wirasari in the event that a single man involved in the robbery was 
allowed to escape, the Yogya ruler conferred with his son, the Crown Prince, 
and then summoned the nayaka to give their views. Eventually, the Resident 
was told through his secretary, who was interpreting, that the sultan was 
content with Daendels’ communication, that he would indeed give him ‘satis-
faction’, but that he would feel ‘ashamed’ if the governor-general ordered his 
troops to enter Yogya territory. In any case, nothing could be done until the 
return of the Yogya commission from Grobogan-Wirasari, at which an exas-
perated Daendels wrote in the margins of Engelhard’s dispatch: ‘I will await 
one more post, but then I will await the outcome of this Yogya commission no 
longer!’120 It would be nearly another two weeks and many more posts before 
the commission returned.121
118 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 22-9-1810.
119 Note 109.
120 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 30-9-1810. 
There seems to have been no regular postal service in Java until the eve of the Java War, and then 
only	for	official	correspondence	between	the	Residencies,	see	Chapter	X	note	46.
121 Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 13-10-1810. The mission, 
which comprised the ‘old’ Residency translator, J.G. Dietrée, the bupati of Grobogan-Wirasari, Radèn 
Tumenggung	Sasrakusuma,	and	Mas	Ngabèhi	Sindujaya,	official	assistant	(kliwon) of the Keparak 
Kiwa (treasury) department in the kraton, had departed on 16-9-1810, Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard 
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In the meantime, on the very evening of the kraton meeting, Engelhard 
was surprised by a night-time visit by Radèn Rongga to his residence. The 
bupati wedana had come to inform the Resident of his imminent departure 
for Madiun where he would remain until after the end of the fasting month 
(Puwasa). Engelhard was suspicious: ‘This seemed to me very strange because 
usually it is in the Puwasa month [which that year fell from 1-30 October] 
when the mancanagara regents make their annual return home and they usu-
ally come in state to the minister [Resident] to take their leave together’.122 
Unbeknowns	to	the	Resident,	the	first	steps	in	Rongga’s	rebellion	had	begun.	
On his arrival in Madiun, subsequent reports indicate that the still unfinished 
walls of his kraton-like residence at Maospati were fortified with sharpened 
bamboo spikes and cannon, and contacts made with Pangéran Prangwedana 
(Mangkunagara II), a personal friend, who may have given assurances that 
if his legion was deployed against him, his soldier’s guns would have no live 
rounds in them.123 Rongga also wrote to all his subordinate Madiun bupati 
informing them that he would probably not appear at court the following 
Garebeg Mulud in late April 1811 when the eastern mancanagara administra-
tors travelled to the royal capital.124 
Although Engelhard attempted to prevent Rongga leaving Yogya by 
pointing out to Danureja II that it was highly improper for the bupati wedana 
to absent himself from the royal capital while the official report into the 
Panaraga incursion of the previous January by the joint Yogyakarta-Surakarta 
commission was still awaited, none of the patih’s official assistants dared to 
take the message to the sultan. Rongga was thus allowed to leave unhin-
(Yogyakarta)	to	P.A.	Goldbach	(Semarang	and	Demak),	13-9-1810.	On	the	establishment	of	an	offi-
cial postal service in Yogya during the Residency of A.H. Smissaert (1823-1825), see below Chapter 
X note 46. At this time all posts and dispatches were carried by messengers (oppasser).
122 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 1 Ramelan 
AJ 1737 (AD 30-9-1810), Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 
3 Ramelan AJ 1737 (AD 2-10-1810), Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/
Buitenzorg), 2-10-1810.
123 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 25-11-1810, Radèn 
Tumenggung Purwadipura (Cemara, Madiun) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 25-11-1810, (on Rong-
ga’s contacts with Prangwedana through Radèn Ngabèhi Sumadiwirya (note 218), and Purwadi-
pura’s report that Prangwedana had gone hunting deer near the village of Sarèn in the Sragèn 
district	on	the	road	which	Rongga	was	taking	on	his	way	to	Madiun	after	his	flight	from	Yogya,	
and the two ‘had conveniently not met’ which he surmised was due to their prior agreement, see 
further Poensen 1905:203-4, Dj.Br 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 78, who states that Rongga and Prang-
wedana in fact met at Sarèn); P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. 
von Winckelmann (Semarang), 1-12-1810 (on fortifying of Rongga’s dalem at Maospati); S.Br. 37, 
p. 103, Prangwedana (Surakarta) to Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta), 16-12-1810, 22-12-1810 (Prang-
wedana’s acknowledgement of Dutch suspicions).
124 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 28-11-1810, 
relaying a report from the bupati of Rawa, Radèn Tumenggung Pringgakusuma, who had met 
Rongga at Delanggu on his return journey to Yogya from Madiun in early November 1810 when 
he	was	coming	back	to	attend	the	Garebeg	Puwasa.	On	The	Garebeg	Mulud	of	1811,	see	p.	269.
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dered at midday on 1 October.125 He would not return until 8 November by 
which time preparations for his rebellion were already well advanced.126 It 
seems that he had been warned by Natadiningrat that the official report of 
the commission, which confirmed that Rongga’s Madiun inhabitants had 
violated Surakarta territory, was about to be received and that there would 
be serious consequences for him.127 This was prescient. In the margins of 
Engelhard’s dispatch informing him of Rongga’s departure, Daendels had 
written that the report, which he had subsequently received from Goldbach, 
showed Rongga’s guilt in the affair and that he would be demanding that the 
sultan ‘inflict the necessary punishment’. ‘But the partiality [of the sultan] for 
Rongga in this case shines through clearly’, the governor-general noted, so 
other steps would need to be taken including involving Sunan Pakubuwana 
IV, the aggrieved party in the affair, to cooperate with the European govern-
ment in ‘bringing pressure to bear’ on Yogya.128 Given what had happened to 
the demang of Tersana and what would soon befall the Yogya bekel of Gabus, 
who was handed over to the Dutch authorities in Demak in late November 
and executed by a firing squad for his role in the September raid,129 there 
could be few illusions about what Rongga’s fate would be should he ever be 
entrusted to the tender mercies of Daendels’ government.
‘So they piled up the affairs of Radèn Rongga’, Dipanagara noted in his 
babad description of the situation in Yogya at this time. In that month of 
October as the bupati wedana paid his last peacetime visit to his Maospati 
residence, the sultan was confronting no less than four separate demands for 
satisfaction from the European government in the resolution of cross-border 
issues in the pasisir and mancanagara. In chronological order, they were: 
Rongga’s Panaraga incursion of 31 January 1810 as evidenced in the recently 
submitted joint Surakarta-Yogyakarta report,130 the extradition of three assist-
ants (patih) to the bupati of Japan (Majakerta) for their supposed role in con-
niving at the ‘camp for military deserters’ in their mancanagara district, the 
‘sensational satisfaction’ involving the surrender of the bekel of Gabus and 
restitution of 10,000 Spanish dollars worth of stolen goods from the Chinese 
125 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 2-10-1810.
126 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 9-11-1810.
127 It was sent to the landdrost of Demak and Semarang, P.A. Goldbach, on the very day Rongga 
left	Yogya,	Dj.Br.	46,	C.F.	Krijgsman	(Residency	translator	Semarang)	and	E.	Diepen	(Panaraga)	to	
P.A. Goldbach (Semarang and Demak), 1-10-1810.
128	 Dj.Br.	46,	Daendels’	marginal	notes	on	letter	of	Pieter	Engelhard	(Yogyakarta)	to	H.W.	Dae-
ndels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 2-10-1810.
129 Dj.Br. 46, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 25-11-1810; 
Dj.Br. 27, A.H. Smissaert (acting landdrost of Semarang and Demak) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/
Buitenzorg), 1-12-1810, on the ‘fusillading’ of the bekel of Gabus in Semarang.
130 The Yogya commissioners, Pangéran Dipakusuma and Radèn Tumenggung Jayadipura, 
had refused to sign this joint report for fear of incurring Hamengkubuwana II’s wrath by impli-
cating	Radèn	Rongga	in	the	attacks,	Dj.Br.	46,	C.F.	Krijgsman	and	E.	Diepen	(Panaraga)	to	P.A.	
Goldbach (Semarang and Demak), 1-10-1810.
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bandar in Demak following the early September raid. And, as if these were 
not enoug h, a demand from the landdrost of Rembang and member of the 
Forestry Board, Pieter Herbert Baron van Lawick van Pabst, for an enquiry by 
Radèn Rongga into attacks by another robber band of Yogya provenance on 
the first government forester of Rembang and a local Surakarta demang in the 
Blora teak forests in early October.131 In vain, the sultan pointed out that there 
was not even proof that Yogya inhabitants were responsible for the Demak 
raid, still less that it involved military deserters,132 nor yet that the three Japan 
(Majakerta) patih – one of whom had been in Yogya since the 18 April Garebeg 
Mulud – had had anything to do with the so-called ‘camp’ for fugitives from 
the Semarang garrison regiment.133 In fact, he steadfastly refused to hand 
over the three officials, reserving the right to punish them himself if they 
were found guilty of any misdemeanour by staking them out in the sun each 
morning on the official meeting place in front of the kraton.134
Small wonder, that by the time of the celebration of the Garebeg Puwasa 
on 30 October, relations between the Resident and the sultan had reached 
breaking point. They were not improved when Engelhard refused to fire 
the customary 21-gun salute from the fort (Daendels had discouraged the 
firing of such salutes to conserve gunpowder)135 when the traditional ‘rice 
mountain’ offerings (gunungan) were carried in procession from the kraton to 
the Great Mosque (Mesjid Ageng). The sultan in turn declined to receive the 
Resident standing up as the new ceremonial demanded.136 He also ordered 
all his troops for the usual Garebeg parade to turn out on horseback (they 
were normally on foot) to meet the Resident at the paséban and overawe him 
131 Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 6 Puwasa AJ 
1737 (AD 6-10-1810); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 29-10-1810, 6-11-
1810.
132 Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 16 Rame-
lan AJ 1737 (AD 16-10-1810), stating that the stepmother and brother-in-law of two of the men 
accused of being military deserters from the district of Kayumas (Grobogan-Wirasari) had trav-
elled to Yogya to vouchsafe their credentials as civilians.
133 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 18 Ruwah AJ 1737 (AD 
18-9-1810), Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 23 Ruwah AJ 
1737 (AD 23-9-1810), 6 Ramelan AJ 1737 (AD 6-10-1810), Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engel-
hard (Yogyakarta), 11 Ramelan AJ 1737 (AD 11-10-1810); Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) 
to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 18-9-1810, 26-9-1810, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hameng-
kubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 3 Puwasa AJ 1737 (AD 3-10-1810), Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to 
Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 11-10-1810, 12-10-1810, 13-10-1810, 16-10-1810. 
134 Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 16 Ramelan 
AJ 1737 (AD 16-10-1810).
135 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 4-12-1810, 
referring to Daendels’ orders of 19-1-1809 and 21-2-1809 restricting the yearly delivery of gunpow-
der	for	the	firing	of	salutes	to	500	lbs	for	Hamengkubuwana	II	and	100	lbs	for	the	Crown	Prince.
136 Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 30-10-1810. 
On	the	symbolic	significance	of	the	gunungan, see Lind 1975:33-5.
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with their mounted presence.137 Following the ceremony, a curt note was 
delivered to Engelhard stating that the failure to fire the customary salute 
‘showed a lack of friendship’ on the part of the Resident and the patih would 
suffer four days’ house arrest unless the custom was immediately restored. 
Engelhard refused to receive the communication, summoning Danureja II 
and his assistants to remind them of their duties to maintain the prestige and 
honour of the Dutch in the presence of the sultan and the same with regard 
to the ruler in the presence of the ‘minister’ (Resident). The patih remained 
silent. His standing at court had already been fatally compromised: he alone 
amongst the sultan’s family and high officials had just been refused permis-
sion to approach the ruler to pay the usual act of obeisance or sungkem on the 
day of celebration and absolution at the end of the fasting. There could not 
have been a more public humiliation.138
‘I sense more and more that the sultan is hurrying to his fall’, Daendels 
minuted on the back of Engelhard’s dispatch relating the humiliations of the 
recent Garebeg celebrations. But the marshal resolved to give the sultan one 
last chance by sending his deputy Jacob Andries van Braam to Yogya bear-
ing letters. These would demand satisfaction from the Yogya ruler about the 
three outstanding cases involving Rongga, the three Japan (Majakerta) patih 
and the Demak attack, and would warn him about the political ambitions of 
his brother, Pangéran Natakusuma. In the event that this approach failed, the 
same marginal minute indicated that the governor-general had made the nec-
essary military preparations: Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann, the 
Semarang divisional commander, had been ordered to march two infantry 
companies and half an artillery company with six cannon each to Surakarta 
and Klathèn thus freeing up the Ambonese garrisons to move to Yogya.139
The rise of powerful anti-European sentiments was now evident in the 
sultan’s capital. Both Javanese and Europeans alike sensed it. In the days 
immediately preceding the Garebeg, as members of the sultan’s family began 
to split along pro and anti-government lines, one prince, Pangéran Dipawijaya 
I,140 a son of the first sultan, shaved off his hair and adopted an Islamic name, 
Muhamad Abubakar, in order to become a ‘priest’ (santri) and thereby remain 
aloof from the approaching conflict between the Yogya ruler and the Dutch 
137 Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 31-10-1810.
138 Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 31-10-1810, 
2-11-1810, referring to the lebaran puwasa, the day of celebration and forgiveness at the end of 
Puwasa.
139 Dj.Br. 36, marginal minute of Daendels on Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels 
(Batavia/Buitenzorg), 31-10-1810. Daendels later ordered the Ambonese troops to Surabaya, and 
replaced the garrisons at Klathèn and Yogya with 80-90 Javanese troops each, Dj.Br. 46, H.W. 
Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 17-11-1810.
140	 Also	referred	to	in	the	Residency	letters	as	Pangéran	Adiwijaya,	Dj.Br.	36,	Pieter	Engelhard	
(Yogyakarta)	to	H.W.	Daendels	(Batavia/Buitenzorg),	3-11-1810.	The	name	Dipawijaya	I	is	given	
in Mandoyokusumo 1977:13 no. 16.
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(Carey 1992:400 note 5). The Crown Prince, meanwhile, felt constrained to 
issue orders to his retainers to avoid giving gratuitous insults to Europeans in 
public and remonstrated with Sumadiningrat to keep his mouth shut rather 
than constantly urge the sultan on to ever bolder steps against the govern-
ment.141 But this was not enough for Engelhard who made preparations to 
send his wife out to Semarang to avoid her suffering the same indignity which 
had befallen Resident Moorrees’ partner when she was attacked in her carriage 
four months previously.142 News that the sultan had given orders for a general 
mustering of his troops on the southern alun-alun the day after the Garebeg 
indicated that an armed confrontation would not long be delayed.143
All eyes were now fixed on the arrival of two individuals on whom the 
immediate fate of the sultanate seemed to depend: Daendels’ deputy, Van 
Braam, and the stormy petrel of Madiun, Radèn Rongga, whose return from 
the eastern mancanagara via Surakarta was daily tracked in the Residency let-
ters from early November onwards.144 Rongga slipped into Yogya unobtru-
sively with a small escort on 8 November just over a day after the one-year 
commemoration feast for his late wife, Ratu Maduretna, had taken place in the 
kraton.145 Two days later, almost equally without fanfare, Van Braam arrived 
bearing a letter from Daendels to the sultan, which bristled with demands 
for ‘sensational reparations’ and eclatante satisfactie (sensational satisfaction) 
in the three outstanding cases of Panaraga, Japan (Majakerta) and Demak.146 
But no sooner had Van Braam begun to settle into his three-day commission 
(10-13 November) than a second letter arrived from the governor-general 
for the Yogya ruler. This missive dated 3 November – the postal service still 
took a week from Batavia even with the benefit of Daendels’ post-road – was 
altogether more politically explosive. Its central message was to warn the 
sultan against his brother, Pangéran Natakusuma, who was accused of hav-
ing designs on the sultanate. To this end, the prince, in Daendels’ view, had 
worked to discredit both the patih and the Crown Prince in the eyes of the 
ruler and was intriguing to have his son, Natadiningrat, appointed in the lat-
ter’s place. The marshal likewise averred that both Radèn Rongga and Ratu 
141 Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 2-11-1810, 
6-11-1810.
142 Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 31-10-1810, 
2-11-1810.
143 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 31-10-1810.
144 Dj.Br. 46, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 5-11-1810, Pieter 
Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 6-11-1810, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to 
Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 6-11-1810, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Bata-
via/Buitenzorg), 9-11-1810 (announcing arrival of Rongga in Yogya on 8-11-1810).
145 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 6-11-1810, 
referring to the sedhekah for Ratu Maduretna. On Rongga’s arrival, see note 144.
146 Text	 of	Daendels’	 letter	 dated	 Buitenzorg	 (Bogor)	 24-10-1810	 in	Daendels	 1814:Bijlage	 2,	
additionele stukken 5; Poensen 1905:183-4; Valck 1844:156.
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Kencana Wulan were involved in this plot. But, according to Daendels, the 
prince now had it in mind to break the marriage of his son to the Ratu’s daugh-
ter on account of her ‘lewd behaviour’147 and have him married off to a more 
appropriate Yogya princess who would bind him closer to the leading fami-
lies of Mataram and Kedhu where Natakusuma’s principle apanage holdings 
lay. To back up his accusations, the governor-general included extracts about 
Natakusuma’s ambitions from the final administrative reports of the previous 
VOC Residents of Yogya from Jan Matthijs van Rhijn (in office 1773-1786) to 
Matthijs Waterloo (in office 1803-1808).148 Here the sultan could read such 
choice passages in Javanese translation as Van IJsseldijk’s report, submitted at 
the time of Sultan Mangkubumi’s death on 24 March 1792, that Natakusuma 
might withdraw from the capital to lead a rebellion in Kedhu to prevent his 
brother succeeding to the throne,149 or J.G. van den Berg’s well-aimed his-
torical comparison which likened Natakusuma to Pangéran Puger (the future 
Sunan Pakubuwana I, reigned 1704-1719), the prince whom the VOC had 
adopted as a more suitable candidate for the Mataram throne than his intran-
sigent nephew, Sunan Amangkurat III (reigned 1703-1708).150 But he would 
have been spared Governor of Java’s Northeast Coast Nicolaus Engelhard’s 
succinct summation: ‘A wink would be enough to incite this Pangéran and his 
following, whom I am closely informed is large and powerful, to topple his 
brother from the throne’ (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:142).
Daendels’ aim was to place both Natakusuma and Radèn Rongga ‘out 
of commission’ by getting them handed over to the European government. 
Once this had happened, the marshal expected no further opposition from 
the Yogya court and felt confident that the Crown Prince could be supported 
as the government’s key ally against all potential enemies, including his 
father.151 He would begin with Rongga. He thus sent instructions with Van 
Braam that the bupati wedana be placed ‘at the disposal of the government’ 
and come to his new administrative centre at Buitenzorg (Bogor) to answer 
for his depredations in Panaraga.152 Given the sizeable entourage which 
Rongga intended to bring with him (2,000 according to Engelhard, half that 




and Van Deventer 1884-88, XII:245.
150 Dj.Br. 37, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 21-11-1801; 
KITLV H 97 (8), Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803.
151 Dj.Br. 46, minute of Daendels in margin of Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels 
(Batavia/Buitenzorg),	9-11-1810.	Text	of	Daendels’	letter	to	Hamengkubuwana	II	of	24-11-1810	in	
Daendels	1814:Bijlage	2,	additionele	stukken	9.
152 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard and J.A. van Braam (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Bui-
tenzorg), 12-11-1810.
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number according to Dipanagara), these orders were later changed: instead 
of Bogor where there was nowhere for the bupati wedana and his following to 
lodge, he would be asked to proceed straight to Batavia.153 Since the gover-
nor-general had it in mind that the eastern mancanagara administrator would 
not be long for this world, the size of his entourage and their long-term lodg-
ing was hardly going to be a problem. 
To get the sultan to cooperate, Daendels suggested that he should be 
given ‘a large dose of fear’. Regretting that Van Braam had not waited for his 
second letter detailing his accusations against Natakusuma before leaving 
on his commission, he suggested that the presence of Von Winckelmann’s 
troops in Semarang be used to instil a sense of impending threat. Rumours 
were thus spread – and not denied by Engelhard – that 2,000 Dutch soldiers 
were on the march and had reached Boyolali.154 The sultan himself was said 
to be convinced that a hostile military force was moving south. It was against 
this background that Daendels’ letters were handed over to the sultan by the 
Residency secretary on 10 November.155
According to Danureja II, none of the Yogya bupati and princes in the coun-
cil of state meeting opposed Rongga’s removal to Bogor. Even Rongga with 
swollen face and angry demeanour had answered sandika (‘as you order!’) 
as the decision was taken. Likewise, none of the courtiers had protested 
at the handover of the three Japan (Majakerta) patih or the bekel of Gabus, 
although the sultan had made difficulties with allowing the return of the 
stolen goods. As for Daendels’ 3 November letter detailing the threat posed 
by Natakusuma, this had been read in a very low voice by the Residency 
secretary until he reached the passage ‘while the patih has once again fallen 
into disgrace’. The sultan had then seized the letter and dismissed the secre-
tary, instructing Danureja II to read the passages from the final administra-
tive reports of previous Yogya Residents. But when the name ‘Natakusuma’ 
appeared, the sultan got up from his throne, took the letter and its enclosures, 
and accompanied only by the Crown Prince went into his private apartments 
to peruse them out of sight of the council of state.156 
153 Dj.Br. 46, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 23-11-1810. 
Rongga’s 1-2,000 entourage is mentioned in Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Dae-
ndels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 15-11-1810; BD (Manado), II:132, XIV:102.
154 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 9-11-1810; 
J.A. van Braam (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 10-11-1810; marginal minute 
of	Daendels	on	Van	Braam’s	letter.
155 Dj.Br. 46, J.A. van Braam (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 11-11-1810, 
Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 11-11-1810, 12-11-1810, 
7-12-1810. Engelhard	had	feigned	illness	in	order	not	to	suffer	the	indignity	of	meeting	the	sultan	
under	the	old-style	ceremonial.	The	letters	had	been	taken	in	by	the	Residency	secretary,	H.W.	
Gezelschap, who had considerable mastery of Javanese.
156 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 7-12-1810.
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Whether the sultan was genuinely shocked by Daendels’ revelations or just 
felt it politic to make some concessions we may never know. Engelhard later 
remarked that the Yogya ruler had ‘become quite another person’ when read-
ing the second letter from the governor-general, although how he came by this 
information given that the letter and its enclosures were studied in private is 
hard to fathom.157 Certainly, by the time Van Braam met the sultan two days 
later (12 November) a complete change had taken place. As well as allowing 
the surrender of Rongga and the Yogya officials, the sultan announced that 
Danureja II was being reinstated in full in his prime ministerial duties and 
that Natadiningrat would return to his old position as First Outer bupati. 
The following day, a date was even set for Rongga’s departure – Monday, 26 
November – a day deemed auspicious for the Yogya ruler by the court santri. 
The royal instruction issued to the four bupati designated to accompany the 
bupati wedana to Bogor even contained special instructions that if Rongga tried 
anything on the way they were to force him to continue his journey.158 On 14 
November, the court gamelan played on the Sitinggil (High Ground) to signify 
that the differences of opinion between the sultan and the governor-general 
had been resolved.159 As Van Braam rode back to Surakarta, he may have 
thought that his commission had been an outstanding success. His Yogya 
colleague was certainly celebrating, signing off his dispatch to the divisional 
commander in Semarang to stand down his troops with his own epigram con-
cocted from two famous authors of Latin epic: nulla salus bello, pax optima rerum 
(‘there is no deliverance in war, peace is the best of things’).160
157 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann 
(Semarang), 20-11-1810. Engelhard’s main source on the reaction of the sultan and the Yogya 
Council	of	State	to	the	receipt	of	Daendels’	letters	was	Danureja	II,	but	he	was	not	present	in	the	
private	apartments	when	Hamengkubuwana	II	read	Daendels’	second	letter	and	conferred	with	
the Crown Prince. The patih’s report is cited in Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. 
Daendels (Semarang), 7-12-1810.
158 Dj.Br. 27, J.A. van Braam and Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/
Buitenzorg), 13-11-1810; Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/
Buitenzorg), 7-12-1810.
159 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 14-11-1810, J.A. van 
Braam (Surakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 14-11-1810, 15-11-1810.
160 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann 
(Semarang), 20-11-1810. Engelhard was obviously well versed in Classical literature because his 
‘epigram’	is	a	mélange	from	two	different	authors	of	Latin	epic,	nulla salus bello is from Virgil’s 
Aeneid (Book XI line 362), and pax optima rerum from Silius Italicus’ Punica (Book XI line 592). 
I am grateful to Dr Peter Brown, Fellow and Tutor in Classics at Trinity College, Oxford, for his 
assistance	with	this	identification.
Map 4.  Central and east Java in 1810 showing the route taken by Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III  after his flight from Yogyakarta on 20 November 1810 until his final battle and death at Sekaran 
on the banks of the Sala River on 17 December 1810. Taken from De Graaf 1971. Redrawn and  rearranged by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
Map 4.  Central and east Java in 1810 showing the route taken by Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III  after his flight from Yogyakarta on 20 November 1810 until his final battle and death at Sekaran 
on the banks of the Sala River on 17 December 1810. Taken from De Graaf 1971. Redrawn and  rearranged by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
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Cleansing Java of defilement: Radèn Rongga’s eastern mancanagara rebellion
At 3.30 in the morning of 21 November, Engelhard was roused from his 
bed with the news that Radèn Rongga had departed earlier that night for 
Madiun accompanied by 300 followers. Although he wrote immediately 
to the Assistant-Resident in Surakarta to ask the Sunan and Prangwedana 
(Mangkunagara II) to cut off Rongga’s march, it was too late: the bupati 
wedana had already passed Delanggu.161 
The following morning the sultan assembled a 1,000-strong expeditionary 
force under Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura and sent a circular order to all 
Yogya mancanagara bupati to cooperate in hunting Rongga down. The royal 
decree specifically sanctioned Rongga’s death should he refuse to return to 
Yogya.162 This order was subsequently overtaken by a further instruction 
161 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 21-11-1810, W.N. 
Servatius (Surakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 21-11-1810, reporting that Rongga had 
passed Delanggu at 10 o’clock in the morning with 250 men.
162 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 21-11-1810, Pieter 
Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 21-11-1810, Hamengkubuwana 
II (Yogyakarta) order to mancanagara bupati,	23	Sawal	AJ	1737	(AD	21-11-1810).	The	senior	officials	
attached	to	the	Yogya	expeditionary	force	are	listed	as	the	wedana (heads) of the Gedhong Tengen 
department, Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura and Radèn Ria Sindureja, the Outer bupati, Radèn 
Tumenggung Wiryanegara and Radèn Tumenggung Mertalaya, the kraton troop commander 
(wedana prajurit), Radèn Panji Suryèngrana, the wedana of the prajurit kadipatèn (Crown Prince’s 
forces), Radèn Ngabèhi Jayasentika, and the head of the Yogya police (Tumenggung Tamp-
Plate 27. A ferry crossing in Java similar to that which Radèn Rongga would have 
used to transport his 300-strong band across the Sala River on 22 November as he 
made his way from Kartasura to Masaran on the first stage of his journey to Madiun. 
Watercolour by John Newman, circa 1811-1813. Photograph by courtesy of the British 
Library, London, WD 953, f.78 (89).
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given to Pangéran Dipakusuma, who was sent to reinforce Purwadipura 
and the Yogya expeditionary force on 27 November, to the effect that even 
if Rongga was taken alive he should be immediately killed. According to 
Danureja II, this was because the sultan did not want the embarrassment of 
Rongga being brought back to Yogya alive, mindful as he was of the promise 
made by his father, Sultan Mangkubumi, to Rongga’s grandfather, his army 
commander during the Giyanti War (1746-1755), that he would never harm 
any of his descendants or shed their blood, and if they transgressed he would 
always grant them forgiveness.163 The Yogya force was accompanied by a 
Dutch officer, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus, and a Batavia-born Eurasian NCO, 
Sergeant Lucas Leberveld, who was serving at the time as the sultan’s coach-
man. Both were said to be fluent Javanese speakers, with thorough knowledge 
of the country.164 They were to play a critical role in the operations against 
Rongga over the next four weeks.
Although Rongga had departed hastily from the sultan’s capital, he had 
clearly prepared his move long in advance. We have already seen how he had 
used his time in Maospati (Madiun) during the fasting month to strengthen 
the fortifications of his walled residence, contact his subordinate bupati and 
supposedly come to an agreement with Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II). 
On his return to Yogya, he had also taken care to gather the necessary cash 
and clothing for his troops: 800 Spanish dollars’ worth of garments had been 
obtained on credit from a French textile merchant in Yogya, Louis Marcus.165 
ing), Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja, along with twelve dragoons from the kraton guard, Dj.Br. 27, 
Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 23 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 21-11-
1810); Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 28 Sawal AJ 
1737 (AD 26-11-1810).
163 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 28-11-1810.
164 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Yogyakarta), 21-11-
1810; Bataviasche Koloniale Courant 3, 18-1-1811; Lieutenant Paulus, born Dordrecht circa 1773, had 
come to Java in 1787 and had resided in Yogya since 1803. He was pensioned from military service 
in July 1817. Nahuys	van	Burgst	later	commented	on	his	fluency	in	Javanese,	MvK	3124,	‘Register	
der Europese personeel op Java en Madoera, Djokjokarta’, 1-1-1819, AN Besluit van den Gouver-
neur-Generaal,	17-7-1817	no.	14,	Dj.Br.	51,	H.G.	Nahuys	van	Burgst	(Yogyakarta)	to	J.	de	Bruijn	
(Semarang), 19-8-1819. Sergeant Lucas Leberfeld, born Batavia 1757, had been in VOC military 
service since 1777 and had served as Hamengkubuwana II’s coachman since the early 1800s. He 
was	promoted	to	officer	by	Daendels	on	7-11-1811	for	his	role	in	hunting	down	and	killing	Radèn	
Rongga,	Daendels	 1814:Bijlage	 2,	 additionele	 stukken	 4	 (report	 on	military	 operations	 against	
Rongga). Both Paulus and Leberfeld were referred to in the Dutch sources as taal en land kundig.
165 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 25-11-1810. 
Marcus later also lent money to the commander of the Yogya expeditionary force, Radèn Tumeng-
gung Purwadipura, which was never repaid, Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja 
II (Yogyakarta), 23-1-1811. Born in Tulle, a well-known textile town in the Corrèze region of 
southwestern	France	in	circa	1760,	Louis	Marcus	had	arrived	in	Java	in	1785	and	settled	in	Yogya	
in 1809. He gave his occupation as commerçant, MvK 3124, ‘Register der Europese personeel op 
Java en Madoera, Djokjokarta’, 1-1-1819. It is possible that the clothes obtained by Rongga were of 
European design for Crawfurd gave a description of the incongruous medley of garments worn 
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At the same time, he had been loaned a large amount of cash, jewelry and 
gold ornaments from the very wealthy Ratu Kencana Wulan for his journey 
to Bogor, which he took with him when he left for Madiun.166 Along with the 
outstanding eastern mancanagara taxes which the bupati wedana still owed the 
sultan from the previous Garebeg Mulud, Engelhard reckoned that Rongga’s 
departure had left the Yogya ruler and his favourite consort at least 20,000 
ronde real out of pocket.167
He had also written almost identical letters three days before his flight 
to Natadiningrat and Sumadiningrat laying out his reasons for his rebellion. 
These letters, which were never delivered to their intended recipients,168 
give an insight into some of Rongga’s key objectives. The following is that to 
Natadiningrat:
Younger brother Tumenggung Natadiningrat, I beg leave to inform you that I 
now wish to take my leave of you to lead a roving life intending to destroy those 
who constantly deceive the Javanese. Even though they do this in the name of the 
[European] government, they too are Javanese. I will indeed pick and choose those 
who are attempting to bring about my destruction. Indeed, I will certainly destroy 
them. As for the territories of Surakarta or of the north coast, I will quickly usurp 
them all so that if possible I will set them against the government and against the 
forces of Surakarta. Moreover, after my departure, it is you who must watch over 
the court of Yogyakarta in a proper manner so that if I have succeeded in usurping 
the territories of the [Dutch] fortress in Yogyakarta, and of the court of Surakarta, 
they will certainly not dare to disturb the court of Yogyakarta. Furthermore, I am 
absolutely not rebelling against His Highness [the sultan of Yogyakarta] and will 
not exceed the royal blessings which I implore, together with the blessings of the 




court under Pakubuwana IV, see De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:128. On the use of 
European	clothes	in	battle	during	the	Java	War,	Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	III:80.
166 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 25-11-1810, 
7-12-1810,	related	that	Ratu	Kencana	Wulan	had	declared	strongly	against	Rongga	after	his	flight	on	
account of her substantial losses. On her wealth acquired through trade in opium, gold ornaments 
and precious stones between Yogya, Kutha Gedhé and Semarang, see Carey 1992:403 note 21.
167 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 25-11-1810.
168	 Poensen	1905:203-6,	 states	 that	 the	 letters	were	 found	by	a	young	 lad	 in	Rongga’s	Yogya	
residence	when	it	was	searched	on	21	November	following	his	flight	and	were	given	to	Danureja	
II who in turn presented them to Hamengkubuwana II to read. The patih then insisted that they 
should be passed on to Pieter Engelhard. The Resident, however, reported that they were found 
by Ngabèhi Pusparana, a court mantri	attached	to	the	Outer	Left	(Jaba	Kiwa)	department	(Carey	
and Hoadley 2000:195, 206-7) in his search of Rongga’s dalem under other ‘dirty and used papers’. 
They were opened and taken straight to Hamengkubuwana II without being delivered to their 
intended recipients, Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buiten-
zorg), 28-11-1810. The originals, together with their envelopes with broken seals which bear the 
imprint of Rongga’s personal stamp (pratandha Rahadèn Rongga Prawiradireja) in dark purple wax 
are in Dj.Br. 46 in the Arsip Nasional.
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ancestors who were warrior kings. And don’t let it go so far that it should happen 
that His Highness entertains the wish to cause me misery. I urgently and deeply 
beseech this with all my heart and soul. For truly, I earnestly intend to take away 
the uncleanness from Java and I will thank God all the more if I can do that which 
will bring good to the court and pleasure to His Highness’ heart.
This, younger brother Tumenggung Natadiningrat, I entrust you to bring to the 
knowledge of His Highness.
Written on Saturday, the twentieth of the month Sawal in the year Wawu [AJ] 1  7 
3  7 [AD 17 November 1810].169
Purging ’uncleanness’ and defilement from the land of Java caused by the 
administration of Marshal Daendels was clearly central here, but it was a puri-
fication targeted as much against the Sunan in Surakarta and those Javanese 
who had taken the side of the European government as against the Dutch. 
Here one can find echoes of the disembodied voice heard by Dipanagara at 
Parangkusuma in circa 1805 which spoke of ‘the beginning of the ruin of the 
Land of Java’, although in Dipanagara’s case, unlike that of Rongga, his call to 
restore the moral order during his own purifying struggle at the time of the Java 
War was very much linked to the teachings of Islam with the Dutch and their 
Javanese allies being dismissed as ‘unbelievers’ (kapir) and ‘apostates’ (kapir 
murtad) respectively.170 Despite his extensive connections with the Javanese-
Islamic communities in east Java, the idea of a distinction between the people 
of Islam and the European kapir or Javanese apostates is wholly missing in 
169 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat 
(Yogyakarta), 20 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 17-11-1810) (punctuation as in original): 
Adhi Tumenggung Natadiningrat, kula anyanthèlaken unjuk dhateng adhi yèn sapunika kula 
nuwun pamit ngumbara, sumedya angrisak dhumateng ingkang tansah adamel kiyanat ing titiyang 
Jawi amargi saking namaning Gupernemèn sanajan bangsa Jawi, kula inggih amilih-milih, pundi 
ingkang sumedya adamel karisakan kula, amasthi inggih kula risak, kadosta bawah ing Surakarta, 
punapa déning bawah pasisir, inggal kula rayut sadaya, ingkang supados kénginga kula aben kalih 
Gupernemèn, sarta kula aben kalih dedamel ing Surakarta. Wondéning sapengker kula, kraton-Dalem 
ing Ngayogya, tuwin keraton ing Surakarta, yèn sampun kalampahan sami kula rayut bawahipun, 
amasthi boten purun anganggu ing kraton-Dalem. Wondéning kula boten pisan-pisan yun baléloha 
ing sampéyan-Dalem, boten langkung pandonga-Dalem ingkang kula suwun, sarta berkah panjurun-
gipun ing leluhur-Dalem ingkang sami ambeg ratu pinarjurit, nanging sampéyan-Dalem sampun 
ngantos kelajeng-lajeng gadhah kersa adamel ing kemlaratan kula, sakelangkung atas sanget ing panu-
wun kula, mila sayektos, kula temen-temen sumedya angrimpili susuker ing Tanah Jawi, sokur malih 
ing tembé kula saged adamel ingkang dados écanipun ing kraton-Dalem, tuwin suka ing nala-Dalem.
Ingkang punika adhi Tumenggung Natadiningrat, kunjukipun kahuningan ing sampéyan-Dalem 
kula pitajeng dhateng adhi.
Sinerat ing dinten Saptu tanggal ping kalih-dasa wulan Sawal ing taun Wawu angkaning warsa 
1  7  3  7.
170 Chapter XI.
Plate 28. A Javanese regent (bupati) in full dress, drawn between 1830-1850. A dwarf-
like panakawan (attendant) can be seen in the background holding a payung (state 
umbrella), the bupati’s symbol of office. Taken from Hardouin and Ritter 1855:121.
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Rongga’s rebellion. Instead, the spirit of the Hindu-Javanese shadow play 
(wayang) and the ghost of Sultan Mangkubumi seem to hover over his enter-
prise. Van IJsseldijk, who had known Rongga in the mid 1790s when he was 
still serving as one of the second sultan’s intimate retainers, remarked that he 
had the conceit that he was Bathara Guru, the supervising deity in the wayang 
to whom all the other shadow-play puppets are notionally subservient.171 The 
bupati wedana also drew on examples from the Ramayana epic when he came 
to appoint his troop commanders in Madiun in late November. Thus his lead-
ing general was given the name of ‘Dasamuka’, a moniker for the giant-king of 
Lanka (Ceylon), Rawana, in the Ramayana, and his deputy the nom-de-guerre 
of Dirgananda.172 Much like a ruler in the wayang, Rongga set about turning 
his family and entourage into a court-ordered hierarchy by bestowing royal 
titles on his mother, wives and other female relatives, as well as appointing 
his son, cousins and leading bupati as heir apparent, patih and senior officials 
respectively of his new kraton at Maospati.173 
The payung (state parasol) makers in Madiun were worked overtime to 
turn out the requisite regalia: all gold for the new ruler, green with gold bands 
for his deputies, and blue for those local officials who rallied to his cause.174 
Even at the end, when Rongga had been deserted by all but a handful of his 
followers, he still had with him three payung carriers together with his pen-
nant bearers, drummers and trumpeters.175 Indeed, on his penultimate night 
171	 Baud	306,	Van	IJsseldijk,	‘Nota’,	22-10-1816.
172 S.Br. 37, p. 93, Opgave (report) of Kartakusuma (patih of Radèn Ngabèhi Kartasari of Caru-
ban) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 19-12-1810. ‘Dirgananda’ may be a variant of 
‘Durgandana’ (the ‘vile smelling one’), the ruler of Wirata and father-in-law of Abimanyu in 
the wayang purwa. On similar wayang allusions during the Java War, when the Dutch supreme 
commander, Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock (1779-1845), was compared by the 
Javanese	to	Dasamuka	(Rawana),	and	Major	(later	Colonel)	Bernard	Sollewijn	(1785-1864),	to	a	
red-bearded buta sabrang (overseas ogre), see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:618 note 1; Van 
den Broek 1873, 20:535.
173 Carey 1980:38, Radèn Ayu Sepuh (Radèn Ayu Rongga), the widow of Radèn Rongga 
Prawiradirja II and a daughter of Hamengkubuwana I, became Ratu Ibu, his wives and female 
relatives became Radèn Ayu with names such as Radèn Ayu Anggèr, Radèn Ayu Gusti and Radèn 
Ayu Retnawaruju. His brother, Radèn Ngabèhi Prawirapraja, became Radèn Rongga Prawiradin-
ingrat (see Appendix Vb), and his patih, the former low-born Mas Ngabèhi Puspadiwirya, became 
Radèn Adipati Suryanegara.
174 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura (Cemara) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 25-11-
1810 (mentioning that the payung of Rongga’s deputies were blue with gold bands); Lieutenant 
Thomas Paulus (Gabugan, Sragèn) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 26-11-1810 (indicating that 
these payung were green with gold bands), Sergeant Lucas Leberveld (Sekaran) to Pieter Engel-
hard (Yogyakarta), 17-12-1810 (on the capture of two pennants, two gold payung and one green 
payung with gold bands belonging to Radèn Rongga and Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara respec-
tively	after	their	deaths	at	Sekaran).	Senior	local	officials	who	rallied	to	Radèn	Rongga	were	given	
new names all of which bore the title of ‘Rongga’, Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura 
(Magetan) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 1-12-1810.
175 Dj.Br. 46, Sergeant Lucas Leberveld (Sekaran) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 17-12-1810.
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at his encampment at Cabéyan, a day’s march from Sekaran where he would 
be cut down in a final skirmish on the banks of the Sala River, Rongga was 
signing a proclamation as ‘Susuhunan Prabu Ingalaga of the court of the war-
rior kings at Maospati who is now wandering about to wage war’.176  As for 
the shade of the first sultan, this was evoked by Rongga’s use of such phrases 
as ‘to lead a roving life’ and his invocation of ‘the blessings of his ancestors 
who had been warrior kings’. Even the royal title he subsequently adopted, 
‘Kangjeng Susuhunan Prabu Ingalaga’ (‘His Highness the king, ruler in war’), 
and that which he gave to his principal deputy, the bupati of Padhangan, Mas 
Tumenggung Sumanegara, ‘Panembahan Sénapatiningprang’ (‘The Lord 
High Commander in battle’)177 recall the title taken by Mangkubumi when he 
first went into rebellion in Sokawati in 1746.178 The fact that Sumanegara was a 
grandson of Mangkubumi’s famous Balinese army commander, Tumenggung 
Malangnegara, further strengthened this connection with the first sultan.179  
There were also practical suggestions contained in Rongga’s letter to 
Sumadiningrat which showed a strategic grasp of the routes which Daendels 
might use to move in military reinforcements to attack Yogya and crush his 
uprising in the east. These included the breaking of the bridges over the Kali 
Codhé and Winonga in Yogyakarta, and the bridge over the Kali Tuntang on 
the highway eight kilometres north of Salatiga whose destruction would hold 
up troops marching from Semarang to the Principalities. Similarly, the bridge 
at Merbung180 five kilometres to the west and slightly south of Klathèn, which 
Rongga also asked to be broken, was part of the highway from the sultan’s 
176 Dj.Br. 46, Proclamation of Susuhunan Prabu Ngalaga (Radèn Rongga) (Cabéyan) to kapitan 
cina of Lasem and Rembang, 18 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 15-12-1810). Dj.Br. 46 only gives this 
proclamation in Dutch translation, but we can reconstruct the original Javanese text from Rongga’s 
other	extant	letters	(Carey	1980:37,	above	note	168)	to	give:	Ingkeng Sinuhun Kangjeng Susuhunan 
Prabu Ngalaga, ingkeng angrenggani kraton pinarjurit in Maospati, ingkeng angumbara amangun jurit.
177 Dj.Br. 46. Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 24-11-1810 
(indicating that Rongga was already styling himself by his new title when he passed through 
Kartasura on 22-11-1810); Proclamation of Radèn Rongga, 21 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 18-11-1810) 
(bestowal of title of ‘Sénapatiningprang’ on four deputies (kalipah) including Sumanegara). See 
also Carey 1980:38 note 2.
178 On this title, ‘Pangéran Adipati Sukawati Sénapatiningprang Pramuka Jayèngrat’, see Balé 
Poestaka 1939:32.
179 Carey 1980:38 note 2. Sumanegara’s Balinese connections were the source of much spec-
ulation by Engelhard that the large number of Balinese pirate prau (ships) seen coming and 
going to the Bay of Pacitan in early December might have been an indication that Rongga was 
receiving reinforcements from Bali. The bupati of Rawa (Tulung Agung), Radèn Tumenggung 
Pringgakusuma, disabused him saying that no Balinese prau could land presumably because of 
prevailing sea conditions, Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Lieutenant Thomas Paulus 
(Maospati/Madiun), 13-12-1810, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati/Madiun) to Pieter Engel-
hard (Yogyakarta), 18-12-1810. See further Chapter I note 58, Chapter V note 20, Chapter XI note 
46; Remmelink 1994:21.
180 On Merbung’s location in the Kembangarum sub-district of Klathèn, see Schoel 1931:233.
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capital to Surakarta across which the Dutch forces would have to move.181
One aspect of Rongga’s rebellion which was markedly different from that 
of Dipanagara fifteen years later was his appeal to the Chinese communities 
in east Java and the pasisir. Prior to his uprising, Rongga had enjoyed close 
relations with these communities principally through his position as the sul-
tan’s chief tollgate-leaser in the Madiun area (Carey 1984a:21-2). As we have 
seen, he also shared their deep misgivings about the threat posed to their local 
economic interests especially in the timber trade by the indiscriminate activi-
ties of European loggers and entrepreneurs. It was largely on the strength of 
these shared concerns that Rongga declared himself ‘protector’182 of all the 
Javanese and Chinese who had been ‘mistreated by the [European] govern-
ment’ and urged them to work together to ‘exterminate’ the Dutch officials 
who had undermined the prosperity and well-being of Java (Carey 1980:36-8, 
1984:22). His appeal was also specifically directed to the wealthy mixed-blood 
or peranakan Chinese communities on the north coast in places such as Lasem, 
Tuban and Sidhayu, whose support he hoped to enlist in a series of strikes 
against the main Dutch garrisons in the area between Rembang and Surabaya. 
He thus urged the pasisir Chinese to take control of the offices and posts of 
evicted Europeans and guard them against possible counter-attacks (Carey 
1980:37, 1984:22). One of Rongga’s initial objectives was the Dutch shipyard at 
Teleng which was being laid out at a village on the Sala River just upstream 
from Bojanegara. Local officials from Blora operating under Rongga’s orders 
attacked this yard in late November and gutted the Dutch manager’s house 
with the help of the manager’s assistant, a Lasem-born Chinese.183 On 15 
December 1810, just two days before the European-officered flying column 
closed in on him at Sekaran, Rongga made one last desperate plea to the cap-
tains of the Chinese of Lasem and Rembang, promising them that once the 
Europeans had been destroyed, they would enjoy his special protection and 
their descendants would inherit their official positions (Carey 1980:40 note 1, 
1984:22 note 100). Even as he prepared to fight the last battle of his life, twelve 
181 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Tumenggung Sumadinin-
grat (Yogyakarta), 20 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 17-11-1810). Rongga also encouraged Sumadiningrat to 
break	any	other	bridges	in	south-central	Java	which	might	be	strategically	significant	to	prevent	
enemy forces advancing on Yogya (tuwin ing saliyanipun malih, énggal sampéyan bubrahi sedaya, 
ingkang supados yèn wonten mengsah, sampun ngantos lumebet ing kraton-Dalem). He may have had 
the bridge over the Kali Elo in Kedhu in mind, Poensen 1905:204.
182 Carey 1980:37, the full Javanese text reads: ingkeng kinuwasakaken angrayud serta angayumi 
tuwin atutulung ing kasusahaning titiyang bongsa Jawi utawi bongsa Cina.
183 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann 
(Semarang), 1-12-1810; P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von 
Winckelmann (Semarang), 1-12-1810; Dj.Br. 46, Pangéran Raja Suria Adiprakasa (Radèn Rongga) 
(Cabéyan) to Baba Sun (? Rembang), 18 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 16-12-1810), asking the Chi-
nese to meet him at Teleng ‘to take council about destroying the Europeans’. The shipyard man-
ager,	Verhaagen,	was	not	present	at	the	time	of	the	attack.	On	Teleng’s	location	see	Map	4.
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Chinese were reported amongst the much depleted band of a hundred or so 
military retainers who still remained with him (Carey 1984a:22). 
Rongga’s appeal to the Chinese showed his shrewd understanding of their 
economic and social importance in the eastern mancanagara. Indeed, specifi-
cally mancanagara grievances against the Dutch played a critical role in gen-
erating local support for Rongga’s rebellion. Thus the forest-dwelling people 
of Tuban, Sidhayu and Lasem, who had suffered most from the government 
teak monopoly, were amongst the first to rally to him as he made his way to 
Madiun in the last rainy days of November. Rongga’s demand that the pasisir 
areas of the north coast should once again be delivered up to the Javanese was 
also a goal which was very dear to the hearts of the south-central Javanese 
rulers and was one of their foremost objectives following the collapse of the 
Franco-Dutch government in mid-September 1811.184
Short-lived though it was, Rongga’s revolt and his continuous attempts 
to involve the Chinese in his cause stand in marked contrast to the situation 
which pertained during the Java War. How to explain this contrast? The pau-
city of Chinese tollgate keepers in the eastern mancanagara when compared to 
the situation which pertained in south-central Java in the nine years preced-
ing the outbreak of the Java War may partly account for this.185 It should also 
be noted that it was precisely the long-established Chinese Muslim communi-
ties on the north coast which gave Dipanagara’s local commanders the most 
consistent support in his struggle against the Dutch (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, III:444-5, 452, 525). The invidious role of the Chinese in south-
central Java as the public face of Dutch fiscal oppression through the opium 
farm, market taxes and tollgates in the post-1816 period certainly changed 
local Javanese attitudes towards them, particularly at the elite level (Chapter 
IX). Traditionally, inter-marriage with those of partly Chinese descent had 
not been seen as a problem.186 By 1825, however, this attitude had begun to 
change and a new perception took its place that relations with the Chinese, 
particularly those of a sexual nature, brought misfortune in time of war 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:525; Carey 1984a:2, 32).
Rongga’s revolt also had significant Javanese messianic undertones which 
again prefigured Dipanagara’s uprising in 1825. Thus the Yogya babad describes 
how Rongga’s deputy, Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara, received the inspiration 
184 Recognition of royal jurisdiction over the holy graves at Ampèl, Giri, Tuban, Bonang, 
Kudhus,	Kadilangu,	Demak	and	Tegalarum,	was	specifically	demanded	by	Sunan	Pakubuwana	
IV from the new British administration in late September 1811, IOL Eur F 148/17, ‘Captain Robi-
son, Java 1811’, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 5 Ramelan AH 1226 (AD 
23-9-1811). In previous Javanese history, the mosque at Demak and the long graves at Kadilangu 
were regarded as the two vital pusaka (heirlooms) of Java, Olthof 1941a, II:301.
185 See pp. 467-8, 617-21.
186	 Chapter	II	note	68	on	the	possibility	that	Dipanagara’s	first	wife,	the	daughter	of	the	bupati 
of Panolan, was of partly Chinese descent.
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that the bupati wedana should rule as Sunan Ingalaga at the kraton of Kutha 
Pethik in the ‘kingdom’ (praja) of Ketangga.187 We know from other sources 
that Kutha Pethik was another name for Maospati, which had been chosen 
by astrologers as the most auspicious place for Rongga’s new dalem when he 
moved from Madiun in the early 1800s (Onghokham 1975:60). This seems to 
suggest that Rongga may have viewed himself as a Ratu Adil, a Javanese mes-
sianic ‘Just King’. In the Jayabaya prophecies ascribed to a legendary twelfth-
century king of Kedhiri, the kingdom of the Ratu Adil is usually located at 
Kutha Pethik near the Ketangga River in the forest of Budhak four kilometres 
to the south of Ngawi.188 Ketangga would remain throughout the nineteenth 
century a focus for popular gatherings of a pronounced messianic character 
with particularly large assemblies being reported in 1817, 1819 and 1888.189 
During the Java War after Dipanagara had proclaimed himself as the Ratu Adil 
by taking the title of Sultan Èrucakra, fierce fighting also took place around 
this site involving a close ally of the prince.190 The fact that Rongga’s rebel-
lion occurred in the Javanese year Wawu, the seventh year of the eight-year 
Javanese cycle, which was supposedly the appropriate time for the Ratu Adil 
to appear – Dipanagara would also take his Èrucakra title at the beginning of a 
Wawu year (Carey 1981a:261 note 108) – might also have enhanced its popular 
appeal in the eastern mancanagara and might partly explain why his rebellion 
made such a deep impression on so many members of the Yogya court, particu-
larly the young Dipanagara. 
It seems almost certain that Rongga enjoyed the tacit support of many of 
the south-central Javanese rulers and princes who hoped to use his rebellion 
187 B.Ng. I:160-1, XL.32-5. In the Dutch reports there are also references to Rongga preparing 
to defend himself at ‘Pethik’ in the Madiun area, Dj.Br. 27, Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winck-
elmann (Semarang) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 29-11-1810, Wangsadrana (Semarang) to 
Radèn Panji Natadiningrat (bupati of Semarang), 30-11-1810, W.N. Servatius (Surakarta) to Pieter 
Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 30-11-18210, Kyai Tumenggung Adimenggala (bupati of Demak) to A.H. 
Smissaert (acting landdrost of Semarang and Demak), 1-12-1810.
188 Dwijosoegondo	(Tjantrik	Mataram)	1966:51-2;	Sartono	Kartodirdjo	1972:96.	The following 
is the description in the Reksapustaka (Surakarta) Serat Centhini, IV:1813, II.7 wedi wilalating Nata/ 
adil-asih paramarta/ bumi Pethik akukutha/ parek lan Kali Ketangga/ ing sajroning Budhak wana.
189	 Dj.Br.	60,	H.A.	Steijn	Parvé	(Semarang)	to	H.G.	Nahuys	van	Burgst	(Yogyakarta),	11-7-1817,	
relaying report from bupati of Grobogan that 4,000 Javanese from all over the eastern mancana-
gara had gathered in Ketangga ‘because of an old prophecy that a new and mighty ruler would 
establish	himself	 there’);	Dj.Br.	 62A,	 J.C.	Ellinghuijsen	 (Pasuruan)	 to	H.G.	Nahuys	van	Burgst	
(Yogyakarta), 13-11-1819 (on gathering in Ketangga on the orders of the ‘General above the wind’ 
(Jéndral diatas angin) from Turkey (Rum) prior to the establishment of a new ruler in Malang who 
would fall on Pasuruan, Bangil and Surabaya); S.Br. 4, ‘Algemeen Verslag der Residentie Soer-
akarta over het jaar 1888’, 8-9, on the so-called ‘Sri Katon’ incident involving a mass meeting at 
Ketangga. See further pp. 484-5, 491-2.
190 dK 183, A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Buiten-
zorg),	25-11-1825	(on	Mas	Tumenggung	Kertadirja’s	abortive	attack	on	Ketangga	in	November	
1825). See also Carey 1974a:28.
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for their own ends. We have seen how in Yogya, both Pangéran Natakusuma 
and his son, Natadiningrat, had already fallen under suspicion even before 
Rongga’s flight from Yogya. Pieter Herbert van Lawick van Pabst in Rembang 
even speculated that Rongga and Natakusuma had come to a prior agreement 
about the division of Yogyakarta in the event that the bupati wedana’s uprising 
proved successful.191  It was thus no surprise that as soon as news of Rongga’s 
rebellion reached Engelhard that Natakusuma’s residence was placed under 
guard,192 and orders issued by Daendels for the prince and his son’s arrest.193 
On 17 December, on the very day of Rongga’s death, they were sent overland 
to Batavia where they were held in the fort at Meester Cornelis (present-day 
Jatinegara) and downtown Batavia before being transferred to Cirebon, where 
Daendels subsequently sought their death.194 The position of the sultan was also 
extremely delicate. He had been very supportive of Rongga and the marshal 
automatically assumed his complicity in the uprising.195 But Daendels’ demand 
that Engelhard consider arresting the sultan along with his key military adviser, 
Sumadiningrat, was rejected by the Resident. He was not prepared to execute 
such drastic measures given the Yogya ruler’s seeming cooperation in the days 
following Rongga’s flight.196 Dipanagara even thought the sultan had turned 
against his former favourite, accusing him in his babad of giving in too easily 
to Daendels’ demand that he be sent to Buitenzorg (Bogor). He stated that this 
was ‘the cause of Yogya’s later destruction’.197 Furthermore, he described the 
sultan’s decision to send an expeditionary force under Purwadipura to track 
down Rongga as ‘a great sin’.198 In fact, far from cooperating with the Dutch, 
this force achieved little and Purwadipura was later dismissed from his court 
position for spending his time trading in opium and engaging in currency 
deals.199 In the end Rongga had to be hunted down by a flying column of 150 
191 Chapter V note 123.
192 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 21-11-1810.
193 Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 29-11-1810.
194 Daendels	 1814:Bijlage	 2,	 additionele	 stukken	 17;	Mack.Pr. 2, ‘Surakarta sengkala list’, 185 
(gives Monday, 20 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 as the date of their departure) ; B.Ng. I:183-5, XLV.7-23. 
On Daendels’ instructions for their assassination, see pp. 277-8.
195 Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 29-11-1810, 
Daendels’ marginal note in Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buiten-
zorg),	30-11-1810	stating	‘even	before	Rongga’s	flight	his	actions	were	equivocal’.
196 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 30-11-1810.
197 BD (Manado), II:132, XIV (Sinom) 102 Kangjeng sultan teka gampil/ pan ika kang dadya marga/ 
rusaké Ngayogya iki.
198 BD (Manado). II:133, XV (Asmaradana) 4.  kangjeng sultan kang winuwus/ kalangkung ing 
durakanira.
199	 Carey	1980:189-90;	great	profits	could	be	made	at	this	time	in	the	eastern	mancanagara by 
changing silver ronde real into ducatoons and Chinese merchants employed Javanese women as 
money changers in many of the local markets, Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II 
(Yogyakarta), 22-10-1809. Purwadipura and the other Javanese commanders of the Yogya expedi-
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men commanded by Sergeant Lucas Leberveld. Several years afterwards, how-
ever, evidence came to light that far from being innocent in the affair, the sultan 
had plotted with Sunan Pakubuwana IV to coordinate a general uprising in the 
Principalities against Daendels in the event of a successful attack by Rongga on 
the pasisir. This evidence came from a respected local kyai, Kyai Murma Wijaya, 
who had extensive contacts at both courts as a teacher and religious adviser, 
and had apparently been employed as a messenger and go-between carrying 
secret communications between Surakarta and Yogyakarta at this time.200 If 
this source is sound, then it is clear that the Sunan played a duplicitous role 
because he also wrote to Daendels denouncing the sultan for having been ‘at 
one’ with Rongga.201 Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) likewise adopted a 
highly equivocal stance as we have seen. At the start of Rongga’s rebellion, his 
legion was in Semarang, and although he later marched with 600 of his troops 
to clear Rongga’s supporters out of Blora, he does not seem to have taken very 
active measures against the rebel bupati wedana.202 One source even alleges that 
he killed the messengers sent by Lieutenant Paulus from Maospati so that he 
would not have to coordinate his actions with the Dutch supported expedition-
ary force.203 This general collusion of the rulers of south-central Java, specifi-
cally Sunan Pakubuwana IV and the sultan, was to be repeated in the period 
October 1811 to May 1812 against the British (Carey 1980:54-70; Chapter VII), 
and underlines the fact that while each hoped to gain from a successful attack 
on the European power they continued to pursue their own personal political 
ambitions against their royal rivals.
Rongga’s rebellion did not, however, offer such an opportunity. Daendels 
moved with considerable speed and firmness to quell the uprising. An expe-
ditionary force of 3,000 infantry was disembarked in Semarang on 2 December 
and they were followed by two squadrons of cavalry and two companies of 
horse-drawn artillery – 200 men in all – which left Batavia on 1 December to 
march overland to central Java. The governor-general followed them by sea 
tion were constantly telling Lieutenant Thomas Paulus to be patient – nanti Litnan (‘later Lieu-
tenant’)	–	when	he	tried	to	urge	them	on.	They	had	not	left	Maospati	by	the	time	Rongga	was	
killed at Sekaran on 17-12-1810, Dj.Br. 46, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati/Madiun) to Pieter 
Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 18-12-1810.
200	 UBL	BPL	616,	Port.	5	pt.	7,	D.W.	Pinket	van	Haak	(Surakarta)	to	G.A.G.Ph.	van	der	Capel-
len (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 27-11-1816; Dj.Br. 40, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-
General (Batavia), 13-11-1816, enclosing procès-verbaal	(official	transcript	of	interview)	with	Kyai	
Murma	Wijaya.	On	the	fate	of	this	ulama, see pp. 444-8. 
201 S.Br. 37, Radèn Tumenggung Wiriadiningrat (Surakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara 
(Surakarta), 5-12-1810.
202 Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 29-11-1810; 
S.Br. 37, p. 61, Radèn Tumenggung Mertanegara (bupati Blora) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara 
(Surakarta), 7-12-1810. See further Poensen 1905:208-9.
203 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 78.
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on 6 December arriving in Semarang four days later.204 Fearing that the sultan 
might withdraw from Yogya to the mountain fastnesses of Merapi or the twin 
volcanoes of Sumbing and Sundoro in Kedhu to lead a guerrilla resistance,205 
the marshal ordered Engelhard to place a corps of the Crown Prince’s troops 
between Yogyakarta and the Jambu hills to prevent such a retreat. He also 
instructed the Resident to form a party at court against the sultan consist-
ing of the Crown Prince, Danureja II and the elderly Pangéran Ngabèhi (the 
elder brother of the sultan).206 The Yogya ruler, meanwhile, acquiesced in the 
appointment of the Crown Prince as temporary commander of the Yogya 
forces and agreed that Natakusuma and his son should be sent to Semarang 
for the duration of Rongga’s rebellion as a ‘guarantee of peace’ in south-central 
Java and to prevent any threat to the sultan’s person.207 As a further proof of 
his willingness to cooperate, he declared his intention to dismiss Purwadipura 
from his position as head of the Yogya expeditionary force because of his dila-
tory tactics and appoint new commanders.208 Sumadiningrat was, however, 
204 Dj.Br. 46, Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann (Semarang) to Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta), 6-12-1810.
205 Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 29-11-1810. 
There is no evidence that Hamengkubuwana II was contemplating such a move at this time, although 
later	during	the	British	attack	on	Java	in	August	1811,	the	sultan	consulted	a	Bagelèn-based	haji, Haji 
Mukidin, to see what would become of the Yogya kraton if the British prevailed. Mukidin replied 
that the kraton seemed ‘very dull’ and that it should be transferred to the north-west. Whereupon, 
Hamengkubuwana II considered retiring to his bodyguard to Beliga (Bligo) in southern Kedhu 
(note 109) and sending his valuables (heirlooms or pusaka, gold and jewelry) to Mancingan on the 
south coast in the event that the kraton was taken by the British, IOL Eur F148/24, ‘Translations of 
secret	 letters	between	Surakarta	and	Yogyakarta’,	no.	 25,	 ‘Abstract	of	 letters	 found	 in	 the	house	
of the Radèn Adipati (Cakranagara)’, no. 5, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (Yogyakarta) to 
Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), undated. According to the Javanese babad, such a move 
was supposedly suspected by the British, Poensen 1905:303-4, B.Ng. I:296, LXXII.24.
206 Besides Pangéran Ngabèhi, Engelhard also expected support from Hamengkubuwana I’s 
sons	Demang,	Panular	 (Adiwijaya	 I)	 and	Adikusuma,	 as	well	 as	 from	Hamengkubuwana	 II’s	
children, Mangkudiningrat and Adiwinata, Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Dae-
ndels (Semarang), 4-12-1810. On these see further Ricklefs 1974a:352 note 31.
207 Note 194.
208 Poensen 1905:207; Carey 1992:284, 441 note 209; B.Ng. I:166-7, XLI.28-32. Hamengkubu-
wana II sent up reinforcements to Maospati under Pangéran Dipakusuma, Pangéran Adinagara 
(a	nephew	of	Hamengkubuwana	I),	and	Radèn	Tumenggung	Wiryakusuma,	an	unattached	court	
bupati (bupati miji), whose father was Pangéran Demang, a son of Hamengkubuwana I (Ricklefs 
1974a:352) on 27 November. The Yogya mancanagara bupati led by the bupati of Rawa (Tulung 
Agung), Radèn Tumenggung Pringgakusuma, were also ordered to assist and special clearance 
arranged for them to pass through Surakarta lands in Pacitan on their way to Madiun, Dj.Br. 
27, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 26 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 
24-11-1810). They arrived in Maospati around 6 December. Hamengkubuwana II’s plan to send 
a new expedition commanded by his sons Pangéran Jayakusuma (Ngabèhi) and Pangéran San-
tawijaya,	his	son-in-law,	Radèn	Tumenggung	Natadiningrat	and	his	troop	commander	(wedana 
prajurit), Radèn Panji Jayèngrana (post-1811, Radèn Tumenggung Ranadiningrat), with Danureja 
II	attached	as	political	counsellor,	was	rejected	on	7-12-1810	by	Engelhard	as	unnecessary	and	
inappropriate given the need to keep the patih in Yogya, Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) 
to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 26-11-1810, 7-12-1810. 
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cleared of any implication in Rongga’s rebellion and his name was dropped 
from the group which Daendels had demanded should be delivered up to him 
in Semarang.209
Meanwhile, Rongga was being relentlessly pursued. After his depar-
ture from Yogya on the night of 20-21 November he had made his way 
under unseasonally heavy rain back to his dalem at Maospati arriving on 28 
November (see Map 4). En route, he had burnt various Surakarta villages 
and tollgate posts including Masaran and Sragèn, and fought a pitched bat-
tle at Magetan on 27 November where his troop commander Dasamuka, 
according to one report, was killed in the capture of the bupati’s residence. 
The town was then set on fire.210 Once Rongga had reached Maospati, he 
attempted to win over the Yogya mancanagara bupati to his side, but the only 
one who rallied to him wholeheartedly was Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara, 
the bupati of Padhangan, who was reported to have been his long-time friend 
and confidant.211 With a few exceptions,212 most of the others seem to have 
tried to distance themselves from the conflict only emerging when Rongga 
and Sumanegara had been safely dispatched.213 The attitude of Dipanagara’s 
father-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya III of Panolan, is not spe-
cifically clarified in the sources. It is known that his district afforded Rongga 
some military assistance,214 but at the same time his immediate superior, the 
bupati of Jipang-Rajegwesi, Radèn Tumenggung Sasradiningrat, was expecting 
him to guard the woods and roads of Panolan so that Rongga should not break 
209 Daendels	1814:Bijlage	2,	additionele	stukken	15;	Poensen	1905:206.
210 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 26-11-1810; Radèn 
Tumenggung Purwadipura (Maospati) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 4 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 
1-12-1810); S.Br. 37, Radèn Tumenggung Wiriadiningrat (Panaraga) to Radèn Adipati Cakrana-
gara (Surakarta), 5-12-1810. See further note 220.
211 Dj.Br. 46, A.H. Smissaert (acting landdrost of Semarang and Demak) to Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta), 3-12-1810.
212 Those who gave support to the Dutch included the following bupati: Radèn Tumenggung 
Pringgakusuma (Rawa, present-day Tulung Agung), Radèn Tumenggung Yudakusuma (Wiras-
ari), Radèn Tumenggung Mangundirana (Kalangbrèt), and the two Yogya bupati of Grobogan, 
Radèn Tumenggung Sasrakusuma and Radèn Tumenggung Sasranegara, Dj.Br. 46, A.H. Smiss-
aert (acting landdrost Semarang and Demak) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 3-12-1810, Lieu-
tenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati/Madiun) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 7-12-1810, Relaas of 
Sergeant Lucas Leberveld in Leberveld (Sekaran) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 17-12-1810.
213 Dj.Br. 46, Relaas of Sergeant Lucas Leberveld in Leberveld (Sekaran) to Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta), 17-12-1810, who described how all the Jipang bupati	only	appeared	two	hours	after	
Rongga and Sumanegara had been killed and he was still standing by their bodies. These included 
Radèn Tumenggung Sasradiningrat (Jipang), Radèn Tumenggung Prawirasentika (Bauwerna), 
Radèn Tumenggung Natadiwiria (Dhuri/Wanaseraya), and Radèn Tumengung Prawirayuda 
(Pasekaran). Two others, Radèn Tumenggung Sasradipura (Magetan) and Radèn Tumenggung 
Pringgalaya	(Kertasana),	had	fled	from	their	respective	kabupatèn once Rongga’s force arrived. 
214 Dj.Br. 46, P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckel-
mann (Semarang), 1-12-1810, referring to ‘200 men under arms’ who were available to Rongga in 
Panolan.
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through to the pasisir.215 Just over six months after Rongga’s revolt, however, 
his son, Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya IV, was appointed in his place, so it 
is possible that the older Natawijaya had either died in the intervening time or 
fallen into disgrace because of his conduct during the bupati wedana’s uprising 
(Carey and Hoadley 2000:72, 240-4; Chapter VII).
Certainly Rongga’s rebellion seems to have thrown the mancanagara into 
confusion. We will see in the next chapter how the administration of the 
eastern outlying districts was changed to prevent another such challenge 
ever occurring to the south-central Javanese rulers. Although Rongga made 
a specific appeal for support from the local Chinese communities, many fled 
to the European-controlled pasisir. The great Chinese-run tollgate (bandar) at 
Ngawi at the confluence of the Sala and Madiun rivers was deserted as were 
the Chinese quarters of Maospati and Madiun. Reports reaching the Dutch 
from these places spoke of the ‘great commotion’ amongst the local Chinese 
population and the ‘awe and fear’ which Rongga evinced amongst ordinary 
Javanese inhabitants of the eastern mancanagara.216 But these sentiments did 
not prevent the extensive looting of Rongga’s dalem at Maospati once the 
bupati wedana had decided to move on. When a Surakarta spy reached the kra-
ton-like residence on 9 December, a week after Rongga’s departure, he found 
that all the fruit trees had been cut down by robbers and the main mosque 
looted. The chests containing Rongga’s extensive library of religious texts had 
been forced open and their contents scattered on the mosque floor, while the 
incumbent Sundanese ‘priest’, Nuryemangi, with 29 of his pupils was on the 
road heading back to his village at Sukapura in west Java.217
When Rongga abandoned his plans to attack Panaraga and decided to 
make for the pasisir, he clearly hoped to avail himself of help from the Chinese 
communities at Lasem, Tuban and Sidhayu. But he found that this support 
was not forthcoming. Starting out with a 150-strong escort from Maospati 
on 2 December, he still had nearly 100 left (including twelve Chinese) when 
Leberveld’s flying column of some 150 men caught up with him at Sekaran 
on the night of the 16-17 December. In the final encounter on the morning 
of 17 December close to the Sala River, most of Rongga’s army slipped away 
into the adjacent woods, leaving only his deputy, Sumanegara, his patih, 
Mas Ngabèhi Puspadiwirya, and their pennant and payung carriers on the 
field of battle. After the first exchange of shots, the bupati of Wirasari, Radèn 
215 Dj.Br. 46, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati/Madiun) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 9-
12-1810.
216 Dj.Br. 46, P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckel-
mann (Semarang), 1-12-1810, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati/Madiun) to Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta), 7-12-1810.
217 S.Br. 37, Relaas of Wangsataruna (Surakarta spy sent to watch Rongga’s movements) 
(Maospati) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 9-12-1810. Sukapura would appear to be a 
village in the Singaparna district of Tasikmalaya residency, see Schoel 1931:353.
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Tumenggung Yudakusuma, who was accompanying Leberveld’s force, cried 
out to ask what Rongga wanted. The bupati wedana replied that he intended 
no harm to the Javanese but wished to kill all those who were being a burden 
on the Javanese and Chinese in the mancanagara. Thereupon he dismounted 
and tried to thrust out with his pike. In the ensuing encounter, one of the 
junior Yogya officials, a magang (aspirant bupati), Sumadiwirya,218 managed 
to wound him in the chest and Leberveld ordered his foot-soldiers to move in 
and finish him off. Much the same fate befell Rongga’s deputy, Sumanegara, 
who was shot with a matchlock by the same Yogya bupati of Wirasari and then 
stabbed to death by the bupati’s armed men. The only one of Rongga’s entou-
rage to escape was his patih who, although wounded, managed to flee with 
the payung and pennant bearers. The bodies of the two slain rebels were then 
washed in the Sala River, wrapped in white linen and eventually handed over 
to Purwadipura for transport to Yogya. Once this sad cargo had reached the 
royal capital, according to the Javanese sources, the sultan ordered the corpses 
to be hung in open coffins at the Pangurakan crossroads near the guardhouse 
on the northern alun-alun, where the bodies of executed criminals were pub-
licly displayed (Poensen 1905:262; Carey 1980:125-6). There they may have 
been seen by the young Dipanagara on one of his journeys to the court. They 
were then cut down and interred on 22 December at the traitors’ graveyard 
at Banyusumurup to the southeast of Imagiri on the abutments of Gunung 
Kidul.219 Soon afterwards, Rongga’s mother, Radèn Ayu Rongga, and two 
of his younger brothers, Radèn Ngabèhi Prawirapraja and Radèn Ngabèhi 
Sumaprawira, were brought back to Yogya under armed guard along with 
the severed head of Rongga’s army commander, Dasamuka.220 According 
218 Sumadiwirya appears to have been rewarded for his services during this expedition against 
Rongga by being appointed to the post of bupati miji (unattached	bupati) with 400 cacah of apanage 
land, some of it derived from the redistributed landholdings of the disgraced Radèn Tumeng-
gung Purwadipura, Carey and Hoadley 2000:182-3. This happened in early 1811. He subse-
quently	(3-7-1812)	followed	Hamengkubuwana	II	into	exile	in	Pulau	Pinang	and	Ambon	after	the	
sultan’s	deposition	in	the	aftermath	of	the	British	attack	on	the	Yogya	kraton (20-6-1812). His role 
in	the	firing	of	the	powder	magazine	in	the	fort	during	the	British	assault	on	the	Yogya	kraton on 
20 June 1812 had made him persona non grata with the British, see Carey 1992:438-9 note 201; pp. 
335, 337, 363.
219 Dj.Br. 46, Relaas of Sergeant Lucas Leberveld, in Leberveld (Sekaran) to Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta),	 17-12-1810,	 gives	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 Rongga’s	 final	 hours.	 See	 also	Daendels	
1814:	Bijlage	2,	additionele	stukken	4	(Daendels’	official	report	on	the	military	operations	against	
Rongga, 7-1-1811), no. 16, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 30 
Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 26-12-1810) (reporting details of Rongga’s end based on Leberveld’s 
relaas. This printed version is incorrectly dated 10 Dulkangidah AJ 1737). On the hanging of the 
bodies at the Pangurakan and their subsequent interment at Banyusumurup on 22-12-1810, see 
Van Mook 1972:18; Hageman 1955-56:269-70; B.Ng. I:185-92, XLVI.6-XLVII.7, XLVIII.1-3; LOr 8987 
no. 1 (Babad Alit), pt. 21.
220 Dj.Br. 46, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 17-12-
1810.	One	report	suggests	that	Dasamuka	had	been	killed	in	the	battle	for	Magetan	on	27	Novem-
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to the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’, a contemporary Javanese source, 
Rongga’s mother, a younger sister of the second sultan, was particularly 
badly treated by Purwadipura on her journey from Madiun and this was one 
of the reason’s for the Radèn Tumenggung’s subsequent exile during the brief 
regency (January-September 1811) of the future third sultan (Carey 1992:116, 
284, 441 note 206a; p. 268).
Conclusion
Despite the pathos of Radèn Rongga’s end, his rebellion was a major event 
in the pre-Java War history of the south-central Javanese courts. Prior to 
1810, notwith standing Daendels’ bluster and military threats, the balance of 
power had not yet swung decisively in favour of the European government. 
The ability of the sultan to resist the imposition of the new ceremonial and 
his skill in spinning out the responses to the governor-general’s demands for 
‘satisfaction’ in the numerous border disputes involving the sultanate and 
Daendels’ administration in the three years before Rongga’s uprising showed 
that there were limits to the government’s power. In south-central Java proper 
these limits would continue until the time of the British attack on the Yogya 
kraton on 20 June 1812 when the remaining constraints on the government 
from the court-based militaries were finally swept aside. The situation in the 
mancanagara, however, was somewhat different. Here Rongga was indeed 
the ‘last champion’. His death accelerated the transformation of these eastern 
outlying districts into an economic zone under the decisive influence of the 
European government. Daendels’ demands in 1809-1810 for the eastern dis-
tricts to be opened up for unrestricted – monopoly –  supply of timber, rice, 
and other key commodities to the north coast, as well as European capital 
investment in the establishment of new shipyards and logging enterprises, 
were bitterly resisted by Rongga and some of his fellow bupati. Although 
they couched their resistance in terms of protection for the wong cilik (‘little 
people’), in particular those who earned their living from the teak forests, 
the so-called blandhong people, in large part their motivation was to preserve 
their own economic position. In this they received the tacit support of the 
sultan, and, if we believe the testimony of figures like Kyai Murma Wijaya, of 
the Sunan and Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) as well.
ber	and	his	body	thrown	into	a	nearby	river.	If	so,	it	had	clearly	been	fished	out	by	Purwadipura’s	
expedition	and	the	head	cut	off	as	a	trophy	to	bring	back	to	Yogya,	Dj.Br.	46,	Relaas of Secameng-
gala (Magetan) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 4-12-1810. Another report states that he was 
only	wounded	at	Magetan,	living	on	to	fight	another	skirmish	at	Balong	Tjok	(Panaraga)	where	
he was defeated (and presumably killed) along with his fellow commander Dirgananda, S.Br. 37, 
p. 93, Opgave of Kartakusuma (patih of Radèn Ngabèhi Kartasari of Caruban) to Radèn Adipati 
Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y. (? 16-12-1810).
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The failure of Rongga’s eastern rebellion marked the point when the bal-
ance of power in the territories bordering the Dutch-controlled pasisir swung 
decisively in favour of the European government. Henceforth, these eastern 
outlying districts would be pulled inexorably into the European orbit. Within 
the space of two short decades, the whole of the mancanagara would be 
annexed by the government, starting with the treaties imposed by Daendels 
on the courts in January 1811 and followed by those dictated by Raffles in the 
aftermath of the British attack on Yogya in June 1812. The political significance 
of all this was not lost on Dipanagara. His admiration for Rongga shines 
through in his babad. Here was a young Yogya nobleman, who was almost 
his contemporary, a man like himself who enjoyed strong links with the local 
Javanese-Islamic communities and who was prepared to go down fighting 
rather than die miserably as a prisoner of the European power. In many 
respects, Rongga was the satria, the warrior prince, whom Dipanagara had in 
mind as an example when he confronted a similar set of economic and political 
circumstances in the south-central Javanese heartland in the decade before the 
Java War. With his close family ties to Rongga, ties which were enhanced by 
his later marriages to the former bupati wedana’s daughter and niece (Appendix 
III), and a remarkable reliance on his teenage son, Senthot, as his principal cav-
alry commander, it is hardly surprising that Dipanagara should have made so 
much of his kinsman as the ‘last champion’ of the Yogya sultanate. When the 
prince’s turn came to step forward to defend the moral and spiritual integrity 
of the Javanese old order, he would do so under the much broader banner of 
Javanese Islam and with a messianic appeal unmatched by that of Rongga. 
But the ghost of the slain bupati wedana and his evocation of the warrior kings 
(ratu pinarjurit) of Mataram would still hover over his enterprise just as that of 
Mangkubumi had over Rongga’s own doomed uprising.

chapter VII
the end of the beginning
the last months of the Franco-Dutch government 
and the British rape of Yogyakarta, 1811-1812
Introduction
In the eighteen months which elapsed between Radèn Rongga’s death on 17 
December 1810 and the fall of the Yogya kraton to British-Indian troops on 
20 June 1812 ‘the beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java’ prophesied to 
Dipanagara at Parangkusuma in circa 1805 would reach its fruition. This would 
see the effective evisceration of the military and political power of the south-
central Javanese courts through the imposition of a series of treaties and land 
annexations which would make it impossible for the rulers ever again to chal-
lenge the power of the European government. Although they retained some 
residual capacity to mount resistance through their patron-client networks, 
which were part of the traditional Javanese apanage system, by the time of 
the Java War (1825-1830) the limits of these kraton-based power arrangements 
would be all too evident. Dipanagara’s struggle would thus have to draw on 
a much broader social and political base and would use the mobilising force 
of Javanese-Islam and Javanese national identity in ways unimaginable to his 
royal-born and noble predecessors, men such as Sultan Mangkubumi, Radèn 
Mas Said (Mangkunagara I) and Radèn Rongga. This process of evisceration 
will be the subject of this chapter. It would complete the Parangkusuma proph-
ecy and would bring to Java’s shores a new and far better resourced enemy 
than the threadbare Franco-Dutch administration of Marshal Daendels and 
his luckless successor, Lieutenant-General Jan Willem Janssens. The Javanese 
elite would now experience the full force of Britain at its imperial zenith, what 
historian C.A. Bayly has termed the island nation’s ‘imperial meridian’ (1780-
1830; Bayly 1989). They would also find that they had exchanged one form 
of colonial tyranny for another, no longer a Napoleonic Marshal this time 
but a ‘virtual Napoleonic philosopher’ and instinctive authoritarian, Thomas 
Stamford Raffles, a man ‘who had a strong distrust of the [native] chiefs and a 
desire to rule autocratically’ (Bastin 1957:xx, quoting C.Th. Elout). 
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The reckoning
Even before Rongga’s death, Daendels had decided on a radical alteration 
to Yogya’s governance. Following his arrival in Semarang on 10 December, 
he had summoned Pieter Engelhard and Willem Nicolaas Servatius, acting 
Resident of Surakarta, to a meeting to hear what he had in mind. The patih of 
both courts were also bidden to Semarang. In Danureja II’s case, he was spe-
cifically informed that he should not come as a representative of the sultan but 
rather in his capacity as an appointee of the European government. He was 
also ordered to send his large ceremonial retinue back from Ungaran and pro-
ceed on to Semarang with only the smallest personal escort.1 When the con-
ference eventually took place,2 the two chief ministers were informed that the 
marshal had resolved to force the sultan to resign his throne in favour of the 
Crown Prince who would henceforth rule as Prince Regent.3 On 26 December, 
Daendels marched on Yogya with a force of 3,200 men. He had already travelled 
as far as the old Mataram tollgate at Kemlaka between Tempèl and Pisangan 
on the main Yogya-Magelang highway4 when news reached him of Rongga’s 
death. Although there was now no necessity to continue on with such a large 
military force to Yogya, especially given the sultan’s cooperation in the period 
leading up to the killing of the rebellious bupati wedana, the marshal persisted 
in order to provide substantial prize money for his officers and men from the 
sultan’s treasury at a time when his army was haemorrhaging at the rate of 70 
desertions a day because of lack of pay.5 Some of the prize hand-outs were sub-
stantial: Daendels’ deputy, Van Braam, for example, received 10,000 Spanish 
dollars ’to indemnify him for the third visit he had made at his own expense 
to Yogya’,6 while Pieter Engelhard and the former Resident, Inspector-General 
of Forests Gustaf Wilhelm Wiese, both of whom were tasked along with Van 
Braam with drawing up the new boundary demarcation between the pasisir 
and the Principalities, were allocated some 5,000 Spanish dollars each. The 
1 Dj.Br. 39, H.W. Gezelschap (Yogyakarta) to Kyai Tumenggung Sindunagara (Yogyakarta), 22 




Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 27-12-1810, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Dae-
ndels (Yogyakarta), 1 Besar AJ 1737 (AD 28-12-1810).
4	 Daendels	1814:Bijlage	2,	additionele	stukken	17.	On	the	location	of	Kemlaka,	see	S.Br.	170,	
map of old Mataram tollgates; Carey 1984:44; Map 1; and Map 1 in this volume.
5 Bataviasche Koloniale Courant	 6,	 8-2-1811;	Daendels	1814:Bijlage	2,	 additionele	 stukken	24,	
gives the breakdown of the distribution of the 196,320 Spanish dollars; Louw and De Klerck 1894-
1909, I:33, reference to desertions amongst Indonesian – especially Javanese – troops on Daendels’ 
Yogya expedition. See also Chapter VI.
6 Bataviasche Koloniale Courant 6, 8-2-1811. Van Braam had come to Yogya twice on commis-
sion in circa July 1810 (Chapter VI note 87) and 10-13 November 1810 (pp. 236-9), so this late 
December visit with Daendels was his third in under six months.
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senior officer commanding the force, Brigadier-General Hendrik Merkus de 
Kock, whom we shall meet again below as supremo of Dutch military forces 
during the Java War,7 received a similar sum (Bataviasche Koloniale Courant 6, 
8-2-1811). These were not quite as lavish as the moneys distributed by the British 
prize agents following the storming of the Yogya kraton on 20 June 1812, when 
the British commander, Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie, walked away with 
£15,000 (74,000 Spanish dollars/165,000 guilders; Carey 1980:12 note 4), but 
they were still substantial. They constituted the first step in the bankrupting 
of the sultanate and the impoverishment of its elite, both of which would be 
evident to the eye of former VOC officials who had known Yogya in its heyday 
when they travelled to the Principalities in the period after the Dutch restora-
tion in August 1816.8 
Daendels arrived in Yogya on 28 December and went straight to the 
Residency House, summoning the sultan to meet him there without paying 
the customary courtesy visit to the kraton first. Although, he had already 
warned the Yogya ruler that he would be coming ‘in the strictest incognito’ 
and that he would be dispensing with all ceremonial,9 such a gross breach 
of etiquette appears to have evinced bitter feelings at court. Dipanagara 
described in his babad how preparations were made for military resistance 
and we know from another source that the ever bellicose Sumadiningrat was 
urging the sultan on towards a more aggressive response.10 But, according to 
Dipanagara, the sultan was too conflicted to act even though his close family 
and bodyguard were prepared for war.11 The most the Yogya ruler was pre-
pared to do was to write to Daendels while the governor-general was still at 
Kemlaka to express his disquiet at the prospect of such a large troop presence 
in his capital. To which the marshal replied that his ‘small’ force was only 
being brought for the ruler’s own protection and that if he had intended hos-
tile operations against Yogya he would have mobilised a much larger army 
of 15-20,000 men.12 Moreover, the force would leave, Daendels assured the 
7 Chapter XI.
8	 Baud	306,	Van	IJsseldijk,	‘Rapport’,	11-12-1816,	commented	on	the	‘greater	poverty’	of	Yogya	
which, when compared to Surakarta, was ‘everywhere visible’ amongst the kraton elite. See further 
Van Deventer 1891:97-8, on the poor quality silver and Chinese clay plates which had replaced the 
gold	platters	and	beakers	in	use	for	Yogya	kraton receptions before 1812. On the sale of jewelry and 
gold ornaments from the court during the fourth sultan’s reign, see Chapter X note 135.
9	 Daendels	 1814:Bijlage	 2,	 additionele	 stukken	 19,	 letter	 of	 H.W.	 Daendels	 (Semarang)	 to	
Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 23-12-1810.
10 BD (Manado) II:135, XV.10; Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 59 (on Sumadiningrat’s bellicose 
advice).
11 BD (Manado) II:135, XV (Asmaradana) 10. Sampun karsaning Hyang Widi/ Jeng Sultan èwed 
karsanya.
12	 Daendels	1814:Bijlage	2,	additionele	stukken	16-7	(the	date	of	Hamengkubuwana	II’s	letter	
is wrongly given as 10 Dulkangidah in the printed version); Dj.Br. 46, Hamengkubuwana II 
(Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Kemlaka), 30 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 26-12-1810), H.W. Daen-
dels (Kemlaka) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 1 Besar AJ 1737 (AD 27-12-1810).
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sultan, once all the political changes had been agreed and completed.
According to the Yogya babad, this potentially dangerous situation was 
only resolved by the careful diplomacy of Danureja II, an unlikely tale given 
the lack of respect the patih commanded at court and his poor record as a 
negotiator.13 In fact, the sultan refused to go in person to the Residency House 
to confer with Daendels, sending his son, the Crown Prince, as his representa-
tive. There, in the presence of Daendels, Van Braam, Wiese and Engelhard, the 
new political arrangements were agreed. On 31 December, the sultan finally 
acquiesced to the governor-general’s demands and signed a proclamation giv-
ing up the administration of Yogyakarta to the Crown Prince, who was to rule 
as Prince Regent bearing his previous title of Raja Putra Naréndra Pangéran 
Adipati Anom Amangkunagara.14 Superficially, it seemed that Daendels had 
effected a political revolution in Yogya, and he immediately boasted that this 
was the case in a dispatch to the Council of the Indies in Batavia.15 In fact, 
nothing had changed. True, the exile of Pangéran Natakusuma and his son 
had served to strengthen the party of the Crown Prince and Danureja II. But 
the Javanese accounts make it quite clear that the Crown Prince was acting 
with the sultan’s permission when he accepted the position of Prince Regent.16 
Thus, although he now had control of the sultan’s seal, presided over the 
council of state with the senior court bupati in the kadipatèn, and sat on the sul-
tan’s right side at the Garebeg ceremonies,17 the centre of influence remained 
with the old sultan who retained control of finances and apanage lands.18 He 
was also allowed to stay on in the kraton. This was a concession accorded by 
Daendels at the express request of the Crown Prince19 and was tantamount to 
13 B.Ng. I:208-9, LII.30-LIII.6.
14	 Daendels	1814:Bijlage	2,	additionele	stukken	20	and	21;	De	Jonge	and	Van	Deventer	1884-88,	
XIII:cxvi (gives partial text of Hamengkubuwana II’s proclamation); the original copy is in Dj.Br. 
42	pt.	2,	‘Kopij	boek	van	contracten	Djokjo,	1755-1812’	(henceforth:	‘Kopij	boek	contracten’),	101.	
See	also	KITLV	H	696c	‘Archiefstukken	(Vorstenlandse)’,	ed.	G.P.	Rouffaer,	no.	82.
15 Daendels	 1814:	Bijlage	 2,	 additionele	 stukken	 4,	H.W.	Daendels	 (Surakarta)	 to	Raad	van	
Indië (Batavia), 7-1-1811.
16 B.Ng. I:209, LIII.18; BD (Manado), II:136, XV.14.
17	 Daendels	 1814:	 Bijlage	 2,	 additionele	 stukken	 22;	Dj.Br.	 46,	H.W.	Daendels	 (Yogyakarta)	
to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 7 Besar AJ 1737 (2-1-1811); Dj.Br. 37, Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 17-1-1811. The original copy of the agreement 
between	the	European	government	and	the	Prince	Regent	can	be	found	in	Dj.Br.	42	pt.	2,	‘Kopij	
boek contracten’, 96-100, ‘Contract tusschen het Hollandsche Gouvernement […] en den Regent 
van	het	rijk	van	Djokjokarta	den	Pangerang	Adipatti	Anom	Amangkoe	Nagoro’,	10-1-1811.
18	 IOL	Eur	F148/18	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	18),	Pieter	Engelhard	(Yogyakarta)	to	Cap-
tain William Robison (Yogyakarta), 27-9-1811, where Engelhard is quoted as saying that: ‘the 
[old]	sultan	retains	a	very	great	influence	in	the	administration	and	extorts	from	his	son	the	most	
considerable part of the revenues. I am even informed that out of the last half yearly revenues, the 
latter	had	only	been	allowed	an	amount	of	10,000	rix	dollars	[Spanish	dollars]’.
19	 Daendels	1814:Bijlage	2,	additionele	stukken	22;	Poensen	1905:234;	Dj.Br.	46,	H.W.	Daendels	
(Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 7 Besar AJ 1737 (AD 2-1-1811).
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permitting affairs to continue as before given that the heir apparent did not 
have the character to gainsay his father on any matters of political importance. 
The old sultan’s favourite consort, Ratu Kencana Wulan, whom Daendels had 
considered marrying off to ‘some distant désa head’ and who was now heavily 
pregnant with her third child (a girl, born 29 January 1811), was also permit-
ted to remain in the keputrèn (women’s apartments in the kraton).20 In fact, the 
measures imposed by Daendels changed little of substance politically. Instead, 
they added hugely to the public humiliation of the sultan. So why did he 
agree to them? Perhaps the old ruler felt it was necessary to bend before the 
wind. The presence of 3,200 troops in Yogya must have given him pause. But 
it was clear that once the opportunity presented itself, such as the disordered 
period which followed the collapse of the Franco-Dutch government in late 
September 1811, he would move to take back the trappings of office and seek 
revenge against all those who had helped the Crown Prince. 
The treaties imposed by Daendels on the courts provided for the annexa-
tion of areas bordering on the government districts on the north coast.21 Some 
of these contained important grave-sites regularly visited by court-sponsored 
pilgrimages.22 One such area was Séla (also known as Seséla), where both the 
courts maintained tax-free benefices set aside for religious officials. Known 
as abdi-Dalem pamutihan magersari, these officials tended the gravesite of Ki 
Ageng Seséla, the Promethean figure in Javanese mythology who had bound 
the lightning, and who was also revered as the grandfather of the founder of 
Mataram, Kyai Ageng Pamenahan (Rouffaer 1905:598; Carey 1980:137; Carey 
and Hoadley 2000:86, 382). Despite its curious blend of veneration and world-
liness – Séla was also renowned as a haunt of gamblers – the prospective loss 
of this district caused much bitterness at the courts and numerous demands 
20	 Dj.Br.	9A,	Valck,	‘Overzigt’,	74	(on	Daendels’	idea	of	getting	Ratu	Kencana	Wulan	married	
off	to	a	‘distant	désa	head’);	Daendels	1814:Bijlage	2,	additionele	stukken	19,	H.W.	Daendels	(Sema-
rang) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 23-12-1810, warning Hamengkubuwana II about the 
danger if Ratu Kencana Wulan gave birth to a son; Dj.Br. 37, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to 
W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 30-1-1811 (referring to Ratu Kencana Wulan giving birth at midday 
on 4 Sura AJ 1738). This third daughter of Ratu Kencana Wulan, the future Ratu Sasi, married 
Radèn	Adipati	Danureja	IV	(post-1847,	Pangéran	Kusumayuda;	in	office	as	patih 1813-1847), Man-
doyokusumo 1977:26 no. 75. See also Chapter VI note 98.
21	 The	text	of	the	treaties	is	given	in	Daendels	1814:Bijlage	2,	additionele	stukken	27	(treaty	
with Surakarta, 6-1-1811), 28 (treaty with Yogyakarta, 10-1-1811); Dj.Br. 27, contains a map of 
the European government’s acquisitions under these January 1811 treaties. These included Japan 
(Majakerta), Wirasaba, Bauwerna, Dhuri, Rajegwesi (Jipang), Padhangan, Sekaran, Panolan, 
Wirasari, Blora, Séla, Warung, Grobogan, Sérang, Sima, Gagatan, and the Kedhu enclave on 
the north coast bounded by Kendhal, Batang and Pekalongan. This last district – also known as 
Jabarangkah (literally ‘the area outside the [old Mataram] tollgate’) – was annexed to permit a 
more direct route for Daendels’ post-road (postweg) between Batang and Kendhal through the 
teak	forests	of	Subah-Weleri	rather	than	along	the	less	direct	coast	route,	see	Rouffaer	1905:592;	
Nagtegaal 1996:169-70.
22 Chapter IV note 18.
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were made by the rulers, including the newly installed Prince Regent, for 
it to be left out of the land acquisitions. Even when it was eventually taken 
over following the British annexations in August 1812, these requests and 
complaints about the alienation of the ‘graves of the ancestors’ remained 
so persistent that those parts of the district deemed tanah pusaka (‘heirloom’ 
land) were eventually given back to the courts in the post-Java War territorial 
settlement of 1830-1831.23 
Another point of dispute involved the strandgeld payments, or ‘rent’ for 
the north coast districts originally part of the Mataram patrimony (Chapter 
V). These had been fixed at 20,000 Spanish dollars by the 1746 treaty between 
Pakubuwana II (reigned 1727-1749) and the VOC (Veth 1896-1907, II:163), 
half of which was paid to Yogyakarta following the 1755 Giyanti settlement 
(Soekanto 1952:185; Ricklefs 1974a:62). Under the terms of Daendels’ January 
1811 treaties, these payments were now ended. This meant that both the 
Sunan and the sultan lost valuable revenue besides being denied nominal 
sovereignty over the pasisir with its many important ancestral tombs and 
pilgrimage sites (Chapter IV note 18). The abolition of the strandgeld removed 
one of the main incentives for the south-central Javanese courts’ toleration 
of a European presence in Java and strengthened the resolve of its rulers to 
regain control of the north coast areas as we will see shortly in this chapter. 
In order to soften the blow of this loss of land and revenue, Daendels made 
some territorial concessions to the courts by ceding to Yogya some Dutch-
controlled lands around Boyolali in the east and the areas of Galuh and 
Cauwer Wétan in the west on the borders of Banyumas. At the same time, 
Surakarta was to receive the districts of Malang and Antang which had earlier 
been considered as lying within the territory claimed by the VOC (Daendels 
1814: Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 27 art. 6; Ricklefs 1974a:106-7; Chapter V 
note 11). Daendels also agreed to pay the debts of the Sunan to private indi-
viduals amounting to the sum of 96,875 silver reals.24 
23 Dj.Br. 27, Hendrik Veeckens (Batavia) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 15-7-1811, on the 
Prince Regent’s complaints. On the demands for the return of the gravesites at the end of the 
Java War, see NA MvK 4220 Exh. 20-9-1830 56k geheim; Dj.Br. 17, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven 
(Surakarta) to Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 8-11-1831 no. 102; Houben 
1994:65. For references to court pilgrimages to Séla, see Musium Nasional (Jakarta), MS 933 DJ, ‘Ir 
J. Moens Platen Album’ no. 8 (ngintun leluhur-Dalem dhateng Seséla). On Séla’s subsequent history, 
see	Rouffaer	1905:598-9.
24	 Daendels	1814:Bijlage	2,	additionele	stukken	27	art.	3;	IOL	Eur	F148/18	(Raffles-Minto	col-
lection vol. 18), Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 9-7-1811 
(listing Pakubuwana IV’s debts as 25,000 Spanish dollars to Mr Blanck at 250 per month interest, 
50,000 to Mr Samuel also at 250 per month interest and 21,000 to the widow of Mr Michaelis at 
210 per month interest), J.A. van Braam, ‘Memorial of existing relations between Souracarta and 
the former [Franco-Dutch] government’, 24-9-1811; UBL BPL 616, Port. 4 pt. 12, J.A. van Braam 
(Semarang)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Surabaya),	13-12-1811.
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The new land settlement had the effect of making Yogya a more westerly 
based power and Surakarta a more easterly one by adding territory to their 
western and eastern mancanagara territories respectively. But, as far as Yogya 
was concerned, the concessions were not valued. Galuh and Cauwer Wétan 
were notorious as hideouts of robbers and bandits and the Prince Regent had 
no wish to accept responsibility for them.25 At the same time, the old sultan 
was aggrieved at the annexation of Jipang and Japan (Majakerta), the latter 
district being the birthplace of the mother of Ratu Kencana Wulan and an 
area where many of her family still lived.26 The treaties also seemed to bear 
more heavily on Yogya, which had to cede 1,600 cacah as opposed to the 1,500 
cacah relinquished by Surakarta. Since the measures for the final demarcation 
of the new boundaries had not been finalised before the fall of the Franco-
Dutch government in mid-September 1811, however, this difference would in 
the end prove somewhat academic.27 
Although these eastern mancanagara territories were not ceded, major 
changes were introduced into the administration of Radèn Rongga’s old 
fiefdom in Madiun. In January 1811, the office of bupati wedana was divided 
between two new appointees who would henceforth share responsibility as 
acting bupati wedana (Carey and Hoadley 2000:67-8, 232-6, 244-50). These were 
Pangéran Dipakusuma, who had distinguished himself in the November-
December 1810 campaign and who was married to a daughter of the second 
Radèn Rongga (Radèn Rongga Mangundirja, in office 1784-1790, 1794-1796), 
and Radèn Rongga Prawirasentika, an uncle of Radèn Rongga, who was noto-
rious for his stingy and money-grubbing administration (Carey 1980:189). 
They were to remain in office until the majority of Rongga’s son who would 
govern as sole bupati wedana from 1826 to 1830 under the name of Pangéran 
Rongga Prawiradiningrat and from 1830 to 1859 under the more elevated title 
of Pangéran Adipati Prawiradiningrat (Appendix Vb). At the same time, in 
order to reduce the previous concentration of power on Maospati/Madiun, 
25 Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 29-7-1811; IOL Eur 
F148/42,	 (Raffles-Minto	 collection	 vol.	 42),	 ‘Report	 on	 the	 state	 of	 Java	 by	Messrs	 [J.]	 Knops	
and [P.H. van Lawick] van Pabst’, Semarang, 29-6-1812, described the situation in Galuh thus: 
‘through the invasion of pirates and heavy servitude imposed on the inhabitants, many of them 
have	left	the	country	for	that	of	the	princes	[namely,	the	Sunan	and	sultan]’.	A	similar	situation	
was	noted	by	Captain	Godfrey	Phipps	Baker	 in	1815,	Baker,	 ‘Memoir’,	 104-7.	The	first	Dutch	
Resident	of	Banyumas	after	the	Java	War,	J.E.	de	Sturler	(in	office	1830-1835),	wrote	of	Dayeuh	
Luhur	as	a	‘very	poor	district’	whose	34,396	population	‘had	little	visible	means	of	subsistence’	
and only paid 85 cents per head annual pajak (tax), AN, Kabinet 13-9-1832 no. 1599, J.E. de Sturler 
(Banyumas) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 5-9-1832.
26 Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 29-7-1811, stating that the 
birthplace of Ratu Kencana Wulan’s mother was in Japan (Majakerta), and various family graves 
were there. See also Poensen 1905:187; Hageman 1856, V:258.
27 Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 29-7-1811; UBL BPL 616, 
Port.	4	pt.	12,	J.A.	van	Braam	(Semarang)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Surabaya),	13-12-1811.
The power of prophecy268
the number of kabupatèn in the Madiun area was greatly increased.28 New 
appointments were also made to those districts (Sekaran, Kertasana) where 
the incumbent bupati had been deemed to act in a disloyal or ineffective fash-
ion at the approach of Rongga’s troops (Carey 1980:41-4; Carey and Hoadley 
2000:64-74, 232-72). 
One of those dismissed at this time for his less than effective leadership 
during Rongga’s revolt was the commander of the Yogya expeditionary force, 
Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura. His closeness to the sultan had afforded 
him some initial protection, but following the Crown Prince’s elevation as 
Prince Regent he had been exiled to the woods of Sélamanik near Wanasaba 
where, according to the report of a Surakarta spy, he was to be murdered.29 
But the tenacity of Purwadipura’s wife, the youngest daughter of the first 
sultan, apparently saved his life: according to a Javanese account she refused 
to let go of his belt until she had received explicit assurances from the Prince 
Regent’s uncle, Pangéran Panular, that he would not be murdered (Carey 
1992:116, 284, 441 notes 207-9). There was also talk of his family being sent to 
Pacitan where the local bupati was his ‘mortal enemy’ according to Danureja, 
but even this appears to have been averted.30 After a mere seven months of 
banishment (February-September 1811), Purwadipura was allowed back to 
Yogya when the old sultan seized back power from his son in late September 
and reinstated many of his former officials (Carey 1992:441 note 209).
Meanwhile, in Madiun, the new bupati wedana were ordered to obliterate 
the last vestiges of Radèn Rongga’s royal pretensions. Even while Rongga 
was still being hunted down, the sultan had sent instructions that his son-in-
law’s kraton should be broken up and his recently deceased wife’s gravesite 
at Gunung Bancak, which had been restyled as Giripurna and smacked too 
much of a Madiun version of Imagiri (also known as Girilaya),31 should revert 
to its original name.32 Under explicit instructions from Yogya, Dipakusuma 
also moved the seat of the bupati wedana back from Rongga’s ruined residence 
28 Dj.Br. 6, P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillavry (Surakarta), 
1-2-1826, who listed seven new kabupatèn in Madiun, including Kutaarja (Panggungan), Tunggul-
Wanakerta, Maospati, Purwadadi, Banget, Kenitèn, and Nguning; three each in Rawa (Tulung 
Agung) and Magetan, and two in Goranggarèng. See further Onghokham 1975:62; Chapter VIII 
note 89.
29	 S.Br.	46,	Anonymous	Javanese	letter	(reports	by	spies	about	Yogya),	9	Sura	AJ	1738	(AD	20-
2-1811). Sélamanik appears to have been part of the royal domain lands (bumi pamajegan-Dalem), 
areas which delivered products exclusively for the ruler’s household, in this case presumably 
high-quality wood, see Kollmann 1864:361.
30 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 21-6-1811 (on Prince 
Regent’s consideration of possible exile of family of Purwadipura to Pacitan).
31 S.Br. 37, p. 1091, Radèn Adipati Sasradiningrat II (Surakarta) to Kyai Adipati Danureja III 
(Yogyakarta), 12-1-1813 (on burning down of mosque at Girilaya (Imagiri) on 25 Besar AJ 1739).
32 Dj.Br. 46, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura (Maospati/Madiun), 
15 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 12-12-1810).
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at Maospati to Madiun where the old dalem of the second Radèn Rongga at 
Wanasari was restored.33 Curiously, amidst all this administrative activity and 
reform in the eastern mancanagara, Daendels’ proposed annexations under 
the terms of his January 1811 treaty were effectively ignored. Many of the 
new appointments made in the January-June 1811 period were to districts 
like Panolan, Padhangan and Sekaran which were slated for hand-over to the 
European government.34 In order to regularise this situation, Danureja II wrote 
to Engelhard at the start of the month of Mulud (25 March-23 April 1811) to ask 
that the mancanagara bupati be still allowed to come to Yogya to pay their usual 
respects to the Prince Regent and the old sultan when the next Garebeg Mulud 
was celebrated on 20 April and that they should continue to do so until such 
time as the new boundaries had been worked out. He likewise suggested that 
the tax-farmers of those western districts ceded to Yogya – namely, Galuh and 
Cauwer wétan – should continue to pay their revenues to the European gov-
ernment as before.35 Danureja’s proposals were accepted. In fact, on 30 April 
Engelhard wrote to the Prince Regent informing him that, given the imminent 
British invasion (based on firm intelligence about their naval and troop build 
up in Pulau Pinang and Melaka), all further work on the new border demarca-
tion would be suspended until after they had been fought off.36
What could not be ignored, however, was the very large indemnity 
demanded by Daendels and which he insisted was paid before he withdrew 
his troops from the sultan’s capital. This was eventually sent in silver coin from 
the kraton treasury to the fort on 4 January in 66 large chests to be counted. But 
the Dutch military auditors – perhaps at the marshal’s instigation – made prob-
lems about the type of specie in which the indemnity had been paid, demand-
ing an additional sum calculated down to the last quarter dollar to cover the 
difference.37 The Prince Regent agreed to this, but warned that ‘the wantonness 
33 UBL BPL 616, Port. 22 pt. 4, Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Montjonegorosche-Djokjokartasche 
landen’, n.y. (1826). See also Adam 1940:336.
34 Carey and Hoadley 2000:64-74; Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta), 1 Mulud AJ 1738 (AD 25-3-1811), relating that the Prince Regent had ordered Radèn 
Tumenggung Yudakusuma of Grobogan-Wirasari to return to his kabupatèn ‘to place himself at 
the disposal of the Dutch’.
35 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 1 Mulud AJ 1738 
(AD 25-3-1811). The border demarcation was being undertaken from the Yogya side by a joint 
survey team led by the former Yogya Resident, Gustaf Wilhelm Wiese, and the Yogya bupati, Mas 
Tumenggung	Sindunagara	(later	Kyai	Adipati	Danureja	III,	in	office	1811-1813).
36 Dj.Br. 41, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta), 5 Rabingula-
kir AJ 1738 (AD 30-4-1811), Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 
9 Rabingulakir AJ 1738 (AD 4-5-1811).
37 Since the 196,320 Spanish dollar sum was paid in silver half ducatoons (worth f 1.60) and 
Java rupees (rupiyah) worth f 1.20, rather than whole silver ronde maaten (Spanish dollars), it was 
found to be 2,977 and a quarter Spanish dollars short and Daendels insisted that this money 
should be paid before he removed his army from Yogya, Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) 
to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 11 Besar AJ 1737 (AD 7-1-1811); Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to 
Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 13 Besar AJ 1737 (AD 9-1-1811).
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and lawlessness’ of Daendels’ forces necessitated their immediate withdrawal 
from Yogya because any longer stay ‘would cause extreme unpleasantness 
with the local inhabitants’.38 Danureja II, who had direct responsibility for the 
safe delivery of the indemnity, was later accused of embezzling some 20,000 
ronde realen of the moneys taken to the fort, a charge which further intensified 
the sultan’s bitter hatred of him and contributed to his later murder.39 
Daendels’ visit to Yogya thus left the sultan with a triple humiliation: a dis-
astrous treaty, the loss of a fifth of his state treasure and an almost impossible 
situation at court. The sultan’s jealousy was further aroused when Daendels 
sent the Prince Regent a letter from King Louis (Lodewijk I) of Holland 
congratulating him on his new appointment and an order, referred to in 
Dipanagara’s babad as a bintang (star), which was almost certainly the Orde 
van de Unie (Order of the Union), which had been created as a new Dutch 
nobility by King Louis on 14 February 1807. This was set in an eight-pointed 
gold star studded with diamonds.40 A similar honour seems to have been 
sent to Sunan Pakubuwana IV at the same time.41 According to Dipanagara, 
another of the reasons why the patih was put to death on the Yogya ruler’s 
orders in October 1811 was because Danureja II had persuaded the Prince 
Regent to wear this order in public at the celebrations for Napoleon’s birthday 
on 15 August despite the old sultan’s intense jealousy.42
38 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 13 Besar AJ 1737 (AD 
9-1-1811).
39 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:37; Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Jans-
sens (Batavia), 28-6-1811.
40 According to Van Braam, this order (ridderorde) was delivered to Pakubuwana IV and the 
Prince	Regent	sometime	in	May,	presumably	along	with	King	Louis’	letter,	S.Br.	25,	J.A.	van	Braam	
(Surakarta) to Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta), 8-5-1811. Dipanagara mentioned that the star was as 
big as Daendels’ own but did not have any diamonds (18. Jéndral mantuk mring Batawi/ datan lami 
kintun bintang/ dhumateng jeng rama mangko/ pan sinami agengira/ lan bintangé priyangga/ pan Jéndral 
Dandles puniku/ namung kantun mawi séla), BD (Manado) II:136-7, XV.18-9. This suggests that the 
Prince Regent’s was also the Grand Cross (grand croix or grootkruis) which went to men of minis-
terial rank or Raad van Staat as well as top foreign ministers, princes of the empire and allies like 
the Prince Regent, personal communication Professor Simon Schama, 22-3-1976. Despite Dipana-
gara’s testimony, it was in fact set in diamonds, see Groneman 1895:23, who describes the eight-
pointed star sent by Daendels which was worn by Hamengkubuwana VII (reigned 1877-1921) at 
Garebeg celebrations; and Plate 54 (p. 460) on the 1938 depiction of Hamengkubuwana IV with 
the	star	in	his	official	portrait.
41 Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:654, S.Br. 25, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to Pakubuwana IV 
(Surakarta), 8-5-1811, on the bintang kadhaton, the gold star set with jewels sent by Daendels to 
Pakubuwana IV.
42 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 27, Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 29-
7-1811 (referring to Hamengkubuwana II’s jealousy over this order); Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 16-8-1811, referring to the Prince Regent wearing a ‘bril-
liant star’ to a Residency party to celebrate Napoleon’s birthday (15-8-1811).
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Incipient civil war in Yogya
Reports of spies in the pay of Engelhard and Sunan Pakubuwana IV give a 
deeply troubled picture of the sultanate in the months leading up to the British 
invasion on 4 August 1811. Already on 17 January, just over two weeks after 
his appointment as Prince Regent, Engelhard was writing to the former Crown 
Prince to ask why he had never appeared outside the kadipatèn for the usual 
Saturday tournaments on the southern alun-alun. He pointed out that as the 
new de facto ruler he should be presiding over them while his father, the old 
sultan, should only come ‘as a spectator’: ‘Your subjects will begin to wonder 
whether you are really the ruler of Yogya if you do not attend these Saturday 
[tournaments]’, the Resident counselled, ‘You should not be so afraid of your 
father!’43 Wonder they might. If Engelhard had been reading his spies’ reports 
properly he would have known better than to urge such a foolhardy step on 
his government’s protégé, who sensibly only attended one such Saturday tour-
nament in the whole of the first six months of his regency.44 
In February, these reports were speaking of ‘impending civil war’ in Yogya. 
An unbridgeable chasm had seemingly opened up between the followers of 
the Prince Regent and the old sultan. On the one side were Danureja II and 
his family, who were always in the kadipatèn. On the other were the former 
ruler’s favourite son, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat, his elder brother Pangéran 
Ngabèhi and his quirky younger brother, the santri prince Pangéran Muhamad 
Abubakar (Dipawijaya I), who had special responsibilities for mobilising the 
Yogya officials in receipt of tax-free benefices45 in support of the former mon-
arch. According to the reports, these three were ‘day and night’ in the kraton.46 
Many were the prakara (issues) between the old ruler and his son, but none 
were ever cleared up with the result that the Yogya princes were in confusion 
not knowing which way to turn.47 According to a Dutch source, the enmity 
43 Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta), 21 Besar AJ 
1737 (AD 17-1-1811).
44 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 28 Sapar AJ 1738 (AD 
22-3-1811) (on the ‘party’ on the southern alun-alun at the time of a Monday tournament (Senenan) 
when Hamengkubuwana II and Raja Putra Naréndra had ridden out together, something which 
had never happened before in ‘old adat’); Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II 
(Yogyakarta), 9 Rabingulakir AJ 1738 (AD 2-5-1811), Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Raja Putra 
Naréndra	(Yogyakarta),	20-6-1811,	complaint	that	Prince	Regent	had	only	attended	one	Saturday	
tournament or Setonan since January. 
45 Referred to in the secret report as priyayi pradikan or pethakan, literally the ‘white ones’, 
namely those who had adopted the white garb of the santri,	Dj.Br.	46,	Anonymous	Javanese	letter	
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between the party of the ‘old sultan’ (kasepuhan) and the Prince Regent (kara-
jan) really dates from this time.48
One of these issues concerned the distribution of the goods and chat-
tels of the dead Radèn Rongga, and the three exiled members of the court: 
Pangéran Natakusuma, his son Natadiningrat, and the recently dismissed 
Purwadipura.49 The old sultan wanted their belongings (and presumably 
apanage holdings) distributed amongst his children, but the Prince Regent 
did not wish it.50 Both sides apparently refused to make concessions. At the 
same time, they started recruiting new soldiers (prajurit)51 and acquiring new 
weaponry. The former ruler was reported by Danureja to have placed an 
order for cannon to defend the walls of the kraton against attack and his ever 
loyal supporter, Sumadiningrat, was rumoured to be purchasing horses and 
muskets on his sovereign’s behalf to equip his new cavalry squadrons.52 The 
old monarch was now exercising these recently raised cavalry and infantry 
formations on the southern alun-alun every Wednesday. On Mondays and 
Thursdays, if these same confidential reports can be trusted, he was engaged 
in an altogether more sinister activity, namely attending special prayer meet-
ings and religious meals (sedhekah) in the house of Tuwan Haji Muhammad 
Idris, the senior Yogya court ‘priest’ and 40 other returned Mecca pilgrims, 
where prayers were supposedly being said for the ‘taking from this world of 
those of the sultan’s children who had proven themselves disobedient’, an 
48	 Dj.Br.	18,	F.G.	Valck,	‘Geheime	Memorie	behoorende	bij		het	Algemeen	Verslag	der	Residen-
tie Djocjocarta over het jaar 1839’, 31-3-1840. See also Chapter V note 121.
49 Purwadipura’s apanage lands (sabin ingkang ampas saking Purwadipuran) were also retrenched 
and	redistributed	at	this	time,	in	part	to	Yogya	officials	like	Radèn	Tumenggung	Sumadiwirya,	
who had distinguished themselves in the campaign against Radèn Rongga, see Carey and Hoad-
ley 2000:144-5, 155-7, 182-3, 187-8, 189-90; Chapter VI note 218.
50	 Dj.Br.	46,	Anonymous	Javanese	 letter	 (reports	of	spies	about	Yogya),	9	Sura	AJ	1738	(AD	
20-2-1811). See further B.Ng. I:229-30, LVIII.12-15; Poensen 1905:276-7; Carey 1992:210, 219, on 
the revenge plundering of Pangéran Adikusuma’s dalem by Pakualam forces at the time of the 
storming of the Yogya kraton by the British on 20 June 1812 because of his role in robbing Nataku-
suma/Pakualam I’s residence in January 1811.
51	 Dj.Br.	46,	Anonymous	Javanese	 letter	 (reports	of	spies	about	Yogya),	9	Sura	AJ	1738	(AD	
20-2-1811), which gives the following new troop numbers enrolled: Hamengkubuwana II (600), 
Mangkudiningrat (500), Prince Regent (400), Danureja II (200), Sumadiningrat (100). The two 
brothers	of	Danureja	II,	Radèn	Tumenggung	Mertawijaya	(post-June	1812,	Danukusuma	II)	and	
Radèn Tumenggung Mertadiwirya, were appointed as the Prince Regent’s troop commanders, 
see further Carey 1992:342, 489 note 424. Hamengkubuwana II was said to have recruited his new 
prajurit in part from amongst his cousins, grandsons and panakawan (intimate personal retainers) 
who	had	no	ricefields	(sawah) or apanage lands of their own, Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) 
to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 12 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 6-2-1811).
52 Carey 190:20; Carey and Hoadley 2000:Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta), 12 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 6-2-1811). Engelhard recommended that Hamengkubuwana II’s 
order	for	ordnance	be	allowed	but	the	cannon	be	handed	over	to	the	Prince	Regent	after	they	had	
been cast, presumably in the royal gun foundries at Taman Sari and Kutha Gedhé, and in the Chi-
nese and Arab-run foundries in Gresik, see Thorn 1815:185, Plate XIX no. S; Chapter VI note 53.
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obvious reference to the Prince Regent and those royal family members who 
were supporting him.53 The old sultan’s assiduity in attending Friday services 
at the Mesjid Ageng or Great Mosque, something which he had only done 
extremely rarely during the previous nineteen years of his reign, was also 
remarked on by the Resident. It seemed to Engelhard that the ruler was up 
to some ‘plot’ with the court santri.54 At the same time, his decision to send a 
24-strong party of Yogya ‘priests’ on a court-sponsored pilgrimage to Mecca 
in early June, despite the obvious difficulties of the British naval blockade of 
Javanese ports, was seen as highly inappropriate by the Dutch authorities and 
the party were not allowed to proceed to Semarang.55
For his part, the Prince Regent tried to establish his own administration 
through the appointment of new court bupati,56 but he had no joy when he 
asked his father to provide them with the necessary ricefields (sawah) to 
maintain them in their new offices. The old sultan replied that he had no 
sawah to give them, but that there was plenty of land in Surakarta and in the 
Dutch-controlled districts of the north coast so his son should ask there for 
the necessary apanage holdings for his new officials!57 All seven of the Prince 
Regent’s bupati appointed at this time would later be stripped of their offices 
by the old sultan in May 1812 just before the British attack on the kraton. 
Indeed, there was even speculation in the British reports at the time that the 
Yogya ruler intended to put them to death.58
53	 Dj.Br.	46,	Anonymous	Javanese	letter	(reports	of	spies	on	the	situation	in	Yogya),	9	Sura	AJ	
1738 (AD 20-2-1811); S.Br. 37, Report of Yogya spy to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 
25 Sapar AJ 1738 (AD 19-3-1811). These reports were denied by Danureja II who gave out that 
the Kyai Pengulu of Yogya (head of the religious hierarchy), pradikan priests and santri in receipt 
of	tax-free	benefices,	as	well	as	court	haji, had the duty of praying for the long life of Hameng-
kubuwana II and the Prince Regent. For a reference to a certain Haji Muhammad Idris, who sup-
posedly brought ‘seditious communications’ from Mecca to the south-central Javanese courts in 
the 1770s and may have been a pupil of the famous Sumatran teacher in Mecca, ‘Abd al-Samad 
al-Palimbani, see Ricklefs 1974a:153-4; Drewes 1976:274. See further Chapter IX note 129.
54 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 28-6-1811; Dj.Br. 9A, 
Valck,	‘Overzigt’,	96.	On	Hamengkubuwana	II’s	greater	assiduity	in	attending	mosque	services	
during his 1826-1828 restoration to the Yogya throne at the height of the Java War, see Van den 
Broek 1875, 22:284.
55 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 10-6-1811, 28-6-1811. 
Chapter II note 71.
56 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 28 Sapar AJ 1738 (AD 
22-3-1811). The new court bupati were: Radèn Tumenggung Kusumareja, Raden Tumenggung 
Natayuda III, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiwirya (note 49; Chapter VI note 218), and Radèn 
Tumenggung	Wiriadipura,	while	the	unattached	bupati (bupati miji) were: Radèn Tumenggung 
Tirtadiwiria,	Radèn	Tumenggung	Mertawijaya	(later	Danukusuma	II)	and	Radèn	Tumenggung	
Mangkuwijaya.	Two	of	these	(Kusumareja	and	Mertawijaya)	were	brothers	of	Danureja	II,	while	
Tirtadiwiria was his uncle, see Appendix II.
57 Dj.Br. 41, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 28 Sapar AJ 1738 (AD 
25-3-1811), Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 28 Sapar AJ 1738 (AD 25-3-
1811).
58	 IOL	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection	vol.	24),	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raf-
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By June 1811, there were rumours that the second sultan was preparing 
to appoint his younger son Mangkudiningrat as his heir apparent in place of 
the Prince Regent who was considered to have forfeited his previous posi-
tion. According to Dipanagara, this move was urged on the former ruler 
by various princes and by two of his consorts: Ratu Kencana Wulan and 
Mangkudiningrat’s mother, Ratu Mas.59 Certain pusaka (heirlooms) belong-
ing to the kadipatèn were demanded back, presumably in preparation for 
his investiture.60 Mangkudiningrat, meanwhile, conducted himself in an 
outwardly friendly fashion towards the Prince Regent, but it was clear that 
he secretly coveted the heir apparent’s position regarding it as his by right 
of birth.61 His candidature was also undoubtedly being used by the former 
monarch as a means of bringing pressure on the Prince Regent, quite apart 
from the fact that he genuinely hoped that Mangkudiningrat would succeed 
him on the throne of Yogya as by this time he had become his favourite son. 
Engelhard, meanwhile, could do little to support the Prince Regent as he was 
often incapacitated by recurrent fevers which by late September had so seri-
ously undermined his health that he asked the new British administration to 
be immediately relieved of his post.62
As the royal government descended into disarray in Yogya, the number 
of robberies and violent attacks in the countryside around the sultan’s capital 
increased. The old sultan’s hand was thought to be behind many of these. If 
true, it was an extremely effective way of unsettling his son’s administration.63 
fles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	8-5-1812	no.	6.	Crawfurd’s	speculation	that	they	would	suffer	the	death	
penalty did not in the end prove correct as the old sultan was overthrown before it could happen. 
One of the bupati, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiwirya, even accompanied him into exile (Carey 
1992:438 note 201). Carey 1992:39 is thus incorrect in his assertion in his May 1812 entry in his 
‘List of important dates, 1794-1825’, that ‘Hamengkubuwana II put seven mancanagara officials	
loyal to the Crown Prince to death’.
59 BD (Manado) II:137-8, XV.20-4; B.Ng. I:214-5, LIV.22-31; Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard 
(Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 28-6-1811.
60 B.Ng. I:215, LIV.30, the two pusaka kris in question were Kyai Betha and Kyai Nagakusuma. 
61 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens, 21-6-1811; Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engel-
hard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 5-9-1811. Mangkudiningrat felt that his mother, Ratu 
Mas,	had	been	unjustly	deprived	of	her	position	as	first	consort	of	Hamengkubuwana	II	at	the	
beginning of his reign in favour of Ratu Kedhaton, the Prince Regent’s mother, see further Van 
der Kemp 1896a:321; Chapter V.
62 De Haan 1935a:543; Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 21-6-
1811;	IOL	Eur	F148/18	(Raffles-Minto	collection	vol.	18),	Captain	William	Robison	(Yogyakarta)	to	
Lord Minto (Batavia), 26-9-1811, described him as ‘consumptive’. He appears to have died early in 
1812. 
63 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 28 Sapar AJ 1738 (AD 
25-3-1811) (acknowledgement of increase in number of robberies since January 1811 in the Mata-
ram core region and dispatch of a Yogya bupati, Radèn Tumenggung Cakradiwirya II to investi-
gate); Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 9 Rabingulakir AJ 1738 
(AD	4-5-1811)	(denying	his	father’s	involvement	in	the	robberies);	Baud	306,	W.H.	van	IJsseldijk	
(Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 22-10-1816 (on the great rise in robberies 
since 1811-1812 ‘under the walls of Semarang and in the smoke of the courts’).
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Meanwhile, the troubles encountered by the Prince Regent reached the ears 
of Daendels, who in early May 1811 even threatened to come once again to 
Yogya with as many troops as he had brought on the previous occasion to sort 
out the situation, but only after he had ‘dealt with the English’.64 This was an 
idle threat. Daendels was then in the very last days of his administration: he 
would be replaced by Jan Willem Janssens on 16 May, who owed his promo-
tion to the high favour he enjoyed both with the Emperor Napoleon and his 
step-daughter, Hortense de Beauharnais (1783-1837), the wife of King Louis 
of Holland (Stapel 1941:79). As for his motley army of locally raised troops, 
it would prove no match for the 11,000 seasoned soldiers drawn from British 
line regiments, Bengal sepoy battalions, and Madras artillery units which were 
even then being readied in Melaka for the invasion of Java in early August.65 
The collapse of the Franco-Dutch government
While Yogya stood on the cusp of civil war and the threat of invasion grew 
ever more real, the former Dutch government in Java underwent its final 
transformation. At seven o’clock in the morning of 27 February the ‘momen-
tous and joyful’ news reached Yogya of the proclamation of the annexation of 
Holland by France on 9 July 1810.66 Daendels’ dispatch with the announce-
ment was brought to the kadipatèn by Danureja II and the following day a brief 
ceremony was held to mark the event. ‘Minister’ Engelhard and his secretary, 
Hendrik Willem Gezelschap, in their full dress uniforms accompanied by their 
mounted dragoon escort processed by coach to the Crown Prince’s residence 
where all the princes and notables had foregathered to be told of the annexa-
tion. One of the royal bodyguard regiments, the Ketanggung, then shot off 
three salvos of musket shots as a signal to the gunners in the fort to fire their 
cannon which were promptly answered by the thunder of the sultan’s ord-
nance from the kraton battlements. As the reverberations died away, the health 
was drunk of ‘His Majesty, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector 
64 Dj.Br. 41, Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 9 Rabingula-
kir AJ 1738 (AD 4-5-1811).
65 Poensen 1905:255; Abdullah 1970:86-7; Stockdale 1812:2-3, 6, who relates that the First Divi-
sion of the British expeditionary force under Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie had sailed from Madras 
on 18 April and had docked at Pinang on 18 May on their way to Malaka which they reached on 
1 June 1811. The Bengal troops had landed in Malaka ‘six weeks previously’, namely on 20 April. 
Troop numbers are given in Thorn 1815:17, which lists 5,344 European and 5,777 ‘native’ troops 
with 839 pioneers or lascar, giving a grand total of 11,960 of whom 1,200 had fallen sick in Malaka 
and	another	1,500	on	landing	in	Java,	thus	leaving	approximately	9,000	to	fight	the	campaign.
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of the Rhineland Association, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation’, titles 
which would have meant as much to the assembled Javanese as Daendels’ 
previous grandiloquent statements about the ‘mightiest Empire in the world’ 
and the ‘great Napoleon’ which had so bemused the patih in Semarang in 
early October 1808 (Chapter V). The Prince Regent then joined Engelhard, 
Gezelschap and Pangéran Ngabèhi in the Resident’s coach for the short return 
trip to the fort where thousands of ‘Chinese, Moors (non-Indonesian Asians), 
Malays and Javanese’ had gathered in the square in front of the main gate to 
hear the reading of the proclamation. The Dutch flag was lowered and the 
French tricolour raised as a 45-gun salute boomed forth from the fort (Vink 
1892:444-7). Napoleon’s France was now direct ruler of Java. Henceforth all 
civil and military officials would be required to take an oath of loyalty to 
the emperor (Nahuys van Burgst 1858:46-7). But it would not be long before 
another flag flew over Mangkubumi’s capital. As for the reaction of the Dutch 
inhabitants of Java to the news that their country had been absorbed into la 
grande nation, the future Yogya Resident, Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst 
probably caught the mood when he wrote that ‘for the most part it created 
feelings of great distress and grief’ (Nahuys van Burgst 1858:47).
Two members of the Yogya elite who were not at the flag raising ceremony 
and for whom a change in political regime could not come soon enough were 
Pangéran Natakusuma and his son, Natadiningrat. In late December 1810, 
they had been taken under armed escort from Yogya to Semarang and then 
overland via Sumedhang and Bogor to Batavia (Poensen 1905:227-31), where 
they were held first in Daendels’ fortress at Meester Cornelis and then in a 
private house in the Kantor Baru district of Batavia.67 According to Daendels 
(1814:97 note 1), plans to send them into exile in Makassar – Dipanagara’s 
later place of banishment – could not be acted upon because of the stringency 
of the British blockade, so they were sent instead to Cirebon where they were 
placed in the care of the bailiff, Matthijs Waterloo. As an erstwhile Resident 
of Yogyakarta, he was well acquainted with the two men from his time in the 
sultan’s capital.68 Government enquiries about whether the prince and his son 
should be returned to Yogya met with a negative response from the Prince 
Regent, the patih and members of the karajan party, who did not disguise the 
fact that they would like to see them dead.69 The old sultan, on the contrary, 
was reported to be fervently hoping that if the British invasion went ahead, 
Natakusuma and his son would be allowed back to his capital.70
67 Poensen 1905:231; Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 21-6-
1811.
68 Poensen 1905:238-42; B.Ng. I:218, LV.24-9.
69 Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 11-9-1811.
70 Dj.Br. 41, Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 10 Rabingu-
lakir AJ 1738 (AD 4-5-1811).
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It is possible that the Prince Regent and his party were successful in persuad-
ing Daendels that the two prominent Yogyanese should be severely treated. We 
know from the extant Residency letters, that there was a rumour in late April 
1811 that Natadiningrat had returned to Yogya. This had elicited an emphatic 
denial from Waterloo in Cirebon.71 He confirmed that both Natakusuma and 
his son were still in his care, but since a large amount of writing materials had 
been found in their baggage, they had been split up and had been placed in 
stocks in separate cells in the dungeon of Cirebon fort where they had con-
tracted ‘heavy malarial fevers’. Their five female servants (one of whom was 
Chinese), who had accompanied them from Yogya, had also been separated 
from them.72 According to Waterloo’s friend, Nahuys van Burgst, who was then 
lodging with the bailiff while he conducted his duties as a member of Daendels’ 
Forest Administration, Waterloo’s reference to ‘heavy malarial fevers’ was part 
of a delaying tactic which they had worked out together to prevent his two 
detainees’ immediate execution. They had calculated that they could buy time 
by arguing that the sudden deaths of two such prominent members of the 
Yogya elite would play badly in the sultan’s kraton, so reports should be sent 
that Natakusuma and Natadiningrat were very sick, then that there was little 
hope left for them, and finally – if no other options were open to delay further 
– that they had expired (Nahuys van Burgst 1858:49-52; Van Kesteren 1887:1305 
note 1; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:36 note 1).
All this was to counter Daendels’ secret instruction sent to Cirebon on 20 
April and written in his own hand on a small piece of paper and slipped into 
a letter from his deputy, J.A. van Braam to Waterloo, which read (Van Polanen 
1816:264; Poensen 1905:249):
Notto Coesoemo [Natakusuma] and Notto Diningrat [Natadiningrat] are the sole 
supporters of Kentjono Woelang [Ratu Kencana Wulan] who rule her. The govern-
ment cannot openly bring these people to death, but it longs to learn that they are 
no more. 
According to the Pakualam babad, it was Van Braam’s wife who had secured 
the marshal’s promise that they should be executed due to the personal 
influence she exercised over the governor-general.73 Other reports speak of 
the advice being received from Engelhard stressing that the two were ‘most 
extremely dangerous’ for the peace of the Yogya court (Van Polanen 1816:263). 
Probably Daendels needed no outside persuasion and had already made up 
71 Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 12 Rabingulakir AJ 1738 
(AD 5-5-1811); Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 13 Rabingula-
kir	AJ	1738	(AD	6-5-1811)	referring	to	Matthijs	Waterloo’s	dispatch	from	Cirebon	of	30-4-1811.
72 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 13 Rabingulakir AJ 
1738 (AD 6-6-1811) had strongly urged that they should not be sent back to Yogya but kept under 
close watch in Cirebon.
73 Poensen 1905:239, 242-52; Chapter V note 141.
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his mind to do away with the two Yogya notables before they could be used by 
the British following a successful invasion. Whatever the case, the situation of 
the detainees was desperate. Only the delaying tactics of the bailiff supported 
by his friend Nahuys ensured that their execution was averted until the new 
governor-general, J.W. Janssens, had replaced Daendels on 16 May.74 Neither 
Natakusuma nor his son would ever forgive the Prince Regent for his role in 
their year-long exile and near execution. Their implacable animosity would lie 
at the root of the suspicion which poisoned relations between the Pakualaman 
and the Yogya court during the Prince Regent’s reign as Hamengkubuwana III 
(1812-1814) and beyond into the nineteenth century (Carey 1992:458-9 notes 
286, 288).
The arrival of Janssens led to a significant liberalisation of Daendels’ 
administration, and his honest character formed a sharp contrast to the bru-
tality of his predecessor.75 A Malay text, the Hikayat Mareskalek (‘The marshal’s 
chronicle’), speaks of him as a ‘gentle ruler and beloved father’ (Van Ronkel 
1918:872). During his brief tenure, he took some important initiatives such 
as the establishment on 20 July 1811 of a new training scheme for young 
European administrators in Javanese known as the élèves voor het civiele (pupils 
for the civil service), later to be renamed élèves voor de Javaansche taal (pupils 
for the Javanese language; Van der Chijs 1895-97, XVI:715-7; Houben 1994:119-
22). But such steps had little immediate impact given that he had inherited an 
insolvent administration from Daendels, and assumed the governor-general-
ship only in time to preside over the submission of Java to the British, the 
second occasion in his colonial career when he had been forced to undergo 
such a humiliation.76 Although Daendels had done much to organise the 
island’s military defences and increase the number of troops, the government’s 
financial situation was desperate. The supply of silver money had dried up 




1816:256). Janssens landed in east Java sometime in the second week of May and took over from 
Daendels on 16 May, Nahuys van Burgst 1858:50-2; Stapel 1941:79.
75 NA, G.K. van Hogendorp private collection 147b, ‘Memorie van Dirk van Hogendorp over de 
geschiktheid van Generaal Janssens; Redeerende memorie te onderzoeken of de Generaal Janssens 
geschikt is om also gouverneur-generaal naar Oost-Indiën gezonden te worden’ (henceforth: Dirk 
Van Hogendorp, ‘Memorie’), n.y. (circa 1814). Despite acknowledging Janssens’ eerlijkheid (honesty), 
Van	Hogendorp	argued	that	he	was	totally	unfit	to	be	sent	back	as	governor-general	in	1816:	1.	as	
an	officer’s	son	he	had	had	no	education;	2.	he	was	a	weak	character	and	lacked	firmness	in	carry-
ing out his plans; 3. if criticised he could be passionate and hot-tempered (driftig); 4. he spoke no 
Indonesian languages and had no knowledge of local customs; 5. he had no judgement of men and 
wanted for the cold-bloodedness necessary to govern a large colony (unlike Daendels!). 
76 Janssens had been forced to hand over Cape Colony to the British on 23 January 1806 when, 
according to Van Hogendorp, ‘he had lost his head’ even though the military aspects were well 
planned, Dirk van Hogendorp, ‘Memorie’, n.y. (circa 1814); Stapel 1941:79.
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and debased copper coinage produced at Daendels’ new mint at Tawangsari 
in Surabaya had caused a flight of good coinage from the local markets.77 The 
resulting inflation created great hardship for the local population, particu-
larly in the Principalities where Chinese tax-farmers exported silver specie to 
the pasisir and allowed devalued coins to reappear in circulation.78 Javanese 
specie traders in Kutha Gedhé also appear to have ‘cashed in’ on the situa-
tion by minting coins for export.79 At the same time, the British blockade had 
prevented the sale of coffee, the government’s main export crop, and by July 
1811 only 84,000 Spanish dollars remained in the treasury with outstanding 
debts to local bupati in west Java for the payment of crop contingents totalling 
well over 300,000 Spanish dollars. Janssens warned Engelhard that he feared 
widespread insurrection unless these contingents were paid and urged the 
Resident to secure a loan from the old sultan or the patih for 500,000 Spanish 
dollars, or at the very least 300,000. ‘Accord the [old] sultan all the privileges 
you can, but do not allow him to gain too great an influence over affairs of 
state’ the new governor-general suggested.80 How Engelhard was going to 
arrange such a loan from the former monarch, who still controlled the purse 
strings in Yogya, without allowing him back into his previous estate as de jure 
ruler Janssens did not say. But even the suggestion that the new Franco-Dutch 
government was now dependant on Yogya for the provision of financial assist-
ance in order to survive must have emboldened the old sultan. Not only would 
Janssens’ administration be unlikely to prevail against a British invasion, the 
former Yogya ruler would calculate, but the time was not so far distant when 
he himself would be able to seize back his full royal powers.81 He thus had no 
difficulty in refusing the governor-general’s request. 
77 De Haan 1910-12, I-2:97, Ong Tae-hae 1849:20; Dj.Br. 3, F.G. Valck, ‘Algemeen Verslag der 
Residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1833’, 30-11-1834 (on refusal of local population in Yogya to 




population in Principalities to accept new copper coins minted in Holland during the Java War); 
Crawfurd 1971:286; Carey 1980:199-200.
78 Thorn 1815:204-5; Dj.Br.3, F.G. Valck, ‘Algemeen Verslag der Residentie Djokjokarta over het 
jaar 1836’, 31-3-1837 (on export of copper and silver coins from Yogya). See further Chapter IX 
note 90.
79 Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Janssens (Batavia) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 30-6-1811; Pieter Engel-
hard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 12-7-1811. On the royal mint at Kutha Gedhé, see 
AN, Exh. 17-2-1841 no. 16; and on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Javanese coinage, see 
Netscher	and	Van	der	Chijs	1864:141-7.
80 Dj.Br. 22, J.W. Janssens (Batavia) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 15-7-1811, Pieter Engel-
hard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 22-7-1811. Tea and sugar were also important export 
crops at this time.
81 Dirk van Hogendorp, ‘Memorie’, n.y. (circa 1814).
The power of prophecy280
The sense that great changes were afoot was seemingly mirrored in the nat-
ural world on 27 June when the east Java volcano, Mount Kelut, erupted. The 
heavy earthquake and falls of ash and sand which accompanied the eruption 
blanketed south-central Java for days on end turning day into night.82 Another 
portent of coming political change were the Malay-language letters dispatched 
by the future British lieutenant-governor of Java, Thomas Stamford Raffles (in 
office 1811-1816), from Melaka to the rulers of the Indonesian archipelago, 
including Surakarta and Yogyakarta.83 These announced that the British 
would be coming to help them make an end of everything associated with the 
Dutch and the French in Java and the eastern archipelago. As far as the sultan 
was concerned, Raffles’ letter promised him that he would be restored to his 
full dignity as monarch in accord with previous contracts thus overturning the 
changes which the Dutch had made. Moreover, the rulers were urged not to 
enter into any further treaties or agreements with the Dutch but were to await 
the arrival of the British in Java.84
Raffles’ correspondence, which reached Surakarta by way of the head of 
the senior branch of the Cirebon royal house, Sultan Kasepuhan, and the 
Ngabèhi of Dayeuhluhur, a Surakarta mancanagara district in Banyumas, 
opened up a secret connection between the south-central Javanese courts 
which would continue almost until the fall of Yogyakarta in June 1812.85 
The contacts were maintained through two separate channels: first, through 
backstairs communications between the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati 
Cakranagara, and the sultan’s confidant, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat, 
which were established in late September 1811 when Raffles’ letter of 20 
December 1810 was forwarded to Yogya.86 Second, through the links which 
82 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 28-6-1811; IOL Mack.
Pr. 2, ‘Surakarta sengkala list’, 186, 4 Jumadilakir AJ 1738 (AD 6-7-1811) on the rain of ashes from 
Gunung Kelut falling on Surakarta.
83	 Raffles	 1830:31-2;	 Boulger	 1892:90-1;	Adam	 1971:xii,	 62;	 Carey	 1980:201-2;	UBL	BPL	 616,	
Port.	4	pt.	10,	C.F.	Krijgsman	(translator),	‘Het	geheim	verhandelde	in	de	bijeenkomst	van	eenige	
rijksgrooten’	(henceforth:	Krijgsman,	‘Het	geheime	verhandelde’),	Surakarta,	23-9-1811;	BL	Add	
MS	 45272	 (Raffles	 secret	 correspondence	with	 Lord	Minto,	 January-March	 1812),	 T.S.	 Raffles	
(Rijswijk/Batavia)	to	Lord	Minto	(Calcutta),	21-1-1812.
84 Carey 1980:201-2, the relevant parts of the Malay text reads: dengan pertolongan Kompeni Ing-
gris akan menbuangkan sekali-sekali segala Holandis dan Perangsis yang didalam Tanah Jawa sekaliannya 
dan segala negeri timur, karena beta hendak memulangkan segala martabat kebesaran sahabat beta dan 
kelabaan seperti ngadat yang dahulu-dahulu dan tiada beta membuat bagaimana sekali seperti ngadat 
Holandis itu […] dan apabila sahabat beta telah mendapat ini melainkan janganlah sehabat beta membuat 
surat perjanjian lagi dengan Holandis sekedar sahabat beta bernantikan orang Inggris datang ke Jawa.
85 Dj.Br. 9A,Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 111-2, 124; IOL, Java Separate Consultations, G21/39, 8-3-1814, 
Extract of the Proceedings of the Governor-General in Council, 2-10-1813, 174, 183 (on the com-
mencement of the secret correspondence in August 1811 and its origination with Pakubuwana IV).
86	 The	correspondence	is	contained	in	IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection	vol.	24),	pts.	
A-E, ‘Translations of secret correspondence’ (henceforth: ‘Secret correspondence’). See further 
Carey 1980:54-70. The genesis of the contact is mentioned in pt. G, no. 23, ‘Information given to 
Mr [Herman Warner] Muntinghe by Raden Tjokro Negoro, the late prime minister of Surakarta 
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were opened up through a number of court santri, in particular returned 
Mecca pilgrims, who kept the monarchs closely informed of developments 
and even carried messages for them to other Indonesian rulers in Bali and the 
eastern archipelago.87 According to Cakranagara’s testimony, the sultan had 
confided in his secret emissary, Haji Ibrahim, that he proposed not to declare 
in favour of either the British or the Dutch in the event of a decisive outcome 
to the British invasion. He adviced the Sunan to do likewise.88 It is certain that 
the old sultan entertained the secret hope that in the event of a collapse of the 
Franco-Dutch government, he would be able to regain complete control of the 
Yogya administration. Indeed, he had been encouraged in that expectation by 
Raffles himself.
Meanwhile, the British invasion took place. On 3 August, their landing 
fleet of 57 transports and ships-of-the-line appeared off Batavia and by 8 
August the town had fallen. Janssens entrenched himself with the bulk of his 
troops at Meester Cornelis, the great redoubt built by Daendels just outside 
Weltevreden, but it was clear that resistance would be difficult given that the 
British had overwhelming military superiority (Thorn 1815:16-32; Stockdale 
1812:15-7; Aukes 1935:31-2). News of the British attack was received impas-
(n.y., circa 18-7-1812) (henceforth: ‘Information given to Mr Muntinghe’), and no. 25, ‘Abstract 
of	 letters	 found	 in	 the	house	of	 the	Raden	Dipati	 [Radèn	Adipati	Cakranagara]’,	no.	8,	Radèn	
Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y.; Carey 
1980:55-6, where Cakranagara related that he had chosen Sumadiningrat as the recipient because 
he was the only Yogya bupati	he	had	met	and	because	he	was	in	a	position	to	report	affairs	quickly	
to	the	sultan.	The	physical	transport	of	the	letters	was	entrusted	to	lower	ranking	court	officials:	
Ngabèhi	Ranawijaya	from	the	Surakarta	kepatihan, and Sumadiningrat’s subordinates, Kyai Niti-
menggala and Ngabèhi Kertaleksana, as well as the patih of the kadipatèn, Ngabèhi Jayasentika. 
S.Br.	55,	P.H.	van	Lawick	van	Pabst,	‘Nota	betreffende	de	conspiratie	van	de	hoven	van	Soerakarta	
en	Djokjokarta	tegen	de	Britsche	Gouvernment	in	1812’	(henceforth:	Van	Pabst,	‘Nota	betreffende	
de conspiratie’), 13-6-1827, mentions that two of the messengers were from the désa of Dèrèsan, 
which was part of Sumadiningrat’s apanage to the south of Yogya. These were the aforemen-
tioned Kertaleksana, a panèwu Keparak (who died before the Java War) and Ngabèhi Gunasemita, 
an	officer	(lurah) of the Ketanggung regiment, who was a trusted intimate of Hamengkubuwana 
II when he was still Crown Prince before 2 April 1792.
87	 Carey	1981a:262	note	110	(on	Kyai	Maja’s	carrying	of	letters	from	Pakubuwana	IV	to	the	Raja	
of Bali Buleleng); Carey 1980:55 note 1; Chapter II note 27 (on Haji Ngali Ibrahim, a Yogya court 
pradikan, a man of religion in receipt of a pension from the court, who served as one of Hameng-
kubuwana II’s secret emissaries to Surakarta and who later had contacts with the sultans of Bima 
(Sumbawa) and Tidore); IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. E, Radèn Tumenggung 
Sumadiningrat (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 28 Dulkangidah AJ 1738 
(AD 14-12-1811) (reference to a second Yogya court santri, Haji Muhamad Salèh, who acted as a 
messenger).	See	also	S.Br.	55,	Van	Pabst,	‘Nota	betreffende	de	conspiratie’,	13-6-1827,	who	men-
tions Haji Ibrahim who hailed from the kampung Pringgodani in Yogya and was the son of Haji 
Slèman (Suleiman) from the village of Wanasari, see further S.Br. 87, ‘Relaas gegeven door den 
Raden Brongtakusuma’, Yogyakarta, 13-5-1823. He was trusted by both rulers and had personal 
access to them. Carey 1980:18-9, on Kyai Abdulsalam who brought Hamengkubuwana II news of 
political	developments	in	Cirebon	after	the	1802	uprising.
88 IOL, Eur F148/24, pt. G no. 23, ‘Information given to Mr Muntinghe’.
Plate 29. Jan-Willem Janssens (1762-1838), governor of Cape Colony (1803-1806) 
and of Java (May-September 1811). Photograph by courtesy 
of the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
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sively in Yogya. ‘The court is very tranquil’, Engelhard wrote, ‘as far as I 
could judge the appearance of so many English ships made not the slightest 
impression.’ In fact, the old sultan seemed to be more interested in exercising 
his Amazon corps on the southern alun-alun than learning anything further 
about the military situation in Batavia where Janssens was now besieged at 
Cornelis.89 On 15 August, accompanied by a number of Yogya princes and 
officials, the former ruler attended a party in the Residency House with his 
son, the Prince Regent, to celebrate the birthday of the Emperor Napoleon. 
‘The old gentleman is in extraordinarily good spirits’ (bijzonder wel), Engelhard 
reported, although, as we have seen, the Prince Regent’s wearing of his new 
Dutch order of knighthood irked him deeply.90 Meanwhile, preparations were 
made to equip Yogya troops to march to Semarang in case they were needed.
News of the fall of Meester Cornelis on 26 August in a bloody battle in 
which the British suffered over 500 casualties during their destruction of 
Janssens’ defending force, was relayed to Yogya via the Semarang divisional 
commander, Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann, on 1 September. The 
same dispatch brought the news that Janssens had moved his seat of govern-
ment to Semarang.91 The death toll on the Franco-Dutch side at Cornelis had 
been so high – fifty percent amongst their European and Ambonese troops and 
far higher when it came to their Javanese and Madurese auxiliaries – that the 
rumour reaching the Principalities at this time was that the victorious British-
Indian troops had behaved with extreme brutality, destroying everything in 
their path and giving no quarter (Aukes 1935:35). On the day of the fall of 
Cornelis, Lord Minto, the governor-general of India (in office 1807-1813), who 
had accompanied the expedition to Java, issued a proclamation setting forth 
the liberal and enlightened principles on which the new British government 
would be based. In particular, he promised the Javanese an amelioration in 
their condition:
89 Dj.Br. 24, (Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Meester Cornelis), 12-8-1811.
90	 Note	40.	After	the	9	July	1810	annexation	of	Holland	to	France,	this	order	was	renamed	as	
the ‘Orde van de Reunie’ (‘Order of the Reunion’).
91 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 1-9-1811. The 550 
British	dead	and	wounded	 included	48	officers	 and	 represented	a	fifth	of	 their	 total	 invasion	
force; the losses on Janssens’ side were considerably greater: 6,000 prisoners were taken amongst 
them	250	officers	of	whom	two	were	generals;	280	pieces	of	artillery	were	captured	(1,500	overall	
during the campaign), Thorn 1815:41-63, 108; Aukes 1935:33. On the very high casualties on the 
Franco-Dutch side, see Nahuys van Burgst 1858:60-1; Dj.Br. 19¹¹, De Stuers, ‘Inleiding’, n.y. who 
gives	the	figures	for	those	killed	in	the	entire	campaign	as	9,600	Europeans	and	Ambonese	(out	of	
21,500 mobilised), 1,715 Javanese and Madurese (out of 2,296 mobilised) and 609 auxiliaries from 
the courts (out of 12,577 mobilised). The majority of the two former categories died at Meester 
Cornelis, a very high casualty rate comprising nearly 50 and 80 percent of those mobilised. They 
were	forever	after	remembered	in	the	name	given	to	that	area	of	Batavia	near	Meester	Cornelis:	
Rawabangké (the swamp of the corpses; Schoel 1931:313) so called because of the mass graves in 
which the Franco-Dutch and Indonesian dead were hurriedly buried, personal communication, 
Ibu Paramita Abdurrachman, Jakarta, October 1976. The site is today the location of the Univer-
sitas Indonesia at Rawa Mangun.
Plate 30. Gilbert Elliott, first Lord Minto (1751-1814), governor-general 
of India (in office July 1807-October 1813), who accompanied the British 
expedition to Java in 1811. Portrait by George Chinnery (1774-1854) 
made in Calcutta in late 1811 or 1812, showing him in his earl’s robes 
with maps of Java, Bourbon and Mauritius. Photograph by courtesy of 
the National Portrait Gallery, London.
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The inhabitants of Java now touch the fortunate moment when they will be placed 
under the protection of a power which will keep the calamities and sufferings of 
war far from their shores and under the guardianship of a just and beneficent gov-
ernment whose principle it is to combine the interests of the state with the security, 
prosperity and happiness of every class and denomination of the people. Let the 
people prove itself worthy of those blessings by a timely display of grateful zeal 
and obedience.92 
This was followed up on 6 September by a further announcement specifically 
targeted at the south-central Javanese rulers sent by Minto’s aide- de-camp, 
Captain William Robison, from Cirebon, which spoke of the whole prov-
ince of Cirebon as well as Jaccatra (Batavia) and west Java now being in the 
hands of the British. All further resistance by ‘French fugitives’ from the rout 
at Meester Cornelis would be in vain, the announcement declared, so the 
rulers should not be deceived by the ‘ministers’ at their courts into provid-
ing further assistance to Janssens; rather they should understand that Lord 
Minto desired good relations with them.93 It is doubtful that these proclama-
tions had any effect in swaying the allegiance of the Yogya court. The Prince 
Regent especially feared that any abrupt political change would undermine 
still further his already precarious position, and Engelhard remarked on his 
‘incomprehensible fear of his father’ at this time. In the deliberations which 
took place in the kadipatèn about the number of Yogya troops which should be 
sent to assist Janssens in Semarang, it was clear that the Prince Regent could 
not decide anything without the approval of his father.94 
On 4 September, 2,400 Yogya troops left for Semarang to join the forces of 
the Sunan and Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) in Janssens’ second line of 
defence in central Java.95 But the Franco-Dutch position was hopeless; Janssens 
had lost all his artillery at Meester Cornelis and his attempt to hold the line 
in central Java had more to do with personal honour than with military reali-
ties.96 Moves by the old sultan to have his favourite son Mangkudiningrat 
92	 IOL,	Eur	E105	(Raffles	collection	vol.	3),	301,	Proclamation	of	Lord	Minto,	Weltevreden,	26-
8-1811.
93 IOL Eur F148/17, Proclamation of Captain William Robison to the rulers of Surakarta and 
Yogyakarta, Cirebon, 6-9-1811.
94 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Cirebon), 31-8-1811.
95 Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 5-9-1811. The size 
of the 2,400-strong Yogya contingent and the names of the commander (Radèn Tumenggung 
Danukusuma I) and the other senior court and mancanagara bupati who led it are given in Dj.Br. 
24, Hamengkubuwana II and Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 17 
Ruwah AJ 1738 (AD 6-9-1811) in reply to Janssens’ request of 1-9-1811. 
96 Napoleon had warned Janssens that there should be no repetition of his loss of Cape Colony 
to the British in January 1806: ‘souvenez-vous monsieur qu’un génèral français ne se laisse pas prendre 
pour une deuxième fois!’ (‘Remember Sir that a French general does not allow himself to be taken a 
second time!’), Thorn 1815:103. He had thus rejected Lord Minto’s summons to him to surrender 
after	the	fall	of	Meester	Cornelis	on	26	August	with	the	words:	‘Tell	Lord	Minto	that	he	has	not	
more than a tenth of the island [of Java] in his possession and that I shall continue to defend it 
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appointed as the Yogya commander were frustrated by Janssens who rightly 
judged that this would strengthen his position in the kraton.97 At the same 
time, the presence in Semarang of Pangéran Natakusuma and his son, who 
had been brought with Janssens as free men from Cirebon on 1 September, 
made the Prince Regent extremely apprehensive. He urgently besought the 
governor-general through Engelhard not to let them fall into the hands of 
the British and he attempted to dispel the favourable impression of the two 
Yogya nobles entertained in some European circles.98 On 11 September, the 
news of the capture of Sumenep and the promotion of the Panembahan of 
Sumenep to the title of sultan by the British caused the Prince Regent even 
greater distress, mainly, so Engelhard noted, because of his close family con-
nections with Madura through his mother (Thorn 1815:93; Chapter II). He 
refused to believe the news, stating that it was a trick of the British enemy to 
get the ‘Sumeneppers’ on their side.99 In an attempt to bring him round firmly 
to the cause of the Franco-Dutch government, Engelhard promised that the 
lands annexed by Daendels in the 10 January treaty would be returned to 
Yogya.100 But the fate of the Prince Regent and his party was already sealed. 
On 12 September, 1,600 British troops landed at Semarang and four days 
later at Jati Ngalèh near Serondhol on the heights above Semarang, Janssens 
and his Javanese allies were comprehensively defeated (Thorn 1815:97-101; 
Aukes 1935:38-47). Amongst the Javanese troops, only the horse artillery 
of Prangwedana’s legion and the Surabaya regiment acquitted themselves 
with any bravery (Thorn 1815:100; Aukes 1935:43-4). Reports on the con-
duct of the Yogya troops, who had been the first to bear the brunt of the 
surprise British early morning attack on Janssens’ left flank (Aukes 1935:43), 
were more mixed. But after their initial pell-mell flight, they appear to have 
fallen back in some semblance of order to Bojong in Kedhu where the Prince 
Regent, who was deeply disturbed by news of Janssens’ defeat,101 demanded 




of Engelhard on 5-9-1811). Danureja II’s father Radèn Tumengung Danukusuma I, appears to 
have served as Yogya commander.
98 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 4-9-1811, 5-9-1811.
99 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 11-9-1811, referring to 
the Prince Regent’s use of the term akal (trick). The Panembahan later became a close friend and 
scholarly	collaborator	of	Raffles.
100 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 11-9-1811.
101 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Salatiga), 18-9-1811, 19-9-1811, 
reporting	that	the	news	of	Janssens’	negotiations	with	the	British	for	a	capitulation	affected	the	
Prince Regent deeply as he had pinned his hopes on Franco-Dutch success at Jati Ngalèh and 
wanted to remain with the Franco-Dutch government. The prospect of an agreement with the 
British was unpleasant for him.
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allow them to return to Yogya.102 The rest of the Javanese auxiliaries collapsed 
in a miserable fashion, turning on their officers and fleeing back to Surakarta 
(Thorn 1815:100; Hageman 1856, VI:409; De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, 
XIII:547-8; Poensen 1905:258; Aukes 1935:43).
Following his defeat, Janssens retreated to the eighteenth-century Dutch 
fort, ‘De Hersteller’,103 at Salatiga, but further resistance was pointless. On 18 
September, at the bridge at Kali Tuntang, which Radèn Rongga had ordered 
destroyed at the start of his rebellion on 20-21 November 1810 (Chapter VI) 
and which the Prince Regent was even now expecting to be broken by the 
vanquished Janssens, the second and last of the Franco-Dutch governor-gen-
erals signed the articles of capitulation. This allowed all civilian officials, who 
had held office under the Franco-Dutch government, to offer their services 
to the new British administration, while all those with military commissions 
became prisoners-of-war (Thorn 1815:101; Soekanto 1952:83-7). The British 
were now the undisputed masters of Java and its eastern dependencies. It 
was the start of a five-year interregnum which would witness remarkable 
changes in colonial policy, but would also see the principles so confidently 
proclaimed by Minto at Weltevreden on 26 August sacrificed on the altar of 
political expediency.
The squaring of accounts
A very confused period now ensued in the wake of the Franco-Dutch gov-
ernment’s collapse. In the countryside, bands of robbers, some no doubt 
acting on the orders of the south-central Javanese rulers, terrorised travellers 
and plundered the homes of Europeans. Janssens’ last military headquarters 
at Salatiga was amongst the places targeted and his cipher correspondence 
with the minister of the colonies taken (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-
88, XIII:548). Captain Robison, Lord Minto’s Dutch-speaking aide-de-camp, 
who undertook an unauthorised mission to the courts from 21-27 September, 
102	 Dj.Br.	 9A,	 Valck.	 ‘Overzigt,	 97	 (on	 the	 praise	 of	 the	 Dutch	 colonel,	 Kiverlijn,	 who	 was	
attached	to	the	Yogya	contingent,	for	the	conduct	of	the	Yogya	troops);	Aukes	1935:38	(on	deser-
tions amongst Yogya and Sala troops many of whom had brought their wives with them); J.W. 
Janssens (Batavia) to Minister of the Colonies (Paris), 5-10-1811, in De Jonge and Van Deventer 
1884-88,	XIII:547-8	(on	the	complete	collapse	of	the	Javanese	troops	and	the	horrors	committed	by	
them,	including	the	murder	of	their	European	officers);	Dj.Br.	46,	Pieter	Engelhard	(Yogyakarta)	
to	 J.W.	 Janssens	 (Salatiga),	18-9-1811,	19-9-1811	 (on	 insistence	of	 the	Prince	Regent	 for	written	
orders from Janssens to the Yogya commander, Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma, before Yogya 
troops allowed back from Bojong, in absence of these orders he was shown a copy of the 18 Sep-
tember articles of capitulation of Kali Tuntang). See also BD (Manado) II:138-9, XV.25-30.
103 Built in the mid-eighteenth century and named in honour of Governor-General Baron van 
Imhoff	 (in	 office	 1743-1750),	whose	flagship	 ‘De	Hersteller’	 (‘The	Repairer’)	 inspired	his	 own	
sobriquet, Stapel 1941:59.
Plate 31. Boats of His Majesty's Sloop Procris attacking and capturing six French gunboats off        the coast of Java at Indramayu on 31 July 1811. Engraving by Charles Rosenberg (flourished 
mid-19th century) after a painting by the celebrated naval artist, William John Huggins (1781-       1845). Photograph by courtesy of the British Library, London.
Plate 31. Boats of His Majesty's Sloop Procris attacking and capturing six French gunboats off        the coast of Java at Indramayu on 31 July 1811. Engraving by Charles Rosenberg (flourished 
mid-19th century) after a painting by the celebrated naval artist, William John Huggins (1781-       1845). Photograph by courtesy of the British Library, London.
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noticed groups of roving bandits on the road as he set out for Surakarta.104 
By the time he reached the Sunan’s capital, however, advanced units of the 
Buckinghamshire regiment (14th Regiment of Foot) were an already vis-
ible presence watched by thousands of curious onlookers who crowded the 
streets for their first glimpse of Java’s new conquerors.105
Robison’s task, given to him by the British commander-in-chief, Sir Samuel 
Auchmuty, was to assure the Surakarta and Yogyakarta rulers of the friend-
ship of the new British government and to sound out their views.106 On 
22 September, he had a secret meeting with the Sunan in the house of the 
Surakarta Resident, J.A. van Braam, in the presence of twelve of his senior 
court officials. The Surakarta ruler articulated a number of grievances with 
the former government of Daendels, which give a good indication of the 
issues which had built up at the courts over the previous three years. In par-
ticular, he singled out the marshal’s withdrawal of the strandgeld payments 
(which he wished to have paid in good copper coin), the despoliation of the 
most important royal tomb on the north coast, that of Sunan Amangkurat I 
(reigned 1646-1677), and the change in court ceremonies and etiquette, ‘from 
which’, according to Robison, ‘His Majesty’s dignity has suffered not a littl e’. 
Henceforth, he asked that the pre-July 1808 ceremonial be restored for the 
recep tion of the Resident and all other European officials in the kraton.107 
104	 IOL,	Eur	F148/17	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	17),	Captain	William	Robison	(Yogyakarta)	
to Lord Minto (Batavia), 26-9-1811. On his gebrekkig soort Nederlandsch (‘imperfect sort of Dutch’) 
which he had acquired through marriage to a Cape Dutch woman, see De Haan 1935a:630-1. He 
also mentioned that he could speak ‘poor Malay’ and was eager to learn both Dutch and Malay 
properly. During his mission, he used an interpreter, IOL Eur F148/17, Captain William Robison 
(Cirebon) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 6-9-1811.
105	 IOL	Eur	F148/17	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	17),	Captain	William	Robison	(Yogyakarta)	to	
Lord Minto (Batavia), 26-9-1811.
106 Robison’s explicit instruction from Auchmuty was to ‘carry tidings of the armistice [with 
the Franco-Dutch government] to Surakarta and Yogyakarta’ and to communicate Lord Min-
to’s desire to continue the same relationship with the courts that the previous (pre-1808) Dutch 
government had enjoyed, IOL Eur F148/17, Captain William Robison (Ungaran) to Lord Minto 
(Batavia),	20-9-1811.	Raffles	later	wrote	that	‘Auchmutty’s	[sic]	authority	could	not	extend	to	the	
places in question [namely, Yogyakarta and Surakarta]’ and that ‘the only instruction Robison had 
received from Lord Minto on leaving Batavia was to render assistance in the Dutch language on 
further	instructions	from	the	senior	officer	Colonel	Wood’.	Robison’s	agreements	with	the	Sunan	
were	 thus	 repudiated	by	 the	 lieutenant-governor,	 IOL,	Mack.Pr.	 2,	 32,	T.S.	Raffles	 (Semarang)	
to Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta), 6-12-1811. See further De Haan 1935a:630. Pakubu-
wana	IV’s	reply	to	Auchmuty’s	letter	of	17	September	can	be	found	in	Dj.Br.	24,	Pakubuwana	IV	
(Surakarta) to Sir Samuel Auchmuty (Semarang), 2 Ramelan AJ 1738 (AD 21-9-1811).
107	 UBL	 BPL	 616	 Port.	 4	 pt.	 1,	 Krijgsman,	 ‘Het	 geheime	 verhandelde’,	 23-9-1811;	 IOL	 Eur	
F148/17, Captain William Robison (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 26-9-1811. Daendels had 
apparently cleared some ground around the grave of Sunan Amangkurat I at Tegalarum for a 
park,	IOL	Eur	F148/18	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	18),	Raja	Putra	Naréndra	and	Hamengkubu-
wana II (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 7 Ramelan AH 1226 (AD 26-9-1811). The other 
demands voiced by Pakubuwana IV were: 1. the return of burial grounds, kramat (holy places) 
VII The end of the beginning 291
Similar demands were made in Yogya by the old sultan and the Prince Regent 
in a joint audience with Robison, where they especially complained of the suf-
fering of the Yogya inhabitants in areas bordering on the European-controlled 
pasisir during Daendels’ administration.108
Although the demands made to Robison at the two courts were similar, 
the infantry captain noticed that the political atmosphere in Surakarta and 
Yogyakarta was very different. Whereas it would be an easy matter to main-
tain a good understanding with the Sunan ‘who is well-disposed and pliant’, 
he reported, the old sultan was a different story. He appeared to Robison both 
headstrong and difficult to deal with, all the more so because of the indignities 
heaped on him by Daendels. ‘So jealous is the old sultan of his prerogatives’, 
he wrote, ‘that he is constantly interfering with the Prince Regent who is too 
weak and fearful to resist.’ The Regent himself was ‘on the contrary more trac-
table and, if established beyond the control of the sultan, things should go well 
enough’.109 Robison’s shrewd judgement, based on extensive discussions with 
Engelhard, foreshadowed Raffles’ later policies. But for the time being, the old 
sultan had the upper hand. In his babad, Dipanagara described how the former 
monarch was ‘overjoyed’ that the Dutch had been defeated for he now felt able 
to carry out his plans.110 Thus, he wrote to Lord Minto immediately after his 
meeting with Robison to request the return of Pangéran Natakusuma and his 
son from Surabaya where they were being held under British protection.111 
He also seemed poised to take back full administrative responsibilities from 
and jurukunci (keepers of the keys of royal gravesites) of Ampèl (Surabaya), Giri, Tuban, Batang, 
Kudhus, Kadilangu; 2. the placing of the Surakarta Chinese once more under his authority so 
that the ‘inconvenience of a separate jurisdiction (established by Daendels’ in October 1809) could 
be abolished’; 3. the return of birds’ nests revenues usurped by Van Braam; 4. the immediate 
replacement of Daendels’ appointees, Van Braam (Resident) and W.N. Servatius (secretary), in 
Surakarta; 5. the immediate return of Prangwedana from Batavia/Bogor so he could be placed 
under Pakubuwana IV’s authority; 6. the investigation of complaints against Pakubuwana IV’s 
subjects	by	the	Sunan	first	before	the	European	government	became	involved;	7.	the	return	of	all	
Surakarta inhabitants taken to neighbouring European-controlled provinces – namely, the kalang 
(wood-cutters,	carpenters),	pinggir people and postweg workers (p.186) to be placed again under 
Pakubuwana IV’s jurisdiction, see S.Br. 37, p. 973, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to Lord Minto (Bat-
avia),	5	Ramelan	AH	1226	(AD	24-9-1811).	On	Raffles’	decisions	on	these	requests,	see	IOL,	Mack.
Pr. 2, Remarks on Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Adams’ secret memoir, Semarang, 6-12-1811, 
18-25, 30-7.
108	 IOL	Eur	F148/18	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	18),	Raja	Putra	Naréndra	and	Hamengkubu-
wana II (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 7 Ramelan AH 1226 (AD 26-9-1811).
109	 IOL	Eur	F148/17	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	17),	Captain	William	Robison	(Yogyakarta)	to	
Lord Minto (Batavia), 26-9-1811.
110 BD (Manado) II:139, XV (Asmaradana) 29. kangjeng sultan geng tyasipun/ déné Walanda wus 
sirna. 30. mapan sampun salin Inggris/ pan samana kangjeng sultan/ lajeng arsa datengaké/ ingkang 
dadya teleng ing tyas.
111 IOL	Eur	F148/18	 (Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	18),	Hamengkubuwana	 II	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	
Lord Minto (Batavia), 6 Ramelan AH 1226 (AD 25-9-1811). There	is	a	copy	of	this	letter	in	S.Br.	37.	
See further Poensen 1905:259-60.
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the Prince Regent, although there is no specific reference to this in Engelhard’s 
letters until 7 November when the Prince Regent reported that the differences 
between himself and his father had been ‘resolved’.112
In early October, Engelhard began to notice an unusual atmosphere in 
Yogya. ‘There are strange happenings here’, he wrote, ‘and I do not know 
what to ascribe them to.’ The patih refused to visit him in the Residency where 
he lay bedridden with a chronic heart condition and consumptive fever 
which would later kill him. At the same time, the countryside continued to 
be disturbed by marauders who appeared below the very walls of the newly 
built fort at Klathèn where on two successive nights they attacked the house 
of a retired Dutch sergeant.113 Unbeknownst to the Resident, who had forti-
fied his residence and garden with cannon,114 the old sultan was preparing to 
take action against the patih to clear the way for his own re-seizure of power 
and to avenge the indignities he had suffered. His favourite, Purwadipura, 
was recalled from his forest exile at Sélamanik and orders were given to his 
court bupati to have as few dealings with European officials as possible.115 
Then, on 28 October, Danureja was summoned to a morning meeting in the 
kraton. On entering the Purwaretna pavilion, the place where the court pusaka 
(heirlooms) and the eternal flame from Séla were kept (De Graaf and Pigeaud 
1974:30), he was seized from behind by seven senior officials led by Radèn 
Tumenggung Sumadiningrat.116 Amongst these were Radèn Tumenggung 
Mertalaya (the so-called ‘killer’ bupati because of his role in hunting down 
Radèn Rongga), Purwadipura, Radèn Tumenggung Prawirawinata, a brother 
of Ratu Kencana Wulan (Carey 1992:413 note 72) and Jaya Ngusman, who is 
described in the sources as a ‘man of religion’.117 An hour later, Danureja was 
strangled with white cloth – the usual method of execution of members of the 
Javanese elite because it did not draw blood or leave marks on the body.118 
112	 Dj.Br.	24,	Pieter	Engelhard	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	7-11-1811;	B.Ng.	
I:232, LVIII.34-6, gives 20 Ramelan AJ 1738 (AD 7-10-1811) as the date for the hand-over of 
power, which is also mentioned in the Pakualam babad	as	occurring	immediately	after	Robison’s	
departure	from	Yogya	on	26	September,	see	Poensen	1905:264.	Dipanagara	places	the	event	after	
Danureja II’s murder on 31 October, see BD (Manado), II:156-7, XV.100-2.
113 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Captain William Robison (Semarang/Batavia), 
14-10-1811.
114	 Dj.Br.	24,	Pieter	Engelhard	(Yogyakarta)	to	Lieve	Willem	Meijer	(Batavia),	18-11-1811,	the	
arming of the Residency House and garden with cannon had been ordered by Janssens’ besluit of 
7-9-1811.
115	 Dj.Br.	24,	Pieter	Engelhard	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	31-10-1811;	LOr	
11089 (II), ‘Patih séda kadhaton, anggitanipoen J.B. Tjiptawinata’, 9.
116 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 103.
117 This may be Kyai Amad Ngusman, later head (lurah) of the Suranatan corps, see Appendix 
VIIb. But since this man is listed as a retainer of the kadipatèn, his presence in the group ordered 
to	murder	the	Crown	Prince’s	staunch	ally,	Danureja	II,	does	not	really	fit.
118 Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 25-5-1803, 
31-5-1803, on the strangulation of the Mataram bupati, Radèn Tumenggung Cakradiwirya I, with 
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At daybreak the following morning, his body was taken south for interment 
at the traitor’s graveyard just beyond Imagiri where Radèn Rongga’s hacked 
corpse had been laid to rest just ten months previously.119
On 31 October, Engelhard received a report from Pangéran Dipakusuma, 
the joint acting bupati wedana of the eastern mancanagara who was in Yogya for 
the Garebeg Puwasa, to the effect that Danureja and his father, the gallant but 
dim Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma, who had just returned from command-
ing the Yogya forces at Jati Ngalèh (Serondhol), had been ‘dismissed’.120 In fact, 
Danureja had been dead for three full days and, as we will see shortly, his 
father would not be long in following him. Danureja’s uncle, Kyai Tumenggung 
Sindunagara, the prematurely aged Outer bupati had been appointed to take 
Danureja’s place.121 Within an hour of his meeting with Engelhard, Dipakusuma 
was back at the Residency with a short official letter from the sultan confirm-
ing the patih’s ‘dismissal’ and referring to his many defects. These included 
besmirching the Islamic religion (angresahi agami Islam), demeaning the sultan’s 
royal dignity, and violating both his injunctions as sovereign and those of the 
late Sultan Mangkubumi. His father, Danukusuma, had been ‘struck’ (tiwas) 
by his son’s misfortune (Carey 1980:76-7). Two references in the old sultan’s 
white thread on the orders of Hamengkubuwana II; AN, Besluit van den gouverneur-generaal, 
19-3-1822 no. 11, on the commutation of the death sentence by strangulation passed against 
Hamengkubuwana I’s son, Pangéran Dipasana, for leading a rebellion in Kedhu in February 1822. 
See further Chapter IX.
119 There are a number of accounts of Danureja II’s death and those that took part in it. I have 
followed John Crawfurd’s description given in IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, ‘State of the court of Djocjacarta’, 
6-12-1811, 47. Both LOr 11089 (I), ‘Lelampahanipoen Kangdjeng Pangeran Arja Djoeroe R.M.P. 
Santadilaga Lempoejangan (Djokjokarta)’, 1, and B.Ng. I:236, LIX.53-4 give 13 Sawal AJ 1738 (AD 
1-11-1811) and 14 Sawal AJ 1738 (AD 2-11-1811) as the dates of his death and burial. His body 
was later disinterred from Banyusumurup and moved to the family graveyard at Melangi (see 
Chapter III) during the reign of Hamengkubuwana VI (1855-1877), Carey 1992:430 note 151. The 
inscription on Danureja II’s grave at the family graveyard at Melangi reads: sumaré ing ngriki 
saking Banyusumurup 14 Besar [AJ] 1 7 9 3 (‘interred here from Banyusumurup on 11 May 1865’), 
personal visit to the dhusun perdikan of Melangi, Yogyakarta, 14-5-1977. Danureja II was just 39 
when he was murdered.
120	 Dj.Br.	24,	Pieter	Engelhard	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	31-10-1811;	Louw	
and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:38.
121	 Dj.Br.	24,	Pieter	Engelhard	(Yogyakarta)	 to	T.S.	Raffles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	31-10-1811.	 It	 is	
clear from Hamengkubuwana II and the Crown Prince (future Hamengkubuwana III’s) joint 
letter	 to	Pakubuwana	 IV	of	 14	Besar	AJ	 1738	 (AD	30-12-1811)	 that	 Sindunagara	was	officially	
invested as patih on 19 Sawal AJ 1738 (AD 7-11-1811); Pakubuwana IV’s reply dated 18 Besar AJ 
1738	(AD	3-1-1812)	to	this	letter	is	in	S.Br.	37,	p.	1025.	According	to	Dipanagara	(BD	(Manado)	
II:158-9, XV.107-12), Sindunagara was invested on Monday, 12 November in the presence of the 
Residency Interpreter, J.G. Dietrée, and the Commander of the Fort, Lieutenant Willem Driessen, 
but	he	was	never	officially	recognised	by	the	British	government	as	a	legitimate	patih (Appendix 
Va)	and	only	bore	the	title	of	Kyai	Adipati	Danureja,	see	further	Rouffaer	1905:608,	on	the	‘hill-
billy’ – berg Javaan – title of ‘Kyai Adipati’. On the willingness of the British to accept his allegiance 
without	officially	recognising	his	status,	see	IOL	Eur	E105/3	(Raffles	collection,	vol.	3),	John	Craw-
furd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	22-1-1812.	
The power of prophecy294
letter leap off the page: his evocation of Mangkubumi’s legacy underscores 
once again what a massive and enduring influence the founder of Yogya had 
on the younger generation who governed his kingdom in the early nineteenth 
century. Even more significant, however, was the way in which the Islamic reli-
gion (agami Islam) appears in the text. It may be that the sultan had the syariah 
(Islamic law) in mind. We have seen above how the political crisis of the past 
ten months had led to a greater assiduity on his part in attending the Friday 
services at the Great Mosque as well as the twice weekly prayer meetings of 
the court santri. But there is something larger being evoked here: Islam seems 
to be being used as a shorthand for the Javanese-Islamic moral order in gen-
eral. Indeed, we will see how this equating of agami Islam with the moral order 
would become an especially salient feature of Dipanagara’s struggle during the 
Java War.
Confirmation of Danureja’s death only reached Engelhard on 7 November122 
and the Resident was later much censured for allowing the sultan to perpe-
trate his murder (De Haan 1910-12, I pt. 2:98). Certainly, the ruler’s action 
was in direct contravention of two of the key articles of his contract with the 
VOC agreed at the time of his accession on 2 April 1792 (Carey 1980:76 note 
1). But given Engelhard’s very poor physical health, he was in no position to 
do anything at the time. Besides, he himself was in some personal danger and 
was later attacked by a band operating under the second sultan’s orders as 
he made his way in a sedan chair through the Jambu hills to Semarang after 
relinquishing his post to Crawfurd in mid-November.123 Both in this attack 
on the Resident and the brutal murder of Danureja six weeks previously, the 
old sultan was taking revenge for the humiliation of Daendels’ policies dur-
ing the previous three years.
The position of the Prince Regent was now desperate. With his main 
supporter murdered and the Resident in such a sickly condition, nothing 
appeared to stand in the way of his own destruction. Engelhard noticed how 
at this time, the Regent – who had de facto returned to his previous rank as 
Crown Prince given the sultan’s re-seizure of power – appeared to be sunk 
into a state of deep grief for a number of days.124 In his babad, Dipanagara 
also gives a graphic account of his father’s plight, describing how he was 
summoned from Tegalreja on 1 November to find the great outer doors of 
his father’s residence, the kadipatèn, bolted and guarded by members of the 
122	 Dj.Br.	24,	Pieter	Engelhard	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Bogor),	7-11-1811.
123 Hageman 1857:414; Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 106, who suggests that there was no inten-
tion	of	murdering	Engelhard,	arguing	that	 the	attack	was	 intended	to	shake	him	up	and	bring	
home	to	him	the	sultan’s	anger	at	the	his	role	in	the	ruler’s	recent	political	humiliation.	No	attempt	
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firm Islamic community and the ‘priestly’ Suranatan regiment.125 The prince 
adds a description of his own mediating role which appears nowhere else 
in the sources and cannot be verified. His father, he says, informed him of 
Danureja’s death and asked what he should do in the event that the sultan 
summoned him to the kraton. Clearly, he feared that he would meet the same 
fate as the patih. Dipanagara gave him the advice not to go that night. Instead, 
he, the prince, would accompany his father to the kraton when he was next 
bidden to an audience with the Yogya ruler. Meanwhile, he told his father 
that he had thrown away the bolts to the outer doors of the kadipatèn and 
dismissed his Suranatan bodyguard in order to avoid any misunderstanding 
with the old sultan.126 If we are to believe Dipanagara’s account, he succeeded 
in mediating a potentially dangerous situation. 
Four days later (5 November), the erstwhile Regent (now Crown Prince) 
made his attendance on the sultan surrounded by all his relations, includ-
ing the twenty-six-year-old Dipanagara – then still styled Radèn Antawirya 
– who was now fast emerging, according to his own testimony and that of at 
least one of his Yogya contemporaries, as his father’s chief political adviser.127 
The former Regent accepted the sultan’s explanation for the patih’s death and 
made his peace with him. On 7 November, Engelhard reported that the dif-
ferences between the Prince Regent and his father had been overcome.128 In 
a secret letter to the Surakarta patih written around this time, Sumadiningrat 
also mentioned that the ex-Regent, now Crown Prince, was ‘completely 
obedient’ to the sultan.129 Sometime later, the ex-Regent wrote to the sultan 
formally relinquishing his previous position and was reinstated once again 
as Crown Prince.130 By this action, Dipanagara suggests in his babad, he 
hoped to forestall any move to appoint Mangkudiningrat in his father’s place 
and to present a united front against the British. Indeed, Raffles would later 
remark on the extraordinary ‘filial piety’ of the Crown Prince for his father 
at this time,131 a judgement clearly based on Crawfurd’s own assessment that 
‘the Crown Prince’s conduct to his father has been marked by a tenderness 
125 BD (Manado) II: 140, XV.33-34. Dipanagara refers to kaum	which	I	have	translated	as	‘firm	
Islamic community’.
126 BD (Manado) II:146, XV.53.
127	 BD	(Manado)	II:147-9,	XV.57-69.	The	first	independent	reference	to	Dipanagara’s	crucial	role	
as his father’s political adviser comes in Pangéran Panular’s babad of the British occupation of 
Yogya, when in circa August 1812 he is described as the ‘one who is made foremost’ (ingkang 
kinarya pangarsa) by his father, see Carey 1992:119, 290, 450 note 244; Chapter VIII.
128	 Dj.Br.	24,	Pieter	Engelhard	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Batavia),	7-11-1811.
129 IOL Eur F148/24, pt. A, ‘Secret correspondence’, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat 
(Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y. (circa early November 1811).
130 BD (Manado) II:55-57, XV.98-101; Van der Kemp 1896a:414-5. Dipanagara’s testimony is par-
tially	confirmed	by	Valck	who	says	that	the	former	Prince	Regent	later	told	John	Crawfurd	that	he	
had ‘abdicated’ voluntarily, Dj.Br. 9A, ‘Overzigt’, 113.
131	 IOL,	G21/65,	Raffles,	‘Memorandum	respecting	Java’,	1813,	36.
Plate 32. Portrait of John Crawfurd (1783-1868), who served as Resident of 
Yogyakarta with intermissions from November 1811 to August 1816 and was 
centrally involved with the political arrangements relating to the British attack 
on Yogyakarta in June 1812. Study in oils painted in Edinburgh by Sir John 
Watson Gordon, R.A. (1790-1864) at the request of the European inhabitants of 
Singapore who commissioned the portrait for their new town hall. It was first 
exhibited at the Royal Academy in London in 1858. Photograph by courtesy of 
the National Museum, Singapore.
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and deference not usual under such circumstances as those in which he has 
been placed’ (Carey 1980:85 note 1). Something of this same deference would 
also be evident in Dipanagara’s actions at the time of the sultan’s death on 3 
January 1828 when he went out of his way to show respect for his late grand-
father despite the vicissitudes of war.132 But events were soon to undermine 
the precarious unity of the Yogya court.
The British attempt at compromise and Raffles’ first visit to the courts
On 14 November, the new British Resident,133 John Crawfurd, arrived in 
Yogya with an escort of 300 sepoys drawn from the Bengal Light Infantry 
Volunteer Battalion then in transit at Semarang. The British-Indian soldiers’ 
immediate task was to relieve the garrison of 70 Ambonese cavalry,134 but 
during the next four years they would undertake lengthy tours of duty at the 
courts until their involvement in the sepoy conspiracy of October-November 
1815 necessitated their immediate and permanent withdrawal from south-
central Java (pp. 415-28). The following day, Engelhard formally handed over 
the Residency seals to his successor. 
Crawfurd was undoubtedly one of the most able officials to serve in the 
sultan’s capital in the four decades when Dipanagara was living in Yogya 
before the Java War. As we have seen, the prince would later place him above 
all the Dutch Residents he met in terms of character and ability (p. 108). He 
was also by all accounts a rather popular Resident with the local Javanese elite 
who appreciated his willingness to learn to speak fluent High Javanese and to 
allow his horses to participate in the English-style horse races in the town (De 
Haan 1935a:529; Carey 1992:296, 420 note 106, 453-4 note 262, 524 note 617). 
But he did not start off well in his new post. Within days he had ma naged to 
132 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:532; B.Ng. III:201, XXIX.9-11, on Dipanagara’s order to 
his followers to recite the salat gaib (prayer for the dead) at the passing of Hamengkubuwana 
II	on	3	 January	1828,	and	his	 instruction	 to	his	younger	brother	Pangéran	Suryawijaya	(Basah	
Ngabdulsamsu), who was commanding his forces to the south of Yogya, to get his troops to line 
the route to Imagiri when his funeral cortège passed. Because of the security situation, Hameng-
kubuwana II ended up being buried in Kutha Gedhé instead. See Chapter XI.
133	 The	title	of	‘minister’	had	been	abolished	by	the	British.	Henceforth	all	the	senior	official	
representatives at the south-central Javanese courts until the late 1920s (when they were given 
the title of ‘governor’) would be known as ‘Resident’ and their deputies as ‘Assistant-Residents’ 
(post-1824, ‘secretaries’).
134	 Hageman	1857:414;	Dj.Br.	9A,	Valck,	 ‘Overzigt’,	 108;	 IOL	Eur	F148/17	 (Raffles-Minto	col-
lection, vol. 17), Captain William Robison, ‘Note of Temporary arrangements made by […] at 
Souracarta and Djocjocarta’, Semarang, 27-9-1811 (on the Ambonese cavalry garrison); S.Br. 14B, 
Colonel	Alexander	Adams	(Surakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	12-5-1812	(on	the	strength	
of	the	sepoy	garrisons	in	south-central	Java	in	May	1812:	597	‘rank-and-file’	in	Surakarta,	400	in	
Yogya, where Crawfurd also retained members of the 22nd Dragoon Regiment in the fort).
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anger not only the sultan, but also his immediate superior, Raffles, and the 
new commander-in-chief of the army, Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie, three of 
the most important men in Java. Crawfurd’s instructions had been to spend 
time in Semarang and Surakarta before proceeding to Yogya. However, the 
news he received while in the two central Javanese towns from the Dutch 
Residents at the courts and from the Sunan about the actions of the Yogya 
ruler was so grave that he decided to take along a sizeable sepoy escort for his 
own safety. There were even rumours that he would himself be attacked en 
route by the sultan’s forces. In direct contravention of Raffles’ and Gillespie’s 
orders, he also detained the Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion, which was 
destined for Surabaya, in Semarang in case he needed to call on further 
troops.135 On 18 November, Raffles wrote deprecating Crawfurd’s action 
for which he had no superior authority.136 The irascible Gillespie’s reaction 
is unrecorded, but it would certainly have been vivid and unprintable. In 
fact, far from being attacked, the Scotsman was met at Prambanan by the 
second sultan’s ambassadors who presented him with their ruler’s compli-
ments and went out of their way to show him the customary respect. Once 
safely arrived in Yogya, however, he ignored Raffles’ explicit instructions that 
he should not to bring any further disharmony into European government-
Yogya relations,137 and in particular that he should thoroughly investigate 
the possibility of restoring the sultan and maintaining the Regent as Crown 
Prince (Van Deventer 1891:307-8).
The new British Resident seems to have arrived in Yogya with his mind 
already made up against the old sultan and his supporters. ‘The sultan is a 
sulking old rogue’, he confided to his Surakarta colleague, Colonel Alexander 
Adams, on his first full day in office.138 A curt note almost calculated to offend 
was sent that day to the court with the Resident’s official seal at the bottom 
rather than in the usual place at the top left-hand corner:
The undersigned elected British Resident to the court of Djocjocarta has learnt 
with much surprise the unwarranted steps pursued by that court without the 
knowledge or sanction of the legitimate representative of the British Government, 
Mr [Pieter] Engelhard.
The undersigned is in duty bound to enter his solemn protest against all the 
measures of the court of Djocjocarta since the 31st October and to decline all inter-
course with it until he receive the commands of that Government which manages 
the affairs of the conquerors of Java. 
135	 IOL,	Raffles-Minto	collection	(Xerox	copies	of	holograph	letters),	vol.	2,	T.S.	Raffles	(Rijswijk	/




137 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 108.
138 S.Br. 24, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta), 15-11-1811.
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The British Resident avails himself of this opportunity to assure the royal family 
of Djocjocarta of his high esteem and consideration. 
Done at the Residency House of Djocjocarta this fifteenth day of November 
1811.139
With almost Daendelian brazenness, Crawfurd toyed with the idea of cap-
turing the second sultan by surprise, and re-appointing his son as Prince 
Regent.140 On 17 November, he wrote to Raffles stating that he thought both 
Hamengkubuwana II and Mangkudiningrat should be exiled from Java.141 
‘Fear and not affection are now the tie of the people’, he confided in his survey 
of the leading figures at the court in early December, ‘for the conduct of the sul-
tan has of late been very oppressive […] fines are levied on the rich on the most 
trivial pretexts […] [and] sons are seldom allowed to succeed to their fathers’ 
[estates] without the payment of heavy costs’.142 The Regent was, however, 
‘a man of good sense and conduct and of mild manners and disposition’.143 
He also formed a high opinion of the absent Natakusuma, whom he had met 
before arriving in Yogya, though not of his vindictive son, Natadiningrat, and 
urged the lieutenant-governor that they might be used as secret and confiden-
tial agents of British policy should their services be required.144
Crawfurd declined to meet the sultan in the kraton for nearly two weeks 
after his arrival.145 He also refused to accept Sindunagara as patih because 
his appointment had been made without official British approval. Indeed, it 
was not until 22 January 1812 that the acting patih was able to take the official 
oath of allegiance to the British government.146 All the aged Sindunagara’s 
attempts to get Crawfurd to have an audience with the Yogya ruler were 
rebuffed. The Yogya monarch for his part was confused. Raffles’ letter of 
20 December 1810 from Melaka had spoken of his being ‘restored’ to his 
full dignity as ruler. He was thus under the impression that the new British 
139 S.Br. 24, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 15-11-1811.
140 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 110-1.
141	 AvJ,	 John	Crawfurd	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	T.S.	Raffles	 (Rijswijk/Batavia),	 17-11-1811,	 quoted	 in	
A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 5-8-1824. See also 
Hageman 1857:415.
142 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘State of the court of Djocjacarta’, 6-12-1811, 41. Crawfurd 
appears	to	have	drawn	heavily	on	his	conversations	with	Engelhard	before	the	latter’s	18	Novem-
ber departure from Yogya and on a perusal of the memorie van overgave	 (final	 administrative	
reports)	of	the	previous	Dutch	Residents	such	as	W.H.	van	IJsseldijk	(in	office	1786-1798),	J.G.	van	
den	Berg	(1798-1803)	and	Matthijs	Waterloo	(1803-1808),	copies	of	which	were	available	 in	the	
Residency archive, before writing his report.
143 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘State of the court of Djocjacarta’, 6-12-1811, 44.
144 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘State of the court of Djocjacarta’, 6-12-1811, 43; Van Deventer 
1891:309,	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Semarang),	6-12-1811.
145 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 110-1.
146	 IOL	Eur	E105	(Raffles	collection,	vol.	3),	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Rijs-
wijk/Batavia),	 22-1-1812,	on	Kyai	Adipati	Danureja	 III’s	 taking	of	 the	oath	of	allegiance	 to	 the	
British government. See also Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 119.
Plate 33. Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781-1826), lieutenant-governor of Java (October 
1811-March 1816). Copy of a plaster bust made by Sir Francis Legatt Chantrey (1781-1841) 
in 1817. Photograph by courtesy of the India Office Library and Records, London.
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go vernment had accepted his political revolution. Indeed, he believed that 
the relevant dispatches from Minto and Raffles recognising his fait accompli 
had been intentionally hidden by Engelhard and Danureja II. This was one of 
the reasons, according to a later Dutch commentator, why the patih had been 
murdered and the Resident attacked on his journey to Semarang.147 Now 
the new British appointee was formally protesting his actions. What was he 
to make of all this? In response, he sent a joint letter with the Crown Prince 
pointing out that Crawfurd, referred to as ‘the minister who appended his 
seal to the bottom of his letter‘, was not allowed to meddle – literally ’act as a 
guardian angel for’ (ambaureksa) – in the events which had taken place in the 
kraton since 1 November (Carey 1980:77-9).
Meanwhile, Raffles had become seriously alarmed about his subordinate’s 
actions. He feared that they were leading the newly established British gov-
ernment into a showdown with Yogya just at a time when troops were thinly 
spread:148 the bulk of the invasion force was being withdrawn from Java after 
completing their operations against the Franco-Dutch forces and those that 
remained were being readied for deployment elsewhere in the archipelago.149 
The onset of the rainy season was also a consideration. A campaign in central 
Java at this time would be particularly difficult.150 ‘It must be laid down as a 
principle in all our dealings with the native courts’, he wrote in a secret dis-
patch to Crawfurd on 15 December, ‘that in no case must we demand what 
we cannot enforce in case of refusal’ (Van Deventer 1891:313). In fact, the 
lieutenant-governor’s demands at this time were quite minimal and in part 
almost as politically naive as those of his Yogya representative. In late October, 
he had already assured Minto that the second sultan’s reinstatement seemed 
‘practicable […] without endangering the tranquillity of the country’,151 and he 
reiterated this view in another secret dispatch to Crawfurd in early December, 
adding the condition that the Yogya ruler should write a letter of atonement for 
his recent actions. Then came a remark of stunning ignorance: if he still proved 
intractable Yogya should be placed under the administration of the Sunan!152
147 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 111.
148 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 117.
149	 On	troop	levels	and	withdrawals,	Thorn	1815:123-4,	200;	IOL,	G21/65,	Raffles,	‘Memoran-
dum	respecting	Java’,	1813,	43,	citing	Gillespie’s	concern	that	the	attack	on	Yogya	should	occur	
as early as possible because European regiments were about to be withdrawn to Bengal. On the 
need to mount an expedition, comprising 750 European troops and 375 sepoys, against the Sultan 
of	Palembang,	which	eventually	sailed	on	20	March	1812,	see	Thorn	1815:127-73;	Raffles,	‘Memo-
randum	respecting	Java’,	1813,	41;	IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	24),	T.S.	Raffles	





1891:312. See also Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:37 note 3, 39; Valck 1844:28.
Plate 34. Aquatint by William Daniell (1769-1837) of a Light Infantry 
Volunteer Battalion sepoy who took part in the British attack on the Yogya 
kraton in June 1812 and the sepoy conspiracy of 1815. Taken from Williams 
1817; 331 facing. Photograph by courtesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
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Even before these secret dispatches were written and prior to his own 
arrival in Semarang, Raffles had instructed Crawfurd to climb down and 
meet with the sultan and the Crown Prince.153 The audience took place on 
26 November and seems to have passed off well enough under the circum-
stances, although the Resident noticed with dismay that instead of sitting 
next to his father or on a stool, the Crown Prince sat on the floor with the 
other senior officials, and the second sultan’s throne was once again raised 
above his own seat by the insertion of a wooden bench.154 The Yogya ruler 
was clearly determined to return to the pre-July 1808 status quo, something 
which Raffles again appeared to have encouraged in his Melaka dispatch.
Soon after this initial meeting, however, relations between the British 
Residency and the court came under renewed strain due to a series of inci-
dents involving members of the sepoy garrison. Over a period of six days (29 
November-4 December), Yogya inhabitants, particularly those who worked in 
the main market Pasar Beringharjo, reacted to what they perceived as the offen-
sive habits of the Bengali soldiers by acting in Crawfurd’s words in ‘a publicly 
insulting fashion’ towards them. In at least one case a knife was drawn, and 
in another stones were hurled at a sepoy who was visiting the main market 
(Carey 1980:79-81). A later Dutch source even speaks of a mortal wounding of 
one of the sepoy guards at the fort, but this is not confirmed in the official cor-
respondence.155 Nahuys van Burgst, who had access to the Residency archive 
during his own six-year tour of duty in the sultan’s capital (1816-1822), subse-
quently wrote that the ‘immorality’ of the garrison at this time nearly caused 
a mass local uprising against the Europeans in the sultan’s capital.156 Raffles 
recognised that the ‘habits and manners’ of the sepoys were offensive to the 
Javanese and ‘often produced disturbances’, but he also stressed that they were 
153 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 112.
154 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 112-3.
155	 Dj.Br.	9A,	Valck,	‘Overzigt’,	113.	One	of	the	problems	with	confirming	anything	in	the	offi-
cial	Residency	archive	of	the	British	period	is	that	Valck	appears	to	have	used	the	official	letters	
for his major survey of Yogya history from 1755 to the Java War (partly published in Tijdschrift 
voor Nederlandsch-Indië in 1844), but then kept them for his own personal collection, see Carey 
1978:119,	119	note	15.	The	result	is	that	the	Residency	letters	for	the	period	November	1811	to	
August 1816 are extremely sparse. In fact, the only three bundles available (Dj.Br. 28-30) were 
put together by François de Haan (landsarchivaris – government archivist of the Netherlands East 
Indies archive in Batavia – 1905-1922) when he was researching his major article on the personali-
ties of the British administration, De Haan 1935a:477-681. In 1817, Nahuys van Burgst reported 
that	all	the	incoming	letters	from	the	British	government	to	John	Crawfurd	as	Resident	of	Yogya	
(1811-1814, 1816) for the period 29-5-1812 – 26-8-1812, during the immediate build up to the Brit-
ish	attack	of	20	June	1812	and	its	aftermath,	were	missing	from	the	Residency	archive;	and	in	1823,	
the then Yogya Resident, A.H. Smissaert, mentioned that the Residency archives were in great 
disorder	and	vital	files	–	for	example	on	Haji	Ibrahim	(note	87)	–	could	not	be	found,	S.Br.	87,	A.H.	
Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to A.M.Th. de Salis (Surakarta), 2-4-1823.
156 Dj.Br. 52C, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen, 13-3-1821, 
reference to the zedeloosheid of the sepoy garrison in Yogya.
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‘of the best service’ because ‘the Javanese stand in great awe of them’.157 Since 
British power in Java was to a large extent based on their Indian – particularly 
Bengali – soldiery, the sepoys were not easily replaceable with European or 
Indonesian troops,158 especially at a time when intense debate was taking place 
in the lieutenant-governor’s council about force levels in British-occupied Java 
and the need to make economies (Thorn 1815:200; De Haan 1935a:553).
Another source of conflict in mid-December had to do with the dispatch of a 
customary letter of greeting and ambassadorial mission led by the acting patih 
to Raffles in Semarang as the incoming ‘governor-general’. Since Raffles held 
the title of lieutenant-governor, this may have confused the Yogya court into 
thinking that they were dealing with a British version of the defunct governor 
of Java’s Northeast Coast (Chapter V). It is clear from an extant letter from the 
sultan and the Crown Prince to Raffles dated 19 December that the lieutenant-
governor was being addressed as a ‘good friend’ and ‘brother’ (Carey 1980:86-
7) rather than the more customary ‘grandfather’ (éyang) (Ricklefs 1974a:373). 
Crawfurd had protested that the usual forms of address had not been fol-
lowed and the letter was not allowed to be sent.159 In particular, he objected to 
the opening phrase in the letter ‘from the sultan holding court in Yogyakarta’ 
because he felt the Prince Regent was brought into degradation by the expres-
sion (Carey 1980:83 note 2). He thus insisted on dictating a revised letter and 
ordering that a new mission should be sent under the acting patih to present 
it.160 But it seems that both Crawfurd and Raffles, who was then travelling to 
Surabaya before proceeding on to Surakarta,161 expected this ambassadorial 
mission to meet the lieutenant-governor in the Sunan’s capital rather than 
at Semarang. This neither the sultan nor the Crown Prince would accept 
(Carey 1980:83-5). Again Raffles and his representative in Yogya had shown a 
157	 IOL,	G21/65,	Raffles,	‘Memorandum	respecting	Java’,	1813,	141. ‘From the fear entertained 
of them by the Javanese’, he wrote to Lord Minto, ‘[the sepoys] are hardly in any respects inferior 
to	the	Europeans’,	IOL,	Eur	F148/23	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	23),	T.S.	Raffles	(Salatiga)	to	
Lord	Minto	(Calcutta),	6-8-1812.	See	also	Carey	1977:296.





dum respecting Java’, 1813, 141.
159 Carey 1980:83 note 2; Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 112.
160 IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. E no. 3, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat 
(Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y. (? 19-12-1811). See further Hageman 
1857:416, who stated that sultan used the expression saudara	(‘friend’)	in	his	letter.
161	 IOL,	Mack.Pr.	 2,	 29,	T.S.	Raffles	 (Semarang)	 to	Colonel	Alexander	Adams	 (Surakarta),	 6-
12-1811,	refers	to	Raffles’	travel	plans	for	mid-December	which	involved	the	following	itinerary:	
11-13 December: in Surabaya, 14 December: back to Semarang, 15-17 December: in Surakarta and 
18-19 December: in Yogyakarta. But this appears to have been delayed by a week.
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basic misunderstanding of court politics in south-central Java.162 Eventually, 
Sindunagara was sent to the north coast with the revised letter only to find that 
Raffles had already departed for Surakarta (20 December) on the first stage of 
his December visit to the courts (Hageman 1857:416). Sumadiningrat reported 
at this time to his Surakarta counterpart, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara, through 
the secret back channel which had now been opened between the two courts, 
that the Resident’s actions had united the sultan and the Crown Prince ‘as one 
person’ against the opinionated Scot.163
On 16 December, Natakusuma was returned to Yogya from Surabaya 
by the British government after deeply impressing Raffles with his under-
standing of political affairs in the sultan’s capital.164 He had an immediate 
audience with the sultan and told him of the lieutenant-governor’s concerns 
about the ruler’s slighting of the previous Franco-Dutch government – a ref-
erence to the Yogya monarch’s unilateral resumption of his full royal powers 
– and the appointment of a patih without the approval of the government. 
Before Raffles arrived in Yogya, Natakusuma informed the sultan, he would 
have to return political arrangements to what they had been under Marshal 
Daendels by placing the Crown Prince once more in charge of the kraton as 
Regent. Then when the lieutenant-governor came, he would formally rein-
state Hamengkubuwana II to his previous position as ruler (Carey 1980:66-8, 
90-1). We know that while he was still in Surabaya on 15 December, Raffles 
had instructed Crawfurd that the sultan should formally resign the royal 
government into the hands of the Crown Prince before he could be reinstated. 
But what Natakusuma had not told his elder brother was that this would 
involve the British Resident dictating a letter which would, as Raffles put it, 
‘express […] in such words as to adequately answer the purposes of atone-
ment intended. The letter should contain the best excuse for his conduct that 
can be adduced […] [this] will in my opinion be sufficient […] on the part 
of the sultan and a justification for my again placing him in power’ (Van 
Deventer 1891:312-3; Carey 1980:85 note 1). 
The intended letter was eventually written on 19 December, although the 
sultan refused to cleave exactly to Crawfurd’s draft text. In suitably contrite 
tone, the Yogya ruler begged the forgiveness of the ‘high officers’ of the British 
government and stated that he had only acted ‘high-handedly’ against the 
previous Franco-Dutch government because it had lost all authority after 
162 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 114.
163 IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. E no. 3, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat 
(Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y. (? 15-12-1811).
164 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 116; IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. F no. 12, 
Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y. 
(? 19-12-1811) (both give Monday, 16 December as the date of Natakusuma’s return); AvJ, T.S. 
Raffles	(Surabaya)	to	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta),	14-12-1811,	Secret	(on	Raffles’	view	of	Nataku-
suma’s political acumen).
Plate 35. Portrait of Colonel Colin Mackenzie (circa 1754-1821), chief engi-
neer to the British Forces in Java, who planned the assault on the Yogyakarta 
kraton in June 1812, surrounded by his three South Indian pandits who 
served as his cartographers and language teachers. Painting by Thomas 
Hickey (1741-1824). Photograph by courtesy of the India Office Library and 
Records, London.
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the unconditional capitulation of Janssens at Kali Tuntang (18 September). 
Moreover, the former Prince Regent had not acted unpleasantly towards 
him, but had always behaved with extreme obedience and respect. It was 
quite otherwise with the deceased patih, however, who had conducted him-
self evilly, grieving the sultan’s heart and angering him greatly. He had also 
behaved badly towards the wives and children of leading Javanese, a reference 
to Danureja II’s supposed role as a procurer of young girls for the ex-Regent 
(Chapter VI). The sultan declared himself well pleased to confirm his son once 
more in control of the affairs of state but craved the ‘justice and fairness’ of 
those now in charge of the administration of Java – a clear echo here of Minto’s 
26 August proclamation from Crawfurd’s pen – and hoped that they would 
return him to his full royal dignity once again (Carey 1980:86-7, 89). 
At his 16 December audience, the sultan had already told Natakusuma 
that the Crown Prince and himself were now as one together and stood by 
their previous actions.165 But despite this apparent solidarity, Natakusuma’s 
return could not have been a pleasant development for the heir apparent 
who had so recently extricated himself from a perilous political impasse. The 
sultan’s younger brother had returned to Yogya seething with resentment 
against his nephew whom he considered as the chief architect of his exile 
and near assassination. These feelings were undoubtedly heightened when 
Natakusuma learnt of the plundering of his residence during his absence 
(Poensen 1905:276-7; Carey 1992:96, 250, 404 note 30). The next six months 
until the fall of the Yogya kraton to British assault on 20 June 1812, were thus 
a period of very delicate manoeuvring on the part of the future Pakualam I 
and the Crown Prince. On the one hand, they needed to protect themselves 
against the sultan, on the other they had to maintain their good relations with 
the British government, a difficult combination. In this fine balancing act, the 
rivalry between the two men was to assume great importance for the prize 
was nothing less than the throne of Yogya.
Preparations were now set in train for Raffles’ first visit to the sultan’s 
capital. A three-man commission comprising the lieutenant-governor’s excep-
tionally able Dutch assistant, Harman Warner Muntinghe, and two Malay-
speaking Bengal army officers, Captain L.H. Davy of the 4th Bengal Volunteer 
Battalion, and Captain W.E. Phillips,166 arrived in Yogya on 23 December to 
make the necessary political arrangements for the visit by entering into pre-
165 IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. F no. 12, ‘Radèn Tumengung Sumadiningrat 
(Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y. (? 19-12-1811), reference to Nataku-
suma and Hamengkubuwana II feeling as one salira kalih dados satunggil.
166 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 117; and for biographical sketches of Davy and Muntinghe, 
see	De	Haan	1935a:533-4,	614-7;	Dudok	van	Heel	2002:161	(who	indicates	that	Muntinghe’s	first	
name is a Groningen version of ‘Herman’); and on Phillips, who later developed special interests 
in Malay literature and wrote a report on the native states of Boné and Gowa in South Sulawesi, 
see Blagden 1916:91; Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:120, 124.
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liminary treaty negotiations with the sultan (Van Deventer 1891:313-4; De 
Haan 1935a:615; Carey 1980:91). There they liaised closely with Crawfurd 
who had returned with them from Surakarta where he had conferred with 
Raffles about the political goals of the visit.167 They were also joined by 
Colonel Colin Mackenzie of the Madras Engineers, Raffles’ chief engineer 
officer, whose expertise was necessary to provide a detailed assessment of the 
sultan’s military capacity and the strength of his kraton fortifications should a 
subsequent British assault be required.168 
Crawfurd had apparently pressed his superior to come in person to 
Yogya with a large military escort to overawe the sultan with British mili-
tary strengt h.169 But, as we have seen, the lieutenant-governor wished to act 
extremely cautiously because of the limited number of troops at his disposal. 
At the time of his first visit to the courts, British forces in central Java num-
bered just over a thousand men, less than half of whom were Europeans, 
the rest being Bengal sepoys from the central Javanese garrisons.170 Of these 
Raffles took 400 with him (100 cavalry and 300 infantry) when he arrived 
in Yogya on 27 December.171 On 25 December, he wrote to Crawfurd from 
Surakarta laying out his views in clear and uncompromising terms. In effect, 
he reminded his Resident just who was in charge:
It will be for me to effect by force what may not be managed by negotiation, but I 
sincerely trust that your influence added to the measures taken by the Commission 
[of Muntinghe, Davy and Phillips], without whose concurrence you are in no case 
to act, may supersede the immediate effect of hostilities which under no circum-
stances short of the most absolute and peremptory necessity can be admitted.172
The issue of the size of the lieutenant-governor’s military escort was also some-
thing which greatly exercised the sultan and his eldest son. On 21 December, 
they sent a joint letter to Crawfurd enquiring whether Raffles would bring a 
167 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 116.
168 Van Deventer 1891:313; De Haan 1935a:600; Mackenzie’s detailed survey of the Yogya kraton 
fortifications	was	 eventually	made	on	16-19	 June	1812	 just	before	 the	British	 assault.	He	 then	
remained	in	Yogya	until	14	July	to	finalise	his	report,	leaving	with	the	last	detachment	of	troops	
on 15 July 1812 for Semarang, see IOL, Mack.Pr. 14, Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Mackenzie, ‘Report 
and journal of Lieutenant Colonel C. Mackenzie’s proceedings on the island of Java from 1st Octo-
ber	1811	to	7th	June	1813	transmitted	to	the	commander	in	chief	at	Fort	St.	George’	(henceforth:	
Mackenzie, ‘Report’), Batavia, 7-6-1813, 252-3. Key maps of the Yogya kraton and Yogya territories 
were taken out of the Residency Archive by Crawfurd and sent to the Marine Academy/Military 
School in Semarang prior to the British assault so that detailed plans could be drawn up for the 
campaign, AvJ, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 19-
4-1823; A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Director of Military School (Semarang), 26-10-1823. See 
further Chapter X note 48.
169 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 116.
170 Thorn 1815:123. On the available European troops, see above note 158.
171	 AvJ,	T.S.	Raffles	(Surakarta)	to	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta),	25-12-1811.
172	 AvJ,	T.S.	Raffles	(Surakarta)	to	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta),	25-12-1811.
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large or a small force with him (Carey 1980:87-8). The Yogya ruler – for it was 
he who was the principal author of the letter – begged the Resident to tell his 
superior not to bring a large retinue because this would certainly cause him 
feelings of unease and unpleasant surprise, feelings which would be shared by 
the Crown Prince and all the other members of his family. Both the sultan and 
his heir apparent stressed that they did not want their intimate relations with 
the British government and its new lieutenant-governor to be sundered or to 
have to engage in hostilities with them. But if Raffles insisted on bringing a 
large escort they would interpret this as a sign that he did not trust them, the 
implication being that this would almost certainly lead eventually to armed 
confrontation. On 24 December, they reiterated this message in another letter 
to the Resident (Carey 1980:89). The fact that Raffles insisted on being received 
in Yogya with the full prerogatives and ceremonial of a visiting governor-
general much in the same fashion as Daendels had been during his 29 July-2 
August visit of 1809 even though his rank was only that of lieutenant-gover-
nor undoubtedly compounded these feelings of unease in Yogya.173
Such preliminaries were hardly an auspicious beginning to Raffles’ arrival 
in the sultan’s capital on 27 December when he was forced to make his official 
entrance down the principal avenue (future Jalan Maliabara) with the Yogya 
ruler’s troops massed on each side bristling with pikes and loaded muskets, 
as many as 10,000 according to the lieutenant-governor‘s subsequent dispatch 
to Minto (Chapter 1 note 20). In fact, it was clear that he was negotiating from 
a position of weakness and his visit was almost marked by tragedy. At the 
first official meeting between himself and the sultan in the throne room of 
the Residency, the latter refused to sit on the chair provided for him, insisting 
instead on using his silver throne under which the inevitable wooden bench 
had been placed so he could sit higher than the lieutenant-governor. Raffles’ 
aide-de-camps apparently kicked the bench away with their feet, whereupon 
some members of the sultan’s entourage drew their krises. British officers then 
entered the room, which was now so full that if it had come to a fight, weapons 
could not have been used. Just in time the Crown Prince stepped between the 
lieutenant-governor and his father and the two men came to their senses.174 
173 AN, Kabinet, 2-3-1838 no. 30, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Algemene Secretarie (Batavia), 
18-2-1837, on the historical precedents for the ceremonial arrangements for Governor-General 
Dominique	Jacques	de	Eerens’	(in	office	1836-1840)	visit	to	the	Yogya	in	1838.	See	further	Houben	
1994:81-2. On Daendels’ 1809 visit, see pp. 208-11.
174 There are various descriptions of this incident in the European and Javanese sources. 
Amongst the European sources I have used: Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 118 (the most complete 




account	of	his	visit);	Raffles	1830:125	 (Lady	Raffles’	memoir	stating	 that	 if	 the	order	had	been	
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The situation was saved, but the incident provided a vivid illustration of the 
tensions which lay just below the surface, tensions which had been exacer-
bated on the Javanese side by nearly four years of humiliation and indignity.
On 28 December, a new treaty was signed between Raffles and the sul-
tan. This allowed for the return of all the lands ceded to Daendels under 
the 10 January treaty except for Grobogan, with its 3,000 cacah and 19,400 
Java rupees in annual rents,175 which was reserved for Natakusuma. But the 
strandgeld payments were not reinstated. The tollgate and market taxes were 
also slated to be taken over by the British government on payment of 80,000 
Spanish dollars a year (Van Deventer 1891:318 article 6). This clause, which 
was not acted upon because of the second sultan’s subsequent opposition in 
the early months of 1812, later opened the way to much fiscal oppression by 
the returned post-1816 Dutch administration in the years leading up to the 
Java War. The cash-strapped Netherlands East Indies government’s attempt 
to raise as much money as possible from this source regardless of the prob-
lems this caused for local trade occasioned much hardship and would be 
one of the rallying points for popular support for Dipanagara’s rebellion in 
the Principalities in 1825 (Chapter IX). Meanwhile, Pacitan was annexed to 
the government, mainly for strategic and commercial reasons, and the sul-
tan was required to lend assistance in the construction of a highway from 
Yogya to Pacitan Bay:176 Raffles wanted access to Pacitan’s harbour and good 
communications with the interior of Java in the event of a future landing by 
British-Indian troops on the south coast (Chapter I note 55). A further article 
attempted to make the Yogya region more accessible to the import of manu-
factured articles, especially English cotton piece goods.177 This carried a stage 
given to Hamengkubuwana II’s entourage to use their drawn krises ‘given the manner in which 
the English were surrounded not a man would have escaped’); Veth 1896-1907, II:303. The Java-
nese sources are: BD (Manado), II:172-3, XVI.6-10 (who stresses key role of the Crown Prince); 
B.Ng. I:254-5, LXIII.1-13. 
175 Grobogan’s 3,000 cacah (productive peasant family) capacity is listed in the Serat Ebuk Anyar 
(New Book) of 1773, see Dj.Br. 43, ‘Register der landen van den Sultan opgemaakt te Semarang 
Aº 1773’, 2-11-1773; its 19,200 Java rupee annual rental assessment is mentioned in S.Br. 23, Hugh 
Hope	(Surakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Buitenzorg),	9-5-1813.	1	Java	rupee	was	worth	f 1.20 or 24 pence 
in contemporary English currency, Carey 1980:199-200; Appendix XVI.
176 Van Deventer 1891:319 articles 8-9; UBL BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst, 
‘Rapport over de residentie Djokjokarta’, 6-2-1817. See further pp. 164-5.
177 Van Deventer 1891:319 article 10. This sought to abolish the sumptuary laws (awisan-Dalem) 
on the wearing of certain types of batik cloth which had been earlier reserved to the ruler and 
his close family. One of these was the parang rusak	pattern,	which	was	very	much	sought	after	
in	Yogya.	Crawfurd	 later	had	 examples	 of	 this	 and	other	 batik	patterns	 sent	 to	British	 textile	
manufacturers in Paisley (Glasgow) and Lancashire so they could produce piece goods for the 
Yogya market, see Chapter I note 75. On the awisan-Dalem in Yogya in the period 1755-1812, see 
further Carey 1980:177-82; Carey and Hoadley 2000:85-6, 94-5; IOL, Mack.Pr. 79, Johan Knops, 
‘Description of the city of Samarang [Semarang] of its campongs [kampung], of its environs & of 
its population’, 280-5. See further Chapter VIII note 99.
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further the opening up of Java’s interior to the newly industrialising world 
economy of which Britain was at this time the global leader. It also led to sig-
nificant developments within Java’s own domestic waxed-dyed fabric (batik) 
industry designed to counter competition from European textile imports, 
most notably the greater use of hand block printing (Rouffaer 1904:21-2).
Although Raffles had belatedly abandoned any idea of placing Yogya 
under Surakarta control, the political clauses in the treaty were not without 
their problems. In fact, they showed that the lieutenant-governor continued 
to labour under significant misconceptions with regard to the south-central 
Javanese court system. Thus, although the Yogya treaty was nearly the same 
as that concluded with the Sunan on 23 December, it significantly did not 
include a clause continuing the sultan in his administration such as had been 
incorporated in the treaty with Pakubuwana IV (Van Deventer 1891:315 note 
1 article 2). Instead, the relevant clause of the Yogya treaty envisaged that 
the Resident, John Crawfurd, would fulfil the role of patih (Van Deventer 
1891:317 article 2). Perhaps Raffles hoped that this would keep the sultan in 
check. But if so, he made a grave blunder. In the Javanese view, it seemed to 
admit that the Resident was now the servant of the sultan, much in the same 
fashion as the earlier representatives of the VOC at the courts (Chapter V). 
Crawfurd must have realised that a cardinal error had been made because 
shortly after the treaty was concluded the only signed copy ‘disappeared’ 
from the Residency archive.178
In return for his political advice and assistance, Natakusuma was given 
an immediate stipend of 6,000 Spanish dollars a year – which was never in 
fact paid – with a smaller sum of 1,000 Spanish dollars a year being allocated 
to the Yogya kapitan cina (captain of the Chinese) Tan Jin Sing (in office 1803-
1813), who had also provided invaluable services to Crawfurd.179 But Raffles 
later noted that his previous idea of employing Natakusuma as a secret 
British agent had been sabotaged by Crawfurd’s actions in grooming him as 
a rival to the sultan and the Prince Regent so that he had already become the 
object of the greatest jealousy on the part of the court.180
The treaty was destined to be short-lived. Neither side had any intention of 
abiding by its clauses. According to the Pakualam babad, Raffles had assured 
178 Van Deventer 1891:317 note 1, 319-20 note 2, called this clause a ‘gigantic blunder’ (een 
reusachtige blunder) and speculated that this may have been one of the reasons why the signed 
copy of the treaty had been removed the Yogya Residency archive.
179	 Van	Deventer	1891:xv	note	1;	AvJ,	T.S.	Raffles	(Yogyakarta)	to	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta),	
28-12-1811, who stated that the payments were to be made out of the secret service fund. Accord-
ing to Van Deventer 1891:102, they were never paid.
180	 BL	Add	MS.	45272	(Raffles’	secret	correspondence	with	Lord	Minto,	January-March	1812),	
T.S.	Raffles	 (Rijswijk/Batavia)	 to	Lord	Minto	 (Calcutta),	 21-1-1812.	Raffles’	 judgement	was	 col-
oured	by	his	prejudice	against	Crawfurd.	It	is	clear	that	Natakusuma	still	enjoyed	the	confidence	
of the sultan.
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Natakusuma that at the onset of the next dry season (May-October) affairs in 
Yogya would be reconsidered (Poensen 1905:278). In a subsequent dispatch 
to Lord Minto written after the fall of the Yogya kraton and the subsequent 
exile of the second sultan to Pulau Pinang in early July 1812, Raffles admitted 
that ‘the terms [of the 28 December 1811 treaty] were acceptable to me rather 
as the best, which under the existing circumstances could be procured, rather 
than […] what I would have wished’.181 The sultan immediately set about 
making preparations for resistance. In Crawfurd’s words:
The laxity and moderation of British conduct was mistaken for fear […] After the 
signature of the treaty, an immediate start was made on the collection of troops, 
the manufacturing of arms and the strengthening of the defences of the cratton 
[kraton].182
As we have seen, Raffles himself noticed large numbers of troops in the 
sultan’s capital during his December visit and he remarked on the hostile 
attitude of the local population towards the British.183 Both sides were soon 
preparing for war. It was evident that a military showdown between the 
British government and the sultan could not be long delayed.
Preparations for war
Just as in a Greek tragedy hubris leads on inevitably to nemesis, so it was 
with the Yogya ruler in the early months of 1812 as he prepared to confront 
the emerging imperial superpower. Daendels had already written that he 
sensed that ‘the sultan was hurrying towards his fall’ during the crisis over 
Radèn Rongga in 1810 (Chapter VI). However, the inherent weaknesses of the 
Franco-Dutch government and the pressure of world events associated with 
the Napoleonic Wars, in particular the British invasion of Java in August 1811, 
had given Hamengkubuwana II a chance to recoup his political position. But 
once the new Raffles’ administration felt militarily strong enough to confront 
181	 IOL,	Eur	 F148/23	 (Raffles-Minto	 collection,	 vol.	 23),	 T.S.	Raffles	 (Salatiga)	 to	Lord	Minto	
(Calcutta),	 6-8-1812.	 IOL,	G21/65,	Raffles,	 ‘Memorandum	respecting	 Java’,	 1813,	 38,	where	 the	
treaty was described as ‘merely [a] temporary arrangement calculated to promote the immediate 
effect	of	tranquillizing	the	country	but	without	providing	effectively	against	any	hostile	views	




despite his outwardly friendly demeanour; IOL, G21/39, Java Separate Consultations, 8-3-1814, 
177-9,	Fort	William	(Calcutta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Bogor),	2-10-1813,	on	Hamengkubuwana	II’s	attitude	
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the Yogya ruler and the dry season allowed more favourable campaigning con-
ditions, the settling of accounts with the sultanate would not be long delayed. 
Once again, the inability of the Yogya elite to read the runes of world history 
and adapt to the fast changing international order would lead to disaster. 
Soon after Raffles’ departure from Yogya on 29 December 1811, Natadiningrat 
arrived from Semarang.184 His presence doubtless strengthened the position 
of his father for the Yogya babad remarks on the particularly good relationship 
which developed between Natakusuma and the sultan at this time.185 Raffles 
too reckoned that Natakusuma was adeptly serving both parties and interests 
by ingratiating himself with his elder brother, the sultan, while ensuring his 
links with the European power: ‘It is necessary to keep him loyal to the British 
government if possible’, he wrote, ‘but not to encourage him in the expecta-
tion of the sultanate.’186 According to Dipanagara’s autobiography, the sultan’s 
main enmity was now directed against Dipanagara’s father, for he feared that 
he had come to a secret understanding with the British.187 Moves were thus 
made against the Crown Prince and his supporters, particularly those who had 
helped him into power under Daendels. As we shall see shortly, Dipanagara 
himself was seen as a threat and his life was said to be in danger.
On 15 January, Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma was sent into exile in 
Pacitan and strangled in a small wayside prayer house by his kraton escort, his 
body being interred in a nearby forest before being brought back for ignomini-
ous burial at the traitor’s graveyard at Banyusumurup which was now rapidly 
filling up with the sultan’s victims.188 News of the old man’s ‘exile’ had been 
broken to Crawfurd by Natadiningrat. This announcement and the fact that 
the event had occurred so soon after the future Pakualam II’s return, caused the 
Resident to associate the deed with his influence: ‘It has left upon my mind an 
impression of Natadiningrat less favourable than I was willing to entertain of 
him’, he wrote to Raffles.189 Subsequent Dutch sources also link Natadiningrat 
to the murder citing his anger at the fact that the aged royal counsellor had 
been given one of his pusaka (heirloom) krises which had been taken from 
184	 IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	24),	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raf-
fles	 (Rijswijk/Batavia),	15-1-1812.	See	 further	Poensen	1905:278-9,	who	states	 that	he	first	went	
to pay his respects to Crawfurd and then had an audience with the sultan, who allowed him to 
take his wife, now Ratu Ayu (see Chapter VI note 98), back from the kraton to his plundered resi-
dence.
185 B.Ng. I:259-60, LXIV.3-9.
186	 IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	24),	T.S.	Raffles	(Bogor)	to	John	Crawfurd	
(Yogyakarta), 2-4-1812.
187 BD (Manado), II:76, XVI.21-2.
188 Carey 1980:77 note 2, 1992:430 note 151 (on Danukusuma’s murder in a wayside langgar). On 
Danukusuma’s burial at Banyusumurup, see Van Pabst, ‘Nota’, 26-8-1826. His corpse was later 
disinterred and buried at the family graveyard at Melangi on 27 November 1812 on the orders of 
Hamengkubuwana III, B.Ng. I:338, LXXXIII.22-3.
189	 IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	24),	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raf-
fles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	15-1-1812.	See	further	Poensen	1905:279.
Plate 36. BL Add. MS. 12341 f.35r, original note of Kyai Nitimenggala to Radèn 
Tumenggung Sumadi ningrat regarding preparations in Surakarta for the reception of 
Raffles in December 1811 (Sec. I, pt. 6, doc. VI). Photograph by courtesy of the British 
Library, London.
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his residence by Danukusuma’s son, Danureja II, in late December 1810 after 
Natadiningrat and his father were exiled to Semarang.190 Danukusuma’s close 
family ties to Natakusuma – he was the prince’s brother-in-law – were appar-
ently of no avail in this instance (Mandoyokusumo 1977:12 no. 7, 13 no. 11). 
After nearly four years of unrelenting political pressure from the European 
government, feelings were running so high in the kraton that a de facto civil 
war was now being fought out. Brothers were prepared to kill brothers, and 
fathers murder sons.
Following the strangulation of Danukusuma, there began a series of 
moves against the Crown Prince which had as their object his removal 
and even death. His mother, Ratu Kedhaton, was confined on four sepa-
rate occasions in the Bangsal Kencana (Golden Hall), a kraton pavilion, 
because she had protested so strongly against the sultan’s plans to appoint 
Mangkudiningrat in her son’s stead as Crown Prince (pp. 74-5; Van der Kemp 
1896a:321-2). In March, twelve members of the Crown Prince’s entourage, 
who had been instrumental in effecting the transfer of power in January 1811, 
were demanded by the sultan to be delivered up to him.191 Crawfurd also 
reported that the Crown Prince’s life was in imminent danger: ‘there is little 
doubt […] that it is the wish of the Sultan to deprive him of the succession 
and the shortest mode of accomplishing this will be to take away his life by 
a dose of poison’.192 Crawfurd envisaged that the Crown Prince would soon 
need to be brought under British protection.193 
Throughout this dangerous period, Dipanagara apparently afforded his 
father constant advice and support, often journeying in from Tegalreja for 
secret meetings in the kadipatèn. In his babad, he describes how he felt keenly the 
dilemma of having to choose between his father and his grandfather, counselling 
the Crown Prince to act with extreme caution.194 We know from a subsequent 
Dutch source that the second sultan was well aware of Dipanagara’s actions in 
support of his father at this time and intended to have him murdered.195 It is 
striking, however, that Crawfurd in his many dispatches to Raffles during this 
190 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 120; Nahuys van Burgst 1835, I:22; Louw and De Klerck 1894-
1909, I:39.
191	 Dj.Br.	 9A,	Valck,	 ‘Overzigt’,	 119-20;	 IOL,	Raffles-Minto	 collection	 (Xerox	 copies	 of	Holo-
graph	 letters),	vol.	2,	T.S.	Raffles	 (Bogor)	 to	Lord	Minto	 (Calcutta),	21-3-1812	 (who	reported	 ‘I	
believe four were immediately strangled and the remainder will no doubt share in the same fate’). 





194 BD (Manado), II:163, XV.129-31. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:322-33.
195 Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, ‘Nota eerbiedig aangeboden aan de hooge commissie, die benoemd 
is	om	den	oud-Sultan	van	Jogjakarta	in	zijn	waardigheid	te	herstellen’,	23-8-1826,	quoted	Louw	and	
De Klerck 1894-1909, II:422.
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period never once mentions the Crown Prince’s eldest son. Indeed, nowhere in 
all of Crawfurd’s voluminous correspondence during his three separate tours 
of duty in the sultan’s capital (Appendix IX) is there any referen ce to a Radèn 
Antawirya (Dipanagara’s pre-July 1812 name) or a Pangéran Dipanagara. This 
omission is all the more strange given Dipanagara’s boast that the Scotsman 
had discussed ‘everything in person with his father and himself’ (p. 109) and 
that he had been charged by his father with responsibility for delicate nego-
tiations with Crawfurd through the Crown Prince’s patih, Radèn Ngabèhi 
Jayasentika from mid-April 1812 onwards (Louw 1894:36-7). The problem 
for the historian of the British period in Yogya is that a subsequent Dutch 
Resident and amateur historian, Frans Valck (in office 1831-1841), who wrote 
a detailed survey of Yogya history from Giyanti (1755) to the Java War, which 
was partly publishe d in Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië in 1844, used the 
Residency archive for his research and then appears to have kept many of the 
letters for his personal collection. A large number of these were apparently 
from the British period (note 155). We are thus dependant on his testimony 
and have no means of independently verifying his sources. Valck states 
unequi vocally, however, that according to the Residency archive, Dipanagara 
was indeed used as a go-between between his father and Crawfurd and was 
‘in general very highly regarded by Europeans’ at this time,196 a view which 
was confirmed by a number of Dutch officials at the time of his appointment 
as a guardian to the child sultan, Hamengkubuwana V, in December 1822 
(pp. 509-510). So, until evidence appears to the contrary, we may assume that 
Dipanagara did play an important role despite his comparatively young age 
and lack of standing in court councils.197
While these murderous intrigues were moving towards their conclusion, 
the central Javanese courts came to a secret understanding against the British. 
The initiative seems to have come from the Sunan who used the back channel 
which had been kept open between his patih, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara, 
and Sumadiningrat in Yogya. On 25 March, there is a reference in one of 
Sumadiningrat’s secret missives to his Surakarta counterpart, quoting the 
Sunan as writing ‘that he wished to enter into a league and union with his 
“father” [the sultan] which might descend to their latest posterity’.198 The 
196 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 123; Valck 1844, 6-4:37.
197 Dipanagara was 26 in European years and 27 in Javanese years in April 1812. Since the age 
of legal majority in Java at this time was 16 Javanese years, then Dipanagara’s age was perhaps 
not so young. Even in Europe at this time there were instances of very young men assuming posi-
tions of considerable importance in their respective countries when they were still in their mid-
twenties,	one	thinks	here	of	William	Pitt	‘the	Younger’	 (1759-1806),	who	became	British	prime	
minister in 1783 at the age of 24, and Louis Antoine de St. Just (1767-1794), who became a member 
of	the	Committee	of	Public	Safety	(1793-1794)	and	was	executed	before	his	27th	birthday.
198 IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. C, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat 
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treaty itself took the form of two documents exchanged between the courts. 
Each document read as follows:199
The contract of Raden Adipati Cakranagara and Tumenggung Sumadiningrat 
bearing the royal seal200 of His Highness the Susuhunan Pakubuwana IV and also 
that of His Highness Sultan Hamengkubuwana II and binding upon their poster-
ity. Let this instrument be held by Tumenggung Sumadiningrat in token of the 
engagement entered into between him and Raden Adipati Cakranagara.
In the first place, whereas our two sovereigns the Sunan and his father, the 
Sultan, have now united as one person and exchange expressions of sincerity, it is 
agreed between them that the country of Java, in the same manner as heretofore 
possessed by them, shall forever be possessed, viz. one half by His Highness the 
Susuhunan and the other half by His Highness the Sultan descending to their 
respective posterity.
In the second place, it is agreed that should any one of the princes of Surakarta 
rebel against the sovereign, the same shall be considered an enemy of His Highness 
the Sultan as well as of His Highness the Susuhunan, and that should in like man-
ner any of the princes of Yogyakarta act disloyally towards His Highness the 
Sultan, they shall be treated as enemies of His Highness the Susuhunan as well as 
His Highness the Sultan.
The second clause of the treaty was clearly directed against the Yogya Crown 
Prince, as Crawfurd later pointed out.201 The first, however, seemed to be 
a reaffirmation of the old division of Java between the courts such as had 
existed before the changes wrought by Daendels. Pakubuwana IV’s aspira-
tions to be recognised as the senior ruler in Java, which he had put forward 
in 1790, were also ostensibly abandoned (Chapter V note 16). It thus mirrored 
the profoundly conservative desire to maintain the division of Java which 
had been built up so painstakingly since the late eighteenth century (Ricklefs 
1974a:339-40). The European government was not specifically mentioned, but 
the document was clearly aimed against outside interference in the affairs 
(Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 10 Rabingulakir AJ 1739 (AD 25-3-1812); 
John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	8-5-1812.
199	 A	recension	of	the	original	treaty	in	English	translation	is	in	IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	
collection, vol. 24), pt. F. See also IOL, G21/39, Java Separate Consultations, 8-3-1814, 171, Fort 
William	(Calcutta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Bogor),	2-10-1813.	The	quotation	given	here	is	from	the	official	
English	translation	of	the	sultan’s	copy	of	the	treaty	made	by	G.P.	Rouffaer	in	AvJ,	‘Secret	contract	
established in the beginning of 1812 between the Sunan and the Sultan’ (henceforth: ‘Secret con-
tract’), n.y. (? March 1812).
200 Neither of the treaties was ever sealed by the rulers. Apparently neither the Sunan nor the 
sultan	wished	to	be	the	first	to	append	their	seals	to	the	document.	They	would	also	not	entrust	
their seals to a subordinate so the sealing could be done simultaneously, S.Br. 55, Van Pabst, ‘Nota 
betreffende	de	conspiratie’,	13-6-1827.
201 AvJ, ‘Secret contract’, includes the note by Crawfurd, ‘the last article is levelled at the 
Hereditar y Prince [Crown Prince] and the European power which vested him with the Regency, 
and is meant to secure to the Sultan, without reference to the European Government, the power 
which he had recently usurped’.
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of south-central Java. In a later letter, Sumadiningrat described the recent 
December treaty with the British in this fashion to his colleague in Surakarta:
in my opinion, my son, the situation of our sovereigns resembles that of two people 
secretly engaged in wedlock. Should you consider it in that light then the treaty 
[with the British] is of no consequence.202
He also adviced Cakranagara that there should be no etiquette of ‘high’ and 
‘low’, a reference to the use of the krama (High Javanese) and ngoko (Low 
Javanese) speech levels, ‘thus all difficulty will be avoided between us two’.203
According to P.H. van Lawick van Pabst, who wrote a subsequent note on 
the conspiracy during the Java War, the secret agreement involved more than 
just a mutual aid treaty. Instead, it was specifically targeted against the British 
with an understanding that, in the event of an attack on Yogya, the Sunan 
would fall on the British forces from the rear. There were also plans, Van Pabst 
alleged, for a general massacre of the European inhabitants in the kraton towns, 
although this is not confirmed elsewhere in the European sources. Preparations 
for resistance were apparently well advanced by the time the British began to 
assemble troops for their campaign in late May and early June.204 The Sunan 
used his family connections with Madura to send secret emissaries to the 
court of his father-in-law, Sultan Sepuh of Madura, the former Panembahan 
Cakradiningrat IV of Pamekasan (p. 181), as well as to make contacts amongst 
the north coast bupati who were linked to the court by ties of marriage.205 
There were even rumours that the Javanese (‘colonial’) corps in Surabaya were 
preparing to join the uprising.206 In the event, Pakubuwana IV left Yogya to its 
202 IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. C no. 5, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat 
(Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 10 Rabingulakir AJ 1739 (AD 25-3-1812). 
Pakubuwana IV had apparently been particularly worried about article 9 of his 23 December 1811 
treaty with the British which reiterated the provision in previous Dutch/VOC treaties forbidding 
correspondence with foreign and domestic powers without the express permission of the gov-
ernment,	IOL,	G21/39,	Java	Separate	Consultations,	8-3-1814,	169,	Fort	William	(Calcutta)	to	T.S.	
Raffles	(Bogor),	2-10-1813;	Van	Deventer	1891:316	article	9.
203 IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. C no. 5, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat 
(Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 10 Rabingulakir AJ 1739 (AD 25-3-
1812).
204	 S.Br.	55,	Van	Pabst,	‘Nota	betreff	ende	de	conspiratie’,	13-6-1827.	On	Raffl		es’	arrival	in	Sema-






bupati, see Chapter V note 12.
206	 Thorn	 1815:184-5;	Gerlach	 1859:211.	 Raffles	 spoke	with	 contempt	 of	 this	 corps:	 ‘they	do	
not even make a return of their numbers: they are one day reported to be near 800 strong and 
the next they appear by the general return only 200. The men who have been enlisted are of the 
most worthless cast and I fear will never be good for anything. The Jayeng Sekar [Jayèng Sekar: 
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fate. Indeed, once the scale of the conspiracy was fully confirmed following the 
fall of the Yogya kraton and the capture of its archive,207 he ‘drew in his horns’ 
in Van Pabst’s words and sacrificed his patih, who was exiled to Surabaya. Two 
other Surakarta officials, the bupati of Blora, Radèn Tumenggung Mertanegara, 
and a clerk of the Surakarta patih’s office, Radèn Ngabèhi Ranawijaya, who 
had served as a secret courier, were also briefly imprisoned in Semarang by the 
British for their part in the affair.208
In his babad, Dipanagara gives a short but rather accurate description of 
the affair:
XVI. 23  So His Highness the Sultan
  was certain to be the enemy of the English.
  Tumenggung Sumadiningrat
  was burdened with the task,
 24 [and] made contact with Surakarta.
  But His Highness the Sunan trusted in his younger brother
  Pangéran Mangkubumi
  and in the patih,
  Radèn Adipati Cakranagara.
  So there was an agreement
  that in future, if it came to battle
 25  with the English, Surakarta
  undertook to fall on them from behind.
  Thus they swore together
  and exchanged documents
  with their signatures as an undertaking,
  indeed for all time.
  Thus was the agreement.209




and the breach of article 9 of his 23 December 1811 treaty with the British in late April (note 238), 
but the full extent of the conspiracy and Pakubuwana IV’s involvement in it only became clear 
after	the	capture	of	Yogya	archive	(20-6-1812).	Corroborating	evidence	was	found	in	the	house	of	
the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara, in late July, S.Br. 23, Charles Assey (Batavia) to 
Hugh Hope (Surakarta), 4-8-1812.
208	 S.Br.	 23,	 Hugh	 Hope	 (Surakarta)	 to	 T.S.	 Raffles	 (Rijswijk/Batavia),	 10-8-1812. When the 
goods	and	chattels	of	these	three	men	were	sold	at	public	auction	in	Surakarta	in	late	July	1812,	
the previous British Resident was shocked to discover a very large quantity of arms (pikes, mus-
kets,	carbines	and	swords)	amongst	their	personal	effects,	S.Br.	14B,	Colonel	Alexander	Adams	
(Surakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Semarang),	22-7-1812.
209 BD (Manado) II:176-7, XVI (Pangkur) 23-5. mengkana Kangjeng Sultan/ mapan nemah mengsah 
lawan Inggris iku/ Dèn Menggung Sumadiningrat/ ingkang binobot ing kardi. 24. atepang lan Surakarta/ 
nging Jeng Sunan pitajeng mring kang rayi/ Pangran Mangkubumi iku/ lawan ingkang Papatya/ Dèn 
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Dipanagara’s reference to the key role played by the Sunan’s younger brother, 
Pangéran Mangkubumi (Chapter V note 42), is fully borne out in the European 
sources.210 Known for his virulently anti-European views and forceful charac-
ter, the prince was subsequently exiled first to Batavia (1816-1818) and then to 
Ambon (1818-1824) following his involvement in a second major conspiracy in 
Surakarta in 1815 linked to the local sepoy garrison (Carey 1977:299, 321 note 
104; Chapter VIII). Another of the Sunan’s brothers who played a part in the 
conspiracy was Pangéran Buminata (Chapter II note 86). As we have seen, both 
the Sunan and Buminata maintained close links with the religious communi-
ties in Surakarta (Chapter II), and these became of increasing concern to the 
British authorities as the date of their attack neared. On 17 June 1812, the British 
Resident in Surakarta, Colonel Alexander Adams urged Raffles to caution the 
Sunan about allowing ‘priests and Arabs’ free access to his kraton, and permit-
ting them to rove the countryside ‘in disguise’ without official passes.211 His 
fears were justified. Not only did court santri carry out important tasks as the 
secret emissaries between the courts at this time (note 87), but it appears that 
Pakubuwana IV gave clandestine instructions to his kraton religious hierarchy 
that in the event of a British attack on Surakarta they were to take to the hills 
to lead the resistance against the occupying forces.212 Public prayers were also 
said for the safety of the sultan at the Friday service in the Great Mosque.213
Despite the clear evidence of the Sunan’s hostile intentions towards the 
British, which included the strengthening of his military positions and the 
stoning of the British cavalry post at the Srimenganti gate by his intimate 
Dipati Cakranagara puniku/ mapan lajeng prajangjèyan/ ing bénjing kalamun jurit. 25. lawan Inggris 
Surakarta/ mapan sagah anyabet saking wuri/ apan samya sumpah sampun/ kang sarta liru patra/ tondha 
nama wus dadya ubayanipun/ mapan ing samongsa-mongsa/ mangkana ingkang ubanggi. In 1946, when 
Muhammad Yamin (1903-1962) was preparing his biography of Dipanagara (Yamin 1950), a rom-
anised copy of the Rusche text edition of Dipanagara’s babad was prepared for him by Kangjeng 
Radèn Mas Tumenggung Tirtodiningrat in Surakarta, but the whole section dealing with Surakar-
ta’s	treachery	was	omitted	from	his	transliteration.	The	relevant	sections	are	Rusche	1908-09,	I:32-3,	
XVI.23-38 (LOr 6547b, 176-81). This is an interesting case of the past as present reality, and may 
have	reflected	the	conflicted	loyalties	of	the	Surakarta	kraton	in	that	first	turbulent	year	of	the	Indo-
nesian Revolution (1945-1949), see Anderson 1972:351-64. The two-volume romanised copy was 
given to the present author by the late Professor C.C. Berg in Leiden in 1971. Muhammad Yamin 
had originally asked Professor Berg for his assistance with his Dipanagara biography.
210	 AN,	Kabinet	Missive	17-5-1846	no.	134,	‘Troonsopvolging	in	het	rijk	van	Soerakarta’,	Baron	
W.R. van Hoëvell (Surakarta) to Governor-General J.J. van Rochussen (Batavia), 4-3-1846, pencil 
note in margin of report on key role played by Mangkubumi in the secret correspondence of 
1812.
211	 S.Br.	14B,	Colonel	Alexander	Adams	(Surakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Yogyakarta),	17-6-1812.	On	
Daendels’ institution of passes for travelling priests and men of religion on 16 September 1810, 
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retainers (panakawan) on 1 June,214 he does not seem to have been seriously 
committed to providing Yogya military help. He flattered the sultan by the 
use of the title ‘father’ in his letters and urged him on against the British, 
hoping that this might lead to his own advantage. But, as Raffles pointed out, 
‘the Susu[hu]nan has been timid and wavering throughout, anxious to join 
in anything which could shake the European power, yet afraid to adopt the 
avowed and open tone of the Sultan’.215 From March onwards, soldiers from 
the eastern mancanagara flooded into the Sunan’s capital until on the eve of 
the British attack on Yogya some 7,000 troops were available and appeared to 
‘await only on instructions from Yogya to commence hostilities’.216 But when 
Colonel Gillespie’s force took up their positions in Yogya on 17 June, the 
Sunan merely placed a part of his army across their line of communications 
to Semarang thereby hoping to profit from any military reverse or protracted 
campaign.217 It is uncertain too just how far the sultan placed his trust in the 
Sunan’s promises. In early May, the Crown Prince remarked to Crawfurd 
that:
[There is] little danger to be apprehended from this intended cooperation of the 
courts, for […] such was the impression the Sultan had of the Emperor’s [Sunan’s] 
character that [he] placed little reliance on his professions and, as for his part, he 
conceived that on the first appearance of danger, the Susu[hu]nan would endeav-
our to recommend himself to the British Government by making a disclosure of 
the whole circumstances.218
There seems to have been no attempt on the part of the sultan to appeal for 
help from Surakarta during the actual attack on his kraton. Indeed, after its 
fall, the author of the Babad bedhah ing Ngayogyakarta (‘Chronicle of the fall of 
Yogyakarta’), Pangéran Panular, remarked that even with the Sunan’s assist-
ance, Yogya would still not have been able to withstand the British (Carey 
1992:107, 267, 433 note 167).
According to Dipanagara, immediately after the late March 1812 secret 
agreement with Surakarta, the sultan was in two minds about whether to 
214	 IOL,	Raffles-Minto	collection	(Xerox	copies	of	holograph	letters),	vol.	3,	T.S.	Raffles	(Bogor)	
to	Lord	Minto	(Calcutta),	23-4-1813;	S.Br.	25,	Colonel	Alexander	Adams	(Surakarta)	to	Pakubu-
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implement his plans against the British or to seek a peaceful solution by solic-
iting their approval for the murder of the Crown Prince and the appointment 
of his favourite son, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat, in his stead. The prince 
states in his babad that the Yogya ruler initially decided on the second course 
of action and tasked Natakusuma with handing over a letter to Crawfurd 
detailing the sultan’s demands. Unbeknownst to the future Pakualam I, how-
ever, the meeting was secretly monitored by the Crown Prince’s patih, Radèn 
Ngabèhi Jayasentika, who, according to Dipanagara, hid in the spacious attic 
over the throne room, which a previous Dutch Resident had built for stor-
ing the highly valuable birds’ nests,219 so he could overhear Natakusuma’s 
conversation.220 The prince was later reported by the British Resident to have 
said that ‘the main intention of the Sultan is that the Pangeran Adipati [Crown 
Prince] should not succeed to the throne’.221 He also denigrated the Crown 
Prince by stating that ‘the crimes of the Hereditary Prince are his intrigues’, 
going on to explain the background of his enmity in the following terms:
during the lifetime of the late Sultan [Hamengkubuwana I, reigned 1749-1792], 
the Hereditary Prince loved me as a father, but he has since acted treacherously 
[towards] me […] My own opinion of him now is that he is at present in fear and 
difficulty. He will in all respects obey the [lieutenant-]governor, but he is not liked 
by the prajurit [troops], by the princes or by the nobility […] [his] crimes are his 
intrigues amongst the women of the chiefs, his breach of the oaths he has taken and 
his presumptuous behaviour to his father upon whom he has grossly imposed.
But Crawfurd noted that Natakusuma’s opinion was ‘deeply tinctured with 
prejudice and by his aversion, […] even detestation of the [Crown] Prince’. 
Moreover, the prince was equally dismissive towards his own elder brother, 
the sultan, whose attitude towards him, he averred, had also undergone a 
radical change after the death of Sultan Mangkubumi in March 1792: ‘[all] 
the accounts are [now] that he is in great trouble. He hardly eats or sleeps. To 
hide his situation he feigns to employ himself with his troops. His conduct is 
219	 The	attic	was	built	by	Resident	Jan	Lapro	(in	office	1764-1773)	specifically	for	storing	birds’	
nests, AvJ, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph., van der Capellen, 2-5-1823. On the impor-
tance of income from this source as a supplement to the previous Dutch Residents’ modest sala-
ries,	see	Chapter	V	notes	29-30.	According	to	Pieter	Engelhard,	half	the	profits	of	approximately	
30,000 ronde realen (silver reals) from the birds’ nests in Yogya were kept by the Resident (thus 
doubling	his	official	salary)	and	the	rest	went	to	Daendels,	IOL,	Eur	F148/18	(Raffles-Minto	collec-
tion, vol. 18), Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Captain William Robison (Yogyakarta), 27-9-1811. 
Raffles	took	the	decision	to	take	over	the	entire	income	from	this	source	for	the	government	(IOL,	
Mack.Pr.	2,	Raffles’	remarks	on	Colonel	Alexander	Adams’	secret	memoir,	Semarang,	6-12-1811,	
20) and post-1816, special government inspectors of the birds’ nest rocks, opziener der vogelnestklip-
pen, were appointed, see KITLV H 263, P.D. Portier, ‘Verklaring’, Surakarta, 1826.
220 BD (Manado) II:177-80, XVI.26-35.
221	 IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	24),	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raf-
fles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	14-5-1812.	Natakusuma’s	report	was	received	by	Crawfurd	on	13-5-1811.
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in all respects like that of a child.’222
In fact, without disclosing anything to Natakusuma, as early as the begin-
ning of April, when evidence of the sultan’s bad faith was plain, Raffles had 
ordered Crawfurd to open out a secret channel of communication to the 
Crown Prince. He was told to warn him about the forthcoming concentra-
tion of troops at Semarang, a military arrangement which in fact had to be 
delayed by nearly two months because of the need to mount an expedition 
against the Sultan of Palembang, Mahmud Badarrudin (reigned 1804-1812, 
1813, 1818-1821).223 In Raffles’ words:
The immediate object of assembling so large a force in the neighbourhood of 
Semarang is […] to impress upon the Sultan an idea of the means we possess for 
enforcing our demands and thereby effect such a treaty as may be consistent with 
the interests and dignity of the British Government […] it will therefore be your 
policy to endeavour by every possible means to attach the Prince Regent [Crown 
Prince] personally [to our cause] and if practicable [to] separate him from the 
interests of his father.224
Crawfurd thereupon contacted the Crown Prince, who in turn designated 
Radèn Ngabèhi Jayasentika as his representative. Of partly Madurese descent, 
Jayasentika had been one of the junior commanders of the 1,000-strong Yogya 
force sent to Batavia in October 1793 to help strengthen VOC defences at the 
time of the outbreak of the war between the French Republic and Holland.225 
He appears to have spent several months in the colonial capital and this may 
have given him experience of dealing with Europeans. He had also curiously 
been one of the Yogya officials involved in facilitating the secret correspond-
ence between the courts (note 86) so he would have been able to inform the 
British Resident in detail about what had transpired over the period from 
late September 1811 when the exchanges began. A man of unusual courage, 
according to Dipanagara, he would later pay for his loyalty to the Crown 





furd (Yogyakarta), 2-4-1812, no. 15. The troops assembled for the Yogya expedition numbered 
some	 600	 infantry	 (‘firelocks’)	with	 a	 small	 number	 of	 cavalry	 and	 artillery	 in	 support.	 1,400	
further	troops,	mainly	sepoys,	were	held	in	reserve,	IOL,	Raffles-Minto	collection	(Xerox	copies	
of	holograph	letters),	vol.	3,	T.S.	Raffles	(Yogyakarta)	to	Lord	Minto	(Calcutta),	19-6-1812;	S.Br.	29,	
Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta) to Hugh Hope (Semarang), 10-4-1812; IOL, G21/65, Raf-
fles,	‘Memorandum	respecting	Java’,	1813,	41.
224	 IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	24),	T.S.	Raffles	(Bogor)	to	John	Crawfurd	
(Yogyakarta), 2-4-1812, no. 15.
225	 AvJ,	W.H.	van	IJ	sseldij	k	(Yogyakarta)	to	J.G.	van	Overstraten	(Semarang),	4-11-1793.	Jayasen-
tika appears to have been a member of the Katanggel kraton infantry regiment in the pre-April 
1792 period, see Carey and Hoadley 2000:214.
226 BD (Manado) II:142, XV (Asmaradana) 41. nenggih Radèn Jayasentika/ kaduk purun kéwala.
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The first meeting between Jayasentika and Crawfurd took place on the 
night of 11 April in the house of the retired Residency surgeon, the Brunswick-
born Friedrich Willem Baumgarten.227 Crawfurd assured the Crown Prince’s 
patih in general terms of Raffles’ friendship for the Crown Prince and gave 
him to understand that if the heir apparent’s life was in danger the Residency 
House would be placed at his disposal. The Crown Prince for his part 
declare d throug h Jayasentika his willingness to subscribe to any of the terms 
dictate d by the British which would relieve him from his dangerous and irk-
some situatio n. The part Madurese official then gave Crawfurd a list of the 
Crown Prince’s friends and supporters. After looking this through, Crawfurd 
wrote to Raffles: ‘the general impression of this [list] is that the Prince has 
many secret but few declared friends, a circumstance which may be readily 
supposed from the general dread of the Sultan’.228 But, unlike Natakusuma, 
the Crown Prince made no attempt to denigrate either his father or his 
uncle, even speaking well of the bellicose Sumadiningrat. Only Pangéran 
Mangkudiningrat and the new joint acting bupati wedana of Madiun, the sec-
ond sultan’s former army commander, Pangéran Dipakusuma, were described 
as resolutely inimical to the Crown Prince’s interests. ‘The Prince’s conduct’, 
declared Crawfurd late r, ‘and his greater humanity makes him more gener-
ally liked amongst the chiefs than the Sultan, his father’.229 
As we have seen, Dipanagara claimed that he was himself entrusted by 
his father with responsibility for these negotiations with Crawfurd. He did 
not meet the British Resident in person at this time, according to his babad, 
but continued to act through Jayasentika and the Yogya kapitan cina, Tan 
Jin Sing, who served as his interpreter helping him to draw up a letter to 
Raffles declaring that the Crown Prince was prepared to enter into a contract 
with the British.230 Shortly afterwards, on 1-6 June, Crawfurd travelled to 
Semarang for a meeting with Raffles ahead of the British attack on the kra-
ton.231 According to Dipanagara’s babad, the lieutenant-governor declared his 






230 BD (Manado) II:180-2, XVI.39-82; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 22, where he mentions Dipanagara’s 




Alexander Adams, the British Resident in Surakarta, in Semarang on 2 June. Crawfurd returned 
to Yogya on 6 June and it is possible that he had the Yogya kapitan cina, Tan Jin Sing, with him, 
IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	24),	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	
(Semarang), 8-6-1812, no. 15.
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plans at this meeting to depose the sultan, appoint the Crown Prince in his 
place and recognise Dipanagara as the new Pangéran Adipati (heir appar-
ent). But Dipanagara refused to accept the position, taking an oath before two 
members of the Suranatan who were his close friends, Kyai Rahmanudin, the 
future pengulu of Yogya (in office 1812-1823), and Kyai Amad Ngusman, later 
head of the Suranatan and personal tutor of Dipanagara’s younger brother, 
Hamengkubuwana IV (reigned 1814-1822) (Appendix VIIb). According to his 
babad, he spoke as follows:
XV. 78  Be my witnesses
 79  if I should forget.
  I make [you] witnesses of my firmness of heart:
  let me not be made
  Pangéran Adipati [Crown Prince].
  Even if I were later to be made sultan,
  even if it were done by my father
  or grandfather,
 80 I myself do not wish
  to have to repent to the Almighty.
  No matter how long I am upon this earth,
  I would constantly be sinful.232
Dipanagara thereupon confirmed that the position of Pangéran Adipati (Crown 
Prince) should pass to his younger brother, Bendara Radèn Mas Sudama (also 
known as Bendara Radèn Mas Ambiyah and Gusti Radèn Mas Ibnu Jarot; 
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:115; Mandoyokusumo 1977:37), who unlike 
himself had been born from an official wife.233 But the prince agreed, accord-
ing to his own testimony, that if the latter came to the throne when he was 
still a minor, which in fact happened – the future Hamengkubuwana IV was 
232 BD (Manado) II:191, XVI (Pangkur) 78-80. padha seksènana mami. 79. menawi lali ta ingwang/ 
pan sun karya éling ugering ati/ aja tan kinarya ingsun/ iya Pangran Dipatya/ nadyan silih sun banjur 
kinarya ratu/ lamun karya kangjeng rama/ utawa Jeng éyang mami.* 80. sun dhéwé mapan tan nedya/ tobat 
marang Pangéran Ingkang Luwih/ pira lawas nèng donyèku/ tan wurung mapan dosa. * I have followed 
the Rusche edition here (1908-09, I:39), LOr 6547b has utawa kangjeng yang mami. It is useful to 
compare	this	with	the	remark	made	by	Dipanagara	to	Major	F.V.H.A.	de	Stuers	after	his	capture	
at Magelang on 28 March 1830: ‘On another occasion he [Dipanagara] recounted how, during the 
period	of	the	British	administration,	it	was	left	up	to	his	choice	whether	he	wished	to	be	raised	to	the	
sultanate, but he did not wish to take upon himself that status for too many worldly preoccupations 
were	attached	to	it’,	Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	V:744.	See	further	Van	der	Kemp	1896a:324.
233 This was the daughter of the deceased Yogya bupati of Jipang-Rajengwesi, Radèn Tumeng-
gung	Sasradiningrat	I	(in	office	1794-1807),	who	was	married	to	a	daughter	of	Hamengkubuwana	
I, Mandoyokusumo 1977:12 no. 8, 29. Known as Ratu Kencana (post-3-11-1814, Ratu Ibu), she was 
apparently	Hamengkubuwana	 III’s	 favourite	wife,	Dj.Br.	 21,	Matthijs	Waterloo	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	
Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 5-9-1807; dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808.
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only ten years old when he ascended the throne on 10 November 1814 – he 
would assume the responsibilities of state.234 Just before the British attack on 
the kraton, Dipanagara also seems to have received a copy of the 12 June secret 
treaty authorised by Raffles confirming the British government’s undertaking 
to remove the second sultan and appoint his father as ruler in return for the 
payment of a massive indemnity ‘defraying the whole expence [sic] of every 
description incurred by the British Government’ for its military expedition, 
and the agreement by the Crown Prince to enter into a new treaty with the 
British.235 This later gave rise to speculation that Dipanagara’s rights to the sul-
tanate had been recognised either by his father or the lieutenant-governor.236 
The whole episode as it is related in Dipanagara’s babad and the rumours 
which later surrounded the affair are deeply baffling. As we have seen, 
Dipanagara’s supposed role in the correspondence between the British and his 
father is nowhere acknowledged in the extant letters which passed between 
Crawfurd and Raffles in this period. We only have Valck’s authority that his 
contribution was known and appreciated by the British authorities. Besides, 
according to Matthijs Waterloo, Bendara Radèn Mas Sudama had already been 
recognised by the Crown Prince as his lawful successor and was very much 
loved by him.237 It would have been quite out of character for Dipanagara to 
have coveted this position which he knew was not his by right of birth and 
which he had been specifically warned not to accept by the disembodied 
voice at Parangkusuma in circa 1805 (Chapter IV). Nor indeed did Dipanagara 
wish to assume the responsibilities which such a position entailed. The only 
possible explanation is that either Crawfurd or Raffles misunderstood the 
Javanese distinction between royal sons by official (garwa padmi) and unof-
ficial (garwa ampéyan or selir) wives. Aware that Dipanagara was the eldest son 
of the Crown Prince and now an increasingly known quantity in terms of his 
negotiating skills, they may have automatically assumed that the succession 
should be secured to him in the event that his father became sultan. Despite 
Dipanagara’s emphatic rejection of the proposal, rumours thus continued to 
234 B.Ng. I:323-4, LXXIX.1-9; BD (Manado), II:187-8, XVI.65-7; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 18.
235 BD (Manado), II:194-5, XVI.93-6. The treaty, which contained just three articles (Carey 
1980:95-6),	was	drawn	up	on	one	side	in	English	and	on	the	other	in	Javanese,	the	latter	composed	
by Tan Jin Sing (post-December 1813, Radèn Tumenggung Secadiningrat). A copy was later kept 
by Dipanagara in his archive in Tegalreja (BD (Manado), II:288-9, XIX.41-2), but he also appears 
to have looked for the original in the kraton archive in September 1823, but without success given 
the state of the archive at the time, see Chapter I note 182; p. 545.
236 According to P.H. van Lawick van Pabst, who had it from Pangéran Adiwinata II at the time 
of Van Pabst’s interim period as Resident of Yogyakarta (March-October 1827) during the Java 
War,	Hamengkubuwana	III	had	written	a	letter	to	Dipanagara	recognising	him	as	his	successor,	
see	dK	165,	 ‘Translaat-verhaal	Adiwinotto’,	n.y.	(?	8-1827).	See	further	Van	Pabst,	 ‘Nota	betref-
fende de aan den Pangeran Diepo Negoro geopende vooruitzichten op den troon van Jogjakarta’, 
Yogyakarta, 29-6-1827, in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:116-9. See further p. 645.
237 dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van overgave’, 4-4-1808.
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circulate in the kraton concerning his ambitions which were later to poison 
relations between the prince and the court during the reign of his younger 
brother, Hamengkubuwana IV (Van der Kemp 1896a:324; Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Carey 1976:61, 1981a:269 note 134). We will see later 
how these rumours even convinced some less well-informed Dutch officials at 
the time of the outbreak of the Java War that the true reason for Dipanagara’s 
rebellion was thwarted political ambition (p. 645).
Crawfurd’s negotiations with the Crown Prince continued throughout April 
and May, but it was already evident that action would have to be taken against 
the sultan. Rumours of the Yogya ruler’s correspondence with the Sunan were 
known about by Raffles on 23 April and the news was corroborated by both 
Natakusuma and Jayasentika in the latter’s interview with Crawfurd on 8 
May.238 At the same time, the Crown Prince’s life seemed in more imminent 
danger than ever. Early in May, seven senior officials closely associated with 
the prince were taken into custody and degraded by the sultan. There were 
even rumours that he intended to have them strangled.239 This gave rise to 
speculation that the Crown Prince himself would be assassinated. Indeed, on 
Friday, 9 May, when the sultan and his eldest son were attending the Friday 
service in the Great Mosque, the former pointed at his son and declared to all 
assembled that matters would not go right in Yogya until he had been done 
away with.240 Although Crawfurd pressed the Crown Prince to take refuge 
in the Residency House, he refused to contemplate such a step which in his 
opinion would irritate the sultan beyond all measure.241 Instead, he seems to 
have continued to attend ceremonial occasions in the kraton together with his 
uncle, Natakusuma, in order to dispel any suspicions the sultan might have 
had that the two were contemplating going over to the British.
On Sunday, 18 May, a former Dutch official, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, 
who was at this time temporarily out of favour with the new British admin-
istration because of his pro-French views (De Haan 1935a:646) and who was 
making a private journey from Batavia to the eastern salient (Oosthoek) of 
238	 IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffl		es-Minto	collection,	vol.	24),	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raf-
fles	 (Rijswijk/Batavia),	 8-5-1812,	 14-5-1812;	 T.S.	Raffles	 (Bogor)	 to	Lord	Minto	 (Calcutta),	 18-4-
1813;	S.Br.	14B,	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	12-5-1812.	
239 IOL,	Eur	F148/24,	 John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	 to	T.S.	Raffles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	8-5-1812,	
12-5-1812; Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 120. Later, in his proclamation of 22 June 1812 recognising 
the	Crown	Prince	(Hamengkubuwana	III)	as	ruler	of	Yogya,	Raffles	announced	that	all	seven	had	
been executed, Java Government Gazette, 4-7-1812, 3 no. 5. Poensen 1905:279, however, states that 
six of the seven, who were of the rank of lurah (chief) and hailed from the Crown Prince’s personal 





of Dipanagara to contemplate taking refuge in the Yogya fort.
Plate 37. Aquatint by William Daniell (1769-1837), of a grenadier sepoy, a member 
of one of the Bengal volunteer battalions which took part in the British attack on the 
Yogyakarta kraton in June 1812. From Williams 1817:171 facing. Photograph by cour-
tesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
VII The end of the beginning 329
Java, had a personal audience with the sultan at which both the Crown Prince 
and Natakusuma were present. He described the Yogya ruler as already an old 
man with a very stiff Javanese appearance and a bad facial twitch, who spoke 
little and then only through his patih, and who was not nearly as friendly as 
the Sunan. The Crown Prince, however, had an innocent but kind expression, 
but appeared prematurely aged for his forty-three years.242 According to 
the Pakualam babad, the sultan was lulled by these court appearances on the 
part of his younger brother and his son into thinking that they were still on 
his side: ‘Thank goodness’, he is supposed to have exclaimed, ‘my younger 
brother still has long hair!’ (Poensen 1905:291), a reference to the fact that 
Natakusuma had not gone over to the Europeans who were distinguishable 
from the Javanese by their short-cropped hair (Carey 1981a:254 note 79). But 
not for long: no sooner had Natakusuma and his son, Natadiningrat, taken 
shelter in the Yogya fort early on the morning of 18 June than their appear-
ance would undergo the sort of sartorial and physical make-over already evi-
dent when Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) received his Colonel’s 
commission from Daendels in July 1808 (pp. 183-4): namely, the donning of 
a European cavalry officer’s uniform and the close cropping of their flowing 
Javanese locks (Carey 1992:80, 226, 409 note 57, 462 note 300a). Meanwhile, 
the sultan continued with his military preparations: additional guns were 
mounted on the kraton walls, new embrasures cut and his troops drilled 
silently and regularly on the southern alun-alun.243 Raffles was kept in close 
touch with these developments by Crawfurd, whom he now praised highly 
for his abilities and discretion.244 Although the lieutenant-governor had 
hoped to march on Yogya in early May, the delay of Colonel Gillespie’s force 
in Palembang meant that the British expedition could not be concentrated at 
Semarang before June (see also note 223).
242 KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 111-2, referring to Hamengkubuwana II 
having slechte trekken in zijn gezicht, and the Crown Prince as being reeds bejaard. See also Thorn 
1815:291, who described the future Hamengkubuwana III as ‘tall and stout, but without having 
anything	prepossessing	or	dignified	in	his	manner’.
243	 IOL,	 Eur	 F148/24	 (Raffles-Minto	 collection,	 vol.	 24),	 John	 Crawfurd	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	 T.S.	
Raffles	(Rijswijk/Batavia),	12-5-1812,	14-5-1812.	According	to	reports	made	to	Raffles	by	Craw-
furd and used by Valck, Hamengkubuwana II assembled 8,380 troops of which 1,180 were kraton 
‘regulars’,	namely	members	of	the	elite	bodyguard	regiments.	Only	these	last	offered	any	real	




Plate 38. A Javanese chief in war dress, taken from Raffles 1817, I:90 facing.
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The fall of Yogyakarta, 20 June 1812
By early June, the British expeditionary force numbering some 1,000 of their 
best troops, of which half were Europeans and half sepoys, was already 
encamped in temporary barracks in Semarang, Ungaran and Salatiga.245 
Various advanced parties had been sent down to strengthen the garri-
sons in Surakarta, Klathèn and Yogya.246 By 13 June, the main body was on 
the march to the sultan’s capital.247 They arrived surreptitiously in Yogya in 
small groups, entering the fort by night. But the sultan’s suspicions were soon 
aroused. He enquired of Crawfurd the purpose of this massive reinforcement 
of the Yogya garrison and was given the reply that these were ‘new troops’ 
who needed experience of the south-central Javanese kraton and that the 
lieutenant-governor had ordered it.248 According to Dipanagara, the sultan 
still continued to believe in the assurances of his court haji who assured him 
that the lieutenant-governor was on the march to take the Crown Prince 
prisoner and banish him from Java.249 Indeed, until the very end, the sultan 
hoped that he could persuade the British to recognise Mangkudiningrat as his 
successor in place of Dipanagara’s father (Poensen 1905:306; Carey 1992:75, 
218). Meanwhile, his own military preparations continued: additional guards 
were placed on the kraton gates, watch towers were built on the ramparts and 
sentries posted on the principal avenues leading to the kraton.250
Sumadiningrat was apparently the adviser who pressed the sultan most 
strongly to resist the British. In Dipanagara’s words, ‘he steadfastly expressed 
his joy that [at last] it should come to battle’.251 The Babad Spèhi (‘Chronicle of 
the sepoy war’), written by Pangéran Mangkudiningrat while in exile in Pulau 
Pinang (1812-1816), adds the detail that the Yogya ruler was also encouraged in 
his actions by various local Dutch and Eurasian residents of Yogya who relished 
the prospect that the British might suffer a defeat.252 This is partly corroborated 
in the private letter of a British artillery captain who wrote to his father in 
245 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 125, states that the British had ‘1,200’ of their ‘best troops’ and 






247 IOL, Mack.Pr. 14, Mackenzie, ‘Report’, 7-6-1813, 252.
248	 IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	24),	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raf-
fles	(Semarang),	8-6-1812;	B.Ng.	I:279,	LXVIII.41-2;	Carey	1992:72,	213.
249 BD (Manado), II:192, XVI.82.
250	 IOL,	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	24),	John	Crawfurd	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raf-
fles	(Semarang),	8-6-1812.
251 BD (Manado), II:191, XVI (Pangkur) 81. Dèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat puniku / ingkang 
kekah aturira/ kang remen dadosing jurit.
252 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):103, I.17-8.
The power of prophecy332
England that ‘the Dutch [inhabitants] had laboured to persuade the natives that 
ours were not troops of any great enterprise’.253 But the sultan still expected to 
be able to arrange suitable terms. Thus he dispatched his patih, Sindunagara 
(post-January 1812, Kyai Adipati Danureja III), to negotiate with Raffles when 
he arrived in Semarang on 1 June. But the Yogya chief minister halted at Jambu 
in northern Kedhu, ostensibly to await a similar mission from Surakarta, and 
missed both the lieutenant-governor during his stay in Semarang (1-16 June) 
and the beginning of the British attack on the Yogya kraton arriving back in the 
sultan’s capital just as the court was coming under sustained bombardment 
from British guns in the fort (Carey 1992:71-2, 75-6, 220, 213, 402-3 note 19a, 405 
note 32). On 17 June, Raffles himself arrived in Yogya, and two days later all the 
British detachments, along with 500 men of Pangéran Prangwedana’s legion 
commanded by the prince himself, were in the fort.254 
Meanwhile, Natakusuma and his family were preparing to go over to the 
British. The prince refused the sultan’s summons to attend a general meeting 
in the kraton on the morning of 17 June because he had received word from 
Crawfurd’s Malay Indian orderly, Encik Ahmad, that he should meet Raffles 
on his arrival at the Residency. At five o’clock in the morning of 18 June, he 
thus took refuge in the fort with his wives and children. His followers were 
thereupon distributed with flashes for their left arms so that they could be 
easily recognised by the British troops during their forthcoming assault.255 
At the same time, according to Dipanagara’s account, attempts were made 
to contact the Crown Prince. Although summoned to the Residency to meet 
with Crawfurd, Dipanagara refused to go so as not to jeopardise his father’s 
position. Instead, the faithful Jayasentika was sent and received a copy of the 
12 June contract certified by Crawfurd, which had been previously authorized 
by Jayasentika on the Crown Prince’s behalf.256 Despite the Crown Prince’s 
highly vulnerable position, both the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ and 
Valck’s historical overview make it quite clear that he never intended any 
treachery towards his father, but stood by in the kadipatèn to afford the sultan 
assistance in the event of a British attack.257
News of Natakusuma’s defection, however, greatly incensed the sultan 
who had seemingly placed his trust in his younger brother to the end.258 
He now gave orders for the further deployment of kraton troops, amongst 
253 Royal Artillery Institution, London, MD/143, Captain William Colebrooke (Yogyakarta) to 
his	father	(henceforth:	‘Colebrooke	letter’),	8-7-1812.
254	 Hageman	1857:422-3;	Colebrooke	letter,	8-7-1812	stating	that	his	Royal	Artillery	detachment	
was one of the last to arrive at nine o’clock on the morning of 19 June.
255 BD (Manado), II:194, XVI.92-3; Poensen 1905:298.
256 BD (Manado), II:194-5, XVI.92-6. The copy which Jayasentika was given appears to have had 
the	date	changed	to	18	June	to	reflect	the	time	of	his	meeting	with	the	Resident,	Carey	1980:95-6.
257 Carey 1992:67-78, 204-23; Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 126.
258 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):110, I.44-5; BD (Manado), II:194, XVI.92. 
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which were detachments from the western mancanagara districts of Bagelèn, 
Lowanu and Gagatan, as well as the core region of Pajang. Large numbers of 
Bugis and Balinese were also mobilised.259 The mosque officials and all the 
‘men of religion’ from the tax-free areas took up their positions around the 
Great Mosque and were said by Mangkudiningrat to be ‘preparing for holy 
war’ (sumedya sabil utama).260 The sultan’s santri younger brother, Pangéran 
Muhamad Abubakar, who was still intending a pilgrimage to Mecca, appar-
ently donned his white haji robes for duty on the kraton battlements, but was 
soon forced to divest himself of these and renounce his intention of waging 
‘holy war’ because his dress made him an all too conspicuous a target for the 
British gunners in the fort when they began their bombardment on the after-
noon of 18 June (Carey 1992:68, 208-9, 400 note 5). 
Already, various skirmishes had broken out. Small parties of pikemen, 
musketeers and cavalry, described as ‘banditti’ in the British sources, were 
sent out by the sultan to mount ambushes, burn bridges, lay waste the coun-
tryside and generally impede the British line of march (Raffles 1830:126). One 
of the sultan’s ablest commanders, Radèn Aria Sindureja II (circa 1770-circa 
1814),261 was dispatched to lead such a harassing force. He attempted to cut 
off Prangwedana’s legion just outside Yogya as they were trying to enter the 
sultan’s capital by night, but his small troop was worsted in the encounter.262 
The following day, however, he had his revenge when an advance party of 
British dragoons, who were clearing the road ahead of Gillespie’s main force, 
fell into a clever ambush he had laid at the ravine of the Kali Gajahwong at 
Papringan. The 25-strong squadron suffered heavy losses: five dead (‘man-
gled most shockingly’ in the words of a British artillery officer who came on 
the scene)263 and thirteen severely wounded including their British officer. 
The action once again proved the effectiveness of Javanese pikemen operating 
in disciplined formation using their very long spears to dismount European 
cavalrymen before they could reload their cumbersome cavalry carbines 
(Thorn 1815:177-8; Carey 1992:427 note 238; p. 7). Sindureja’s action would 
not be repeated. If it had, the British assault on Yogya might have taken a 
rather different course, resulting in the sort of casualty levels (twenty percent 
of the attacking force) sustained by the British at Meester Cornelis. Instead, 
259 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):106, I.30-1, 108, I:37.
260 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):111, I.49, sagung ing pamutihan […] sumedya prang sabil. On the 
understanding of the meaning of ‘holy war’ (prang sabil) at this time in south-central Java, see 
Carey 1981a:241 note 30. 
261 A son of Hamengkubuwana I, Sindureja II was a court bupati (nayaka) renowned for his skill 
and astuteness, Carey 1980:191. 
262 B.Ng. I:288-9, LXXI.6-9.
263	 Colebrooke	 letter,	 8-7-1812.	Raffles	 later	mentioned	 that	 18	dragoons	had	been	killed	by	
ambush	before	the	assault,	IOL,	Raffles-Minto	collection	(Xerox	copy	of	holograph	letters),	T.S.	
Raffles	(Semarang)	to	Lord	Minto	(Calcutta),	25-6-1812.
Map 5. Sketch of the Yogyakarta kraton at the time of the British assault on the morning 
of 20 June 1812. Adapted from Thorn 1815:185 facing, Plate XIX ‘Sketch of the fortified 
cratten of the Sultan of Djocjo Carta taken by assault 20 June 1812 by the British Forces 
commanded by Major General R.R. Gillespie’, by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
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the British lost twenty-three killed and seventy-four wounded, including one 
officer who subsequently died of his wounds, out of a total attacking force 
of just under 1,000 men. This gives a casualty rate of just under ten percent, 
small if compared to the many hundreds – ‘dreadful’ losses according to 
Raffles – who died on the Javanese side (Carey 1992:415 note 95). 
On the same day that Sindureja laid his successful ambush (Thursday, 18 
June) Raffles dispatched the Semarang Residency interpreter, C.F. Krijgsman, 
who had accompanied him to Yogya, to take in a letter to the sultan giving 
him an ultimatum: unless he abdicated in the next two hours (the ultimatum 
was to start at noon) in favour of the Crown Prince the British would begin 
their artillery bombardment.264 Krijgsman was received in the Srimenganti 
pavilion by the sultan with his relations and senior court officials seated on 
the floor around him in full battle array. Sumadiningrat was directly opposite. 
Turning to the Crown Prince, the sultan asked if he was prepared to accede to 
the demands of the British government.265 According to Mangkudiningrat’s 
account, the Crown Prince resolutely refused to accept them, whereupon 
the sultan drew up a letter detailing the impossibility of agreeing to Raffles’ 
demands and asking that Natakusuma should immediately explain why he 
had gone over to the fort.266 
The British artillery bombardment began that afternoon and would con-
tinue until late in the night of Friday, 19 June, the eve of the British assault. 
According to Raffles, the lengthy cannonade had two purposes: to allow time 
for the main body of the British assault force to reach Yogya, and to afford 
the sultan space to reconsider his position and negotiate.267 Far from being 
intimidated, however, the sultan appeared set on hostilities and waved aside 
Mangkudiningrat’s warnings about what had happened at Kartasura when the 
kraton had been stormed by the Chinese in 1742 during the Chinese War (1741-
1743).268 According to Valck, he later changed his tune when the British attack 
proper got under way early on the morning of 20 June and his cowardly behav-
iour at that time undermined the fighting morale of the kraton defenders.269
264	 IOL	G21/65,	Raffles,	‘Memorandum	respecting	Java’,	1813,	44.
265 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):113-5, I.57-66; BD (Manado) II:195-7, XVI.98-102; B.Ng. I:291-2, 
LXXI.24-40.
266 LOr 6791 (3): 114-5, I.63-6.
267	 IOL.	G21/65,	Raffles,	‘Memorandum	respecting	Java’,	1813,	45.	The	main	body	of	the	Brit-
ish assault force under Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Macleod (C.O. 59th Regiment of Foot, 2nd 
Nottinghamshires)	only	reached	Yogya	on	19	June.	Colebrooke	letter,	8-7-1812,	gives	a	descrip-
tion of the cannonade: ‘the 19th was taken up in bombarding and cannonading with a view to 
annoying	and	distracting	their	attention	which	we	kept	up	during	the	night	[of	19/20	June].	The	
enemy returned it but so feebly that the loss was very trivial. Many were, however, severely hurt 
by	an	unlucky	explosion	in	our	battery’.
268 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):105, I.25-6, reference to prang pacinan. See further Remmelink 
1994:180-1.
269 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 126.
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The ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’, which takes up the story at the 
start of the British bombardment, gives a vivid account of the low morale 
amongst the kraton defenders, especially the Javanese gunners when faced 
with the accuracy of the British fire. Many of the princes, who were supposed 
to set an example on the battlements by leading the defence, merely cowered 
in the shelter of gateways or pretended they were sick (Carey 1992:67-8, 
204-6, 208-9). Others slipped away from the kraton over the walls to take 
refuge in surrounding villages where their wives had close blood relations, a 
number going with their families to Imagiri, the site of the royal graveyard.270 
Only a handful of princes and senior officials, amongst them Sumadiningrat 
and Pangéran Jayakusuma (post-1825, Ngabèhi), Dipanagara’s future cavalry 
commander (p. 79), led the defence with any resolution. Some of the areas to 
the north of the kraton, especially the kauman, the vicinity around the Great 
Mosque where many santri lived, and the Pangurakan and Gladhagan door-
less gateways between the fort and the northern alun-alun, were damaged by 
fires started by stray artillery shots. At the same time, many of the inhabitants 
of Yogya fled from the town and there was much plundering by the troops of 
Prangwedana’s legion, the followers of Natakusuma, as well as sepoys. Only 
to the east of the Kali Codhé, on both sides of Natakusuma’s residence – the 
future Pakualaman – were the houses left untouched.271
The kadipatèn, to which both Dipanagara and his father had gone after 
the sultan’s defiant meeting with Krijgsman in the Srimenganti pavilion, was 
particularly badly damaged by cannon fire as it was positioned in the north-
eastern part of the kraton closest to the batteries in the fort (Carey 1992:67, 69, 
205, 210). The British also seemed to be preparing for an assault, for the main 
gate of the kadipatèn was nearly battered down by cannon balls. Twice the 
Crown Prince sent word to the sultan via his uncle, Pangéran Aria Panular, 
that reinforcements were urgently needed to prevent the kadipatèn falling to 
the besiegers. But the sultan remained in one of the pavilions of the inner kra-
ton during the cannonade surrounded by members of his Amazon corps who 
were always in attendance on him (Thorn 1815:293; Carey 1992:68, 207-8). 
Twice, he deferred to his son Mangkudiningrat’s advice that there were 
already enough soldiers in the Crown Prince’s establishment and that only a 
few gunners and some gunpowder could be spared to stiffen resistance there. 
Eventually, the Crown Prince’s younger brother, the heavily goitred Pangéran 
Mangkubumi, was sent over to help but he was deemed too irresolute to be of 
270	 Carey	1992:75,	76-7,	219-20,	221;	Colebrooke	letter,	8-7-1812	also	mentions	the	escape	of	the	
kraton defenders.
271 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):119, II.19, 120, II.23; Carey 1992:69, 210, 401 note 15; Mackenzie, 
‘Report’,	7-6-1813,	252,	stated	that	all	the	Javanese	workmen	and	artificers	fled	the	town	on	20	
June.	The	fact	that	Natakusuma’s	residence	and	neighbourhood	was	left	untouched	was	certainly	
due to his position as an ally of the British.
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any use.272 The author of the chronicle, Pangéran Panular, however, urged the 
Crown Prince to stand by his father in life and death despite his seeming lack 
of cooperation citing the plight of Sunan Amangkurat I (reigned 1646-1677) 
during the rebellion of the Madurese prince Trunajaya (1649-1680) when his 
kraton at Plérèd was overrun (1677) by rebel forces and he died as a fugitive on 
the north coast (Carey 1992:69, 210; Ricklefs 1993a:74-6). Indeed, the situation 
in the kraton proper was hardly more favourable than in the Crown Prince’s 
establishment. The same chronicle describes the sultan as being profoundly 
disturbed: many of his personal retainers and female bodyguard were recit-
ing prayers and incantations (dhikr) (Carey 1992:70, 211). Only the successful 
firing of the powder magazine in the fort (note 267) by three Bugis soldiers 
commanded by the same court bupati, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiwirya, 
who had struck the first blow at Radèn Rongga at Sekaran (p. 257), caused the 
sultan to shout for joy and pace the floor excitedly (Thorn 1815:181; Campbell 
1915, I:381; Carey 1992:70, 211-2).
At nine o’clock in the evening the British guns fell silent. In the kraton, 
many of the defenders fell asleep, thinking that the fighting had died down. 
But at three o’clock the following morning, the cannon thundered forth again 
with redoubled power.273 At daybreak (about five o’clock in the morning), 
parties of British and sepoy troops dispersed around the walls of the kraton 
together with the followers of Natakusuma (Hageman 1857:424-5; Thorn 
1815:184-7; Carey 1992:72, 214). Some bore flimsy bamboo scaling ladders, 
apparently prepared under the direction of the kapitan cina, Tan Jin Sing, 
whose Yogya Chinese community were reported to be strongly in support 
of the British attack, an attitude which fuelled powerful anti-Chinese senti-
ments in the aftermath of the British operation.274 Although Raffles would 
later report that the assault was made ‘by escalade’,275 many of the troops 
272 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):118, II.16; Carey 1992:71, 212-3. The same view of Mangkubumi 
was	evident	during	the	Java	War	when	Dipanagara	gave	him	the	task	of	looking	after	the	women	
and children at the village of Rejasa in Kulon Praga. He characterised him as a ‘coward’ (ing-
kang kuwatos kemawon), Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 15. Brumund (1854:192) called him Dipanagara’s ‘great 
eunuch’. Mangkubumi’s huge goitre, which made him instantly recognisable, is mentioned in 
Lettres de Java 1829:96. See further Carey 1981a:286 note 213.
273 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):113, I.60; Carey 1992:71-2, 213-4.
274	 Mackenzie,	‘Report’,	7-6-1813,	252,	mentioned	that	he	had	ordered	local	Javanese	artificers	
to make these on 19 June; Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 135, Hageman 1857:424; Meinsma 1876:132, 
refer to Tan Jin Sing’s role which included providing rice and supplies for the British troops for 
which he was subsequently rewarded by being given the title of Radèn Tumenggung Secadin-
ingrat, see Chapter VIII; Dj.Br. 29, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to George Augustus Addison 
(Bogor),	18-8-1814,	reported	that	the	Chinese	community	actively	supported	the	British	attack.	On	
the growth of anti-Chinese sentiments at this time and the burning of the Chinese tollgate post and 
quarter at Prambanan, see Carey 1984:22-4. The reference in Panular’s chronicle to Tan Jin Sing as 
‘Jisim’, the same word used in Javanese for a corpse, is hardly accidental, Carey 1992:243. 
275	 IOL,	 Raffles-Minto	 collection	 (Xerox	 copies	 of	 holograph	 letters),	 vol.	 3,	 T.S.	 Raffles	
(Yogyakarta)	to	Lord	Minto	(Calcutta),	25-6-1812.
Plate 40. Colonel (later Major-General) Sir Robert Rollo Gillespie (1766-1814), 
who commanded the British forces during the assault on Yogya in June 1812. 
Miniature by George Chinnery (1774-1854) made in Calcutta in circa 1814, show-
in g him in the dress uniform of his regiment, the 25th Light Dragoons. Taken 
from Wakeham 1937. Photograph by courtesy of the publisher and the Bodleian 
Library, Oxford.
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had to stand on each other’s shoulders in order to climb the walls (Thorn 
1815:186-7). The kadipatèn seems to have been the first to fall: the Pancasura 
gate in the northeast bastion was blown up by a unit of the Madras horse 
artillery276 and its battlements were overrun by sepoys who turned the kraton 
guns on the defenders (Thorn 1815:185, Plate XIX no. F; Carey 1992:72, 214).
The Crown Prince and his supporters, including his eldest son, Dipanagara, 
thereupon resolved to flee into the kraton to join the sultan, but at the 
Srimenganti gate they were refused entrance by Pangéran Jayakusuma, who 
stated that he was acting on the explicit orders of the Yogya ruler not to 
allow any armed men into the court.277 An altercation took place in which 
Dipanagara was instructed by his father to unsheath his kris. Sensing that a 
fight was brewing, the Crown Prince then told his son that they should move 
on (Carey 1992:73, 215). The party made their way south under continuous 
musketry fire from sepoys, who were already on the battlements. They tried 
to enter the kraton by other gates, but to no avail. Eventually, as they were 
nearing Pasar Ngasem near the Taman Sari, the branches of the tamarind 
trees lining the street blown into their path by British cannon shots, they were 
caught up with by a detachment led by the commanding officer of the Bengal 
Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion, Major Dennis Harman Dalton (Carey 
1992:512 note 543), and John Deans, the Malay-speaking secretary of the Yogya 
Residency (in office 1811-1813).278 He asked the Crown Prince to come under 
armed guard to the Residency. This the Crown Prince agreed to, but his party 
was first roughly disarmed by Dalton’s sepoys who gave Dipanagara a light 
bayonet wound as they were relieving him of his kris. Tan Jin Sing, who was 
with Deans, had to intervene personally to save the party from further humili-
ation, rescuing three of the Crown Prince’s pusaka (heirloom) pikes and his 
gold state parasol from being divided as spoil amongst the exultant Bengali 
soldiery.279 Eventually, the Crown Prince and his group reached the Residency 
where they were received by Raffles and Crawfurd. But Natakusuma treated 
them icily, hardly deigning to speak with his nephew (Carey 1992:78-9, 224-5). 
It was half past six in the morning (Hageman 1857:425).
News that the Crown Prince had been taken prisoner by the British was 
received with feelings of dismay in the kraton. Even the sultan forgot the 
many differences which had estranged him from his son and began to fear 
for his safety. The strong resistance which the British had first encountered 
276	 Colebrooke	letter,	8-7-1812.
277 BD (Manado), II:204-5, XVI.129-31; Carey 1992:72-3, 215. Jayakusuma was at this time a 
staunch supporter of the sultan’s party (kasepuhan) and had also taken part in the secret corre-
spondence with Surakarta.
278	 Later	founder	of	the	Semarang-based	firm,	Deans,	Scott	&	Co,	and	a	close	associate	of	Craw-
furd who called him ‘my acute and intelligent friend’, see De Haan 1935a:534-5.
279 BD (Manado) II:206-10, XVII.1-13; Thorn 1815:188; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:765; 
Campbell 1915, I:390; Carey 1992:77-8, 222-4. 
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as they entered the kraton had now begun to fade.280 The sultan, meanwhile, 
continued to take council with his younger brother, Pangéran Demang, who 
was known for his expertise in Javanese-Islamic mystical lore and cleverness 
with words (Carey 1992:84, 187-8, 383), but, as the ‘Chronicle of the fall of 
Yogyakarta’ put it, he was like a wayang puppeteer who had been caught by 
the morning never knowing when to round off his conversation at the appro-
priate time (Carey 1992:87, 232-3, 411 note 68). 
Meanwhile, the southern alun-alun had already been overrun and 
Sumadiningrat, deserted by his troops, would shortly be killed in his own 
residence to the south of the kraton while trying to avoid capture, the third 
and last of the sultan’s and Ratu Kedhaton’s sons-in-law to die violently 
within the space of just eightee n months.281 With the British now poised to 
make a frontal assault on the kadha ton (inner court) and realising that further 
resistance would only result in more bloodshed, the sultan resolved to hoist 
a white flag, recall his commanders and instruct them to order their troops to 
lay down their arms (Carey 1992:83, 231-2). He hoped that by this voluntary 
submission, the kraton proper would be spared by the British (Carey 1992:83, 
232). But, on seeing the flag, the British commander Colonel Gillespie imme-
diately entered the kadhaton and according to the Pakualam babad continued to 
fight fiercely sabreing the kraton defenders to right and left.282 There was still 
some isolated resistance and Gillespie was wounded in the upper left arm by 
a musket shot fired from the Suranatan mosque to the west of the Srimenganti 
pavilion where the sultan and his retainers were waiting to make their formal 
surrender (Raffles 1830:128; Carey 1992:79, 225, 409 note 53).
When the vanguard of the British force reached the Srimenganti pavilion, 
they found the sultan and his relations dressed in white with many of the 






281 The others had been Radèn Rongga (p. 257) and Danureja II (p. 292). Accounts of Sumadin-
ingrat’s death vary: Thorn 1815:187; Campbell 1915, I:385, both mention that he was killed by 
Lieutenant	Colonel	James	Dewar’s	(commanding	officer	3rd	Bengal	Volunteer	Battalion)	troops	
near the southern alun-alun before the main assault on the kraton, but Carey 1992:90-1, 242-3, 
418-9 note 94; Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoerejan, n.y., 207, both state that he was killed 
in his residence by the combined forces of Prangwedana’s legion and sepoys commanded by 
John Deans and I have accepted these. According to the last accounts, his body was stripped of 
its clothes and mutilated, subsequently being buried at the Sumadiningrat family graveyard at 
Jejeran, two kilometres to the south of Yogya near the Kali Codhé at 10 p.m. His residence was 
thoroughly looted and burnt. No folk memory of the site of his residence survives at the present 
time, personal visit to location of former Sumadiningratan, Yogya, April 1978.
282	 Poensen	1905:310.	Raffles	1830:128,	described	Gillespie	as	being	‘himself’,	namely,	showing	
his usual dash and bravery. See further Carey 1992:409 note 53.
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Yogya ruler’s mind had been set on death rather than surrender, might have 
prefigured the prang puputan (‘final battle/ending wars’) in Lombok and Bali 
in 1894 and 1906-1908 when some of the rulers, their families and follow-
ers met their deaths at the hands of the invading Dutch armies dressed in 
white with all their ceremonial finery.283 In the case of Yogya, the monarch 
and his entourage made no attempt at such a desperate last stand. Instead, 
they allowed themselves to be immediately disarmed and their hands held 
at their sides by their British and sepoy guards. Even the sultan’s person 
was secured by a British officer, Lieutenant Henry N. Douglas of the 78th 
Highland Regiment of Foot (Carey 1992:85, 234-5, 412 note 69a). Although 
he was not forced immediately to surrender his personal kris, his request to 
bring his pusaka (heirloom) weapons from the kraton was refused and they 
were taken by Gillespie.284 Under these humiliating circumstances, the sultan 
and his relations were marched to the Residency between a row of British and 
sepoy soldiers with drawn swords and fixed bayonets. As the party entered 
the Residency House, the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ describes how 
Raffles noticed with pleasure that only a couple of pangéran tried to get down 
from their chairs to pay the sultan their customary respects. He motioned 
these to remain seated. The Crown Prince himself hid his feelings, although 
he felt acutely the pathos of the moment. In tears, the sultan and his follow-
ers were now forced to give up their personal kris and gold ornaments (Carey 
1992:86, 236), the sultan’s sword and stabbing dagger later being sent by 
Raffles to Lord Minto in Calcutta as a symbol of ‘the entire submission’ of the 
Yogya court to the British.285 Even the small diamond buttons of the sultan’s 
dress jacket were subsequently cut off by his sepoy guards as he lay asleep 
in his place of detention (Nahuys van Burgst 1835-36, I:131). The Yogya ruler 
283 Carey 1992:234, VIII (Pangkur) 13-4. kang kursi samya tinata/ lawon putih dènsuwèki. 14. sadaya 
kang nèng jru pura/ nganggé pethak delasan peryayi stri/ Sang Nata angawé gupuh/ kacu putih kinarya. 
13.	‘the	chairs	were	covered/	with	torn	strips	of	white	cotton.	14.	Everyone	in	the	inner	kraton/ 
wore white even the female bodyguard./ The sultan was hurriedly/ having white squares of 
cloth made’. On the prang puputan in Lombok and Bali, see Covarrubias 1972:32-6; Van der Kraan 
1980:97; Creese 2006:1-38.
284 Carey 1992:85, 234-5; Campbell 1915, I:390, mention that Hamengkubuwana II was forced to 
leave behind the following pusaka kris: Kyai Paningset, Kyai Sangkelat, Kyai Urub, and Kyai Jingga. 
B.Ng. I:320-1, LXXXVIII.11-13, Carey 1992:105, 264, state that these kris, together with Kyai Gupita, 
Kyai Jaka Piturun, and Kyai Mesèm, were taken by Colonel Gillespie but later returned at Hameng-
kubuwana III’s coronation ceremony on 28 June 1812. See also KITLV H 76, ‘Boedel van [Sultan] 




of Djocjocarta delivered to me by Colonel Gillespie with two krises [kris] which according to the 
custom and usage of these Eastern Isles are intended to represent the entire submission of the 
courts of Surakarta and Djojcocarta’.
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was thereupon led into a small side room of the Residency where he was 
held prisoner with Mangkudiningrat until their exile from Yogya on 3 July.286 
It was eight o’clock in the morning.287 As far as the sultanate was concerned, 
the Parangkusuma prophecy had been fulfilled.
Conclusion
So the kraton of Yogyakarta fell to the British nearly fifty-seven years after 
it had been first occupied as Mangkubumi’s capital on 6 November 1755 
(Ricklefs 1974a:80). As we have seen in previous chapters, it was perhaps the 
inevitable outcome of the Yogya elite’s inability to come to terms with the real-
ity of the new European colonialism born of the twin revolutions of industri-
alisation and bourgeoise democracy which had convulsed Europe in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The changes had been introduced 
into Java too rapidly and in too brutal a fashion. In the space of just under 
four years, the south-central Javanese courts had been forced to accommodate 
themselves to a new form of centralised colonial government which stood in 
direct contradiction to their own political philosophy of divided sovereignty 
in Java. Given time, they might have been able to reshape their political con-
ceptions to legitimize the changed realities, but they could not do it in the 
quick fire way demanded by Daendels and Raffles. The result was disaster. 
This was particularly the case for Yogya, which had entered on this period of 
cataclysmic change with ostensibly the most powerful and prosperous court, 
but in fact hopelessly divided against itself and ruled by a vain and inflex-
ible man. The rapid germination of intrigues within the kraton literally tore it 
apart just at the time when it needed its undivided energies to cope with the 
new challenges posed by a resurgent Europe. Mangkubumi’s kingdom had 
been founded by the sword, in June 1812 it could be said to have perished by 
the sword.
For the British colonial government in Java, there was little doubt about 
the significance of their victory. Muntinghe hailed it as an event of similar 
significance to Clive’s victory at Plassey on 23 June 1757 which had opened 
up the whole of northern India to British rule (Carey 1992:60 note 102). Raffles 
echoed this in a dispatch to his patron, Lord Minto, when he stated that ‘the 
European power is for the first time paramount in Java. […] we never till this 





the fall of Yogyakarta’, Carey 1992:87, 237.
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moment could call ourselves masters of the more valuable provinces in the 
interior, nay, our possessions on the sea coasts would always have been pre-
carious and, had [our] military force been materially reduced, much eventual 
danger was to be apprehended.’288 Although both Yogyakarta and Surakarta 
would continue as dismembered states after 1812, they were never again 
capable of posing a threat to the position of the European government. When 
a new challenge did materialise under Dipanagara’s Javanese-Islamic banner 
in July 1825, it would owe its inspiration and energies to influences outside 
the great court traditions. The support given to the prince by the religious 
communities and the Javanese peasantry, both groups who felt themselves 
increasingly excluded from the new colonial order, was more important than 
the traditional foci of court patronage and loyalty. In many ways, June 1812, 
rather than the end of the Java War, should be seen as the date when the new 
colonial era dawned in Java. Out of this collapse and the legacy of bitterness 
which it left, however, a new and more potent combination of elements in 
Javanese society would emerge. It is with these social, political and economic 
developments in the thirteen years following the British attack on Yogya that 





Into a new era
the British interregnum, 1812-1816
Lineaments of a new order
The four years which followed the British storming of the Yogya kraton ushe-
red in a new era in the relationship between the south-central Javanese courts 
and the European government. The balance of force had now shifted decisi-
vely in favour of the colonial state. Never again would a governor-general 
have to fear the countervailing military power of the independent rulers, still 
less their combined forces which the sorry episode of the un-ratified March 
1812 secret treaty had been shown to be a chimera. The treaties imposed by 
Raffles on the courts in the aftermath of the Yogya attack would strip them 
forever of their independent military capacity through the imposition of li-
mits on their court bodyguard regiments. At the same time, the annexation 
of the key central apanage province of Kedhu and parts of their respective 
mancanagara territories would also end forever their potential for calling up 
military levies to augment their court-based military establishments. Indeed, 
so secure did Raffles feel following the 20 June operation and the speedy sub-
mission of the Yogya chiefs that he did not even consider it necessary to order 
the destruction of the Yogya kraton fortifications, although the gun batteries 
were demolished with the approval of the third sultan.1 The city wall around 
Batavia was also allowed to fall into ruin during this decade, and some of the 
stone from Daendels’ fortress at Meester Cornelis was shipped off to build 
the new defences at Muntok on the island of Bangka which guarded the sea 
approaches to Palembang along the Musi River.2 
This fundamental shift in the balance of power is reflected in the extant 
Residency letters which are now full of the minutiae of colonial administration 




July 1825 would, however, lead to a hurried revision of this policy of neglect, new defences being 
thrown up to protect the colonial capital as the tide of war lapped at Dutch-controlled cities along 
the	north	coast,	see	Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	I:177.
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rather than the urgent litany of threat and procrastination which characterised 
the	Daendels’	era	(1808-1811).	Although	the	Residents	themselves	would	still	
retain an important political role, their official responsibilities were now incre-
asingly bureaucratic and predictable, a world away from the complex – and at 
times dangerous – ambassadorial functions of their pre-June 1812 predecessors. 
No longer would there be any question that the demands of the European go-
vernment in Batavia would trump the expectations of the sovereigns to whom 
the Residents were accredited. At the same time, there were important chan-
ges	in	the	economic	field:	just	as	the	collapse	of	Radèn	Rongga’s	rebellion	in	
December 1810 had swept aside the last barriers to the economic exploitation 
of the eastern outlying provinces so now the Principalities themselves were 
opened out to western capital. This was evident in the small beginnings made 
during the British interregnum in the leasing of landed estates by European 
entrepreneurs for the production of cash crops such as indigo and coffee, 
leases which would become a source of considerable political friction during 
the post-1816 Dutch restoration regime of Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van 
der	Capellen	(in	office	1816-1826).	In	this	process	of	land	lease,	the	Residents	
led the way, in particular, Crawfurd and his Dutch successor in Yogya, H.G. 
Nahuys	van	Burgst	(in	office	1816-1822),	both	of	whom	leased	lands	and	had	
other business interests in the Principalities.3 
The present chapter will assess the impact of this shift in the balance of 
power on the politics and economic life of the south-central Javanese courts. It 
will also attempt to reconstruct the history of the four years of the British in-
terregnum from the fragmentary Residency archive of Yogyakarta whose con-
temporary	letters	were	purloined	by	a	subsequent	Dutch	Resident	(Chapter	
VII	note	155).
The plunder of the Yogya kraton
Before the new era could dawn, Colonel R.R. Gillespie’s force took the Yogya 
kraton apart in a wholesale looting of the court and its contents. In India, 
booty	was	one	of	the	major	perquisites	of	East	India	Company	officers	and	
the British army in India had fought for the right to keep everything in for-
tresses, courts and strong points taken by assault. Yogya was no exception. 
Raffles referred briefly to this process in a dispatch to Lord Minto written 
soon after the fall of the kraton:	
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The	whole	of	the	tangible	property	of	Djocjocarta	fell	to	the	captors	[…]	but	in	the	
immediate	distribution	they	took	more	upon	themselves	than	was	justifiable.	[…]	
I had no reason to expect so hasty and hurried a measure on their part, but the 
mischief	being	once	done,	 it	was	useless	 to	object	or	condemn.	 […]	The	univer-
sal	opinion	[has	been]	that	in	places	carried	by	assault,	the	army	was	entitled	to	
make	an	immediate	distribution	of	treasure	and	jewels,	and	the	authority	of	Lord	








Gillespie refused to heed his warnings and proceeded to an immediate divi-






to Bengal so that officers could draw bills of exchange for the support of 
their families in India.7	At	the	same	time,	7,000	Spanish	dollars	was	given	to	
Pangéran	Prangwedana	(Mangkunagara	II)	out	of	the	Yogya	prize	money	in	
recognition of the services of his legion during the attack.8











7 The fall of the kraton	and	the	distribution	of	prize	money	led	to	a	great	amount	of	specie	
being	thrown	into	circulation	in	Java	causing	in	Raffles	words	‘much	distress’	amongst	officers	
of	 the	army	since	existing	restrictions	on	the	export	of	bullion	prevented	them	from	remitting	




8	 UBL,	 BPL	 616,	 Port.	 7	 pt.	 6,	 H.G.	 Nahuys	 van	 Burgst	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	A.M.Th.	 de	 Salis	
(Surakarta),	22-4-1822.
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that he would be able to defray the whole cost of the expedition were disap-
pointed.	Indeed,	when	he	came	to	ask	Pakubuwana	IV	and	the	newly	ap-
pointed	third	sultan	to	make	a	contribution	of	200,000	Spanish	dollars	each,	
both pleaded poverty, the sultan stating that the only wealth that was now 
left	to	him	was	his	personal	collection	of	jewellery.9  Faced with this situation, 
Raffles	made	the	best	case	possible	to	Minto:
The	 Craton	 [kraton]	 having	 fallen	 by	 assault,	 it	was	 impracticable	 to	make	 any	
provision	for	Government	to	[re]cover	the	expences	[sic]	of	the	undertaking;	con-
sequently,	the	whole	plunder	became	Prize	to	the	Army.	It	is	considerable,	but	it	
could not have fallen into better hands. They richly deserved what they got. I can-
not	speak	too	highly	of	the	conduct	of	the	Army	in	its	relation	with	Government:	
every	 officer	 has	 behaved	 like	 a	 gentleman.	 Majors	 [Archibald]	 Campbell	 and	
[Jeremiah	Martin]	Johnson	accompanied	me	and	will	both	improve	their	fortunes	
considerably.	They	are	appointed	Prize	Agents.10
He then went on to some special pleading intended to soothe Minto’s fears 
that	the	army	had	got	above	itself:
in	 the	present	 instance	 [the	army]	has	a	special	claim	to	 indulgence,	 it	 is	on	 the	
score	of	the	moderation	and	forbearance	evinced	by	all	classes	[?	ranks]	and	the	
earnest desire that was evident in all to render the effects of victory as little disgus-




Javanese source we have, takes up the tale. According to this account, the 
British and sepoy troops went roughly to work plundering the court. Many 
of	the	princes	were	forced	to	hand	over	their	personal	jewel	encrusted	kris 
and were sent under armed guard to the Residency. Even the aged Pangéran 
Ngabèhi,	the	seventy-four-year	old	elder	brother	of	the	second	sultan,	who	
was then suffering from dysentery, was forced to leave the inner court, being 
transported	to	the	Residency	in	a	chair	by	his	retainers.	Still	dressed	in	their	
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Meanwhile, the ladies of the court were handled roughly and robbed of 
their valuables, even though the chronicle noted that it was not like the fall of 
the kraton	at	Plérèd	(1677)	and	Kartasura	(1742)	during	the	Trunajaya	rebel-
lion	(1675-1680)	and	the	Chinese	War	(1740-1743)	when	the	younger	and	more	
beautiful women and female servants were raped before being carried off as 
war	booty	(Carey	1992:88,	238,	415	note	84;	Ricklefs	1993b:41).	This	is	to	some	
extent	confirmed	in	the	account	of	Major	William	Thorn,	who	served	as	quar-
termaster-general to the British forces at the time of the assault. He remarked 
on	the	‘great	forbearance’	of	the	British	and	sepoy	troops	in	the	women’s	apart-
ments	(Thorn	1815:190).	But	it	is	clear	that	some	violence	was	involved.	This	can	
be seen from the fate of the one British officer to die of wounds sustained du-
ring	the	attack:	Lieutenant	Hector	Maclean	of	the	Buckinghamshire	Regiment,	
who expired on 25 June and was buried in Yogya, was apparently fatally stab-






later cut a pitiable figure when she was eventually brought back to the kadipa-
tèn on the evening of 21 June following the Crown Prince’s return as the newly 
appointed	Sultan	Hamengkubuwana	III.12  
According to the chronicle, a rigorous search was conducted for articles of 
jewellery.	Ratu	Kencana	Wulan	was	particularly	singled	out	as	she	was	rumou-
red to be inordinately rich, disposing of large amounts of gems and having in 
her	possession	one	diamond	the	size	of	a	big	toe.	The	ratu vigorously denied it, 
but, on being threatened, she not only handed over her pouch belt filled with 
precious stones, but also a large diamond ring, which had been hidden down 
a	well.	The	finder	was	later	supposedly	paid	500	Spanish	dollars	by	Raffles	
himself.13	Tan	Jin	Sing’s	arrival	from	the	Residency	shortly	after	nine	o’clock	
on the morning of 20 June with the news that the Crown Prince was to be rai-
sed as sultan, seems to have helped to calm the fears of the court women and 
most were eventually escorted to safety in the Residency with their children 
in	palanquins	(Carey	1992:92,	244).	Others,	such	as	Ratu	Kencana	Wulan	and	






13	 Carey	 1992:88,	 237-8,	 415	 note	 83.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 Raffles’	 prize	 agent,	 Major	 Jeremiah	
Martin Johnson, rather than the lieutenant-governor himself was the recipient of this diamond 
ring because there was an advertisement placed by Johnson in the Java Government Gazette of 22 
August	1812	for	the	sale	of	a	string	of	large	diamonds,	De	Haan	1935a:588.
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the	members	of	the	former	ruler’s	Amazon	corps,	apparently	found	temporary	
accommodation in the residence of Pangéran Natakusuma, soon to be known 
as	the	Pakualaman	(Carey	1992:113,	278).	A	few,	however,	were	left	behind	as	
we have seen with the case of the unknown court lady whose encounter with 
the	Scots	lieutenant	proved	so	fatal	for	the	latter.	
The plundering of the kraton continued, according to the chronicle, for more 
than four whole days, an unending stream of booty being carried to the Residency 
on ox-carts and on the backs of porters. Many of the old sultan’s retainers and 




men’s quarters after the fall of the kraton, were forced to participate in trans-
porting the heavy chests normally used for storing the court heirlooms to the 
Residency	(Van	den	Broek	1875:69;	Carey	1992:94,	248,	421	note	111).	Amongst	
the	major	items	taken	were	most	of	the	kraton ordnance, sets of shadow-play 
puppets, all the court gamelan	(Javanese	orchestras)	and	the	court	archives	and	
manuscripts	(with	the	exception	of	a	solitary	Qur’ān)	(Java Government Gazette 
5,	4-7-1812;	Thorn	1815:192;	Carey	1980:12-3	notes	1-5,	1992:94,	248).	The	ma-
nuscripts included literary works such as babad	(Javanese	chronicles),	as	well	





them that one particularly beautiful babad,	bound	in	gold	leaf	and	set	with	je-




was especially delighted and intrigued by Natakusuma’s literary knowledge. 
As a token of his esteem for him, he is said to have returned the manuscript to 
the	prince	(Carey	1992:96,	251).	This	episode	in	which	the	future	Pakualam	I	
helped Crawfurd sort through the kraton library and supposedly impressed the 
lieutenant-governor	with	his	literary	knowledge	is	intriguing.	We	cannot	con-
firm it in the European accounts, but we know from independent sources that 
a special friendship did indeed grow up between Natakusuma/Pakualam I and 
the British Resident. This was based on common literary interests and later re-
sulted	in	the	loan	of	various	manuscripts	to	the	Scotsman	from	the	Pakualaman	
(Ricklefs	1969:241-2;	Ricklefs	and	Voorhoeve	1977:52).	When	the	time	came	for	
Crawfurd to leave Yogya on 10 August 1816, he was unstinting in his praise of 
his	Javanese	friend	to	his	Dutch	successor,	Nahuys	van	Burgst:	‘Pakualam	is	for	
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a Javanese a man of superior mind. He has a comprehensiveness of understan-
ding to which among the natives there is no parallel.’ 14 
Another such relationship of mutual literary and scholarly esteem can be 






shared literary and scholarly interests, they also had their exploitative side. 
The	expertise	of	men	such	as	Natakusuma/Pakualam	I,	Sura-adimanggala	and	
the	Panembahan	of	Sumenep	(p.	286	note	99),	enabled	scholar	administra-
tors like Raffles and Crawfurd to draw on local sources for their histories. All 




cripts, almost none were returned to their original royal owners as seems to 
have happened with the Pakualaman text. Indeed, it is clear that a number 
were	taken	as	booty	by	British	officers	and	prize	agents.15 The foundation of 
Crawfurd’s own private collection of Indonesian manuscripts appears to have 
been	laid	at	this	time	with	a	personal	haul	of	at	least	45	Javanese	MSS	from	
the kraton library, most of which he subsequently sold to the British Museum 
in	1842	(Ricklefs	and	Voorhoeve	1977:48;	Carey	1980:2,	13	note	17).	A	slightly	
larger group of 55 manuscripts was claimed by Raffles for the British govern-
ment.	These	were	sent	to	him	in	Bogor	in	November	181416 and formed the 
core	of	his	own	personal	collection	of	Javanese	and	Indonesian	MSS,	the	bulk	








Mackenzie,	 Blagden	 1916:vii-xii.	 The	 bulk	 of	 this	 collection,	which	had	been	 brought	 back	 to	
Bengal	with	him	in	July	1813	and	which	was	subsequently	known	as	the	Mackenzie	Private	Col-
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of	which	were	presented	by	Lady	Raffles	to	the	Royal	Asiatic	Society	in	1830	
after	his	death	(Ricklefs	and	Voorhoeve	1977:xxvii-xxviii).	In	this	fashion,	the	
private and public archives of Great Britain were swelled by the plunder of its 
soldiers	and	colonial	administrators;	intellectual	booty	capitalism	in	its	purest	
form,	invaluable	for	subsequent	Western	scholars,	but	deeply	impoverishing	
for those non-European societies who fell victim to its depredations. The pre-
sent volume owes much to that imperial grand larceny.
The appointment of Hamengkubuwana III and kasepuhan-karajan rivalries
The rapid humiliation of the old sultan and the preparations for the appoint-
ment of the Crown Prince as Hamengkubuwana III seem to have intensified 
the feelings of bitterness amongst the party of the former ruler, the kasepuhan. 
The exile of the old sultan and his principal supporters by the British govern-
ment	on	3	July	(Carey	1992:438	note	201)	did	not	spell	the	end	of	the	kasepu-
han. Indeed, when Nahuys van Burgst became Resident in August 1816, he 
was so aware of this rivalry that he attempted to bring about some sort of 
reconciliation by inviting supporters from each faction in pairs to a series of 
private dinner parties which he held at his country estate at Bedhaya on the 
flanks of Mount Merapi.17 But these parties in themselves do not seem to have 
made	much	of	a	lasting	impact.	During	the	Java	War	it	was	noticeable	that	
there were many more princes of the party which supported the third sultan 
– the karajan – than those from the kasepuhan who rallied to Dipanagara’s 
cause or afforded him support at some point during the conflict.18 Even after 
the end of the war, during the reign of the second sultan’s great-grandson, 
Hamengkubwana	V	(reigned	1822-1826,	1828-1855),	kasepuhan and karajan 
loyalties continued to be detected amongst the younger generations of Yogya 
princes and officials.19 
Prominent amongst the old sultan’s supporters was, of course, his favou-
rite son, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat. He had apparently asked the British for 
a	3,000	cacah apanage and the title of Pangéran Adipati, which, if accorded, 









later killed, Knoer le, ‘Journal’,	16;	dK	158,	‘Lyst	der	personen	welke	zich	als	muitelingen	hebben	
opgeworpen’,	12-1829	(with	marginal	entries	by	H.M.	de	Kock);	Chapter	XII,	notes	2	and	4.
19 Dj.Br.	18,	Valck,	‘Geheime	memorie’,	31-3-1840;	Houben	1994:133.
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would have put him on a par with the Crown Prince.20 The official British 
government view is unknown, but it is unlikely to have been favourable. The 
granting of such elevated status to a known rival of their ally would have 
been political folly. As for Mangkudiningrat, it is clear that he was not prepa-
red to accept his sudden loss of political influence at court and seems to have 
cast around for ways to revenge himself on the Crown Prince. His hand was 
soon thought to have been behind a grievous incident which occurred at the 
house	of	the	Yogya	captain	of	the	Chinese	(kapitan cina)	on	the	night	following	
the fall of the kraton.21 Crawfurd gives a succinct account of this in his History 
of the Indian Archipelago	(Crawfurd	1820,	I:69):
In	the	year	1812,	[on]	the	very	day	on	which	the	fortified	palace	of	the	Sultan	[…]	
was	stormed,	a	certain	petty	chief,	a	 favourite	of	 the	dethroned	Sultan,	was	one	
of the first to come over to the conquerors and was active in the course of the day 
[20	June]	in	[…]	the	pacification	of	the	country.	At	night,	he	was	with	many	other	




own life, he killed and wounded a great number of persons chiefly his country-
men, who were sleeping in the same apartment with him. I arrived on the spot a 
few	seconds	after	this	tragic	affair	[…]	and	found	it	as	usual	on	such	occasions	a	
very difficult matter to obtain a true account of.
The	 ‘petty	 chief’	 in	 question	was	Mas	Ngabèhi	 Gandadiwirya,	 one	 of	
Mangkudiningrat’s panakawan	(intimate	confidants;	retainers).	According	to	
Dipanagara, the last straw for Mangkudiningrat had been Crawfurd’s an-
nouncement at a party in the Residency House on the evening of the day of the 
fall of the kraton	(20	June)	that	the	part	Madurese	patih of the kadipatèn,	Radèn	
Ngabèhi	Jayasentika,	who	had	played	such	a	key	role	as	an	intermediary	du-
ring	the	negotiations	between	the	British	and	the	Crown	Prince	(pp.	323-4),	
would shortly be appointed Yogya chief minister. Mangkudiningrat had left 
the party at that point and instructed Gandadiwirya to carry out the attack.22 
There	is	nothing	in	the	other	sources	to	confirm	this,	although	the	‘Chronicle	
20 LOr	6791	(3)	(Babad Spèhi):111,	I.50-1;	AvJ,	A.H.	Smissaert	(Yogyakarta)	to	G.A.G.Ph.	van	der	
Capellen	(Batavia),	5-8-1824.	For a discussion of the Pangéran Adipati title which appears to have 
fallen	into	disuse	after	the	Kartasura	War	(1740-1743),	see	Meinsma	1876:126-33.









The power of prophecy354




that Gandadiwirya, who was at the party, had taken deep offence at some of 
the remarks made by supporters of the Crown Prince regarding the kasepuhan. 
He had controlled his anger at the time, but during the night, when most of 
the Crown Prince’s party had left, he had run amok with his pike and stab-
bed to death Jayasentika and another of the prince’s senior officials.23 Despite 
the presence of a strong sepoy guard at the house, several others had been 
seriously	wounded,	among	them	Tan	Jin	Sing,	who	received	stab	wounds	in	




this case, the attack was not blind. Gandadiwirya’s targets were very specific. 
We	have	seen	how	the	kapitan cina and the wider Yogya Chinese commu-
nity, over whom the captain of the Chinese exercised authority, had made 
themselves the butt of ethnic Javanese resentment because of their strong 
support for the British during their operations against the kraton	(Chapter	
VII).	We	will	see	shortly	how	Tan	Jin	Sing	would	become	even	more	of	a	
bête noire amongst local Javanese when he was elevated as a bupati with the 
title	of	Radèn	Tumenggung	Secadiningrat	under	pressure	from	the	British	in	
December	1813.	At	the	same	time,	threats	to	his	life	continued.	Indeed,	so	fear-
ful was the kapitan cina after Gandadiwirya’s amok assault that a sepoy guard 
had to be permanently stationed at his house to prevent any further attack on 
him.24  It is clear that both Jayasentika and his kadipatèn colleague were targe-
ted because they were thought to be destined to play important roles in the 
future third sultan’s administration. In the longer term, Jayasentika’s death 
was a tragedy for Yogya for if he had lived and been appointed to the chief 
ministerial position, the later quarrel between Dipanagara and the man who 
did eventually become patih	in	December	1813,	the	part	Balinese,	part	east	
Javanese bupati	of	Japan	(Majakerta),	Mas	Tumenggung	Sumadipura,	might	
never	have	happened	(Chapters	IX	and	X).	In	view	of	Jayasentika’s	importan-
ce, it is thus hard to escape the conclusion that he was specifically singled out 
by Gandadiwirya as his principal victim. On the other hand, the rather hasty 
implication of Mangkudiningrat in the affair could have been engineered by 
the third sultan to do away with his most serious rival. This was certainly the 
gloss that the exiled pangéran put on it in his own babad.25
23	 This	was	Radèn	Tumenggung	Citradiwirya,	see	Carey	1992:425	note	128.
24 Baud	306,	Van	IJsseldijk,	‘Rapport’,	11-12-1816.
25 LOr	6791	(3)	(Babad Spèhi):148-50,	III.68-78.	Mangkudiningrat was sent into exile in Pulau 
Pinang	along	with	the	old	sultan	on	3	July	1812,	Carey	1992:438	note	201.
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The episode of Gandadiwirya’s murderous attack serves to underscore the 
very delicate political situation in Yogya after the fall of the kraton in which 
various sons of the old sultan acted in a hostile fashion towards his British-
sponsored successor. This hostility was apparently very much in evidence 
during the third sultan’s appointment ceremony at half past four in the af-
ternoon	on	Sunday,	21	June.26 According to the chronicle, during the official 
banquet which followed the ceremony, many of the older princes merely ga-
zed	in	a	bored	fashion	out	of	the	windows	and	took	not	the	slightest	notice	of	
the new sultan despite the efforts of the chronicle’s author, Pangéran Panular, 
one of Hamengkubuwana III’s strongest supporters, to arouse their attention 
(Carey	1992:109,	269,	434	note	172).
The ceremony itself, however, seems to have taken place without mis-





impressive’.27 Raffles’ official proclamation, which had been drawn up on 18 
June before the British attack and posted up around Yogya after the fall of the 
kraton,	was	read	out	(Carey	1992:89,	241).	This	contained	the	official	notifica-
tion of the government’s intention to appoint the Crown Prince as ruler and 
had already been announced by public declamation at nine o’clock that same 
morning	at	the	Residency	House	(Carey	1992:416	note	91).	The	full	text	was	
now	read	out	by	the	official	Javanese	interpreter,	C.F.	Krijgsman.	First	came	
the statement of the British government’s grounds for action against the se-
cond	sultan,	who	‘by	his	crimes	and	violation	of	[the	28	December	1811]	trea-
ty	[has]	shown	himself	unworthy	of	the	confidence	of	the	British	Government	







Hamengkubuwana III’. Then came a warning to the members of the kasepu-
han	and	would-be	supporters	of	the	old	sultan:	‘all	who	presume	to	abet	the	
dethroned Prince in his pretensions to government will be considered as trai-
tors	to	their	country	and	dealt	with	accordingly’	(Carey	1992:417	note	92).
26 On the confusion over the dates and time of Hamengkubuwana III’s elevation as sultan 
in	 the	Dutch	 secondary	 sources,	 see	Carey	1992:430	note	 147	 referring	 to	Levyssohn	Norman	
1857:72;	Veth	1896-1907,	II:305;	Rouffaer	1905:599.
27	 Colebrooke	letter,	8-7-1812.
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For	perhaps	the	first	time	since	Sunan	Pakubuwana	II’s	reign	(1726-1749)	
formal cession of his kingdom to the Dutch East Indies Company by his tre-
aty	of	11	December	1749	a	European	government	was	in	place	in	Java	which	
could give de facto	substance	to	the	claim	that	they	were	‘sovereigns’	over	
Mataram.	As	Ricklefs	has	pointed	out	in	his	study	of	Sultan	Mangkubumi’s	
reign	(1749-1792):	‘only	men	and	gunpowder	could	accomplish	that	and	of	
these commodities the Dutch supply was inadequate until the nineteenth 
century’	(Ricklefs	1974a:52).	The	British	with	their	Indian	army	victorious	on	
land and their navy unchallenged on the high seas could now announce that 
they	were	‘delegating’	half	the	high	lands	of	Java	and	had	the	military	muscle	
to make that delegation real. The third sultan was a client sovereign in fact as 
well	as	name.	Those	who	opposed	him	were	traitors	not	just	to	Yogya	but	also	
to the British government. This was a changed world indeed.
After the proclamation had been read out in Javanese and English, 
Dipanagara’s	younger	brother,	Bendara	Radèn	Mas	Sudama	was	proclaimed	
as Crown Prince, whereupon the appointments were acclaimed by all those 
present and the lieutenant-governor came forward to bestow his greetings 
and kiss on the new sultan. According to the author of the chronicle, this 
kiss looked more like the fighting of quails with their beaks – a reference to 
the contests between quail hens which were very popular amongst the ladies 
of	the	Javanese	courts	at	this	time	–		rather	than	a	warm	embrace	(Carey	
1992:105,	264,	431	note	155).	The	official	ornaments	of	state	were	handed	over	
together with some of the court heirlooms, which intriguingly did not include 
any of the great regalia or pusaka ageng which had not been found during 
the plundering of the kraton	(Carey	1992:105,	264,	431	note	156-57a).	A	nine-
teen-gun salute then boomed forth from the fort and the military band of 
the sultan’s Eurasian and Ambonese dragoon guards struck up, after which 
those Javanese nobles and senior court officials present came forward to pay 
their	respects	led	by	Natakusuma	and	Prangwedana	(Mangkunagara	II),	the	
last greeting the new ruler by shaking his hand European-style a further sign 
– along with his short-cropped hair and European military uniform – that he 
was	now	a	‘Company’	(European	government)	prince	(Carey	1992:105,	264,	
432	note	159).	At	this	point,	according	to	the	chronicle,	some	unpleasantness	
occurred when two of the older princes, who had favoured the former sultan, 
gave Raffles and the new ruler the usual two-handed Muslim greeting rather 
than the full act of homage by kissing their feet. As uncles of the third sultan, 
their greeting was in fact the correct one, and as for paying respects to a go-
vernor, the full act of homage was unheard of. But, according to the chronicle, 
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sode is a vivid one and was another reflection of the changed political world 
in which the princes of Yogya were now living.
The	official	ceremonies	in	the	Residency	over	and	the	sun	just	about	to	
set, Raffles invited the sultan and his party to come outside and inspect the 
British and sepoy troops, who were drawn up in fifteen long rows in the 
front	square	between	the	Residency	and	the	fort	(Carey	1992:106-8,	265-8,	
429	note	146).	We	have	both	Javanese	and	Dutch	accounts	to	corroborate	the	
description of the show of massed force put on by Gillespie’s army ostensibly 
to celebrate the third sultan’s appointment, but also to underscore the mili-
tary capacity of the new British government in the event that any in Yogya 
might contemplate a return to the sort of confrontational politics which had 




officers had secured the person of the sultan at the time of the surrender of 
the kraton	(p.	341).	
Dressed	in	red	jackets,	green	cotton	trousers	and	knobbled	helmets	with	
circlets of gold, the three-faced blade of their bayonets glinted in the light of 
the setting sun as they presented arms. Behind them were the sepoy troops 
with	green	jackets	and	breeches,	white	camisoles,	silver-braided	shoulder	
bands	and	epaulettes,	and	fez-like	mob	caps.	Many	were	heavily	bearded	and,	
according to both Raffles and the chronicle, they created a terrifying impres-
sion amongst the watching Javanese.29 Indeed, all the British and sepoy troops, 
including the detachment of HM 22nd Dragoons with their red-plumed ca-
valry shakos, who performed elaborate manoeuvres on horseback and were 
described as appearing like mounted demons, deeply impressed the author of 
the chronicle. In his view, it was fitting that Yogya had been conquered by such 
warlike	enemies	and	that	even	with	the	help	of	Surakarta,	the	Javanese	would	
not have been able to withstand them. The Yogyanese, in his estimation, had 
been at odds with each other and the ulama	(Javanese-Islamic	religious	scho-
lars),	who	should	have	been	setting	an	example	by	devoting	themselves	to	
mystical sciences, had been motivated more by the pursuit of greed and mate-
rial	gain	like	merchants	(Carey	1992:267,	434	note	168).	Amongst	the	common	
Javanese there were some men of mettle, but it was as though they had not 





Chapter	 VII	 note	 157.	 For	 contemporary	 aquatints	 by	William	 Daniell	 (1769-1837)	 of	 Bengal	
sepoys	in	service	with	the	British	at	this	time,	see	Plates	34,	37,	42,	48.
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Plate	41.	An	officer	and	private	of	the	14th	Regi	ment	
of	Foot	(Buckinghamshire	Regiment)	who	took	part	
in the attack on the Yogyakarta kraton in June 1812. 
Taken	 from	Captain	H.	 O’Donnell	 (ed.),	Historical 
records of the 14th Regiment	 (Devonport,	 1893):104	
facing.
had done much wrong. All had been responsible for the debacle for they had 
not	cooperated	or	worked	together	(Carey	1992:107-8,	266-8).	
It was not only the Javanese who experienced this shock in contemplating 
the new military power in their midst. The Dutch inhabitants of Java too had 











These impressions are all the more striking for only fifteen years earlier, 
the	Governor	of	Java’s	Northeast	Coast	Pieter	Gerardus	van	Overstraten	(in	
office	1791-1796),	had	referred	to	the	VOC’s	Madurese	auxiliaries	as	‘even	bet-
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ter troops than the famed sepoys’,30 and in some kraton circles the Madurese 
remained the very epitome of indigenous military prowess, their presence a 
barometer of the seriousness with which the post-1816 Dutch government 
viewed a particular revolt. Thus in August 1825, Pakualam I was supposed to 
have	observed	that	‘if	the	Sampang	[West	Madurese]	troops	come	to	Yogya	
then Dipanagara’s revolt is a revolt of importance, if not then it is insignifi-
cant’	(Van	den	Broek	1873,	20:489-90).








was fashioned according to that worn by English East India Company troops 
(Carey	1992:418	note	93),	British	military	models	were	closely	emulated	as	a	
way of distancing these minor courts from their more culturally traditional 
senior	counterparts	in	the	main	Yogyakarta	and	Surakarta	kraton.
Creation of the Pakualaman, exile of the old sultan and the disposal of kraton plunder
Before	Raffles	left	Yogya	early	on	the	morning	of	23	June	to	make	the	thirteen-
hour	journey	on	horseback	to	Semarang	via	Kartasura,31 he appears to have 
presided over three other important ceremonies. The first was the formal in-
vitation	made	to	the	third	sultan	to	‘repossess’	the	kraton. This occurred im-
mediately	after	the	‘coronation’	banquet	in	the	Residency	House	on	the	eve-
ning of 21 June. Bidden godspeed by the lieutenant-governor on the steps of 
the Residency House, the new ruler set out for the court in the same carriage 
with Crawfurd and the newly appointed Crown Prince. He was accompanied 
by a large British mounted escort and a torch-lit procession which included 
the court princesses and the young female state regalia bearers transported 
in	palanquins	(Carey	1992:109,	268-9).	But	this	was	something	of	a	sham	‘re-










ons which took part in the British attack on Yogya on 20 June 1812 and the 
sepoy	conspiracy	of	1815.	Taken	from	Williams	1817:178	facing.
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1992:109,	269).	It	was	not	until	the	evening	of	24	June,	four	full	days	after	the	
British assault, that the thoroughly looted and partially burnt kraton could be 
reoccupied	(Java Government Gazette	15,	4-7-1812:3;	Carey	1992:111,	272).
The second ceremony took place on the afternoon of 22 June when 
Hamengkubuwana III met Raffles and Crawfurd in one of the still intact 
court pavilions, the Bangsal Kencana, along with senior British officers and 
the ruler’s uncles and younger brothers. During this meeting, in which the 
lieutenant-governor gave formal notice of the annexation of Kedhu and a 
third of the Yogya mancanagara by way of repayment for recent British ope-
rations – the kraton treasure having been taken by the army – he announced 





ked out until much later, partly owing to the difficulties in drawing up the 
boundaries with the sultan’s lands and partly due to the fact that most of the 
prince’s previous apanage lands had been in Kedhu which was now in the 
process of being taken over by the British.33
Natakusuma’s promotion was both a reward for his services to the British 
during the previous nine months, in particular during the attack on the kra-
ton, and a token of Raffles’ own feelings of personal friendship towards him.34 
The creation of the Pakualaman marked an important stage in the political 
division of Yogyakarta and served as another tangible sign of the sultana-
te’s defeat. The first Pakualam now owed his allegiance exclusively to the 
European government, a fact which was registered clearly in the Javanese 













clear	from	the	Javanese	sources	that	this	occurred	soon	after	the	fall	of	the	kraton, most probably 
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ficial)	of	the	Europeans,35	or	as	a	‘servant’	of	the	British	government36 or as a 
‘Government	person’	(wong Gupermèn).37 Although the prince was sometimes 
critical of the policies of the European government, especially in the period 
immediately	preceding	the	Java	War,	he	remained	throughout	essentially	loy-
al to the government realising that his own interests were best served by such 
a course of action. At the same time, his relations with the sultanate continued 
on a distinctly cool and uneasy level, a state of affairs which, as we will see 
shortly, was greatly exacerbated by his conduct as regent during the minority 
of	the	fourth	sultan	from	December	1814	to	January	1820	(Carey	1992:517-9	
note	577).	In	Crawfurd’s	words:
[The	prince	has]	a	clear	 insight	 into	 the	character	and	resources	of	 the	European	
government and it enables him to calculate upon the probable result of any contest 
between it and the natives. This is the best antidote to a large share of ambition 
which he no doubt possesses, but it is not the only one. For if I am not mistaken, 
he is not possessed of that hardihood and intrepidity which would make ambition 
dangerous.	 Those	 qualities	 in	 a	word	 to	which	 his	 father	 [Sultan	Mangkubumi]	
owed his success and which plunged the country for years into so much misery.38
And	not	just	Sultan	Mangkubumi:	if	Crawfurd’s	briefings	by	his	predecessor	
Pieter Engelhard had been more complete and he had been given the oppor-
tunity to extend his stay in Java by another decade, he might have added two 
more names to place alongside that of the first sultan when he considered 
Javanese noblemen in whom hardihood and intrepidity were rendered fatal 
by	a	large	dose	of	personal	ambition:	Radèn	Rongga	and	Dipanagara.	
The third and final public event ordered by Raffles before his departu-
re appears to have been an oath-taking ceremony. This involved the public 
swearing of allegiance to the British government and the Yogya ruler by the 
sultan’s relations and members of his court administration at a function at-
tended by the lieutenant-governor, the Resident and senior British officers 
(Carey	1992:114,	281).	The	evident	reluctance	of	the	old	sultan’s	supporters	to	
accept the new monarch and the continuing rift between kasepuhan and kara-
jan may have inspired this initiative. But it did not in itself change the politi-
cal realities in a deeply divided and now suddenly impoverished sultanate. 
35	 Carey	1992:125,	304,	458	note	280.	The	title	miji	usually	referred	to	an	official	under	the	direct	
orders of the sultan, see p. 62.
36	 Carey	1980:97,	where	the	phrase:	sampun lumebet dados rencangé Gupernemèn Inggris occurs 
in	an	undated	letter	(?	mid-July	1812)	from	Hamengkubuwana	III	to	John	Crawfurd	on	the	terms	
of the 1 August 1812 treaty with the British.
37	 Louw	 and	 De	 Klerck	 1894-1909,	 II:425,	 reference	 to	 Pakualam	 referring	 to	 himself	 as	
Gupernemèn punya orang;	BD	(Manado)	II:222,	XVII.72,	where	Dipanagara	states	that	Pakualam	
and	his	family	had	become	‘British	Government	people’	(dadi wongnya Gupermèn Inggris).
38	 UBL,	 BPL	 616,	 Port.	 5	 pt.	 5,	 John	 Crawfurd	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	 H.G.	 Nahuys	 van	 Burgst	
(Yogyakarta),	9-8-1816.
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On	3	July,	at	the	same	time	as	the	departure	of	the	main	body	of	British	
troops with the treasure from the kraton,39 the old sultan and his two sons, 
Pangéran	Mangkudiningrat	and	Pangéran	Mertasana,	were	taken	to	Semarang	
on	the	first	stage	of	their	journey	into	exile	in	Pulau	Pinang.	They	were	accom-
panied by the former mancanagara bupati,	Radèn	Tumenggung	Sumadiwirya,	
who	had	been	responsible	for	firing	the	powder	magazine	in	the	fort	during	
the	British	attack	(p.	335	note	267,	and	p.	337).	According	to	the	chronicle,	they	
were carried in Chinese-style palanquins with dried palm-leaf rooves, except 
for	Sumadiwirya	who	was	forced	to	follow	on	foot	(Carey	1992:115,	282-3).	
They cut pitiable figures. As we have seen, Mangkudiningrat had been forced 
to share his father’s exile because of his supposed involvement in Jayasentika’s 









exile and his initial period of banishment in Pulau Pinang with fortitude. 
According to the Malay translator to the Pulau Pinang government, both the 
exiled	ruler	and	his	party	conducted	themselves	with	‘the	greatest	propri-
ety	and	consistency’	(Carey	1992:438	note	201).	Indeed,	he	would	live	long	
enough to be reinstalled on the Yogya throne in August 1826 during the dar-
kest	period	of	the	Java	War.	By	then,	however,	he	had	lost	much	of	his	fierce	
energy. According to P.J.F. Louw, fourteen years of sorrow and humiliation 
had	taken	their	toll	(Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	II:435).	Ruling	as	a	Dutch	
ally	until	his	death	on	3	January	1828,	his	last	period	as	ruler	would	not	be	a	
happy one for the sultanate. Nevertheless, his presence both in exile and in 
Java, would remain a living inspiration for his religious and royal suppor-
ters in the kasepuhan	party	who	flocked	to	see	him	in	Batavia	and	Surabaya	
between his return from Pinang in April 1815 and his re-exile to Ambon in 
January	1817	(Carey	1992:438	note	201).	Raffles	reported	that	when	he	met	
the	deposed	Yogya	monarch	again	in	Semarang	after	his	arrival	on	4	July,	
and appraised him of his more lenient sentence of temporary banishment in 
Pulau	Pinang,	he	reacted	with	unfeigned	relief:
even	the	unfortunate	Sultan	has	been	considered	of	late	comparatively	happy,	for	
on his first apprehension he certainly expected to have been put to death. That 
39	 Dj.Br.	 29,	 ‘Letters	 from	 British	 period	 collected	 by	 F.	 de	Haan’,	 Testimony	 of	 Busserage	
Singh,	sepoy,	2-7-1814,	stating	that	he	had	escorted	five	boxes	of	treasure	to	Semarang	in	early	
July 1812.
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fear removed, transportation to Banda for life appeared inevitable and as bad as 
a	second	death.	On	his	arrival	here	[in	Semarang]	this	has	since	been	mitigated	to	
Pinang with a promise that if all things remain quiet, he shall in a few years be 
permitted	to	return	and	end	his	days	in	the	land	of	his	forefathers	[Java].40
The former ruler eventually sailed for Pinang on 16 July on a fast frigate 
bound for Calcutta under command of Lord Minto’s son, the Honourable 








his harsh fiscal policies of the first eighteen years of his reign travelled with 
him	into	exile.	But	it	would	not	be	his	to	enjoy.	The	blood	and	sweat	of	a	
nameless generation of south-central Javanese peasants was now the spoil of 
a	foreign	conqueror.	As	for	Salèh	and	Sukur,	they	represented	Java’s	conflic-








risation of the Javanese peasantry in Kedhu in the immediate pre-war period 
(Chapter	IX	notes	82-3),	his	decision	to	rally	to	Dipanagara	early	in	the	conflict	
in	late	August	1825	and	his	adoption	of	a	new	Muslim	name	–	Radèn	Hasan	
Mahmud – implicated his whole immediate family who suffered degrada-
tion,	imprisonment	and	exile	(De	Haan	1935a:641;	Carey	1988:139	note	239).	
The same torn loyalties would be evident in the career of their first cousin, 
the	celebrated	painter	Radèn	Salèh	Syarif	Bustaman	(circa	1811-1880),	whose	
personal life and artistic oeuvre would intersect in interesting ways with that 
of	the	exiled	prince	during	his	last	years	in	Makassar	(Kraus	2005:278-88;	p.	
742).	Significantly,	Prangwedana	(Mangkunagara	II)	specifically	forbade	his	
sons to study in Europe, even though urged to by Raffles and the post-1816 
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On the day before the old sultan sailed for Pinang, the last British military 
detachments left Yogya and an uneasy calm descended on the ravaged city.41 
According to the Javanese accounts, most of those who had fled from the town 
before the British attack returned within two months from the outlying vil-
lages:	traders	once	again	began	to	visit	the	capital	and	the	santri came back to 
their partially burnt homes in the kauman	(firm	Islamic	community)	near	the	
Great	Mosque	(Carey	1992:118,	288-9,	448	note	237).	In	the	Yogya	market,	the	
price	of	rice	returned	to	its	pre-June	level	(Appendix	X)	and	copper-smiths,	
iron-workers, makers of gamelan instruments and forgers of weapons began to 
make a prosperous living again. This was especially the case with the kris ma-





market outside the fort, that quick profits were made according to the chroni-
cle by those skilled at trading on commission. Prominent amongst these were 
the	better-off	local	European	and	Indo-European	‘Free	Burghers’	who	bought	
directly from the British and sepoy soldiers. For more than a month these 
commercial opportunities continued and many became rich overnight on ac-
count of this unexpected benefaction from the state, so much so that special 
ritual offerings were made in honour of the exiled sultan by those who had 
been	beneficiaries	of	his	windfall	gifts	(Carey	1992:118,	289).
The third sultan’s new order and Dipanagara’s role
In	Javanese	history,	a	new	reign	offered	the	opportunity	for	a	major	reordering	
of the administrative personnel of the court as well as the distribution of titles 
and offices to the new ruler’s blood relations. Brief though it proved to be and 
sadly diminished in terms of its financial resources, the third sultan’s two-and-
a-half-year rule opened with the same wholesale recasting of the kraton hier-














in the Yogya kraton.	A	 female	 servant	 (nyai keparak)	 holding	 a	 spittoon	 (tempolong)	
looks	on.	Taken	from	KITLV	Or	13	(Buku Kedhung Kebo),	f.66v.	Photograph	by	courtesy	
of	the	KITLV,	Leiden.
kadipatèn with special duties as carer for the young Crown Prince who was to 
live	with	her	until	shortly	after	his	appointment	as	sultan	in	November	1814	
(Carey	1992:113,	277).	Crawfurd	noted	that	she	was	treated	with	great	atten-
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1992:113,	277).	Crawfurd	later	commented	that	the	latter	was	the	favourite	
wife	of	Hamengkubuwana	III,	but	was	less	‘respectable’	than	Ratu	Kencana,	





man’, both at the time of the British attack when she had been lightly woun-
ded in the foot by sepoy sniper fire as she accompanied her husband in his 
flight from the kadipatèn	(Carey	1992:77,	222),	and	on	the	occasion	of	his	final	
illness	and	death	in	November	1814	(Carey	1992:187,	382).	During	the	mino-
rity	(1814-1820)	of	her	son,	the	fourth	sultan	(reigned	1814-1822),	she	came	
to exercise an important sway over kraton politics deciding most of the signi-
ficant	issues	with	her	key	advisers.	Crawfurd	thought	highly	of	her:	‘[Ratu	
Kencana’s]	moderation	and	discretion	renders	this	power	very	safe	in	her	
hands’.44 But this was not the view of her stepson, Dipanagara. He came to 
despise her loose morals – she apparently had an affair with a court dancer 
who	specialised	in	masked	dance	(topèng)	performances	(Hageman	1856:39)	
– and her close association with two of his bitterest enemies within the kra-
ton administration. These were the patih,	Danureja	IV	(in	office	1813-1847),	
and	the	commander	of	the	sultan’s	bodyguard,	Radèn	Tumenggung	Major	
Wiranagara,	with	whom	the	ratu	was	also	romantically	linked	(Chapter	III).	
The latter, known in his youth by his santri name of Mas Mukidin, was a des-
cendant	of	the	late	seventeenth-century	Balinese	adventurer,	Untung	Surapati	










was richly rewarded by the Dutch at the end of the war with the title of 
Pangéran Adipati Prabuningrat and a quasi-independent landholding in the 
Nanggulon	area	of	Kulon	Praga	(Rouffaer	1905:597-8;	Carey	1981a:245	note	
41,	278	note	178).	But	his	fall	was	equally	swift:	ambitious	to	get	his	wife	re-
cognised as a ratu	(royal	consort)	and	constantly	intriguing	against	the	fifth	
44	 UBL,	 BPL	 616,	 Port.	 5	 pt.	 5,	 John	 Crawfurd	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	 H.G.	 Nahuys	 van	 Burgst	
(Yogyakarta),	9-8-1816.
45 Dj.Br.	19¹,	A.H.W.	de	Kock,	‘Memorie	van	overgave’,	Yogya,	17-5-1851.




misfortune to Dipanagara’s curse, the prince being renowned for the power of 
his	maledictions	(Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	VI:251).	Ratu	Ageng	would	
also	have	an	unhappy	end,	dying	in	the	second	year	of	the	war	(20	June	1826)	
of an illness brought on by what the Yogya babad describes as deep emotional 
affliction at the misfortunes which had overwhelmed the sultanate.46 In a fa-
mous article, the Dutch historian, P.H. van der Kemp, compared Dipanagara 
to	the	Shakespearean	tragic	hero,	Hamlet,	and	based	an	important	strand	of	
his argument on this enmity-filled relationship between the prince and his 
stepmother with her politically ambitious younger lover fulfilling the role of 
the	usurping	king	of	Denmark	(Van	der	Kemp	1896a:310-3).	
At the same time as the new titles were accorded the sultan’s female re-
latives, the older male offspring of the ruler also received new names and 
ranks. Three of Dipanagara’s younger brothers were appointed as pangéran 
(princes)47 and his uncle, Pangéran Panengah, was accorded the new name 
of Pangéran Dipawiyana. Both the Javanese accounts and contemporary 
Residency letters mention that the latter became one of the third sultan’s most 
trusted advisers and was a great favourite in the meetings of the nayaka.48 
Dipanagara	himself	later	commented	that	‘the	Pangéran	was	very	much	at-
tached	to	the	rule	of	the	British	[…]	[and]	was	a	philosopher	who	followed	
all the commands of The Prophet and died as a wali	[apostle	of	Islam]’.49 
46 B.Ng.	 III:48,	 XV.1-2.	 Jeng Ratu Ageng tansah/ sungkawa ing kalbu/ kétang sewaya Naréndra/ 
maksih timur rusaking praja ngranuhi/ ginagas saya krasa. 2. cipta ngenes kapepes sru atis/ kunus ing tyas 
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Dipawiyana’s son, was married to one of Dipanagara’s sisters and both later 





volved on his eldest son, the future Pangéran Dipanagara II, who had been 
born	of	a	secondary	wife	at	Tegalreja	(Chapter	III).	The	elder	Dipanagara	also	
received an enhanced 500 cacah apanage at this time with a personal stipend 
of	700	Spanish	dollars	a	year	from	the	court	paid	out	of	the	annual	gratuity	of	
100,000	Spanish	dollars	given	to	the	Yogya	kraton by the British government 
for the tax-farm of the tollgates and markets in the sultan’s territory under the 
terms	of	the	soon	to	be	signed	1	August	1812	treaty	(Van	Deventer	1891:322-
3;	Appendix	VIII).	Many	of	the	lands	in	his	July	1812	apanage	grant	appear	






been the guardian of Dipanagara’s younger brother, Pangéran Adinagara 
(Chapter	II	note	25;	Carey	1981a:238	note	20).	Others	were	situated	in	Bagelèn,	
Banyumas	and	Sokawati.	They	replaced	lands	which	Dipanagara	had	previ-
ously held in Kedhu and which had now been annexed to the British govern-
ment	(Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	V:745).	By	the	time	of	the	outbreak	of	
the	Java	War,	the	prince’s	landholdings	had	apparently	doubled	to	1,000	cacah 
all of which were given to his uncle, Pangéran Panular, who replaced him as a 
guardian	of	the	child	sultan,	Hamengkubuwana	V,	in	August	1825.50









50 Dj.Br.	6,	 ‘Vergadering	bij	den	raad	uitmakende	het	bestuur	over	het	 rijk	van	Djocjakarta,	
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same	title	had	also	been	held	by	a	younger	brother	of	Pakubuwana	IV	(reigne	d	
1788-1820),	who	passed	away	in	April	1811.52 It was the norm at the south-
central Javanese courts that only one prince at a time would bear a particular 
name,	but	since	the	title	had	been	vacant	in	Yogya	since	1787	and	the	former	
bearer	had	been	held	in	high	regard	by	the	first	sultan	(note	51),	the	third	






who possesses life and force. It was in this sense that Dipanagara understood his 
name.	‘Nagara’	means	a	country	or	a	province	and	‘Dipanagara’	is	thus	a	man	who	
gives enlightenment, power and prosperity to a country.53
The prince went on to stress that the particular etymological explanation was 
unique	to	his	name	and	not	to	that	of	his	cousin	and	brother-in-law,	Radèn	
Tumenggung Dipawiyana, who was travelling with him.54 This indicates 
that	he	may	have	been	linking	his	new	moniker	with	his	grandfather	Sultan	
Mangkubumi’s prophecy about his future historical significance as the des-
cendant who would rise against the Dutch and cause them even more des-
truction	than	he	had	done	during	the	Giyanti	War	(1746-1755)	but	that	only	
the	Almighty	knew	the	outcome	(p.	71).	
Other changes mainly affected the sultan’s officials. The former ruler’s 
pe ngulu	(head	of	the	Yogya	religious	establishment),	Muhamad	Sapingi,	an	
ulama	of	Sundanese	origin,	who	had	fled	back	to	west	Java	at	the	time	of	
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and remained until his death in May 1815 an important counsellor of both 
Hamengkubuwana III and his son. Indeed, he was even put forward as a 
replacement for the acting Yogya patih,	Mas	Tumenggung	Sindunagara	(Kyai	
Adipati	Danureja	III),	when	the	latter	was	forcibly	retired	in	December	1813	
(Carey	1992:116,	285,	442-3	note	213,	490	note	429).
Many of the new appointments involved those who had afforded the third 





I, as one of the Outer bupati or nayaka	with	the	title	of	Radèn	Tumenggung	
Danukusuma	 II.	 The	 other	was	Radèn	Ria	Mandura	 (post-1813,	Radèn	
Tumenggung	Sindunagara	II),	the	acting	patih,	Sindunagara	I’s	son,	who	was	
appointed as head of the porters’ guild.56 Crawfurd remarked that although 




better’.57 The chronicle is even more disparaging, speaking of Danukusuma 
II’s younger brothers as idle lay-abouts who spent their time smoking opium 
and	sleeping,	giving	their	mother,	Radèn	Ayu	Danukusuma,	an	avid	reader	
of Javanese-Islamic mystical literature or sastra pégon	(pp.	99-100),	no	support	
in	her	penurious	widowhood	(Carey	1992:157,	343).	
Important new links between the third sultan’s immediate family and the 
Danurejan	were	also	established	through	the	marriage	of	two	of	Danureja	








Tumenggung Danukusuma I’s body from the traitor’s plot at Banyusumurup 
to	the	family	graveyard	at	Melangi	on	27	November	1812	(Chapter	VII	note	
56	 UBL,	 BPL	 616	 Port.	 5	 pt.	 5,	 John	 Crawfurd	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	 H.G.	 Nahuys	 van	 Burgst	
(Yogyakarta),	9-8-1816;	Carey	1992:285,	443	notes	214-5.	Van	IJsseldijk	suggests	that	another	of	
Sindunagara’s	 sons,	 Radèn	 Tumenggung	 Jaganagara,	 had	 become	 head	 of	 the	 porters’	 guild	
(wedana gladhag),	but	that	his	addiction	to	opium	rendered	him	unsuitable	for	the	post,	Baud	306,	
Van	IJsseldijk,	‘Rapport’,	11-12-1816.
57	 UBL,	 BPL	 616	 Port.	 5	 pt.	 5,	 John	 Crawfurd	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	 H.G.	 Nahuys	 van	 Burgst	
(Yogyakarta),	9-8-1816;	Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	II:422.
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188),	although	curiously	not	that	of	his	son,58 also helped to efface the previ-
ous stigma of treachery. Ties between the two families thus continued on a 
cordial and intimate level and would result in substantial support from the 
Danurejan	for	Dipanagara	during	the	Java	War	(Chapters	III,	VI,	and	XI).
Amongst the eastern mancanagara officials, both Pangéran Dipakusuma 
and	Radèn	Rongga	Prawirasentika	were	continued	as	acting	bupati wedana. 
The former had earlier been denounced to Crawfurd as one of the third sul-
tan’s	principal	opponents	(Chapter	VII),	but	he	seems	to	have	quickly	esta-
blished better relations with the new ruler resulting in the marriage of one 
of	his	sons	with	a	daughter	of	Hamengkubuwana	III	on	28	June	1813	(Carey	
1992:493	note	452).	Both	the	chronicle	(Carey	1992:113,	277,	402	note	18a)	and	




although I had once imbibed an unfavourable opinion of him, I am now convinced 
of his fidelity and discretion.59
Later	Dutch	officials	were	more	cautious.	W.H.	van	IJsseldijk,	who	served	
as	ambassador	extraordinary	(buitengewoon gezant)	to	the	courts	in	August-
October 1816, was concerned that Dipakusuma should be kept in Yogya rather 
than be allowed to spend too much time in Madiun. The combination of his 






himself born in Ceylonese banishment, had been brought back to Madura by 
the British, and speculated that the proximity of Dipakusuma in Madiun and 
his recently returned relatives in Madura could be the nexus of a new eastern 
mancanagara rebellion.60	But	this	was	far-fetched.	The	days	of	Radèn	Rongga	
were over. The pangéran would remain scrupulously loyal to the European 






60	 Baud	306,	Van	IJsseldijk,	 ‘Rapport’,	 11-12-1816.	The	British	had	 seized	 control	of	Ceylon	
from	the	Dutch	in	1795-1796	and	had	made	it	a	crown	colony	in	1802.	Some	of	the	high-born	Java-
nese exiles, whom the Dutch had transported there during the course of the eighteenth century 
for	political	reasons,	were	allowed	back	to	Java	at	the	time	of	the	British	occupation	(1811-1816).
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gation to greet the incoming Dutch commissioners-general in Batavia at the 
time of the hand-over of the colony in August 1816.61
Within	a	few	months	of	the	third	sultan’s	accession	most	of	the	important	
changes in the kraton had been made. In his babad, Dipanagara describes how, 
shortly	after	Raffles’	departure	on	23	June,	he	had	begged	his	father	to	allow	
him	to	return	to	Tegalreja,	but	his	request	had	been	refused.	Instead,	he	was	
lodged in the kraton	at	one	of	the	pavilions	called	the	Gedhong	Kuning	(Yellow	
Building).	A	few	weeks	later	in	mid-July,	he	again	approached	the	sultan	about	
granting him permission to return to his estate because he felt distinctly ill at 
ease in the court environment. But his father, fearing that if he moved back 
to his residence he would be too far away to help him with the conduct of 
daily	affairs,	assigned	him	a	small	lodging	at	Mijèn	on	the	western	outskirts	
of	Yogya	half	way	to	Tegalreja.62 It is unclear how long he remained there. 
Certainly,	by	late	1813,	he	had	moved	back	to	Tegalreja	because	he	describes	
in his babad	how	Tan	Jin	Sing	was	sent	out	to	him	with	a	shortlist	of	two	names	
from which to select the new patih	in	early	December	1813	(p.	396).	The	prince	
also mentions how he still came to Yogya for the thrice yearly Javanese-Islamic 
Garebeg	festivals	(pp.	87-8),	as	well	as	making	special	journeys	when	matters	
of particular importance had to be discussed. According to Dipanagara, the 
third	sultan	likewise	journeyed	out	to	Tegalreja	from	time	to	time	to	talk	over	
minor affairs with his eldest son.63 The prince’s claim that he acted as one of 
his father’s closest advisers during this period is confirmed in the chronicle, 
which gives the following description of him in these months immediately 
after	the	third	sultan’s	appointment	(Carey	1992:290):
XXIV.	21			 Of	the	sultan’s	sons,
  the one who was made foremost
  was Pangéran Dipanagara,




  not afraid in front of the multitudes.
	 	 He	spoke	easily	[and]	sweetly	with	a	friendly	countenance,
	 	 [and]	took	pains	with	all	the	people	of	the	kingdom,
  for he was invested by his father.
	 	 Great	[and]	small,	young	[and]	old,
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	 23				 He	took	charge	of	affairs	with	the	Residency:
	 	 on	each	Monday	[and]	Thursday	the	Pangéran
  visited the Residency accompanied by
  Pangéran Dipawiyana,
  The younger brother of the sultan.
The fact that Dipanagara took charge of the negotiations with the Residency 
is also mentioned in the prince’s babad where he relates that he was particu-
larly tasked with discussing the terms of the new treaty between Yogyakarta 
and the British government. This does not seem to have involved him going 
to	the	Residency	in	person.	This	was	the	job	of	Pangéran	Dipakusuma	and	
the acting patih,	Mas	Tumenggung	Sindunagara	(Kyai	Adipati	Danureja	III).64 
But,	according	to	the	prince’s	testimony,	every	time	Sindunagara	had	met	
with Crawfurd, he, Dipanagara, would see him in the Kemandhungan pa-
vilion in the kraton to talk over any outstanding matters in the company of 
the nayaka.65 The third sultan himself was also involved as we know from 





at which Crawfurd noted, 
His	Highness	 is	 possessed	 by	 a	degree	 of	 humanity	 [which	 is]	 not	 a	 usual	 con-
comitant of the Javanese character. During the reigns of the last two sultans 
[Hamengkubuwana	I,	1749-1792,	and	Hamengkubuwana	II,	1792-1810,	1811-1812]	
torture and mutilation were constantly practised and the combat of criminals with 
tigers	and	other	animals	often	occurred	[in]	circumstances	of	aggravated	horror.66
Discussions	over	the	treaties	occupied	slightly	over	two	weeks	and	on	14	July,	
Raffles submitted a draft to Lord Minto which was to serve as the basis for 
negotiation with the courts. The final treaties were concluded a fortnight later 
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these contracts shortly. But first we need to consider the trustworthiness of 
Dipanagara’s	account	of	his	key	role	in	these	treaty	negotiations.	We	have	
already	seen	(pp.	315-6)	that	nowhere	in	Crawfurd’s	extant	letters	is	there	
any mention of the prince’s contribution as a plenipotentiary on behalf of 
his father prior to the British attack on the kraton.	Given	that	Valck	retained	
many of the Residency letters from this period for his own private collection, 
his statement that the prince was indeed used as a go-between has been ac-




Nahuys van Burgst, when he drew up his list of the main personalities at the 
Yogya court a day before his departure from the sultan’s capital on 10 August 
1816?69	Since	Dipanagara	had	returned	to	Tegalreja	by	this	time	and	rarely	
visited the court, it is possible that Crawfurd overlooked him. But on one 
particular detail, it can be proved beyond a shadow of doubt that the influ-
ence, which the prince claimed he had with Crawfurd, had no basis in reality. 
This	was	the	matter	of	the	appointment	of	the	Scotsman’s	Dutch	successor.	
According to Dipanagara, on apprehending that Java would be handed back 
to the Dutch in August 1816, he expressed his concern to the British Resident 
over the character of his replacement. Crawfurd was then supposed to have 
asked	the	prince	what	sort	of	Dutch	Resident	he	would	prefer:	one	who	had	
already	served	in	Java	under	the	Dutch	East	Indies	Company	(VOC),	namely	
before Daendels’ arrival in January 1808, or one more recently arrived from 
Europe?	Dipanagara	had	opted	for	the	latter,	whereupon	Crawfurd	was	re-
ported to have said that he had a good acquaintance in Batavia by the name of 
‘Major	Nahuys	[van	Burgst]’,	and	that	he	would	try	to	get	him	as	his	replace-
ment.	Soon	afterwards	Nahuys	did	indeed	arrive	in	Yogya	which	confirmed	
Dipanagara’s view of the power and influence of the British.70




government as Resident designate of Yogya. But at the last moment he asked 
to be excused from the post for pressing family reasons. The incoming Dutch 
governor-general, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen, then sought a replacement and 
Nahuys van Burgst was eventually appointed by executive decision of 22 July 
1816. The choice of Nahuys also had much to do with the help he had given to 
Pakualam	I	(then	Pangéran	Natakusuma)	and	his	son,	Natadiningrat,	when	
69	 UBL,	 BPL	 616	 Port.	 5	 pt.	 5,	 John	 Crawfurd	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	 H.G.	 Nahuys	 van	 Burgst	
(Yogyakarta),	9-8-1816.
70	 Knoerle,	‘Journal’,	28-9.
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they	were	in	danger	of	their	lives	in	Cirebon	in	early	May	1811	(Chapter	VII).	
As C.Th. Elout, one of the Dutch commissioner-generals charged with over-




and fatherland, but particularly for the serendipitous service which he was 
able	[to	provide]	earlier	to	the	regent	[Pakualam	I]’	(Louw	and	De	Klerck	
1894-1909,	I:36	note	1).	Pakualam	himself	was	naturally	delighted	at	the	de-
cision, and relieved that the former Daendelian, Tiedeman, had not taken up 
the	post	(Van	der	Kemp	1913:321).
Fortunate though Nahuys’ appointment may have been for some members 
of the Yogya elite, Dipanagara’s unsubstantiated claim that he was in some 
way responsible for his selection indicates that he may have greatly exagge-
rated his friendship with Crawfurd. His role as his father’s principal link with 
the Residency at the time of the treaty negotiations must also be questioned. 
Perhaps this exaggeration may have been prompted by the prince’s later dif-
ficulties as a guardian of the fifth sultan during the two years before the Java 
War.	Indeed,	when	he	came	to	dictate	his	autobiographical	babad in exile in 
Manado	in	1831-1832,	he	may	have	looked	back	on	the	British	interregnum	as	
something	of	a	golden	age	when	he	had	enjoyed	a	prominent	and	privileged	
position as his father, the third sultan’s, principal confidant.
Although he may not have been as close to Crawfurd as he later preten-
ded,	this	does	not	gainsay	the	fact	that	he	clearly	appreciated	the	Scotsman’s	
style	and	abilities.	As	we	have	seen	in	the	previous	chapter	(pp.	297-303),	after	
a difficult start, Crawfurd turned into a remarkably successful Resident of 
Yogyakarta far outshining his Dutch predecessors and immediate successors 













sponsored by the Yogya court undoubtedly endeared him to the inhabitants 
of Yogya, especially Dipanagara and his father who both shared the usual kra-
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ton love of equestrian pursuits and admiration for English bloodstock.71 The 
literary	and	historical	knowledge	of	the	third	sultan	(p.	70)	and	Dipanagara’s	
own	familiarity	with	Javanese-Islamic	texts	(pp.	103-4,	743-5)	may	well	have	
formed common ground for friendship with the British Resident, although 
direct references to this are lacking. Crawfurd’s presence in Yogya throughout 
most	of	the	period	of	British	rule	(Appendix	IX)	undoubtedly	contributed	to	
the restoration of good relations between the Yogya court and the European 
government after the twin traumas of Daendels’ December 1810 treaty and 
the British attack on the kraton.
The 1 August 1812 treaties and their implications
The treaties signed between the British government and the courts on 1 
August 1812 gave legal title to the radically altered political environment in 
which the south-central Javanese kraton were now forced to exist.72 In his 
letter of 6 August 1812 to Lord Minto, Raffles gave a useful summary of the 
treaties as they appeared in their final form.73 He remarked first that he had 
all along regarded the 28 December 1811 treaty with Yogya as a temporary 
measure forced on him by his disadvantageous political and military posi-
tion	at	the	time	(p.	301).	The	new	treaties,	the	lieutenant-governor	averred,	
would	place	the	south-central	Javanese	courts	‘on	such	a	footing	as	might	
no longer endanger the tranquillity of the country’ and would open up their 
administrations to significant liberalisation and reform. Despite the manifest 
treachery	of	the	Sunan	in	cutting	the	British	lines	of	communication	with	
71 On the Javanese nobility and royalty’s admiration for English bloodstock, see IOL Mack.
Pr.	21	pt.	4,	Crawfurd,	‘Sultan’s	country’,	91;	Dj.Br.	49,	Matthijs	Waterloo	(Yogyakarta)	to	Nico-
laus	Engelhard	(Semarang),	15-9-1803	(on	Hamengkubuwana	II’s	love	of	English	horses);	Winter	















73	 IOL,	Eur	 F148/23	 (Raffles-Minto	 collection,	 vol.	 23),	 T.S.	Raffles	 (Salatiga)	 to	Lord	Minto	
(Calcutta),	6-8-1812.
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Semarang	during	the	British	attack	on	Yogya	and	the	discovery	of	the	secret	
correspondence	in	which	the	distinctive	handwriting	of	Pakubuwana	IV	was 





a sufficiently large military force at his disposal to give the impression that he 
was	prepared	to	march	on	Surakarta	at	a	moment’s	notice.75 At the same time, 
he	reckoned	that	if	the	Sunan’s	personal	vanity	was	flattered	by	the	attenti-




Regarding the detailed clauses of the treaties, Raffles made a number of 
interesting observations to Minto. The second article, which forbade the rulers 
to maintain any military forces except for that permitted by the British govern-
ment	‘to	protect	their	persons	and	territories’,	was	particularly	directed	against	
74	 AN,	Kabinet	Missive	17-5-1846	no.	134,	‘Troonsopvolging	in	het	rijk	van	Soerakarta’,	Baron	
W.R.	van	Hoëvell	 (Surakarta)	 to	 J.J.	van	Rochussen	(Batavia),	4-3-1846	 (on	 the	very	distinctive	
handwriting	of	Pakubuwana	IV);	IOL	Eur	F148/24	(Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	24),	Hugh	Hope	
(Surakarta)	 to	 T.S.	 Raffles	 (Bogor),	 2-4-1813,	 remarked	 that	 amongst	 the	 papers	 found	 in	 the	
Yogya kraton	were	the	originals	of	the	secret	correspondence	and	Pakubuwana	IV’s	handwriting	
had been immediately recognised.











1811-1812)	had	tried	 to	put	a	stop	 to	 the	practice	declaring	bitterly	 that	 ‘he	was	no	restaurant	
keeper’, but it had led to much bad feeling and was one of the reasons for Adams’ removal, De 
Haan	1935a:483-5;	IOL,	Raffles-Minto	collection	(Xerox	copy	of	holograph	letters),	vol.	3,	T.S.	Raf-
fles	(Semarang)	to	Lord	Minto	(Calcutta),	16-7-1812,	where	he	observed:	‘Colonel	Adams,	altho’	a	
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Yogya. According to the lieutenant-governor, the second sultan had kept up 
a considerable military establishment of 8-9,000 men, some paid in land and 
appropriations	(pp.	5-9),	others	in	cash	stipends.	Many	of	these	had	been	per-
manently based in the royal capital. They had never, in Raffles’ view, been 
used for maintaining peace in the countryside or in police duties in Yogya, 
and	the	individuals	composing	the	force	‘were	the	most	idle,	profligate	and	
worthless part of the community’. Once they had been disbanded, he sugge-




for the purposes of state than for hostilities and did not pose the same threat 
as	those	in	Djocjo	[Yogya]’.78	The	disbandment	of	the	major	part	of	the	sultan’s	
bodyguard almost certainly caused hardship to many families in Yogya. As 
late	as	December	1813,	the	Assistant-Resident	of	Yogya	wrote	that	most	of	the	
ex-members of the kraton	regiments	could	find	no	suitable	employment	‘work	
not being a fashionable employment at this place’. He suggested that they 
should	be	sent	to	Semarang	rather	than	remain	in	Yogya	to	cause	trouble.79 
Crawfurd also remarked on the large number of Bugis and Balinese who had 
lost their livelihood as soldiers of fortune. At Raffles’ instigation, his gover-
ning	Council	in	Batavia	ordered	that	these	men	should	be	sent	to	Banjarmasin	
(south	Kalimantan)	to	work	in	the	estates	of	the	lieutenant-governor’s	friend,	
Alexander Hare, whose vaulting ambition to carve out a personal colonial fief-
dom in eastern Borneo ultimately met with disappointment.80 But many seem 
to have remained in the sultan’s capital, engaging in small-time banditry and 
robbery and later affording Dipanagara substantial support during the early 
stages	of	the	Java	War	(Carey	1981a:243-4	note	36,	252-3	note	72;	pp.	623-6).









80	 Dj.Br.	 29,	 John	Crawfurd	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	Charles	Assey	 (Batavia/Bogor),	 21-3-1813;	 S.Br.	





Sekaran,	 Dhuri	 (Wanaseraya)	 and	 Bauwerna,	 Carey	 1992:455	 note	 265.	 On	 these	 annexations	
more	generally,	see	Bastin	1954:94-104.
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Raffles wrote that Kedhu was without doubt the finest province in Java pro-
ducing	upwards	of	150,000	Spanish	dollars	each	year	in	tax	returns	and	oc-
cupying a strategic position with regard to the north coast.82 In the imme-
diate	post-Java	War	period,	it	was	referred	to	as	the	‘corn	granary’	of	the	




Kedhu’s acquisition rounded out government territory in central Java and 
ended the threat to security which had always been posed by rebels who had 
used the province as their base, a problem already identified in the Daendels’ 
period	(p.	216;	Chapter	VII	note	21).	Dipanagara	noted	in	his	babad, probably 
on the basis of his conversations with the acting patih,	Kyai	Adipati	Danureja	
III, that the province had been annexed primarily to pay for the costs of the 
recent military operations against Yogya. Once these had been met, its re-
turn to the south-central Javanese courts might be considered.84 This was, 
however,	a	vain	hope;	what	the	European	government	took	it	did	not	intend	
to return. Dipanagara also stated that in his negotiations with Crawfurd, he 
had stipulated that the taxes and dues in the annexed areas should continue 
to be paid to the previous landowners, a stipulation accepted by the British 
Resident.85	Again,	this	seems	of	dubious	validity,	although	it	may	just	have	
reflected Crawfurd’s own thinking on the introduction of Raffles’ flawed 
land-rent scheme.86
Continuing with his survey of the annexed outlying districts, Raffles des-
cribed Pacitan as a small fertile province important for its harbour which ex-
ported rice, salt, cotton, indigo and pepper. Its port facilities could also be used 
to	prevent	smuggling	and	piracy	(Chapter	V	note	20).	The	other	mancanagara 
provinces were all of economic interest because of their extensive teak forests 
and	the	easy	transport	afforded	by	the	rivers,	especially	the	Bengawan	Sala	
which passed through the length of Jipang. The distance of these provinces 










In	opposition	to	Raffles,	Crawfurd	advocated	that	 the	bekel	 (village	 tax	collectors),	but	not	 the	
demang (p.	15),	should	be	considered	as	the	permanent	landowners	and	settlements	made	directly	
with	them.	In	his	view,	if	the	Javanese	official	class	were	set	aside,	they	would	become	drones	and	
vagabonds. But the lieutenant-governor overruled him.
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to fall into decay. Because of this they contained much less cultivated land 
than they had done sixty years’ previously in the aftermath of the Giyanti set-
tlement	(p.	51).	By	1812,	their	total	yearly	revenue	was	a	mere	57,000	Spanish	
dollars and the extensive uninhabited regions and mountainous areas had 
become the haunt of bandits who subsisted by plundering local villages and 
engaging in the smuggling of opium.87	During	the	Java	War,	the	population	
of Jipang in particular was noted for their disaffected attitude towards the 
Dutch government. Their long-held desire to return to Yogya administrati-
on	(Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	III:360)	was	one	of	the	reasons	for	the	
overwhelming popular support for the rebellion of Dipanagara’s brother-in-
law,	Radèn	Tumenggung	Aria	Sasradilaga,	a	son	of	the	former	Yogya	bupati 
of Jipang and captain of the sultan’s bodyguard, who brought the whole of 
Rembang	and	Jipang	into	the	war	against	the	Dutch	in	1827-1828	(Louw	and	
De	Klerck	1894-1909,	III:490;	Chapter	XI).
The annexation of these eastern outlying provinces, many of which had 
earlier been demanded by Daendels, meant that numerous – but not all – 
Yogya	and	Surakarta	bupati lost their positions and livelihood, for the British 
government only wanted to retain officials from the rank of sub-district head 
(demang, mantri désa)	downwards.88 Most of these bupati returned to the kraton 
where	they	eked	out	an	impoverished	existence	(Carey	1992:122,	296,	454-5	
note	264).	Only	a	few	from	the	eastern	mancanagara, were reassigned to newly 
created – and much smaller – kabupatèn in Madiun.89 The grievances of these 
prematurely dismissed bupati, the so-called bupati dhongkol, encouraged many 
to	join	Dipanagara	in	1825	(Carey	1981a:240	note	28,	244-5	note	39).	At	the	
same time, the loss of Kedhu, the richest apanage area for the court princes 











and	Sala	apanage	holders	and	their	respective	senior	bupati, the bupati bumija	(Yogya)	and	bupati 
bumi	(Sala),	see	Rouffaer	1905:593,	612,	620.
89	 Dj.Br.	6,	P.H.	van	Lawick	van	Pabst	(Yogyakarta)	to	Hendrik	MacGillavry	(Surakarta),	1-2-
1826, on the creation of new kabupatèn	in	Purwadadi,	Kenitèn	and	Goranggarèng,	for	the	prema-
turely dismissed bupati	(bupati dhongkol)	of	Jipang,	Japan	(Majakerta),	Grobogan	and	Wirasari.	On	
the earlier creation of these new kabupatèn	in	Madiun	in	the	aftermath	of	Radèn	Rongga’s	revolt	
in	November-December	1810,	see	Chapter	VII	note	28.	Since	Daendels’	annexations	had	not	been	
carried out because of the British invasion, it was only in the post-1 August 1812 that these new 
districts came into being as separate kabupatèn.	See	further	Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	I:520;	
Carey	1981a:244-5	note	39.
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and officials was, in many respects, even more serious since it affected a greater 




to relinquish his 28 cacah landholding.90 Curiously, it appears that Crawfurd 
later leased these lands from Prangwedana and derived a handsome annual 
income	of	150	ducats	(just	over	£147	in	contemporary	money)	from	the	an-






port for the sepoy conspiracy of October-November 1815 as we will see shortly 
(Van	der	Kemp	1913:324-5;	Carey	1977:322	note	120).
In Yogyakarta too there were problems. Pakualam I, who had substantial 
landholdings in Kedhu in the pre-August 1812 period, was said to have been 
planning a show of force against the Residency and the Chinese quarter.92 This 




struck by this during his commission as ambassador extraordinary to the courts 
in	August-October	1816:	in	an	interview	with	the	second	sultan’s	elder	brother,	
Pangéran	Ngabèhi,	then	in	his	late	seventies,	complained	that	‘as	a	sentana or 
prince of the old lineage, he had lost much of his means of subsistence because 
of	the	annexation	of	Kedhu’	(Van	Deventer	1891:100).	We	also	know	from	the	
official records and witness statements of the robberies which took place in 
Yogya	in	the	period	leading	up	to	the	Java	War	that	at	least	one	was	carried	out	
by a prematurely pensioned official from the annexed districts.93
90	 S.Br.	23,	Hugh	Hope	(Surakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Bogor),	3-5-1813,	explained	that	the	lands	








92	 The	attacks	were	 supposed	 to	have	been	planned	 for	October-November	1812.	The	paci-
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The introduction of Raffles’ land tax scheme into these annexed regions 
and the lieutenant-governor’s over-optimistic view of their productive capa-
city – Kedhu in particular – resulted in great hardship for the local popula-
tion. Not only were the tax demands pitched too high, but the population 
– particularly those with dry fields – were also forced to pay in cash – prefe-
rably silver – rather than in kind. This forced them into the hands of Chinese 
moneylenders who charged extortionate interest.94 At the same time, many of 
the previous dues and personal services expected by the local Javanese offi-
cials remained in force.95 Indirectly, Raffles’ land annexations in August 1812 
exacerbated social problems at the courts and in Javanese society more wide-
ly. These would later manifest in the breadth of local support for Dipanagara 
at	the	time	of	the	outbreak	of	the	Java	War	(Carey	1981a:260	note	106).	We	will	
return to this issue of the land tax and its consequences during the post-1816 
Dutch	administration	in	the	next	chapter	(Chapter	IX).	
The fourth article of the treaties dealt with the vexed question of the ces-
sion of the tollgates and markets in return for an annual payment of 100,000 
Spanish	dollars	by	the	British	government.	This	had	already	been	allowed	for	
in	the	December	1811	treaties	(Chapter	VII),	but	the	clause	had	been	the	bone	
of much contention between Crawfurd and the second sultan, the latter refu-
sing to negotiate their surrender to the British in the early months of 1812.96 
In Yogya at this time, there were some thirty-four tollgates, with another four 




in Yogya and Pacitan were taken over.98 Finally, there were two tobacco ware-
houses	at	Gunung	Tawang	and	Sibebek	(see	Map	1	on	p.	26)	where	dues	were	
levied	on	the	export	of	tobacco	from	Kedhu	and	Bagelèn	to	the	north	coast	





95 KITLV	 H	 788,	 ‘Verzameling	 van	 documenten,	 meest	 brieven	 aan	 Jos.	Donatien Boutet, 
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the tollgates were levied on rice, cotton and piece goods destined for the pasi-
sir, and salt, oil and indigo which were traded internally. In his letter to Minto, 
the	lieutenant-governor	stressed	the	‘injurious	and	arbitrary’	duties	levied	by	
the	courts	and	suggested	that	these	should	be	rationalised:	grain	should	not	be	
taxed, but trade in Javanese cloth should be discouraged by high ad valorem 
duties in order to facilitate the import of textiles from Bengal and England.99 
Raffles’ attempts to encourage foreign cotton imports met with only limited 
success in the short term, mainly because early imports of Javanese batik pat-
terns	manufactured	in	Britain	were	found	not	to	be	dye-fast	(p.	25).	But	the	
period of British rule did see a revival of trade in foreign piece goods, many of 
them from Bengal, which had fallen off so drastically during the British naval 
blockade	(1795-1811).	In	the	longer	term,	Raffles’	measure	struck	a	blow	at	the	
local	Javanese	cotton	industry	which	had	been	enjoying	a	decade	and	a	half	
of unprecedented expansion due to the absence of foreign competition. By 
1817,	the	Dutch	Resident	of	Yogya,	Nahuys	van	Burgst,	noted	that	most	of	the	
indigo being grown in the sultanate and in Pacitan, which was reported to be 
of	exceptionally	high	quality,	was	sold	abroad.	Since	indigo	was	a	primary	dye	
ingredient in making Javanese batik and colouring other cloth such as lurik, 
the export of the crop as dry indigo cake may well have indicated a falling off 
in the Javanese trade in locally produced piece goods.100
Raffles’ declared aim in taking over the markets and tollgates was to ensu-
re a regular supply of provisions in central Java. But yet again the lieutenant-
governor’s laudable intentions were compromised by his insatiable need for 
revenue:	far	from	rationalising	the	scale	of	duties	levied	on	the	tollgates	in	the	
Principalities, both the British and the post-1816 returned Dutch government 
raised revenue from the tollgates out of all proportion to the realities of local 
commerce	(Appendix	XV).	Even	the	British	government’s	decision	to	abolish	
excise	posts	along	the	Sala	River	in	February	1814	in	order	to	facilitate	com-
merce between south-central Java and the pasisir rebounded. Pressure on the 
tollgate keepers to raise their annual lease payments led to an increase in the 
number of tollgates on the access roads leading to the river.101 By the eve of 
the	Java	War	rice	prices	in	the	eastern	mancanagara had climbed steeply.102 The 
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fact	that	most	of	the	tollgate	keepers	(bandar)	were	Chinese	also	exacerbated	
ethnic tensions. The system of leasing the tax farms to the highest bidder 
meant that the bandar were under pressure to extract the greatest profit from 
the farms under their control. During the British period the tax farm receipts 
showed significant yearly increases, but the restored Dutch government’s at-
tempt	to	milk	the	system	after	1816	caused	catastrophe	in	the	pre-Java	War	
years	as	we	will	see	shortly	(Chapter	IX,	Appendix	XV).	Local	commerce	was	
affected and strong anti-Chinese feelings were aroused as Javanese traders 
and farmers were forced to meet the increasingly arbitrary demands of the 
Chinese bandar. The origins of the later social and economic difficulties in 
south-central and east Java can thus be traced back directly to Raffles’ 1812 
treaties, which opened the Principalities to direct European governmental in-
terference in local commerce and taxation.
If all this was not enough, there was one further clause in the treaties which 
bore even harder on the local population of the princely states. This was ar-
ticle eight, which stipulated that all foreigners and Javanese born outside the 
Principalities	should	henceforth	fall	directly	under	European	government	ju-
risdiction and be tried according to government law.103 Raffles stressed that 
the article was specifically designed to afford protection to the Chinese and 
to ensure that they received their legal rights.104 But this seemingly innocuous 
provision had far-reaching consequences for the inhabitants of south-central 
Java.	After	February	1814,	when	the	Resident’s	courts	were	established,	all	
litigation between these inhabitants and the Chinese, as well as foreigners 
or	subjects	born	outside	the	territories	of	the	south-central	Javanese	kraton, 








to Java’. He considered the use of this colonial law as more practical than introducing British 
common	law.	The	only	modifications	he	made	were	with	regard	to	the	abolition	of	torture	and	
the death sentence in minor cases. 
104	 IOL,	Eur	 F148/23	 (Raffles-Minto	 collection,	 vol.	 23),	 T.S.	Raffles	 (Salatiga)	 to	Lord	Minto	
(Calcutta),	6-8-1812.
105	 The	Residency	courts	had	been	set	up	under	Raffles’	regulation	of	11-2-1814,	IOL,	G21/69,	
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meant that Javanese plaintiffs and defendants hailing from the sultan’s and 
Sunan’s	dominions,	who	became	involved	in	litigation	with	non-Javanese	or	
those Javanese born in government territories, were forced to have their ca-
ses	tried	under	legal	norms	–	the	trial	by	jury	system	for	example	–	and	un-




was usually well outside the means and capacity of most Javanese farmers.106 
And it must be remembered that such cases involving locally-born Javanese 
from the Principalities and foreigners, especially Chinese, were numerous at 
the time because of the large number of suits which arose out of the corrupt 
and	oppressive	administration	of	the	tollgates	(Carey	1976:67).	Long	absences	
from agricultural duties were disastrous for Javanese cultivators and Dutch 
officials were frequently constrained to settle cases out of court to avoid un-
necessary	hardship	(Carey	1987:298	note	66).	





contract	with	the	Dutch	on	2	April	1792.107 But until 1812, the stipulation 








larly their right to order the death penalty, and Javanese farmers struggled 
with	an	increasingly	alien	judicial	system,	the	religious	communities	were	







107	 De	 Jonge	 and	Van	Deventer	 1884-88,	 XII:251-2	 (English	 translation	 in	 IOL,	 Eur	 F148/18,	
Raffles-Minto	collection,	vol.	18).	Articles	12-13	of	this	contract	stipulated	that	besides	non-Java-
nese inhabitants, Javanese born in areas controlled by the government were also to remain under 
European	jurisdiction	even	though	temporarily	domiciled	in	the	Principalities.	See	further	Nagte-
gaal	1996:215-6,	who	describes	how	death	by	hanging	was	especially	resented	by	the	Javanese.
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ted to European laws.108
He also pointed out that every ulama in Java who could read the Qur’ān was 
deeply disturbed by the abolition of the penalties of Islamic law.109 The im-
portance	which	both	Kyai	Maja	and	Dipanagara	attached	to	this	point	can	






cording to Javanese-Islamic law, although as a special concession he was pre-
pared to allow the governor-general to regulate disputes between Europeans 
according	to	government	law	(Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1904,	III:263).	The	
former governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, Nicolaus Engelhard, then approa-
ching the end of his life but with his faculties undimmed, also warned the 
Dutch commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock, in 
March 1829 that the prince would only reopen peace negotiations if the cri-
minal	law	which	had	existed	before	the	arrival	of	the	British	was	restored	(De	
Haan	1910-12,	IV:855;	Ball	1982:153).	‘People	know	that	I	long	to	have	autho-







Raffles’ 1812 treaty, his subsequent legal reforms and the question of the so-
vereignty of Javanese-Islamic law in criminal cases thus proved highly signi-
ficant	in	the	later	context	of	the	Java	War.	Unlike	the	issue	of	Islamic	religious	
practice which tended to divide Dipanagara’s kraton and santri supporters, the 
former favouring a rather less strict observance than the latter, British moves 
against the competence of the royal and religious courts in criminal cases uni-
ted these two groups. Javanese law codes, derived from Indic traditions, such 
108	 Knoerle,	‘Journal’,	30.
109 NA,	 Geheim	 en	 Kabinets	Archief,	 20-9-1830	 no.	 58k,	 Johannes	 van	 den	 Bosch	 (Batavia/
Bogor)	to	Pieter	Merkus	(Surakarta),	19-4-1830.	See	further	p.	706.
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as the Serat Raja Kapa-Kapa, Jugul Mudha, and Surya Ngalam	(Pigeaud	1967-80,	
I:308-10;	Carey	1987:300-1;	Chapter	III	note	27),	had	long	been	used	side	by	
side with Islamic fiqh in the Javanese law courts and over the years an ef-
fective symbiosis between Indic and Islamic legal traditions appears to have 
taken place imbuing the legal culture of south-central Java with a syncretic 
character accepted by the court elite and men of religion alike. In this sense, 
Dipanagara’s demands to be recognised as the regulator of religion with spe-
cial	competence	over	issues	of	criminal	justice	had	widespread	resonance.
The 1812 treaties were a disaster for the south-central Javanese courts. Not 
only did they involve a significant reduction in their territory, but they also 
left a potentially dangerous long-term social and economic legacy, especially 
in Yogya. Here the combination of the fall of the kraton, the plundering of 
its treasury, artefacts and archives, and the imposition of Raffles’ treaty, all 
dealt a shattering blow to the prestige and charisma of the court. Besides the 
financial and territorial losses, the looting of the kraton was undoubtedly felt 
at a very deep psychological level by most Yogyanese. In previous Javanese 
history, such an event had usually signified that the court had been irredee-
mably defiled. The loss of magical power, which such a defilement entailed, 




attempt to move the Yogya kraton after June 1812, a seemingly fateful month 
for the fall of Javanese courts. Besides, the sultanate did not have the financial 
resources even if it had wished it. The sense of shame and disappointment 
at the events of 1812 persisted however. There are references in the Javanese 
sources that even before the British attack some held the view that the lustre 
(cahya)	of	the	kraton	had	been	so	tarnished	that	a	move	was	essential	(Chapter	
VI	note	205).	In	his	babad, Dipanagara also wrote that the court’s cahya had 
been very much dimmed.110 Meanwhile, his father is described in the Javanese 
chronicles as having felt especially keenly the humiliation undergone by the 
sultanate at the hands of the British.111	The	aged	Pangéran	Ngabèhi,	elder	
brother of the exiled second sultan, probably spoke for many when he refer-
red to the surrender of his personal kris	(stabbing	dagger)	at	the	time	of	the	
British assault as a form of castration.112 
110	 BD	(Manado)	II:164,	XV	(Asmaradana)	133.	mapan nagari Ngayogya/ kalangkung surem cahy-
ané.
111	 LOr	6791	(3)	(Babad Spèhi):207,	VI.9-11;	KITLV	Or	13	(Buku Kedhung Kebo):9v-10r,	II.1-3.
112	 Carey	1992:90,	241	(Ngabèhi’s	reference	to	abedhogolan;	Gericke	and	Roorda	1901,	II:372	sub:	
dhogol,	‘male	member’).	The	British	confiscation	of	all	the	kris of the senior Yogya priyayi	(officials)	
and	princes	in	the	aftermath	of	the	fall	of	the	kraton would certainly have been experienced as a 
form of unmanning given the special symbolic importance of the kris in Javanese culture, where 
the weapon can represent the presence of its male owner at a wedding.
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Later,	following	the	second	sultan’s	restoration	(17	August	1826)	and	re-
turn to the kraton	(21	September	1826)	during	the	Java	War,	some	of	the	let-
ters	written	to	him	by	Yogya	princes,	who	had	joined	Dipanagara,	dwelt	on	
the sense of shame they had experienced in witnessing his treatment at the 
hands of the British and the humiliation of the plunder of the kraton.113 These 
feelings of humiliation and bitterness towards the Europeans were to deepen 
during the fourth sultan’s reign when the political and economic influence of 
the European government in the princely territories became ever more pro-
nounced. They put in perspective the attempts by Dipanagara early in the 
war to bring about the final destruction of the Yogya kraton and to establish 
a new undefiled kraton	at	another	site,	initially	at	Selarong	(Carey	1981a:241	
note	29,	282	note	197).	‘All	Java	knows	this’,	Willem	van	Hogendorp	would	
later	write,	‘how	the	Dutch	allowed	the	kraton	[of	Yogya]	to	be	turned	into	a	
brothel and how Dipanagara has sworn to destroy it to the last stone and ex-
pel	the	[European]	landowners	who	have	driven	out	the	Javanese	officials.’114 
The yearning for moral regeneration under the banner of Islam and the resto-
ration of the sultanate’s prestige became significant themes in the years prece-
ding	the	Java	War	and	go	far	to	explain	why	so	many	members	of	the	Yogya	
court rallied to Dipanagara in 1825.
Positive developments during the third sultan’s reign
Despite the great difficulties with which the third sultan began his reign, his 
brief twenty-nine-month rule was one of peace and modest prosperity for 
Yogya. In terms of the royal administration, significant improvements seem 
to have been made over the costly and burdensome rule of his predecessor. 
The latter’s extensive construction of rural hunting lodges and country pa-
vilions was halted,115 and stiff economies imposed on court expenditure in 
113	 NA,	 MvK	 4192,	 Geheim	 en	 Kabinets	 Archief	 no.	 243k,	 30-10-1826,	 Pangéran	 Ngabèhi	











when Hamengkubuwana III was still Crown Prince, he declined to follow his father’s example 
in	indulging	in	large-scale	building	projects.	This	drew	from	Hamengkubuwana	II	the	sarcastic	
remark	that	‘his	son	wished	to	make	himself	beloved	by	the	inhabitants	of	his	kingdom’.	See	fur-
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order to replenish the looted treasury. By the time of Hamengkubuwana III’s 
death	in	November	1814,	some	60,000	Spanish	dollars	had	been	accumulated	
in the kraton coffers and the pensions of the sultan’s family amounting to an 
annual	sum	of	50,999	Spanish	dollars	were	being	paid	regularly	at	Mulud	
and Puwasa.116 In ensuring the regularity of these payments, the fixed annual 
grant	of	100,000	Spanish	dollars	from	the	British	government	to	the	sultan	for	
the annual rent of the markets and tollgates proved to be a critical resource.
Plans were also laid to curb the activities of the country tax-collectors and 
rural	police	(gunung).	The	establishment	of	a	‘regular	and	permanent	system	
of	police’	had	been	stipulated	under	article	7	of	the	1812	treaties	(Rouffaer	
1905:644-5),	and	in	his	babad, Dipanagara described how he had asked his 
father that all the gunung should be dismissed because of the burden they 
imposed on the common people. He suggested that money payments previ-
ously demanded by the second sultan should be commuted to corvée labour 
and the costs of the court entirely covered by the British government’s annual 
market and tollgate rent.117 Furthermore, the prince envisaged that the village 
administration	(paréntah désa)	should	return	to	what	it	had	been	under	the	
first sultan,118 a suggestion which his father apparently agreed to provided 
that one year was allowed to elapse before the changes were implemented in 
order to restore kraton	finances.	Unfortunately,	he	died	on	3	November	1814	
before this administrative reorganisation could be put into effect.119 Again, 
one has to wonder whether the prince was investing himself with rather too 
much influence over his father’s administration and whether these initiatives 
to	return	to	the	practices	of	Sultan	Mangkubumi’s	reign	were	really	all	his	
idea. Just three years earlier in February 1811, the third sultan, then Prince 
Regent, had already issued an administrative order instructing that all labour 
services on royal apanage lands should return to what they had been under 
Sultan	Mangkubumi	(Carey	1980:21),	so	it	is	unclear	what	exactly	Dipanagara	
himself contributed. This is especially relevant when we consider the detailed 
nature of his father’s previous instruction which stated that the unpaid levy 
of	building	materials	(stones,	whitewash,	teak	roofing	tiles),	previously	de-
manded by the second sultan, was to cease, and that if building materials 






payment	of	court	pensions	increased	the	influence	of	the	bupati in charge of the treasury depart-
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neys. The order even dealt with military service requirements stipulating that 
they should revert to their former levels, another reference to the first sultan’s 
reign.120
Confirmation that the third sultan’s reign marked a change from that 
of his fiscally rapacious predecessor was given by Captain Robert Clement 
Garnham,	John	Crawfurd’s	replacement	as	Resident	of	Yogya	in	1814-1815,	
who	wrote	of	a	‘new	epoch’	in	the	administration	of	the	sultanate	after	June	
1812,121 a view echoed by Captain Godfrey Phipps Baker during his survey 
of the western mancanagara	and	south	coast	during	the	dry	season	(May-
September)	of	1815.122 Garnham stated that the second sultan’s pancas land 
measurement	revisions	of	1802	and	circa	1808-1811	(pp.	60-6)	had	been	so	
oppressive that many Javanese farmers had been ruined and the personal 
bodyguards of the Yogya bupati had caused serious depredations in the coun-
tryside.123	This	insecurity	had	reached	a	peak	in	1811	(p.	274)	and	the	state	of	
the sultanate had remained very troubled until Hamengkubuwana II’s depo-
sition	in	June	1812.	Since	that	time,	there	had	been	far	fewer	large-scale	robbe-





protesting	the	surrender	of	Surakarta	mancanagara territory to the British.124 
But Garnham glossed over these inconvenient facts. The harsh sentences pas-
sed on anyone molesting the property of the sultan, in his estimation, had 
served as a deterrent. At the same time, the British government’s ban on ga-
ming	and	cockfighting	in	July	1813	had	also	contributed	to	the	peace	of	the	
countryside.125 True, there had been some administrative disasters such as 
120 Despite the changes, apanage holders were still expected to produce soldiers for military 
exercises	 (geladhi),	 for	 the	Garebeg	ceremonies	and	 to	 take	part	 in	expeditions	ordered	by	 the	

















(1782-1827),	 aide-de-camp	and	 confidant	 of	Raffles,	who	 served	 as	
Resident	of	Yogyakarta	from	20	September	1814	to	31	August	1815.	
Portrait	 by	 Samuel	 Lane	 (1780-1859),	 first	 exhibited	 at	 the	 Royal	
Academy	(London)	in	1818,	showing	him	dressed	in	his	personally	
designed aide-de-camp’s uniform with his head turned to one side 
to hide the large birth mark which covered his left cheek. The kris 
presented to him by the Yogya court at the time of his departure in 
1815, can be seen to his right. Photograph by courtesy of Mrs. Patricia 
Gadsby, a direct descendant of Garnham. 
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Crawfurd’s	ill-advised	(and	later	abandoned)	attempt	to	create	a	government	
monopoly on south sea salt,126 but this was the exception that proved the 
rule. In Garnham’s view, the combination of enlightened British laws and the 
sagacious administration of the third sultan had combined to improve the 
condition of the people.127
Two other measures taken by the British government shortly after the 
third	sultan’s	death	in	November	1814,	promised	long-term	amelioration	of	
the physical health and social situation of a number of inhabitants of Java. 
These were the government’s decision to introduce more widespread small-








Perhaps nature rather than human agency was more important in the 
short-term in leading to tangible benefits for the local population in the 










William	Ainslie	 (postmaster-general)	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	T.S.	Raffles	(Bogor),	6-8-1814	on	working	
of	government	salt	monopoly	and	Crawfurd’s	failed	attempt	to	force	south	coast	salt	producers	
to	sell	to	the	government	at	a	purchase	price	40	stuiver for sale by government at 99 stuiver per 
100 pound pikul.	The	high	expense	involved,	poor	quality	of	south	coast	salt	compared	to	better	
north	coast	variety,	problems	for	south	coast	producers	and	complaints	from	Surakarta	led	to	the	
abrogation of the scheme, see further Chapter I note 126.
127	 Dj.Br.	29,	R.C.	Garnham	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Batavia/Bogor),	22-6-1815.









some surviving slaves in Yogya.
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parently had remarkable short-term beneficial effects on the 1815 rice harvest 
in	south-central	Java.	Unlike	the	June	1811	eruption	of	Gunung	Kelut	(Chapter	
VII),	which	led	to	cattle	murrain,	the	full	force	of	the	Tambora	eruption	was	ex-
perienced late in the growing cycle and helped to bring on a bumper harvest. 
In	Surakarta,	the	Resident,	Major	Jeremiah	Martin	Johnson,	spoke	of	‘such	
a season of abundance as the present has not been known for many years 
[…]	by	the	many	persons	conversant	with	the	grain	[harvest]’.131 Indeed, the 
short-term effect on the climate seems to have been dramatic with mean tem-
peratures falling by some five to seven degrees Fahrenheit in the immediate 
aftermath of the eruption.132 
Political and administrative changes 





his lifetime and while he conducts himself to their satisfaction’ a monthly 
stipend	of	750	Spanish	dollars	(Van	Deventer	1891:334).	The	government	also	
undertook to make arrangements with the sultan whereby the prince would 
be	‘placed	in	possession	of	lands	to	the	full	amount	of	4,000	cacah, to be in 
like manner held during his lifetime and good behaviour, and to descend to 
his	eldest	son,	the	prince	Suryaningrat,	to	be	held	on	similar	terms	and	con-
ditions’	(Van	Deventer	1891:334).	The	phrase	‘the	full	amount’	in	connection	
with the cacah meant that Pakualam received the land according to the old 
land	measurement	re-valued	by	the	first	sultan	in	circa	1790-1791	rather	than	
the devalued measurements introduced by Hamengkubuwana II in 1802 and 
in	the	1808-1811	period	(pp.	60-6).	The	area	was	also	to	be	held	as	hereditary	
landholding and not as an apanage from the senior court like the lands of the 







133	 Rouffaer	 1905:590,	 603,	 605.	 The	 Mangkunagaran	 rulers	 were	 technically	 pangéran miji, 
princes	under	the	direct	orders	of	the	Sunan,	until	1896	when	they	were	recognised	as	pangéran 
amardhika, independent princes from the Kasunanan, but still pangéran miji of the Dutch. This was 
never	the	case	with	the	Pakualam	who	from	the	first	were	pangéran amardhika from the sultanate, 
although always pangéran miji with regard to the government.
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very poor quality.134 Both the Residency letters and the Javanese sources relat e 
how	this	haphazard	allocation	of	marginal	land	caused	some	bitter	affrays	
between the Pakualaman and the sultanate.135 Moreover, the prince’s record 
as a stingy landlord made him a figure of hate and loathing amongst the local 
Javanese	peasantry	causing	the	Dutch	many	difficulties	during	the	Java	War	
(Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	II:411).		As	we	have	seen	(Chapter	I),	it	was	
only in the aftermath of the war, that his landholdings were grouped together 
in the Adikarta area of southern Kulon Praga. The original British sponsored 
land grant was also given with conditions attached. One of these was that 
the	prince	‘support	and	maintain	for	the	British	government	a	corps	of	one	
hundred	horses’	which	would	be	‘armed	and	clothed	by	the	British	govern-
ment in such manner as they may deem the most expedient, the prince on his 
part supplying horses, accoutrements and necessaries’. Another was that he 
would pay the monthly salaries of the privates and non-commissioned offi-
cers	(Van	Deventer	1891:335).	This	corps	later	assisted	the	European	govern-
ment in putting down local uprisings in the Yogya area and played a part as 
government	auxiliaries	against	Dipanagara	during	the	Java	War.	But	it	never	








of Pakualam’s new-found independence from the sultanate.
Another significant administrative change was the appointment of a new 
patih.136 The background to this appointment lay in the increasingly urgent 
need to replace the acting patih,	Mas	Tumenggung	Sindunagara	(Kyai	Adipati	
Danureja	III)	who	was	in	his	dotage	and	often	made	mistakes	in	discussing	
affairs with the Resident.137 According to Dipanagara, Crawfurd urged the 
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only	had	a	few	more	years	to	live),	the	second,	Crawfurd’s	own	choice,	Radèn	
Tumenggung Pringgadiningrat, the patih jero, was not accepted by the prin-
ce.138 There matters rested until Crawfurd began to grow impatient and the 
sultan dispatched the kapitan cina,	Tan	Jin	Sing,	to	Tegalreja	with	a	shortlist	of	




astonishment of his father who pointed out that the bupati was still young and 
was of common birth. Moreover, he had little experience of giving orders to 
the senior priyayi and when he spoke his east Javanese accent marked him 
out	as	a	provincial	(Carey	1992:173,	368,	500	note	492).	But	Dipanagara	stuck	
by	his	decision	and	Sumadipura	was	appointed	as	Radèn	Adipati	Danureja	
IV	on	2	December	1813.139 He was to remain in office for the next thirty-four 
years	(Pigeaud	1931-32,	II:130;	Appendix	Va).
Such	is	the	description	in	Dipanagara’s	babad and there is nothing in the 
Residency letters to confirm it, although another Javanese source states expli-
citly	that	Sumadipura	became	patih through the good offices of the prince and 
that the latter’s patronage later aroused the new chief minister’s intense resent-
ment.140	In	many	respects,	it	is	understandable	why	Sumadipura	was	chosen	
for	there	were	no	suitable	candidates	from	within	the	Danurejan	family	to	fill	
the post.141 Furthermore, the bupati of Japan was undoubtedly well known to 
both Dipanagara and his father because he was the son of a previous head of the 
Crown	Prince’s	establishment	(kadipatèn),	Mas	Tumenggung	Sumadirja	(in	office	
circa	1807-circa	1810;	Appendix	Vb),	and	was	closely	related	to	the	third	sultan’s	




gara, was given the title of Kyai Adipati Adipurwa and a 1,000 cacah	apanage	in	Rèma	(Karang-
anyar),	but	he	did	not	live	long	to	enjoy	it,	dying	within	the	year	(1814)	at	the	age	of	seventy,	B.Ng.	
I:344,	LXXXV.9-12;	Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoerejan,	n.y.:480.




jocarta’,	 22-10-1816,	who	noted	 that	 the	 third	 sultan	mooted	 the	possibility	 of	 appointing	 the	
outgoing patih’s	son,	Radèn	Ria	Mandura,	but	was	overruled	by	Crawfurd	who	pointed	out	the	
latter’s	complete	lack	of	administrative	skill.
142	 Pigeaud	 1931-32,	 II:39,	 gives	 a	 family	 tree	 indicating	 that	Mas	 Tumenggung	 Sumadirja	
(referred	to	as	‘T[umenggung]	Soemadipoera	(Soemadirdjan)	Djapan’),	who	had	served	as	bupati 
of	Japan	from	25-2-1796	to	30-4-1807	(Carey	and	Hoadley	2000:64-5),	was	a	brother	of	the	mother	
of	Ratu	Kedhaton	 (referred	 to	 erroneously	by	Pigeaud	as	 ‘K[angjeng]	R[atu]	Kentjana’),	Nyai	
Adipati Purwadiningrat of Magetan.
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riage to a daughter of the second sultan by his favourite consort, Ratu Kencana 
Wulan,	shortly	after	his	appointment	as	patih	(Mandoyokusumo	1977:26	no.	
75).	It	is	also	understandable	that	Hamengkubuwana	III	wished	to	reward	him,	
along with other members of the karajan, following his accession to the throne 




of the fall of Yogyakarta’, for example, refers to the excellent impression he 
made	at	the	time	of	his	official	inauguration	(Carey	1992:172-3,	368),	and	
Crawfurd	wrote	of	him	in	rather	positive	terms	to	his	successor,	Nahuys:
I can safely recommend him both as a good and an intelligent man peculiarly fitted 
for the office he holds. You will receive from him candid and impartial opinions, 
for I never knew him to say anything with the intention to mislead. His greatest 
defect is one which, as it is all too universal, I need not dwell upon – a share of 
indolence	more	 consistent	with	 the	national	 [Javanese]	 character	 than	with	 that	









horses, has beautiful women and is attached to the opium pipe’.146
Over time, however, these self-indulgent qualities began to have a cor-
rosive	effect:	in	November	1825,	some	four	months	after	the	outbreak	of	the	
Java	War,	Van	Sevenhoven	remarked	that	the	patih’s addiction to opium had 




remaining loyal to the karajan	faction	in	the	1830s.






Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	I:450.	On elite opium addiction in Yogya at this time, see Carey 
1984:33-5;	Chapter	III.
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described	by	Yogya	contemporaries	as	a	man	with	‘an	unclean	heart’.148 His 
fondness for pleasure and unscrupulous personal ambition led him to abuse 
his position to demand sexual favours and cases decided in his court at the ke-
patihan	were	always	open	to	extensive	bribery	(Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	
I:85-7).	As	his	political	influence	grew,	so	his	capacity	for	extortion	and	cor-
ruption increased. His control of key royal monopolies such as the limestone 
ovens	at	Gunung	Gamping,	which	he	seized	from	Dipanagara	during	the	lat-
ter’s	period	(1822-1825)	as	guardian	of	the	child	sultan	Hamengkubuwana	V,	
as well as the Gunung Kidul teak forests, combined with his heavy financial 
demands on new apanage holders for sealing their title deeds, and his own 
property	deals	in	Yogya,	turned	him	into	an	exceedingly	wealthy	man	(Carey	
1992:499	note	486).	But	his	behaviour	had	disastrous	consequences:	the	Yogya	
administration began to operate fitfully and discord amongst senior officials 
became	rife:	one	contemporary	Javanese	text	even	referred	to	him	as	a	‘devil	
in	human	clothes’	who	‘robbed	people	while	sitting	down’.149
One problem was that despite his close connections with the kadipatèn and 
the family of the third sultan, the new patih was something of an outsider 
in Yogya court circles. Indeed, he was not even of full Javanese blood since 
both	his	parents	were	of	Balinese	ancestry:	his	father	was	a	fourth-genera-





on his mother’s side who had married a rich Chinese businessman in east 
Java, Bah Co, the manager of extensive cubeb pepper estates and provider 
of loans to the British government to meet the wages of local sepoy troops. 
This combination of Balinese ancestry, east Javanese provenance and wealthy 
Chinese	business	links	accentuated	Sumadipura’s	separateness	from	other	
high Yogya officials. It also perhaps made him more willing to cooperate with 
the European government for the advancement of his own career, a course 
facilitated by the fact that he was in office for long periods during the mi-
nority of under-age rulers.150 Indeed, during the reign of the fourth sultan, 
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third	cousin	and	like	himself	a	descendant	of	Surapati.	This	group	would	ally	
itself strongly with European estate interests in Yogya and would gravely 
exacerbate	political	tensions	at	the	Yogya	court	on	the	eve	of	the	Java	War,	
thus helping to precipitate Dipanagara’s rebellion in July 1825.
Four	days	after	Sumadipura’s	inauguration	as	patih, another official elevati-
on took place which was to have consequences for the future. This was the ap-
pointment of the kapitan cina,	Tan	Jin	Sing,	as	Radèn	Tumenggung	Secadiningrat	








including a stretch of land to the north of the kraton	which	Tan	Jin	Sing	leased	
out to other Chinese for building purposes.152 Yet the appointment was clearly 
only made by the third sultan under duress. For a Chinese to be given such 
a prominent title and extensive apanage at the Yogya court was unheard of. 
Although there had been cases of Chinese tax-farmers administering north 
coast administrative districts on behalf of the Mataram empire in the seven-
teenth	and	early	eighteenth	centuries	(Remmelink	1994:25),	this	had	not	been	
repeated	in	the	post-Giyanti	period.	Indeed,	Sultan	Mangkubumi	appears	to	
have taken a strong line on not allowing Chinese to have too close a relation-
ship with the royal family, stating that this would be a prescription for internal 
discord within the kraton	(Carey	1992:462	note	304).	Moreover,	as	we	have	




of the head of the tollgates and markets, Kyai Tumenggung Reksanegara, did 
not	come	at	a	very	favourable	time	in	Sino-Javanese	relations.	
The kapitan cina hailed from a well-established Hokkien family of Amoy 
extraction but long settled in the Banyumas area, who had earlier served the 
sultanate with distinction as tax-farmers in Kedhu.153 Although he had em-
151	 His	grant	letter	stated	that	this	was	equivalent	to	1,000	cacah urip:	‘living’,	namely	cultivated,	
cacah.
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braced Islam – namely professed the articles of The Faith and was circumcised 
– he was resented both in conservative court circles and by the Chinese com-
munities	in	south-central	Java	(Carey	1992:485	note	399).	The	latter	shunned	
him because of his unique political position and his abandonment of Chinese 
customs, whereas the former resented his arrogation of special privileges such 
as the keeping of female bedhaya dancers in his house, sitting on a chair with 
senior princes at court receptions, styling his wife, a low-born Javanese,154 
as	a	Radèn	Ayu	(princess),	and	insisting	that	kraton messengers perform the 
sembah	(gesture	of	kneeling	respect	with	hands	placed	together	in	greeting)	
to	him	(Carey	1992:485	note	399).	The	former	kapitan cina’s strange position 
suspended uneasily between three worlds – the Chinese, the European and 
the	Javanese	–	was	well	summed	up	by	the	clever	Yogya	ditty	‘no	longer	a	




in the countryside’,155 he was far too closely identified with the European 








his countrymen, he possesses all the local knowledge of a native, and I may safely 
refer you to him as the very best source of information and advice which this place 
affords. His very existence depends on that of the European power whatever it be 
and	it	may	be	assured	of	his	zealous	support.	In	return	I	venture	to	recommend	
him to the generosity and protection of the new administration.157
154	 Purwosugiyanto	(Yogyakarta),	personal	communication	enclosing	‘Silsilah	R.T.	Secodinin-
grat	 (Tan	 Jin	Sing)’,	 15-9-1985,	 states	 that	Tan	 Jin	Sing/Secadiningrat’s	wife	was	a	daughter	of	





156 Knoerle,	 ‘Journal’,	 22.	Dipanagara’s	views	on	Tan	 Jin	Sing/Secadiningrat’s	 role	are	partly	
confirmed	by	NA,	Ministerie	van	Koloniën	4497,	Besluit	van	den	Gouverneur-Generaal	geheim,	
18-10-1816 no. A.
157	 UBL,	 BPL	 616	 Port.	 5	 pt.	 5,	 John	 Crawfurd	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	 H.G.	 Nahuys	 van	 Burgst	
(Yogyakarta),	9-8-1816.
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Nahuys	for	his	part	made	great	use	of	Tan	Jin	Sing	as	his	informant	and	later	




ded’.158 Despite his anomalous position as a trusted informant of successive 
Yogya	Residents,	Tan	Jin	Sing	managed	to	remain	on	rather	good	terms	with	
Dipanagara, whose personal bodyguard he helped to maintain in the years 
immediately	preceding	the	Java	War	(Carey	1981a:253	note	73).	He	also	seems	
to have adopted a neutral attitude to the court intrigues which so plagued the 
sultanate during this period, although he was a strong advocate of the policy 
of renting land to Europeans in the princely territories which became such an 
issue in the 1816-1822 period.159 His appointment must have been viewed by 
many in Yogya as yet another facet of the decline of the sultanate’s prestige 
and independence in the years following June 1812.160





interlude in his babad and affords an insight into the very deep affection 
which Dipanagara felt for his second official wife. In his account, he descri-
bed how his father had constantly pressed him to marry again but that he had 
always refused. Eventually he was summoned to the kraton and instructed 





160	 Baud	 306,	 Van	 IJsseldijk,	 ‘Rapport’,	 11-12-1816,	 referred	 to	 the	 hatred	 evinced	 by	many	
Yogya bupati	towards	Tan	Jin	Sing	when	he	visited	Yogya	in	September	1816.
161	 The	date	of	Dipanagara’s	marriage	is	obscure:	B.Ng.	I:356,	LXXXVII.34-6,	gives	11	Sawal,	
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of	the	slain	Radèn	Tumenggung	Sumadiningrat.	The	prince	thereupon	made	
his way to the keputrèn	(female	quarters)	in	the	kraton to meet the ratu, a du-
tiful son making the next step in what might have seemed would be a politi-
cally	expedient	but	loveless	second	marriage.	Then	Cupid	shot	his	arrow:	as	
Dipanagara	was	passing	the	entrance	to	the	religious	retreat	area	(panepèn)	
in the kraton he describes how he caught sight of Ratu Maduretna’s daughter 
framed in the doorway and immediately evinced an overpowering physical 
attraction for her.162 This chance encounter and the prince’s reaction to it, was 
immediately reported to the sultan by the two nyai keparak	(personal	female	
retainers	of	the	ruler)	who	had	accompanied	him	to	the	keputrèn. Once Ratu 
Bendara had confirmed that she was not minded to remarry, a betrothal bet-
ween	Dipanagara	and	the	Radèn	Ayu,	who	had	taken	her	mother’s	name	of	
Maduretna, was arranged. The marriage ceremony took place in the kraton. A 
feast and all-night wayang	performance	followed	at	Tegalreja	(Chapter	II	note	
57).	We	do	not	know	the	particular	lakon	(wayang	plot)	chosen,	but	in	his	ba-






sed this satria ideal and was very familiar to Javanese from the wayang theatre. 
Wisnu’s	role	as	a	saviour	of	the	world	in	troubled	times	was	also	well	known	





final meditation at Parangkusuma on his pilgrimage to the south coast in 
circa	1805	(Chapter	IV).	This	analogy	was	also	taken	up	after	his	exile	in	his	
eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II’s mystical allegorical babad, which deals 
162	 BD	(Manado)	II:235,	XVII.131-3.	It	is	not	known	how	old	Ratu	Maduretna’s	daughter	was	













brothers in the Mahabharata cycle of wayang plays, with whom 
Dipanagara appears to have identified himself in his autobiograph-
ical babad	 (Babad Dipanagara,	 Manado	 version).	 Taken	 from	 Kats	
1923:268	facing.	Photograph	by	courtesy	of	the	KITLV,	Leiden.
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with the elder Dipanagara’s life, the Babad Dipanagaran Surya Ngalam, where 








described as a mischievous young rogue and a dwarf.164 This description 
recalls	the	deformed	servitors	of	Arjuna	and	the	other	Pandhawa	brothers,	
who	also	followed	their	masters	off	into	the	jungles	after	Yudistira	had	lost	
the kingdom of Ngastina to the Kurawa in a game of dice. The analogy is 
made even clearer in Dipanagara’s babad	when	the	names	of	Semar,	Garèng	
and Petruk were given to three local bekel	(village	tax-collectors/heads)	from	
the surrounding area who had temporarily attached themselves to the prin-
ce’s party. Dipanagara adds the detail that the names suited the physical ap-
pearance of the bekel and the latter found them good.165
At the practical level, it is clear that Dipanagara’s marriage gave him a 
sensitive and sympathetic partner in whom to confide in the troubled years 
which followed his father’s demise and who gave him her full support right 
up to the time of her death in February 1828 in the penultimate year of the 
Java	War.	Of	all	the	prince’s	wives,	Radèn	Ayu	Maduretna	was	the	only	one	




Rongga’s grandfather, the founder of the line of Madiun bupati wedana	(p.	190)	






questioned by Knoerle during his voyage into exile he sought to deny his 
kinship with Rongga perhaps to protect the latter’s son, Pangéran Rongga 
Prawiradiningrat, who was then serving as bupati wedana	in	Madiun	(in	office	
1822-1859).166
164	 BD	(Manado)	IV:229,	XXXVIII	(Mijil)	150.	Laré bajang apan kang satunggil/ sanget beleringon/ 
pinaring nama Banthèngwarèng/ kang satunggil pun Rata namèki.
165	 BD	(Manado)	IV:229-30,	XXXVIII.153-4.	See	further	Carey	1974a:13.
166	 Knoerle,	‘Journal’,	11;	Appendix	Vb.
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In	 October	 1814,	 the	 sultan	 contracted	 a	 cold	which,	 according	 to	
Dipanagara, lasted for a month.167 A similar condition is mentioned in the 
Buku Kedhung Kebo	(‘Chronicle	of	the	buffaloes’	watering	hole’)	although	in	
this account death followed almost immediately.168 The sultan had never en-
joyed	good	health	and	the	intrigues	of	the	latter	part	of	his	father’s	reign,	in	
particular the events leading up to the storming of the Yogya kraton in June 
1812,	had	doubtless	take	their	toll	on	his	weak	physique.	As	we	have	seen	(p.	
329),	Jan	Isaäk	van	Sevenhoven,	while	on	a	private	visit	to	the	Yogya	court	in	
May 1812, had noticed how old and drawn the future third sultan had looked 
for his forty-three years. Despite his illness, the sultan continued to go out for 
tours of the kraton battlements, but as November dawned, it was clear that 
his	final	sickness	had	begun.	The	‘Chronicle	of	the	fall	of	Yogyakarta’	gives	
a vivid description of the deathbed scene in the ruler’s private apartments in 
the kraton where dhukun	(herbalists,	traditional	medical	practitioners)	were	
called to administer potions while healing incantations followed one after 
the other and some of the older princes intoned dhikr	(short	repetitive	phrases	
from the Qur’ān;	Carey	1992:186-7,	383).	Interestingly,	the	author	of	the	chro-
nicle noted that Dipanagara took particular exception to the special lustration 
ceremony performed by his great-uncle, Pangéran Demang, over the sultan’s 
dying body. This involved Demang exposing the sultan’s navel and licking it 
in order to facilitate the exit of the life force while magical incantations were 
intoned. Dipanagara apparently stepped forward at this point to replace the 
coverlet firmly over his father’s body and force his embarrassed great-uncle 
to	desist	his	ministrations	(Carey	1992:187-8,	383).	This	is	a	telling	vignette,	
which indicates that although in many respects a typical Javanese-Islamic 
mystic the prince did not hold with some of the more arcane aspects of the 
magico-religious lore of his day.169
Meanwhile, the British Resident, Captain Garnham, and the Residency 
doctor,	Dr	Harvey	Thomson	(1790-1837),170 were roused from their sleep and 
167	 BD	(Manado)	II:263,	XVIII	(Kinanthi)	94.	kangjeng sultan kang winarni/ pan sampun karsaning 
Suksma/ agerah celeb puniki/ pan sampun angsal sacandra.
168	 KITLV	Or	13	(Buku Kedhung Kebo)	11r-v:II.8-9.
169	 Carey	1992:513-4	note	555.	This	can	be	compared	to	Dipanagara’s	reluctance	to	attend	the	
Garebeg	ceremonies	(pp.	87-8),	although	it	is	worth	noting	that	in	his	Makassar	MS	Book	II,	there	
are numerous references to dhikr and daérah	 (diagrams	for	regulating	breathing	during	prayer	
[sujud])	although	most	of	these	seem	to	have	been	based	on	the	Qur’ān and other Islamic texts. 
On the use of dhikr	in	south-central	Java	at	this	time,	see	further	Winter	1902:65.	Dipanagara	may	
have	objected	to	the	mantra	chanted	in	the	kraton at the time of his father’s death because they 
were not drawn from the Qur’ān. 
170	 For	a	biography	of	Thomson,	see	Van	Enk	1990,	1999,	neither	of	which	refer	to	Thomson’s	
position as Residency doctor in Yogya at this time. He	is	mentioned	in	this	capacity	in	Dj.Br.	9B,	
‘Geheime	stukken	van	1836’,	‘Ceremonieel	in	acht	genomen	bij	gelegenheid	der	plegtige	installa-
tie	van	Z.H.	den	Sultan	Hamangkuboewono	der	vierde	te	Djocjokarta	den	9	Nov.	1814	opgemaakt	
door	den	Heere	Resident	R.C.	Garnham’	 (henceforth:	Garnham,	 ‘Ceremonieel’),	 9-11-1814.	He 
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sped to the kraton	to	render	assistance	(Carey	1992:186-7,	381).	But	it	was	
all	to	no	avail.	At	six	o’clock	in	the	morning	of	3	November	after	a	reign	of	
just	865	days,	the	third	sultan	died.171 According to the chronicle, Garnham 
immediately ordered the sepoy garrison commander and Residency staff to 
remain on the highest alert, and oversaw the sealing and padlocking of the 
royal	treasure	chambers	in	preparation	for	the	new	reign	(Carey	1992:187-8,	
382,	384).	The	babad accounts suggest that the third sultan’s sudden demise 
caused considerable anxiety in the kraton:	Ratu	Ageng,	the	mother	of	the	late	
sultan,	feared	that	her	grandson	(the	future	fourth	sultan),	who	was	still	a	
minor, would not be able to rule and Dipanagara stated that no one in Yogya 
had expected the sultan to die so young. Garnham himself, who had recently 
arrived	in	Yogya	to	take	up	his	post	(20	September	1814),	is	also	described	as	
having been visibly moved and upset during the deathbed scene in the kra-
ton.172 In his official correspondence with Raffles, however, Garnham made 
no	mention	of	this	sense	of	unease,	speaking	instead	of	the	‘great	tranquillity’	
which prevailed in Yogya after the sultan’s death.173 Raffles for his part de-
termined to mark the Yogya ruler’s passing with due respect, ordering all the 
Union flags to be flown at half-mast at the main military stations in Java and 
the minute guns at each fort to be fired forty-five times to indicate the late sul-
tan’s age at the time of his demise.174 Meanwhile, the body of the sultan was 
washed and laid out in the Bangsal Kencana pavilion so that the members of 
the royal family could take their leave before its removal on the afternoon fol-
lowing his death to the royal graveyard at Imagiri and interment besides the 
grave	of	the	late	ruler’s	beloved	grandfather,	Sultan	Mangkubumi.175















not being able to bear to watch the administration of medicines and chanting of incantations at the 
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Accession, regency and marriage of the boy sultan, Hamengkubuwana IV
In many ways the third sultan’s untimely passing augured ill for the future 
of	Yogya,	coming	as	it	did	just	as	hopes	were	growing	that	the	fortunes	of	the	
sultanate might be restored after the disasters of the second sultan’s reign. The 
fact that Yogya was now to be ruled by a minor opened up further possibilities 
of intrigue and corruption in the kraton.	Such	fears	for	the	future	of	the	sulta-
nate are mirrored in the chronicle where the text’s author, Pangéran Panular, is 
described as having had a dream of four half moons engaging in a fierce battle 
with a large full moon. The half moons shone with a very pale light and the ex-
planation of the dream given in the babad was of the coming eclipse of the king-
dom due to ambition amongst the sultan’s leading advisers which would create 
a	situation	whereby	the	state	would	be	‘dismembered	and	torn	to	shreds’.176
Such	premonitions	were	not,	however,	justified	by	the	immediate	circum-
stances of the fourth sultan’s accession which took place amidst general re-
joicing	on	9	November	after	Garnham’s	prior	announcement	of	his	elevation	
three days earlier.177 A brilliant firework display laid on by the former kapitan 
cina,	Tan	Jin	Sing	(now	Radèn	Tumenggung	Secadiningrat),	and	a	dinner	in	
the Residency House opened by a seventeen-gun salute from the fort conclu-
ded the accession festivities. The regency council established by Garnham 
after consultation with the sultan’s family also found widespread approval 
in the kraton.	Danureja	IV,	the	aged	First	Inner	bupati or patih jero,	Radèn	
Tumenggung Pringgadiningrat, and two of the senior court bupati	(nayaka),	
Radèn	Tumenggung	Ranadiningrat	and	Radèn	Tumenggung	Mertanagara,	
were	appointed,	the	last	two	being	tasked	with	touring	Pajang	and	Bagelèn	
respectively to distribute copies of Garnham’s proclamation and apprise 
the populace of the change of ruler.178 Meanwhile, it seemed that the third 
sultan’s style of administration would be continued for when the eastern 
mancanagara bupati arrived in the royal capital for the Garebeg Besar on 25 
November	1814,	shortly	after	the	fourth	sultan’s	inauguration,	the	two	acting	
bupati wedana	(Appendix	Vb)	were	instructed	by	the	boy	ruler	to	continue	as	
before.179 Unfortunately, Garnham’s choice of regency council was not accep-
ted by Raffles who sent back instructions that his friend Pakualam should be 
176	 Carey	1992:166-7,	355	(Javanese	text:	kapethal jinuwing sinuwir),	494	note	462a.	On	a	rather	
similar	dream	of	two	eagles	fighting	in	the	sky	over	Surabaya,	see	Thorn	1815:184.
177	 Dj.Br.9B,	Garnham,	‘Ceremonieel’,	9-11-1814.
178	 Dj.Br.29,	 Captain	 R.C.	 Garnham	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	 Charles	 Assey)	 (Batavia/Bogor),	 23-11-
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appointed as sole regent. The independent prince was officially installed on 
17	December.180 The lieutenant-governor’s decision caused consternation in 
Yogya. Garnham wrote back to his superior stating that he had received the 
order	‘with	much	anxiety	and	apprehension’,	hoping	that	the	measure	might	
be	a	provisional	one	(Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894-1909,	I:43	note	1):







is on the other hand to be recollected that this Pangeran also has claims on 




already an independent prince answerable directly to the British government. 
What	more	did	he	expect?	The	sultanate?	This	was	certainly	the	gloss	put	on	
the lieutenant-governor’s decision in Yogya where it seemed that Raffles might 
even be contemplating a new division of the kingdom which would leave 
the sultanate even weaker than before. Moreover, the suspicions concerning 
Pakualam’s avaricious character were amply borne out when he began to mi-
suse his position as regent to buy up lands on his own account and lead a more 
extravagant	life	style	in	his	Pakualaman	residence	(Carey	1992:519	note	577).	
At the same time, many smaller actions aroused resentment and underscored 
Pakualam’s	overweening	political	ambitions:	thus	he	demanded	to	be	styled	
Pangéran Adipati, a title refused him previously by the British government, 
and asked for the line of succession to be determined in the event of the fourth 
sultan’s sudden death expecting that the government would confirm him as 
the heir apparent. Instead, he was chagrined to find that the boy ruler’s mild-
mannered uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, was designated instead.181 He also 
insisted	on	greeting	the	sultan	‘in	European	fashion’	with	a	handshake	on	those	
few occasions when he met him in the kraton in the company of the Resident. 
As for the meetings of the council of state, he held these in his own residence 
rather than at the paséban or meeting place at the kraton as he was required to 
180	 IOL,	G21/42,	 Java	Separate	 and	Political	Consultations,	 22-3-1815,	 6-1-1815,	Captain	R.C.	
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do	under	the	terms	of	the	regency	(Carey	1992:519	note	577).
It soon became apparent that he could not be allowed to continue to exer-
cise authority over court finances and sometime before the Dutch restoration 
in	August	1816,	the	queen	mother,	Ratu	Ibu	(former	Ratu	Kencana),	assisted	by	
the patih,	Danureja	IV,	took	over	all	his	duties.	Only	the	great	seal	(cap ageng)	




official payment he received for his regency which left a legacy of bitterness in 
the Yogya kraton	which	took	years	to	dissipate	(Carey	1992:519	note	577).
Meanwhile, the private education of the sultan remained throughout in the 
hands of his mother, Ratu Ibu, who exercised great influence over him.182	She	
chose	Dipanagara’s	friend,	Kyai	Amad	Ngusman,	the	head	of	the	Suranatan,	
as his tutor in Arabic and Qur’ān studies. The latter instructed his pupil each 
morning in the Gedhong Kuning pavilion in the kraton and gave him special 
guidance in the reading of the Qur’ān.183	Since	it	proved	impossible	to	iden-
tify a Malay tutor of the right calibre in Yogya, Garnham asked the British 
government	to	send	one	down	from	Batavia	or	Semarang.	Eventually	a	sepoy	
officer by the name of Lieutenant Abbas, who had served as official Malay in-
terpreter	at	the	time	of	the	Sambas	expedition	in	May-June	1813,	was	chosen	
for the post and he gave the sultan lessons in Malay literature and langua-
ge.184 Dipanagara also seems to have taken an active interest in his younger 
brother’s	education:	according	to	the	Buku Kedhung Kebo he often came over 
from	Tegalreja	to	the	kraton to tell him edifying stories from the Fatāh al-Mu-
luk	(‘The	victory	of	kings’)	dealing	with	the	exploits	of	the	legendary	rulers	
of	Syria	(Ajam)	and	Arabia.185 The Yogya babad confirms this and relates 
how the prince recommended certain texts for his brother’s reading amongst 
which were the Serat Ambiya, Taj as-Salātīn, Hikayat Makutha Raja	(‘Mirror	of	
princes’),	Serat Ménak, Babad Kraton, Arjuna Sasrabahu, Serat Bratayuda and 






184	 Dj.Br.29,	 Captain	 R.C.	 Garnham	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	 Charles	 Assey	 (Batavia/Bogor),	 1-12-
1814,	Captain	R.C.	Garnham	(Yogyakarta)	to	T.S.	Raffles	(Batavia/Bogor),	20-3-1815;	B.Ng.	I:383,	
XCIV.13.	Sang Ministèr anyaosi mistir/ bangsa encik nama Litnan Abas/ mulang basa Lumajuné.
185	 KITLV	Or	13	(Buku Kedhung Kebo):	21-4,	II.47-55;	on	Dipanagara’s	own	study	of	the	Fatāh 
al-Muluk, see Chapter III.
186	 B.Ng.	I:388,	XCV.26-7.	The	Babad Kraton	referred	to	may	be	a	later	recension	of	BL	Add	MS	
12320,	dated	1777-1778,	which	was	plundered	 from	 the	Yogya	kraton in June 1812. This babad 
covers	legends	and	history	from	the	time	of	Adam	to	the	fall	of	Kartasura	in	1742,	Ricklefs	1974a:
xxiii, 212-9.
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also ask to be copied by the Dutch government when he was educating his 
own	children	in	Makassar	in	the	1840s	(Carey	1981a:lxiii	note	112;	p.	743).	
The same Javanese chronicle adds that in his attitude towards the boy sul-
tan,	Dipanagara	was	like	Kresna	giving	advice	to	Arjuna.187	Sometimes,	the	
young	ruler	also	visited	Tegalreja	and	on	the	occasion	of	his	circumcision	of	
22 March 1815, it was Dipanagara who held his hands over his brother’s eyes 
when the ceremonial operation took place.188
Despite	the	educational	advantages	which	the	fourth	sultan	enjoyed	he	does	
not seem to have been a very diligent student. Nine months after the appoint-
ment of Abbas as his private tutor, he could still not string together enough 
words in Malay to respond to Raffles when the latter paid a brief official visit to 
Yogya	from	12-14	January	1816	(Carey	1992:198,	394,	524	note	617).	The	Yogya	
babad also describes how he was more interested in the martial arts, and in 
riding and listening to the court gamelan than in reading Javanese literature.189 
The celebration of his marriage to the eldest daughter of the murdered patih, 
Danureja	II,	on	13	May	1816	was	a	magnificent	affair	with	three	full-length	
shadow play performances held in the kraton together with other forms of en-
tertainment,190 and the inevitable firework display arranged by the former kapi-
tan cina on the northern alun-alun.	Shortly	afterwards	when	Crawfurd	was	pen-
ning his final political summary for Nahuys van Burgst, he contrived to give a 
rather	favourable	impression	of	the	young	sultan’s	character	and	capabilities:
the sultan is now about thirteen years of age but has the appearance and I think 
the understanding of a youth of three or four years beyond it. His disposition as 
far as it has yet shown itself is unexceptional, and his understanding promises to 
be sound and respectable. He has displayed no ambition which can interfere with 
the European interest and in short he is likely to turn out a prince as well suited to 







for a description of circumcision ceremonies in the kraton at this time which involved one close 
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His marriage had been a useful political match. According to the chronicle, 
it had been urged by Raffles during his previous official visit to Yogya with his 
late	wife,	Olivia	Mariamne	(1771-1814),	from	8-12	December	1813,	when	the	
lieutenant-governor had pointed out that having a rather older partner was no 
bar to a successful union.192 This seems a bit far-fetched. As Crawfurd pointed 
out the marriage had long been in the mind of the third sultan and the British 
‘stood	pledged	to	its	taking	place	for	which	reason	it	was	solemnized	a	few	
months ago notwithstanding the tender age of His Highness’. As for the young 
ruler’s	bride,	now	styled	Ratu	Kencana,	Crawfurd	described	her	as	‘an	inte-
resting pretty young woman from which circumstance and her superiority of 
age	[…]	[note	192]	she	is	likely	to	have	considerable	influence	over	the	mind	
of	His	Highness’	(Carey	1992:504	note	509).	She	would	later,	however,	suffer	
severe psychosis, which in one instance manifested in the stabbing of one of her 
husband’s former unofficial wives, following the young ruler’s sudden death in 
December	1822	(Van	den	Broek	1873,	20:480;	Carey	1992:504-5	note	509).
Later, after the return of the Dutch administration in August 1816, less 
sympathetic accounts were given of the fourth sultan by European officials. 
Thus	the	acting	Resident	of	Yogyakarta,	Johan	Diederich	Kruseman	(in	of-
fice	1816-1817),	related	rumours	that	despite	his	young	age	the	sultan	had	
been encouraged by his mother to have sexual congress with some of his 
father’s	and	even	some	of	his	grandfather’s	and	great-grandfather	Sultan	
Mangkubumi’s unofficial wives, something that was strictly forbidden under 
Javanese	royal	custom	(Carey	1992:463	note	309,	505	note	509).	Similar	stories	
are related in the Javanese accounts which describe how the ruler’s mother, 
Ratu	Ibu,	had	ordered	his	nurse,	Radèn	Ayu	Puspitawati,	a	former	unofficial	
wife	of	the	third	sultan	(Mandoyokusumo	1977:32	no.	22),	to	instruct	him	in	
sexual matters by sleeping with him when he was barely thirteen years old 
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This unfavourable impression was later echoed by Adriaan David Cornets 
de	Groot	Junior	(1804-1829),	at	that	time	élève in de Javaansche taal	(pupil	for	
the	Javanese	language)	in	Surakarta,	who	remarked	after	a	visit	to	Yogya	
in the company of Nahuys van Burgst in October 1819 that the sultan was 
‘like	a	country	lad:	tall,	fat,	thick-headed	and	very	ungainly	and	unmanne-
red. In fact, toute bête	[completely	stupid]	[…]	the	very	opposite	of	the	Sunan	
[Pakubuwana	IV]	who	is	so	urbane’.195
It is possible that these post-1816 Dutch accounts of the fourth sultan were 
rather	overdrawn.	When	the	Dutch	historian	Jan	Hageman	later	interviewed	
surviving members of the Yogya kraton	for	his	history	of	the	Java	War,	these	






besotted with European military uniforms.196 It is no coincidence that his of-
ficial kraton portrait shows him on horseback attired in the full-dress uniform 
of a Dutch general with the eight-pointed diamond-studded star of the Order 
of	the	Union,	given	to	his	father	by	Daendels	in	1811,	on	his	chest	(Chapter	
VII	note	40;	Mandoyokusumo	1977:35;	Carey	1992:Plate	27).	This	equestrian	
portrait could serve as an icon of the new European-dominated age in south-
central Java following the British attack.
Although the fourth sultan may have had some positive personal quali-
ties, he lacked the intelligence and application to govern Yogya effectively.197 
He was thus easily led both by his mother, who doted on him and gave in 
to all his wishes, and by her supporters in the kraton. The post-1816 Dutch 
administration in the person of the new Resident, Nahuys van Burgst, com-
pounded this situation by taking advantage of the sultan’s youth and inex-














too inexperienced to stand up for himself.
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ral	abyss,	which	Van	Hogendorp	later	referred	in	his	telling	reference	to	the	
Dutch transformation of the Yogya kraton into a brothel, can be traced to this 
period.	So	too	can	Dipanagara’s	implacable	conviction	that	Yogya	needed	to	
be destroyed and the Javanese apostate rulers stripped of their political po-
wer	along	with	their	unbeliever	(kapir)	European	patrons	in	order	for	a	new	
moral order based on the precepts of Islam and traditional Javanese values to 
be established. In many ways the lack of a firm and experienced ruler proved 
disastrous	for	the	sultanate	in	this	period	just	as	it	had	been	at	the	time	of	
the second sultan’s confrontation with Daendels and Raffles between January 
1808 and June 1812.
The Sayyid Kramat disturbance in Madiun and the sepoy plot of 1815
As British rule drew to a close, various local disturbances and plots troubled 
the surface political calm of south-central Java. The first incident involved 
a local millenarian movement in Madiun which came to a head during the 
absence of the Yogya mancanagara bupati in Yogya during the fourth sultan’s 
accession ceremony and the celebration of the Garebeg Besar in November 
1814.	A	certain	Sayyid	Muhammad,	who	may	have	been	an	Hadhrami	Arab,	
attempted to win the support of the local population for an uprising against 
the	sultanate’s	provincial	officials.	This	Sayyid	had	apparently	fled	from	
Mecca during the disturbances which followed from the capture of the city 
by	the	Wahhābī	in	1803	and	had	settled	in	Aceh.198 From there he had passed 
through Pulau Pinang, where he had met the exiled second sultan and had 
talked with his sons, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat and Pangéran Mertasana 
about	the	post-Wahhābī	situation	in	Arabia	and	the	coming	of	the	Javanese	
‘Just	King’	(Ratu	Adil).199	He	had	then	arrived	in	Surabaya	on	a	fishing	boat	
and had begged his way to Gresik and Madiun where he had set himself 
up in the village of Gedhung Putri. There, he took over the village admi-
nistration from the local tax-collector, Tirtawangsa, and built a mosque. He 
then urged the local inhabitants to refuse to obey any further orders from the 
Yogya-appointed priyayi.	Amongst	the	local	inhabitants,	Sayyid	Muhammad	
became	known	as	Sayyid	Kramat,	the	‘holy	Sayyid’	or	‘the	Sayyid	with	ma-
gical powers’, and he informed them that he would go to Magetan to get a 
large	mosque	drum	(bedhug)	to	call	the	faithful	to	prayer	and	that	he	would	
cleanse	the	village	from	‘all	Javanese	impurities’,	a	reference	to	the	pre-Isla-
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one	of	the	joint	acting	bupati wedana,	Radèn	Rongga	Prawirasentika.200 The 
whole affair created no more than a temporary disturbance, but it serves as 
an interesting illustration of contemporary millenarian expectations in the 
Javanese	countryside	in	the	decade	before	the	Java	War.201	It	also	shows	just	
how fragile the royal provincial administration had become in the mancana-
gara areas in the aftermath of the British annexations. The same combination 
of millenarian hopes and anti-priyayi sentiments would be seen again in the 
Umar	Mahdi	movement	in	Bagelèn	in	January	1817	(Chapter	IX).
Exactly a year later, in November 1815, a much more serious and far-rea-
ching	affair	was	uncovered	in	Yogyakarta	which	involved	the	Surakarta	court	
and the local sepoy garrison. According to reports which reached Raffles in 
November	and	December	1815,	a	plot	had	been	hatched	between	the	Sunan,	
Pakubuwana	IV,	and	members	of	the	Light	Infantry	Volunteer	Battalion	who	
had been involved in garrison duties in south-central Java since November 
1811	(Chapter	VII).	The	aim	of	the	plot	was	to	massacre	all	the	Europeans	
in Java and destroy the court of Yogya. In return for the help afforded by 
the	sepoys,	one	sepoy	junior	commissioned	officer	(JCO),	a	subadar	(captain),	
was to be appointed as the new lieutenant-governor and the administration 
of west Java and the north coast districts would probably have been entrus-
ted to the care of the British-Indian troops.202	Valck	even	reported	that	the	
Sunan	was	prepared	to	give	one	of	his	daughters	in	marriage	to	this	sepoy	
captain.203	Since	the	implications	of	the	plot	were	potentially	so	serious	for	
the safety of the European community in Java – this being a time of great 
uncertainty as the British prepared to relinquish control of the island to the 
newly liberated Dutch204 – there seems to have been an active attempt on 
the	part	of	the	European	government	to	shroud	the	affair	in	secrecy	(Carey	











the restoration of Dutch sovereignty under a new monarch, the son of the former stadhouder	(head	
of	state),	Prince	William	V	(Preface	note	5),	who	ruled	as	King	William	I	(1813-1840).





unapprised, although their existence probably depended on the prompt decision 
of a moment which under Providence was displayed by the British officers in the 
garrison	of	Djocjocarta	[Yogyakarta].
Despite this official silence, however, it is still possible to recount the main 
features of the plot. The conspiracy against the British government and the 
court	of	Yogya	seems	to	have	originated	with	the	Sunan	whose	penchant	











with a gentle disposition bordering on the naive and as impotent,205 was the 
son of the ratu in question and a son-in-law of Mangkubumi. He would la-
ter	succeed	to	the	Surakarta	throne	as	Pakubuwana	VII	(reigned	1830-1858).	
According	to	Raffles,	Mangkubumi	had	(Van	Deventer	1891:59):
for a long time been in a state of honourable restraint within the Palace and, mar-
ked	for	his	turbulent	character,	is	in	fact	a	madman	[who]	appears	to	be	the	native	
chief with whom the leaders of the conspiracy in the Light Infantry Battalion were 
chiefly in concert.






















even in his most secret apartments. No exception from the native officers down 
to	 the	bheesty	 [Persian	bihishtī,	domestic	 servant	who	 fetches	and	carries	water]	
Hindoos	 [Hindus]	 talked	 to	 him	 of	 their	 Hindoo	 [Hindu]	 forefathers,	 and	 the	
Musulmen of their Prophet. In gold, diamonds and money, the amount is incredi-
ble what they have received from him.
This	fascination	on	the	part	of	the	Sunan	for	Hindu	ceremonial	was	later	
stressed by Raffles as having been one of the main reasons why such close 
initial	contacts	were	made	between	the	Surakarta	court	and	the	sepoys.206 In 
a	letter	to	the	governor-general	of	India,	Lord	Moira	(in	office	1813-1823),	he	
pointed out that most of the conspirators were Hindus of the higher castes 
who	‘appear	to	have	been	gratified	at	discovering	relics	of	their	ancient	re-
ligion	and	faith	[in	Java]	and	to	have	received	without	dislike	a	country	in	
which they found themselves so much at home’.207 Although Raffles’ idea 
that the success of the sepoy conspiracy might have led to the immediate re-
conversion of the Javanese to Hinduism was fanciful, the existence of exten-
sive Hindu remains in south-central Java and the influence of Indic traditions 
on Javanese court culture probably contributed directly to the early intimacy 
between	Pakubuwana	IV	and	the	sepoys.	Indeed,	the	sepoy	conspirators	in	
Surakarta	were	at	pains	to	emphasise	to	the	Sunan	that	Java	had	a	special	
Hindu heritage which in their view should be once again revitalised.208 Thus 
in	conversations	with	the	Surakarta	ruler,	‘the	sepoys	always	pointed	out	that	
Java was the land of Brama. This they would say was the country in which 
their	gods	took	delight;	this	must	be	the	country	described	in	their	sacred	
206	 Raffles	1817,	II:5:	‘The	intimacy	between	this	prince	[Pakubuwana	IV]	and	the	Sepoys	first	
commenced	 from	his	attending	ceremonies	of	 their	 religious	worship,	which	was	Hindu,	and	
assisting them with several idols of that worship which had been preserved in his family. The 













Plate	 48.	Aquatint	 by	William	Daniell	 (1769-1837)	 of	 a	 sepoy	
subadar	(captain),	a	junior	commissioned	officer	(JCO)	of	one	of	
the	Bengal	Volunteer	Battalions	which	took	part	in	the	British	
assault on Yogya in June 1812 and the sepoy conspiracy of 
1815.	 Taken	 from	Williams	 1817,	 frontispiece.	 Photograph	 by	
courtesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
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books and not Hindustan, which, if ever the abode of the gods must have 
since been strangely altered, and that it was a sin and a shame that the land 
of	Brama	should	remain	in	the	hands	of	infidels	[Europeans].’209 
The fact that many of the Hindu temples and archaeological remains of 
Java’s Hindu-Buddhist past were in the process of being cleaned and surveyed 




princes took statuary away from the Hindu and Buddhist temples such as 
Kalasan,	Prambanan	and	Candhi	Sèwu	to	the	east	of	the	city	to	decorate	their	
residences.210 But when the sepoy conspirators in Yogya later tried to capita-
lise on this interest to win the fourth sultan over to their cause they met with 
a rebuff. According to the testimony of a spy, a sepoy officer had visited the 
kraton to speak – presumably in Malay – with the boy ruler and had told him 
that	‘the	images	[from	the	Hindu	temples]	in	Java	were	the	same	as	those	wor-
shipped	by	[our]	forefathers	in	India,	consequently	we	must	be	from	the	same	
stock. Thus, if you feel uneasy under the British let me know and I will settle 
the matter for you.’ But the sultan had immediately reported the matter to his 
mother, Ratu Ibu, who had in turn informed the Resident, Captain Garnham 
(Carey	1977:317	note	56).	Although	the	sepoys	made	no	headway	with	the	
Yogya court, many British-Indian soldiers appear to have deserted in the sul-
tan’s	capital	where	they	married	into	Javanese	families.	Some	took	service	in	
the	court	as	mahouts	(drivers)	for	the	royal	elephants	or	as	members	of	the	
sultan’s bodyguard regiments, others based themselves in Kedhu and Boyolali 
where they kept dairy cattle and produced milk and ghee for consumption 
in	the	court	cities	(note	75;	Carey	1977:302,	310,	317	note	57),	still	others	be-
came involved in the cloth trade211 or hired themselves out as bodyguards to 
wealthy	Eurasian	landrenters	like	J.A.	Dezentjé	(Chapter	I	note	159).
In	Surakarta,	however,	the	Sunan	immediately	responded	to	the	sepoys’	
overtures by lending them Hindu images from the court collections and by 
providing money for the decoration of the statues and to light up the ghāt 
(platforms)	on	which	they	were	placed.	He	also	attended	various	ceremonies	
inside the fort, usually alone and dressed as a common Javanese, but some-
209	 T.S.	Raffles	(Semarang)	to	Colonel	N.	Burslem	(Batavia),	16-1-1816,	quoted	Carey	1977:301,	
316	note	53.
210 Chapter II note 60. The third sultan also instructed one of his uncles to make sketches of 
the	standing	image	of	Lara	Jonggrang	and	all	the	adjacent	statues,	temple	reliefs,	gateways	and	
ruined temple buildings during a visit to Prambanan in the company of John Crawfurd in Decem-
ber	1812,	Carey	1992:136-8,	320-2.
211	 Dj.Br.	60,	H.	F.	Lippe	(Surakarta)	to	H.G.	Nahuys	van	Burgst	(Yogyakarta),	9-6-1817,	on	three	
deserters	of	 the	Light	 Infantry	Volunteer	Battalion	who	 ‘pretended	 to	be	engaged	 in	 the	cloth	
trade’.
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times also accompanied by members of his family when he would arrive by 
carriage	(Carey	1977:302).	In	return,	the	Sunan	welcomed	leading	sepoy	con-
spirators into his court, sitting with them in the evenings at the Randingan, 
the place set aside for archery practice in the kraton, where he would inter-
rogate them on the manner and customs of India and watch their gymnastic 
displays	(Carey	1977:303,	317	note	61).	The	sepoys	also	told	him	about	the	
history of Bengal, the strength of the British army in India and their victories 
there, stressing that the power of the farang	(British)	was	entirely	dependant	
on	their	British-Indian	troops	(Carey	1977:303,	317	note	62).
During	the	early	period	of	their	contacts	in	1813-1814,	neither	the	Sunan	
nor the sepoys appear to have devised any firm plans for a conspiracy against 
the	British	or	the	Yogya	court.	The	most	that	the	Sunan	appeared	to	hope	for	
at this stage was to be able to retain some sepoys in his service in the event 
that the British handed Java back to the Dutch, and to build up a connection 




a conversation which took place between him and the subadar	(captain),	la-
ter designated as the potential sepoy governor. On asking about news from 
Bengal,	the	Surakarta	ruler	had	been	told	that	the	‘Hindus’	were	opposing	the	
British there and that unless the British allowed the subadar and his battalion 
to	return	home,	‘he	would	make	a	start	with	them	in	Java’.		Whereupon	the	
Sunan	replied	that	he	was	now	a	child	of	the	English	and	that	those	who	
wished to oppose them could do so, but that he wanted no say in the matter 
(Carey	1977:303,	317	note	66).	
The	sepoys	for	their	part	were	not	interested	in	the	Surakarta	kraton family 
intrigue. Instead, they seem to have hoped to secure for themselves positi-
ons and material advancement in the event of a successful rising against the 
Europeans in Java. They were also probably motivated by anti-European sen-
timents	brought	on	by	long	tours	of	duty	in	south-central	Java	(Van	Deventer	
1891:62-3).	Unlike	their	fellow	sepoys	in	the	Madras	and	Bombay	presidencies,	
they were not allowed to take their family with them while on active service, 
having to rely instead on remitting a substantial part of their pay to support 
their	relatives	(Kaye	1880,	I:333-4).	Colonel	N.	Burslem,	the	commander	of	the	
eastern military division of Java, who later investigated the plot, pointed out 
that	the	Light	Infantry	Volunteer	Battalion	had	remained	at	the	courts	for	the	
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ficant	breakdown	in	discipline	(Van	Deventer	1891:58	note	1).	Dissatisfaction	
had	begun	to	manifest	as	early	as	July	1813,	when	the	Java	Light	Cavalry,	
which had only recently arrived from Bengal, was withdrawn from garrison 
duty	after	a	very	short	posting	in	south-central	Java	(Carey	1977:297,	314	note	
22).	The	Light	Infantry	Battalion	sepoys,	then	garrisoned	in	the	court	towns	
for over twenty months, began to declare openly their annoyance at having 
been passed over in their tour of garrison duty and at having been parted 





of the British military presence in Java at this time in preparation for the Dutch 
arrival may have encouraged the sepoys into thinking that they could defy 
the authority of the British government with impunity. Rumours also spread 
amongst the British-Indian troops that the kings of England and Holland had 
negotiated a marriage between their children and Java was to be given as a 
dowry	to	the	Dutch	ruler,	King	William	I	(reigned	1813-1840).	These	reports	
reawakened all the old fears amongst the sepoys that their battalions were 
about to be sold to the Dutch and the idea grew that preventive steps should 
be	taken.	Some	of	the	conspirators	suggested	that	the	European	officers	should	
be	seized	and	forced	to	take	the	sepoys	back	with	them	to	Bengal.	Others	put	
forward more ambitious plans for murdering their British superiors and re-






next chapter how a similarly garbled account of European politics in the after-
math	of	the	Congress	of	Vienna	(1815)	was	circulated	in	Surakarta	one	year	la-
ter	by	a	certain	Radèn	Kaap	(‘the	nobleman	from	the	Cape’),	a	great-grandson	
of the exiled Pangéran Arya Mangkunagara.213
Contacts were made between one of the sepoy plotters in Yogya and the 
sepoy	garrisons	in	Weltevreden	(Batavia)	and	Surabaya	to	coordinate	plans	
in the event of a successful uprising in south-central Java. Close links were 
also	maintained	with	the	British	Indian	troops	in	the	garrisons	at	Klathèn	and	
Magelang, as well as the numerous sepoy deserters in Kedhu. Another sepoy 
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captain promised that he would use his influence to win over the Malay batta-
lions in Batavia and secure the capital for the conspirators. In the same month, 
September	1815,	reports	were	received	from	members	of	the	Fourth	Volunteer	
Battalion,	who	had	deserted	in	south	Sulawesi,	that	the	Raja	of	Boné	had	ta-
ken them on as mercenaries in his campaign against the British and had given 





involved in the conspiracy for their pay which still remained unremitted in 
the	government	treasury	in	Batavia.	The	Sunan	agreed,	provided	that	Purbaya	
was placed on the throne of Yogya. At the same time, Pangéran Mangkubumi 
gave the sepoys an undertaking that their monthly pay would be guaranteed 
until such time as they wished to return to Bengal after destroying the British 
administration	in	Java.	From	late	September	onwards,	frequent	meetings	be-






plot are difficult to decipher. It is clear that he was unhappy with the sepoy 
plans	for	massacring	their	British	officers	just	as	in	1812	he	had	been	reluctant	
to participate openly in an attack on the British when Raffles moved against 
Yogya	(Chapter	VII)	and	had	given	specific	instructions	that	there	‘should	be	
no	murder	and	the	spilling	of	blood’	(Carey	1977:319	note	78,	1980:69).	But	he	
may have been overruled by his younger brother, Mangkubumi. Furthermore, 
the latter played on his fears that when the Dutch returned to Java they might 
suspend the 1812 treaty and end the payments for the tollgates and mar-
kets	which	constituted	such	an	important	source	of	revenue	for	the	Surakarta	
court	(Carey	1977:305,	319	note	79).	Rumours	were	also	circulating	at	this	
time that Marshal Daendels was about to return as the new Dutch governor-
general	and	this	must	have	caused	the	Sunan	deep	concern.214 On the other 
hand,	the	Sunan	seems	to	have	entertained	the	hope	that	a	successful	sepoy	
uprising in Yogya would not only place the sultanate under his control but 
also win him back the rich apanage lands in Kedhu which had been annexed 
214	 Van	der	Kemp	1911:44.	 In	fact,	 in	October	1815	Daendels	had	been	appointed	Governor-
General	of	the	Netherlands	colonies	on	the	Guinea	Coast	(Nederlandsche	Bezittingen	aan	de	kust	
van	Guinee)	(west	Africa),	where	he	died	on	2	May	1818,	Stapel	1941:77.	Health	conditions,	in	
particular endemic yellow fever, were so bad that it was said in the early nineteenth century that 
the	Dutch	needed	three	governor-generals	of	the	Guinea	(Gold)	Coast:	one	being	buried,	one	in	
post, and one sailing from Texel to take his place in the event of his imminent death. 
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in	August	1812.	The	prospect	of	establishing	Surakarta	supremacy	once	again	
in	south-central	Java	was	probably	so	enticing	that	the	Sunan	was	prepared	
to sanction any means to achieve this end. 
What	the	relationship	would	have	been	between	the	Sunan	and	the	sepoys	
after the destruction of the British administration in Java was never clarified. 
It	is	possible	that	Pakubuwana	IV	expected	them	to	return	to	Bengal	eventu-
ally or at the most establish themselves along the north coast or in west Java, 




began to assume an increasingly subordinate role in the eyes of the sepoy 






plating his own double-dealing by betraying the sepoys to the British and 
cooperating with them in putting down their uprising in return for territorial 
concessions,	in	particular	in	Kedhu	(Van	der	Kemp	1913:324-5).
The discovery of the conspiracy was not quite the fortuitous event which 
later commentators like P.H. van Lawick van Pabst have made out.215 Although 
the	main	plans	were	laid	in	Surakarta,	the	actual	uprising	was	to	take	place	in	
Yogya where a series of meetings took place between the conspirators from 
12 October onwards, one of which involved 29 sepoy officers and men and 
took	place	in	the	Taman	Sari.	As	the	day	of	the	uprising	approached,	constant	
postponements were asked for by the leaders in order to be sure of more 
support. Eventually, news of what was afoot reached the ears of the acting 
commanding	officer,	Lieutenant	Steel,	who	paraded	the	battalion	and	warned	
that anyone involved in the plot would be blown away from the mouth of 
cannon, a usual punishment for mutineers in the Indian army at this time.216 




of the battalion gave evidence against the conspirators. The ringleaders were 
thereupon arrested along with about twenty others and sent under armed 
guard	to	the	British	military	post	at	Serondhol	above	Semarang	to	await	the	
convening of a general court-martial in January 1816. Further arrests were 
215	 Van	Pabst,	‘Nota’,	26-8-1826.
216	 Kaye	1880,	I:206,	it	had	earlier	been	a	Mughal	practice.




Although the prompt action taken by the British officers in Yogya appears 
to	have	been	entirely	successful	in	scotching	the	intrigue,	Surakarta	remained	
unsettled	for	some	time	afterwards.	It	took	the	Surakarta	Resident,	Major	
Jeremiah Martin Johnson, nearly two months to make a full enquiry into the 
extent of the court’s involvement with the conspirators. The fact that he had 
been an absentee Resident in the last half of 1815, either on sick-leave at the 
Surakarta	hill	station	at	Séla	on	the	saddle	between	the	twin	volcanoes	of	
Mount Merapi and Mount Merbabu, or in Batavia on civilian assignments, in-
ter alia as deputy paymaster-general, meant that he was woefully out of touch 
with	developments	in	Surakarta.	It	was	not	until	the	end	of	December	that	he	
was	able	to	submit	his	report	to	Raffles.	During	this	time	the	Surakarta	court	





of the approach of any loyal sepoy and European troops. Meanwhile, various 
Surakarta	princes	and	officials	were	said	to	have	entered	into	an	agreement	
to go to the rescue of Pangéran Mangkubumi in the event that the British 
government	attempted	to	exile	him	(Carey	1977:308).	
Mangkubumi was inevitably at the centre of these preparations and was 
in	close	contact	with	the	Surakarta	bupati	of	Banyumas,	Radèn	Tumenggung	
Yudanegara	(Chapter	I).	This	official	was	tasked	with	coordinating	resistance	










in early January 1816, based on Johnson’s reports, not to proceed to an at-
tack	on	Surakarta	but	to	pardon	the	Sunan	on	condition	that	he	surrender	his	
younger brother and put an end to further intrigues against the Crown Prince. 
Raffles’ decision may have been prompted by an awareness of his disadvan-
tageous	military	position	at	the	time	(shades	of	December	1811,	p.	301),	but	
as	it	turned	out	he	had	judged	the	Sunan	correctly	and	the	latter	made	no	at-
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tempt	to	prevent	his	younger	brother	being	handed	over	to	him	in	Semarang	
on	7	January	1816.	Two	days	later	Raffles	travelled	to	Surakarta	for	a	series	of	
talks	with	the	Sunan	and	the	patih during which he issued strong warnings 
against	any	further	intrigues	and	insisted	that	the	Surakarta	ruler	should	‘re-
tire’ and hand over the day-to-day running of kraton affairs to his heir appa-
rent	(Pakubuwana	V).	At	the	same	time,	he	gave	the	Sunan	promises	that	the	
Dutch would not tamper with any existing treaty arrangements when they ar-







than Raffles had at first supposed, he did not go back on his decision. Moves 
were nevertheless taken to tighten up security arrangements in south-central 
Java. In Yogya, a new corps of 25 mounted troops was formed to guard the 
kraton and to keep an eye on the activities of the court, much in the same fa-
shion	as	the	small	dragoon	detachment	which	was	maintained	by	the	Sunan	
in	Surakarta	(Carey	1977:309,	321	note	109).	These	troops	were	recruited	from	
Dutch and German residents in the court towns who had Javanese mothers, 
and were commanded by a European officer seconded from the local garri-
son. There were also some Ambonese soldiers seconded to the corps to give 
it an additional Indonesian presence. Most of these men spoke Malay and 
some even a little Javanese so that they were in a position to report back any 
developments in the kraton to the Resident. Every day six of these troops un-




22 January to the much more experienced John Crawfurd who returned for 
his fourth and last tour of duty as Resident at the sultan’s court.
This was not, however, quite the last which was heard of the sepoys in sou-
th-central	Java.	Ironicially,	the	Light	Infantry	Volunteer	Battalion,	which	had	
proved so unreliable in 1815 and which Raffles had demanded should be im-
mediately sent back to Bengal, was one of the last British units to leave the 
island because of the acute shortage of troops during the British transfer of Java 
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ken	on	by	the	new	Dutch	government	as	Jayèng	Sekar	(mounted	constabulary;	
Bataviasche Courant	31,	12-5-1827)	and	later	proved	mutinous	when	the	Dutch	
tried to use them against Dipanagara in 1825.218 The number of deserters who 
had	settled	in	south-central	Java	also	caused	the	Dutch	government	concern:	in	
1817,	Nahuys	van	Burgst	warned	Batavia	about	‘the	presence	of	some	many	of	






Nurngali, described in Dipanagara’s babad as a dhukun Benggala	(Bengali	physi-
cian	and	herbalist)	served	as	the	prince’s	personal	physician	and	fought	with	
him against the Dutch.219 In the same period, the great banking house of Palmer 
&	Company	in	Calcutta,	which	had	arranged	a	six	million	Sicca	rupee	loan	to	
Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen’s cash-strapped government be-
fore	the	Java	War	and	had	demanded	as	collateral	an	option	over	all	the	Dutch	
possessions	in	the	Indies	(De	Prins	2002:108),	even	offered	to	send	sepoys	to	
help turn the tide of battle in favour of the Dutch. Although the British had 
no desire to see the Dutch driven out of Java, the proposal was eventually ve-
toed	by	the	British	foreign	minister,	George	Canning	(in	office	1822-1827),	as	
being an inappropriate use of the military resources of the Bengal Presidency 
(Hogendorp	1913:182-3).	A	similar	demand	for	3,000	British-Indian	troops	was	
contemplated by the Dutch commander-in-chief, Hendrik Merkus de Kock, 




the British would again find that using Indian troops in Java against nationalist 
forces	would	have	its	drawbacks	(Thorne	1988:117-8).
Conclusion
The sepoy plot of 1815 was the last important event to mark the period of 
British rule in Java. In five short years it had effected remarkable changes in 


















ment itself would not reap the benefits. In May 1815, the final decision had 





decision formed part of a wider British policy of rebuilding Dutch strength to 





Capellen, the last invested as the new Dutch governor-general designate and 
travelling on two different vessels to ensure that all three would not be lost in 
the	event	of	shipwreck	–	set	sail	from	Texel	for	Java	where	they	arrived	on	27	




Indies. This marked the beginning of the modern era of Dutch colonialism. 
In Yogyakarta, Crawfurd’s replacement, Nahuys van Burgst, had arrived 
on 9 August and the Dutch tricolour had flown again again over the court 
cities	on	the	fourteenth	of	that	month	(Van	der	Kemp	1911:248).		Crawfurd	
assured	Nahuys	that:
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The	European	ascendancy	at	this	place	[Yogya]	 is	surrendered	to	our	successors	
unimpaired and in as complete an exercise as the existing arrangements can admit 
of.	[…]	The	country	[likewise]	enjoys	as	much	tranquillity	and	prosperity	as	under	
the present frame of society can reasonably be hoped for. The vigour and character 
of the European Government counter-balance the usual weakness of a minority, 
while the latter is favourable to that moderation and freedom which encourage 
industry and prosperity. A thorough and favourable revolution has taken place in 
the relations of the European and Native governments within the last five years 
which	render	the	former	[…]	indisputably	paramount.222
Although Nahuys acknowledged that Crawfurd had handed over the Residency 
‘in	the	greatest	peace’,	it	remained	to	be	seen	whether	the	principles	of	econo-
mic liberalism referred to by Crawfurd would sit comfortably with a returned 
Dutch government fixated on securing immediate profits from their erstwhile 
colony. Once again, the years ahead would prove troubling and testing ones for 
Dutch and Javanese alike. Far from being the doorway to a new era of industry 
and prosperity, the conflicted period of the Dutch restoration would open a 
high road to war in south-central Java. This time the destruction of Java refer-
red to in the Parangkusuma prophecy would encompass more than the ruined 
sultanate of Yogya.
222	 UBL,	 BPL	 616	 Port.	 5	 pt.	 5,	 John	 Crawfurd	 (Yogyakarta)	 to	 H.G.	 Nahuys	 van	 Burgst	
(Yogyakarta),	9-8-1816.
Chapter IX
Binding on the iron yoke
the returned Dutch administration, 
the impoverishment of the south-central 
Javanese peasantry and the rise of millenarian 
expectations, 1816-1822
Squaring the circle
The period which followed the formal British handover of Java and its de-
pendencies on 19 August 1816 saw a doomed attempt by the returned Dutch 
administration to square the circle between the demands of economic libe-
ralism and the interests of the local population. The new governor-general, 
G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (in office 1816-1826), took the task of protecting 
the indigenous inhabitants from foreign exploitation particularly to heart. 
During a voyage to Maluku in 1824, he noted in his diary that Dutch coloni-
alism ‘could no longer go forward solely with an eye to making profit, but 
should secure the welfare of the people and uplift them from [their] state of 
degradation and contempt’ (De Prins 2002:140, citing Nieuwenhuys 1973:82). 
These were words which might have passed the lips of any early twentieth-
century Dutch ‘ethical’ official inspired by the notion of Holland’s ‘Debt of 
Honour’ in which the wealth drawn from the Indies was to be repaid by 
giving primacy to the local population in colonial policy (Ricklefs 1993:151). 
The problem for Van der Capellen was that he was almost a century befo-
re his time. And he recognised this fact. In the same year in which he was 
committing his private thoughts to his diary, he burst out in a lament to the 
Dutch Minister of the Colonies, his former commissioner-general colleague 
(1816-1819), C.Th. Elout, that ‘whenever I see that in the Netherlands people 
understand liberalism to mean the protection of European landowners at the 
cost of the native population, and that the latter, who are so dear to me, are 
completely lost from view in order that a few [European] speculators and 
adventurers can succeed in their plans, then I must declare myself an ultra 
anti-liberal’ (De Prins 2002:140, citing Mijer 1878:190). Even Nahuys, diame-
trically opposed as he was to Van der Capellen in so many areas of economic 
Plate 49. Godert Alexander Gerard Philip baron van der Capellen, 1778-1848. 
Painting by E. Spanier after Hoffmeister. Photograph courtesy 
Stichting Iconografisch Bureau, The Hague.
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policy, acknowledged the genuiness of his intentions, writing that he was ‘an 
enlightened and virtuous governor-general […] who more than any other 
[…] I have known between 1806 and 1839 […], devoted all his time from early 
dawn until late at night with very little intermission to the duties of his high 
station’ (Nahuys van Burgst 1852:103). 
 In the years leading up to the outbreak of the Java War the balance bet-
ween speculators and adventurers on the one hand, and Dutch ethici avant 
la lettre like Van der Capellen on the other, was firmly weighted in favour of 
the former. Indeed, the lead came from the very top as Raffles himself noted 
after a conversation with the new Dutch monarch in Brussels in July 1817: 
‘the King himself [William I, reigned 1813-1840] and his leading minister 
[Secretary of State Anton Reinhard Falck, in office 1813-1818] seem to mean 
well, [but] they have too great a hankering after profit, and immediate profit, 
for any liberal policy to thrive under them’ (Raffles 1830:235). Dipanagara’s 
seemingly apocryphal conversation with Crawfurd about the type of Dutch 
Resident he might favour as the British official’s replacement – namely one 
who had served the VOC or a newcomer from Europe (Chapter VIII) – poin-
ted to an all too present reality: the unstoppable tide of former Napoleonic 
War soldiers and fortune seekers of all sorts ‘whose former vocations no one 
had the slightest inkling of’ who now descended on Java to make a career for 
themselves (Van den Doel 1994:49). Well over half of those who made their 
way to Java at this time claimed to have special recommendations from the 
new governor-general (Van den Broek 1893:3). As a keen-eyed traveller, who 
visited Java shortly after the handover, wrote, Van der Capellen was literally 
overwhelmed with whole boat loads of ‘aged paterfamilias who, instead of 
knowledge of Indies affairs, only brought over with them a numerous and 
needy progeny, and who had no other intention […] than to restore in the 
shortest possible time […] their dilapidated affairs in the mother country so 
that, without having to trouble themselves further with the Indies, they could 
return home with their nests nicely feathered’ (Van den Doel 1994:49, citing 
Olivier 1830, III:425). Baroe datang (‘one who has just arrived’) would soon 
become a veritable refrain amongst the great Portuguese-Indies-Dutch mixed 
race families in Batavia as they contemplated this unwelcome tide of new-
comers whose arrival heralded the transformation of Dutch colonial society 
into a tropical beambtenstaat (bureaucratic state; Taylor 1983:116). A telling 
example of the degree of hopeless disorder which accompanied the sending 
of officials to Java at this time and the utter ignorance of the new govern-
ment in The Hague of the colony which had now been restored to them, was 
that no one knew enough Malay even to translate the inscription on the new 
Java rupee banknotes which were being printed in 1815 in the government 
mint prior to the handover of the colony from the British (Van der Kemp 
1907:1400-1, 1914:178). 
Plate 50. Huibert Gerard baron Nahuys van Burgst (1782-1858), the ‘bigwig with a 
pair of big thick epaulettes’, who served as Resi dent of Yogyakarta between 1816 and 
1822 (a post which he combined with that of acting Resident of Surakarta between 
1820 and 1822). Dipanagara described him in his autobiographical babad (that is, the 
Babad Dipanagara, Manado version) as a resident who ‘enjoyed eating and drinking 
and the spreading of Dutch ways’ (karemannya mangan minum/lan anjrah cara Welandi). 
Lithograph by Jean-Baptiste Ambroise Marcelin Jobard (1792-1861) based on a pain-
ting by the Belgian artist J.B. Madou made in circa 1831 when Nahuys was back in 
Holland on leave after the end of the Java War. Photograph by courtesy of the late 
W.G.I.C. Rissink of Leiden, a descendant of Nahuys.
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A Resident who enjoyed eating and drinking and the spreading of Dutch ways
Although the new Dutch Resident of Yogyakarta, Nahuys van Burgst (in of-
fice 1816-1822), was no stranger to Java – he had spent a year (1806-1807) 
there during the governor-generalship of A.H. Wiese (in office 1805-1808) 
and returned to serve a two-year stint as a member of Daendels’ Forest 
Administration in 1809-1811 (p. 277; De Haan 1935a:620) – he belonged in 
his political affiliations and outlook to the post-1816 generation of Dutch of-
ficials. François de Haan described him with some justification as a gambler 
who had come out to Java secure in the knowledge that he enjoyed the favour 
of the Dutch king through the political influence of his brother-in-law, Rutger 
Jan Schimmelpenninck (1761-1825), erstwhile Grand Pensionary of Holland 
(1805-1806).1 Like his monarch, Nahuys also had very definite views about 
the appropriate economic policies which should be pursued in the Indies. He 
was himself a persuasive advocate of the opening up of the Javanese hinter-
land to western capital. In particular, he advocated an increase in the number 
of privately owned western estates and land leases in the Principalities as a 
method of bringing Java’s feudal society into the modern world. In this res-
pect, Nahuys was a ‘liberal’ and stood in opposition to ‘conservatives’ such 
as Nicolaus Engelhard, Van der Capellen and his close adviser, H.J. van de 
Graaff (1782-1827) – the ‘scourge of the colony’ (Van Hogendorp 1913:29) 
– who were for more government control of the economy.2 Nahuys’ strong 
views on this question, in which his own financial interests were later directly 
involved, was to be of great significance for his period as Resident. Although 
some of his contemporaries found him both honourable and impressive,3 
most censured him for making private profit out of his position.4 He was 
also, as we will see later in this chapter, not above plagiarising the work of his 
subordinates and publishing it as his own (note 170). The judgement of the 
1 Biographical details on Nahuys can be found in De Haan 1935a:620-1; Handelingen en 
geschriften van het Indisch Genootschap 1859, VI:91-110; Genealogie Nahuys 2000-1:38-9. He was not 
styled ‘van Burgst’ until after he was ennobled as baron in 1836.
2 vAE (aanwinsten 1941) 20, H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to Mr J. Fabius (Holland), 26-7-1823; 
Day 1972:203-42; Nieuwenhuys 1973:76-87.
3 Recommending him to Lord Minto, Raffles remarked on the great kindness shown by 
Nahuys to British prisoners of war formerly held in Semarang (?prior to the collapse of the 
Franco-Dutch government on 18-9-1811) and stated that ‘he bears a very high character among 
his countrymen for honour and uprightness’, IOL, Eur F148/29 (Raffles-Minto collection vol. 
29), T.S. Raffles (Bogor) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 8-4-1813. Willem van Hogendorp thought him 
one of the most remarkable personages he had encountered during his four-year stay in Java 
(1826-1830) writing of him as a ‘decided calm man [whose] features denoted a person of action 
and ambition’, Van Hogendorp 1913:142.
4 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 148; dK 23, Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor) to H.M. de 
Kock (Batavia), 29-4-1830 (commenting on Nahuys’ lack of delicatesse and stating that he possessed 
great qualities of spirit which were not always ruled by greatness of soul). See further Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, I:56 (on his personal enrichment), 621-4 (on the profits made by Nahuys from his 
estate at Kalitan near Surakarta which he rented from the Surakarta patih, Sasradiningrat II).
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Dutch historians of the Java War, P.J.F. Louw and E.S. de Klerck, is damning 
in this respect (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:58): 
In everything we have read from his hand […] there arises in our imagination 
the image of a man who was at heart an autocrat. [A person] who was able to 
demand from the native princes a very salutary respect and assure himself of their 
friendship, in which endeavours he was aided by the ample experience and the 
great knowledge he possessed of the Javanese courts. [But] he was [also] extremely 
pleased with himself and did not really know how to value the services of others. 
Skilful with his pen, he advanced fine theories, but in practice he did things which 
a more fastidious person would have omitted, actions which make us doubt the 
inner worth of his motto, non sibi sed patria [not for himself but for his country]. 
Nahuys’ personality certainly set him apart from his predecessor, Crawfurd. 
If the latter had been retiring and austere, Nahuys was bluff and supremely 
self-confident. He shared none of Crawfurd’s scholarly attributes and had 
little interest in Javanese culture, but he made up for this by his boldness, 
energy and administrative capabilities. In many ways a product of Holland’s 
Patriot Revolution, he placed great faith in the importance of the individual 
and in European superiority. But perhaps like Julien Sorel in Stendhal’s Le 
rouge et le noir (1830), he believed more in the idea of equality for all but 
distinction for himself. Characterised by another historian (and veteran) 
of the Java War, F.V.H.A. Ridder de Stuers, as a ‘pseudo military man’ (De 
Stuers 1833:19), his one attempt at leading troops in the field during Radèn 
Tumenggung Sasradilaga’s uprising in Rembang in December 1827 ended 
in ignominious failure when he was put to flight during a skirmish on the 
Panolan-Padhangan road. The sight of a Tuwan Besar met een paar dikke epau-
letten, ‘a bigwig with a pair of thick epaulettes’ in De Stuers’s telling phrase, 
fleeing from the field of battle before a band of Javanese rebels, no doubt 
did wonders for the morale of Sasradilaga’s troops but hardly reflected well 
on the wisdom of the Dutch high command in using uniformed civilians 
and pantomime officers like Nahuys in battle against a resolute foe (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:386-7, 386 note 1). On a social level, however, 
‘Major’ Nahuys did seem to get on famously with members of the Javanese 
nobility, especially in Surakarta where H.M. de Kock noted how ‘puzzlingly 
well loved’ the Resident was with the princes.5 Nahuys’ reputation as a bon 
vivant was well known (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:572) and during 
his travels through south-central Java at the time of the Java War, Willem van 
5 NA, G.K. van Hogendorp private collection 91, H.M. de Kock (Surakarta) to L.P.J. du Bus 
de Gisignies (Batavia), 31-8-1827, referring to Nahuys as onbegrijpelig bemind in Surakarta. Prom-
inent amongst the Surakarta princes whom Nahuys struck up a friendship with were Pangéran 
Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II; note 10) and Pangéran Buminata, Kyai Maja’s court patron 
(Chapter II).
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Hogendorp would memorably record the Resident’s behaviour at a dinner 
party which he gave for some fifty members of the Sunan’s family and senior 
court officials (Van Hogendorp 1913:165-6):
I had this opportunity to observe Nahuys in his full glory and I could perceive 
what a great talent he has for getting on with the natives [Javanese]. For three 
hours at a stretch he kept the assembled company roaring with laughter and each 
toast he proposed was taken up and drunk amidst enthusiastic cheers. 
The contrast with his abstemious predecessor could not have been more mar-
ked. Although there is no record of any dinner party given by Crawfurd du-
ring his time in Yogya, he subsequently achieved a notorious reputation for 
his parsimony during his three years as Resident of Singapore (1823-1826) 
where his dinners were the talk of the town. Here is the diary entry of one of 
the Scotsman’s particularly disgruntled guests:
Description of a dinner given by John Crawfurd, Resident, to all Europeans in the 
settlement. Began to assemble at 7 p.m., all sat down, no conversation or sparkle 
[…] Once Mr Crawfurd amused us not a little: he requested us to fill our glasses 
as he was about to propose a toast. At the smaller table we made shift by frugality 
to get so much as served and were sitting all ready to hear the coming toast, silent 
as usual, and at last we waited so long we were beginning to whisper that the 
Resident had drunk too much and forgot himself. But the truth came out by his 
turning to the person next to him at our table and requesting the loan of a bottle 
of claret as theirs was all done. The quiz and wink passed from one to another 
around the table at the ill-timed frugality of the Resident. It is the same on private 
and public occasions […] It is the talk of everyone and serves to promote a laugh 
when other subject is scarce.6
When it came to ebullience and abstemiousness, the choice was easily made 
as far as Dipanagara was concerned. He would later, as we have seen (p. 108), 
compare Nahuys unfavourably with Crawfurd and would dismiss the former 
laconically in his babad as a Resident ‘who [merely] enjoyed eating and drin-
king and the spreading of Dutch ways’. He also noticed with displeasure how 
the younger members of the sultan’s family followed Nahuys’ example, forget-
ting the prohibitions of Islam.7 Dutch contemporaries noted that the Resident 
and his Eurasian deputy-cum-business partner, Robbert Nicolaas Christiaan 
d’Abo, were as one when it came to developing a culture of gambling and 
hard drinking amongst the Yogya elite.8 Although a taste for the bottle was 
6 Singapore 1883:4-5 (entry of 6-2-1824 on the [annual] celebration of the hoisting of the British 
flag). I am grateful to Professor John Bastin for this reference.
7 BD (Manado) II:271, XVIII.130.
8 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 119 (on D’Abo’s role); S.Br. 170, A.M.Th. de Salis (Surakarta) 
to Director of Finances (Batavia), 8-8-1822 (on large imports over European alcoholic beverages, 
especially jenever [Dutch gin], into the Principalities); Van Hogendorp 1913:152; Van der Kemp 
1896a:308-9, quoting Nicolaus Engelhard and J.I. van Sevenhoven. On the consumption of alco-
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nothing new in the Principalities9 – even Dipanagara indulged occasionally10 
– the behaviour of the post-1816 Dutch representatives at the courts appears 
to have been quite remarkably bibulous and dissolute: in one of the last of the 
grand VOC-style corruption scandals, both the Surakarta Resident, Rijck van 
Prehn (in office 1818-1819) and the Residency translator, Johannes Wilhelmus 
Winter (in office 1806-1820), were dismissed from their posts and banished 
from central Java in 1820 for making large sums of money out of ensuring 
that certain Javanese received appointments to high office at the Sala court 
(Winter 1902:18-20; Houben 1994:104). Even when they were not engaging in 
wholesale embezzlement, the social behaviour of Dutch officials left much to 
be desired. Nahuys may have kept his Surakarta guests laughing, but was 
this really what well-born Javanese expected of their social encounters with 
Europeans? Willem van Hogendorp, who had been so struck by Nahuys’ skills 
at the dinner table, was not so sure (Van Hogendorp 1913:179-80):
The Javanese are always reserved never giving themselves up to exuberant laugh-
ter and jokes […] but they have seen us drinking every day, laughing all shyness 
aside and asking our conversation – every word of which is utter nonsense – to 
be interpreted to them. […] We have played around the Pangerans in their state 
clothes like [so many] spoilt children. 
The sexual mores of senior Dutch officials also became a source of comment 
in the Principalities. Nowhere more so than in Yogya where Dipanagara and 
his kraton contemporaries were shocked by the behaviour of the new Resident 
in particular. Although the prince later admitted to a certain attachment for 
Nahuys, he immediately qualified this by pointing out his puzzlement at 
the curious ménage à trois in which the Resident and his deputy appeared to 
be sharing the same woman in common.11 He was alluding here to Nahuys’ 
rather public affair with D’Abo’s wife, née Anna Louisa van den Berg, whom he 
would later marry (Chapter III note 79). In December 1822, she would return 
hol amongst the Madiun bupati during the Java War, and the kelder (cellar) of Dutch gin used by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Sollewijn to retain Pangéran Adipati Natapraja’s loyalty following 
his defection from Dipanagara’s side in June 1827, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:220 note 
3, III:576.
9 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 114, noted how Javanese nobles drank wine 
during the British period. On the absence of alcohol at traditional Javanese festivities, where 
cool water drunk from earthenware kendhi (water carafe with pouring spout) would be the usual 
refreshment, see Winter 1902:47.
10 On Dipanagara’s consumption of wine, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743; Chapter 
III note 86; p. 524. Van Hogendorp 1913:162 noted that in Surakarta many of the princes ‘drank 
like Templars’. The one major exception was the teetotal Pangéran Prangwedana (Mang kunagara 
II) who, according to Van Hogendorp, was ‘Nahuys’ greatest friend and a handsome man who, 
whenever he sits opposite our Commissioner-General [L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies] at table, in tone 
and manner completely puts him in the shade’.
11 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 5-6. See further p. 510. Nahuys’ first wife, Aleyda Johanna Catharina 
Geertruy de Vries (1782-1821), whom he had met and married during his legal studies in Harder-
wijk, had died on 8-8-1821, see Genealogie Nahuys 2000-1:39.
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to Padang in west Sumatra as divorce proceedings were commenced by her 
estranged husband of seventeen years (Chapter III note 79; Van Hogendorp 
1913:149). He may also have been aware of the Resident’s penchant for liaisons 
with professional women (Houben 1994:108), although Nahuys never quite 
reached the level of his opposite number in Surakarta, Diederik Willem Pinket 
van Haak (in office 1816-1817), a strong supporter of the former Franco-Dutch 
regime, who went through a whole series of relationships with Eurasian 
mistresses,12 and left behind a bankrupt estate and ten illegitimate children by 
the time of his death in Surabaya in 1840 (De Haan 1935a:558-9). 
Eurasian mistresses and dalliances with the wives of junior officials were 
one thing, seducing and appropriating the womenfolk of well-born Javanese 
quite another. Yet this appears to have been increasingly the norm amongst 
Dutch officials in central Java in the years leading up to the Java War. In Van 
Hogendorp’s words, ‘the hatred and contempt’ which the Javanese felt for 
Europeans in these years ‘were certainly quickened by what both senior and 
junior officials permitted themselves with regard to native women: a number 
of Residents known [to me] by name13 forced the [Javanese] chiefs under 
their authority to surrender their legal wives [and daughters] to them’ (Van 
Hogendorp 1913:40). We will see in the following chapter how the sexual con-
duct of the Yogya Resident, Anthonië Hendrik Smissaert (in office 1823-1825), 
his Assistant-Resident (‘secretary’), Pierre Frederic Henri Chevallier (in office 
1823-1825), and the official Residency translator, Johannes Godlieb Dietrée 
(in office 1796-1825), would contribute directly to the breakdown of relations 
with Dipanagara.14 So much so that it would be cited by one of the prince’s 
relatives, the chief pengulu (senior religious official) of Rembang, as amongst 
the four key issues which the Dutch needed to address before the Java War 
could be brought to an end (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:494). In the 
view of the later Dutch Resident of Yogya, Frans Valck (Appendix IX), the 
decline in morals amongst the women of the Yogya court could be dated back 
12 Naber 1938:45: ‘Mr Pinket van Haak was a tall handsome man of about 30 years of age. He 
was unmarried, but had various Eurasian mistresses of whom there was always one sitting on a 
sofa in the rear gallery [of the Residency]’.
13 Amongst the Residents Van Hogendorp seems to have had in mind were P.H. van Lawick 
van Pabst (Provisional Resident of Surabaya, 1817, and Resident successively of Rembang, 1823-7; 
Yogyakarta, 1827; and Semarang, 1828; Civiel Gezaghebber of Banyumas, 1828-1830 (post-1829, 
Bagelèn and Banyumas), and Commissioner for the annexed districts [of the Principalities], 
1830-1833), and H.J. Domis (acting Resident of Semarang, 1820-1822; and Resident successively of 
Semarang, 1822-1827; Pasuruan, 1828-1831; and Surabaya, 1831-1834), see Baud 177, Willem van 
Hogendorp, ‘Extract-Rapport […] over den toestand van Java, den particuliere eigendommen 
aldaar en den staat der zaken in de Residentie Kadoe’, 1827 (original in G.K. van Hogendorp 153). 
For a description of Van Pabst at this time, see Van den Broek 1873-77, 22:288, referring to him as 
‘big, broad and strong […] one wouldn’t say looking at him that he had a quick understanding, 
but it would be difficult indeed to find a Resident who equalled [him] in skill’.
14 See pp. 548-51; Van Hogendorp 1913:40: ‘All Java knows that what happened at the Yogya 
court can never see the light of day and has rightly provoked Dipanagara’s just rage’.
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to the British conquest of June 1812. Although none of the Yogya Residents 
during the British interregnum itself (Appendix IX) appear to have taken ad-
vantage of their position to have such liaisons,15 after 1816 a moral rot seems 
to have set in. The influence of the fourth sultan’s mother, Ratu Ibu (Chapter 
VIII), and her lover, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara, who acted as a ‘procu-
rer’ of court women for European officials, like Chevallier and Dietrée, clearly 
contributed to this. Valck’s comments are interesting given the recent work on 
gender, sexuality and race by feminist anthropologists like Ann Stoler who 
have argued that sexual control was fundamental to the way in which colo-
nial policies operated in the high colonial period (Stoler 2002:78). In Valck’s 
case this would also involve him using his own position as Resident of Yogya 
in the post-Java War period to force the fifth sultan to part with his favourite 
unofficial wife (selir) whom he made his new mistress (Houben 1994:109) 
and, according to one hostile source, even to impose one of his former mis-
tresses on the sultan as his consort (Houben 1994:199-200). 
In the utterly altered epoch in which elite Javanese were now living af-
ter June 1812, such sexual exploitation of their womenfolk by powerful 
Europeans may have seemed yet another humiliating aspect of their colonial 
status. But they might have reflected on the changes which had occurred 
since the eighteenth century when relationships between well-born Javanese 
and senior European officials had been altogether more equal. One thinks 
here of the passage in the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ in which the 
text’s princely author relates how his mother, a woman of Balambangan ori-
gin from the eastern salient of Java, came to Sultan Mangkubumi’s court as 
one of the ruler’s wives. She had apparently been given to the first sultan by 
the Javanese-speaking governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, Nicolaas Hartingh 
(in office 1754-1761) (Remmelink 1994:273), in return for Mangkubumi’s per-
sonal gift of his own favourite unofficial wife, Radèn Ayu Sepuh, whom the 
Yogya monarch had presented in recognition of the governor’s skill in broke-
ring the Giyanti treaty (13 February 1755; Carey 1992:5-6). This had paved the 
way for the foundation of Mangkubumi’s kingdom, hence the first sultan’s 
gratitude. Whatever one may think of the use of women as pawns in an elabo-
rate system of exchange between powerful eighteenth-century men, at least 
in this case a degree of respect appears to have existed between Mangkubumi 
and the Semarang governor. In the years preceding the Java War there were 
no such feelings. The relationship between Europeans and Javanese was now 
one of exploitation: the raiding of kraton treasuries and archives now had its 
counterpart in the raiding of the bodies of the radèn ayu (court princesses).
15 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 166; Van Hogendorp 1913:40, who remarked that with regard 
to such sexual relationships the ‘British administration gives a completely different picture’. On 
the apparent practice in the pre-colonial Javanese and Balinese kraton of allowing Chinese and 
European visitors access to lower-ranking court women who functioned as prostitutes, see Creese 
2004:70; Andaya 1998:16.’
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The early challenges of Nahuys’ Residency 
Two matters complicated Nahuys’ assumption of his new post as Resident of 
Yogya in August 1816. The first was the arrival in Batavia of the exiled second 
sultan, who had been returned from Pulau Pinang by the British in order to 
be handed over to Dutch keeping.16 Rather unwisely, the British seem to have 
allowed some of the former ruler’s wives – including Ratu Kencana Wulan 
(now styled Ratu Wétan) – to join him. But this measure only encouraged 
others to profit from the opportunity of the former ruler’s stay in the colonial 
capital to make their way there to pay him their respects. The new Dutch 
administration soon became alarmed by the number of kasepuhan suppor-
ters and ‘priests’, presumably Yogya kraton santri, who started turning up in 
Batavia (Carey 1992:438 note 201). The old monarch’s presence in Java was 
deemed to pose a threat to stability. When enquiries in Yogya as to whether 
he should be returned there met with a resolutely negative response on the 
part of Pakualam and the other Yogya princes (Van der Kemp 1911:269), the 
commissioners-general decided to banish him again, this time to Ambon 
where he remained until March 1824 (Carey 1992:438-9 note 201). In all these 
consultations between the European government and the Yogya court, both 
Nahuys and the Dutch ambassador extraordinary to the courts, W.H. van 
IJsseldijk (in office August-October 1816), played a central role.
The second matter threatened to have even more serious consequences 
for the prestige of the returned Dutch government. This was the dispatch by 
the fourth sultan of Pangéran Dipakusuma, the joint acting bupati wedana of 
the eastern mancanagara, to greet the new Dutch governor-general and to take 
secret messages to his great-grandfather, the second sultan, in the colonial 
capital.17 As we have seen (Chapter V), the question of sending an emissary to 
convey the sultan’s compliments to an incoming governor-general had long 
been a point of conflict between Yogya and the European government. By 
1816, this conflict had been mitigated to some extent by the changed reality 
of the relationship between Batavia and the south-central Javanese courts. 
But it is significant that the new Dutch administration felt strongly enough 
about it to try to prevent Dipakusuma from even sailing from Semarang. 
The commissioners-general pointed out that they had nominated the former 
Yogya Resident, W.H. van IJsseldijk, to act as ambassador extraordinary at the 
courts after the official handover of the colony on 19 August 1816, and that 
it was not necessary for any envoys to be sent from the kraton to Batavia.18 
16 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):335, XI.22; Carey 1992:328 note 201.
17 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 2, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-Gen-
eral (Batavia), 13-8-1816; B.Ng. I:406, C.1-3, states that Dipakusuma departed on 5 Ruwah AJ 1743 
(AD 1-7-1816) and that he was accompanied by four bupati.
18 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 2, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General 
(Batavia), 13-8-1816; S.Br. 23, Major J.M. Johnson (Surakarta) to Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor), 
Plate 52. Portrait of Hendrik Mauritz MacGillivray (1797-1835), who served as acting 
Resident and Resident of Surakarta (with intermissions) from 1823 to 1827 and 
1830 to 1834, and later attempted to have Dipanagara and his uncle, Pangéran 
Mangkubumi, murdered in July 1825 (page 595). Photograph by courtesy of the 
Stichting Iconografisch Bureau, The Hague.
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The affair provided a clear indication that, despite the revolution in political 
relationships wrought by Daendels and Raffles between 1808 and 1812, the 
Yogya court still fostered the hope that the old ideal of the division of Java 
between the Dutch and the Javanese still had some relevance. And Yogya 
was not alone. As we have seen, the Sunan, Pakubuwana IV, had counted 
on attaining similar objectives during the abortive sepoy conspiracy of 1815 
(Chapter VIII). Both episodes thus highlighted the continuing unwillingness 
or inability of the south-central Javanese rulers to accommodate themselves 
to their changed political status. The old Javanese concept of the political 
division of Java between the foreign kingdom of west Java and the Javanese 
heartland (kejawèn) died hard. It may explain too why so many members of 
the Yogya court rallied to Dipanagara in 1825. He seems to have held out the 
hope for them that their conservative aspirations for a return to the idealized 
pre-Daendelian political order might be realized. This was a concept which 
Dipanagara himself would hark back to in his February to March 1830 peace 
negotiations with the Dutch (pp. 663-4; Carey 1974b:285-8).
Meanwhile, Dipanagara himself appears to have begun to feel himself in-
creasingly isolated in the new political alignments which had developed at 
the Yogya court after his father’s death. The passing of the late sultan’s closest 
adviser, Pangéran Dipawiyana, in January 1815 (Chapter VIII note 49) and 
the demise of the aged patih jero, Radèn Tumenggung Pringgadiningrat, five 
months later (25 May 1815; Carey 1992:522 note 600), deprived him of the ad-
ministrative and personal support which he had enjoyed during his father’s 
brief reign. Two events occurred which may have contributed to the prince’s 
increasing hostility towards the returned Dutch administration and their kra-
ton allies, in particular the clique around the queen mother. The first was the 
sudden arrest and banishment in November 1816 of Kyai Murma Wijaya, a 
rich and respected religious teacher who lived in the village of Kepundhung 
in the Pajang area.19 The second was a dispute over the appointment of coun-
22-7-1816, note of Assey telling Johnson to inform Pakubuwana IV that the Dutch commissioners-
general had nominated W.H. van IJsseldijk to go as ambassador extraordinary to the courts after the 
formal handover on 19-8-1816 and that it was not necessary for Pakubuwana IV’s envoys to go to 
Batavia.
19 The exact location of Kepundhung is unclear: it may have been situated to the north of 
the royal graveyard of Imagiri, see Dj.Br. 12, ‘Notulen van de raad uitmakende het bestuur van 
Djocjocarta, 1830-31’, 15-12-1830, ‘Opgave der Solosche landen tot onderhoud der graven te Ima-
giri, Giriloyo, Banyusumurup en tot onderhoud dienende van de Raden Wirakusuma met zijn 
onderhebbende grafbewakers en welke landen gelegen zijn bezuiden de rivier Opak en beoosten 
dezelve en benoorden de rivier Ojo’, where it is cited as a Surakarta royal gravesite on the abut-
ments of Gunung Kidul; or it may have been near Delanggu, see Dj.Br. 63A, H.G. Nahuys van 
Burgst (Yogyakarta) to H.F. Lippe (Surakarta), translation of a Javanese letter referring to the vil-
lage of Kepundhung near Delanggu, 8-3-1820. I have opted for the latter given the kyai’s wealth 
and influence at the courts, which would have been more difficult to sustain if he had lived in the 
more remote Gunung Kidul location. See further Soebardi 1975:4; Carey and Hoadley 2000:8, 10, 
where Kepundhung is mentioned in Yogya apanage grants. 
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try tax-collectors and police officials (gunung) between Dipanagara and cer-
tain members of the Yogya court. 
As we have seen, Murma had earlier played an important role in relaying 
messages between the sultan and the Sunan during Radèn Rongga’s rebellion 
in November-December 1810 (p. 253). The kyai was a typical example of the 
sort of rural religious teacher who was held in high favour by the south-cen-
tral Javanese courts as well as being revered by the local populace. The latter 
seem to have regarded him with special awe and considered that he possessed 
magical powers given that he had such ready access both to the Yogya court 
and the sultan’s funds.20 Born in the pradikan (tax-free) village of Maja, home 
to Dipanagara’s religious adviser, Kyai Maja, Murma had moved at a young 
age to Kepundhung. The exact location of this village is unclear because there 
are at least two such villages in the Yogya area which had tax-free status as 
religious centres. It is likely to have been the one near Delanggu close to the 
Surakarta-Yogya highway. According to Dipanagara, it was amongst the ri-
chest pradikan villages in Yogyakarta. As the birth place of the first sultan’s 
mother, Mas Ayu Téjawati, it had been freed of all labour services and taxes 
by the Yogya court.21 Given this connection with the first sultan’s family, it 
is possible that Kyai Murma might have been one of the religious teachers 
whom Dipanagara’s great-grandmother, Ratu Ageng, invited to visit her at 
Tegalreja while he was growing up and studying Islam under her care in the 
mid- to late 1790s (Chapter II). It is known that Murma had close ties with 
Dipanagara’s father for in 1809 he had been promised a sizeable sum (Chapter 
VI note 105) to pray for the swift demise of the future third sultan’s own father, 
Hamengkubuwana II. For over two years (1814-1816) following her husband, 
the third sultan’s, death, Ratu Ibu was said to have continued to maintain 
connections with Murma, paying him sums of money and lending him state 
clothes in order that he should devise ways – both material and spiritual – to 
20 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Bata-
via), 8-11-1816.
21 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 6, states that Dipanagara described the village as the birthplace of the 
‘wife’ of Hamengkubuwana I; Mandoyokusumo 1977:15, however, indicates that Kyai Cibkakak, 
the great-grandfather of Hamengkubuwana I’s mother, Mas Ayu Téjawati, lived there, so it may 
be that Knoerle misheard stri (wife) for bibi (low-born mother/aunt) in his conversation with the 
prince. This is indeed how she is described in Mandoyokusumo: Sarasilahipun Mas Ayu Tejowati 
ingkang bibi ngarsadalem sampeyandalem Sinuhun Kangjeng Sultan Hamengku Buwono I. It is signifi-
cant that Kepundhung does not occur in the list of Yogya pradikan villages (Appendix VIIa), but 
in those pertaining to Surakarta (note 19), so Dipanagara may have been wrong to ascribe its tax-
free status to Hamengkubuwana I’s initiative. Instead, it would have been originally allocated as a 
pradikan désa by the Kartasura court given that Mas Ayu Téjawati was a wife of Sunan Amangku-
rat IV (reigned 1719-1726). Its administration would have been taken over by the Surakarta court 
after the move from Kartasura in 1745, although it is clear from the acting Resident of Yogya, J.D. 
Kruseman’s report (note 22), that by 1816 Kepundhung was a village in the Yogya nagara agung 
(core apanage region) in Pajang. On Kepundhung’s location, see note 19.
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lessen the power of the European government and place it on the same footing 
that it had been before Daendels’ arrival in January 1808.22 Other religious 
teachers and local leaders were similarly employed by the Yogya court at this 
time with Ratu Ibu using some of the funds provided by the British for the 
annual rent of the tollgates and markets to pay for their services.23
Murma’s connections with Surakarta were also of very long standing. They 
dated back to about 1792 when Pakubuwana IV had lost a court heirloom, a pu-
saka kris by the name of Kangjeng Kyai Birawa, said to have been of Majapahit 
vintage. Murma had been instructed to pray for its return and when this was 
achieved after four years, he was rewarded with a 2,000 Spanish dollar gift. 
This appears to have been a down payment for the original 10,000 Spanish dol-
lars promised by the Sunan. Relationships between the kyai and the chief mi-
nisters of the Surakarta kingdom (Appendix Va) as well as the Sunan’s youn-
ger brother, Pangéran Buminata, a great patron of men of religion (pp. 93-4), 
became particularly close and at various stages Murma had received further 
financial gifts from the Surakarta court. In early 1812, just before the British at-
tack on Yogya, Murma had been visited by a certain Sèh Abubakar, a Sumatran 
from Palembang, who had been sent by the Sunan to ask Murma to pray for 
his success against the British in June 1812 (pp. 316-21, 377-8). Murma is repor-
ted to have replied with the words that ‘Allah and the [British] government are 
too great to undertake such a thing’. Despite this refusal, the kyai’s Surakarta 
court connections appear to have been maintained right up until his arrest in 
October 1816. Pakubuwana IV had consulted with him shortly after the special 
envoy, W.H. van IJsseldijk’s, visit to the courts in September 1816. At that time, 
he had apparently paid for the construction of Murma’s house.24
Murma was thus a figure intimately connected with the internal political 
and spiritual life of the south-central Javanese kraton. So much so, that his ar-
rest may well have been precipitated by court rivalries. Ratu Ibu, for example, 
suspected that a Surakarta prince, perhaps Pangéran Buminata, had used the 
affair to bring discredit on Yogya.25 But it seems that the Assistant-Resident 
of Yogya, Johan Diederik Kruseman (in office 1816-1817), who was covering 
22 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 
8-11-1816; Van der Kemp 1911:127, 271 note 1. Since Kruseman’s source was Pakualam I, who 
had his own reasons for casting Ratu Ibu in a bad light, the testimony may be suspect. Nahuys’ 
subsequent report to the Commissioners-General suggests that Ratu Ibu was not so involved 
with Murma, AN, Besluit van den Commissarissen-Generaal, 25-2-1817, La A, H.G. Nahuys van 
Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 14-2-1817.
23 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 
8-11-1816.
24 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 
8-11-1816, J.D. Kruseman, proces-verbaal of Kyai Murma, 13-11-1816; S.Br. 37:1229-31, Surakarta 
reports on Murma’s arrest.
25 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Bata-
via), 8-11-1816; S.Br. 37:1231, Surakarta reports on Murma’s arrest.
Plate 52. Johan Diederik Kruseman, 1794-1861. Painting by E. Spanier after 
Hoffmeister. Photograph by courtesy of the Stichting Iconografisch 
Bureau, The Hague. 
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for Nahuys during his absence on sick leave in Batavia (7 October 1816-23 
January 1817), first heard about the expected ‘revolt’ of Murma from sources 
in the Yogya kraton hostile to the queen mother and her son, the fourth sultan. 
Prominent amongst these was the regent, Pakualam I. Later during his jour-
ney into exile, Dipanagara would express his bitterness about the affair sta-
ting that Murma had been exiled ‘only in order that [the Dutch] could make 
themselves masters of [his] treasure and plunder the désa of Kepundhung’, 
and that ‘Pakualam had set the Government against Murma to bring [them] 
and the princes of Yogyakarta into discord’.26 On his return to Yogya, Nahuys 
broadly confirmed this view, pointing out that the seizure of Murma’s pro-
perty had created a very bad impression in the Yogya kraton and suggesting 
that Pakualam was largely to blame for precipitating the kyai’s arrest.27
In his report to the commissioners-general in Batavia, however, Kruseman 
justified his armed attack on Kepundhung on the morning of 6 November 1816 
by pointing out that a quantity of arms had been found in Murma’s house (10 
pikes and 10 rifles) and that Murma’s brother, Abdullah, had offered armed 
resistance in the Kepundhung mosque with fifteen men.28 Given the insecurity 
of the Javanese countryside at this time and the amount of valuables which 
Murma had acquired over the years from the court princes and officials, valu-
ables which included fine heirloom kris, state clothes and jewellery, it is hardly 
surprising that he had weapons in his désa for self-protection. The Dutch go-
vernment compounded their violent action by selling most of the valuables at 
public auction and keeping the proceeds. Only a few were returned to the kyai 
before he was exiled to Ambon in 1818.29 Furthermore, the treatment of the 
aged religious teacher seems to have been unduly severe. Although the case 
against him – that he had engaged in political intrigues with the courts against 
the European government – rested on hearsay evidence and referred back to 
the British period, he was still charged with a criminal offence. His personal 
rebuttal of the charges in the Yogya Resident’s court availed him little. Indeed, 
during the kyai’s absence in the sultan’s capital for the trial proceedings, the 
Dutch authorities took the opportunity to impound his house and seize his 
remaining valuables, even attacking his relations in the local mosque when 
26 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 6.
27 AN, Besluit van den Commissarrissen Generaal, 1-5-1817 no. 1; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, p. 6 (on 
Dipanagara’s view).
28 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 
8-11-1816, 12-11-1816. Kruseman took with him a troop of 80 dragoons drawn from Pakualam’s 
corps and the 25-strong mounted contingent from the Yogya kraton. He was unable to arrest 
Murma immediately because he appears to have escaped into adjacent Surakarta territory and 
was apprehended later in the Sunan’s capital.
29 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-
General (Batavia), 14-2-1817; AN, Besluit van den Commissarissen Generaal, 25-2-1817 La A; AN, 
Besluit van den Secretaris van Staat der Gouverneur-Generaal, 14-3-1818 no. 6; AvJ, H.G. Nahuys 
van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 1-6-1818.
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they tried to resist (Carey 1987:294). His sentence of banishment and the six 
years he spent in Ambon at his advanced age (he appears to have been in his 
late sixties) were reported to have brought on severe psychological problems. 
By the time he was allowed back to Semarang in September 1824 he was in the 
last stages of a chronic mental illness (senile dementia). He died soon afterwards 
without ever returning to his village or seeing his family again.30 
Nahuys’ reports from south-central Java in the pre-Java War period indi-
cate that the treatment meted out to Kyai Murma was far from being unu-
sual. He even boasted to his superiors about his ‘strong-arm’ tactics in or-
dering an ulama to be seized while giving a lesson in his religious school. 
Similar actions were taken against ‘recalcitrant’ religious teachers in Salatiga 
by the Assistant-Resident there with ‘excellent results’ according to Nahuys.31 
Contemporary Residency reports are peppered with the phrase ‘sly priest’, 
an interesting reflection on the way in which Nahuys’ attitudes and those 
of his Dutch contemporaries were shaped by Calvinist hatred of Roman 
Catholicism. Indeed, it seems that Islam came to be seen in the mind of many 
early nineteenth-century Dutch colonial officials as a hierarchical religion. 
Like Roman Catholicism, it was thought to owe its authority to a central fi-
gure – be it the Ottoman sultan or the Sherif (chief religious authority) of 
Mecca – who functioned as a sort of pope (Carey 1987:292 note 51). These at-
titudes hardened still further following the outbreak of the Java War. ‘Santri’ – 
pious Muslims and students of religion – then became a term of abuse (Payen 
1988:120 note 260). Those suspected of harbouring santri – namely pro-Dipa-
nagara – sympathies were singled out for special treatment as the Belgian 
painter, Antoine Auguste Joseph Payen (1792-1853), noticed during the siege 
of Yogya in August-September 1825 (Payen 1988:65):
This morning [18 August 1825] various vagabonds suspected of being bandits [bran-
dhal, namely followers of Dipanagara] were brought in. They were put in chains. The 
white soldiers were allowed to have their fun: I saw an officer hit one of these men, 
said to be a santri, as hard as possible. Another, who remained in the hands of the 
soldiers, was mistreated in the most cruel way. Trampled under foot, he was taken 
away dying, blood pouring from his mouth. What I have written, I have seen.’
The Murma affair and the government’s subsequent actions seem to have 
marked an important stage in the deterioration of Dipanagara’s relationship 
with the new Dutch administration. The exile and subsequent death of such 
30 AN, Besluit van den Secretaris van Staat der Gouverneur-Generaal, 18-4-1818 no. 5 (on Mur-
ma’s exile); AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 10-4-1824 no. 10 (decision to allow Murma 
back to Java); Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 15-9-1824 
(reporting Murma’s return from Ambon to Semarang); Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 6 (on Murma’s death 
soon after his arrival).
31 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 9 pt. 3, Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Onlusten op Java’, Maastricht, 1826; Carey 
1987:294-5.
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an influential and well-respected kyai, who may perhaps have been one of the 
prince’s religious mentors in his youth, was undoubtedly felt at a deep perso-
nal level. It may have convinced him that the new breed of post-1816 Dutch 
officials and European estate leasers were completely lacking in sensitivity 
and understanding towards Islam. As Knoerle later noted in his conversati-
ons with Dipanagara during his journey to Manado:
[The prince] was especially incensed that Europeans in the Principalities were 
without any religious feelings and always ridiculed the religion [of The Prophet]: 
he said that drunken soldiers [? sepoys] had defiled the temple of Muhammad in 
Klathèn. He was so fired up with rage that I could not follow the swiftness of his 
words.32
Dipanagara’s view that Europeans were devoid of religious feelings was not 
unusual. The post-Java War Dutch Assistant-Resident of Pacitan, J.T. Canter- 
visscher (in office 1838-1842), related how a revered local official, the seventy-
year old pensioned bupati, Kyai Tumenggung Jagakarya, an erstwhile modin 
(mosque official) renowned for his devotion to Islam, had only begun to 
show signs of friendship towards his family when he observed one of Canter 
Visscher’s sons saying a Christian grace before a meal. The aged former bupati 
had remarked that up to that moment he had thought all Europeans were 
entirely without religion (Carey 1987:291 note 48).
Sometime after the arrest of Murma, a serious administrative issue arose 
in Yogya concerning the appointment of rural police officials or gunung33 
who also had tax-raising powers. This was not a new problem because, as we 
have seen (Chapter VIII), the role of the gunung and their impact on village 
society had already been discussed between Dipanagara and his father, the 
third sultan, during the early part of his reign. The incident of the post-1816 
appointment of more police officials by the patih, Danureja IV, and the com-
mander of the sultan’s bodyguard, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara, is only 
related in the prince’s babad, but later Dutch and Malay reports dwell on the 
misuse of powers by the gunung acting under the chief minister’s orders so 
it is likely the incident is well founded.34 Dipanagara had originally put for-
32 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 14.
33 Also known as tamping in Yogya, the term gunung was more common in Surakarta and 
appears to have derived from their role in bearing the gunungan (rice mountain) offerings at 
the time of the Garebeg ceremonies at the courts, AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 
17-2-1841 no. 16; Rouffaer 1905:614.
34 Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/Bogor), 
18-3-1823; Van Nes 1844:139; AN, Geheim Kommissorial, 16-9-1846 La N6, ‘Bevinding van Soer-
acarta in de maand Juli van het jaar 1846’ (on tax-raising powers of gunung and their oppression 
in Sala); Radèn Adipati Jayadiningrat, ‘Schetsen over den oorlog van Java 1825-30’ (henceforth: 
Jayadiningrat, ‘Schetsen’), 2-2-1857, 8-9; Carey 1981a:249 note 55; Winter 1902:33, 107 note 47, 153. 
On the murder of one of Danureja’s gunung by Dipanagara’s supporters during the early stages of 
the Java War, see Carey 1981a:289 note 226.
Plate 53. Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (in office, 1813-1847) being hit over the face with         a slipper by Dipanagara as a result of an argument. A sentana (member of the 
Sultan’s family) looks on. From Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde     (Leiden), Oriental MS 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo), f.55v. Photograph by courtesy 
of the KITLV.
Plate 53. Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (in office, 1813-1847) being hit over the face with         a slipper by Dipanagara as a result of an argument. A sentana (member of the 
Sultan’s family) looks on. From Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde     (Leiden), Oriental MS 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo), f.55v. Photograph by courtesy 
of the KITLV.
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ward the plan to abolish the police officials entirely in order to alleviate the 
tax burden in country areas, but nothing came of this because of his father’s 
early death. It is possible that the activities of the gunung were supervised 
more stringently in the interests of just government during the early period of 
the fourth sultan’s minority. But shortly after 1816, forty more of these police 
officials were appointed under the command of two lurah (chiefs). They drew 
their salaries directly from the royal tax moneys and had the special task of 
collecting the pacumplèng – a door tax levied at ten to twenty cents per house 
entrance (Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:297)35 – in the villages at half-yearly 
intervals, namely at Mulud and Puwasa.36 When not engaged in this fashion, 
the gunung apparently gathered at the kepatihan (the chief minister’s residence 
and office), serving as messengers and police officials for Danureja IV much 
in the same fashion as the members of the Macanan (‘tiger’ corps) described 
so vividly in the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara (pp. 53-5).
In his chronicle, Dipanagara describes how the appointment of these po-
lice officials was made without his approval or prior knowledge and how he 
was only informed about it in a roundabout way through some of the older 
members of the sultan’s family and senior court bupati.37 The prince then con-
fronted his younger brother, the fourth sultan, with a choice: either accept 
his advice that the gunung constituted a serious tax burden on the country 
districts and withdraw the royal letter of appointment or allow the letter to 
remain in force and thereby side openly with the prince’s two major court 
adversaries, Danureja IV and Wiranagara. The sultan apparently decided 
to rescind the letter but an angry scene then occurred between Dipanagara 
and Wiranagara in which the latter defended his actions and argued strongly 
against the annulment.38 When Ratu Ibu heard that the appointment of the 
gunung had been withdrawn, Dipanagara related how she chided her son in 
his presence:
XIX. 16  ‘Sultan, I tell you in truth
  that the person who rules the state
  of Yogyakarta is in reality
  your elder brother Dipanagara,
 
 17  for I was already ordered
  by your father [Hamengkubuwana III] earlier
  when he was still in the kadipatèn.
  Thus was his instruction:
  “Radèn Ayu, I tell you
35 Also a tax of four skeins of cotton yarn and 40 cents per jung. See further pp. 56-7.
36 BD (Manado) II:274-5, XVIIII.144-XIX.1.
37 BD (Manado) II:272, XVIII.134; Van der Kemp 1896a:359.
38 BD (Manado) II:275-80, XIX.1-15; Van der Kemp 1896a:359-61.
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  do not hope too much for your son,
  for the one my heart is fixed on
  is in truth my eldest son [Dipanagara].”
  I replied: “As you wish”.’
 18   The sultan showed embarrassment
  because many people [now] knew [of this].
  Thus was his speech:
  ’Your tale
  is already known to me
  [for I am aware of] my father’s instructions
  to me.’
  Pangéran [Dipanagara] smiled [and] spoke calmly:
  ‘Ratu Ibu is like a child, My Lord,
 19   in telling this secret
  so that many people know of it.’39
The whole incident of appointment of the gunung, Dipanagara’s intervention 
and Ratu Ibu’s reaction to it, provides a striking illustration of the growth of 
the tacit rivalry between the prince and the court clique around the queen 
mother which began to split the kraton during the fourth sultan’s reign. On 
the one hand, Ratu Ibu and her supporters entertained deep suspicions of 
Dipanagara and his motives. On the other, the prince felt that he was being in-
creasingly excluded from a say in affairs of state to which he felt entitled as a 
senior member of the sultan’s family. The final break did not come until much 
later during the initial years of the minority of the fifth sultan (1822-1836; 
Chapter X), but the rivalries and suspicions which were later to erupt into 
such poisonous and open hostility were already coming to the surface. As for 
the gunung, Dipanagara’s intervention seems to have availed little because 
there were still complaints about their fiscal oppression and misuse of their 
powers just two years before the Java War.40
39 BD (Manado) II:280-1, XIX (Sinom) 16-19. sultan sun pajar satuhu/ ingkang duwé nagara/ ing 
Ngayogya iki yekti/ raka dika Pangéran Dipanagara. 17. mapan sun wus dhinawuhan/ mring rama dika 
ing nguni/ duk meksih kadipatènnya/ mengkéné timbalnèki/ Dèn Ayu sun pajari/ [wiya]* ngarep-arep 
anakmu/ ingkang dadi tyas ingwang/ nak ingsun kula tuwa yekti/ atur kula mring rama dika sumongga. 
18. èsmu lingsem kangjeng sultan/ sabab kathah tiyang uning/ mengkana ingkang aturira/ sampun apa 
dika werti/ kula sampun udani/ kangjeng rama welingipun/ inggih dhateng kawula/ Jeng Pangran mèsem 
nabda ris/ Ibu Ratu pan kados raré paduka. 19. ngandika wados punika/ pan kathah tiyang udani. MS. ‘ja’, 
as there is a consonant missing in the line I have followed Rusche 1908, I:84.
40 Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 
18-3-1823.
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Nahuys’ land-rent initiative in the Principalities and its problems
The arrest of Kyai Murma and the dispute over the gunung were events which 
signalled growing tensions between Dipanagara and the European government 
as well as the pro-European court faction in Yogya. They were soon oversha-
dowed, however, by the question of the land-rent and Nahuys’ proactive role 
in its implementation. The situation in the Principalities regarding the renting 
of land to Europeans and Chinese was as follows. Before 1816, in particular 
during the period of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), but also during 
the administrations of Daendels (1808-1811) and Raffles (1811-1816), only 
very small plots of land had been rented out to Europeans as vegetable plots 
and country retreats and then only for strictly limited periods of time (Van 
der Kemp 1897:16; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:49; Carey and Hoadley 
2000:317-20). The Dutch Residents at the courts, for example, had access to cer-
tain properties, but these were held directly from the rulers themselves much 
in the same fashion as the apanage land bestowed on the princes and priy-
ayi. Furthermore, all land grants were closely supervised by the rulers and no 
large-scale rents or long-term leases were allowed.41 Apart from such senior of-
ficials, all Europeans domiciled in the Principalities were restricted to the court 
towns.42 Both Daendels and Raffles had sought to continue these restrictions 
on the settlement of Europeans in the Javanese interior, the first by his decree 
of 18 June 1808 forbidding the renting out of villages to Europeans (Van der 
Chijs 1895-97, XIV:803) and the second by his proclamation of 21 April 1815 
requiring all Europeans to seek prior permission from the lieutenant-governor 
before entering into land leases. This last proclamation had been reconfirmed 
by the commissioners-general in 1818.43 Daendels’ legislation did not cover 
the Principalities and Raffles’ constant revenue requirements had led to the 
alienation of extensive government lands, most notoriously in the case of the 
extensive Ciasem and Pamanukan estates in Krawang in west Java (Levyssohn 
Norman 1857:293-300; Bastin 1954:80-6). After mid-August 1816, however, the 
situation in Yogyakarta and Surakarta began to change (note 53). There were 
two reasons for this. First, and most important was Nahuys’ personal influenc e 
41 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:61 (quoting A.M.Th. de Salis who stated that three-year 
leases were the maximum); LOr 2168, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to Colonel Alexander Adams 
(Surakarta), 6 Sapar AJ 1739 (AD 14-2-1812; on the renting of lands at Ampèl, Klèca, and Séla on 
the high saddle between Gunung Merapi and Gunung Merbabu, as country retreats and kitchen 
gardens by the Surakarta Residents); Dj.Br. 29, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Sura-
baya), 4-1-1814 (on the Yogya Resident’s estates at Melathèn worth 1,100 Spanish dollars in rents 
a year – about half his monthly salary – Karang Bolong on the south coast where the annual birds’ 
nests harvest was collected (pp. 17-8) and at Sana Pakis, which all remained the property of the 
sultan); KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 115 (on Hamengkubuwana II some-
times leasing land but never selling it). See further De Haan 1935a:576-7; Carey 1980:91 note 2.
42 S.Br.122, H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 23-3-1822.
43 NA, Besluit van den Commissarissen-Generaal, 28-8-1818.
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as Resident of Yogya, an office which he later combined briefly with that of 
Surakarta (Appendix IX; pp. 501, 517 note 40). Second, European planters 
and estate owners were actively looking for land to lease in the Principalities 
as a way of escaping the restrictions imposed by the European government 
on the extension of private landholdings and the registration of new leases 
in lands under their direct administration (Day 1972:231-7). As we have seen, 
both Governor-General Van der Capellen (in office 1816-1826) and his principal 
adviser, Hendrik Jan van de Graaff, took an increasingly tough line on this is-
sue, considering the indiscriminate leasing of land to European and Chinese 
landowners detrimental to the interests of Javanese cultivators.44 In De Graaff’s 
view, the Cirebon disturbances of 1803-1806, had been largely precipitated 
by the settlement of Chinese in the villages of the interior,45 and he blamed 
the more recent agrarian unrest in Krawang on the extortionate practices of 
the European landowners in taking more than their usual fifth of the rice har-
vest (Levyssohn Norman 1857:297). As the President of the Board of Finances 
Harman Warner Muntinghe (1773-1827) explained in a letter to Nahuys in July 
1817, the government had fears that:
If [Western] planters were allowed a completely free hand in agriculture in the 
Principalities, the Javanese would be brought under a new yoke, which will weigh 
on them even harder than all the bribery and corruption of the Javanese [royal] 
administrations. We think […] that a steady decline in the welfare of the Javanese 
peasant and a fall in his personal wealth will be the inevitable outcome of such a 
policy.46
Nahuys’ return in late January 1817 from Batavia, where he had been on leave 
for four months to restore his health, marked the beginning of his efforts to 
broaden the scope of the land rent in Yogya. On 1 May 1817, he wrote to the 
commissioners-general pointing out the poor state of the old pepper plantati-
ons laid out by the VOC in Pacitan and Lowanu (Bagelèn), which in the 1790s 
had been producing some 300,000 avoirdupois pounds from 37,000 pepper 
bushes. Given high global prices for cash crops like pepper, coffee and indigo, 
he wished to encourage the extension of cultivation of these crops in south-
central Java.47 In particular, Nahuys asserted that an increase in the land-rent 
44 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-Gene-
ral (Batavia), 15-9-1817; vAE (aanwinsten 1941) 20, H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to J. Fabius (Hol-
land), 26-7-1823.
45 S.Br. 122, H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 23-3-1822.
46 Quoted in UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commis-
sioners-General (Batavia), 19-9-1817. See further Van Deventer 1865-66, I:344-9.
47 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-
General (Batavia), 1-5-1817. See Van der Kemp 1913:24-5 (for text of Nahuys’ original letter of 
14-4-1817 on land rent). On the productive capacity of the VOC pepper gardens in Pacitan and 
Lowanu (Bagelèn) in the early 1790s, see Dj.Br. 45, W.H. van IJsseldijk, ‘Eerbeidige bericht aan-
gaande de landen van Z.H. den Sulthan van Djocjocarta’, in W.H. van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to 
P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 15-1-1793.
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would help ‘the many poor princes and priyayi [high officials]’ in Yogya and 
that corruption by village officials and the sale of local offices would decline 
if European estate managers took up residence in the Javanese interior.48 He 
even cited the passage in Adam Smith’s Wealth of nations (1776), where ‘feudal 
government’ is blamed for the miserable state of the occupiers of the land in 
ancien régime Europe.49
The following July, he led the way by persuading the young sultan to grant 
him the hereditary lease of Bedhaya, an open area high on the flanks of Mount 
Merapi with four adjoining villages to provide labour for the cultivation of 
coffee (Lettres de Java 1829:100; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:602-3; Payen 
1988:46). In September 1817, Nahuys again wrote to the commissioners-gene-
ral refuting Muntinghe’s arguments that the renting of land would harm the 
local inhabitants and pressing the case for the lease of a large area of Pacitan to 
a Dutch resident, Carl Hendrik Coster, for the extension of the old pepper gar-
dens.50 During the course of the following year (1818), large numbers of other 
grants were organised in Yogya, some negotiated directly by Nahuys with the 
sultan. This was the case with the 40 jung of royal land at the second sultan’s 
former country estate of Rajawinangun (also known as Arjawinangun) to the 
east of Yogya (Chapter V; Appendix VI), which were rented out to Nahuys’ 
friend, Dr Harvey Thomson, the former Yogya Residency doctor for whom 
the Javanese would coin the punning name ‘Tuan Tom’ (‘Mr Indigo’) for his 
zeal as a dyestuff producer.51 Further leases of royal and princely land were 
48 UBL, BPL 616, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 
1-5-1817.
49 S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 
2-12-1821, citing Adam Smith, An enquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (London, 
1776), Book III, Chapter 3 (‘Of the accumulation of capital, or of productive and unproductive 
labour’).
50 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-Gen-
eral (Batavia), 19-9-1817; AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 10-1-1817 no. 55 (original 
government rejection of Pacitan land lease); Van Deventer 1865-66, I:347, Herman Warner Munt-
inghe (president of Board of Finances) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 14-7-1817, rejecting 
the request for the fifteen-year lease of land in Pacitan by two Yogya inhabitants, G.J. Koops and 
C.H. Coster, but allowing them to make contracts with the local inhabitants for the delivery of 
pepper. Coster appears to have died of cholera in Magelang on 30-5-1821, Dj.Br. 64, F.E. Hardy 
(Magelang) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 30-5-1821. 
51 On Harvey Thomson, who had served as assistant surgeon to the British expeditionary force 
and Residency doctor in Yogya during the latter half of the British period, see Chapter VIII note 170; 
Van Enk 1999:137-8. His epithet ‘Tuan Tom’ is mentioned in B.Ng. II:63, XIV.22. See also Raffles 1817, 
I:38 (on the Javanese word for indigo). Although only 40 jung were declared in the contract for the 
lease of Rajawinangun, it seems that Thomson had access to over 100 jung, see Dj.Br. 60, Dr Harvey 
Thomson (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 25-10-1817 (notification that lands 
in vicinity of Yogya suitable for indigo production and requesting clarification whether private 
individuals could rent lands on indefinite term lease from the sultan); Dj.Br. 62, Dr Harvey Thom-
son (Rajawinangun) to R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta), 26-5-1819 (on leasing of local sawah around his 
estate). See further Van Enk 1990:8, who cites Thomson’s letter and Nahuys’ reply.
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entered into by Chinese and European land-renters in the period 1818-1819. 
Indeed, by the time Nahuys retired in April 1822 from his joint office of 
Resident in Yogya and Surakarta no less than 115 separate plots of lands and 
villages (with their inhabitants) had been rented out in the sultanate and a 
further 189 in the territory of the Sunan.52 A comparison of the various years in 
which these properties were leased and Nahuys’ incumbency as Resident first 
in Yogya (1816-1820) and then jointly in both Yogya and Surakarta (1820-1822; 
Appendix IX), clearly indicate that his presence was critical in securing the 
contracts.53 Many of the Europeans who rented lands in the Principalities at 
this time were personal acquaintances or business associates of the Resident.54 
Indeed, in a political tract penned in the Netherlands in 1826, he referred to 
them patronisingly as ‘my planters’.55 He also boasted that he lent them mo-
ney out of his own pocket to encourage them in their undertakings (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:53). Despite his criticism of the government’s eco-
nomic policies, Nahuys appears to have had influence in Batavia, managing 
to have his Batavian business partner, D’Abo, appointed as Assistant-Resident 
in Yogya (in office 1817-1823) when his former deputy, J.D. Kruseman, was 
transferred to Batavia early in 1817 to await posting to a new appointment as 
Resident of Ai and Run in the Moluccas. This was the same business partner 
through whom Nahuys arranged the rent of an entire district – Blitar – in east 
Java, an action which was specifically singled out for censure by Governor-
General Van der Capellen before his abolition of the land-rent in May 1823.56
52 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:59 (Nahuys had given a total of 166 leases but this was 23 
short as his successor in Surakarta, A.M.Th. de Salis, pointed out).
53 The numbers of estates and the dates they were rented out are as follows: A. Yogyakarta: 
1814: 1; 1815: 3; 1816: 20; 1817: 30; 1818: 55; 1819: 1; 1820: 1; B. Surakarta: 1816: 6; 1817: 6; 1818: 9; 
1819: 16; 1820: 52; 1821: 75. The figures are taken from Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:604-14, but 
note the caveats entered by Veth on the reliability of Louw’s figures, Veth 1896-1907, II:349 note 2.
54 In a letter to Governor-General Van der Capellen in 1822, Nahuys reported that out of the 
32 ‘Christians’ (Dutch, Eurasian and other Europeans), two-thirds had been born in Java or were 
Dutchmen or Eurasians of part Dutch parentage who had settled a long time in Surakarta. Only 
three were of foreign birth and nationality: Joseph Donatiën Boutet (born Nantes, circa 1790), 
William Stavers (born Scotland) and James Shand (born Aberdeen, died Yogya, 28 June 1824). In 
Yogyakarta, he cited only Dr Harvey Thomson (born Aberdeen, 11-1790, died Batavia, 17-1-1837) 
and the Frenchman J.M. Tissot (born Marseilles circa 1784), S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst 
(Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 29-9-1822. But he was either misin-
formed or being deliberately misleading because there were many other non-Dutch Europeans 
who rented land in the Principalities at this time, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:604-14; 
Van Enk 1999:257.
55 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 9 pt. 3, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Onlusten op Java’, Maastricht, 4-1826.
56 S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/
Bogor), 29-9-1822 (referring to letter of complaint about this lease from A.M.Th. de Salis to Van 
der Capellen, 22-4-1822, just prior to his assumption of the Residency of Surakarta from Nahuys 
on 29-4-1822); Dj.Br. 81, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor) to Guardians (Pangéran 
Dipanagara and Pangéran Mangkubumi) of Hamengkubuwana V (Yogyakarta), 14-1-1823, Van 
der Capellen’s statement of his opposition to the long leases (5-20 years) of lands in the Principali-
ties to Chinese and Europeans.
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 Such a rapid extension of the land rent had important consequences for 
the Javanese not all of which were as advantageous as Nahuys chose to make 
out. Although the princes and priyayi renting land benefited from higher 
cash incomes and were relieved of some of the duties of personally admi-
nistering their estates through their often fractious local tax collectors (bekel, 
demang; pp. 14-9), the old paternalistic link between the Javanese apanage 
holder and his rayat (peasant cultivators, retainers) was broken. According 
to Rouffaer, the Javanese agrarian law code, the Angger Sepuluh, was even 
modified in October 1818, seemingly under Nahuys’ influence, to facilitate 
this increase in land rent and give the European and Chinese land renters the 
same rights as the previous Javanese fief holders. Village tax collectors (bekel) 
and Javanese cultivators alike were affected (Winter 1902:123-8, 172; Rouffaer 
1905:627-8). Indeed, European and Chinese land-renters now began to adopt 
Javanese names. They also decided which cash crops were planted on which 
ricefields (sawah). At harvest time, they reaped the main profits leaving the 
peasant cultivators to shoulder the burden of the tribute payments. In the 
event that a cash-crop harvest could not be gathered in before the Mulud and 
Puwasa half-yearly tribute payments, the land-renters were still not left out 
of pocket according to Nahuys’ successor, A.M.Th. de Salis (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, I:60-1). De Salis also pointed out that few land-renters had 
any knowledge of Javanese agriculture, profit being their sole motive (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:61). Smissaert, who replaced De Salis in Yogya, 
agreed. He stated that the peasant cultivators on the estates always regarded 
the Europeans as ‘domineering foreigners’,57 sentiments which were echoed 
by Javanese contemporaries. Haji Ngisa, one of Dipanagara’s principal religi-
ous advisers (Appendix VIIb) and an exceedingly able man according to the 
Dutch commissioners tasked with enquiring into the causes of the Java War, 
complained that foreign land-renters had acted too much the Tuwan Besar 
(European lord and master). This had caused great difficulties for the local 
population and put the renters at odds with the local police officials.58 Similar 
concerns were expressed by Dipanagara’s uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi and 
his nephew, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II. ‘Better be bitten by a Javanese cat 
than a foreign tom cat’ was Mangkubumi’s view.59 The fact that few European 
land renters spoke Javanese and most could only manage broken Malay – 
57 vAE (aanwinsten 1941) 28, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brus-
sels), n.y. (? 1828), referring to the European and Chinese land-renters as overheerschende vreemde-
lingen. See further Van Enk 1990:9.
58 GKA, Exhibitum 28-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, Haji Ngisoh [Ngisa] interview, Yogya-
karta, 21-4-1830. See further S.Br. 55, J.I. van Sevenhoven, ‘Nota over de landverhuringen aan 
partikulieren in de vorstenlanden’, 16-3-1837.
59 GKA, Exhibitum 28-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II inter-
view, Yogyakarta, 17-4-1830; Pangéran Mangkubumi interview, Yogyakarta, 19-4-1830.
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despite the figment of their adopted Javanese names – added to their pro-
blems of communication with their tenants.60 
Another key consideration was that Javanese much preferred land to 
money. Indeed, their impoverished state meant that they could not handle 
the influx of ready cash which suddenly came their way from the land-rent 
payments.61 All too often, this money was used by the fief holders not for 
capital improvements but for the purchase of luxury goods imported from 
Europe. Although the available evidence is hard to evaluate, it seems that not 
only did the consumption of alcohol increase at the courts in the years after 
August 1816 (note 8; Carey 1981a:269 note 137), but that the use of European 
furniture, carriages and card games amongst the kraton elite also rose.62 In 
this respect, the Yogya nobility probably remained more traditional in their 
tastes than their Surakarta counterparts (Van Hogendorp 1913:91; Carey and 
Houben 1987:30 note 26), yet even here there were changes in style. Thus, 
the fourth sultan, perhaps at Nahuys’ instigation, equipped new companies 
of kraton troops with European military uniforms. He also enjoyed wearing 
the outfit of a Dutch major-general on sorties outside the court (Plate 54).63 
Indeed, it was said that the young ruler was so attached to this uniform that 
had he not been dissuaded by his closest advisers he would have worn it 
when presiding over those most quintessential of Javanese-Islamic court fes-
tivals, the Garebeg (Van Nes 1844:164). 
Dipanagara’s reaction to the land-rent issue was predictably hostile. He did 
not himself rent out any of his apanage holdings, although some of his brothers 
did. Moreover, unlike most of his kraton contemporaries, he was renowned for 
his careful administration, his close ties with his peasant cultivators and his 
land improvements, which made him at this time one of the richest landow-
60 Van Hogendorp 1913:160. A striking exception here, according to Van Hogendorp, was the 
‘English’ (sic, he was in fact Scots) land renter, Captain William Stavers, a former sepoy officer 
and fluent Javanese speaker, a language he had acquired through his marriage to a Eurasian 
woman of part Javanese parentage, S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. 
van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 29-9-1822. He served as aide-de-camp (ordonnans) to Pangéran 
Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) and helped to broker the September 1827 Salatiga meeting 
between Commissioner-General L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies and Kyai Maja, see pp. 387, 644. He 
was then serving (1826-1830) as Captain Adjutant (aide-de-camp) to Du Bus. On Dipanagara’s 
view of Malay as ‘the language of chickens (basa pitik) which no ruler in Java wished to hear’, see 
p. 109.
61 Dj.Br. 19¹¹, De Stuers, ‘Inleiding’; A.H. Smissaert, J.I. van Sevenhoven, H. MacGillivray, 
‘Rapport omtrent de landverhuringen’, 7-1825.
62 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 6 pt. 14, will of Pangéran Purbanegara (Kedhiri), 31-3-1821 (listing two 
carriages, one four-wheeled, the other an open two-wheeled brougham); Journal 1853-54, 8:18; 
Van der Kemp 1896a:308; Van Hogendorp 1913:169.
63 Ministerie van Koloniën 4207, GKA 208L geheim, 11-10-1828, A.M.Th. de Salis, ‘Pro Memo-
rie over de Javasche vorstenlanden’ (henceforth: De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’), The Hague, 8-5-1828; 
KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):15-19, II.29-37; Van Nes 1844:164.
Plate 54. Equestrian portrait of Sultan Hamengkubuwana IV (reigned 1814-1822) of 
Yogya karta showing him dressed in his Dutch major-general’s uniform and wearing 
the eight-pointed star set with diamonds of the Order of the Union (Orde van de 
Unie) given to his father, Hamengkubuwana III (reigned 1812-1814), by Daendels 
in May 1811 after he was appointed Regent of Yogyakarta. Portrait by the Javanese 
artist, Soebardjo, based on an original oil painting and completed in February 1938. 
Photograph by courtesy of the Musium Karaton Ngayogyakarta.
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ners in the sultanate.64 But both Valck’s historical survey of events in Yogya 
from Giyanti (1755) to the Java War and a near contemporary Javanese source 
indicate that the prince was profoundly disturbed by the developments insti-
gated by Nahuys. Valck referred to him ‘often remonstrating’ with his youn-
ger brother, the fourth sultan, about the inappropriateness of renting land to 
Europeans.65 The Buku Kedhung Kebo, meanwhile, relates how shortly before 
the death of his grandmother, Ratu Ageng (pre-1812, Ratu Kedhaton), at the 
time of the Garebeg Puwasa of 12 July 1820,66 Dipanagara publicly rebuked 
the chief minister, Danureja IV, in the kraton for allowing the renting out of the 
royal sawah (ricefields) at Rajawinangun. When the chief minister answered 
the charges frivolously, the prince took off his slipper and struck him hard 
across the face.67 The affair is reminiscent of Dipanagara’s contretemps with 
Wiranagara over the appointment of the royal police officials and may well 
have been apocryphal. But it was certainly symbolic of his hostile attitude and 
the widening gap between himself and the court clique around his stepmother, 
Ratu Ibu. This split is likely to have become even more pronounced after his 
grandmother, Ratu Ageng’s, passing. Her stubborn Madurese character and 
religious piety had commanded widespread respect and obedience amongst 
different members of the sultan’s family, not least from the young sultan for 
whom she had acted as principle guardian prior to his elevation to the throne 
in November 1814 (pp. 365-6). Significantly, one of Dipanagara’s first actions as 
a guardian (wakil-Dalem) of the child sultan, Hamengkubuwana V (1822-1826, 
1828-1855), in early 1823 just before Van der Capellen’s 6 May decree abolishing 
the land-rent (p. 529), was to launch an attack on the whole policy. ‘Must we 
continue to burden our people, who suffer so much’, he is supposed to have 
said in a meeting of the Yogya regency council,68 ‘with the renting out of their 
lands [while we] acquiesce with those who rent them?’ (Van Nes 1844:147). 
64 Chapter II. On Dipanagara’s careful financial administration, which the Dutch labelled ‘ava-
riciousness’, see Van der Kemp 1896a:331; Kielstra 1885:409, 411 (on improvements to his estates); 
Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 4; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743; Carey 1981a:282 note 198 (on the 
f 3,000 in ready money and large amounts of unhusked rice [padi] from the Puwasa taxes of 21 
May 1825 which he had to leave behind in his residence at Tegalreja at the time of his flight on 20 
July 1825); AN, Exhibitum 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (acting Resident Manado) to Johannes 
van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831 (on the estimated f 4,000 which Dipanagara had saved 
from his initial government allowance of f 600 in Manado). See further p. 726 note 212.
65 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 153.
66 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 21-7-1820 no. 13, states that Ratu Ageng’s death 
occurred on 14 July 1820.
67 KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo), 52-56:IV.69-75. Hageman 1856:45 relates a similar incident. 
See further Van der Kemp 1896a:308, 313-4, 362; Plate 53. On the royal ricefields at Rajawin angun 
which were rented out through the intermediary of Danureja IV, see KITLV H 696g (Archiefs-
tukken [diverse] over de Vorstenlanden):75; Carey and Hoadley 2000:301-2.
68 This was known as the ‘Raad uitmakende het bestuur over den rijk van Djokjo’ and func-
tioned as the supreme governing council of Yogya during Hamengkubuwana V’s minority, see 
further Dj.Br. 6 pt. 18.
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Dipanagara’s first cousin, Mangkudiningrat II, would later report that one of 
the principal causes of support for the prince after the outbreak of the Java War 
was the dislike of ordinary Javanese at seeing lands rented out to Chinese:
Amongst the village people who gave assistance to Dipanagara, there were those 
who had nothing to eat, and those whose means of livelihood were crime, rob-
bery and theft. These assisted him out of their own evil designs. As for those who 
were not engaged in criminal activities, such as village officials and village tax-
collectors, [most followed him] because of their grievances against the Chinese 
whose behaviour was very different from what it had been previously. They now 
expected people to make a sembah of humble greeting to them and they sat high 
up [namely on chairs] while the village officials had to sit cross-legged on the floor 
in front of them.69
Mangkudiningrat’s observation underscores the fact that the impact of the 
land-rent on the village communities was even more important than the 
changes it wrought on kraton lifestyles or the reaction it provoked from the 
disapproving Dipanagara. The renting of land not only entailed the aliena-
tion of property but also in most instances the local population. In the case of 
coffee, which was usually grown at high altitude (3-6,000 feet), villagers were 
often constrained to work as day labourers in remote mountain and elevated 
plateau locations.70 Although some may have welcomed the opportunity to 
earn money as hired hands, most resented the intrusion into their customary 
village life. This was the case, for example, with the eighteen Javanese fami-
lies who were uprooted from their villages to work on Nahuys’ coffee estate 
at Bedhaya.71 They apparently agreed to the move under duress and althoug h 
they did not dare to complain openly to the Yogya court, they conveyed 
their misgivings about their future to their friends and relations (Van Nes 
1844:142). They were not alone. Other reports stressed the resentment of the 
local Javanese at the heavy labour demands of European land-renters. Roads, 
irrigation systems, drying sheds, processing factories and coffee gardens all 
had to be laid out and maintained.72 And all this was on top of the fourth sul-
tan’s own mania for road building which caused the destruction of many kam-
pung (urban quarters) and the flight of population in the immediate vicinity 
of Yogya (Carey 1992:506-7 note 516). Indigo was especially hated. We know 
69 dK 131, Pangéran Aria Mangkudiningrat II (Yogyakarta) to F.G. Valck (Magelang), n.y. 
(1828). See further Carey 1984:40-1.
70 S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/
Bogor), 29-9-1822, stating that most coffee plantations in the Surakarta area were looked after by 
day labourers. See further note 74.
71 Dj.Br. 52, Pangéran Dipanagara and Pangéran Mangkubumi (Selarong) to A.H. Smissaert 
(Yogyakarta), 25-7-1825, referred to the problems of the villages attached to Bedhaya.
72 Dj.Br.19¹¹, De Stuers, ‘Inleiding’; Rouffaer 1905:626, 631; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):17-18, 
II.31-36 (on Hamengkubuwana IV’s road building mania in the immediate environs of Yogya). 
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from post-Java War reports that its forced cultivation under the Cultivation 
System (1830-1870) caused population movements in Bagelèn and other dis-
tricts.73 Not only did the indigo plant exhaust the soil, necessitating the ope-
ning up of new land further from established villages, but the preparation of 
the dye in small factories involved an unpleasant fermentation process. This 
required workers to wade and slosh in the vats, resulting in long-term disco-
loration of their skin (Van Niel 1992:76). The wages paid to the workers on the 
estates were also not particularly generous even by the low standards of the 
day.74 Finally, the juxtaposition of cash crops with the sawah of neighbouring 
villages caused problems of irrigation control. This was particularly the case 
with Dr Thomson’s indigo plantations at Rajawinangun.75 There were also 
fears amongst the local population that too much land was being taken away 
from rice cultivation thus jeopardising food supply. Post-war Dutch reports 
on the land-rent suggested that, given the choice, Javanese peasant cultivators 
would plant all their fields to rice and abandon cash crops altogether. Only 
pressure from the Resident forced them to turn sawah over to indigo or su-
gar, and even then particular problems would arise when the indigo harvest 
failed, as it appears to have done in 1819 and 1821,76 or sugar prices collapsed 
and mills closed down as they did in Kedhu and Bagelèn in the latter year as 
we will see shortly. Significantly, one of the most prosperous post-war land-
holdings in the Yogya area was that of Pakualam II in the Adikarta district of 
southern Kulon Praga – not a particularly fertile region – which went from 
73 Dj.Br. 3, F.G. Valck, ‘Algemeen verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1840’, 3-1841.
74 Van Nes 1844:149, mentioned that the eighteen families who worked on Nahuys’ Bedhaya 
estate were paid f 15 a day in total. On the conservative estimate that there were two able-bodied 
workers per family, this would have worked out at 42 cents a day each, but some of this money 
would have been taken by the overseers (mandur). The wage structure on P.M.M. Bouwens van 
den Boyen’s coffee estate at Kembangarum on the flanks of Mount Merapi in the Slèman district 
of Yogya can be seen in the report of Carl von Winckelmann, the inspector of Coffee Culture, in 
April 1825. This stated that the workers were a mix of local villagers and day labourers. They were 
paid 10 duit (13 cents) for every 100 trees cleaned and weeded (there were 105,000 coffee trees on 
the estate) with two free meals of rice a day. The mandur were paid 30 duit (40 cents) a day. Local 
villagers from Kembangarum were also required to do labour services (kerigan) two days a week, 
the first paid and the second unpaid. The usual payment for a day’s kerigan was 6 duit (8 cents) 
for villagers and double that for mandur, see S.Br. 19¹, Carl von Winckelmann (Semarang) to H.M. 
MacGillivray (Surakarta), 22-4-1825; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:269-74. For comparative 
wages for day labourers in central Java at this time, see Chapter I note 124; Van Enk 1990:16-7 (on 
Dezentjé’s estate at Ampèl and Thomson’s at Rajawinangun, where workers received 15 cents a 
day). On Bouwens and Kembangarum, see further Chapter X note 99.
75 Carey 1986:129 note 268, quoting Thomson as stating that ‘those lands [at Rajawinangun], 
which were given to me in rent for the cultivation of indigo, are so intermixed with those of 
other Javanese [farmers] that my indigo crops have been injured by the cultivation of their fields 
lying contiguous to mine’. See further KITLV H 699 (Archiefstukken over de Vorstenlanden, 
1820-1889):76-8l; Van Enk 1990:14; 1999:155.
76 Dj.Br. 3, A.A. Buyskes ‘Algemeen verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1841’, 3-1842; 
Van Enk 1990:9, 12-3 (on the effects of heavy rainfall on the 1819 indigo harvest); KITLV H 699 
(Archiefstukken over de Vorstenlanden, 1820-1869):78 (on the failure of the 1821 indigo harvest).
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strength to strength according to a later Dutch Resident’s report because the 
independent prince set his face against renting any part of it to Europeans.77 
As conditions deteriorated in south-central Java in the years leading up to 
the Java War, so popular resentment of the land-rent deepened, resulting in a 
growing number of attacks on isolated estates in which local estate workers, 
vagrants and professional bandits (wong durjana) took part (pp. 535-6). 
Raffles’ land tax, coffee plantations and the situation in Kedhu
The problems associated with the land-rent were mirrored in the newly an-
nexed territories. Here the impact of the land tax introduced by Raffles in 
1812-1813 was principally to blame (Bastin 1954:93-112). In theory, this taxa-
tion system was designed to work to the advantage of the local population by 
relieving them of labour services and forced dues in return for the payment of 
a single land tax. This in turn was supposed to be levied fairly on the produc-
tive value of individual landholdings thus enabling Javanese farmers free-
dom of cultivation and an incentive to raise production (Van Deventer 1891, 
I:cxvi; Burger 1939:62; Day 1972:172-6). In practice, as we have seen (p. 383), 
the land tax was often raised unfairly and unevenly on the local population 
because of the absence of detailed cadastral surveys and trained revenue col-
lectors. Furthermore, Raffles’ original expectation that the tax could be paid 
in cash rather than in kind, particularly by farmers who produced maize from 
dry fields (tegal), betrayed an inadequate understanding of the local Javanese 
peasant economy which was based extensively on the barter system.78 His 
tax demands thus drove the Javanese peasant even further into the clutches 
of the local Chinese money-lenders (Bastin 1954:101). At the same time, the 
abuses of the old Javanese fiscal and administrative systems were unwittingly 
maintained. How could it have been otherwise? The land tax itself was nearly 
always collected by Javanese officials (demang, bekel) – many of them former 
members of the royal administrations – who insisted on traditional services 
and forced deliveries (Levyssohn Norman 1857:192; Bastin 1954:179).
Nowhere was this more apparent than in Kedhu, once one of the most 
prosperous apanage districts of the south-central Javanese courts (Chapter 
VIII). In a report on the region in 1816, the new Dutch Resident of the joint 
residencies of Kedhu and Pekalongan, A.M.Th. de Salis (in office 1816-1817, 
1825-1826), asserted that the hurried introduction of the land tax had resul-
77 Dj.Br. 19¹, A.H.W. Baron de Kock, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, Yogyakarta, 17-5-1851.
78 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 304; Chapter I. Much local trade appears to 
have been done by barter, especially in areas where wet-rice (sawah) cultivation was less devel-
oped, Carey 1986:100. Curiously, it was the sinophobic Crawfurd who had persuaded Raffles that 
the land tax should be collected in money rather than in kind in Kedhu, Bastin 1954:101.
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ted in a decline in production and even in population.79 This observation 
was confirmed some years later by a French estate owner who visited both 
Kedhu and Pekalongan and commented on the very difficult conditions of 
the peasantry in those residencies. He described how they were forced to sell 
tobacco, their principal cash crop, to pay the land tax and how they lived on 
a meagre maize diet:
Any excess profit is very rare for the Javanese peasant for besides the high land 
tax, the Javanese tax-collector plagues him and his greatest problem is his own 
Javanese chief […] and he is lucky if he only has one.80
He noticed too that although the Javanese bupati were supposedly salaried 
by the European government, they still made use of the peasantry to squeeze 
extra profits from them. Some of these officials were brought to trial in the 
years before the Java War, but for the most part the Frenchman lamented that 
‘God is very high and the king is far’.81 In years in which plagues of mice and 
rats attacked the rice crop (1819, 1822) or the tobacco harvest failed (1823), the 
local population were reduced to eating leaves and weeds according to Radèn 
79 Day 1972:208 note 1; MvK 3054, ‘Statistieke beschrijving der residentie Kedoe’ (1836), 6, 
indicates that the population continued to decline by nearly 14 percent between 1819 and 1821, 
when there was a brief revival prior to the Java War, see note 80.
80 KITLV H 788 (‘Boutet correspondence’), Joseph Donatiën Boutet (Surakarta) to Lucien Boutet 
(Nantes), n.y. The date of this letter is unclear. Boutet, a wine merchant had left his native Nantes 
on 13 April 1818 and had arrived in Java via Mauritius (Île de France) on 4 September 1818 after 
trying to reach land in a sloop launched from the French brig ‘La Legère’, which was attempting 
to reach Surabaya via Bali. He was washed up on a beach in the Urutsèwu district of eastern 
Bagelèn together with three other Frenchmen Louis, Berceau and Salaun, the last two of whom 
died, Dj.Br. 83, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/
Bogor), 10-9-1818. He arrived in the south-central Java in circa 1820 and rented land in Surakarta 
in 1821 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:613 no. 162). He was a friend of his fellow land-renter, 
Dr Harvey Thomson of Aberdeen. The letter was apparently written during a visit to Thomson 
in the period when the Scotsman was working at the Karangjati indigo factory in Pekalongan 
(1828-1834). See further Enk 1999:236-9. Boutet’s remarks about the diet of the Kedhu peasantry 
directly contradict Willem van Hogendorp’s comments (Chapter I note 127) and may reflect the 
post-war situation, which we know was especially difficult, MvK 3054, ‘Statistieke beschrijving 
der residentie Kedoe’ (1836), 6, which shows a dramatic fall in the population in 1829 to 281,261 
compared to 333,584 in 1824, the last year in which statistics are available before the war. On 
tobacco production in Kedhu, see IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 81-2. It was one 
of the few cash crops – the other was sugar – grown in any quantity in Java by the local population 
as it could be rotated with rice (two years of rice harvests to one year of tobacco). In Kedhu, a vari-
ety known as Pinang tobacco was grown and the annual harvest in the mid-1800s was 2 million 
ponden (1 pond = 453.6 grams) or just over 900,000 kilograms. Most of this was sold on the north 
coast, see Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 31-1-1806.
81 KITLV H 788, Joseph Donatiën Boutet (Surakarta) to Lucien Boutet (Nantes), n.y. (? 1831). 
Boutet’s quote – Dieu est bien haut [..] et le roi est loin – seems to be drawn from Le Clerc 1783, I:45, 
which, in the section on Russian proverbs, gives the phrase Dieu est bien haut, et le Czar est loin. 
Denis Diderot had also used this proverb in his Mélanges II, ‘Au Roi de Prusse’, section entitled, 
Sur la civilisation de la Russie. I am grateful to Dr Ursula Haskins Gonthier, Lecturer in French 
Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK, for these references.
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Sukur, the younger son of the bupati of Semarang, Sura-adimanggala IV, who 
later joined Dipanagara.82 
In addition to the burden of the land tax, as Sukur pointed out, the lo-
cal population also had to contend with heavy labour demands associated 
with coffee production.83 After 1816, coffee plantations were introduced over 
a wide area of the Kedhu plateau and by 1827 these apparently covered bet-
ween two-fifths and three-fifths of all the cultivated high altitude land in the 
province, producing over one million guilders each year for the Netherlands 
Indies government.84 Travelling through south-central Java in 1827, Willem 
van Hogendorp was particularly struck by the extreme hatred evinced by 
peasant cultivators in Kedhu for the heavy labour services demanded by 
the Dutch planters on the coffee estates. These corvée demands, in his opi-
nion, were one of the principal reasons for the widespread local support for 
Dipanagara in Kedhu during the early years of the Java War. Indeed, he rec-
82 Sukur’s report, which seems to have been referring to the situation in Kedhu at the time of 
Pangéran Dipasana’s February 1822 uprising, reads: de beklagenswaardige toestand van den gemeenen 
Javaan, die thans zoo arm en ellendig was, dat hij zijnen honger met bladeren en onkruid moet stillen, ‘the 
pitiable state of the common Javanese, who at present is so poor and miserable that he must still 
his hunger with leaves and weeds’, is cited in Soekanto 1951b:29. Sukur’s clandestine disappear-
ance from his father’s house in Semarang in 1822-1823 to meditate at Gunung Prau on the Dieng 
plateau on the border between Semarang and Kedhu, may have a connection with this report and 
his knowledge of the living conditions of ordinary Javanese in the Kedhu area, see vAE (aanwinsten 
1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), 
n.y. (? 9-1828), mentions that the government tracked him down to his hiding place, but the affair 
was not treated very seriously, which in Smissaert’s view was a mistake given that Sukur was an 
‘extremely dangerous man’, all the more so because of his education in Bengal (1812-1814) and his 
fluency in English, see further p. 364. The consumption of root crops by the local Yogya population 
when the price of rice was too high is cited in Dj.Br. 3, A.H.W. Baron de Kock, ‘Algemeen verslag 
der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1850’, 31-3-1851. On the failure of the 1823 tobacco harvest 
because of heavy rains which followed the 28 December 1822 eruption of Mount Merapi and the 
lava flows which directly damaged tobacco fields in Prabalingga district, see Baud 91, Pieter le 
Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag over de residentie Kadoe’, 30-3-1824, 39; Residentie Kadoe 1871:97. On attacks 
on the rice harvest by rats and mice in 1819 and 1822, see Residentie Kadoe 1871:89.
83 Den Javaan [die men] hout [liet] kappen en slepen en koffij planten op het tydstip dat hij zijn 
rijstvelden moest bewerken om voor het bestaan van hem en zijn huisgezin te zorgen; dat men gevoeglijk ook 
eerlang al om oproer zoude uitbreken, ‘the Javanese who is expected to fell and haul timber and plant 
coffee just at the time when he should be working his ricefields in order to provide for his own 
and his family’s upkeep; [and] who might well before too long burst into insurrection’, Soekanto 
1951b:29.
84 Baud 177, Willem van Hogendorp, ‘Extract rapport betreffende Kedoe’, 1827. This can be 
compared to the 150,000 Spanish dollars (f 400,000+) which Raffles’ estimated as the province’s 
tax return in 1812 (Chapter VIII note 82), and the 7-800,000 which the former Resident, A.M.Th. 
de Salis, reckoned as the profits from the province in 1825-1826, De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’, 8-5-1828. 
For statistics on the growth of coffee cultivation in Kedhu between 1820-1824, see Residentie Kadoe 
1871:109, which indicates that just over two million coffee trees were planted in that four-year 
period. Kedhu has extensive areas of high ground (over 3,000 feet) on the flanks of the Merapi-
Merbabu volcanic range to the east, Sumbing-Sundoro to the west and Gunung Prau and the 
Jambu hills to the north bordering Pekalongan and Semarang residencies, Atlas 1990:15a-b.
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koned that the province was three times more heavily burdened with tax 
and labour services than adjacent districts. So invasive had been the impact 
of coffee cultivation on village commons that Van Hogendorp worried that 
the Dutch ‘had overthrown [in a decade] the principle of common village 
ownership which has been evolved over centuries’.85 Hardly surprising then 
that the coffee estates were one of the first targets for attack by Dipanagara’s 
supporters during the Java War with many coffee bushes being uprooted.86 
In fact, Radèn Sukur had given a clear warning in 1822 of the serious agrarian 
disturbances which he felt were imminent if nothing was done to alleviate the 
plight of the ordinary Javanese. This materialized in July 1825 when the inha-
bitants of the southern Kedhu district of Prabalingga, which had a population 
of around 35,000, rose en masse after a major failure of the tobacco harvest 
and news of Dipanagara’s own rebellion in the sultanate (Carey 1981a:266 
note 123). As with the destruction of the coffee estates in central and northern 
Kedhu, so the main targets for popular vengeance in the south showed the in-
tense hatred of the local population for alien economic domination and fiscal 
oppression. Thus the first attacks were made on land tax posts, tollgates, the 
houses of European land tax inspectors and estate overseers, and on the resi-
dent Chinese community, most of whom fled for their lives to the provincial 
capital of Magelang or the north coast (Carey 1981a:260 note 106).
The working of the tollgates
The plight of the Chinese in southern Kedhu in July 1825 was due in large 
measure to another aspect of the post-1816 European administration which 
had contributed so materially to the rising unrest in the south-central Javanese 
countryside prior to the Java War. This was the working of the tollgates 
(bandar). In the space of just twelve years (1812-1824), following the British 
take-over in August 1812, the revenue received by the European government 
from the bandar in the Yogya territories alone nearly quadrupled (Appendix 
XV). Before dealing with the post-1816 situation in greater detail, we need 
to turn aside for a moment to consider how the tollgates and their Chinese 
keepers came to be so ubiquitous in the south-central Javanese countryside in 
the years before the British annexation. 
85 Baud 177, Van Hogendorp, ‘Extract rapport betreff ende Kedoe’, 1827. On the village com-
mons or sawah kongsèn, see Onghokham 1977:186.
86 Dj.Br. 3, F.G. Valck, ‘Algemeen verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1833’, 3-1834; 
MvK 3054, ‘Beschrijving en statistieke rapport betreffende de Residentie Kedoe’ (henceforth: 
‘Beschrijving der Residentie Kedoe’), 1836:25-6, on the uprooting of coffee bushes during Java 
War: an estimated 755,000 coffee bushes out of a pre-war total of 2 million were destroyed.
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The original tollgates had apparently grown up at wayside stopping pla-
ces and overnight shelters (pesanggrahan) for travellers on the principal high-
ways of seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Mataram and the pasisir 
(Nagtegaal 1996:167. These stopping places, which were positioned a day’s 
journey on foot from each other, were frequented by Chinese merchants, 
some of whom had bought the right from the local captain of the Chinese or 
kapitan cina to levy tolls from other travellers for looking after their goods and 
belongings overnight. Over time, a fully fledged bandar would be established 
run by a Chinese tollgate keeper. Sometimes a market would also develop 
from the wayside stalls (warung) serving the overnight shelter. Then, as the 
Chinese bandar became more familiar with the surrounding countryside and 
greater pressure was put on him by his kapitan cina to pay higher rents, smal-
ler tollgates (rangkah) would be set up on adjacent country lanes. Observation 
posts (salaran) were also constructed on the borders of the customs’ districts 
controlled by the separate bandar to check that the requisite taxes had been 
paid before traders passed into a new zone. These developments were acce-
lerated by the rise of regional trade in the seventy years of peace which fol-
lowed the Giyanti treaty of the mid-eighteenth century. So much so that just 
before the outbreak of the Java War, in the words of the Dutch commissioners 
charged with enquiring into the administration of the Principalities, ‘there 
was a tollgate at the entrance of nearly every village and hamlet’.87 
Beginning with the thirty-four established bandar in 1812 (pp. 383-5; 
Appendix XV), an additional 106 rangkah, 45 rangkah-cum-pasar and 187 
smaller markets were counted in Yogya alone by 1821.88 In addition, there 
were two tobacco warehouses (gedhong tembakau) in recently annexed Kedhu, 
where tobacco consignments were weighed, inspected and assessed for cus-
toms’ duties prior to their export to the north coast (p. 383). Other monopo-
lies and indirect taxes administered by the bandar were also established: in 
the court towns every gamelan (Javanese orchestra) was taxed and failure to 
meet such payments could result in arbitrary imprisonment. As we have seen 
(Chapter I), many bandar maintained their own prisons and stocks.89 Copper 
coins imported from Surabaya and the north coast also paid heavy duty with 
87 S.Br. 170, J.I. van Sevenhoven, H. MacGillivray and A.H. Smissaert (Commissarissen belast 
met het onderzoek in de regering der tolpoorten, de administratie der vogelnestjes en het oprig-
ten eenen landraad in de Residentiën Soerakarta en Jogjokarta’, henceforth: ‘Commissioners’) 
(Yogyakarta/Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 24-10-1824.
88 Dj.Br. 64, ‘Extract uit den algemeenen staat der amfioen kitten behoorende bij de resolutie 
van den 29 Juli 1820 no. 11, aantoonende de plaatsen alwaar in deze Residentie [Yogyakarta] door 
den amfioen pachter in het klein zal mogen worden verkocht met aanwijzing van het aantal kitten 
op elke plaats’, 1821, list showing tollgates and pasar in Yogya where opium could be retailed. See 
also Appendix XV.
89 KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 13-6-1824. On taxing of wayang which dated back at 
least to the British period, see IOL, G21/26, Java Public Consultations, Report of Willem Jacob 
Cranssen, 21-12-1814.
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the result that specie in the Principalities was more costly than in other are-
as.90 Indeed, such high tax was paid on north coast salt that this essential 
commodity was said to be virtually unobtainable in some parts of the eastern 
mancanagara on the eve of the Java War.91 
In theory, the tollgate system worked according to certain rules. Thus 
full dues were levied on certain products at the bandar which would then be 
exempt from all but a token payment – wang peniti (literally ‘pin money’) – 
at adjacent rangkah. If, however, a load was only going a short distance and 
merely needed to pass through a subordinate tollgate or rangkah, then half 
the toll was charged. The receipts of the toll payments were stamped on the 
hands of the Javanese traders and peasant cultivators in slow-fading blue 
indigo dye and these were inspected at the observation posts (salaran) be-
fore the loads were allowed to pass through to the next customs’ area.92 One 
problem was that a main tollgate and its subordinate rangkah might some-
times be sub-farmed by two different Chinese who would each levy full dues 
instead of the usual wang peniti of two cents a horse load.93 Tariffs were fixed 
on the main trade goods from the Principalities. These included rice, raw 
cotton (kapas), cotton thread, piece goods, tobacco, peanut oil, and indigo, all 
of which were exported to the north coast. At the same time, imports of iron, 
gambir (catechu),94 ginger, beeswax for the batik industry, benzoin (a fragrant 
gum resin used in the manufacture of perfumes and incense), spices, opium, 
silks and foreign cloths were imported from the north coast and the eastern 
outlying provinces. These were also liable to tax. So too were special products 
from the craft centres in the Principalities, such as the finely woven mats or 
klasa pesantrèn from the tax-free villages of Pesantrèn and Bendha in southern 
Kedhu, and Javanese tree-bark paper or dluwang from the famous religious 
90 Dj.Br. 60, Besluit van den Commissarissen-Generaal, 20-4-1818 (on import of copper coins 
from the Tawangsari mint in Surabaya); vAE (aanwinsten 1900), 283, Hendrik Mauritz MacGil-
livray (Surakarta) to Director of Finances (Batavia), 1-5-1825. Smissaert later noted that opium 
tax-farmers in particular made vast profits out of exporting silver money from Yogya and chang-
ing it for government notes in Semarang or Kedhu, vAE (aanwinsten 1941) 28, A.H. Smissaert 
(Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 7-1-1824. See further pp. 278-9 (on 
export of silver specie from Principalities in 1811); Van den Broek 1893:14-6 (on minting of copper 
coins during Van der Capellen’s administration, 1816-26).
91 KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 13-6-1824. See further Chapter I note 125, Chapter VIII.
92 S.Br. 170, Commissioners (Yogyakarta/Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/
Bogor), 24-10-1824; S.Br. 170, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta), Report on the working of the 
tollgates (henceforth: Van Burgst, ‘Report’), 29-5-1830.
93 AvJ, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 9-5-1824. 
A horse load varied between 100 to 150 kilograms: Smissaert reckoned such a load at 180 ponden 
(or 82 kilograms; 1 pond = 453 grams), but we know from other sources that it could weigh nearly 
double that, see page 473.
94 See Sastroamidjojo 1967:150-1. Catechu was often used to treat dysentery and other stomach 
ailments.
The power of prophecy470
school of Tegalsari in Panaraga in east Java.95 
The rates on all these goods were determined by the sub-farmers of the 
individual bandar in consultation with the principal tax-farmer in the area 
and the European Resident. The amount of tax was based on the status of the 
tollgate and the general level of prosperity in the district. Thus a pikul (62 kilo-
grams) of rice paid a toll of 44 cents at the old established Mataram era tollgate 
of Ampèl on the Surakarta-Salatiga road, 15 cents at the bandar of Panaraga, 
eight cents in Pacitan town and a mere two cents at the sub-tollgate (rangkah) 
of Pager Watu in the same south coast district.96 However, tariff rates were 
hardly ever properly displayed. Indeed, as most Javanese were illiterate, they 
would not have been able to read them anyway.97 Chinese merchants were 
supposed to pay three times more duty on their merchandise than Javanese. 
In practice, they were often able to get by with only token payments because 
of preferential treatment from their countrymen.98 
Besides such invidious ethnic preferences, the greatest problem faced by 
the ordinary Javanese peasant cultivator was that there were no fixed duties 
on common foodstuffs and agricultural produce. These included the fruit and 
vegetables grown in his orchard or garden which were frequently sold in the 
local market. The level of tax levied on those goods was left at the discretion of 
the tollgate keeper who raised a percentage levy. In effect, this meant that he 
took as much money as possible. Indeed, the bandar were often constrained to 
act harshly because they themselves had sub-rented the tollgate from various 
intermediaries and needed to recoup their cash outlay as soon as possible.99 
Van Sevenhoven, who considered the tollgates along with the porters’ 
guilds as the two greatest evils of pre-war Javanese peasant society, gave a 
depressing account of the sort of scene which became an all too familiar oc-
currence at tollgates throughout south-central Java in this period. He des-
cribed how a Javanese on the way to market would be forced to wait for 
hours in a queue before his load was inspected. If his buffaloes grazed on 
the tollgate keeper’s land during this time, he was fined and if this fine was 
not paid his draught animals were impounded so that at harvest time it was 
not uncommon for a Javanese farmer to surrender the bulk of his profits to 
95 Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta), Report on tollgate regulations, 10-2-1802 (on trade 
in klasa pesantrèn mats by Chinese and Javanese merchants between Kedhu and Semarang); MvK 
3054, ‘Beschrijving der Residentie Kedoe’, 1836:34, 38 (on export of mats); Raffles 1817, I:166-7; 
Crawfurd 1971:327-8; Raffles 1817, I:175; Kooijman 1963:58-60; S.Br. 170, Panaraga and Madiun 
tollgate rates, 1830, on trade in dluwang.
96 S.Br. 170, Van Burgst, ‘Report’, 29-5-1830.
97 KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 15-6-1824.
98 S.Br. 170, Van Burgst, ‘Report’, 29-5-1830.
99 KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 70-1; AvJ, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen 
(Batavia/Bogor) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 9-5-1824.
IX Binding on the iron yoke 471
cover the rent of his own animals from the local bandar.100 When the peasant 
cultivator’s turn came for his load to be inspected, the tollgate keeper would 
browbeat him and demand that he hand over a large percentage payment 
on his goods for right of passage. The peasant cultivator would then throw 
himself at the tollgate keeper’s mercy: ‘Ampun tuwan [‘Have mercy, Sir!’], my 
family is poor!’. But if he refused payment, he ran the risk of having his entire 
load confiscated. During the long hours of waiting, the farmer would often be 
tempted to take opium which was readily available at the bandar and usually 
retailed by the keeper as an additional income source. In the event of an over-
night stay, there would be the added beguilement of ronggèng (dancing girls, 
prostitutes) and gambling parties which would further eat into the farmer’s 
meagre savings. If he had serious ill-luck at cards, the farmer would often be 
forced to part with his clothes and even the money, which many Javanese tra-
ders and peasant cultivators borrowed from their village heads to cover the 
cost of the toll dues. In such a situation, it was not uncommon for a peasant 
cultivator to take to a roving life as a bandit or porter on the roads rather than 
face the ignominy of returning empty-handed to his village.101
The impact of the tollgates on internal trade and Sino-Javanese relations
Appeals to local Javanese officials about abuses of power by the tollgate kee-
pers were usually unavailing because the officials themselves were given cash 
gifts (wang pesangan) to ensure they overlooked extortionate practices. In ad-
dition, a journey to the court towns to put a case before the Residency court 
was usually beyond the means of the average farmer (p. 386). The only way 
a ‘little man’ (wong cilik) could revenge himself on a tollgate keeper would be 
by enlisting the help of local bandits and getting them to plunder the bandar 
or burn it to the ground. Such cases of burglary and arson occurred with 
increasing frequency in the years before the Java War as can be seen from 
the rising value of goods stolen from the tollgates.102 Many Chinese tollgate 
keepers also lost their lives. This situation became desperate following the 
100 This detail was pointed out by Van Sevenhoven’s colleague as commissioner, Hendrik Mau-
ritz MacGillivray, who served as acting Resident of Surakarta (1823-1824) just before Van Seven-
hoven’s one-year incumbency (1824-1825), see MvK 4132, MacGillivray, ‘Nota omtrent den staat 
der Javasche vorstenlanden, de thans bestaande onlusten en de middelen welke tot herstel en 
verzekering der rust kunnen worden aangewend’ (henceforth: MacGillivray, ‘Nota’), Surakarta, 
13-5-1826. MacGillivray’s report was later published, Van Kesteren 1892:973-96.
101 KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 77; AvJ, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Bat-
avia/Bogor) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 9-5-1824.
102 MvK 4132, MacGillivray, ‘Nota’, 13-5-1826, gives the following figures for the value of goods 
stolen from the bandar in the period 1817-1824: 1817: f 2,278; 1818: f 3,005; 1819: f 2,442; 1820: 
f 4,240; 1821: f 8,791; 1822: f 15,623; 1823: f 15,660; 1824: f 32,100 (estimate).
Plate 55. Sketch by A.A.J. Payen of Chinese inhabitants of Java in the early nineteenth 
century showing them in their distinctive clothes with top-hats, umbrellas and long 
pigtails. Inv. nr. E/71 of the A.A.J. Payen drawing collection (Leiden). Photograph by 
courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden.
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outbreak of the war when all the tollgates in the vicinity of Yogya were burnt 
to the ground.103 But popular retribution such as this often spelled disaster 
for the inhabitants of neighbouring villages, which, under the terms of the 
Javanese criminal codes, were liable to pay an indemnity amounting to two-
thirds of the value of any stolen goods or a ‘blood price’ (diyat) – which was 
double the amount for a dead Chinese than for a Javanese – to the family of 
the murdered man if the crime could not be resolved satisfactorily (Soeripto 
1929:88, 268; Carey 1980:126-8, 130 note 1).
Faced with the threat of constant attack, the tollgate keepers began to or-
ganize their own ‘private armies’ of bodyguards and thugs, some of them 
recruited from former sepoys (p. 421), thus adding another twist to the spiral 
of violence in country areas as the Java War loomed (Carey 1981a:243 note 
36; Chapter I). Even when Van Sevenhoven was first writing just before the 
British take-over of the tollgates in August 1812, the potential that they might 
develop into a serious impediment to trade in south-central Java was already 
evident. Twelve years later, when he served as commissioner enquiring into 
the administration of the Principalities, the bandar had become so effectively 
sited that nothing could be transported on the roads without going through 
one. If a Javanese tried to evade a tollgate by taking a cross-country route, the 
tollgate keeper’s spies would usually report his action resulting in the forfei-
ture of his goods.104 The increase in customs’ posts had a significant effect on 
the price of foodstuffs in south-central Java. Nowhere was this more evident 
than in Yogya where prices of rice and other necessities were nearly double 
those in Surakarta, which benefited from cheap transport costs for bulk goods 
along the Sala River (Plate 22; p. 193 note 122; Appendix X). 
In 1812, Crawfurd had written that ‘the abundance and cheapness of 
Cadoe [Kedhu] rice is such that it will bear a journey of 100 miles and heavy 
imposts at the tollgates without becoming too expensive’.105 But this was fan-
ciful. Eight years earlier, the Yogya Resident, Matthijs Waterloo, had worked 
out that a journey from the main rice market at Pasar Payaman in northern 
Kedhu to Yogya would add at least forty percent to the cost of rice retailed 
in the sultan’s capital. He cited the case of a local trader who purchased a 
horse load of rice weighing 240 kati (148 kilograms) for f 6 in Kedhu and sold 
the same amount for f 9.60 in the main market in Yogya (Chapter I note 7) 
after the market taxes (58 cents), tollgate dues (98 cents) and the hire of the 
horse (f 1.60) had been paid for. The trader himself would barely retain a 34 
cent profit – a miserable three percent on his original outlay – for himself 
103 dK 197, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 30-7-1825. On the situa-
tion in the eastern mancanagara, see further Carey 1984:1-2.
104 S.Br. 170, Commissioners (Yogyakarta/Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/
Bogor), 24-10-1824.
105 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 287.
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after a gruelling eleven-hour day travelling over wretched roads in constant 
fear of bandit attacks.106 It was for this reason that rice imports from other 
productive areas such as Banyumas, Bagelèn, Rèma and Ledhok were rarely 
undertaken. Indeed, the price of rice would become an important barometer 
of political discontent with times of high prices coinciding with periods of 
dearth and agrarian unrest, especially in 1821-1822 and 1824-1825 (pp. 475, 
493-4). The fact that Yogya was so dependant on rice imports made it especi-
ally vulnerable in this respect.
The European government was perfectly aware of the harmful effects of 
the tollgates and it made some moves to restrict their influence before 1825. 
As we have seen (p. 384), the British abolished the bandar along the Sala River 
in February 1814 and the Dutch followed suit in Kedhu in 1824, a move 
which led to an immediate increase in the number of markets and the level 
of trade in the province.107 In the same year, Van der Capellen appointed 
a three-man team of commissioners headed by the Residents of Yogyakarta 
and Surakarta and including Van Sevenhoven, soon to take over as Resident 
of Surakarta (in office 1825-1827), to enquire into the working of the tollgates 
in the Principalities. The team reported back in October 1824 unequivocally 
recommending the abolition of all internal customs posts and suggesting that 
the European government should indemnify itself for the lost revenue – esti-
mated at about a million Indies guilders – by annexing the western outlying 
provinces of Bagelèn and Banyumas (p. 562). They also urged that all Chinese 
resident in villages and hamlets should be ordered to move to the royal ca-
pitals, that every unmarried Chinese who had been in the Principalities for 
less than two years should be expelled forthwith, along with those who 
were unemployed or guilty of extortion, and that no new Chinese immigra-
tion should be allowed.108 As one of the commissioners, Hendrik Mauritz 
MacGillivray, later put it:
The Chinese are our work tools and although each year we rejoice over the incre-
ased [tax revenues] which are ascribed to [increased] prosperity and welfare, we 
bind the iron yoke more firmly on the shoulders [of the Javanese] […]. For a mil-
lion guilders a year worth of taxes we compromise the welfare and happiness of 
almost two million inhabitants who are not immediately under our protection […] 
but whose interests are so clearly linked to ours.109
106 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 29-12-1804.
107 Schneither 92, Pieter le Clercq, ‘Algemeen verslag der Residentie Kadoe over het jaar 1824’, 
30-5-1825. The bandar along the Brantas and Madiun rivers were also abolished in December 1823, 
KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 13-6-1824. On the importance of river networks in east Java 
for trade, see Raffles 1817, I:196; p. 193 note 122.
108 S.Br. 170, Commissioners (Yogyakarta/Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/
Bogor), 24-10-1824.
109 MvK 4132, MacGillivray, ‘Nota’, 13-5-1826. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:13; 
Van der Kemp 1896a:386.
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Only the ‘good nature and peacefulness’ of the Javanese, in the commission-
ers’ opinion,110 had enabled the oppression of the tollgate system to continue 
for so long. They ended with a fearful prophecy:
We hope they [the Javanese] will not be awoken out of their slumbering state, for 
we reckon it as a certainty that if the tollgates are permitted to continue, the time 
is not far distant when the Javanese will be aroused in a terrible fashion.111
Despite the dire warnings of imminent agrarian unrest from nearly every 
official who studied the problem, the post-1816 Dutch administration felt it 
could not forego the lucrative tollgate revenues from the Principalities (Van 
der Kemp 1896b:44-5). The nearly threefold rise in annual profits from the 
tollgate farms in Yogya between 1816 and 1824 seems to have made the senior 
officials in the Finance Department in Batavia blind to the fact that the bandar 
were inexorably paralysing trade. Writing in November 1824, a mere two 
months after taking over the once profitable tollgates of Bantul and Jatinom 
to the south of Yogya, the local Chinese tollgate keeper reported that he had 
become bankrupt.112 A prolonged and severe drought since the beginning of 
the year had destroyed the cotton crop and basic foodstuffs such as castor-oil 
plants, soy beans and maize were in short supply. Rice prices were soaring 
(Appendix X) but little trade was being carried on in the local markets be-
cause commerce had effectively collapsed. 
We will see in the next chapter (Chapter X), how in these terrible months 
before the Java War, the south-central Javanese countryside became a place of 
suspicion and terror. Armed gangs operated with virtual impunity, murders 
were rife and the daily activities of the local peasant cultivators took place un-
der the ever-watchful eyes of the tollgate keepers’ spies who were positioned 
on every village and country road to prevent the evasion of toll dues. Even 
the dead on their way to burial were liable for imposts, and mere passage 
through a tollgate even without dutiable goods, would expose the traveller 
to what the Javanese sarcastically came to refer to as the ‘bottom tax’ (pajak 
bokong).113 Neither were high-placed Javanese officials exempt. Chevallier re-
marked how the grey-haired bupati of Nganjuk, a district in the Surakarta 
eastern mancanagara, remarked wrily that he was less fearful of the tigers in-
festing the teak forests on his cross-country journeys to the Sunan’s capital to 
attend the Garebeg festivals than he was of the bare-faced thugs who manned 
110 The commissioners’ remarks about the ‘good-natured and peaceful Javanese’, who were 
liable to run amok if aroused, constitute a classic expression of the widespread and self-deluding 
Dutch colonial view of de Javaan als het zachtste volk ter aarde (the Javanese as the gentlest people 
in the world). See Carey and Houben 1987:13.
111 S.Br. 170, Commissioners (Yogyakarta/Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/
Bogor), 24-10-1824.
112 Dj.Br. 59, Gan Hiang Sing (Bantul) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 9-11-1824.
113 KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 13-6-1824.
Plate 56. An opium den in Java in the early nineteenth century. Taken from Hardouin    and Ritter 1853:27 facing. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
Plate 56. An opium den in Java in the early nineteenth century. Taken from Hardouin    and Ritter 1853:27 facing. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
The power of prophecy478
the tollgates on the Nganjuk-Surakarta highway (Chapter I note 35). Other 
Javanese officials spoke with scarcely concealed contempt of the obscene way 
in which their wives and daughters were physically searched for items of 
jewellery by Chinese bandar newly arrived from the maritime provinces of 
China who were barely conversant in Malay.114 
The Dutch now began to refer to the Chinese as ‘a race of customs house 
keepers’ in their reports echoing the common Javanese expression for them 
as ‘tollgate people’.115 Nahuys, meanwhile, noted that barely one Chinese 
in twenty who came to Java from China ever returned to the place of their 
birth so rich were the pickings in the Indies.116 Yet not all Chinese were by 
nature oppressors. Before the post-1816 Dutch administration had ratcheted 
up its fiscal demands to intolerable levels, there were a number of favourable 
reports of the behaviour of Chinese tax-farmers. During the British period 
(1811-1816), the principal Chinese land-renter in Wirasaba in east Java, Lib 
Sing, who controlled over 200 villages, was reported to have been ‘a kind 
and indulgent master’ under whom the wong cilik or common people liked 
to take service because ‘the lands and villages in his area were better look-
ed after than elsewhere’.117 Similar reports were made of the Chinese land-
renters of Ulujami near Pekalongan on the north coast, the ‘rice granary’ of 
Semarang (Ong Tae-hae 1849:13; Carey 1984:17 note 76). Even Chinese toll-
gate keepers were praised. In May 1812 during his journey across Java, Jan 
Izaäk van Sevenhoven noted that the Chinese bandar at the ferry crossing at 
Kreteg on the Opak River to the south of Yogya ‘seemed the very best sort of 
tollgate keeper’, whose subordinates ‘appeared healthy and robust’.118 What 
had changed in the post-1816 period was not the character of the Chinese 
but the character of the fiscal regime they served. And for this the post-1816 
Dutch administration must take full responsibility.
The effects of the opium monopoly
Although Van der Capellen’s government was principally responsible for the 
sharp rise in tollgate and market revenues after 1816, the British were the 
midwives to another equally disastrous development – the rapid extension 
114 KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 13-6-1825.
115 S.Br. 170, Commissioners (Yogyakarta/Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/
Bogor), 24-10-1824. The expression in the Dutch original was linie van douanen. The Javanese 
phrase was bangsa bandar.
116 S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/
Bogor), 29-9-1822.
117 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21 pt. 10, Lieutenant H.G. Jourdan, ‘Report on Japan and Wirosobo’, 28-4-1813, 
361.
118 KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 135-6.
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of the opium retail trade. The greater ease of opium imports from Bengal 
following the lifting of the British blockade of the Archipelago in August-
September 1811 and the financial pressures on Raffles’ government were the 
key reasons (Hasselman 1858:18-37). Once again, the Chinese came to assume 
a prominent and invidious role as farmers and retailers, opium retail and 
tollgate farming often going hand in hand.
 The statistics for official opium sales in the Principalities reflect the sharp 
increase in opium consumption which began in the British period. Between 
1802 and 1814 sales doubled from 40 chests of 148 avoirdupois pounds to 80, 
by which time the wholesale value of a chest had increased twofold due to 
the effects of inflation, the tightness of the British naval blockade (1804-1811), 
and the more stringent British enforcement of the opium monopoly after they 
assumed control of Java in August 1811 (Appendix XV note 7). During the 
1814-1824 decade, revenue from the Yogya opium farm multiplied five times. 
As we have seen (note 88), by 1820 there were 372 separate places licensed 
to retail opium in the sultan’s territories, namely, nearly every major tollgate, 
sub-tollgate and market in the sultanate. The exact number of opium addicts 
is difficult to ascertain. On the basis of consumption figures compiled in the 
late nineteenth century, a Dutch official estimated that some sixteen percent 
of the 20-million strong Javanese population took opium (Wiselius 1886:6). 
But if one counts all those who inhaled and digested ‘poor men’s’ varieties 
of the drug, such as opium-soaked cigarettes, opium-seasoned coffee, and 
opium-laced betelnut, the incidence of narcotic consumption was almost cer-
tainly very much higher (Rush 1977:20). Raffles, for example, distinguished 
between the crude opium or manta ‘eaten’ by people in the interior of Java, 
particularly in the Principalities, and the prepared opium, referred to as ma-
dat/candu, smoked extensively along the north coast (Raffles 1817, I:102-3). 
During his journey through south-central Java in May 1812, Van Sevenhoven 
remarked on the widespread use of opium amongst the members of the por-
ters’ guilds and unemployed labourers in the court towns. He also noted how 
the tollgate opium outlets had spread the habit amongst Javanese in the coun-
tryside.119 As he passed through the usually bustling market of Klathèn one 
morning, he noticed how full the opium dens were and how threadbare their 
inhabitants: some were barely clothed, others were dressed in worn-out kain 
(wrap-arounds).120 One and a half cents was enough, on average, to purchase 
a small wad of opium-soaked tobacco, containing at the most 76 milligrams 
of opium, which represented about 15 percent of a porter’s daily wage at this 
time (Carey 1984:35 note 160). For many it offered the only release from a life 
of unrelieved toil and hardship. In Pacitan, in the immediate post-Java War 
period, a huge religious feast would be held to celebrate the end of the coffee 
119 KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 73.
120 KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 79-80.
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harvest when crop payments would go on ‘opium eating’ (Kern 1908:163). 
The drug was also used widely as a stimulant and as a valued part of the 
Javanese pharmacopoeia for treating various ailments (Rush 1977:25). During 
the Java War, there were reports that many of Dipanagara’s troops had ‘fallen 
sick’ for want of opium, and Chinese peddlers did a brisk trade behind the 
prince’s lines when the violent sinophobe sentiments of the first months of 
the war had abated somewhat (pp. 610, 617; Louw and De Klerck 1897-1909, 
II:215-6; Payen 1988:68, 123-4 note 179). As we have seen (Chapter III note 89; 
Chapter VIII), several Yogya princes and high officials also acquired a taste 
for the opium pipe, and princely addicts were noticed amongst Dipanagara’s 
followers at his headquarters at Selarong in late July and early August 1825.
 A pastime for the rich, opium addiction was a disaster for the poor. Even 
the slightest predilection for the drug would exhaust the scarce savings of the 
Javanese peasant and made his already difficult economic position even more 
precarious. The road to social degradation and crime was ever present as 
Nahuys recognised during the Java War when he called for the rounding up 
of the thousands of landless labourers and footloose vagrants in south-central 
Java, ‘men with no ricefields whose [thin] shoulders and smooth hands bear 
no marks of labour and whose eyes, lips and colour betray the habitual use 
of narcotics’.121 The social consequences of opium addiction and the increa-
singly salient role played by the Chinese as retailers were yet another strand 
in the rapidly deteriorating socio-economic conditions in south-central Java 
in the post-1816 period. Along with the tollgates, the opium farm lay at the 
heart of the rise in anti-Chinese sentiments amongst the Javanese popula-
tion in the decade before the Java War. Attacks on Chinese tollgate keepers 
and merchants would become an increasingly prominent feature of popular 
movements in south-central Java as the war neared. This will be dealt with 
in the next section.
Popular millenarian movements and prophecies in south-central Java
The gathering socio-economic crisis in south-central Java was reflected in the 
increasingly turbulent situation in country areas. In contrast with the last four 
years of the British administration, when few events of significance had trou-
bled the surface calm of the Javanese countryside (Chapter VIII), the post-1816 
period witnessed a number of millenarian movements and an elite-led revolt 
in Kedhu in February 1822. These were all portents for the future. In January 
1817, the so-called Umar Mahdi affair occurred in eastern Bagelèn. Named 
after an inhabitant from the Yogya village of Sambirata in the Nanggulon dis-
trict of southern Kulon Praga (Dumont 1931:321), which would later serve as 
121 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 9 pt. 3, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Onlusten op Java’, Maastricht, 1826.
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a base for Dipanagara and a number of his leading supporters during the Java 
War and which was mentioned in Javanese millenarian prophecies as the place 
where a new kraton would be founded,122 this man took the title of Radèn 
Mas Umar Mahdi and proclaimed that he was the coming Ratu Adil (‘Just 
King’). He came to the notice of the Yogya authorities when he summoned 
a meeting of some fifty of his followers, including four women, armed with 
pikes, short sabres and kris. The meeting appears to have taken place at the 
village of Sanèpa near Tanggung in the Karanganyar regency just to the east of 
Purwareja in Bagelèn on 2 January 1817. All those attending were reported to 
have been dressed in white tabards (jubah) with different coloured turbans.123 
Prior to the meeting, Mahdi had written to a sub-district official in Tanggung 
– a Yogya administered area (Karanganjar 1931:6) – ordering him to construct 
overnight lodgings and a meeting place or paséban. Flattering him with the 
title of ‘Tumenggung’, he asked him to attend the gathering in person bringing 
with him as many of his followers as possible, all mounted on horseback.124 
Ten white banners, referred to in the reports as umbul-umbul – long vertical 
pennants attached to bamboo poles – were erected at the local mosque. Mahdi 
then announced to his supporters that Mas Tumenggung Sawunggaling, the 
local Yogya bupati of eastern Bagelèn (Chapter I), would be asked to lay down 
his authority. The Javanese date 18 Sapar AJ 1744 (AD Thursday, 9 January 
122 dK 158, ‘Lyst der personen welke zich als muitelingen hebben opgeworpen’ (with anno-
tations by H.M. de Kock), Magelang, 12-1829. Besides Dipanagara himself and one of his sons, 
the list gives the following names of figures on Dipanagara’s side who took refuge in Sambi-
rata at some stage during the Java War: Pangéran Jayakusuma (Ngabèhi) and his son, Radèn 
Mas Sadikin (Pangéran Jayakusuma II), Pangéran Adinagara, Pangéran Purbaya and Pangéran 
Suryadi (sons of Hamengkubuwana III), Pangéran Natadipura and Pangéran Suryadipura (sons 
of Hamengkubuwana II), Kyai Maja, Kyai Hasan Besari, Haji Badarudin and a certain ‘Kyai Guru’ 
(possibly Muhamad Pekih, Kyai Guru of Melangi, a leading religious advisers of Dipanagara, 
see Appendix VIIb), as well as fourteen former Yogya bupati. See further Appendix VIII. Sambi-
rata was also close to Karangwuni where Dipanagara’s mother and daughter were captured in 
October 1829, Chapter II note 17. On the millenarian prophecies associated with Sambirata, see 
Houben 1994:22, citing Van Deventer 1865-66, II:424.
123 Dj.Br. 60, D.W. Pinket van Haak (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Semarang), 
9-1-1817; UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 7, D.W. Pinket van Haak (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-Gen-
eral (Batavia), 10-1-1817, including a translated Javanese report of Ibnu Iman, religious official 
(pengulu) of the Yogya district head of Tanggung, Mas Ngabèhi Sumatirta, 11 Sapar, Bé, AJ 1744 
(AD 31-12-1816), translated by J.W. Winter. There is a brief reference to this affair in Tijdschrift van 
Nederlandsch Indië 23 (1861):298. Sanèpa is also sometimes referred to as Snèpa in the reports.
124 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Commissarissen Generaal, 21-1-1817 no. 1, Umar Mahdi (Sam-
birata) to Mas Tumenggung (sic) Sumatirta (Tanggung), n.y. (? 31-12-1816). According to Kara-
nganjar 1931:6, there were four Yogya officials in the eastern Bagelèn kabupatèn of Karanganyar 
before the Java War who were entitled to bear the title of Tumenggung and Sumatirta was not 
one of them. They were: 1. Radèn Tumenggung Sawunggaling (Semawung district, 8,000 cacah); 
2. Radèn Tumenggung Tirtanegara (Tanggung district, 6,000 cacah); and 3. the district heads of 
Batusapi and Bapangan districts (each with 3,000 cacah). In addition, there was the Surakarta 
tumenggung of Kutawinangun (6,000 cacah), Radèn Tumenggung Arung-Binang (‘the lord of the 
red pikes’, see p. 9).
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1817) was fixed as the day on which he would proclaim himself as the Ratu 
Adil and all the Javanese and Chinese inhabitants of Bagelèn ‘would be brou-
ght to obedience’.125 A later report by the acting Yogya Resident, J.D. Kruseman 
suggests, however, that Mahdi issued more sinister orders. These were sup-
posed to have instructed his followers to make for the weaving centre of Jana 
further to the west, where there was a sizeable Chinese population of traders 
and cloth merchants (p. 24). All the ‘rich Chinese’ found there were to be mur-
dered. His followers were then to proceed across the Menorèh mountains to 
Magelang from whence they were to make their way to Yogya to demand the 
fourth sultan’s abdication.126 In a private report submitted by a local religious 
official in Tanggung who had met Umar Mahdi, the future Ratu Adil was 
described as having declared himself to be a soldier of the Ottoman sultan, 
whom he referred to as Sultan Rum.127 He gave out that the sultan had or-
dered him to guard Sambirata since he would shortly be arriving there ac-
companied by Sèh Sayidina Muhamad, Sèh Rahman Waliyullah (alias Umar 
Mahdi) and thirty other sheikhs (sèh), all coming out of Arab lands. The aim of 
the sultan was to appoint Sèh Rahman Waliyullah (Umar Mahdi) as the new 
ruler of Java, an appointment which would be made in the Javanese month of 
Sapar (22 December 1816-20 January 1817).128 He would be assisted by one of 
the previous apostles of Islam (wali) in Java, Sunan Bonang, who would set 
himself up as a ‘field marshal’ in Semarang. Another follower of the Ottoman 
sultan, Umar Maya, would do likewise in Kedhu. Both would then assist in 
the purification of Java. Announcements were also be sent to the previous 
Javanese rulers along the following lines,
Order from me the Ratu Adil to Tuwan Haji Idris instructing all the haji under him 
to be gathered together and told that those who had lived in Mecca should return 
there and likewise those who had lived in Medina. For gold should become gold 
again, and silver silver.129
Shortly after this meeting, Umar Mahdi was taken prisoner along with 36 
of his followers. After being cross-questioned by the acting Yogya Resident, 
125 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 7, Mas Ngabèhi Sumatirta (Tanggung) to Mas Ngabèhi Kertareja 
(Surakarta), n.y. (? January 1817); Dj.Br. 40, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Secretaris van Staat 
(Batavia), 9-1-1817.
126 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Secretaris van Staat (Batavia), 
14-1-1817.
127 UBL, BPL 616 Port 5 pt. 7, Report of Ibnu Iman (Tanggung), n.y. (? January 1817), where 
Mahdi is described as a prajurit of the Ottoman sultan. On the Javanese view of the Turkish ruler 
as Sultan Rum (Sultan of [Eastern] Rome), see p. 153.
128 This was the month in which the ‘king of Mecca’ was expected to make his appearance in 
Java in 1788, Ricklefs 1974a:293.
129 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Commissarissen Generaal, 21-1-1817 no. 1. The reference to 
Haji Idris appears to be to the head of the Yogya court haji during Hamengkubuwana II’s reign, 
see further Chapter VII note 53.
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Umar Mahdi was declared not to be able to speak a word of Arabic, only 
Javanese with a thick Yogya accent.130 Initially condemned to death, his sen-
tence was later commuted to exile to Ambon for life on account of his ‘mad-
ness’.131 His followers were punished by flogging.
 The Umar Mahdi affair is striking in that many of the key themes of his 
movement can be traced through to Dipanagara’s great rebellion of 1825-1830. 
First, the juxtaposition of Javanese traditions and messianic expectations is 
especially noticeable. Thus, the names Umar Mahdi and Umar Maya seem 
to have been taken from the great Javanese-Islamic epic, Ménak Amir Hamza, 
which relates the fantastic legends of the uncle of The Prophet Muhammad,132 
in which the hero’s intimate retainers or panakawan bear the same monikers 
(Pigeaud 1950:235-40, 1967-80, I:212-6, III:420; Carey 1992:487 note 414). In 
a Surakarta version of the Jayabaya prophecies, the predictions ascribed to 
the eponymous twelfth-century ruler of Kedhiri (pp. 69-70), Umar Maya in 
particular occupied an important place as the warrior who would defend 
Medina against the attacks of the false prophets of the last hour, Jamajuda 
and Dabatul Arli.133 As we have seen, the reference to Sultan Rum (or Ngrum) 
arriving in Java with sèh from Arab lands can be traced back to the traditions 
of the Aji Saka tales and Jayabaya prophecies which held that the Ottoman 
sultan had organised the peopling and civilizing of Java (p. 153). Indeed, in 
the next chapter the reader will note references that the Ratu Adil himself 
was thought to have originated in Arab lands (p. 588). The return of the haji 
to the holy cities may also have had a connection with the tradition that the 
Javanese Just King should have two kraton, one in Java and one in Arabia 
(Wiselius 1892:188). The use of Sunan Bonang’s name was a direct allusion to 
the famous Sino-Javanese apostle of Islam or wali of the Demak period in the 
late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries who was considered to have play-
ed a crucial role in the spreading of Islam to central and east Java (Solichin 
Salam 1963:35-8; De Graaf and Pigeaud 1974:48-50). Furthermore, the traditi-
ons concerning the wali had close links with the Ratu Adil; in one version of 
the Jayabaya prophecies the latter is described as ‘a descendant of the wali’ 
who would be raised as a priest-king, and in another as a waliyullah, a mes-
senger of Allah (Brandes 1889:386-7; Wiselius 1892:188).
130 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 11, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Secretaris van Staat (Batavia), 
14-1-1817.
131 AN, Besluit van den Secretaris van Staat der Gouverneur-Generaal, 14-3-1818 no. 6.
132 Because of strictures against representing The Prophet Muhammad, the legends of Amir 
Hamza are used in Java as surrogate tales about The Prophet himself, see further Petersen 
1994:268, who points out that ‘Hamza legends in one form or another can be found in almost 
every culture that has had contact with Islam [and] their popularity is […] due to their capacity 
to incorporate local myths thereby making Islam more familiar and accessible’.
133 KITLV H 486, ‘Verbeterde Djoijo Bojo (trans. J.W. Winter)’, Surakarta, 4-1812; Van Praag 
1947:228-34; Sartono Kartodirdjo 1972:92, 97. On the origins of messianic expectations in Java as 
reflected in Javanese-Islamic eschatological literature, see Pigeaud 1947:270.
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 Second, in its practical aspects the Umar Mahdi affair seemed to be a 
microcosm of the events of Dipanagara’s rebellion. In both cases, an attack 
on Chinese merchants and tollgate keepers was regarded as a preliminary to 
the ‘purification’ of Java before the just rule of the Ratu Adil could be esta-
blished. Moreover, the white tabards and multi-coloured turbans adopted by 
Dipanagara and his troops during the Java War (Carey 1981a:276-7 note 169) 
were also evident in the earlier movement. It is interesting too that the use of 
Javanese titles such as Radèn Mas alongside Umar Mahdi’s millenarian name 
was not considered incongruous. The same juxtaposition of aristocratic titles 
and Arabic holy war names was common during the Java War. The only sig-
nificant difference was the timing. In 1825, most Javanese accounts state that 
the Ratu Adil was traditionally expected to declare himself in Sura, the first 
month of the Javanese year, rather than in Sapar, the second month, as was 
the case in Umar Mahdi’s uprising (Carey 1981a:261 note 108; Payen 1988:65, 
120 note 161). The Javanese year was also different; Dipanagara announced 
his Just King title in the spiritually significant seventh year – Wawu – of the 
Javanese eight-year Windu cycle (Appendix XIV), supposedly on the instruc-
tions of his spiritual adviser, Kyai Taptajani (p. 90), whereas Umar Mahdi 
made his pronouncement in the previous Bé year.
 The Umar Mahdi affair was not the only millenarian movement to occur 
in Java in 1817. In July of that year, Nahuys received news from his colleague, 
the acting Resident of Semarang, H.A. Steijn Parvé (in office 1816-1819), to the 
effect that 4,000 Javanese had gathered at the Yogya village of Ketangga in the 
Madiun area, a place renowned in Javanese literature as the site where the 
Javanese Just King would establish himself. Coming from Madiun and other 
eastern outlying districts, including adjacent north coast territories (Chapter 
VI note 189), they had brought unhusked rice (padi) from the recent harvest 
and congregated at the village ‘because of an old prophecy that a new and 
mighty ruler would establish himself there’, a clear reference to the Ratu Adil. 
Although enquiries by Nahuys turned up no evidence that such a gathering 
had taken place, it seems hard to imagine that the bupati of Grobogan, who 
was the original source of the acting Resident’s report, could have conjured 
the event out of his imagination. 
Two years’ later, a similar gathering was reported by the Resident of 
Pasuruan,134 J.C. Ellinghuijsen (in office 1818-1826), this time in the ‘forest of 
Ketangga’. This involved people from adjacent Yogya and Surakarta outlying 
districts, in particular Japan (Majakerta), Rawa (Tulung Agung) and Malang. 
They were said to have been summoned ‘to undertake a great work’ (gawé 
gedhé) – what the Dutch reports refer to in Malay as a pekerjaan besar – namely 
the establishment of a new ruler in Malang who would attack the adjacent 
134 The Resident of Pasuruan in the period 1816-1861 also had charge of the adjacent districts of 
Malang and Bangil, see Hageman 1864:253.
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north coast districts of Surabaya, Bangil and Pasuruan, presumably to clear out 
the local Chinese and Europeans. As with the Umar Mahdi affair, the orders 
were said to emanate from the Ottoman sultan, who bore the title of ‘General 
above the wind’ (Jéndral ing atas angin) and who resided in Rum (Turkey). 
Ellinghuijsen reported that the main Chinese tollgate keeper in Kedhiri was 
sufficiently alarmed by the presence of an 80-strong band in neighbouring 
Rawa that he had taken the precaution of arming himself and his assistants. 
Although orders were said to have been given to the local Javanese officials 
to support the movement, none had done so. According to members of the 
Rawa group, who had made their way to Malang, Kyai Sidul Aku, a Gresik-
based religious teacher was the chief instigator of the movement. He was said 
to reside in one of the kauman (firm Islamic communities)135 and specialised in 
instructing the local population in dhikr (short prayers for the glorification of 
Allah which are repeated in ritual order),136 practices which may have been 
linked to one of the mystical brotherhoods (tarekat) like the Nāqs habāndīyya 
and Shatt ārīyya which were popular in early nineteenth-century Java (pp. 
111-4). But the sources are silent about his fate and whether or not he was 
ever apprehended by the Dutch authorities.137
 A remarkable glimpse into the mental world of two contemporary 
Javanese mystics can be seen in reports from the Surakarta Residency archive 
dating from 1819 and 1822. The first, which appears in the translations and 
legal proceedings of the Surakarta civil (pradata) and religious (surambi) courts 
for 17 February 1819, is the translation of the prophetic utterances of a cer-
tain Kyai Iman Sampurna – ‘the sage of perfect faith’ – who lived in a former 
Brahmin temple which he had turned into a mosque in the forest of Lodhaya, 
a place situated in the Surakarta mancanagara district of Sréngat to the south 
of Kedhiri. Known, along with the Tengger highlands further to the east, as 
‘heathen’ territory at this time with many of the local inhabitants still practi-
sing pre-Islamic religions (agama Buda) and belief systems (Winter 1902:35, 102 
note 15), Lodhaya was an unusual area. Directly administered by the Sunan 
as part of his royal domain land (Rouffaer 1905:614 note 1), it was linked with 
various mystical beliefs, one of which was the appearance of men in the form 
of tigers.138 We will see how Kyai Iman Sampurna’s instruction made direct 
135 Kyai Sidul Aku was said to have had two places of residence: désa Blawi in the sub-district/
district of Karangbinangun (Dumont 1931:63) and désa Selempit in the Benawan Jero district, 
Dj.Br. 62A, J.C. Ellinghuijsen (Pasuruan) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 13-11-1819.
136 Kyai Sidul Aku’s dhikr included four described as panatagama (‘regulator of faith’), slamet 
bener (‘true safety’), kawin bathin (‘the marriage of the inner’) and dhikr sir (‘the wish dhikr’), Dj.Br. 
62A, J.C. Ellinghuijsen (Pasuruan) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 13-11-1819.
137 The only report on these events is in Dj.Br. 62A, J.C. Ellinghuijsen (Pasuruan) to H.G. Nahuys 
van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 13-11-1819.
138 On this so-called macan gadhungan (‘were-tiger’) phenomenon in which tigers are thought 
to harbour the souls of men at night, see Winter 1902:85, who also suggested that the belief was 
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reference to these practitioners of the agama Buda when he refers to the wong 
jahil, idol-worshippers and people without a revealed religion (note 144).
 According to the Resident of Kedhu who arranged for the sage’s instruc-
tion to be translated by the Arabic-speaking bupati of Kedhu (note 140), Iman 
Sampurna hailed originally from the village of Ampèl in Surabaya.139 He 
seems to have undertaken extensive pilgrimages to holy sites for the Resident 
described how he had often slept on Mount Lawu, home to the ‘king’ of the 
Javanese spirit world, Sunan Lawu. During one of his meditations on the 
mountainside he had received his instruction and had then gone to the forest 
of Lodhaya where he had turned a former Brahmin temple (sanggar) into a 
mosque. This became his overnight resting place. He also found a Javanese 
gamelan orchestra and a set of shadow-play puppets there – both usually re-
garded as quintessential symbols of pre-Islamic Javanese culture. He medi-
tated, prayed and held religious ceremonies (sedhekah) at which consecrated 
food would be distributed to the local villagers, all of whom were supposed 
to be able to turn themselves into tigers (note 138). His temple residence was 
held in high reverence by these people, who believed that by means of of-
ferings they could achieve riches and high official positions. None, however, 
dared approach the place alone for fear of being devoured by the tigers which 
guarded it. Sampurna was eventually inspired to make his instruction pu-
blic giving orders to the locals to make copies on pain of being devoured by 
the same man-eaters which patrolled his residence. He seems to have been 
helped at this stage by various men of influence in Sréngat, most notably 
the local Surakarta joint bupati, Radèn Tumenggung Mertadiningrat, the dis-
trict pengulu (senior religious official), Muhamad Besari, his son Kyai Soljak, 
and another respected teacher, Ajar Rawana alias Imanreja. All were found to 
have hidden copies of Sampurna’s instruction in their houses. After hearing 
news of the sage’s activities for several weeks, the Surakarta authorities in 
the person of the aged Sunan, Pakubuwana IV, and the Dutch Resident, Rijck 
van Prehn, decided to act. In mid-February, they ordered his arrest and that 
of the other men of religion. Mertadiningrat was dismissed. After being inter-
rogated by the Resident, Iman Sampurna was handed over to the Surakarta 
pengulu who gave him to his son, a mosque official (ketib), for further intense 
occasioned by the sheer number of tigers in the area some of which became man-eaters. But in 
Javanese belief systems the tiger is also seen as a mystical animal linked with those adept in medi-
tation and ascetic practices. See further Chapter II note 64; and Ricklefs 1993:60 on the many tigers 
in the Lodhaya area in the late seventeenth century.
139 S.Br. 131, F.E. Hardy, ‘Eenige berigten wegens de uitgever van dit geschrift [Iman Sam-
purna]’ (henceforth: Hardy, ‘Eenige berigten’), Magelang, 11-2-1819, in ‘Translaten en verbalen 
van den jaar 1816 tot 1819’ (henceforth: ‘Translaten en verbalen’), entry of 17-2-1819, states that 
Iman Sampurna had said that if anyone asked where he was from, they should ask at the house 
of Kyai Abdul Rahman of the village of Ampèl in Surabaya. This is likely to have been situated in 
the Nyamplungan sub-district of Surabaya, Dumont 1931:32.
IX Binding on the iron yoke 487
questioning.140 Considered highly dangerous, the authorities petitioned the 
governor-general to banish Iman Sampurna from Java and he was sent to 
Batavia to await a decision on his ultimate destination. At the same time, 
the Sunan gave orders to all senior court officials, village heads and mem-
bers of the Surakarta religious establishment that whoever believed in Iman 
Sampurna’s prophecies or were found to have copies of his instruction in 
their houses would suffer the same punishment as the sage.141 
The second document in the Surakarta archive was the deposition of a 
wandering ascetic who had links with Lodhaya, Sunan Waliyullah (He who 
is made Lord, The Messenger of Allah), which, as we have seen, was another 
of the names of the Just King. His testimony, which is dated 15 February 1822, 
gives an insight into the peregrinations (lelana; p. 127) of a Javanese mystic 
just a few years after the Serat Centhini, the great compendium of Javanese 
history, prophetic lore and manners was completed in Surakarta.142 Arrested 
by the Surakarta bupati wedana of Kedhiri after he had been discovered gathe-
ring disciples around him during his journey through the eastern mancana-
gara, he was brought down to Surakarta along with four of his followers for 
cross-questioning.143 Idiosyncratic, inspired, and richly allusive all at once, 
Sunan Waliyullah’s testimony, along with Kyai Iman Sampurna’s instruction, 
provide yet another window on the millenarian expectations and sense of 
foreboding in the Javanese countryside on the eve of the Java War.
The fragment of the Javanese original of Sampurna’s instruction which has 
been preserved in the Surakarta archive opens as follows:
140 S.Br. 131, ‘Eenige berigten’, 11-2-1819. Hardy appears to have obtained a translation from 
the pégon original from the bupati of Kedhu, Radèn Tumenggung Danuningrat (also known as 
Sayyid Alwi; in office 1813-1825), who, as the son a sayyid (descendant of The Prophet; Carey 
1992:439-40 note 203), was well versed in Javanese-Islamic literature and could read Arabic. He 
made a Malay translation which was then rendered into Dutch by Secretary of the Kedhu Resi-
dency F.G. Valck.
141 Dj.Br. 4, H.F. Lippe, ’Dagregister van den Res. Sourakarta 1819’, entries of 5-1-1819, 26-1-1819, 
15-2-1819, 17-2-1819, 19-2-1819, 20-2-1819, 22-2-1819, 4-3-1819, 7-3-1819, 8-3-1819, 11-3-1819, 
24-3-1819, 4-5-1819 (reporting Sampurna’s arrival in Batavia); S.Br. 131, ‘Translaten en verbalen 
van den jaar 1816 tot 1819’, entry of 21-2-1819. See also AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Gene-
raal, 27-2-1819 no. 15, requesting further information on Sampurna.
142 On the probable reworking of the Serat Centhini, and Serat Cabolang, the part of the Centhini 
which originated in the pasisir, written by carik Sutrasna and which deals with the pralambang or 
prophecies of Jayabaya, in AJ 1742 (AD 1814-1815) in Surakarta in the circle around the Surakarta 
Crown Prince, the future Pakubuwana V (reigned 1820-1823), see Pigeaud 1933:1-2.
143 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 22 pt. 4, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der 
Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 18-2-1822, containing a report and proces verbaal of ‘Sunan Waliyullah’, 
from Pangéran Aria Cakradiningrat (Kedhiri) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta), 15-2-1822. 
Cakradiningrat was an older cousin of Sunan Pakubuwana V (reigned 1820-1823), see S.Br. 129, 
‘Naamlijst der bij Z.H. den Soesoehoenan [Pakubuwana V] dienst doende regenten en kliwons te 
Soerakarta’, 1820-23.
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From °O° – This is a letter of proclamation from the sage of former times Iman 
Sampurna. 
In the coming Javanese year Alip (AD 21 October 1819-8 October 1820), there will 
be a very great epidemic in Java from the place of the spirit Taragnyana. This is the 
instruction from the sage Iman Sampurna.
In the coming Javanese year Alip, there will be a very great epidemic from the wes-
tern part. The army of the spirit Taragnyana will be like a mist; the forms will be 
various, some in the shape of poisonous millipedes, scorpions, snakes and tigers, all 
of whom will be venomous. The plague from the east will be brought by Nyai Rara 
Kidul and her army, Sunan Lawu and his army and all the spirits of Java. Various 
sorts of weapons will come from the east; some with weapons such as bodkins and 
augers, pikes, muskets, barbed pitch forks [and] halters. That is to say they will 
deal with everyone acocording to his kind, just as the heathen struck by the tahlil 
[confession of faith], arrogant people [will be] speared by pikes, for gamblers dice 
will be thrown by the spirits, arrogant people will be clawed by the spirits, greedy 
people will be destroyed by the spirits. After the epidemic has come, Java will be-
come a sea of blood with drifting corpses. That which will be the [protector] charm 
of people who observe the five daily prayers and people who pray using dhikr; they 
both should have religious feasts [sedhekah] with balls of rice and count the helpers. 
He who is praised is the King of Religion. The meat must be chicken meat, the 
soup must be made from small grains of rice, the prayer must be one for warding 
off catastrophe and at the end of the religious feast, the plates must be covered by a 
yellow cloth. And, moreover, they must know the confession of the faith of the King 
of Religion. If they know it, every night it must be read 44 times. This is the inner 
knowledge: ‘I know of the confession of the faith of the Maintainer and Regulator 
of Religion; he who has the “spirit of relation”, who is in the centre of the heart, 
who is the kernel of life, who is the outer aspect of God, who faces towards God, 
whose shadow is [The Prophet] Muhammad, really a man in perfect form, blessed 
in this world and in the hereafter, Ya ‘Hu’ Ya Allah.’ That is the true instruction. 
Furthermore, the men and women of Java absolutely must observe the instruction 
of the religious scholars from the Kitab Musarar [the text of the prophecies of King 
Jayabaya]: ‘I seek the protection of Allah, the All-Seeing, the All-Knowing, from the 
cursed Satan. The  pleasure of the world is nothing but vanity. Who calls besides 
Allah another god of  whom he has no proof, he is accountable to his Lord; the 
unbelievers will not flourish. Say: “My Lord, forgive and have mercy, thou art the 
best of the merciful.”’144
144 S.Br. 131, ‘Translaten en verbalen’, entry of 21-2-1819, proclamation of Iman Sampurna, 
1819:
Saking °O° punika layang pituduh saking pandhita kang dhihin-dhihin Iman Sampurna.
Ba bésuk in taun Alip Tanah Jawa pageblug luwih gedhé saking anggèné aran dhemit Tarag nyana punika 
pituduh saking pandhita Iman Sampurna.
Bésuk ing taun Alip Tanah Jawa pageblug luwih gedhé saking kilènan aran dhemit Teragny-
ana balané kaya pedhut warna-warna rupané sawenèh ana rupa kaya kelabang, kala-jengking, 
ula lan macan, iku padha ana dhuwèni upas sedaya. Anadéné pageblug kang saking wétan Nyai 
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Despite being one year out, the Iman Sampurna’s prophecies seemed to fo-
retell in graphic detail the coming of the first great Asiatic cholera epidemic 
of May 1821 which reached Java from the west, namely from India by way of 
Pulau Pinang and Melaka. He suggested ways whereby those who practised 
the true faith as Javanese Muslims could ward it off. Written in pégon script – 
the unvocalised Arabic script favoured by those steeped in Javanese-Islamic 
literature (Chapter III) or who espoused the world view of the santri – the 
proclamation contains much that would have resonated with members of the 
Javanese mystical brotherhoods and with the community of religious scho-
lars. One thinks particularly here of the kyai’s reference to the need to hold 
religious ceremonies at which food would be distributed (sedhekah), to recite 
dhikr (litanies)145 and prayers, as well as to observe the prophetic beliefs as-
sociated with the Kitab Musarar text ascribed to the real life twelfth-century 
Roro Kidul sabalané, Sunan Lawu sabalané miwah dhemit Tanah Jawa sedaya. Warna-warna gegamané 
kang saking wétan sawenèh ana gaman kaya uncek lan kaya jara, tumbak, bedhil, canggah, dhadhung, iku 
padha amadha sedaya maring wong jahil* padha katahil, wong ladak padha katumbak, wong botoh padha 
kabotoh déning dhemit, wong dir padha kacakir déning dhemit, wong murka padha sirna déning dhemit. 
Sangartané** pageblug pulo Tanah Jawa dadi segara getih, sarah mayit. Déné ingkang dadi tumbalé wong 
salat limang wektu lan wong muji dikir kalih wong padha sedhekaha segogolong ngétung batur kang 
dènmulé Ratu Agama, ana déné iwaké iwak pitik, janganané jangan menir, dongané tulak bilahi, wekasan 
slamet, kalih malih ambengé ditutupi serbèt kuning, kalih malih wajib angaweruhana ing sahadaté Ratu 
Agama, lamun weruh ing sahadat iku saben-saben wengi dènwacaa kaping patang-puluh papat, ikilah 
ilmuné: “Ingsun angaweruhi ing sahadat Paneteg Panatagama, iya jumeneng roh idlafi*** kang ana tel-
engé ati, kang dadi panceré urip, kang dadi layaring Allah, kang madhep maring Allah, wewayang ané 
Mohamad, sajatiné manungsa iku wujud kang sampurna, selamet dunya selamet akérat, Ya Hu Ya Allah.” 
Iku pituduh kang nyata. Poma manèh wong Tanah Jawa lanang wadon padha angimanana pituduh ing 
para ngulama lan saking Kitab Musarar: “a`ūdu billahi s-sami`i al-`alīm min aš-shayţān ar-rajīm, wa-mā 
`l-hayāt al-dunyā illā matā `al-ghurūr wa-man yad`ū ma`a-allah ilāhan akhara lā burhān lahu bīhī innahu 
fa-innamā hisābuhu `inda rabbihi innahu yuflihu al-kāfirūn wa-qul rabbī-ghfir warham wa-anta khayr 
al-rāhimīn.”**** °O°’.
*   This refers to the Jāhilīyah, the time before the Arabs had a Prophet, as well as to idol-worship-
pers and people without a religion.
**  This word is obscure, it may be a corruption of sakartané (Low Javanese/ngoko, sa-olehé), ‘after 
it’s done [happened]’.
*** This refers to the spirit of holiness – rūh al-Kudus, rūh idhāfī – which is discussed in detail in 
Johns 1957:67-72; Zoetmulder 1995:184-90.
**** Common prayer formula drawn from Qur’ānic phrases, including Qur’ān 3:185 (end), 
12:117-8, verse numbers refer to official Cairo edition, Padwick 1961:83. I am grateful to the late 
Professor G.W.J. Drewes for this reference.
I am grateful to the late Bapak Sastrasuganda of Daengan LOr III/31, Yogyakarta, for his translit-
eration of this pégon letter, and to Professor Merle Ricklefs and Dr Johan Meulemann of Leiden for 
their invaluable help on the translation and explanation of the original text.
145 S.Br. 4, A.J. Spaan, ‘Algemeen verslag der Residentie Soerakarta over het jaar 1887’, 3-1888, 
specifically refers to the dhikr ‘ya hū, ya Allah’ as being regarded as dangerous at a time in the 
1880s when the mystical brotherhoods (tarekat), especially the Nāqshabāndīyya and the Qadari-
yyah, were gaining adherents and a tarekat-influenced peasant revolt was about to break out in 
Banten. See further Sartono Kartodirdjo 1966:158-61. See further on dhikr hū which is said to be 
recited in the soul with the affirmation being held constantly in mind, Johns 1957:29.
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king of Kedhiri, Prabu Jayabaya (Chapter II note 4). The same amalgam can 
be seen in Dipanagara’s own Makassar manuscripts, in particular his refe-
rence to the ‘perfect man’ (insan kamil; Chapter III), which looms so large in 
the last part of Iman Sampurna’s instruction. We also know from a Dutch 
report written just a year after the outbreak of the Java War that belief in the 
Jayabaya prophecies was widespread and unshakeable both at the courts and 
amongst the wider network of men of religion of which Iman Sampurna was 
a part (Carey 1981a:lxiv note 122):
At the courts a prophecy exists […] from a certain ruler Jayabaya that […] a 
Javanese kraton cannot stand for longer than a hundred years. The rulers, courtiers, 
scholars and men of religion all have a deep respect and belief in this prophecy 
and are of the firm opinion that the term of the Yogyakarta court has been fulfilled 
and that of Surakarta will soon be ended. They are all the more confirmed in this 
conviction because, so they say, the prophecies have never failed.
We will return to the belief in the hundred year cycle later (p. 516). There is, 
however, an interesting link which Iman Sampurna made in his deposition 
to the Surakarta authorities (note 144) which has relevance to Dipanagara. He 
connected the coming of the Just King with the establishment of a monarch 
who would be a [Ratu] Paneteg Panatagama, a ‘Maintainer and Regulator of 
Religion’. This person, he stated, would be a ‘most winning personality, a true 
Mataram man’. Both these observations seem to suggest that Iman Sampurna 
might have had someone very much like Dipanagara in mind. Not only was 
he a prince of the royal Mataram line by virtue of his birth as the eldest son 
of the third sultan, but he also saw himself as a ‘Maintainer and Regulator 
of Religion’. This was a central aspect of his calling as a Just King as we will 
discover shortly (Carey 1974a:29; Chapter X). 
Just three years after Iman Sampurna’s instruction came into the hands 
of the Surakarta authorities, a twenty-three year-old inhabitant of the Yogya 
village of Karangnangka in Sokawati, who styled himself Sunan Waliyullah, 
turned up in Madiun. After wandering for three days in open fields around 
the capital of Yogya’s eastern mancanagara, he set off for the southern districts 
of Rawa (Tulung-Agung) and Kalangbrèt, passing through Lodhaya en rou-
te. There he stole some clothes from the local mosque, the same place where 
Iman Sampurna had taken up residence. These garments, he later gave out, 
belonged to him as a descendant of the former ruling dynasty of Majapahit, 
shades again of the Serat Centhini epic whose scabrous heroes are depicted 
in similar guise as scions of the great east Javanese imperial house (Pigeaud 
1933:189). One of the four followers whom Sunan Waliyullah gathered on his 
wanderings, reported that the young Sokawati-born Javanese had instructed 
him to read the Qur’ān and had promised him that he would make him in-
vulnerable to sickness – the great cholera epidemic of May 1821 having just 
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occurred. But after ten days, his period of instruction was cut short by Sunan 
Waliyullah’s arrest in Kedhiri by the bodyguards of the Surakarta bupati weda-
na. His succinct deposition, drawn up in Surakarta on 15 February by the same 
mancanagara head, is only available in Dutch translation. It reads as follows:
Name? Waliyullah. Dwelling? In heaven. Father? Nabi [The prophet] Adam. Mother? 
Eve. Grandfather? Sunan Gresik [one of the apostles of Islam in east Java]. Born? 
Surakarta area. Village? Karangnangka. Under which court? Yogyakarta. Where did 
you go when you left your parents’ house? To Banjarsari [the famous religious school 
near Madiun in east Java which was under the authority of the Yogya court]. How 
long were you there? One year. Then where to? To Surabaya. What for? To wander 
about to get blessings (tirakat). Where did you live? The house of Radèn Tirtakrama. 
How long for? Two years. What for? To purify my body. Then where to? To Gresik. 
Where did you live? Nowhere, still purifying my body. How long did that take? 36 
days. Then where to? To Tuban, to purify my body. Then where to? To Telaga Mandiri. 
What for? To meet the Prophet Kilir. Then where to? To Mount Jatisari. In which vil-
lage? Padang Panolan. Then where to? Mount Jatibungkus. What to do? To see the 
making/beginning of the world. Then where to? Ketangga. What to do? To see God’s 
work. Then where to? Majapitu (Sokawati). What to do? To see the kraton. Which one? 
The one that God has made. Then where to? To Wanakerta. What to do? To see the 
black smith (empu). Who is he? My grandfather. What does he do? He makes pikes and 
kris. His name? Kyai Modin [the kyai who calls to prayer]. Then where to? To Butug. 
What to do? To see Kyai Jagabadalan and to meet Jangul Manik. Then where to? To 
Pinggir. What to do? To wait for a sign. Then where to? To Maospati. What to do? To 
see the workers and peasants. What did you see? The pondhok [small pavilion] of the 
ratu [perhaps a reference to the gravesite of Ratu Maduretna, Chapter VI]. Where did 
you sleep? In the pengulu of Maospati’s house. Then where to? To Mount Lawu. To hear 
what? A voice. Then where to? To Cempurung. What to do? To see the flying horse 
Sembrani [the golden mount of Baron Kasendher, Ricklefs 1974a:412]. Then where 
to? Arja Kencana. What to do? To wait for Almighty God. How long for? Five months. 
Then where to? To Pasar Alam. What to do? To meet Dèwi Kantiwati. For how long? 
36 days. Then where to? To Tumbak (Lodhaya). What to do? To ask for my grandfa-
ther’s heirlooms (pusaka) [from the mosque]. Then where to? To Wringin Pitu [on the 
Brantas River 30 kilometres northeast of Majapahit]. What to do? To pray. Then where 
to? To Kedhiri. What to do? To fly. What is your aim? To be named king over all the 
land east of Mount Lawu. By whose authority? The God of the True Religion.
Space does not permit a lengthy consideration of all the references in Sunan 
Waliyullah’s enigmatic deposition, which bears interesting comparison with 
that of Iman Sampurna.146 But certain themes stand out. First, there are his 
146 Sampurna’s deposition, which is in S.Br. 131 ‘Translaten en Verbalen’, 17-2-1819, reads as 
follows: From where do you hail? Your visitor is a man living in this world [literally, a man from 
the middle world of men, OJ madyapada]; What is your name? A man of a certain age. Whom do 
you follow? I follow the Lord, that is to say the Maintainer and Regulator of Religion, who is the 
fence of saints and believers. His representative is The Holy Man, utterly considerate and a most 
winning personality, a true Mataram man. The reason I follow such excellent men, these sages 
of former times, is because Essence and Attributes are eternal, not subject to alteration, and alive 
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long periods of bodily purification or tirakat. Besides meditation and prayer, 
he would probably have lived on water and white rice, a practice known in 
Java as amutih (existing on a ‘white’ food fast) or patigeni (asceticism). This 
was often embarked on by Javanese mystics who wished to acquire superna-
tural powers such as the ability to fly. Second, there are what may have been 
real life periods of study at the great religious school of Banjarsari in east 
Java, and his meetings with men of spiritual power in Javanese society such 
as the kris maker/blacksmith (empu) at Wanakerta – presumably a village in 
his home district of Sokawati – whom he refers to as his ‘grandfather’. Linked 
to these is his intriguing reference to his desire to see – and presumably meet 
with – Javanese workers and peasants. One thinks here of Dipanagara and 
his comment that he always helped to cut and plant padi (rice) as a way of 
popularising the ‘chiefs with the people’ (Chapter II). Sunan Waliyullah was 
no chief like Dipanagara, but his desire to get close to the Javanese wong cilik 
(‘little people’) stands out in its social concern. Third, there are the professed 
encounters with the Javanese spirit world, in particular the ‘king of the spirits’ 
Sunan Lawu, whom Iman Sampurna had also sought out and been inspired 
by. A wind god of terrifying size whose voice was said to be like thunder, 
he usually manifested in gales and tempestuous storms (Ricklefs 2006:134). 
Fourth, there are the visits to places of historic importance, like the small 
pavilion (pondhok) of the ratu, possibly a reference to the grave site of Radèn 
Rongga’s beloved consort, Ratu Maduretna, at Gunung Bancak, earlier styled 
Giripurna (p. 219), and Ketangga, which we have seen was closely linked 
with Javanese millenarian expectations of the Just King. Finally, his quest to 
be named as ruler over all the lands east of Mount Lawu harked back to an 
older Javanese concept of the division of the island between central and east 
Java. This was already evident in the rebellion (1718-1723) of Dipanagara’s 
early eighteenth-century namesake, the Kartasura Prince Dipanagara who 
took the ‘Èrucakra’ title147 of the Javanese messianic Just King and proclai-
med himself ruler over all the lands east of Mount Lawu (Brandes 1889:371, 
380; Olthof 1941b, II:332-3; Ricklefs 1993:180, 2006:92). According to the 
Babad Tanah Jawi (‘Chronicle of the Land of Java’), he later ‘disappeared’ at 
Lumajang in east Java148 when the tide of battle turned against him in order 
not liable to death. Allah is my being and my presence, all of it conformable to the Messenger of 
Allah. From where do you hail man of a certain age [and] whom do you follow? I follow Radèn Putra as 
my lord. You and I are as it were [no more than] containers the size of a pounded pepper-corn. I 
am Mbok Partimah [Fatima, the daughter of The Prophet also known as ‘Fāţima al-zahrā’ (Fatima 
‘the comely’)], the winsomest lady in this world and the hereafter. Your innermost being is identi-
cal with mine. But be careful!’
147 Brandes (1889:399) translates this title as ‘jewel of the world’. It is equally possible that the 
cakra in the title refers to the solar-disc/discus weapon of Wisnu, the world preserver, see Plate 65 
on pp. 598-9. 
148 In fact, he was exiled to the Cape of Good Hope in July 1723 after the rebellion, which he 
had led with his brothers Blitar and Purbaya, was defeated by an alliance of Dutch (VOC) and 
Kartasura forces, Ricklefs 1993:180-82, 188-201, 2006:95.
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to wait for a more appropriate moment for his task as Just King to be fulfilled 
(Brandes 1889:386-7; Olthof 1941b, II:360). Just over a century later, Pangéran 
Dipanagara of Yogyakarta would take up the Kartasura prince’s mantle. 
The crisis in the Javanese countryside, the cholera epidemic of 1821 and Pangéran 
Dipasana’s revolt
During the five years which elapsed between the Umar Mahdi affair of 
January 1817, and the arrest of Sunan Waliyullah in Kedhiri in February 1822, 
agrarian conditions in south-central Java appear to have deteriorated rapidly. 
Some of the evidence for this we have already considered in connection with 
the impact of the tollgates and problems in Kedhu, to which we will return 
shortly in connection with Pangéran Dipasana’s abortive February 1822 re-
volt. Conditions were compounded by a run of poor rice harvests and a crisis 
in the indigenous sugar industry. Writing in 1820, Nahuys pointed out that 
although commerce and cultivation seemed to have been increasing with 
more woodland being converted into wet-rice fields, the state of the Javanese 
sugar industry had precipitated a short-term production crisis. In his view, 
the industry was too old-fashioned, particularly in Yogya, relying as it did on 
charcoal furnaces and wooden cylinders for boiling sugar, as well as power 
from draught animals rather than water.149 In the rush to capitalise on high 
international prices for sugar in 1819-1820, too much land had been converted 
from sawah to sugar production with the result that when sugar prices col-
lapsed in 1821-1822,150 the price of rice – which had been climbing since 1818 
– did not come down (Appendix X).
Although the temporary difficulties in the sugar industry were eventu-
ally overcome by the introduction of more modern equipment and the use 
of water power, rice prices remained stubbornly high (Appendix X). The si-
tuation was exacerbated in 1821 when the harvest failed in many areas due 
to an unusually long drought in the early months of the year. Farmers were 
149 AvJ, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to P.H. Lawick van Pabst (Surabaya), 17-2-1818; 
H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 12-7-1820. 
On the working of the indigenous sugar industry at this time and the role of the Chinese in boil-
ing sugar cane syrup in large woks, see Residentie Kadoe 1871:102-3; Knight 1975:322-4; Fasseur 
1977:284. For an unfavourable comparison of the Javanese sugar industry with that of Mauritius, 
see IOL, Eur F148/4 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 4), T.S. Raffles (Melaka) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 
24-1-1811, 10-2-1811. On the buying up of iron for the construction of sugar factories in Surakarta, 
see S.Br. 37:1073, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta) to Kyai Adipati Sura-adimanggala IV 
(Semarang), 6-5-1812. The crisis in the sugar industry in 1821, which led to a sharp fall in sugar 
prices and a temporary halt in production, is mentioned in Residentie Kadoe 1871:103.
150 AvJ, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 
12-7-1820; Baud 91, P. le Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag Kadoe’, 30-3-1824, 36 (on low prices for Kedhu 
and Bagelèn sugar in 1822); Residentie Kadoe 1871:103 (on collapse in sugar prices in 1821).
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encouraged to plant potatoes and other root crops, but it was hardly realistic 
to expect that this would bring a solution to the crisis in rice production.151 
Writing in April 1821 after nearly four months without a drop of rain, the lo-
cal Dutch overseer (opziener) of cultivations in southern Pacitan reported that 
his district was ‘a very dismal sight’ with many ricefields unworkable for lack 
of water and those that had been planted drying out quickly under the par-
ching wind from the sea (Kern 1908:162, 173-4; Carey 1986:123 note 237). In 
June 1821, the first Asiatic cholera epidemic struck Pacitan causing many fa-
talities amongst the already weakened population; every day farmers had to 
be pulled from the pepper and coffee estates dead from exhaustion and fever 
(Carey 1986:123 note 238). By November of the same year, the overseer was 
writing of the ‘total demoralization’ of the local work force, many of whom, 
especially those without access to irrigated rice lands and most at risk from 
famine and disease, were eking out a miserable existence on roots and leaves 
(Carey 1986:123 note 239). Neither bribes nor physical coercion, such as the 
whip lashes to the face and buttocks administered to recalcitrant village of-
ficials who reneged on their labour obligations, could keep sufficient workers 
in the estate fields. Whole villages moved to adjacent areas controlled by the 
courts to avoid such forced labour, and the population of government lands 
declined by nearly ten percent in the space of just two years (1819-1821; Kern 
1908:166, 173; Carey 1981a:293 note 243, 1986:124 note 240). Little revival took 
place before the end of the Java War. 
When it came, the Asiatic cholera epidemic of April-August 1821 was eve-
ry bit as terrible as Kyai Iman Sampurna had predicted in his February 1819 
instruction. In Java, it struck a ‘virgin population’ who had no inbuilt immu-
nity to the disease (Boomgaard 1983:13). Nahuys, at the time acting Resident 
of Surakarta, recalled the lethal virulence of the cholera attacks with many 
people succumbing in the Sunan’s capital after only a few hours and some 
even falling dead on the spot as though felled by an apoplectic fit (Nahuys 
van Burgst 1858:123-4). Brought by sailors from Pulau Pinang and Melaka, 
where it had broken out in late 1819, the epidemic first manifested itself in the 
Malay kampung (urban quarter) of Torbaya in Semarang. In the last week of 
April 1821, 1,225 people died (Muller 1832:2-3). By early May, the disease had 
spread along the entire north coast of Java with the most devastating attacks 
occurring in the colonial capital, Batavia (156 reported deaths a day at the 
height of the epidemic) and Surabaya (76 reported deaths a day in mid-June; 
Muller 1832:3). The main wave of the disease appears to have spent itself 
by early August, but in some parts of east Java, serious outbreaks persisted 
until the end of the year, especially in Surabaya, Madura, and the eastern 
151 ‘S.Br. 170, Handelingen van den Resident van Soerakarta 1821’, entry of 20-6-1821 (on 
Surakarta inhabitants being urged to plant potatoes and other root crops). See further Winter 
1902:49 (on consumption of tubers, leaves and forest fruits at times of harvest failure).
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salient (Oosthoek), where a total of 110,000 people or seven percent of the 
population are estimated to have succumbed (Carey 1986:133 note 288). The 
number of fatalities in inland districts appear to have been slightly lower, 
although in Surakarta during the worst phase of the epidemic in late June 
about seventy deaths a day were reported (Muller 1832:4; Nahuys van Burgst 
1858:123; Carey 1986:133 note 289). The situation was exacerbated by the ex-
ceptionally dry weather and prolonged drought, the scarcity and expense of 
all foodstuffs, and the fact that the epidemic was at its height during the fas-
ting month (Puwasa; 23 May-22 June 1821) when resistance to disease on the 
part of the population at large was probably lower. Nahuys as acting Resident 
of Surakarta even issued a letter of instruction to the local inhabitants not to 
fast because of the cholera epidemic (Carey 1986:133 note 290), but whether it 
was heeded is unclear. We know that the newly installed Sunan, Pakubuwana 
V (reigned 1820-1823), took his own precautions by dispatching a group of 
Surakarta court santri to the north coast to clean the graves of the ancestors 
and spiritual guardians of the Mataram dynasty and its south-central Javanese 
successor states, and to pray for their intercession.152
For the lucky ones who survived, the memory of those terrible hot months 
of 1821 must have been profoundly disturbing. The virulence of the disease 
and its manifestation at one of the holiest and most religiously intense periods 
of the year must have betokened to many an upheaval in the natural order, 
a time of cosmic disturbance, what in the Javanese shadow-play is known as 
the gara-gara (commotion in nature) and in Javanese millenarian literature as 
the ‘time of wrath’ – the jaman kala-bendu. This would inevitably precede the 
coming of the Just King who would institute an age of justice and plenty and 
whose coming would be heralded by natural portents and disasters (Brandes 
1889:374; Carey 1986:131 note 279). We will see in the next chapter how the 
famine and cholera pandemic of 1821 would be followed just a year later by 
the massive eruption of Mount Merapi, the volcano overlooking Yogyakarta, 
which many in the sultanate saw as a potent omen of coming change.
It was against the background of these events that a series of local uprisings 
occurred in south-central Java in late January and February 1822. The insti-
gator of these movements was a son of the first sultan, Pangéran Dipasana, 
who, according to Dipanagara, was a small, crippled man who had suffered 
from a form of mental sickness since childhood and whose heart was set on 
evil.153 Apparently skilled at augury and well versed in primbon (divination 
152 S.Br. 170, ‘Handelingen van den Resident van Soerakarta, 1821’, entry for 24-5-1821. For refer-
ences to court-sponsored pilgrimages to the grave of Sunan Amangkurat I (reigned 1646-1677) at 
Tegalarum and other holy sites on the north coast, see further Chapter IV note 18; Carey 1980:171.
153 BD (Manado), II:283, XIX (Sinom) 25-6. déné langkung boten rukun/ Pangéran Dipasana/ répot 
jompo lawan alit/ lan kelangkung kang manah remen maksiyat. 26. nanging ragi gerah mansah/ duk kala 
timurirèki/ marma datan linegèwa.
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manual) literature, he attempted to use his contacts in the spirit world to 
further his aims against the Dutch and the Chinese, and to replace the fourth 
sultan on the throne of Yogya.154 Through the intermediary of a Surakarta 
adventurer named Jakamulya, who later took the title of Bendara Radèn Mas 
Sinduratmaja, he recruited the help of various robber chiefs in Kedhu and 
a wandering female dhukun (clairvoyant, magic practitioner), Embok Kajèn 
(alias Embok Kertamenggala), who styled herself as Radèn Ayu Guru.155 
Her daughter became Sinduratmaja’s partner.156 Two simultaneous uprisings 
were planned: one in southern Kedhu around Bendha, a tax-free village set 
aside for religious scholars (ulama) renowned for its finely woven mats, and 
another to the south of Yogya at Gadhing Temahan and Lipura, the latter 
being a place of considerable historical significance for would-be pretenders 
to the throne of Mataram and its successors (pp. 154-5). Dipasana’s plan was 
to draw troops away from Yogya by the initial uprising in Kedhu, and then 
fall on the sultan’s capital (Nahuys van Burgst 1852:134). But his strategy 
failed. Support from local officials was limited157 and the Dutch were able to 
154 B.Ng. II:87, XXIII.14-16, describes him as pinandhita nujum (skilled at augury), and ‘married’ 
to a female spirit, Dèwi Kenangsari, the daughter of the spirit ruler of Mount Merapi, Sapu Jagad, 
on whom see further De Graaf 1958:129-30; Ricklefs 1974a:404 no. 89. Dipasana’s contacts with 
the Javanese spirit world – such as his pleas to an invisible protector spirit who lived in a jackfruit 
(nangka) tree and his imprecations to Ratu Kidul for the success of his uprising and the slaugh-
ter of all Europeans in Kedhu and Yogya – are also mentioned in Nahuys van Burgst 1852:180. 
He was born in circa 1778 and bore the childhood name of Bendara Radèn Mas Suramar before 
assuming his princely title on 14 March 1795. He married a sister of Radèn Rongga Prawira-
dirja II, bupati wedana of Madiun (in office 1784-1790, 1794-1796; Appendix Vb) on 25 December 
1795, Dj.Br. 85, W.H. van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 14-3-1795, 
25-12-1795. A primbon manuscript (IOL Jav 42) belonging to him is in the British Library, Ricklefs 
and Voorhoeve 1977:63. There is also a Puja Kusuma romance, bearing a eulogy to Dipasana, in 
the Berlin Staatsbibliothek (Berlin SB MS quart. 359), see Pigeaud 1975:212-3.
155 Ministerie van Koloniën 2776, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-4-1822 no. 
3; B.Ng. II:90-3, XXV.11-25; Dj.Br. 65, ‘Inkomende stukken Djokjo 1e en 2e kwartal 1822’, Pieter 
le Clercq (Magelang) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 24-2-1822, refers to the Javanese 
woman ‘Simanggala’ also known as ‘Radèn Ayu Guru’. See also Ministerie van Koloniën 2776, 
Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-4-1822 no. 3, where Radèn Ayu Guru is referred 
to as ‘Embok Kertamenggala’. Nahuys van Burgst 1852:180, likewise mentions the ‘sly dukun’ 
who advised Dipasana.
156 On Radèn Ayu Guru’s daughter, Bok Loro, who was later picked up along with her husband 
by the Assistant-Resident of Yogya, P.F.H. Chevallier, at the village of Kinthèlan 20 kilometres 
from Yogya in June 1825, see Dj.Br. 11, ‘Register inhoudende korte aanteekeningen der dage-
lyksche bevelen en verrigtingen van den Res. van Jokjokarta, tweede trimester 1825’, entry of Sat-
urday, 25-6-1825. She was ordered to reside in Yogya and placed under surveillance. Her husband 
was sent back to Surakarta.
157 Local officials who rallied to Sinduratmaja included Radèn Ngabèhi Kartawijaya, tempo-
rary demang of Menorèh and Radèn Ngabèhi Wiryawijaya (alias Mertawijaya), bekel of Bendha. 
He escaped capture in February 1822 and joined Dipanagara in 1825, Carey 1976, 1981a:266 note 
123. Another local Kedhu official who rallied to Dipanagara and appears to have been sympa-
thetic to Sinduratmaja’s revolt was Radèn Ngabèhi Jayabrata, the dismissed penatus of Tinggol in 
Menorèh district, Bataviasche Courant 42, 7-6-1827.
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overcome Sinduratmaja’s 27-28 January 1822 movement without recourse to 
reinforcements from Yogya. Sinduratmaja’s followers had begun by massing 
at the village of Warayu near Bojong in the Temanggung district of northern 
Kedhu and breaking the bridge over the Kali Elo to prevent reinforcements 
being brought in from Semarang to defend the district capital, Magelang. 
They attacked local Chinese merchants and European officials, murdering 
a Chinese tollgate keeper at Brayut and killing the acting Dutch secretary 
of the Kedhu Residency, Schnetz, whom they had ambushed. A European 
estate overseer was also severely wounded. But the Resident of Kedhu, Pieter 
le Clercq, moved quickly using his own 150-strong mounted constabulary 
(Jayèng Sekar; Chapter I) and summoning a squadron of European hussars 
from Semarang who arrived in Kedhu on 28 January. This was enough to 
turn the tide. With the assistance of Nahuys and members of his Residency 
bodyguard and Javanese dragoons, the ringleaders were captured at the vil-
lage of Menayu near the great Hindu-Buddhist temple complex of Barabadur 
and Mendhut after being betrayed by one of their circle. The rest were put 
to flight.158 Some of those who escaped made their way over the Menorèh 
mountain passes into eastern Bagelèn. There they continued to harass Chinese 
tollgate keepers and cloth traders in the weaving settlements of Wedhi, Jana 
and Ungaran, killing a Chinese merchant in the last place and forcing the rest 
to barricade themselves in their houses. Despite heavy rains, Nahuys, still ac-
companied by his small force and now assisted by two European landrenters, 
William Stavers and Joseph Donatiën Boutet (notes 54, 60 and 80), the first a 
former sepoy officer with extensive military experience, was able to follow 
up this remnant of Sinduratmaja’s group. Their ringleader, Sudik Iman, was 
captured and hanged at Ungaran on 20 February.159 After this, Dipasana’s 
own uprising in Yogya collapsed quickly around Lipura in early February. He 
was brought to Yogya to suffer the usual death penalty reserved for members 
of the ruling family, namely garrotting by white cotton cloth (Chapter VII 
note 118). But the fourth sultan did not want his aged uncle done to death 
in his capital and asked that the sentence be carried out elsewhere. Nahuys 
suggested the prince be sent to Magelang to face a firing squad. After all, in 
Nahuys’ view, his rebellion had broken out there and his public execution 
would serve as a ‘lesson for the Javanese chiefs in this valuable Residency’, 
158 B.Ng. II:97-100, XXVI.32-XXVII.29; Dj.Br. 19¹¹, Summary of Yogya Residency letters, 1814-25, 
R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta) to H.F. Lippe (Surakarta), 29-1-1822; Ministerie van Koloniën 2464, 
Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 7-2-1822 no. 7, 9-2-1822 no. 3, 13-2-1822 no. 
9, 16-2-1822 no. 6, 16-2-1822 no. 10; Ministerie van Koloniën 2776, Besluit van den Gouverneur-
Gene raal in rade, 19-3-1822, 2-4-1822 (stating that the ringleaders were given away by Amad 
Petaja of Menayu); Nahuys van Burgst 1852:101. The locations of Bojong in Temanggung district 
and Menayu in the Mendhut sub-district of southern Kedhu are given in Dumont 1931:66, 231.
159 Ministerie van Koloniën 2776, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 7-3-1822 no. 
34; Nahuys van Burgst 1852:101-2; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:73.
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but he was overruled by Governor-General Van der Capellen who, out of 
consideration for the great loyalty and services of the sultan, commuted his 
sentence to banishment for life in Ambon.160 This commutation was also ex-
tended to his twenty-three followers, one of whom, Dul (Abdul) Gang Singh, 
appears to have been a Bengali sepoy deserter (p. 429). Their death sentences 
were set aside. Instead, they were ordered to be branded, put in chains and 
exiled to Bangka for terms of hard labour ranging from ten to twenty years.161 
Sinduratmaja, who was given a ten-year sentence, appears to have escaped his 
captors, for he is described being picked up with Radèn Ayu Guru’s daughter 
in the Yogya area in June 1825 (note 156).
The events of January-February 1822 were the most serious disturbances 
to trouble the reign of the fourth sultan. In many respects, they could be 
classified as a traditional revolt by a member of the sultan’s family against 
the royal authority. As we have seen (Chapters I and III), the use of local 
bandit leaders and criminal elements was a typical way of gathering support 
for members of the kraton elite. The assumption of titles of nobility such as 
Bendara Radèn Mas and Radèn Ayu by the low-born Sinduratmaja and his 
mother-in-law, Bok Kajèn (Radèn Ayu Guru), were also part of this tradition 
as noted above in connection with the Umar Mahdi movement of January 
1817. Yet, despite these traditional elements, the strength of popular hatred 
against the Chinese and Europeans was a portent of the times. Indeed, ac-
cording to the Yogya chronicle, Jayabaya style prophecies foretelling the 
end of European rule in Java even played some part in the affair.162 Again, 
it can be said that Dipasana’s revolt constituted an important forerunner of 
Dipanagara’s own great rebellion three years later. It was certainly no coin-
cidence that in July 1825, a massive popular uprising took place against the 
Europeans and the Chinese in southern Kedhu, precisely the area which had 
been at the epicentre of Sinduratmaja’s uprising three years previously (Van 
der Kemp 1896a:388; Carey 1981a:266-7 note 123). Despite his reservations 
about Dipasana’s character, Dipanagara also appears to have gone out of his 
160 Ministerie van Koloniën 2776, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 19-3-1822 no. 
11, decision to exile Pangéran Dipasana to Ambon; Ministerie van Koloniën 2469, Besluit van 
den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 2-3-1823 no. 8, acknowledging letter from Resident of 
Surabaya reporting that Dipasana, accompanied by four people including a child, presumably 
Dipasana’s daughter who may have subsequently married in Ambon (see note 161), had sailed 
on the brig ‘Aurora’ from Surabaya on 17 February 1823.
161 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 19-3-1822 no. 11. One of Dipasana’s daughters 
is supposed to have married the exiled Surakarta Sunan, Pakubuwana VI (reigned 1823-1830), a 
strong supporter of Dipanagara in 1825, interview with B.P.H. Djatikoesoemo, Jakarta, 23-4-1977. 
There is no confirmation of this and it seems more likely that the exiled Surakarta prince, Mang-
kubumi (Chapter VIII), who overlapped by one year with Dipasana in Ambon, was the bride-
groom. Mangkubumi eventually returned to Surakarta in 1824 and died there two years later, 
Winter 1902:30.
162 B.Ng. II:90, XXV.4.
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way to honour members of the exiled prince’s family by investing a number 
of his brothers with the title of Pangéran in the first few months of the war 
and giving them military commands close to the southern Kedhu border in 
December 1825 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:487).
Events at the courts in the last years of Pakubuwana IV and Hamengkubuwana IV’s 
reigns
Whilst these events were taking place in the south-central Javanese country-
side, life in the kraton had not stood still. On Sunday, 4 October 1818, the re-
vision and renewed codification of four of the most important Javanese law 
codes in the princely territories was completed when the chief ministers of the 
two courts met in Klathèn for their ratification (Winter 1902:123-5; Rouffaer 
1905:637-43; Soeripto 1929:121-6). The law codes in question were the Angger 
Ageng (‘Great Law Code’), regulating relations between Surakarta and Yogya 
subjects, the Angger Arubiru (‘Law on Disturbing the Peace’), covering land 
claims between the courts (Ricklefs 1974a:161-5), and two codes which affec-
ted Surakarta alone: the Angger Sepuluh (‘Agrarian Law Code’) and Nawala 
Pradata (regulation of the law courts). Although the Angger Sepuluh had been 
partially codified in 1771, it was not until 1818 that it received its great enlar-
gement as an agrarian law code (Rouffaer 1905:627, 638). As we have seen, it 
was also modified at this time – perhaps under Nahuys’ influence – to facili-
tate the increase in land-rent and to give the European and Chinese renters 
the same rights as Javanese apanage holders. But these developments were 
soon overshadowed in Surakarta by various plots and administrative scandals. 
Since Pinket van Haak, the beau garçon Resident with his serial mistresses, had 
been transferred to Pekalongan in April 1817 following a quarrel with the com-
mander of the Surakarta garrison, Lieutenant-Colonel Le Sueur (Van der Kemp 
1913:231-2), the situation in Surakarta had been very fluid. Van Haak had been 
succeeded by the sixty-one year old Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk who died 
in post scarcely a month after taking up his appointment in May 1817.163 For 
nearly a year after this the Residency was left in the hands of the Assistant-
Resident, Hendrik Ferdinand Lippe (1783-1822), and the official translator, J.W. 
Winter. In January 1818, Daendels’ former military adjutant, Rijck van Prehn 
(1779-1843) (De Josselin de Jong 1945:219-33), was appointed as Resident, but, 
as we have seen, he proved himself quite outstandingly corrupt even by the 
lax official standards of the day and on 3 March 1820 he was dismissed along 
with the Residency translator for sitting on cases in the Sunan’s court in which 
he had a pecuniary interest. Even though the Dutch East Indies Company had 
163 Ministerie van Koloniën 2437, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 14-3-1817 
no. 25; AvS, D.W. Pinket van Haak (Surakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 15-4-1817; 
Appendix IX.
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long ceased to exist, this could be seen as the last ancien régime trial in the style 
of the old VOC involving as it did former Company personnel such as Winter 
(Winter 1902:17-20).
The absence of a responsible Resident for a long period and the very pu-
blic humiliation of Van Prehn created an uneasy and unfavourable atmosp-
here in the Sunan’s capital. Partly as a result of this, a number of intrigues 
continued to flourish in the aftermath of the 1815 sepoy conspiracy (Chapter 
VIII). One such incident centred around the somewhat curious figure of 
Radèn Singgunkara, who styled himself as ‘Radèn Kaap’ – the nobleman 
from the Cape – because as a great-grandson of the exiled Pangéran Arya 
Mangkunagara (Chapter VIII note 213) he had been brought up in the former 
Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope.164 In 1816, with the Cape colony 
now a decade under British rule, he had returned to Java speaking fluent 
Cape Dutch and giving out that because of political developments in Europe, 
Java would shortly be taken back by the British.165 He seems to have enjoyed 
great influence in the kraton and developed close contacts with the Surakarta 
garrison commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Le Sueur, whom he befriended 
through taking service as his cook.166 It was this same officer who was at log-
gerheads with the Resident, Pinket van Haak, and intriguing to have himself 
appointed in his place (Van der Kemp 1913:30, 230-1, 231 note 2). 
The uncertain aftermath of the Van Prehn affair may have convinced 
Pakubuwana IV that he should take the opportunity to repudiate the treaty he 
had previously signed with the British government in August 1812 (Chapter 
VIII). The fact that the returned Dutch government had made it quite clear to 
the court that its provisions would remain in force was conveniently ignored 
(Chapter X note 151). He did this soon after he learnt of Van Prehn’s exile 
from Surakarta on 11 February 1820 when his case was still being heard in the 
Dutch supreme court sitting exceptionally in Semarang, sending his chief mi-
nister to tell the astonished Assistant-Resident that the governor-general had 
allowed him to take back all the rights he had previously enjoyed under the 
164 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 7, D.W. Pinket van Haak (Surakarta) to Commissioners-General 
(Batavia), 22-1-1817; Van der Kemp 1913:233 note 4. See further Ricklefs 1974a:109, 287-8.
165 On Radèn Kaap’s garbled version of European politics, which he presented to the Surakarta 
court, see UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 7, D.W. Pinket van Haak (Surakarta) to Commissioners-Gen-
eral (Batavia), 22-1-1817. This involved a dispute between the Russian tsar, Alexander I (reigned 
1801-1825), and the British over the French throne which the tsar was supposed to have sug-
gested should be offered to King William I of the Netherlands and which the British opposed, 
thus threatening war between Britain and Holland in Europe and opening the way for a new 
British attack on Java, see further pp. 734-5. A similar rumour was related by W.H. van IJsseldijk 
when he was serving as special envoy to the courts in August-September 1816, Baud 306, Van 
IJsseldijk, ‘Rapport’, 11-12-1816, 11, stating that the British had spread the word in Surakarta and 
other places in Java that the return of the island to the Dutch was entirely dependant on British 
goodwill and that in two to three years’ time they would be returning.
166 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 7, J.W. Winter, ‘Proces-verbaal of Raden Kaap’, 23-1-1817.
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VOC before the end of the Batavian Republic (1795-1806). This was an imagi-
native interpretation of a letter recently received from Van der Capellen, the 
translation of which had been conveniently ‘disappeared’ from the Residency 
archive.167 If we can believe the ever boastful Nahuys, it was only his sud-
den appearance as acting Resident of Surakarta in early March which caused 
the Sunan to rescind his order (Nahuys van Burgst 1835-6, I:24-30, 1852:93-6; 
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:73). But the affair provided yet another in-
dication that the Surakarta court – or at least the incorrigible Pakubuwana IV 
– had never given up the hope that the political structure of the pre-Daendels 
period could be re-established (Chapters VII and VIII). It was, however, the 
Sunan’s last political act. On 1 October 1820, after suffering from a severe bout 
of diarrhoea,168 he died. He was fifty-four. Sensing that his life was at an end, 
he had apparently refused all Nahuys’ offers of medical assistance from the 
Residency doctor until he was on his deathbed (Nahuys 1821:298). According 
to Javanese tradition, his passing had been foretold over a year earlier by 
the invisible bird malar munga, whose piercing night-time cry, heard at the 
royal graveyard at Imagiri, presaged the demise of Javanese rulers.169 He left 
behind fifty-six children by two official and twenty-six unofficial wives, and 
146 grandchildren (Padmasusastra 1902:159-68). His eldest son, who had a 
reputation as a great lover of women, money, horses and Javanese literature 
– probably in that order – succeeded him on 10 October.170
167 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 6 pt. 13, H.F. Lippe (Surakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J.C. Baud) (Bata-
via/Bogor), 11-2-1820, 25-2-1820; Nahuys van Burgst 1852:93-6.
168 This had apparently exacerbated an existing asthmatic condition, which manifested in a 
tightness of the chest and fevers, S.Br. 122, Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Verhaal van de ziekte, afster-
ven en begrafenis van Z.H. den Soesoehoenan van Soerakarta’ (henceforth: Nahuys, ‘Verhaal’), 
1-10-1820; Nahuys van Burgst 1821:298.
169 S.Br. 131. ‘Translaten en verbalen’, Radèn Panji Suradilaga (Surakarta) to Radèn Adipati Sasra-
diningrat II (Surakarta), 5 Dulkangidah AJ 1746 (AD 27-8-1819), reporting that the jurukunci of Jima-
tan (Imagiri), Mas Mangkuwijaya, had reported the invisible bird’s loud shrieks above the grave of 
a former sultan of Cirebon – Sultan Sepuh – just east of the village of Genilaya in a very old durian 
tree at three o’clock on the morning of 4 Dulkangidah AJ 1746 (AD 26-8-1819). On the malar munga 
belief, see Winter 1902:74, 161 note 59; Lettres de Java 1829:99. See further Chapter IV note 23.
170 Nahuys 1821:298-300, is a published account of Pakubuwana IV’s death and burial, 
which Nahuys had originally written as a report for the Governor-General, S.Br. 122, ‘Verhaal’, 
1-10-1820. This almost certainly drew on original material from J.W. Winter (1902:74), which was 
used without acknowledgement. See further Chapter X note 2. On Pakubuwana V’s character, see 
De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’, 8-5-1828; Hageman 1856:25; Winter 1902:39, who wrote that ‘he was in 
all respects shrewder [than Pakubuwana IV], and didn’t let people hoodwink him. But [he was] 
covetous, viewing money as a fountain-head of temporal welfare. He was very strict, proud, and 
exceedingly amorous’. His reputation as a lover is also mentioned in Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg 
(Surakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 6-9-1803, referring to the fact that one of his ‘con-
cubines’ (selir) was pregnant and the young prince wat veel naar de vrouwen begint te zien (‘is taking 
a lot of interest in women’). His love of horses is mentioned by the French land-renter, J.D. Boutet, 
see KITLV H 788, Boutet, ‘Memorandum on Surakarta’, 1821.
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Meanwhile, in Yogya the period after Dipasana’s abortive revolt in 
February 1822 witnessed a revival of the old intrigues and quarrelling which 
had so poisoned relations between Dipanagara and the court. In his babad, 
Dipanagara remarked that these caused him deep pain, but one incident in 
particular raised tensions to breaking point. This involved the document, 
mentioned earlier (Chapter VII note 236), written by Dipanagara’s father, the 
third sultan, which may have recognised his eldest son’s rights to the Yogya 
throne and which had already been the subject of an altercation between the 
prince and his stepmother at the time of the dispute over the appointment of 
new police officials. According to the prince, the fourth sultan came out to 
Tegalreja sometime in late 1822 to ask for this document which Dipanagara 
had preserved in his personal archive together with all the other political 
agreements relating to the British period, including the 12 June 1812 secret 
treaty (Chapter VII note 235).171 The document was apparently handed over 
to the sultan by Dipanagara under the strict injunction that it should be kept 
safely. According to various accounts, however, the young ruler burnt it 
shortly afterwards to destroy any evidence which could be compromising to 
his own position.172 The prince did not find out about this until nine months 
after the sultan’s death in December 1822, when he wrote to the queen mo-
ther – then styled Ratu Ageng – to ask for the document as a guideline for the 
guardians of the child sultan, Hamengkubuwana V, of which he was one (Van 
der Kemp 1896a:335-7; pp. 62, 545). The prince’s reaction was said to have 
been one of extreme anger which later precipitated his refusal to continue 
to perform his guardianship duties and led to his complete break with the 
kraton.173 Thus, one of the last acts of the fourth sultan’s reign had disastrous 
consequences for the future. 
Shortly afterwards, on 6 December 1822 in the mid-afternoon the young 
monarch died after returning to the kraton from a tour of one of his country 
estates (pesanggrahan).174 The manner of his death was extremely violent – he 
appears to have succumbed to a sudden fit while eating – and his body imme-
diately swelled up, an indication, some contemporaries thought, that he had 
171 BD (Manado) II:286-7, XIX.37. According to Dipanagara, only the copies of the official trea-
ties and financial agreements were kept in the kraton archive, but as we have seen (Chapter I) 
these were not well preserved at this time.
172 BD (Manado) II:289, XIX.43; dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’, n.y. (? 8-1827); Yogya 
kraton MS A.62 (Babad Dipanagaran), 62, Ratu Ageng (Yogyakarta) to Dipanagara (Tegalreja), 
Sura, Dal, AJ 1751 (AD 9-1823).
173 dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’, n.y. (? 8-1827).
174 Dj.Br. 81, Pangéran Adipati Anom (Crown Prince) (Yogyakarta) to Pakubuwana V, 6-12-1822, 
gives the time of Hamengkubuwana IV’s death as 3.30 p.m. The manner of his death was the 
origin of his nickname, sultan séda besiyar (‘the sultan who died while out riding for pleasure’), 
Mandoyokusumo 1977:37. His other nickname Jarot – the ‘strong and handsome one’ – belied his 
corpulence.
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been poisoned.175 But there is nothing in the sources to confirm this. In fact, it 
seems that his corpulence, love of highly spiced food and excessive exertions 
in the saddle had brought on a heart attack at the remarkably young age of 
eighteen.176 His indulgent lifestyle – encouraged by the likes of Nahuys and 
his assistant, R.C.N. d’Abo – had brought him to an early grave. He could be 
seen as the first royal victim of the inexorable westernising tide which had 
swept over the south-central Javanese courts in the aftermath of the Dutch 
restoration in 1816. And he would not be alone. The fourth sultan’s own son, 
who reigned as Hamengkubuwana V (1822-1826, 1828-1855), was already a 
syphilitic wreck in his twenties due to over-indulgences in alcohol and wo-
men in part encouraged by unscrupulous European merchants and suppliers 
in Yogya (Houben 1994:154, 200-2).
Conclusion
So ended the reign of Dipanagara’s younger brother. It closed a lamentable 
chapter in Yogya’s history. Within the kraton, the incipient rivalry between 
Dipanagara and the group around the queen mother was rapidly hardening 
into open conflict. A complete rift was only months away. Meanwhile, the 
return of the Dutch in August 1816 had greatly accelerated the processes be-
gun by the British. One of the most important of these was the integration of 
Java into the global market and the opening of the island’s interior to western 
private capital. The arguments over the land-rent reflected deep doubts on 
the part of Van der Capellen’s administration over the long-term benefits of 
the latter. This would result in his decision to prohibit the leasing of land to 
private European and Chinese investors in May 1823. But in the short term, 
as we will see in the next chapter, this would create more problems than it 
solved. At the same time, his administration’s insatiable demand for reve-
nue, coupled with what Raffles had correctly surmised as a ‘hankering af-
175 KB, Cornets de Groot private collection, IXe pt. 4, 41, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Yogyakarta) 
to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik), 6-12-1822; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):30-2, II.29-36; 
BD (Manado), II:289, XIX.44; Hageman 1856:29-30; Van der Kemp 1896a:311-2. Dipanagara later 
gave credence to these rumours by observing to Captain J.J. Roeps, one of the two Dutch offic-
ers who accompanied him from Magelang to Batavia in late March/early April 1830, ‘“When he 
[Hamengkubuwana IV] died he swelled up in a horrible manner.” “Then he was certainly poi-
soned,” said Captain Roeps, whereupon Dipanagara, without the least emotion and continuing 
in the same voice, said: “He received rice and Javanese food from the patih [Danureja IV] and just 
an hour later he was dead,”’ Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744.
176 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 154, pointing out that Hamengkubuwana IV never ate food 
unless prepared by his unofficial wives (selir) and there was no sign of poisoning on the body. 
Dipanagara partially corroborated Valck’s view, stating that whenever he was with Hameng-
kubuwana IV, the young ruler insisted that Dipanagara eat first and he would take the left-overs, 
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744. See further Kronijk van Nederlandsch-Indië 1842, I:206-7.
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ter immediate profit’ on the part of the royal government in The Hague and 
Brussels, meant that those in charge of colonial policy were becoming increa-
singly oblivious to the plight of the Javanese peasantry. In July 1825, Van der 
Capellen would report that the news of Dipanagara’s rebellion had reached 
him ‘completely unexpectedly’ (Capellen 1860:363; Carey 1981a:283 note 201). 
Yet only the most inveterate optimist could have possibly put such a gloss on 
events. The ever more urgent reports of Dutch officials regarding the crisis in 
the Javanese countryside in the early 1820s all pointed to one conclusion – a 
major popular uprising was imminent. Only the timing and leadership were 
unclear. The combination of the land tax, poor harvests, the 1821 cholera epi-
demic, the tollgates and the renting of estates to Europeans had turned south-
central Java into a powder keg. The popular disturbances of 1817-1822 with 
their quirky millenarian hopes were a symptom of this deepening despair. 
In Yogya, in particular, many were united in a powerful sense of humiliation 
at the outcome of the events of 1812, a humiliation made all the more acute 
by the events of the fourth sultan’s reign. The desire for regeneration and 
the re-establishment of the old political order governing relations with the 
European government had begun to fuse with messianic expectations of a 
golden age of justice and plenty. What was now required was for a leader of 
sufficient stature to proclaim himself and bind the discontented to his cause.
Chapter X
Waiting for the Just King
the road to war in south-central Java, 1822-1825
The man of destiny
In the two and a half years which elapsed between the death of the fourth 
sultan in December 1822 and the outbreak of the Java War in July 1825 the 
crisis in the Javanese countryside deepened. The main outlines have al-
ready been described in the previous chapter. As we have seen, during the 
1817-1822 period several movements and uprisings had occurred, some of 
a pronounced millenarian character, but none had involved figures of true 
stature and authority in Javanese society. Apart from the quirky Pangéran 
Dipasana, the other leaders who had emerged in these years, such as Radèn 
Mas Umar Mahdi, Kyai Iman Sampurna, Sunan Waliyullah, Bendara Radèn 
Mas Sinduratmaja, and Radèn Ayu Guru, were all commoners. Despite their 
assumption of impressive names and titles, they lacked the influence to turn 
their movements into wider regional uprisings. Their appeal was thus lim-
ited. They could certainly not be compared to the mercurial Radèn Rongga 
who had so deeply influenced the young Dipanagara during his November-
December 1810 rebellion (Chapter VI). It is likely that apart from his great-
uncle Dipasana, whom he mentions specifically in his babad, the prince was 
unaware of these other self-appointed prophets in the Javanese countryside. 
The time was coming, however, when he himself would be summoned by 
prophecy and visions to step forward from the obscurity of Tegalreja and 
stand centre stage as the long hoped for Javanese Ratu Adil or Just King. Iman 
Sampurna for one had already indicated in 1819 that the next such person 
would be a prince of Mataram blood (pp. 490, 491 note 146), and he may well 
have had someone of Dipanagara’s stature in mind.
The past five chapters have mainly focussed on the history of the Yogya sul-
tanate since the arrival of Marshal Daendels. In this tale, the prince has been a 
somewhat shadowy figure, making brief and frequently disapproving appear-
ances at the Yogya court. The sources for his early life have been limited forcing 
us to rely on his remarkable autobiography. In the present chapter, however, 
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the situation changes. Dipanagara will now become the main protagonist and 
the sources for his life will become ever more abundant. The period foretold by 
the Parangkusuma prophecy – ‘you alone are the means, but that not for long 
only to be counted amongst the ancestors’ (p. 151) – was at hand. The next two 
chapters will describe how the prince’s destiny was fulfilled.
The aftermath of the fourth sultan’s death and Dipanagara’s guardianship
The fourth sultan’s unexpected fit on returning from his riding tour caused 
scenes of shock and grief at the court, especially amongst the kraton women-
folk.1 Dipanagara was hastily summoned from Tegalreja, but when he arrived 
in the kraton his younger brother was dead. The head of the Yogya religious 
establishment (pengulu) and members of the Yogya religious hierarchy were 
already in attendance at the Srimenganti pavilion in order to wash the sul-
tan’s body and to pray over it. According to Dipanagara, the Yogya Assistant-
Resident R.C.N. d’Abo attempted to postpone this lustration ceremony until 
the arrival of the Surakarta Resident, Baron Adriaan Mauritz Theodorus de 
Salis, who was then combining his Surakarta post with the additional duties 
of acting Resident of Yogya,2 but he was overruled by the prince. The body 
was washed and placed in a wooden coffin in the sultan’s private apartments 
still surrounded by the religious officials who chanted the Usali prayer for 
the dead.3 Other Javanese accounts relate how, on the instructions of D’Abo, 
the Residency surgeon asked that an incision should be made in the sultan’s 
thigh to ascertain whether there was still any circulation. This request was 
passed on to members of the sultan’s close family, but Dipanagara would not 
1 BD (Manado) II:290, XIX.45; B.Ng. II:119, XXX.25-6; KB, Cornets de Groot private collection 
IXe pt. 4:41, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Yogyakarta) to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik), 6-12-1822. 
2 KB, Cornets de Groot private collection IX pt. 4:41, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Surakarta) to 
A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik), 6-12-1822.
3 BD (Manado) II:290, XIX.46-7; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):33-4, III.43-6. The Usali 
prayer is a special Arabic formula used at burials, Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:97. During the 
ceremony for Pakubuwana IV’s death described by Nahuys (1821:298-300), the Sunan’s body was 
washed for two hours with water mixed with tamarind and burnt rice straw. During this time 
the body itself was enveloped in a large cloth and laid on the knees of the Sunan’s relations. 
Only the Crown Prince was allowed to clean the genitals and the cloths used for washing were 
afterwards distributed as magically powerful heirlooms or pusaka. Meanwhile, sandalwood was 
poured into the mouth, nose and ears and the body was then wrapped in five large pieces of 
white linen and laid in a teakwood coffin made without the use of nails. At the bottom of the 
coffin, earth, sand and water from Mecca had been placed along with the Sunan’s nail clippings, 
hair and teeth, which had been kept during his lifetime. Prayers were then said over the body and 
it was guarded by priests. Later, it was carried out, under four gold state sunshades (payung) for 
the Sunan’s relations to pay their last respects. The couch on which the Sunan had died was also 
strewn with flowers and incense burnt over it for forty days. A similar ceremony is likely to have 
taken place in the case of Hamengkubuwana IV. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:357.
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countenance it, stating that it was against Javanese-Islamic practice for a body 
to be mutilated after death. One recalls here the prince’s equally adamant re-
fusal to accept the arcane magico-religious practices for releasing the life force 
proposed by his great-uncle, Pangéran Demang, at his father’s deathbed in 
November 1814 (p. 406). The queen mother, however, still entertained hopes 
that her son might recover so she brushed Dipanagara’s objections aside. The 
incision was made, but no blood flowed  – a clear indication that circulation 
had long since ceased.4 One of Dipanagara’s sons would later reflect that his 
father had shown pleasure at his younger brother’s death stating:
Thank God! How could it be otherwise than that he should die in such a fashion? 
Since he could not bring himself to make war to regain his kingdom or even to 
rule it properly, it is good that he no longer remains in this world. Now everything 
will go better.5
But there is no corroboration for this in any other source. The following day 
the sultan’s body was buried at Imagiri near the grave of his father.6
Meanwhile, in Surakarta De Salis had received word of the sultan’s death 
and departed in the middle of the night to make the three-hour journey on 
horseback to Yogya, taking his student in the Javanese language, the eighteen-
year-old Adriaan David Cornets de Groot Junior, with him (note 2). Arriving 
in the Yogya kraton early on the morning of 7 December, he was met by D’Abo 
who informed him that both the queen mother, Ratu Ageng, and the late sul-
tan’s official consort, Ratu Kencana, together with a number of Yogya nobles, 
had ‘fervently beseeched’ him to confirm the two-year-old Crown Prince on 
the throne. They also requested that the Dutch authorities should on no ac-
count re-appoint Pakualam I as regent during the sultan’s minority or allow 
him any authority over the Yogya court. Ratu Ageng told De Salis directly 
that if no suitable guardians could be found in Yogya, then the European 
government itself should take over the guardianship.7 If this had happened, 
the sultanate would have been turned into a de facto government protector-
ate, the last scintilla of the sultan’s authority soon being extinguished. As we 
shall see, the decision of the Yogya Resident to occupy the throne during the 
4 B.Ng. II:119-21, XXX.28-35; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):32-3, III.38-42.
5 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 9 pt. 2, ‘Proces-Verbaal van Radeen Maas Alip’, 3-8-1825. See further 
Nahuys van Burgst 1835-6, I:12. See also Van Nes 1844:145, who seems to be repeating Alip’s 
testimony.
6 B.Ng. II:121-2, XXX.43-52, states that Hamengkubuwana IV’s body was buried three days 
later on 9 December which must be incorrect given the Muslim requirement that bodies are 
buried before sundown on the day on which the death occurs. In Hamengkubuwana IV’s case, he 
had died too late on 6 December to be buried on that day. Instead he was almost certainly interred 
on 7 December.
7 A.M.Th. de Salis (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 9-12-1822, cited 
in Ministerie van Koloniën 4497, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal geheim, 14-12-1822 no. 1.
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Garebeg ceremonies as the official ‘representative’ of the child sultan would 
already be seen by Dipanagara and other senior figures in the kraton as an 
unacceptable sign of the European government’s new and dominant role in 
court affairs during Hamengkubuwana V’s minority.
To all these requests, the cautious De Salis8 replied that he would await 
Governor-General Van der Capellen’s instructions before proceeding to the 
Crown Prince’s coronation or the appointment of guardians. In the interval 
he stated that he himself would take charge of the Yogya administration and 
the great seal of state. He then proceeded to consult the Residency archives 
to ascertain precisely what had happened in similar circumstances after the 
third sultan’s death in 1814. During his researches he came across Garnham’s 
letter to Raffles of 24 November 1814 (p. 409) concerning Pakualam’s previous 
appointment as regent and he swiftly came to the conclusion that the inde-
pendent prince should not serve in that capacity again. The queen mother, 
Dipanagara’s uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, and the chief minister, Danureja 
IV, were informed of this decision during a conference in the kraton. De Salis 
assured them that the European government would listen to his advice with 
regard to Pakualam. In the meantime, he instructed Danureja to continue 
the administration of the sultan’s lands and ordered the court bupati (nayaka) 
that no changes were to be made in the government of the kraton without 
the Resident’s express approval. He also took the decision to recognise the 
Crown Prince as his father’s official successor and stipulated that the great 
seal should remain in the keeping of the Yogya Resident until the child sultan 
had reached his majority on 20 January 1836. Pakualam, who was in attend-
ance at the kraton at this time, declared himself well satisfied with these ar-
rangements, observing that ‘earlier [during his regency, 1814-1820] his good 
name had been exposed to the designs of the chief minister and the intrigues 
of the court so that he had become a mere figurehead and had enjoyed no real 
power’. His sentiments appear to have been genuine given the way he had 
been treated during his previous incumbency (pp. 409-10). At the same time, 
De Salis’ letter to the governor-general and various appendices referring to 
Garnham’s earlier correspondence with Raffles were read out to the informal 
governing group in the kraton and won universal approval.9
There was some urgency in ensuring a speedy succession given the uncer-
tainties of a prolonged interregnum. On 13 December, there were reports of 
a number of fires being set at various places around Yogya and other local-
ised disturbances.10 The day after this worrying news was registered, Van der 
8 De Salis was described in a Dutch source as a person of ‘shrewd and courageous spirit and 
[a man] well acquainted with Indies affairs’, Van der Kemp 1901, I:145, citing Mijer 1878.
9 See note 7. The non-appointment of a regent had drawbacks, however, because there was 
no one to represent the sultan at the Garebeg ceremonies and various other important court occa-
sions, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:449-50, 453 (on Pakualam’s attitude). 
10 Dj.Br. 19¹¹, Summary of Yogya Residency letters, 1814-1825 in ‘Onderschillen stukken 
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Capellen endorsed De Salis’ recommendations in a secret government resolu-
tion. The patih was ordered to administer the sultan’s lands, but to undertake 
nothing of importance without the approval of the Resident. Everything else 
concerning the guardianship and education of the young sultan together with 
the governance of the kraton and its private finances was to devolve on four 
guardians: Ratu Ageng, Ratu Kencana, Mangkubumi and Dipanagara, the 
first two being concerned with the child sultan’s upbringing and care in the 
kraton, and the two last being principally responsible for the management 
of the sultanate during his minority. The yearly sum of 100,000 Spanish dol-
lars from the rent of the tollgates and markets was to be paid directly to 
these guardians without the intervention of Danureja IV and the patih was 
instructed to give an account of the financial situation of the sultan’s lands to 
them every three months and pay the moneys for the guardianship directly 
into their hands. Moreover, the governor-general’s resolution specifically 
stipulated that the patih would only be permitted to interfere in the internal 
administration of the kraton if the guardians were found by the Resident to be 
lax in the discharge of their duties.11
News of Van der Capellen’s secret resolution reached Yogya on 18 December 
and on the following day – Thursday, 19 December 1822 – the Crown Prince 
was appointed as Hamengkubuwana V. The Resident’s proclamation was read 
out in the Prabayeksa, the sultan’s private apartments, and the oaths of the 
guardians of the child sultan and the patih, accepting full responsibility for their 
new task, were signed and sealed by the parties concerned.12 Writing six years 
later, De Salis commented that the establishment of the guardianship had oc-
curred ‘with the general approval of the ratu and the most important courtiers 
in Yogya; Pangéran Dipanagara also seemed outwardly pleased about it’.13 
General de Kock later confirmed this, giving an account of the esteem in which 
Dipanagara was held at this time by the European government:
Earlier one heard nothing but good about him. He was on cordial terms with 
Nahuys and did not seem to have a bitter heart against the government. [The fact] 
gedient hebbende om de geschiedenis van Djokjokarta op te maken’ (henceforth: ‘Onderschillen 
stukken’), entry for 13-12-1822.
11 Ministerie van Koloniën 4497, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal geheim, 14-12-1822 no. 
1. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:449-52, on the appointment of replacement guard-
ians for Mangkubumi and Dipanagara after the outbreak of the Java War, with more power being 
vested in the hands of the Resident.
12 Ministerie van Koloniën 2778, Besluit van Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 3-1-1823 no. 21 
(referring to De Salis’ letter of 20-12-1822), 28-1-1823 no. 29 (detailing the Resident’s 1,000 Span-
ish dollar expenditure on Hamengkubuwana V’s appointment ceremony). Copies made by G.P. 
Rouffaer of the oaths taken by Mangkubumi, Dipanagara and Danureja IV, together with De 
Salis’ proclamation, are in KITLV H 696c, ‘Archiefstukken (Vorstenlandse)’, no. 91:254-6. On the 
authenticity of these documents see further Roorda 1860:159 note 1.
13 De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’, The Hague, 8-5-1828.
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that this [happened] was entirely due to the disdain heaped on him by Resident 
[A.H.] Smissaert and [the Yogya Assistant-Resident/Residency Secretary P.F.H.] 
Chevallier. His authority, moreover, was hampered inside the kraton by Ratu 
Ageng and outside by the patih.14
Dipanagara largely endorsed De Kock’s observation stating that ‘I was on 
especially good terms with De Salis, with him affairs went well. But, as soon 
as the others came – he meant Smissaert [and Chevallier] – everything was 
plunged into disorder’.15 Separately, in his conversations with Knoerle, the 
prince stated that ‘he had always followed the straight path without devious-
ness in his dealings with the European Residents’.16 Both Nahuys and the 
veteran VOC official, Nicolaus Engelhard, were of the same opinion. Writing 
of Dipanagara and his fellow guardian, Mangkubumi, Nahuys would later 
remark that they were both men ‘who on all former occasions of misunder-
standing [between the Yogya court and the European government] had stood 
quite neutral and were universally considered as good quiet persons with-
out the least ambition’.17 Engelhard, as we have seen (p. 77), characterised 
Dipanagara as ‘a respectable prince […] who in all matters was a Javanese 
and followed Javanese custom’ (Van der Kemp 1896a:415).
Despite the antagonism between Dipanagara and his two principal rivals, 
Ratu Ageng and Danureja IV, he seems to have discharged his guardianship 
duties to the best of his ability for nearly a year after his appointment. It was 
only after Smissaert’s arrival in mid-February 1823, and that of his assistant, 
Chevallier, on 26 August of the same year, that these personal antagonisms 
began to make cooperation impossible. By then the whole issue of the aboli-
tion of the land-rent and the indemnification of the European planters had 
soured relations between the guardians and the Dutch authorities in Yogya. 
There is thus nothing in the European sources to confirm the highly coloured 
Javanese accounts of Hamengkubuwana V’s coronation and Dipanagara’s 
own description of his intense disappointment at being appointed a guard-
ian of his young nephew. Although he does not mention it in his babad, he 
is likely to have had a hand in the choice of the personal tutor for the child 
14 dK 111, H.M. de Kock, ‘Over het karakter van den Soesoehoenan, den Sultan van Djokjo-
karta en de prinsen en rijksgrooten’, Magelang, 20-12-1829.
15 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:743. Dipanagara’s admiration for De Salis was apparently 
not reciprocated by the former Yogya Resident who wrote in 1828, of Dipanagara’s ‘stupid and 
mysterious’ appearance, his portly build and the ‘lazy and indolent life’ he led at Tegalreja, which 
made him ‘the play puppet of his entourage’, De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’, The Hague, 8-5-1828. Since 
De Salis’ remarks were penned towards the end of the Java War, they are likely to have been 
coloured by wartime events and may not have reflected his feelings in 1822-1823 when he was 
serving as acting Resident of Yogya. See further Chapter III note 63.
16 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 14.
17 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 11 pt. 13, Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Memoir on causes of Java War’ (English 
translation of Port. 9 pt. 3, ‘Onlusten op Java’), Maastricht, 2-1826.
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sultan, an Arab from the former Dutch trading post of Surat in western India, 
Sayyid Hasan, who later taught Hamengkubuwana V to read the Qu’rān and 
schooled him in Arabic.18
Once the Java War had broken out, however, senior Dutch officials were 
quick to point out the drawbacks of the guardianship arrangements. Van 
Sevenhoven, who replaced Smissaert as Resident of Yogya in October 1825, 
argued that it placed too much responsibility on the shoulders of the patih and 
the Resident. The idea of giving the Resident a leading role in the guardianship 
was in principle sound as it would allow him to gain more influence in the 
internal affairs of the sultanate and learn more about the royal administration. 
But there was a problem. The Resident’s guardianship duties were not prop-
erly defined and in the hands of an incompetent official matters could turn out 
disastrously.19 This in fact happened when Smissaert failed to give due respect 
to Dipanagara and Mangkubumi and refused to recognise their competence as 
guardians thus fatally alienating them from the European government.20
The ever insightful Dutch historian of the Principalities, Gerrit Pieter 
Rouffaer, would later put it succinctly: why place a child of barely three years 
18 KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):38-42, III.59-IV.11; B.Ng. II:128-36, XXXII.18-XXXIV.10; 
Yogya kraton MS. A. 62 (Babad Dipanagaran):14-16, all state that Dipanagara was purposely not 
invited to the coronation ceremony by Danureja IV, on which see further LOr 8552a, 320-1, 
exchange of letters between Dipanagara and A.M.Th. de Salis in January 1823. In his babad, how-
ever, Dipanagara specifically stated that he was present at the ceremony but experienced such 
mortification at being sworn in as a guardian that he accidentally tore his state clothes (kampuh) 
and was unable to sign his name on the guardianship document or affix his seal to it, BD (Manado) 
II:295-7, XIX.61-5. On his return to Tegalreja, he described how he even contemplated suicide but 
was restrained by his wife, Radèn Ayu Maduretna, BD (Manado) II:297-303, XIX.65-84. After-
wards, he wrote, that he returned his seal to Mangkubumi, refusing to take part in his financial 
duties as a guardian and giving out that he would henceforth be called by his religious name 
– ‘Ngabdulkamit’ – not Pangéran Dipanagara, BD (Manado), II:304-6, XIX.86-94. None of this 
accords with the available historical evidence and is even contradicted earlier in this passage in 
his babad where he appeared once again to have renounced any rights he may have had to the 
Yogya throne, BD (Manado), II:294, XIX.57-9. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:315, 325-7, 350, 
353-6; Kumar 1972:90-9. On Sayyid Hasan al-Habāshi, see Lettres de Java 1829:83, where he is 
described as ‘a very intelligent man whom the [European] government often uses for its missions 
to neighbouring islands’. He later helped the Dutch in the negotiations with Kyai Maja at Salatiga 
in September 1827 and ‘worked tirelessly’, according to Nahuys, ‘for the surrender of the rebels’, 
see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:572-3. He was given a pension of f 100 a month from the 
Yogya court and a personal landholding of 25 cacah (which brought in an income of f 300 a year), 
along with a similar land grant for his ‘priestly following’ of five ulama, see Dj.Br. 19¹¹, Valck, 
‘Voordragt’, 20-2-1830 (full reference Chapter III note 18). On his Surat origins, see Dj.Br. 71, J.F.W. 
van Nes (Yogyakarta) to L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies (Batavia/Bogor), 27-11-1828. The British had 
been in undivided control of Surat from 1800.
19 Dj.Br. 6, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta/Semarang), 10-11-
1825.
20 Dj.Br. 6, Lawick van Pabst, ‘Nota ter betoogen der gelijkmatigheid van den oorlog van den 
jare 1746 met dien van den tegenwoordigen tijd’ (henceforth: Van Pabst, ‘Nota ter betoogen’)’, 5-
11-1828.
The power of prophecy512
on the Yogya throne just because he was born from an official consort when 
in neighbouring Surakarta just a year later the son of an unofficial wife was 
elevated as Susuhunan Pakubuwana VI (reigned 1823-1830)? And why fail 
to recognise and respect Dipanagara’s own rights as the eldest born son of a 
ruler, rights which he should have been allowed to assert with all the honour 
due to him as Hamengkubuwana V’s eldest uncle and guardian? At the very 
least why not accord him the title of Pangéran Ngabèhi, the name usually 
reserved for the eldest son of a ruler by an unofficial wife? In Rouffaer’s view 
much of the reason for the Java War lay there, in the dreadful mishandling of 
the prince by incompetent Dutch officials (Rouffaer 1905:600).
The December 1822 eruption of Mount Merapi and the Jayabaya prophecies 
Shortly after the fifth sultan’s coronation, an important event occurred in the 
natural world which almost certainly had a deep psychological effect on the 
inhabitants of Yogyakarta. This was the violent eruption of Mount Merapi, 
the volcano overlooking the city, between 28 and 30 December 1822. In his 
babad, Dipanagara related how on Friday, 26 December, he had been to the 
house of his younger brother, Pangéran Suryabrangta, whose son was being 
circumcised, a ceremony known in Java as supitan. He had supervised the 
supitan ceremony and had then remained overnight playing chess with his 
old friend and fellow cognoscente of Javanese-Islamic literature, Radèn Ayu 
Danukusuma, widow of the murdered Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma.21 
The following morning, the prince had returned to Tegalreja, but he was so 
tired that he slept right through the day and well into the following night. 
Then, early on the morning of Sunday, 28 December at approximately two 
o’clock, according to one Dutch report, after a series of heavy earth tremors, 
which had started the previous evening, Mount Merapi began to erupt.22 By 
the morning of 29 December streams of glowing lava could be seen pouring 
down the mountain on the Kedhu side with a heavy column of smoke thrown 
up to a great height and rains of ash and sand covering an extensive area as 
far as Mount Sumbing in the west.23 According to Dipanagara:
21 On Radèn Ayu Danukusuma’s love of Javanese-Islamic literature, see pp. 99-100. On the fate 
of her husband, see p. 313. On chess playing in the archipelago at this time, see Crawfurd 1971:93 
sub: ‘chess’. There are also references to the game in contemporary Javanese literature, Ricklefs 
1974a:393.
22 Dj.Br. 52, R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta) to Captain J.Th.A. van den Busch (commandant 
Klathèn), 3-1-1823.
23 Residentie Kadoe 1871:15. This report states that there were eighteen earth tremors in 30 
hours, the heaviest being on the evening of 28 December. The last eruption was on 30 December 
and the volcano was calm again on 3 January.
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XIX.98  Mount Merapi caught fire
  as though its peak reached to the heavens.
  Yogyakarta seemed filled with it.
  The sky became fire
  [and] the noise of it was terrifying;
  it thundered and roared,
  the fires radiating everywhere.
  In great commotion, together,
  everywhere people desperately sought refuge.24
The prince states that he slept through the beginnings of the first eruption, 
which only became serious between half past four and five o’clock in the morn-
ing, when he was awakened by the screams of his female servants. He then 
went outside into the front courtyard with his wife, Radèn Ayu Maduretna, 
and looked up into the sky; seeing the burning mountain and the heaving 
earth, he described how he smiled inwardly to himself knowing that this was 
a sign of God’s anger.25 
The Dutch reports confirm that the eruption was just as violent as 
Dipanagara made out in his babad. Thus, D’Abo wrote that there were three 
major eruptions, two on the Sunday morning at five and seven o’clock, and 
the last at eleven o’clock on Monday, 29 December. He described how a 
huge pall of smoke and ash was blown in a south-westerly direction from 
the mountain and stones as large as coconuts were flung as far as twelve 
kilometres, the ash being carried three times that distance. On the flanks of 
the mountain, people fled their homes and three villages – Bulu, Deles and 
Pringlegi – on the Kedhu side were completely destroyed.26 The rivers which 
rose on the Merapi-Merbabu watershed became clogged with hot mud and 
huge boulders, overflowing their banks (Residentie Kadoe 1871:15). In the 
southern Kedhu district of Prabalingga, the Kali Pabélan was especially badly 
affected. Localised flooding here damaged 144 jung of fields planted to rice 
and tobacco. Even six years after the Java War, the amount of cold lava in the 
river bed, and its constantly changing flow, made bridge building almost im-
possible.27 A Dutch travel diary from this period speaks of the whole western 
flank of the mountain, which before 1823 had been intensely cultivated half 
24 BD (Manado), II:307-8, XIX (Sinom) 98. ardi Mrapi murup ika/ anglir sundhul ing wiyati/ kadya 
kèbekan* Ngayogya/ kang akasa kadi geni/ kang suwara gigirisi/ gemleger lawan gumludhug/ brama pating 
pancurat/ kelangkung gègèr pan sami/ ting kudhangdhang ngupados pangungsèn samya. MS. kèbyukan, 
I have followed Rusche 1908-09, I:98.
25 BD (Manado) II:308-10, XX.1-4. Earlier, Dipanagara had described the eruption thus: BD 
(Manado) II:307.XIX (Sinom) 97. nulya dhawah tiwas bendunira Hyang Sukma.
26 Dj.Br. 52, R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta) to Captain J.Th.A. van den Busch (Klathèn), 3-1-1823.
27 Baud 91, P. le Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag over de Residentie Kadoe’, 30-3-1824, 27-8, 30-1; Minis-
terie van Koloniën 3054, ‘Statistieke beschrijving der residentie Kedoe’ (1836), 10. See further 
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:555, on the deep ravines gouged out in the Pabélan and the 
river’s periodic flooding. 
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Plate 57. Eruption of Mount Merapi, painted by Radèn Sarif Bustaman Salèh in 1865. 
Photograph by courtesy of the Rijksmuseum van Geologie en Mineralogie, Leiden.
way up to its summit, now covered with igneous rocks, lava flows and ash 
(Büchler 1888, I:426-7). Cornets de Groot, who watched the eruptions from 
Surakarta, gave a magnificent description in a personal letter to his father:
It was beautiful to behold; a thick column of smoke rose violently from the top and 
the thunderous noise was heard clearly in Solo [Sala]. I could see glowing rocks 
hurled up into the sky, falling right and left around the mountain. Around the 
peak, there were numerous flashes of lightning caused by the electric attraction 
of the eruption.28
Heavy rain fell for two weeks after the eruption, washing all the ash – with 
its trace elements and nutrients – off the sawah. After the last volcanic activity 
on 3 January 1823, Merapi continued to be wreathed in smoke for days. Much 
damage was done by the lava flows which gouged two deep valleys in the 
side of the mountain, flowing in a south and south-westerly direction. Roads 
were blocked by walls of steaming mud three metres thick and the waters 
in the rivers, which had their source on the mountain, became boiling hot.29 
Bodies were washed down the Praga River and were found as far afield at the 
28 KB, Cornets de Groot private collection IXe pt. 4:44-5, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Surakarta) 
to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik), 31-12-1822.
29 Dj.Br. 52, A.M.Th. de Salis (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/
Bogor), 12-1-1823. The important cross-country trading route between Pisangan on the Yogya-
Slèman road and Boyolali was completely severed, Baud 91, P. le Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag over de 
residentie Kadoe’, 30-3-1824, 14.
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rich salt-making village of Sirisik near the mouth of the river as it flowed into 
the Indian Ocean.30 Although the damage to agriculture was not as serious as 
at first feared – with the exception of southern Kedhu – the short-term diffi-
culties caused by the eruption were registered by the rise in rice prices which 
touched a high of f 6.10 per pikul (62 kilograms) in late January compared 
with an average of f 5.00-5.50 in the preceding quarter and f 4.00-4.50 in the 
following year and a half (Appendix X). The 1823 Kedhu tobacco harvest, as 
we have seen, was also poor (Chapter IX note 82). According to Cornets de 
Groot, the eruption itself was the first for over three decades (fifty years in 
fact) and the worst in living memory.31
Besides the physical damage caused by the eruption, the event almost cer-
tainly helped to raise millenarian expectations on the eve of the Java War. The 
mountain itself occupies a special place in local Javanese mythology and its 
protector spirit, Kyai Sapu Jagad (‘Honourable Sir Sweeper of the World’), is 
regarded along with Ratu Kidul (Chapter IV note 36) as one of the two most 
powerful guardian spirits of the sultanate (Ricklefs 1974b:233 note 21). Any 
volcanic activity on Mount Merapi, not least a violent eruption such as oc-
curred in late December 1822, would have been viewed by the population 
of south-central Java as a tangible portent of coming change. Dipanagara’s 
inward reflection that it was a sign of divine wrath would have been shared by 
many. The fact that it was followed up by a number of subsequent earthquakes 
in December 1823, January 1824 and September 1825, would have been taken 
as further proof that Java was about to enter a new era.32 Thus in 1770, the ap-
parent eruption of the mountain in that year (note 31) and the ash rains which 
preceded it, were considered to be two of the important natural phenomena 
which heralded the end of the Javanese century and the expected fall of the 
kraton (Ricklefs 1974a:186). We have already seen how the eruption of Mount 
Kelut in east Java in late June 1811, coming as it did just over a month before 
the British invasion of early August 1811, may have been taken as a sign that 
major changes were afoot (p. 280). Later, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
the terrific explosion of Mount Krakatau in the Sunda Strait in August 1883, 
30 Dj.Br. 52, A.M.Th. de Salis (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/
Bogor), 12-1-1823. On Sirisik, see further Dj.Br. 19¹¹, ‘Onderscheidene stukken nopens de Djokja-
sche landen’, n.y.
31 KB, Cornets de Groot private collection IXe, pt. 4:44-5, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Surakarta) 
to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik), 31-12-1822, where he wrote ‘thirty years’ which is clearly a 
mistake. The last eruption of Mount Merapi seems to have been in 1770, Ricklefs 1974a:186, but 
even this date is disputed; see IOL Mack.Pr. 16.10, where a date of 1772 is given. There had been 
a violent earth tremor caused by volcanic activity as late as 19-3-1806, Chapter I note 15.
32 Dj.Br. 19¹¹, ‘Onderschillen stukken’, entry for 8-12-1823, refers to a heavy earthquake in 
Yogya on 8 December 1823; Dj.Br. 67, J. Wormer (Inspector of Cultures, Pacitan) to A.H. Smissaert 
(Yogyakarta), 10-1-1824, reference to heavy earthquake in Pacitan which was also seemingly felt 
in Kedhu, Residentie Kadoe 1871:16; Palmer van den Broek 1873-77, 20:518, on the earthquake in 
Yogya on 25 September 1825.
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clearly heightened expectations of the coming Day of Judgement which was 
linked in the popular mind with Mahdi beliefs in Banten before the short-lived 
peasant revolt of 1886 (Sartono Kartodirjo 1966:167). In south-central Java, as 
we have seen (Chapter IX), popular millenarian hopes centred around the fig-
ure of the Just King rather than the Mahdi. In contemporary versions of the 
Jayabaya prophecies, the Ratu Adil’s coming is described as being preceded 
by various natural occurrences including rains of ash, earthquakes, flashes of 
lightning, thunderbolts, heavy rain, gusts of wind, and eclipses of the sun and 
moon.33 The visitations of disease such as the 1821 cholera epidemic and the 
tangible breakdown of society as reflected in the high prices of food, corrupt 
administration, the aimless wandering of the rural population and the rise in 
robberies and violence, all of which were features of pre-Java War life in the 
Principalities, would have been easily connected in the popular mind with 
the time of madness or jaman édan which was to precede the coming of the 
Just King.34 We have already seen how the Jayabaya prophecies held great 
sway at the courts at this time (p. 483), particularly the belief in the hundred-
year cycle for Javanese dynasties. These beliefs would persist long after the 
Java War, resurfacing strongly in the period immediately before and after 
Hamengkubuwana V’s death in June 1855 when the prophecy that Yogya’s cen-
tury had been fulfilled was believed by many.35 As the Yogya Resident, A.H.W. 
Baron de Kock (1808-1891), put it at this time, ‘The prophecies of Jayabaya live 
in the minds of every Javanese and they do not doubt that they will come to 
pass’.36 Even during Indonesia’s struggle for independence in 1945-1949, their 
continued influence would be noted in the areas where Dipanagara had once 
fought (Simatupang 1972:41, 72, 89).
Shortly after the outbreak of the Java War, the Jayabaya prophecies seem 
to have been rewritten to correspond more closely to recent events. Thus in 
a Malay version provided by a Javanese informant to General de Kock at 
his Magelang headquarters, the Javanese year AJ 1753 (AD 15 August 1825-3 
August 1826) is referred to as the time when Java ‘would begin to be de-
stroyed’ – shades of the Parangkusuma prophecy – and when good people 
would be set aside by men of no principle. In this final age of disorder – 
the kaliyuga – before the establishment of the era of the Ratu Adil with its 
peace and plenty, the world would be turned upside down: fathers would 
33 Reksapustaka (Mangkunagaran), Serat Centhini, IV:1812, I (Pucung) 32-3. krep grahana surya/ 
kalawan grahana sasi/ jawah awu lindu gelap clèrèt warsa. 33. prahara gung/ salah mangsa dresing susur/ 
agung prang rusuhan/ mungsuhé boya katawis/ tangèh lamun seneng tentreming wardaya. For a later 
nineteenth-century version, see Wiselius 1886:186.
34 Carey 1981a:4-7; Reksapustaka (Mangkunagaran), Serat Centhini, IV:1812-3, I.34-42.
35 Dj.Br. 1, W.C.E. Baron de Geer, ‘Politieke verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 
1855’, 31-3-1856.
36 Dj.Br. 4, A.H.W. Baron de Kock, ‘Algemeen verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 
1850’, 3-1851.
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forget their children, children their parents, masters would neglect their serv-
ants and servants their masters. The Javanese themselves would be like win-
nowed rice.37 In another Javanese babad version of the events surrounding 
Dipanagara’s rebellion, Jayabaya is depicted as having prophesied that Yogya 
would be destroyed after ten windu (eight-year cycles) or eighty Javanese 
years (Appendix XIV), and after four changes of ruler.38 Signs that this time 
was at hand were to be seen, according to this text, in the corrupt rule of the 
patih who robbed people while sitting down and was like a devil in human 
clothes (Chapter VIII note 149). Meanwhile, in the Buku Kedhung Kebo, the 
author described how in the early stages of the Java War, when Dipanagara 
was still at his first headquarters at Selarong (July-September 1825), many 
of the common folk who rallied to the prince believed that he was the Ratu 
Adil who would carry out the Jayabaya prophecy by driving the Dutch from 
Java. But, the author asserts, in reality the time had not yet arrived and few 
understood the true meaning of the prophecies.39
A small, fat and shy man; Yogyakarta’s new Resident
Just as these events were taking place in Yogya and popular expectations of 
coming millenarian events were on the rise, important changes were occurring 
amongst the Dutch official personnel at the courts. As we shall see, these were 
destined to have a direct influence on the course of events in the sultanate 
during the coming two and a half years. In late April 1822, Nahuys had been 
forced to relinquish his position as acting Resident in Surakarta because of 
growing opposition to his economic policies amongst Van der Capellen’s close 
advisers, in particular H.J. van de Graaff.40 Baron A.M.Th. de Salis, himself an 
eloquent opponent of Nahuys’ schemes, was chosen as his successor.41 Then 
37 dK 166, ‘Nota houdende inlichtingen over het boek Djaja Baja’, n.y. (? 1829). It is useful 
to compare this with equivalent passages dealing with the end of the kaliyuga cycle in Raffles 
1817, I:264; Drewes 1925:160-4; Poerbatjaraka 1933:44-8. On the kaliyuga, see further Zoetmulder 
1935:269-72. The phrase used for winnowed rice is lir gabah dinginteri.
38 UBL, Nederlands Bijbelgenootschap MS. 37 (Babad Dipanagaran, Jayabaya version):5, I 
(Dhandhanggula) 2-3. Prabu Jayabaya duk nguni/ ingkang asung wirayat. 3. nagri Yogyakarta anetepi/ 
apan sampun kawan panjenengan/ nyandhak sapuluh windu.
39 KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):159-60, XIV.69-71; Carey 1974b:43 note 133. See p. 71 on 
Sultan Agung’s prophecy that the Dutch would rule in Java for 300 years after his death in 1646.
40 Van der Kemp 1901, I:145; vAE 20 (aanwinsten 1941) 20, H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to 
G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 23-3-1823; H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) Mr J. Fabius (Hol-
land), 26-7-1823. See further p. 455. On the Residency changes, see Appendix IX. According to Van 
de Graaff, Nahuys hoped to be confirmed as joint Resident of both Yogya and Surakarta and to be 
able to amalgamate the residencies under his control. He was said to have won the support of both 
the Dutch king, William I, and the minister for the Colonies, C.Th. Elout, for the plan. 
41 For a brief biography of De Salis’ career in the Indies, see De Haan 1935a:641-2.
Plate 58. Jonkheer Anthonië Hendrik Smissaert (1777-1832), Resident of Yogyakarta 
between 1823 and 1825, whose bungling and ineptitude were directly responsible for 
the outbreak of the Java War. One Dutch contemporary, Willem van Hogendorp, des-
cribed him as a ‘small, fat and shy man’ (klein, dik en verlegen), and another, the Belgian 
painter A.A.J. Payen, compared him to Sancho Panza, one of the most archetypal 
panakawan figures in European literature. Portrait attributed to the Dutch artist W.G.F. 
Heymans, and probably painted in 1827 after Smissaert had returned to The Hague in 
disgrace. From the private collection of the Baron van Tuyll van Serooskerken (Kasteel 
Heeze). Photograph by courtesy of the Stichting Iconographisch Bureau, The Hague.
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in November 1822, Nahuys also gave up his official post in Yogyakarta to 
return to the Netherlands to argue his plans for economic development in the 
Principalities with the Dutch king and Minister for the Colonies C.Th. Elout 
(Nahuys van Burgst 1858:129; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:51 note 2, 52-3, 
74). The vacancy in Yogya was not filled immediately, but D’Abo continued 
as Assistant-Resident and De Salis functioned as acting Resident coming over 
from Surakarta for important events such as the death of the fourth sultan 
and the installation of his successor. There was, however, something of an ad-
ministrative vacuum in Yogya during these months which must have created 
much the same sort of uncertain atmosphere which had prevailed in Surakarta 
before Pakubuwana IV’s demise in October 1820 (pp. 500-1).
Eventually, on 3 January 1823, Van der Capellen nominated the forty-five 
year old Resident of Rembang, Jonkheer Anthonië Hendrik Smissaert, scion 
of a long-established Indies family and son-in-law of a former VOC Resident 
of Surakarta,42 to fill the vacancy left by Nahuys’ departure. The reasons giv-
en by the governor-general for his unusual choice – Smissaert had no experi-
ence of service at the south-central Javanese courts – are significant. First, the 
former Rembang Resident was appointed to afford him the extra emoluments 
which the Yogya post entailed and which the financially canny Smissaert had 
requested in order to provide for his large family.43 Second, the governor-
general clearly made the appointment in the hope that he would have a sen-
ior official in Yogya who would act more obediently than Nahuys had done 
with regard to the land-rent. He also had in mind the need for an official 
with extensive administrative experience in Java to undertake a far-reaching 
investigation of the Yogya territories with an eye to facilitating further territo-
rial annexations. As we shall see shortly, the western mancanagara provinces 
42 Smissaert had married Clara Elisabeth von Liebeherr, daughter of Bogislaus Friedrich von 
Liebeherr, who had served in Surakarta between 1806 and 1808, on 5 October 1800, see De Haan 
1935a:648-9 (who gives a brief biography of Smissaert’s early career up to the end of the British 
period), Campbell 1915, I:434; pp. 160, 169, and Appendix IX. His later career is referred to in 
Campbell 1915, I:433-6. See also Carey 1981a. Born in Batavia in 1777 and educated in Holland, 
he died in disgrace in The Hague in 1832 following his removal from his Yogya post on 26-9-1825 
and subsequent dismissal from government service.
43 Van der Kemp 1896a:380; Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’ (henceforth: 
‘Bijlagen Smissaert’), G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia) to A.H. Smissaert (Rembang), 4-1-1823, 
referring to Smissaert’s letter of 28-11-1822 requesting the Yogya post. Van der Capellen’s official 
decision to appoint him is in Ministerie van Koloniën 2778, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal 
in rade, 3-1-1823 no. 21. As Van der Capellen put it in his 4 January 1822 letter, ‘the higher income 
which goes with the post […] and the circumstances of the young sultan’s minority should 
place you in a more advantageous position’. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:377 note 1, 379. 
Although there is no proof that Smissaert used his new position for illicit financial gain, De Haan 
(1935a:648-9) noted that, when he was serving as magistrate in Semarang in 1812, Raffles had to 
write him a special letter warning him not to sit on cases in which he had a personal financial 
interest. On Smissaert as a shrewd financier, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:277 note 1. On 
the salary and perks of the Yogya post, see Chapter V note 29 and Chapter VIII note 91. 
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of Banyumas and Bagelèn were now in the government’s sights. Smissaert 
with his nearly twenty years’ service in Java seemed to fit the bill. As Van der 
Capellen pointed out in his letter of appointment:
I consider the post of Resident at Djokjo [Yogyakarta] in the present circumstances 
above all as very important. I wish to see an official placed there whom I trust 
entirely and who in every department of the service gets on with his colleague in 
Surakarta […] your knowledge of Javanese affairs, your long standing relations 
with all classes of Javanese and your diligence in the public service are reason 
enough to convince me that I will not regret my choice.44
Finally, Van der Capellen added that under no circumstances would Nahuys’ 
business associate D’Abo be allowed to stay on in Yogya. Instead, he would 
find Smissaert a ‘capable official’ as his assistant (Van der Kemp 1896a:379). 
This man would later be identified in the governor-general’s inner circle of 
friends and erstwhile staff. The son of his children’s tutor and one of his 
former military adjutants, Pierre Frederic Henri Chevallier’s personal influ- 
ence on the affairs of the sultanate would be almost as disastrous as that of 
his immediate superior.45 D’Abo, meanwhile, stayed on in Yogya attending 
to Nahuys’ coffee estate at Bedhaya and other matters before returning to 
Padang, his birthplace in west Sumatra, where he died in May 1824 (Van 
Enk 1999:218 note 68). It was an unhappy end for a man who had hitched his 
wagon to Nahuys’ star, but had seen both his marriage (Chapter III note 79; 
pp. 438-9) and his business projects fail as a result of his superior’s actions. 
From the start of Smissaert’s Residency, there was a fundamental differ-
ence between what the former Rembang Resident hoped from his position 
and what Van der Capellen expected of him. Whereas Smissaert had in view a 
quiet and lucrative appointment to feather his nest before retirement, the gov-
44 ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia) to A.H. Smissaert (Rembang), 
4-1-1823.
45 Ministerie van Koloniën 2779, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 26-1-1823 no. 2, 
Van der Capellen’s official appointment of Chevallier on 26-8-1823. Chevallier took over from D’Abo 
on the same day, Dj.Br. 19¹¹, Summary of Yogya Residency letters, 1814-25, entry for 26-8-1823. For 
biographical details, see Van der Kemp 1896a:400; Carey 1981a:241-2 note 31. A former officer of the 
7th Dutch hussars who had seen action at Waterloo, Chevallier had resigned his officer’s commis-
sion shortly after arriving in Java in 1820 and entered government service in 1821. He then made 
a good career, serving as secretary of Banten Residency before moving to Yogya in August 1823. 
Van der Capellen clearly thought highly of him – not without reason according to Louw (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:306) – and there is a telling annotation on the original copy of his June 
1824 report on the working of the tollgates in the Arsip Nasional in Jakarta (Dj.Br. 52, Chevallier, 
‘Rapport’, 15-6-1824, full reference Chapter I note 35) where a senior official, perhaps the governor-
general himself, had written in pencil: ‘What does the government want with such tax-farmers and 
their scandalous conduct? Mr Chevallier must become Resident of Banyumas. This report and the 
refusal to follow it lies at the background of the present disturbances’. This was written sometime 
after the outbreak of the Java War on 20-7-1825 and Chevallier’s death on 11-11-1825. Highly ambi-
tious, Chevallier seems to have put his own name forward for the Yogya post confident that his 
close personal ties with Van der Capellen would ensure his selection.
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ernor-general thought foremost of the imminent policy changes relating to the 
land-rent and incorporation of princely territory. And for this latter purpose 
Smissaert was manifestly unsuited. This was particularly so when one consid-
ers the highly delicate political situation then prevailing in Yogya. Although 
he did take some administrative initiatives – the establishment of an official 
Residency postal service in Yogya may have been his work46 – Smissaert was 
a man of distinctly mediocre talents. Willem van Hogendorp described him as 
‘a person more suited to the outdoor life than the position of Resident at one 
of the [south-central Javanese] courts’ (Van Hogendorp 1913:143), while Van 
de Graaff himself considered his appointment a temporary one, ascertaining 
correctly that he had little knowledge of kraton affairs.47 He also appears to 
have had difficulties getting on with his subordinates (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, I:280; Van der Kemp 1896a:377). Added to this, his physical appear-
ance and manner were distinctly unprepossessing. A fat, balding, middle-aged 
man of small and stocky build, Smissaert was shy and diffident in conversa-
tion (Van Hogendorp 1913:146; Carey 1981a:255 note 87, 273 note 152). Such 
a combination of poor capabilities and unimpressive physique was doubly 
unfortunate for a Resident at one of the kraton for the Javanese were shrewd 
judges of men and attached great importance to the bearing and physiognomy 
of Dutch officials (Ricklefs 1974a:27-31; Carey 1981a:255 note 87).
Despite his limitations, Smissaert seems to have made a genuine effort from 
the start of his Residency to follow up Van der Capellen’s instructions regarding 
the collection of statistics about Yogyakarta, in particular its lands, population 
and administration. He received little cooperation, however, from the sultan’s 
officials, writing to the governor-general that the regional bupati were distinctly 
especially unhelpful in providing him the necessary information:
There is a certain reserve and dourness in Yogyakarta [compared to Rembang] 
which makes one too despondent to ask them anything […] none of the bupati 
seem to know their areas well […] [and] the patih himself has visited many places 
near Yogya for the first time with me.48
46 Dj.Br. 58, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Commissarissen ter regeling der vorstenlanden 
(Yogyakarta), 30-6-1830, on the establishment of a brieven posterij (letter post) during Smissaert’s 
Residency to convey letters and official dispatches between Yogya, Surakarta and Semarang; 
before that all letters had been taken by messengers (oppasser), see Chapter VI note 121. Since all 
the archives relating to this postal service were destroyed after the outbreak of the Java War by 
Chevallier, who ordered that they be dumped into one of the canals outside the Yogya Residency 
house, there is no possibility of confirming Smissaert’s role in its establishment. It is equally likely 
that Chevallier himself was the initiator of this scheme. See further above Chapter VI notes 120-1.
47 vAE 20 (aanwinsten 1941), H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to J. Fabius (Holland), 26-7-1823. See 
further Van Nes 1844:153-4. For Harvey Thomson’s view of Smissaert whom he described as ‘that 
little wretch’ on account of his failure to return his rare first edition of Raffles’ History of Java), see 
Van Enk 1990:34.
48 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. 
van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 7-1-1824. Smissaert reported great difficulties in compiling an 
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He soon began to form a poor opinion of the patih and the child sultan’s two 
guardians, Mangkubumi and Dipanagara, as well:
They are good people but lazy. They know very little about the administration 
[of the sultanate] for no registers have been kept since the sack of the kraton [by 
the British] in [June] 1812. Thus, they merely receive the income from the sultan’s 
lands when the bupati choose to give it to them. Danureja, [moreover], is much 
taken up with women on whom he spends all his money. [But] he is prepared to 
serve the Dutch government as much as possible.49
Later, following the outbreak of the Java War when he was casting around for 
scapegoats on whom to lay blame for the disastrous turn of events, Smissaert 
wrote more harshly of the patih, claiming that he was ‘a dull, stupid and luke-
warm man when it came to affairs of importance for the Netherlands Indies 
government’.50 Yet it was precisely this man on whom Smissaert came to rely 
so heavily for help and advice during his period as Resident. So why did he do 
this? If he knew about the chief minister’s character faults and lack of capacity, 
why choose to delegate so much to him? The answer seems to be that Smissaert 
was out of his depth, was frequently absent from Yogya and depended on sub-
ordinates like Danureja to carry out a large part of his work. As a result the 
patih was given far too many responsibilities, lacked the necessary support to 
carry out his tasks, and took advantage of the Resident’s weakness to further 
his own interests. That these interests included a love of the opium pipe, fine 
clothes and beautiful women hardly served to hone his administrative zeal 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:450). It was the same with the Residency 
translator J.G. Dietrée and the new Assistant-Resident P.F.H. Chevallier, both 
accurate statistical survey of the sultanate because of the juxtaposition of Yogyakarta, Surakarta 
and Mangkunagaran lands, see further pp. 11-14. Also certain key maps of the kraton and the 
Yogya lands had been taken out of the Residency archive and sent to the Marine Academy/Mil-
itary School in Semarang prior to the British attack in June 1812, see above Chapter VII note 
168; Van Oosten 1969:247-62 (on the Semarang Marine Academy, 1782-1826). Danureja IV was, 
however, ordered to cooperate in compiling a list of Hindu antiquities in the Yogya area for 
the president of the Antiquities Commission in Japara, and in drawing up a population census, 
Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 20-2-1823, 
26-3-1823; A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Pieter le Clercq (Magelang), 15-4-1823; AvJ, A.H. Smiss-
aert (Yogyakarta) to President Antiquities Commission (Japara), 10-7-1823, 4-8-1823, 21-8-1823, 
16-1-1824; A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta), 3-8-1823. See fur-
ther Chapter II note 60. Despite the difficulties Smissaert experienced, it is clear that much of the 
information which he collected at this time found its way into the official statistical report of the 
Yogya Residency of 1836, see Ministerie van Koloniën 3055, ‘Beschrijving en statistieke rapport 
betreffende de Residentie Djokjokarta’. On an earlier abortive attempt by the returned Dutch 
administration to compile a population census in 1817, see Van der Kemp 1913:24.
49 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. 
van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 25-11-1824. On the sack of the kraton archive by the British, see 
pp. 346-52.
50 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William 
I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828).
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of whom needed the guidance of a capable superior to get the best out of 
them (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:306 note 2). In fact, on a personal level 
Smissaert does not seem to have got on particularly well with either of them, 
especially the latter. Yet he still delegated a number of key duties to them 
(Kielstra 1885:410). How could it be otherwise? For Smissaert was for certain 
key periods to all intents and purposes an absentee Resident. 
On arriving in Yogya in February 1823, he had found the Residency House 
in a grave state of disrepair. It had been left vacant for several months following 
Nahuys’ departure,51 had suffered earthquake damage during the eruption of 
Mount Merapi in December (Payen 1988:8 note 6) and needed a new roof. In 
the end, it was decided to pull much of it down and begin again. But it was not 
until November 1824 that work on redesigning and rebuilding the entire struc-
ture could commence under the capable direction of the Belgian artist-architect, 
Antoine Auguste Joseph Payen.52 Even then work was stopped until the end 
of the rainy season and only resumed at the end of June 1825 when Payen re-
turned to the sultan’s capital. It was still proceeding when the Java War broke 
out on 20 July. This situation, so enriching for the historical record given the di-
ary which the ever observant Payen kept of the dramatic events of Dipanagara’s 
siege of Yogyakarta between late July and mid-September 1825 (Payen 1988), 
proved fateful for Smissaert and for Dutch interests in Yogya. Given the need to 
tear down the old residency house to enable the new building to be construct-
ed, Smissaert and his family moved into the house of the former kapitan cina, 
Tan Jin Sing, in the Chinese quarter of Yogya. They stayed there for just over 
a year between August 1823 and September 1824, when temporary lodgings 
became available in the Dutch fort, Vredenburg.53 During this period, Smissaert 
frequently took his family up to Bedhaya, Nahuys’ former estate on the flanks 
of Mount Merapi (pp. 537-40; Plate 60). According to his own testimony, he 
only remained there for short periods and always informed the patih of his ab-
sence.54 But General de Kock remarked that he was there ‘for months on end’, 
a view confirmed by Lawick van Pabst who stated that Residency office affairs 
51 Nahuys had departed from Yogya on 1 November 1822. In the interim, De Salis only used it 
occasionally and seemingly not at all after it suffered earthquake damage in late December 1822. 
Smissaert arrived to take up his posting on 11 February 1823, and moved over to Tan Jin Sing’s 
house in August 1823 when the old Residency House was pulled down prior to rebuilding work.
52 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. 
van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 10-1-1825.
53 Dj.Br. 67A, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Lieutenant-Governor-General (H.M. de Kock) (Bat-
avia), 4-10-1824. Smissaert stated that he could not move into the fort immediately because an offic-
er’s mess was being constructed there, see vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, extract of 
letter of A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 7-1-1824.
54 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert, comments on the Besluit 
of Minister of Marine and Colonies, C.Th. Elout, 13-10-1829 La 4 no. 90, upholding Smissaert’s 
dismissal from government service as per Governor-General’s Besluit of 20-12-1825 no. 1 (hence-
forth: Smissaert, ‘Comments’).
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were left in the hands of a clerk.55 Indeed, we know from Smissaert’s own cor-
respondence that in the critical weeks before Dipanagara’s rebellion, he was in 
semi-permanent residence at Bedhaya, returning to Yogya only on Mondays 
and Thursdays to transact Residency business (Van der Kemp 1896a:382-3 note 
1). He even planned a climbing holiday for himself and his family in late June 
1825, involving the ascent of Mount Lawu and a visit to the fifteenth-centu-
ry Hindu-Buddhist temple at Sukuh, ordering the Yogya patih to ensure that 
the roads were in a good state of repair to accommodate his carriage. This 
was tantamount to having yet another absentee Resident in Yogya.56 The de-
lays caused to the transaction of official business were considerable given the 
over thirty kilometre round trip required for every journey to and fro to the 
Resident’s country seat. Smissaert’s absence during the critical weekend before 
Dipanagara fled from Tegalreja, as we will see shortly, severely handicapped 
Dutch efforts to open immediate negotiations with the prince after his inten-
tions had become known (note 257). 
Initial reactions to the new Resident on the part of the Yogyanese are not 
known. But Dipanagara afterwards wisely observed that Smissaert was ‘a 
good man but weak’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743; Chapter III). 
The prince also had kind words to say about his wife’s hospitality, remarking 
that ‘I used to go now and then to Bedhaya […] [and whenever] I went there, 
Mrs Smissaert [Clara Elisabeth, née Von Liebeherr] out of the goodness of her 
heart used to come to me offering [me] a bottle of sweet [Cape Dutch] wine 
which she knew I liked at the time’.57 It is also seems that Smissaert was well 
viewed amongst the Yogya Chinese community, not least by Tan Jin Sing who 
let him live in his house rent free.58 At the time of his departure from Yogya 
in late September 1825, the former kapitan cina and the other elders of the 
Chinese community provided him with two glowing testimonials vouching 
for his goodness of heart and special consideration towards them.59
55 dK XLV, H.M. de Kock, ‘Verhaal over het ontstaan van den opstand van Dipo Negoro’ 
(henceforth: De Kock, ‘Verhaal’), 10-1825; Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, Lawick van Pabst, ‘Con-
sideratiën op de Nota van den Heer [Hendrik] MacGillivray’ (henceforth: Van Pabst, ‘Considera-
tiën’), 8-1826.
56 Between March 1820 and April 1822, when he had served as acting Resident of Surakarta 
(Appendix IX), Nahuys had been more often away in the Sunan’s capital than in Yogya. On 
Smissaert’s planned climbing holiday to Mount Lawu, see Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Bedhaya/
Yogyakarta) to Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 23-6-1825. It is unclear whether this took place as Smiss-
aert stated that it depended on the amount of work at his office. Since he was only there on Mon-
days and Thursdays, it cannot have been too onerous.
57 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743. On Dipanagara’s fondness for sweet Cape Dutch 
– Constantia – wine which he regarded as ‘medicinal’ and thus not forbidden under Qur’ānic law, 
see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 35-6, Chapter III note 87.
58 In the end, Smissaert offered him f 88 a month as an ex gratia payment, Dj.Br. 67A, A.H. 
Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Lieutenant Governor-General (H.M. de Kock) (Batavia), 4-10-1824.
59 Van der Kemp 1896a:389 note 1. Tan Jin Sing’s testimonial for Smissaert was also signed by 
other family members and business associates: Qué Hok Sing, Qué Bok Sing, Lien Tjo Tjing, Tjoa 
In Yoe, Tan Jun Kam, Hoen Lo, and Tian Hok.
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One of Smissaert’s first public acts, however, seems to have caused great 
resentment in the Yogya kraton. This concerned his ‘agreement’ – as he put 
it – to represent the young sultan at the Garebeg Puwasa festivities of 9 June 
1823 by sitting in person on the vacant Yogya throne, the dhampar. Given that 
this had earlier been the focus of such intense dispute during the second 
sultan’s reign (Chapters V-VII), it seems strange that the new Resident was 
not more sensitive to its significance. Even the most cursory perusal of the 
Residency archive would have informed him to leave well alone. Ever the 
conscientious bull in a china shop, however, Smissaert pressed ahead and 
came to his own inappropriate conclusion. According to him, the fifth sultan 
was still too young and shy of people to take part in the Garebeg ceremony. 
Although he had initially thought of cancelling the celebrations, he was over-
ruled by the four guardians, who told him that by right one of their number 
should represent the sultan. But, as this choice would give rise to jealousy 
and suspicion amongst them – one can imagine that neither Ratu Ageng nor 
Ratu Kencana would have been happy to see Dipanagara sit on the throne 
– they invited Smissaert to act as their representative.60 Whether this truly 
reflected their jointly held views, or only the opinion of Ratu Ageng, who had 
already indicated her willingness to see the European government act as sole 
guardian for her grandson, we will probably never know. What is certain is 
that Smissaert’s subsequent action caused Dipanagara in particular feelings 
of intense grief and heartache.61 
The Resident had decided that if the dhampar remained unoccupied, ‘it 
would look as though the Netherlands Indies government was not well dis-
posed towards Yogya’.62 The governor-general, who had made his own faux-
pas with the regard to the Yogya court over this very issue during his 29-31 
August 1819 official visit,63 ratified Smissaert’s decision, merely adding the 
60 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. 
van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 23-5-1823; A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The 
Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828).
61 Du Bus 402, H.M. van de Poll (hoofd baljuw, Batavia) and William Stavers (translator), ‘Ver-
hoor van Kijaji Modjo in de boeijen van Batavia’ (henceforth: ‘Verhoor Modjo’), 11-10-1829, testi-
mony of Kyai Rosali (Gajali), one of Dipanagara’s leading santri supporters, who is said to have 
reflected that Smissaert’s action caused Dipanagara een vreeselijk hartzeer. It is unclear which Kyai 
Gajali is being referred to here, but it is likely that it was the ulama from Dhadhapan, whom some 
sources cite as Kyai Maja’s brother, Appendix VIIb; Babcock 1981a:293. During his capture by 
Dipanagara’s forces in late 1826, the Dutch official, Paulus Daniel Portier, heard a similar report 
when he was being brought to the prince’s headquarters at Kemusuh in Kulon Praga. Apparently, 
Dipanagara particularly resented sitting on a stool while the Resident sat on the dhampar, KITLV 
H 263, ‘Verklaring […] houdende een verhaal van zijn gevangenschap bij de muitelingen’ (hence-
forth, Portier ‘Verklaring’), n.y. (? 9-1826).
62 See above note 60.
63 AN, Kabinet, 2-3-1838 no. 30, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (Batavia/Bogor), 
18-2-1837 no. 134, stating that during his 29-31 August 1819 visit to the court, Van der Capellen had 
created great displeasure in Yogya by insisting that his wife, Baroness van der Capellen [Jacque-
line Elizabeth, née Tuyl van Serooskerken], should sit beside him on the throne prepared for him 
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rider that the young sultan should be shown to the public even if only for 
a very short time.64 This meant that at the five Garebeg ceremonies during 
Smissaert’s thirty-one months as Resident, he represented the child sultan by 
sitting on the throne and even received the homage of the mancanagara bupati 
when they came to Yogya to hand over their tribute and pay their respects to 
the sultan. In mitigation, one could argue that Smissaert was a victim of the 
European government’s decision not to appoint Pakualam or another senior 
prince – perhaps Dipanagara himself – as regent. If they had, there would 
have been no debate about who should ‘represent’ Hamengkubuwana V at 
the Garebeg (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:449-50, 453). Subsequently, 
the veteran Indies official, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, who served as acting 
Resident of Yogya between October 1825 and March 1827, followed Smissaert’s 
action during the swearing in ceremony for the new guardians of the child 
sultan on 17 November 1825.65 So, the practice of the Resident occupying 
the Yogya throne at important state functions was apparently continued, at 
least until the restoration of the second sultan in August 1826. Smissaert’s ac-
tion was thus not so unique. But, it still caused deep offence. And not just to 
Dipanagara. It is significant that at the Garebeg Mulud of 16 November 1823, 
a particularly important occasion since it fell in the Javanese year Dal, the fifth 
in the Javanese eight-year windu cycle (Appendix XIV), which was supposed 
to correspond with the year in which The Prophet was born,66 Smissaert no-
ticed that the mancanagara bupati refused to answer his questions concerning 
their districts. Small wonder too that the Resident remarked on the ‘reserve 
and dourness’ in Yogya at this time for his own action must have greatly 
contributed to these sentiments. Later, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II would 
complain about Smissaert’s action to General De Kock when the latter was 
commanding the Dutch forces in central Java during the war.67 The Resident’s 
behaviour was also censured by Minister of Marine and Colonies C.Th. Elout, 
who referred to his decision to represent the sultan at the Garebeg as one 
of the principal reasons for his dismissal from government service.68 Van 
Sevenhoven would later write his epitaph, speaking of Smissaert’s,
at the official receptions. She was apparently the first wife of a governor-general ever to sit on a 
‘throne’ on the occasion of such a visit.
64 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King Wil-
liam I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828).
65 Dj.Br. 81, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 17-11-1825.
66 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. 
van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 9-11-1823. The Prophet Muhammad was supposed to have 
been born on Monday Pon, 12 Mulud, in a Javanese Dal year.
67 Baud 305A, ‘Geschrift van Prins Mangko Diningrat over de oorzaken van den opstand op 
Java’ (henceforth: ‘Geschrift van Mangko Diningrat’), n.y. (12-1826).
68 vAE (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I 
(The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828); Ministerie van Koloniën 2791, Besluit van den Gouverneur-
Generaal in rade, 20-12-1825 no. 1 (decision to uphold Smissaert’s dismissal from his Yogya post, 
see further note 54).
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complete ignorance of [the manners and] customs of the Javanese. For a Resident 
who had spent so many years in Java and had served in so many different posts, 
one cannot but suppose that he was in the highest degree blameworthy and that 
he must always take responsibility for this.69
Poor Smissaert, one cannot escape the conclusion that he was the wrong man 
in the wrong place. As he reflected much later in his justificatory letter to the 
Dutch king in September 1828 (Van der Kemp 1896a:380):
I came to Yogya in 1823 much against my will. I perceived that the arrangements 
which had been made for the return of the rented lands would cause much dis-
content and I was entirely satisfied with [my posting as Resident of] Rembang, 
wanting nothing else than a slightly higher income, which I believe I had the right 
to ask for having been so long in the Indies.
The abolition of the land-rent and its consequences
As Smissaert intimated, even before his arrival in Yogya in February 1823, the 
government was preparing to take a decision of very great consequence: name-
ly, the ending of all land-rent contracts to non-Javanese in the Principalities. 
Both Van der Capellen and his principal adviser, the Surat-born Van de Graaff 
(1782-1827) had long been concerned about the proliferation of privately leased 
estates in the territories controlled by the south-central Javanese courts since it 
conflicted with their views on the European government’s central role in eco-
nomic affairs and the need to protect the welfare of the local population (p. 
455). In 1816, on the arrival of the Dutch commissioners-general in Java, of 
whom Van der Capellen was one, it had been decided to observe the status 
quo with regard to the lands already leased by Daendels and Raffles to private 
individuals. In the following year, Van de Graaff had taken part in Van der 
Capellen’s first journey through Java as a councillor for the Board of Finances. 
On the basis of data collected at that time, Raffles’ land tax system was en-
dorsed as the best groundwork for a comprehensive taxation structure on the 
island. Meanwhile, the old system of contingents and forced deliveries of cash 
crops by peasant cultivators was allowed to continue in the Preanger highlands 
in west Java for the production of coffee and in the Bataviasche Ommelanden 
(Batavian Environs) for sugar, where private individuals – mainly Chinese – 
were still permitted to lease land. Sometime after Van de Graaff’s 1817 journey, 
69 Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van den 
Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 8-5-1831 no. 47, commenting on the Memorie (Memorial) of A.H. Smissaert 
to C.Th. Elout, n.y. (? 9-1828) thus, eene volslagen onkunde van de gewoonten van den Javaan, by eenen 
Resident die zoo veele jaren op Java in verschillende betrekkingen gediend heeft, niet altoos niet te veronder-
stellen, maar hoogst laakbaar en waarvoor hij steeds verantwoordelijk moet zijn.
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the Inspectorate of Finances was set up under P.H. van Lawick van Pabst with 
Van de Graaff as his assistant. Both concurred in the view that grants of land 
to other than Javanese owners should be refused unconditionally, except for 
special concessions to those European owners already in occupation. As late as 
1818, Van der Capellen was still not convinced of the Inspectorate’s arguments, 
and tried to persuade Van Pabst and Van de Graaff to rethink their position on 
the question pending a personal consultation with King William I, who had 
begun to take an active interest in colonial affairs. Van de Graaff, however, per-
sisted in his attitude and when he became acting inspector general of Finances 
in 1819, he refused point blank to allow any more renting of land until the king 
had pronounced on the issue. At the same time, Van der Capellen journeyed 
yet again to the south-central Javanese courts in late August and September 
1819 and discovered that Nahuys, as Resident of Yogya, had arranged land 
leases in Yogya and Surakarta for his friends. The extent of these leases was 
not at the time very striking (Chapter IX note 53), but the governor-general 
asked both Nahuys and his opposite number in Surakarta, Rijck van Prehn, to 
prepare a report about the situation, an order which both Residents appear to 
have ignored.70
After this, events began to move very rapidly in favour of a complete 
repeal of the land-rent. In 1821, Van de Graaff made his second journey to 
south-central Java and in his own words, ‘saw the evil [of the land-rent] grow 
to enormous proportions; British, German, French and Dutch planters had 
taken over extensive lands right in the middle of the princely territories’.71 
Immediately following his visit, he wrote to Van der Capellen urging him to 
put an end to the land-rent and to promulgate firmer rules regarding the resi-
dence of Europeans in the interior of Java. This resulted in the governor-gen-
eral issuing an order at the end of October 1821 prohibiting further land-rent 
in the Principalities until a final decision had been taken by the government.72 
Again this was ignored by Nahuys, who in that very same year registered the 
highest number of land leases in Surakarta of any of the years since his arrival 
in August 1816 (Chapter IX note 53). On 23 March 1822, Van de Graaff’s influ-
ential report on the land-rent to Europeans in the Principalities was complet-
ed (Van der Kemp 1890:148-94). It was then, according to Van de Graaff, that 
Van der Capellen began truly to understand the ‘highly illiberal nature’ of 
70 Hageman 1856:21; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:49 note 7, 53-5; Van der Kemp 1901, 
I:193, 199, who pointed out that there was not even a copy of the governor-general’s decree in the 
Yogya Residency archive.
71 vAE (aanwinsten 1941), H.J. de Graaff (Batavia) to J. Fabius (Holland), 26-7-1823; Van der 
Kemp 1901, I:149; Rouffaer 1905:628. De Graaff’s subsequent report on the land-rent to Europeans 
in the Principalities dated 23 March 1822 is published in Van der Kemp 1890:148-94. See further 
Veth 1898, II:349; Van Enk 1990:20-1.
72 Ministerie van Koloniën 2777, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 30-10-1821 no. 
15.
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the land-rent which ‘deprived the Javanese peasant of his property rights and 
debased his status to that of a coolie’.73 Shortly after his arrival as Resident 
of Surakarta in late April 1822, De Salis also came independently to the same 
conclusion. In his own report to the governor-general, he stressed that in his 
view the land-rent was fundamentally at odds with both European govern-
ment policy and with Javanese custom.74 With these reports still fresh in his 
mind, Van der Capellen made his third and last journey to the courts in late 
August and early September 1822. After lengthy discussions with the chief 
ministers and the leading members of the kraton administrations, he returned 
to Bogor full of disapproval of the existing situation. A commission was im-
mediately established under the chairmanship of General De Kock, then serv-
ing as lieutenant governor-general (in office 1822-1830), which was instructed 
to investigate the whole issue of the property rights of Europeans in the ter-
ritories under European government control, one of the key questions being 
‘whether the renting of land to Europeans in the Principalities with their désa 
[villages] and inhabitants is liberal and necessary for the Netherlands-Indies 
government’. On this point, the commission reported negatively, stating that 
the government had no means of controlling the activities of the European 
planters, nor of alleviating the manifest oppression of the Javanese cultivators 
by the former.75 
According to Clive Day, the American historian of the Dutch administra-
tion in Java, the decision by the Dutch monarch to back the planters and order 
the Netherlands Indies government to raise the price paid to private produc-
ers of coffee also persuaded Van der Capellen to act quickly (Day 1972:234-5). 
This meant that even before the commission’s decision was known, Van der 
Capellen in consultation with his council, decided to promulgate his fate-
ful decree of 6 May 1823, ordering that all land rented by Europeans and 
Chinese in the Principalities should be returned to their original owners not 
later than 31 January 1824. This was followed up by a further decree on 20 
May 1823, which laid down very strict rules regarding the travel and resi-
dence of Europeans, Chinese and other foreigners in Java, especially in the 
princely states.76
73 vAE (aanwinsten 1941), H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to J. Fabius (Holland), 23-7-1823. There is 
useful overview of the main arguments for and against the land-rent deployed by Van de Graaff, 
Van der Capellen, and Nahuys van Burgst, in S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to 
G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 2-12-1821; H.J. de Graaff (Batavia) to G.A.G.Ph. van der 
Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 23-3-1822 (Van de Graaff’s comments on Nahuys’ letter).
74 Van der Kemp 1897:23, referring to De Salis’ report of 30 June 1822. See further Louw and 
De Klerck 1894-1909, I:51-2, 59-70 (which cites the whole of De Salis’ report).
75 vAE (aanwinsten 1941), H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to J. Fabius (Holland), 26-7-1823; Van der 
Kemp 1897:22-3.
76 Ministerie van Koloniën 2778, Besluit van den Gouverneur Generaal in rade, 6-5-1823 no. 1, 
20-5-1823 no. 1, both decrees are printed in Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 17 (1823) and the first 
is reprinted in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:621-4. Article 13 of the 20 May edict stipulated 
Plate 59. Official portrait of Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock (1779-
1845), the commander of the Dutch armies in the field during the Java War, 
and Lieutenant-Governor of the Dutch Asian Possessions (’s Rijks Aziatische 
Bezittingen) (1822-1825) and of the Netherlands Indies (4 February 1826-16 January 
1830). Painted circa 1830. Photograph by courtesy of the Musium Kota, Jakarta.
X Waiting for the Just King 531
This abrupt and radical decision by the governor-general caused mixed feel-
ings at the courts. In Surakarta, De Salis had already noted how, on the receipt 
of an earlier letter from Van der Capellen reporting his more stringent rules 
regarding the land-rent77 – an interim measure prior to complete abolition – 
Pakubuwana V had appeared very perturbed (Van der Kemp 1897:26):
His Highness after reading the letter was greatly dismayed. Although fully alive to 
the importance of the measure, he raised many objections with me about the exe-
cution of the order. In particular, His Highness pointed out that the rent contracts 
from the leased lands bore the authorisation of his royal seal and that, by breaking 
the contracts, his seal would be much degraded and it would be very difficult to 
come to terms with the lessees.
According to Van de Graaff pressure had been put on the Sunan by European 
land-renters to protest the measure (Van der Kemp 1901, I:193). The Dutch his-
torian, P.H. van der Kemp, even suggested that one letter of protest written to 
Nahuys in Batavia by the Surakarta prince, Pangéran Buminata, was actually 
concocted by Nahuys himself with the assistance of a Eurasian land-renter, J.A. 
Dezentjé, who leased a large estate from Buminata at Ampèl some 40 kilome-
tres west of Surakarta on the Boyolali-Salatiga road.78 There is nothing to con-
firm this. It is clear, however, that several senior Surakarta princes were heavily 
in debt to the European government at this time and the land-rent may have 
come at a difficult time. Pangéran Purbaya, the future Sunan Pakubuwana VII, 
was said to owe 300,000 Spanish dollars and Mangkunagara II around 200,000 
Spanish dollars.79 But debts alone were not in themselves a cause for opposing 
the abolition. Mangkunagara II, for example, declared himself fully satisfied 
that no foreigners should reside further than two leagues (three kilometres) from the Residency 
capitals if they resided in the ‘interior’ of Java (namely, inland from the north coast). Articles 15 
and 18 laid down that all foreign visitors to the princely states had to obtain special passes from 
the Residents of Surakarta and Yogyakarta before making their journeys. On 26 August 1823, Van 
der Capellen recapitulated the measures taken by the Residents at the courts to place the Chinese 
under closer supervision, Ministerie van Koloniën 2779, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in 
rade, 26-8-1823 nos. 21-22. See further Van der Kemp 1901, I:146; Rouffaer 1905:628.
77 Van der Kemp 1901, I:194-9, referring to Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 14-1-1823 La 
B, forbidding rental of lands for more than three years, ordering all such rentals to be registered 
with the Resident within two months and insisting that a six-month rent advance was paid by 
the lessee. It was this decision which was communicated to Pakubuwana V. The governor-general 
also wrote to Hamengkubuwana V’s guardian at this time, Dj.Br. 81, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen 
(Batavia/Bogor) to Hamengkubuwana V (Yogyakarta), 14-1-1823.
78 Van der Kemp 1897:30-2. On Dezentjé’s estate at Ampèl, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
I:610; Houben 1994:320-1. He also rented 17 other parcels of land amounting in total (includ-
ing the 11 jung Ampèl estate) to 29 jung. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:482, on 
Nahuys’ 28 August 1828 letter to Commissioner-General Du Bus de Gisignies which describes the 
impact of Van der Capellen’s 6 May 1823 decree in Surakarta.
79 Dj.Br. 6, Lawick van Pabst, ‘Nota ter betoogen’, 5-11-1828. Mangkunagara II, formerly Pan-
géran Prangwedana, had been confirmed in his full title of Kangjeng Gusti Pangéran Adipati Aria 
Mangkunagara II by Van der Capellen’s Besluit of 30-10-1821 no. 17, see Rouffaer 1905:602.
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with the governor-general’s measure and even offered to help the government 
with the liquidation of the estates. Likewise, the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati 
Sasradiningrat II, promised to act swiftly to bring the affairs of the land-rent to 
a conclusion after the Garebeg Mulud of 16 November 1823.80
In Yogyakarta, Van der Capellen’s decision initially met with a favourable 
reception when it was communicated by Smissaert to the guardians in early 
June 1823.81 Mangkubumi seemed to speak for his fellow princes and all those 
who had rented lands in the kraton when he observed: ‘everyone was pleased 
about it. It was as though we had been showered with water. We had been 
hot, now we were refreshed.’82 Such feelings of euphoria were soon dashed, 
however, by the financial realities of the compensations which the govern-
ment stipulated should be paid to the planters.83 In making these payments, 
Yogyakarta was more heavily burdened than Surakarta. Whereas the estates 
in the latter kingdom were to be reimbursed according to the yearly amount 
produced by the plantations and the payments spread out over a long period, 
the Yogyakarta indemnities had to be made directly from the sultan’s treasury 
and income, the estates being immediately taken back by the Yogya ruler 
before being returned to the original fiefees (Van der Kemp 1897:32-4; Van 
Hogendorp 1913:147). Why this distinction was made is not entirely obvious. 
It may be that Europeans who had leased lands from the Sunan’s family in 
Surakarta soon came to the realisation that they had no prospect of getting 
immediate compensation from their impecunious landlords. They thus suc-
cessfully petitioned Van der Capellen to enact a special decree allowing them 
to hold on to their estates until they could be reimbursed through the sale of 
the coffee produced on their lands.84 In Yogyakarta, where the land-rent was 
80 Ministerie van Koloniën 2737, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 8-6-1823 
no. 3, referring to De Salis’ letter of 29-5-1823 in which both Mangkunagara II and Radèn Adipati 
Sasradiningrat II’s reactions were described. According to Willem van Hogendorp, however, the 
land-rent continued in Mangkunagara II’s domains on the recommendation of Mangkunagara 
II’s aide-de-camp (ordonnans), William Stavers, who rented lands at Singosarèn from him, Van 
Hogendorp 1913:156; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:609 (on Stavers’ Singosarèn estate).
81 Ministerie van Koloniën 2737, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 17-6-1823 
no. 4, referring to Smissaert’s letter of 5-6-1823.
82 dK 161, J.F.W. van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen over de waarschij nlij ke oorzaken, die aanlei-
ding tot de onlusten van 1825 en de volgende jaren in de vorstenlanden gegeven hebben’ (hence-
forth: Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’), 28-1-1830. The same quote is reprinted with some errors 
in Van Nes 1844:147.
83 The compensations were later overseen by a three-man commission set up on 3 February 
1824 consisting of J.I. van Sevenhoven (first Resident of Surakarta), Hendrik MacGillivray (second 
Resident of Surakarta), and A.H. Smissaert, Van der Kemp 1897:32-5; Louw and De Klerck 1894-
1909, I:75-6. 
84 Ministerie van Koloniën 2781, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 3-2-1824 no. 
13, citing a petition received from J.A. Dezentjé, P. Hamar de la Brethonnière, F.Ph.F. Darlang, Gil-
lean Maclaine, F.M. Kuiper, Frederik Hoff, Christoffel Nolte, Frederik Hartmann van Vlissingen, 
Carel Eugenius Hoff, François Deux and F. Havinga. See further Van der Kemp 1901, I:197-8; Van 
Hogendorp 1913:147.
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more bitterly resented (Van Hogendorp 1913:147), the decision was taken to 
adopt a system of immediate compensation.85 It is possible that pressure from 
Ratu Ageng and Danureja IV forced this policy on the reluctant guardians, 
Mangkubumi and Dipanagara (Van der Kemp 1901, I:197-8). According to 
Valck, Ratu Ageng in particular thought it better to obey the instructions of 
the government because her grandson the fifth sultan was still so young and 
Yogya was in such dire need of government protection.86 Whatever the case, 
it soon became clear that the depleted Yogya treasury had no capacity to meet 
the payments out of existing funds. The indemnity for Dr Harvey Thomson’s 
Rajawinangun estate alone – f 99,000 – was nearly half the total annual in-
come received by the sultanate from the European government for the rent 
of the markets and tollgates, and special arrangements had to be made to 
pay it off in instalments.87 Given the size of the indemnities demanded – that 
for Thomson’s neighbour, J.M. Tissot, renter of the Jumagatan coffee estate, 
topped f 110,000 (Van Enk 1999:210) – the kraton was soon facing bankruptcy. 
Small wonder that Dipanagara was forced to sanction a loan of f 37,000 from 
the Yogya kapitan cina, Qué Wi Kong (in office 1813-1827), a close relation of 
Tan Jin Sing (Secadiningrat), to defray the ordinary running expenses of the 
court.88 Indeed, the burden of the repayments on the Yogya exchequer was so 
onerous that in November 1824, nine months after the last financial indemni-
ties had been agreed, Smissaert was writing that the guardians were far be-
hind with their repayments. Because of low prices for coffee, he reported that 
the estates would never produce sufficient income to meet these reimburse-
ments.89 In the same year, the European government was forced to give the 
85 The only allowance made was that, if the indemnities were worth more than six months’ 
rent, they could be paid off in instalments at Mulud and Puwasa, and the term of the repayments 
was extended to January 1824, Van der Kemp 1901, I:198.
86 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 175.
87 Ministerie van Koloniën 2779, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1824 no. 
25. Thomson’s f 99,000 indemnity had been accepted by Hamengkubuwana V’s guardians, Dipan-
agara and Mangkubumi, see A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Bata-
via/Bogor), 26-3-1824 cited in Van der Capellen’s 10-5-1824 Besluit; Van Enk 1990:27, 1999:210. 
Given the Yogya treasury’s inability to pay, the government agreed to advance Thomson f 90,000 
out of its public treasury (landskas) and indemnify itself at the rate of 8,000 Spanish dollars a 
month from the ‘pension’ paid to Hamengkubuwana V for the rent of the markets and tollgates. 
Since the value of one Indies guilder was Dfl 1.20 at this time, and that of the Spanish dollar was 
Dfl 2.56 (Appendix XVI), Harvey’s f 99,000 (Dfl 118,800) indemnity was worth nearly half the Dfl 
256.000 (100,000 Spanish dollars) paid annually for the markets and tollgates.
88 Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Commissioner to the courts of 
Surakarta and Yogyakarta) (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 18-2-1831 
no. 13, reporting Danureja IV’s remark that whenever there was no ready money in the kraton to 
meet daily expenses in the 1824-1825 period, this was borrowed from the kapitan cina and Dipana-
gara as guardian had sanctioned a loan of f 37,000 from Qué Wi Kong, which was eventually paid 
off in instalments over three years after the Java War.
89 Dj.Br. 28, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 25-11-
1824.
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guardians an advance of f 45,000 to repay the planters and a further f 18,333 
to meet the daily requirements of the kraton.90 Subsequently, moveable goods 
and family heirlooms (pusaka) were sold to meet the costs of the court and 
further sizeable sums were deducted from the annual government stipend to 
meet the payments to the previous estate owners (Van Nes 1844:152).
It seems clear that the indemnities demanded were too high, and many 
Yogya princes and senior court officials soon began to suspect fraud on the 
part of the European land-renters.91 At the same time, they suffered acute per-
sonal financial embarrassment. Many had become almost wholly dependent 
on land-rent payments for their daily sustenance. They had also used the cash 
income to finance the imported European luxuries to which they had grown 
accustomed (pp. 437-8, 459). Within eighteen months of Van der Capellen’s 
6 May 1823 decision, according to J.F. Walraven van Nes, who would subse-
quently serve as acting Resident of both Yogyakarta and Surakarta (Appendix 
IX), the Yogya pangéran and court retainers were reduced to a state of abject 
poverty.92 General De Kock also remarked that the indemnification process 
had ‘brought many Javanese into extreme distress and even forced village 
tax collectors (bekel) to resign their posts because they were unable to raise 
sufficient taxes’.93 The few surviving debt lists from this period indicate that 
certain members of the Yogya kraton owed large sums to local European and 
Chinese moneylenders in the two years before the Java War.94
The case of a noble such as Pangéran Blitar (circa 1784-1827), a great-uncle 
of Dipanagara, who would himself be one of the first to rally to the prince 
at Selarong in late July 1825, was probably typical of many of his contempo-
raries. He claimed that he had pawned all his valuables, including his pu-
saka, stating that his monthly interest payments came to 110 Spanish dollars 
whereas the highest income he could expect from his lands was 80 Spanish 
dollars a month.95 Smissaert also noted with concern the rapid impoverish-
ment of the Yogya elite and wrote early in 1826 that,
90 Ministerie van Koloniën 2783, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 18-5-1824 no. 
25, 19-7-1824 no. 10.
91 KITLV H 699g (Archiefstukken Vorstenlanden, Rouffaer notes on Yogya Residency archive), 
78. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:59.
92 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830.
93 dK XLV, De Kock, ‘Verhaal’, 10-1825.
94 Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’, lists of debts in Yogya, 5-10-1825; Van 
der Kemp 1896b:567-70. A number of these debts were owed to Smissaert himself who had made 
much profit out of receiving pawned goods from Europeans and Chinese, as well as lending 
money to the commander of the sultan’s troops, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara, and others, 
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:277 note 1.
95 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:600-1, III:109 note 3 (for an unfavourable report on Blitar 
after he had gone over to the Dutch in 1827); dK 111, ‘Over het karakter van den Soesoehoenan, 
den sultan van Djokjokarta en de prinsen en rijksgrooten’, Magelang, 20-12-1829; Dj.Br. 54, A.H. 
Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta), 29-7-1825 (stating that Blitar had 
joined Dipanagara at Selarong on 29 July 1825). See further Appendix VIIIa.
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The princes and regents [bupati] here are very poor. One is doing them a great 
service if one lends them 100 Spanish dollars, for interest rates here are very high, 
they pay three percent [a month] sometimes more when they borrow money.96
Such men later gravitated towards Dipanagara, who had earlier indicated 
his strong personal opposition to the land-rent (Chapter IX), and who, as a 
guardian, soon became outraged at the size of the indemnities offered to the 
European planters.97 We will return to this shortly, but first we must consider 
the impact of Van der Capellen’s decrees at the village level.
One side effect of the abolition of the land-rent seems to have been an 
increase in lawlessness in the countryside, particularly on the part of bandits 
and other criminal elements (wong durjana) who specialised in making attacks 
on properties leased by Europeans. The knowledge that these estates would 
shortly be returned to their original owners and the fact that many lay far from 
populated areas seem to have emboldened the wong durjana who joined up 
with disgruntled estate workers eager to square accounts with their erstwhile 
masters.98 Despite Nahuys’ warnings to Smissaert to redouble his vigilance 
in the months immediately following the publication of Van der Capellen’s 
May decrees, a number of local attacks were made on European leased es-
tates. Nahuys’s own country seat at Bedhaya, as well as Sempu, Babadan and 
Kembangarum, coffee estates on the flanks of Mount Merapi nearer to the 
Yogya-Kedhu border, were amongst those initially targetted.99 Indeed, many 
96 vAE (aanwinsten 1941), A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/
Bogor), 7-1-1824. According to Chevallier and other contemporary sources, the rates of interest 
sometimes reached as much as four percent a month, Kronijk van Nederlandsch-Indië 1845:37; Van 
der Kemp 1896b:569; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:600.
97 Baud 305A, ‘Geschrift Mangko Diningrat’, n.y. (12-1826), remarked that those princes who 
had borrowed money from the Chinese were among the first to join Dipanagara at Selarong. This 
was largely confirmed by Smissaert, vAE (aanwinsten 1941), A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King 
William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (9-1828).
98 On the flight of workers from the coffee estates laid out by Dr Harvey Thomson at Raja-
winangun and the French land-renter, J.M. Tissot, at Kasihan (? Jumagatan) near Gamping in 
Bantul district to the southwest of Yogya (Schoel 1931:168) on 23-7-1825 just after the outbreak 
of the Java War, see Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta), 
23-7-1825. Tissot’s wife, a Javanese, had refused to move from his Jumagatan estate in early 1824 
because she had just given birth to their first child, Dj.Br. 53, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to 
G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 27-1-1824.
99 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 8 pt. 2, William M. Cotes (Salatiga) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Batavia), 
31-5-1823; Port. 9 pt. 3, Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Onlusten op Java’, Maastricht, 2-1826 (on Nahuys’ 
warnings). For the geographical location of Sempu, Babadan, Kembangarum and Bedhaya, see 
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:Map. Sempu was leased by J.D. Boutet (who seems to have 
taken it over from another French land-renter, Simon Roze d’Infreville, Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, I:611 no. 89; Payen 1988:109-10 note 112), Babadan by the Amsterdam-born Dutch estate 
owner, P.M.M. Bouwens van der Boyen, and Kembangarum jointly by Bouwens and the Scotsman 
Robert Shand. Since Bouwens had been sent to Java for political reasons and had contacts with the 
Dutch court, he was exempted from Van der Capellen’s 6 May 1823 decree, see Van Enk 1999:203-6, 
219 note 89. He later married one of Smissaert’s daughters, Payen 1988:46, 86-7 note 6.
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of these places would later become focal points of support for Dipanagara 
during the war – what Dutch military commanders would term ‘bandit’ cen-
tres.100 The most serious incidents involved the property at Babadan leased 
by the much-hated Amsterdam estate owner, Jonkheer (Baron) Pierre Marie 
Mathieu Bouwens van der Boyen, who had been sent to Java as a de facto 
political exile and set up by the government as an estate owner because of 
fears that he might use his insider knowledge of a recent conspiracy involv-
ing the Dutch Crown Prince (future King William II, reigned 1840-1849) to 
blackmail the Dutch monarch.101 With important political connections in the 
Netherlands, but no skill in estate management, Bouwens appears to have 
regularly abused his estate workers (note 99; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
II:269-71; Van Enk 1999:204-6). Indeed, he was so intensely disliked that the 
Residents in the sultan’s capital had to issue him with a special allocation of 
gunpowder from the Yogya fort so that he could use light cannon against 
would-be assailants.102 His workers responded in kind, recruiting local wong 
durjana to mount a series of attacks on his property in 1823-1825 and eventual-
ly razing his estate to the ground following the outbreak of the Java War.103
100 dK 181, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 13-8-1825 (on Demang 
Nitikrama of Sempu who joined Dipanagara and turned Boutet’s former estate into a ‘bandit’ 
centre); Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:461 (on Bedhaya), II:268-71 (on Kembangarum); 465-
6 (on William Stavers’ estate at Singosarèn where Dipanagara’s supporters burnt his house). 
The word used by Dutch commanders for rebel supporters of Dipanagara was brandhal which 
roughly translates as bandit, scoundrel, predator, rebel, freebooter, good-for-nothing, see Carey 
1981a:290-1 note 232.
101 This involved a plot to place the Dutch Crown Prince on the throne of France (and Belgium) 
aided by politically discontented elements in France, Van Enk 1999:205, 220 notes 103-4, citing 
Nieuwenhuyzen 1907:1521. See further Chapter IX note 165 for a possibly garbled report of this 
conspiracy to the Surakarta court.
102 Dj.Br. 53, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Commander of Yogya garrison (? Captain Menso 
Johannes Bouwensch), 14-2-1824. This special issue of gunpowder dated back to 1818, see Dj.Br. 
52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/Bogor), 10-9-1823, 
referring to Ministerie van Koloniën 2441, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 
11-3-1818. A similar provision of three ponden of gunpowder and one eight-pounder cannon was 
made to the Yogya interpreter, J.G. Dietrée, to defend his rented village at Pogang to the east of 
Yogya, Dj.Br. 63, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Commander of Yogya garrison (? Captain M.J. 
Bouwensch), 14-2-1824.
103 The first attack on Babadan occurred in September 1823 when Bouwens’ bamboo ware-
houses (pakhuizen) were put to the torch and an attempt made to fire the main house. Europeans 
were in the house at the time and one of them, Lieutenant Pieters of the Yogya garrison, was killed 
attempting to fight off the assailants with his bare hands. According to Smissaert, the ringleader 
of the attack was a certain Pak Panji from the Yogya village of Tempèl on the Yogya-Magelang 
road which had earlier been a bandit hideout in the British period. Those mounting the attack 
all had palm-leaf jimat (protector amulets), inscribed with magic formulae as head wrappers to 
provide them with invulnerability against Bouwens’ cannon. The local police official (oppasser) 
was very reluctant to investigate the incident and the officials dispatched from the patih’s office 
in Surakarta (Babadan was in Sala territory) took six days to make the short journey from the 
Sunan’s capital travelling in Smissaert’s words ‘like the troops of his Holiness the Pope’, Dj.Br. 52, 
A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/Bogor), 5-9-1823; A.H. 
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Dipanagara’s role as guardian and the land-rent indemnities
As a guardian of the young sultan with special responsibilities for the fi-
nancial administration of the kraton, Dipanagara was called upon to play a 
leading role in the negotiations for the indemnification of the European land-
renters. The first case involved Bedhaya, for which Nahuys requested the 
astronomical sum of f 50,000 by way of financial compensation. The former 
Yogya Resident had already demanded (and secured) an equally inflated fig-
ure for the out-of-town retreat of the Surakarta Residents at Kalitan just to the 
west of Surakarta close to the old royal capital of Kartasura. This country seat 
had been established by the disgraced Rijck van Prehn (in office 1818-1819) 
and completed by Nahuys following his appointment as acting Resident at 
the Sunan’s court in March 1820.104 He had also been able to profit from the 
sale of jewelry and gold ornaments from the Yogya kraton during the fourth 
sultan’s reign (note 135). He now expected to make a similar profit out of his 
Yogya property investment.
Smissaert wrote to Dipanagara and his fellow guardian, Pangéran 
Mangkubumi, on 25 July 1823, stating that the amount stipulated by the 
former Resident included reimbursements for the house, the warehouses, the 
110,000 coffee trees, 30,000 pepper bushes and the yearly rent of 120 Spanish 
dollars which he had paid the deceased fourth sultan since July 1817. As 
Nahuys was on the point of departing for Europe, immediate compensation 
was demanded.105 The two guardians came to see Smissaert and asked if they 
might travel to Bedhaya to inspect the buildings and the grounds. Permission 
was granted, and Smissaert immediately instructed D’Abo, who was then at 
Bedhaya overseeing the coffee plantations, to show the princes everything. 
Accompanied by the patih, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara, and two senior 
kraton bupati, the guardians made their visit on 29 July. After close inspection 
of the house and its immediate environs, they came to the conclusion that the 
Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta), 6-9-1823, 26-9-1823; UBL, BPL 616, 
Port. 8 pt. 4, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Roof en moord op het landgoed van den Heer Bouwens’, 
9-1823. Other attacks occurred in January and April 1824, when an estate overseer was wounded, 
Dj.Br. 53, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta), 7-1-1824, 18-1-1824, 
26-1-1824, 29-4-1824; A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.J. Domis (Semarang), 29-4-1824; and on 
21 July 1825 when local Surakarta inhabitants participated with the estate workers in the attack, 
Dj.Br. 81, P.F.H. Chevallier (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta), 21-7-1825. On the 
razing of Bouwens’ estate in early September 1825, when even the flowers in his garden were torn 
up, see Payen 1988:74. On the use of palm leafs as jimat, see further Roeder 1970:125; Van Dijk 
1981:110; Anderson 1979:237 note 77; Tarling 1992, I:215. 
104 Appendix IX; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:617-20, stating that Van Prehn had con-
structed the house from materials obtained from a former hunting lodge of the Surakarta court at 
Jèbrès. Nahuys had demanded f 17,600 for this estate, which the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati 
Sasradiningrat II, was only prepared to offer 4,000 Spanish dollars (f 10,240) for.
105 Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Pangéran Mangkubumi and Dipanagara (Yogyakarta), 
25-7-1823. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:341-3; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:55.
Plate 60. Bedhaya, the country house on the flanks of Mount Merapi, which was built for Nahuys  van Burgst by the Assistant-Resident of Yogya, R.C.N. d’Abo. It was described by the painter 
A.A.J. Payen as une jolie casino (a pretty country retreat) and was used by Resident A.H. Smissaert during the weeks before the outbreak of the Java War. Sketch from NvB 22.
Plate 60. Bedhaya, the country house on the flanks of Mount Merapi, which was built for Nahuys  van Burgst by the Assistant-Resident of Yogya, R.C.N. d’Abo. It was described by the painter 
A.A.J. Payen as une jolie casino (a pretty country retreat) and was used by Resident A.H. Smissaert during the weeks before the outbreak of the Java War. Sketch from NvB 22.
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price demanded by Nahuys was far too high.106 According to Van Nes, who 
interviewed Mangkubumi and other kraton members in 1829, the guardians 
only agreed to the very small figure of 800 Spanish dollars for the buildings 
(Van Nes 1844:150). Valck even suggested that their offer was lower at 700 
Spanish dollars, a sum which D’Abo himself reckoned the house and ware-
houses to be worth.107 Payen, who visited Bedhaya in early July 1825 inferred 
that these much smaller sums were probably nearer the mark than Nahuys’ 
inflated figure. In his diary, he wrote scathingly that the land around Nahuys’ 
‘pretty little house’ comprising a long gallery with rooms off both ends were 
(Payen 1988:46):
arid cinders in which the miserable coffee plantations which surround this estate 
languish. Seeing them, one is amazed at what they must have all cost to lay out. 
In buying them back, the sultan will only ever get a bit of wood to burn. Already, 
some of the [coffee] trees are dead. Mr D’Abo, who set up this establishment, was 
only too happy to let it go in such a [financially] advantageous way.
It was precisely this realisation that caused the guardians to make their mod-
est bid. As Dipanagara is reported to have said:
How can Smissaert order us to take over all the land and coffee plantations from 
Nahuys? The house itself is perhaps an exception because that can be of use to the 
sultan, but what possible profit can we expect from the coffee and other plantations? 
The arrangement would amount to nothing more than debts for us [because] we 
cannot make the same profits from the plantations which the Europeans did.108 
Mangkubumi supported his co-guardian in this opinion. But Smissaert, who 
later acknowledged the difficulties of harvesting the coffee to his deputy, 
Chevallier,109 refused to accept it. He summoned the guardians to a meeting 
in the old Residency House with the patih present, pressing the guardians on 
the question and asking Danureja to provide details of the amount of money 
which Nahuys spent on the daily wages of his labour force (Chapter IX note 
74). The figures were given and Smissaert suggested that the sum offered was 
far too low. Whereupon Van Nes reported the following observations on the 
part of the guardians:
106 Dj.Br. 52,A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to R.C.N. d’Abo (Bedhaya), 27-7-1823; Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, I:602-3, Pangéran Mangkubumi and Dipanagara (Yogyakarta) to A.H. Smiss-
aert (Yogyakarta), 11-8-1823 (Javanese original translated by J.G. Dietrée), original in Dj.Br. 6, 
‘Authentieke acta betrekking hebbende op den verkoop van Bedojo’, 17-7-1826.
107 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 168.
108 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830. The printed version also contains much 
the same material but with some cuts, Van Nes 1844:148-50. See also Louw and De Klerck 1894-
1909, I:603, where Dipanagara and Mangkubumi made a similar point in their official letter.
109 Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Bedhaya) to P.F.H. Chevallier (Yogyakarta), 13-6-1825.
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‘Yes’, answered Mangkubumi, leaning his head back on his chair, ‘if you want to 
reckon everything together, but what possible value does it have for the young 
sultan?’
Dipanagara stared straight ahead of him for a while and eventually spoke in a 
rather surly way:
‘If my father hadn’t died, he would still be alive. If Nahuys hadn’t spent so 
much money, he would still have it in his pocket.’
Afterwards he spoke not a word more and shook his head.110
But Smissaert held out for the original figure, telling the guardians:
You should be content with that sum. If it was my own property, I would not re-
linquish it for such a small price.111
Mangkubumi proposed that the property be returned to D’Abo’s care for two 
years so that he could make the necessary profits from the sale of the coffee 
and pepper harvests, precisely the arrangement made in Surakarta with the 
European land-renters (page 532). But this was not accepted by Smissaert, 
who, in a private conversation with Danureja, agreed a compromise sum of 
26,000 Spanish dollars. When the guardians again refused, Smissaert cited 
the former Resident’s friendship with the fourth sultan as a reason for their 
agreement, whereupon Dipanagara is supposed to have burst out:
My God! Nahuys may well have been a friend of the sultan, but he never did him 
a favour. Now does he want his friendship paid for in money? He never put the 
sultan on the throne! Mr [John] Deans [secretary of the Yogya Residency, 1811-
1813] was a good friend of [my father] Sultan Raja [Hamengkubuwana III]; he even 
facilitated his accession […] but he never received any repayment for his efforts 
other than that the sultan bought him a horse for 700 Spanish dollars.112
At this point, the meeting broke up in acrimony, tempers frayed on all sides. 
The guardians went straight to the kraton to discuss the matter with Ratu 
Ageng, pointing out the catastrophic effect it would have on court finances 
if the sum negotiated by Smissaert was agreed to. But the ratu, on her own 
initiative and mindful of the need to keep the European government on the 
right side, instructed Danureja to accept the sum proposed by the Resident.113 
Afterwards, the guardians were again summoned to the Residency with in-
structions to bring their seals with them. According to Mangkubumi, they 
were then ordered to authorize an official letter handing over 26,000 Spanish 
110 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830; Van Nes 1844:149 for the printed ver-
sion.
111 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830; Van Nes 1844:150 for the printed ver-
sion.
112 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830. This is not in the printed version.
113 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830. This is not in the printed version.
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dollars without even being given an opportunity to peruse its contents.114 On 
their return to the kraton, the guardians realised that they had been duped. 
But they were constrained to make arrangements whereby 6,000 Spanish dol-
lars was paid immediately out of the sultan’s treasury with the remainder be-
ing met by surrendering one-twelfth of the yearly rent paid by the European 
government for the markets and tollgates.115 
Shortly after this, in February 1824, the question of reimbursement for Dr 
Thomson’s indigo factory at Rajawinangun came up (note 87). But, Dipanagara 
refused to have anything more to do with the liquidation of the land-rent.116 
According to his cousin, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II, he was especially ex-
ercised by the fact that notwithstanding the hefty financial reimbursements 
agreed with the European land-renters many of them still remained on their 
estates in order to ensure repayments from the annual coffee harvests.117 The 
prince now began to appear rarely in the kraton and it was with the utmost 
difficulty that Smissaert could get him to come to Yogya for meetings.118 He 
also began to see his co-guardian, Mangkubumi, very seldom and affairs 
of state were decided in his absence by Smissaert or his Assistant-Resident, 
Chevallier, in consultation with the patih, the commander of the sultan’s 
bodyguard, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara, the Residency interpreter, J.G. 
Dietrée and Ratu Ageng. Indeed, the prince is supposed to have delegated 
all his responsibilities to Ratu Ageng at this juncture with the words: ‘I wish 
to have nothing more to do with it [the guardianship]. Handle it in whatever 
way you choose!’119 Later, when he was being escorted into exile, he reflected 
bitterly on this period (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743):
As a guardian, I always had nothing to do. We were usually informed about the 
money paid into the sultan’s treasury because I had to give my seal for that, but 
we never had any knowledge about the money paid out […] and only that which 
was earmarked for payments within the kraton was given to Wiranagara. When I 
114 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830; Van Nes 1844:151 note 1, where he 
quoted Mangkubumi as saying that ‘[the letter] indeed bore our seals, but its contents were never 
made known to us’. The letter referred to is almost certainly that printed in Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, I:602-3. Smissaert reported the sale to Nahuys in late September, Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smiss-
aert (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Batavia), 22-9-1823.
115 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830; Van Nes 1844:151 for the printed ver-
sion.
116 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830; Van Nes 1844:151-3 for the printed 
version. It seems that by the end of February 1824, all the lands rented by Europeans in Yogya 
had been reimbursed, see Dj.Br. 6, Ratu Ageng (Yogyakarta) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 28-2-
1824, referring to the lands rented by Dr Harvey Thomson (Rajawinangun), J.M. Tissot (Jumaga-
tan), N. Nogues (Kanangan) and Captain De Ceuvelaire (Karanganyar).
117 Baud 305A, ‘Geschrift Mangko Diningrat’, n.y. (12-1826).
118 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William 
I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828).
119 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830; Van Nes 1844:153 for the printed ver-
sion.
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was outside [at Tegalreja], I heard there was no longer any money in the treasury, 
although everyone knew there must be still much left. [But] the patih […] needed 
money, first with this, then with that excuse [and] things were always being built. 
That Dietrée […] he was always busy with the secretary [Chevallier] and the patih 
and anything of importance was decided without us.
We will see shortly how the ensuing period before the outbreak of the Java 
War would be an exceptionally significant one for Dipanagara in terms of his 
spiritual development. Between May 1824 and May 1825, the prince would 
experience a series of visions which would help to clarify his understand-
ing of his calling as a future Ratu Adil. Even Smissaert seemed to sense that 
Dipanagara’s focus was now no longer on the mundane concerns of guardi-
anship. In his subsequent justificatory memorial to the Dutch king, he point-
ed out that ‘the opportunities to see and speak with him [Dipanagara] were 
very rare [after February 1824] because he was always concerned with his 
spiritual duties and lived a very isolated life [at Tegalreja]’. As it became clear 
that Dipanagara might be preparing to oppose the Dutch authorities, the ever 
sanguine Yogya Resident tried to summon him back from one of his retreats 
at the cave of Suralanang on the south coast for a meeting at his temporary 
office in the Yogya fort (Chapter IV note 45). The image of the ascetic prince 
in his cave plotting rebellion and the senior Dutch official in Yogya sending a 
runner down to the south coast to persuade him to turn up for a conference at 
the Yogya fort, speaks volumes for Smissaert’s naiveté. Van Sevenhoven, who 
saw a lot of the Yogya Resident during this period in connection with their 
joint duties as commissioners enquiring into the working of the tollgates and 
preparing for further territorial annexations in the Principalities, remarked 
that his colleague was always blithely unconcerned about any possible threat 
from the Yogya princes, dismissing them as too ‘indolent and stupid’ to ever 
start an uprising against the government.120
Dipanagara’s break with the court
Although Smissaert refused to read the signs, all the evidence indicates that 
Dipanagara’s break with the court had already occurred by early 1824.121 By 
the latter half of 1823, two of Dipanagara’s close friends had been dismissed 
from their offices due to the machinations of Danureja and Ratu Ageng. It is 
certain these moves aroused the prince’s deep indignation. The first dismissal 
involved the bupati of Kerja in the Sokawati area, Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja 
120 Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van den 
Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 5-5-1831 no. 47.
121 There is no evidence to back Dipanagara’s assertion in his babad (note 18) that the break 
occurred much earlier at the start of Hamengkubuwana V’s reign.
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II (born 1779, in office 1812-1821). This man, who had an extensive family (he 
later admitted to having no less than twenty-nine children and grandchildren), 
was well known to the prince because his father had served as the patih of the 
Crown Prince’s establishment (kadipatèn) during Dipanagara’s early manhood 
in the 1800s (Appendix Vb). As we have seen, the younger Kertadirja seems 
to have shared the prince’s interest in Javanese-Islamic religious literature (p. 
100) and he subsequently took up residence at Tegalreja after his dismissal. 
On the outbreak of the Java War, he became one of Dipanagara’s principal 
army commanders in the Madiun area before being captured on the slopes of 
Mount Lawu in January 1826. After the Java War, he expressed a strong inter-
est in making the pilgrimage to Mecca and ending his days in Arabia as a haji, 
stating that if it was God’s Will such an end would be the ‘crowning blessing’ 
of his life.122 One of his early letters, written after Dipanagara had restored 
him to his previous post as bupati of Kerja in August 1825, stated that he was 
waging war to attack Yogya, to improve the practice of the Islamic religion in 
Java and to restore peace in the country. He specifically blamed Danureja IV 
for starting the war pointing out that he had pitted men against each other, in 
particular new village heads against old ones (note 132; Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, I:523 note 2). Certainly, his own dismissal was patently engineered 
by Danureja in order that his father-in-law, Mas Tumenggung Sasrawirana, an 
uncle of Ratu Ageng, could be appointed in Kertadirja’s place. Kertadirja went 
as a supplicant to the Residency early in 1823, but although Smissaert ordered 
a reinvestigation, the original judgement was upheld in the religious court. 
Again Danureja appears to have influenced the proceedings, for the head of 
the Yogya religious establishment, Pengulu Rahmanudin, complained bitterly 
to Dipanagara about it.123
122 Bataviasche Courant 3, 18-1-1826 (on Kertadirja’s capture); AN, Exhibitum 15-11-1831 no. 
20, Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 21 
Jumadilawal AJ 1759 (AD 28-10-1831; on his desire to go on the haj and die in Arabia); Louw and 
De Klerck 1894-1909, I:523 note 2, 559, 576; Carey 1981a:284-5. After his capture by the Dutch 
on 9-1-1826, he was taken on by Mangkunagara II as a supplier for his troops in the Sokawati 
area, but did not fulfil his duties properly. Mangkunagara II asked that he should be banished 
from Java and his previous district of Kerja be incorporated in his own territories after the Java 
War, Büchler 1888, II:8; AN, Exhibitum 3-5-1830 no. 6, 29-5-1830, Kabinet no. 189. Kertadirja was 
sent to Ambon in November 1831 so that, in the words of Governor-General J. van den Bosch’s 
official decision, the government ‘could see Java shot of this spiteful man once and for all’ (om 
in eens deze wrevelige man op Java ontslagen te zien), Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’, Besluit 
van den Gouverneur-Generaal, Bogor, 4-11-1831 no. 100, 15-11-1831 no. 20 (decision on annual 
allowance). There is a reference to him and his two remaining family members in Ambon in 1841 
‘living quietly and modestly’ on his f  50 monthly allowance, which was paid by the Yogya court, 
AN, Brieven Ambon 1189b, ‘Staat de te Amboina aanwezige Staats Gevangenen onder ultimo 
December 1841’. It is unclear whether Mangkunagara II received the former Yogya district of 
Kerja which was a Yogya territorial enclave surrounded by his lands in Sokawati.
123 Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 18-6-1825; B.Ng. II:157-
8, XXXVIII.20-5. The term used for ‘suppliant’ in the Yogya babad is pépé, which refers to the prac-
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Shortly afterwards, in September 1823, the pengulu himself was dismissed, 
doubtless because he was viewed by Danureja as being far too closely allied 
with Dipanagara, whose friend he had been since the days when he had served 
as head of the Suranatan corps under the name of Kyai Rahmanudin (Chapter 
VII; Appendix Vb; Carey 1992:442 note 210). He was replaced by his religious 
assistant (ketib), Abuyamin, who, according to Dipanagara, was insufficiently 
grounded in an understanding of the Qur’ān and Hadīth (Prophetic traditions) 
to serve as pengulu.124 The Yogya kraton version of the Babad Dipanagara, re-
lates how the prince immediately wrote a letter to Ratu Ageng pointing out 
that the appointment of the new pengulu was not legal because of his deficien-
cies in textual knowledge and because the question had not been discussed 
beforehand in the council of the senior court bupati (nayaka). In the same letter, 
as we have seen (Chapters VII notes 235-6; Chapter IX), he also asked the ratu 
to give back the contract from the British which had earlier been lent to the 
fourth sultan and which had subsequently been burnt. Ratu Ageng replied, 
declaring that the contract had been ‘mislaid’ given the hopeless disorder of 
the kraton archives (p. 62), an admission which so incensed Dipanagara that it 
contributed directly to his final break with the court. Concerning the appoint-
ment of the new pengulu, the Ratu wrote as follows:
Secondly, as for the replacement of the pengulu, Rahmanudin, that is settled. I 
don’t want to talk about it; let us not bother to discuss it again. I was also ashame d 
at what people would say if the post were left vacant for a long time. As for the 
matters of the Qur’ān [?] and Hadīth [?], I don’t know. Therefore, he has been re-
placed by [Ketib] Abuyamin because this has the approval of Resident Smissaert 
of Yogyakarta, who after all now has authority over the Dutchmen [Europeans] 
here. Now stop constantly making trouble. If you wanted to change this you could 
hardly do it; if you could, you would scarcely dare; if you dared you could barely 
carry it out; in the end it is best [just] to accept it.125
tice in Java of a victim of justice clothing himself in white and sitting in the sun on the open field 
in front of the court (alun-alun) until the ruler took notice of his presence and summoned him to 
present his case direct to the monarch. The expression is used figuratively here, but see Ricklefs 
1974a:60-1 note 62, where another example is given. See also Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
I:522, where Kertadirja’s dismissal was blamed on bad conduct. 
124 Yogya kraton MS A.62 (Babad Dipanagaran):78, Dipanagara (Tegalreja) to Ratu Ageng 
(Yogyakarta), Sura, Dal, AJ 1751 (AD 9-1823). According to Kyai Gajali, Smissaert had foreknowl-
edge of Rahmanudin’s dismissal, but not Dipanagara, Du Bus 402, Van de Poll and Stavers, ‘Ver-
hoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829, testimony of Kyai Rosali (Gajali).
125 Yogya kraton MS. A.62 (Babad Dipanagaran):79: Bab loro sèlèhé Pangulu Rahmanodin iku wis kena 
katembungaka lumuh, ora susah rinembug manèh, lan aku isin ucaping jalma yèn ngantiya lowok suwa-suwé, 
déné prakara dolal-dalil kodas-kadis aku ora weruh, jaragan wektu saiki wus ngintèni si Abuyamin, krana 
antuk idining Tuwan Résidhèn Semisaret ing Ngayugyakarta, jer kang wus kuwasa saiki wong Welonda, wis 
aja dhemen kangèlan, Pangéran arep angowahi mangsa bisaa, bisa mangsa waniya, waniya, mangsa ngu-
wisana, wusana becik anarima. For further details on the background to Rahmanudin’s dismissal, see 
Ministerie van Koloniën 4204, Pangéran Blitar (Sambirata) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 
10-10-1826 La C no. 3 (henceforth: Blitar, ‘Report’, 10-10-1826; Van der Kemp 1896a:328.
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Ratu Ageng’s letter with its barely concealed impatience with her stepson – 
‘now stop constantly making trouble’ – neatly encapsulates the clash between 
Dipanagara and the court at this time. On the one side, the clique around 
Ratu Ageng seemed determined to keep on the right side of the Dutch author-
ities at all costs, financial and moral; on the other, the stormy petrel of Yogya, 
Dipanagara, was rapidly becoming exasperated with the direction which the 
dowager queen and her allies were now taking the sultanate.
Meanwhile, the affair of the new pengulu, Abuyamin, dragged on. According 
to the Buku Kedhung Kebo, the Yogya religious scholars, the powerful group of 
court-salaried ulama, disputed Abuyamin’s rights to allow marriages between 
the pinggir people, a class of royal inhabitants in the kraton. Eventually, the 
new pengulu went to Tegalreja to seek Dipanagara’s authorisation for his ap-
pointment, thus legalising his position in Yogya.126 It is significant too that 
despite the fact that Abuyamin had been backed by Danureja and Ratu Ageng 
to replace Rahmanudin as pengulu, he still joined Dipanagara with most of 
his entourage of ulama and mosque officials when the prince was at Selarong 
in July-September 1825 (Carey 1981a:249 note 103). This indicates that the 
prince’s influence amongst Yogya religious hierarchy was well nigh unassail-
able, far outweighing any pressure which the patih and the dowager queen 
could bring to bear. At the same time, the former pengulu and old friend of the 
prince, Kyai Rahmanudin, took up residence at Tegalreja, which was now fast 
becoming a centre for those who had fallen foul of the new regime of Ratu 
Ageng, Danureja and the ineffectual Smissaert in Yogya. Rahmanudin stayed 
for nearly a year at the prince’s residence from May 1825 until just before the 
outbreak of the Java War when he departed on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He was 
thus on hand, as we will see shortly, to give Dipanagara much valuable ad-
vice during this crucial period when the prince was experiencing his visions 
and his plans for rebellion were rapidly taking shape.127
The moral rot: Danureja IV’s rule and the conduct of senior Dutch officials in Yogya
According to Kyai Maja, Dipanagara had told him when he arrived at the 
prince’s headquarters at Selarong in August 1825: ‘Uncle, I left Yogyakarta 
because I was repudiated by the Europeans and by Danureja [IV]’.128 
126 KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):57-64, IV.75-V.83. On the pinggir people, see Gericke and 
Roorda 1901, II:342. Their origin seems to have been as prisoners-of-war captured by the Mata-
ram kingdom from Blambangan during the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
The women became unofficial wives (selir) of the rulers and court elite, whereas the men were 
employed in handicrafts, Winter 1902:84; De Graaf 1958:62, who also mentions the Gajahmati 
people who were marched to Mataram from east Java.
127 BD (Manado), II:316-7, XX.22-3.
128 Du Bus 402, Van de Poll and Stavers, ‘Verhoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829.
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‘Repudiated’ was perhaps a rather mild way of describing what Dipanagara 
experienced at the hands of the senior Dutch officials in Yogya and the patih 
in the period following his withdrawal from his formal guardianship duties 
in February 1824.129 Humiliation might be a better word. Just how this came 
about is the subject of the present section.
The dismissal in quick succession of Kertadirja and Rahmanudin was an 
outward sign of Danureja IV’s increasingly corrupt and onerous administra-
tion. The lack of any proper oversight on the part of the new Yogya Resident 
has already been mentioned. But even Smissaert was sufficiently concerned 
by the issue of the chief minister’s appointment of new police officials (gu-
nung; pp. 452-3) to make a formal complaint to Batavia shortly after his ar-
rival in post in mid-February 1823.130 Lawick van Pabst, who had taken over 
Smissaert’s old post as Resident of Rembang, also drew the attention of the 
European government to the ‘wilful and corrupt’ rule of the Yogya chief min-
ister at this time. He referred in particular to Danureja’s sale of offices, his dis-
missal of officials and his embezzlement of kraton revenues, which included 
paying the sultan’s guardians in devalued paper money while he received the 
tax moneys and European government rent for the markets and tollgates in 
good silver coin.131 Jayadiningrat (Appendix VIII part 2), the author of the 
mid-nineteenth century Malay text ‘Sketches on the Java War’ and a personal 
enemy of Danureja, would later give a biting description of the patih’s corrup-
tion of the judicial processes in Yogya and its consequences for the sultanate’s 
officials.132 Moreover, in his personal conduct Danureja seems to have grossly 
129 Maja’s testimony was translated for the senior magistrate (hoofd baljuw) of Batavia, H.M. van 
der Poll, by William Stavers, the Javanese-speaking Scots land-renter in Surakarta (Chapter IX 
note 60) and Kyai Maja’s scribe, Mas Ngabèhi Tirtadrana (‘Tirtadirana’) (Appendix XII no. 4).
130 Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/Bogor), 
18-3-1823.
131 Van Pabst, ‘Consideratiën’, 8-1826. The payment of the guardians in devalued paper cur-
rency is also mentioned in Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 166.
132 The following is Jayadiningrat’s description of the working of the Yogya civil court (pradata) 
under Danureja IV: ‘For a case to be terminated, everything depended on Radèn Adipati Danure-
ja’s wishes: whoever gave the most bribes or gifts in the shape of money or goods or especially 
of beautiful women, he was the one who would be favoured. If the losing party refused to accept 
[the judgement] then a more severe case would be brought against them or it would be rumoured 
that he maintained bandits [and] witnesses would be called who knew how to turn evidence. 
In the end, the party who had [earlier] refused to accept [the judgement] would be punished or 
given a cash fine. If the party owned sawah, then the ricefields or his office [which was paid in 
land] would be suspended [see Rouffaer 1905:622-3] for one or two years with the declaration that 
he was a person who did not follow the laws of the land [and] was prepared to oppose them. If 
an official or a pangéran or bupati died, then the lands attached to his office would be taken over 
by the Danurejan [the patih’s office] for one or two years and they would not be given to […] his 
successor [even] if he had come forward [to claim them]. As regards the produce of confiscated 
land, in the form of money taxes, these would be taken by Radèn Adipati Danureja. If the land 
was given to an official, then the one who received it would incur a payment for his office or the 
stamp duties, which were not fixed. They would be estimated according to the amount of sawah; 
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infringed court etiquette, for he falsely claimed the right to hold dance dramas 
(wayang wong) in his residence. Since the maintenance of such classical dance 
troupes was the exclusive preserve of the sultan, he was forbidden from hold-
ing any further performances in Yogya. So he took his dancers to Pajang where 
he gave performances to the inhabitants of Surakarta instead, thus continuing 
to display his illegally assumed prestige as a patron of the arts.133
Dance dramas could be seen as an enrichment of the cultural life of south-
central Java during a particularly testing time economically and socially. 
But it was quite otherwise with the patih’s behaviour as a serial philanderer. 
According to Van Nes, the chief minister’s conduct with the ladies of the court 
was ‘improper’, and he mentioned that the patih ‘sometimes took women from 
the court to the villages to debauch them’.134 Danureja’s behaviour in this re-
spect had its counterpart in the actions of the Residency interpreter, Dietrée, 
and the new Assistant-Resident (Residency secretary), Chevallier. The former 
had already incurred much bitterness in the kraton during the fourth sultan’s 
reign by purchasing European goods for the sultan and then retailing them 
to him at four or five times their original price (Van Nes 1844:154-5; Houben 
1994:124). He also seems to have kept some of the jewelry and gold orna-
ments which had been entrusted to him by the sultan to pay for these goods. 
Like many other Eurasian and European inhabitants in Yogya he made con-
siderable profits by lending money at high rates of interest to impoverished 
members of the court.135 According to Dutch and Javanese sources, Dietrée, 
thus for one jung of sawah, which was taxed at five réyal or f 12.50-15.00, the stamp duties would 
be f 7.75. As for the official who received the sawah by being prepared to pay such sums, he [reim-
bursed himself by] collecting the money from the village tax-collector. If the latter was willing 
and able to pay, then afterwards three or four times the amount would be collected. If the village 
head refused to pay, then he would be dismissed and replaced by another who was prepared to 
pay such sums. Because of this [rule of] the strongest, there were numerous village wars [prang 
désa].’ For the full text, see Jayadiningrat 1855-57:4-5, part of the text is given in Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, I:85-6. For a comparative reference to the purchase of justice in Madiun in this 
period, see Madioen 1855:3.
133 Van Nes 1844:153; Du Bus 402, Van de Poll and Stavers, ‘Verhoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829, testi-
mony of Kyai Rosali (Gajali; on Danureja’s taking his dance troupe to Pajang). On the sumptuary 
laws (awisan-Dalem) restricting the holding of wayang wong, see Carey 1980:181, 1992:479-80 note 
379. The only dance performance allowed in the kepatihan was the ‘lance dance’ (beksan lawung), 
Groneman 1888:51-2; Kota Jogjakarta 200 Tahun 1956:145-6.
134 dK 111, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 16-12-1829.
135 Van Nes 1844:154-5; Schneither 108 pt. 3, J.I. van Sevenhoven, ‘Stukken rakende de her-
stelling van Zijn Hoogheid Sultan Hamengkoeboewana den tweede’, 8-1826, which states that 
Hamengkubuwana IV had sold jewels and gold ornaments from the kraton, which were not heir-
looms (pusaka), to Nahuys for between f 10-20,000. Some of these may have been disposed of 
through Dietrée. They later came into the possession of the government at the time of Hameng-
kubuwana II’s restoration in August 1826 and some appear to have been given back to the court, 
see Dj.Br. 81, Pangéran Mangkukusuma, Pangéran Natadiningrat, Radèn Adipati Danureja IV 
(guardians of Hamengkubuwana V) to Hamengkubuwana II, 10 Sapar AJ 1754 (AD 12-9-1826), 24 
Sapar AJ 1754 (AD 26-9-1826), on five sealed boxes containing treasure being placed for safekeep-
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a convert to Islam and, according to one source, pious about his religious 
duties, maintained clandestine relations with various women of rank in the 
court, amongst whom was a sister of Dipanagara’s co-guardian, Pangéran 
Mangkubumi, named Radèn Ayu Wiryataruna.136 News of these affairs be-
tween the court radèn ayu and the patih and the Residency interpreter is re-
ported to have been relayed to Dipanagara by his stepmother, Ratu Ageng, 
but he is supposed to have told her, ‘I do not wish to know anything about 
them, I leave them all to your ordering!’137
The prince’s unwillingness to intervene, understandable perhaps given that 
Ratu Ageng and the child sultan’s mother, Ratu Kencana, had been charged 
with the household affairs of the court at the time of the establishment of the 
guardianship in December 1822, opened the way for even more scandalous 
behaviour on the part of senior Dutch officials. Seemingly with Danureja and 
Dietrée’s encouragement, Chevallier also joined in the debauch. Indeed, when 
it came to relations with court women, the patih and the Residency interpreter’s 
actions were soon surpassed by the Assistant-Resident, who seems to have been 
driven by an erotic energy which bordered on the manic. This was rendered 
doubly abusive by his overweening arrogance and contempt for the inlander 
(native) which was evident, according to Smissaert, in all his contacts with the 
Javanese.138 A typical product of the brash new Europe of the post-Revolution-
ary era, and with little understanding of Indonesian society – like so many who 
made their way to Java in the post-1816 period (p. 433) – this unscrupulous and 
amoral man could perhaps be seen as a classic illustration of Ann Stoler’s argu-
ing with the Yogya Resident, J.I. van Sevenhoven, and reference to jewels, gold and silver held by 
Ratu Ageng. Most of these jewels and gold ornaments were subsequently sold during the Java 
War to meet the expenses of Hamengkubuwana II’s court, see Dj.Br. 3, F.G. Valck, ‘Algemeen ver-
slag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1836’, 31-3-1837, who spoke of the ‘complete impover-
ishment of the Yogya court’. Commissioner-General Du Bus also complained to the minister of 
the Colonies about European wives of colonial civil servants in Java buying up some of these 
court jewels at a pittance, Exhibitum, 17-3-1827 no. 35k, L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies (Batavia/Bogor) 
to C.Th. Elout (The Hague), 6-11-1826. On the rates of interest charged see note 96.
136 Du Bus 402, Van de Poll and Stavers, ‘Verhoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829, testimony of Kyai Rosali 
(Gajali), spoke of Dietrée seducing court women and princesses ‘inside and outside the court’. 
Van Nes 1844:154 note 1, mentions Radèn Ayu Wiryataruna, but he must have been misinformed; 
Dwidjosoegondo and Adisoetrisno 1941:99-102, do not give any radèn ayu by that name as sisters 
of Mangkubumi. Instead, Van Nes may have been referring to Radèn Ayu Wiryawinata, a daugh-
ter of Hamengkubuwana II by a selir, Dwidjosoegondo and Adisoetrisno 1941:99, See further Van 
der Kemp 1896a:313. On Dietrée’s conversion to Islam, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 15; Carey 1981a:260 
note 106.
137 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandeling’, 28-1-1830. 
138 vAE (aanwinsten 1941). ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I 
(The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828), who spoke of his ‘rude and unfriendly’ (ruw en onvriendelijk) 
manner towards the Javanese on the many tours which he did with the patih through the country-
side. He would also drink alcohol out in the open on these tours (Carey 1981a:256 note 89) and, 
according to Smissaert, behaved inappropriately with the court elite, treating the Yogya princes 
and nobles with disdain.
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ment regarding the relationship between colonial authority and sexual control 
(p. 440). In Chevallier’s case, however, unbridled lust rather than control seems 
to have been the essence of his dealings with the court radèn ayu. His superior, 
Smissaert, who later attempted to shift most of the blame onto him for the out-
break of the Java War – not so difficult given that he had conveniently died in 
the meantime139 – wrote that Chevallier had constantly engaged in love affairs 
with kraton princesses and the wives of Javanese nobles, stating that ‘in general 
his conduct with numerous Javanese women and girls was not only extremely 
improper but sometimes even attended by insults’.140 Interestingly, Smissaert 
himself admitted candidly to the Dutch monarch that although he had strictly 
eschewed love affairs with court women ‘long experience in Java having taught 
him the risk that this entailed’,
It would be hypocritical to pretend that in a land where it was generally known 
that there was more laxity over the rules of decency towards women than in the 
Netherlands, and where the [local] women themselves were not of the highest 
virtue, he [Smissaert] had excelled over his predecessors and contemporaries in 
his [sexual] conduct.141
As for Smissaert’s deputy, it seems he even boasted of his conquests (Van 
Hogendorp 1913:143; Van Praag 1947:266), brushing aside all his superior’s 
warnings about the dangers of relationships with the kraton princesses.142 
According to Pangéran Blitar, Chevallier had mistreated one of Dipanagara’s 
sisters whom he had found bathing in a river and had lived for several months 
with one of the prince’s unofficial wives.143 When the unofficial wife (selir) in 
question had tried to go back to Tegalreja, according to Blitar, Dipanagara 
139 Chevallier died in Yogya on 11-11-1825, see further Van der Kemp 1901, II:275; Van der 
Kemp 1896b:570.
140 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) King William I 
(The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828). The names of some of the Javanese women living outside 
the kraton who were seduced by Dietrée and Chevallier are given by Kyai Gajali. They included 
the daughters of Pangéran Mangkukusuma (a son of Hamengkubuwana I; Appendix VIII), the 
wife of Radèn Tumenggung Danuatmaja, a member of the Danurejan family (Appendix II), and 
Radèn Ayu Mertanagara, a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II who was married to a son of the 
murdered Radèn Adipati Danureja II (Appendix II), Du Bus 402, Van de Poll and Stavers, ‘Ver-
hoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829, testimony of Kyai Rosali (Gajali). On Van Nes’ reference to one of the 
court radèn ayu said to be involved, see note 136. 
141 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William 
I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828).
142 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William 
I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828). On court women as sex objects and prostitutes, see Creese 
2004:63, 70, 83.
143 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King Wil-
liam I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828), reported that the incident with Dipanagara’s sister 
occurred after the outbreak of the Java War in the period August-October 1825. Chevallier had 
forced the local bupati to bring her to him and had then given her a diamond ring presumably in 
return for services rendered. She had later reported the incident to Dipanagara. It is unclear which 
of Dipanagara’s selir was involved with Chevallier, Appendix IV. See further Kielstra 1885:410.
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had refused her entry because she had slept with a European. Chevallier 
himself is then said to have gone to the prince’s residence to ask why she 
had not been admitted, to which Dipanagara had replied – understandably 
– that he did not maintain his selir for the pleasure of the Assistant-Resident, 
whereupon Chevallier had become angry stating that ‘he would do what he 
liked with native women’ and had hit the prince over the head.144 Blitar’s 
report seems so outrageous that it would be hard to credit, especially as it 
was retailed to the Dutch monarch by Smissaert, but for separate pieces of 
evidence that Dipanagara’s treatment by Chevallier and the Residency inter-
preter was quite unbelievably awful. A key witness here was Kyai Gajali, a 
senior ulama in Kyai Maja’s entourage who may have been his brother (note 
61). In an interview with the chief magistrate of Batavia, H.M. van der Poll, 
and William Stavers, the Javanese-speaking Scots landowner and former se-
poy officer who served as translator with the help of Maja’s Javanese scribe, 
Mas Ngabèhi Tirtadrana (Appendix XII no. 4), he related an incident at a 
Residency reception in the Dutch fort at which both the two Dutch officials 
went out of their way to be rude to Dipanagara, sneering and scoffing that 
he was a ‘madman’, a ‘priest’ and ‘a queer cove’ (grove vent). Even Smissaert 
appears to have failed to observe the normal social niceties referring to the 
prince by name rather than the using his honorific title – Kangjeng Gusti 
(‘your lordship’) – as might have been expected when addressing a pangéran. 
Seeing the prince become steadily more enraged and fearing a scene, Major 
Tumenggung Wiranagara, according to Gajali, had brought his own carriage 
and conducted Dipanagara home to Tegalreja.145 The date of this reception is 
not entirely clear. It may have been that which followed the Garebeg Mulud 
of 4 November 1824, or it could have been that held on 21 May 1825 just after 
the celebration of the Garebeg Puwasa (note 203), when we have a number of 
other sources which relate that the expressions of contempt were mutual and 
that Dipanagara also used very insulting Low Javanese (ngoko) expressions to 
his Dutch hosts calling Smissaert ‘the bald-headed one’ (si buthak-ngelathak) 
when asking the Resident to drink with him (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
I:47 note 1; Schoemaker 1893:414-6; Carey 1981a:273 note 152; Payen 1988:49). 
But even if the date is uncertain and Dipanagara did indeed trade insult for 
insult, the picture this gives of Dutch relations with Dipanagara and other 
members of the elite on the eve of the Java War is unedifying. 
144 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William 
I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828).
145 Du Bus 402, Van der Poll and Stavers, ‘Verhoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829, testimony of Kyai Rosali 
(Gajali) (on Chevallier and Dietrée’s expressions of contempt for Dipanagara and Wiranagara’s 
action in taking Dipanagara home to Tegalreja in his carriage); Ministerie van Koloniën 4204, 
geheim verbaal no. 159, Blitar, ‘Report’, 10-10-1826 (on Smissaert’s disrespectful way of addressing 
Dipanagara).
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Understandably, the memory of the way he had been treated remained viv-
id for the prince. During his voyage to Manado, he was reported to have burst 
out in a torrent of abuse against the Dutch officials of the pre-war period and 
their inability to speak anything but market Malay, describing how ‘Chevallier 
and other Dutchmen had trotted into our kraton as though it was a stable and 
had shouted and called as though it had become a market’.146 This recalls what 
the astute lawyer, Willem van Hogendorp, had written when he commented 
on the Dutch turning the Yogya kraton into a ‘brothel’ and Dipanagara’s vow to 
‘destroy it to the last stone’ and expel the land-renters who had driven out the 
Javanese officials (p. 389). Van Hogendorp’s pithy summary of the root cause of 
the problem, inspired in part by a memoir by Nicolaus Engelhard, would have 
found a strong echo with Dipanagara (Van Hogendorp 1913:142):
The feeling of unrest is extremely great throughout Java […]. As concerns the 
cause [of this] it is nothing else than that the Dutch government […] has made 
itself over the past ten years most vile in the eyes of the Javanese.
The only satisfaction which Dipanagara might have derived from this was 
that all three of the Dutch officials who had caused him so much grief would 
meet unhappy ends: Chevallier, seemingly an alcoholic (Carey 1981a:256 note 
89), expired of a liver abcess in Yogya in November 1825 when he was just 
thirty, Dietrée suffered a lingering death of wounds received when storming 
Dipanagara’s fortified position at Plérèd in April 1826 (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, II:261 note 1; Carey 1981a:242 note 31), and Smissaert succumbed 
to the sorrow of his public disgrace in reduced financial circumstances in The 
Hague in 1832 in his fifty-fifth year.147 As for the prince’s main Javanese pro-
tagonists, Ratu Ageng would die of a broken heart in June 1826 (Chapter VIII 
note 46), Major Tumenggung Wiranagara would end up in exile on distant 
Banda Island (p. 368), and only Danureja IV would see out his full term as 
chief minister of Yogyakarta, retiring in 1847 with a princely title and dying in 
his native Majakerta two years later (Appendix Va; Carey 1992:499 note 486). 
It is clear from references in his babad during the war years that Dipanagara’s 
hatred for both Wiranagara and the chief minister remained undimmed.148
146 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 41. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:313-4.
147 Carey 1981a:235 note 9; vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smisaaert’, contains the offi-
cial papers of his dismissal and review by the minister of the Colonies, C.Th. Elout, who main-
tained the original decision of Van der Capellen to strip him of his post in Yogya (26-9-1825) and 
expel him from the colony (25-12-1825). Smissaert’s financial problems are alluded to in Dj.Br. 17, 
‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/
Bogor), 5-5-1831 no. 47, suggesting that the government give him a pension ‘to save him from 
poverty’, which the minister of the Colonies partially agreed in his Besluit of 13-10-1829, when 
some money was advanced to the former Resident, see vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smiss-
aert’. See further page 755 on the fate of the senior Dutch officials under whom Dipanagara was 
incarcerated in Makassar.
148 BD (Manado), III:262, XXXIX (Dhandhanggula) 2-3. dhateng Jéndral Dhe Kok mangko/ kinèn 
anerang tuhu/ ingkang datan dados karsa Ji/ sumongga dèndhawuhna/ pan Jèndral tumurut/ déné ingkang 
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The government’s annexation plans and their impact
Just as the European presence in Yogya was being fatally compromised by 
the behaviour of the senior Dutch officials charged with maintaining relations 
with the Yogya court, government policy once again began to move in a direc-
tion guaranteed to increase the growing sense of unease in the south-central 
Javanese kraton. This stemmed from Van der Capellen’s desire to effect further 
territorial annexations in the Principalities to increase government revenue and 
bring what he regarded as the benefits of an enlightened European adminis-
tration to the wider Javanese population. Early in 1821, even before he had 
decided on the abolition of the land-rent, the governor-general had tried to 
take advantage of the financial difficulties of the Sunan to force the latter to 
hand over some Surakarta territory bordering on the government Residencies 
of Kedhu, Pekalongan, Tegal and Cirebon. This area included the two districts 
of Jabarangkah and Karangkobar, both renowned as unusually fertile.149 Van 
der Capellen had written to Nahuys enquiring what Pakubuwana V’s reaction 
might be to surrendering these lands as a ‘surety’ for a government loan of 80,000 
Spanish dollars to pay off the debts of his father, the fourth Sunan.150 Nahuys’ 
reply had been an emphatic negative, stating that the newly appointed Sunan 
‘would rather forego all financial help than suffer such a loss of territory […] 
Your Excellency could ask as a surety a small piece of ground, but not rich and 
prosperous provinces’.151 Nahuys also drew the governor-general’s attention 
to the bitter complaints he had heard from both south-central Javanese rulers 
concerning the annexations of Daendels (pp. 265-7) and Raffles (pp. 377-89):
The cession of so many rich areas under various pretexts, which is referred to by 
the Sunan as ‘wrapping up’, has always been regarded by them as a sign of bad 
dados duka/ marginipun pan saking tiyang kakalih/ Mayor* lawan Danurja. 3. sapunika sumongga karsa 
Ji/ pan kawula kinèngkèn ngaturna/ lamun pinundhut pejahé/ pan pinejahan iku/ yèn punika pinundhut 
urip/ ing ngaturaken gesang. * Reference to Major Tumenggung Wiranagara. He had in fact been 
promoted to lieutenant-colonel by the Dutch by this stage in the war. The present passage in 
Dipanagara’s babad refers to the peace negotiations between Kyai Maja and Commissioner-Gen-
eral Du Bus with William Stavers acting as translator in September 1827 at Salatiga. See further 
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:265-6.
149 On the fertility of Jabarangkah and Karangkobar when compared to other adjacent areas of 
Bagelèn, Kedhu, Banyumas, Pekalongan and Semarang, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:76. 
Jabarangkah appears to have derived its name from the region bordering the north coast which 
had formerly been situated outside (jaba) the old tollgate (rangkah) of Mataram (see Map of central 
and east Java).
150 dK 9, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J.C. Baud) (Batavia/
Bogor), 19-2-1821, replying to Van der Capellen’s letter of 10-2-1821. The financial situation in 
the Surakarta kraton was so desperate at this time after Pakubuwana IV’s death (1-10-1820) that 
Chinese creditors had to be turned away daily from the gates of the court. On Daendels’ payment 
of Pakubuwana IV’s bad debts in January 1811, see Chapter VII note 24.
151 dK 9, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J.C. Baud) (Batavia/
Bogor), 19-2-1821.
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times and often references are made to the promises [respecting existing frontiers] 
which were given by Ambassador Extraordinary, Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk, 
in September 1816.152
Finally, the acting Surakarta Resident warned that if the government did pro-
ceed to take over more land from the south-central Javanese courts, the popu-
lation of those areas would prove restive and difficult subjects for the gov-
ernment and ‘the least spark of displeasure could blaze up […] and bring the 
whole land into fire and flame’. Again we have the same apocalyptic refrain 
which MacGillivray and Van Sevenhoven would later express in their reports 
on the tollgates (pp. 474-5) and which Nahuys was now pointing to in his warn-
ing to Van der Capellen over the prospect of further territorial annexations. 
In Nahuys’ view, the government should only attempt such a policy ‘when 
the rulers do not have such a great influence on the people and when the av-
erage Javanese is more accustomed to the fairer and gentler treatment of the 
Europeans, and when their loyalty to their chiefs shall have lapsed slightly’.153 
In attacking the governor-general’s annexation policy, Nahuys’ own in-
terests were clearly foremost in his mind since further government annexa-
tions would restrict the territory available for private European land-renters 
in the Principalities. But he had a point. His analysis of the sensitivity of 
the independent rulers to any new take-over of land was an accurate reflec-
tion of sentiments at both Surakarta and Yogyakarta at this time. His argu-
ments eventually persuaded Van der Capellen to drop his annexation ideas 
for the time being. Instead, it was agreed that money should be advanced to 
both Pakubuwana V and Mangkunagara II (page 531) without using land as 
collateral.154 But the following year, when Van der Capellen made his third 
and final journey to the courts, he returned to his annexation theme.155 By 
this time Nahuys had been replaced by De Salis as Resident of Surakarta. A 
strong supporter of the complete incorporation of the princely territories by 
the government, De Salis is likely to have exercised a strong personal influ-
152 dK 9, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J.C. Baud) (Batavia/
Bogor), 19-2-1821, referring to the government’s policy of inpakken (‘wrapping up’). On Van IJs-
seldijk’s August-September 1816 visit to the courts, see pp. 372, 441. One of his diplomatic tasks 
as ambassador extraordinary was to assure the rulers that the new Dutch government would not 
effect changes in previous British policy and would respect the treaties signed with the courts. 
See further Van Deventer 1891:97-104; Van der Kemp 1911:266-8.
153 dK 9, H.G. Nahuys an Burgst (Surakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J.C. Baud) (Batavia/
Bogor), 21-2-1821.
154 dK 9, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta/
Surakarta), 10-3-1821; Ministerie van Koloniën 2873, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in 
rade, 6-3-1821 no. 21.
155 An account of Van der Capellen’s 1822 journey to south-central Java is in Kern 1941:283-
99. There are also interesting references in Lettres de Java 1829:65-93 (on Surakarta), 94-103 (on 
Yogyakarta).
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ence over the governor-general.156 According to Nahuys, Van der Capellen 
went so far as to air his views in public at a small gathering of Dutch officials 
and Javanese notables, by remarking to the Surakarta patih how much luckier 
the island of Java would be if, instead of being ruled jointly by the Dutch and 
the Javanese, it was governed solely by the former. He even intimated that 
Surakarta should look to a future when it would be like the former independ-
ent courts of Banten and Cirebon, which had been abolished by Daendels 
(Van der Kemp 1897:23-4). The reactions of the Surakarta court to these highly 
tactless remarks are not recorded but they are certain to have been ones of 
dismay and apprehension. Again Van der Capellen did not proceed to active 
measures, but early in 1823 De Salis spoke once more with the governor-gen-
eral urging that in the event of Pakubuwana V’s death, provision should be 
made to take the administration of the police, justice and finance entirely out 
of the hands of the Surakarta ruler. In his view, this should be done either by 
entering into a new contract with Pakubuwana V’s successor or, if no accept-
able heir could be found, by splitting Surakarta up between Pakubuwana IV’s 
younger brother, Pangéran Buminata, and various other Surakarta princes, 
each of whom would sign a separate agreement with the government.157
Soon afterwards, on 5 September 1823, the Sunan died of consumption 
and was succeeded by his eldest surviving son by a secondary wife, Radèn 
Mas Saperdan.158 In quick succession, the seventeen-year-old Saperdan was 
appointed Crown Prince on 14 September and then Sunan the following 
day.159 His appointment caused consternation amongst the senior pangéran 
in the Surakarta kraton who had confidently assumed that Pakubuwana IV’s 
son by an official consort, Pangéran Purbaya, would succeed. According to 
Dipanagara, many in Yogya expected Saperdan’s extraordinary elevation to 
spark a rebellion of the Surakarta princes against the European government, 
but in his view the princes of Sala were ‘not courageous’ (berani) enough for 
156 De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’, The Hague, 8-5-1828, strongly advised the complete destruction of the 
courts and the incorporation of their lands under government rule. See further Houben 1994:17-72.
157 Ministerie van Koloniën 4497, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal geheim, 9-9-1823 La A, 
referring to De Salis’ interview with Van der Capellen in July 1823 (a copy of this extract made by 
G.P. Rouffaer from the Surakarta Residency archive is in KITLV H 696f, Stuk XV, 414-25). De Salis’ 
influence, however, was brief because he was forced to return to the Netherlands in that same 
month of July 1823 because of his wife’s health. His Assistant-Resident, Hendrik Mauritz MacGil-
livray, replaced him, see Ministerie van Koloniën 2779, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in 
rade, 15-7-1823 no. 5 and Appendix IX.
158 Saperdan’s mother, Radèn Ayu Sasrakusuma, who had died giving birth to him on 27-4-
1806, was a sister of the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Sasradiningrat II, who brought him up 
and pushed him strongly as a candidate to succeed Pakubuwana V. See further Rouffaer 1905:599; 
Padmasusastra 1902:170 no. 11.
159 On Pakubuwana VI’s appointment contract, see S.Br. 55, A.H. Smissaert, P. le Clercq and H. 
MacGillivray, ‘Acte van verband gepasseerd door Z.H. den Soesoehoenan Pakoe Boewana Senopati 
Ingalaga Abdur Rahman Sayidin Panotogomo de zesde’, 12 Sura AJ 1756, taun Dal (AD 18-9-1823).
Plate 61. Pakubuwana VI (reigned 1823-1830) of Surakarta conferring with his patih, Radèn       Adipati Sasradiningrat II (in office 1812-1846) about whether or not to help the 
Dutch in the Java War. Taken from KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo) f.148v. Photograph by      courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
Plate 61. Pakubuwana VI (reigned 1823-1830) of Surakarta conferring with his patih, Radèn       Adipati Sasradiningrat II (in office 1812-1846) about whether or not to help the 
Dutch in the Java War. Taken from KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo) f.148v. Photograph by      courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
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this step.160 One can only surmise that in making this remark, Dipanagara 
may have himself been reflecting on the curious paradox in which the eld-
est son by an unofficial wife was chosen as the legal successor in Surakarta 
but that he, who enjoyed a similar position in Yogyakarta, had been passed 
over just nine months previously when the two-year-old Hamengkubuwana 
V had come to the throne (Van der Kemp 1896a:303). The difference, however, 
was that in Yogya, there was a legitimate successor to the fourth sultan, al-
beit still a toddler, whereas in Surakarta the consumptive Pakubuwana V had 
died without an heir by any of his official consorts.161 The Dutch also seem to 
have fixed on Saperdan because he was his father’s favourite – an interesting 
mirror of Dipanagara’s own position viz-à-viz his father, Hamengkubuwana 
III (pp. 373-6, 443). The other two possible candidates, Buminata and 
Purbaya were ruled out, the first on account of his age and the second be-
cause the recently deceased Sunan had not wanted him as his successor.162 
Although Saperdan had passed his sixteenth birthday, the age of major-
ity at the south-central Javanese courts, he was still treated as a minor by the 
Dutch. As in Yogyakarta, the Resident took charge of the seal of state, with the 
patih continuing the administration of the Surakarta lands and Buminata and 
other senior members of the royal family supervising the new Sunan’s educa-
tion.163 Fluent with the pen, and a great cognoscente of Javanese history and 
160 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 28. Dipanagara specifically mentioned Pangéran Buminata as too old, 
and Pangéran Ngabèhi, as too closely connected, through the marriage of his daughter, with 
Pakubuwana VI (on this marriage, see Ministerie van Koloniën 2781, Besluit van den Gouverneur 
Generaal in rade, 3-2-1824 no. 1). Both were senior surviving brothers of Pakubuwana IV. He also 
remarked (Knoerle. ‘Journal’, 27-8): ‘The princes of Sala, Buminata, Ngabèhi and Purbaya, had 
always firmly doubted the royal birth of [Radèn Mas] Saperdan and as a result of this pressed for 
the appointment of Purbaya to the Sunanate. The patih of Sala, Sasradiningrat [II], bore a deathly 
hatred against the said princes to whom he attributed the loss of his father, a previous patih of Sala, 
Radèn Adipati Mangkupraja II [in office 1796-1804], who had been put to death by Sunan Bagus 
[Pakubuwana IV] during the British interregnum [1811-1816], because of their persecution and 
in particular because of the intrigues of Buminata. Sasradiningrat was [then] able to accomplish 
the appointment of Saperdan as Sunan.’ This whole passage in Knoerle’s journal of his voyage to 
Manado with Dipanagara, which refers to the political situation in the Surakarta kraton in 1823 
has been underlined three times in the margin most likely by Johannes van den Bosch himself. He 
clearly had a particular interest in Surakarta court politics given the arrest of Pakubuwana VI on 
6-6-1830 at Mancingan on the south coast (and subsequent exile to Ambon, 16-12-1830) and the 
appointment of Purbaya as Pakubuwana VII on 14-6-1830. See further Houben 1994:29-37.
161 Pakubuwana V had had only one surviving child, a daughter, by an official consort, Ratu 
Mas, and she had married the future Mangkunagara III (reigned 1835-1853), successor to Prang-
wedana (Mangkunagara II). Out of Pakubuwana V’s 45 children, 25 had died young. Three others, 
including Pakubuwana VI, were exiled, Padmasusastra 1902:168-74.
162 Dj.Br. 6, ‘Extract uit het secreet register der handelingen en besluiten van den Gouverneur-
Generaal in rade’, entry for 9-9-1823, no. LA.
163 Ministerie van Koloniën 2779, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 9-9-1823 no. 
45; Van der Kemp 1897:10-13. Assessment of Pakubuwana VI’s character can be found in Winter 
1902:39; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:475-87; and S.Br. 122, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) 
to Lieutenant Governor-General (H.M. de Kock) (Batavia/Bogor), 22-10-1824. De Kock himself 
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customs, the new Sunan proved a difficult and ultimately disastrous choice 
for the Dutch. He clearly harboured secret sympathies with Dipanagara and 
admitted that but for the speedy arrival of General De Kock in Surakarta 
on 30 July 1825, shortly after the outbreak of the Java War, he would have 
gone over to the prince’s side with most of his court (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, I:274-6, II:362-6, 474, III:7-14; Van der Kemp 1896b:543-56; Carey 
1981a:292-3 note 241; Houben 1994:24). Furthermore, his own conduct at the 
end of the war, when he left his kraton in secret to travel to the south coast 
via Imagiri to meditate at the grave of Sultan Agung and to contact the god-
dess of the southern ocean, Ratu Kidul (6-8 June 1830), seemed to mirror 
Dipanagara’s own spiritual preparations for rebellion and led to his exile to 
Ambon (Houben 1994:35-6). He was replaced by Purbaya who reigned as 
Pakubuwana VII (1830-1858). Although even the artless Purbaya had main-
tained his own contacts with Dipanagara and Kyai Maja during the war years 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:248, 496), he subsequently proved a loyal 
and dependable ally of the post-war Dutch administration.
The change of ruler in Surakarta in 1823 coming so soon after the appoint-
ment of a child sultan in Yogya, seemed to many in the European community 
in Java a golden opportunity to take administrative responsibilities away from 
the courts (Büchler 1888, I:414). But Van der Capellen did not feel it advisable 
to proceed with any sweeping changes at this juncture. The recent problems 
with the land-rent were still vivid in his mind. He was also aware that any new 
arrangements which affected only Surakarta and not Yogyakarta would tend 
to unbalance the political situation in south-central Java. He thus decided to 
act cautiously. But he reminded the Residents at the courts that he still hoped 
to place the rulers of Surakarta and Yogyakarta under the immediate control 
of Batavia, much in the same fashion as the north coast bupati had been in the 
would later write of Pakubuwana VI that he had little intelligence but an extensive knowledge of 
Javanese history and customs  that he could write very fluently, dK 111, ‘Beschrijving van de kara-
kter en hoedanigheid van de Keizer, de prinsen en de rijksbestuurder te Soerakarta’, Magelang, 
21-11-1829; and that he had shown better tendencies in the beginning when he had studied hard 
and listened to the advice of Buminata and Sasradiningrat II, but that latterly he had rejected this 
advice and treated his great-uncles and family in a high-handed fashion, H.M. de Kock (Mage-
lang) to L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies (Batavia/Bogor), 7-1-1829 in NA Exhibitum, 11-8-1828 Litt H 
no. 159k, C.Th. Elout (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), 11-8-1828. See further 
on De Kock’s testimony, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:9. The ‘cruel character’and anti-Euro-
pean sentiments of Pakubuwana VI are described in NA, Exhibitum 27-6-1829 no. 119k geheim, 
Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies (Batavia/Bogor), 28-11-1828, 7-2-1829, 
stating that Pakubuwana VI had committed four murders during his reign and made liberal use 
of his whip against those with whom he took offence against: for example, on 22-11-1828, when 
he had laid about Radèn Adipati Sasradiningrat II’s (patih of Surakarta’s) son, who was going to 
the court dressed in Dutch uniform at the head of his father’s prajurit (troops), for not getting out 
of his way quickly enough. He abused his great-uncles, Buminata and Ngabèhi for ‘licking the 
shoes’ and ‘kissing the feet’ of the Europeans; and went to the patih’s residence on 18-11-1828 to 
abuse Kyai Maja’s Bulkio for having surrendered to the Dutch.
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late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a start, he urged the Residents to 
look for opportunities for the European government to take over areas distant 
from the courts but bordering government territory in the pasisir. In particular, 
he advised the acquisition of land near the frontiers of Tegal and Pekalongan 
in the west, and around Pasuruan and Surabaya in the east.164
Van der Capellen’s secret policy decision of 9 September 1823 set the tone 
for government activity right up to the Java War. It caused great anxiety not 
only at the courts but also amongst the populations of those territories which 
the government was seeking to incorporate. The first areas taken over were 
Jabarangkah, which was divided between Surakarta and Yogyakarta, and 
Karangkobar, the northeastern tip of Banyumas which was held solely by the 
Sunan. These were needed mainly for strategic reasons to round out govern-
ment land along the post road between Semarang and Pekalongan. As we 
have seen (Chapter V), this had originally been laid out by Daendels, but by 
1823 it was again under reconstruction. Jabarangkah lay directly athwart this 
vital artery and both provinces posed frontier and police problems, situated as 
they were so far from the kraton that little could be done by the patih to main-
tain order there.165 The government seems to have also seen them as partial 
territorial compensation for the abolition of the tollgates in the Principalities 
which was being considered in December 1824.166 On 1 January 1825, the 
two districts were placed under government control for a 30-year lease at an 
annual rent of f 100,000 to Surakarta and f 26,000 to Yogyakarta, the amount 
of the rent payments reflecting the size of the respective territory held by the 
courts. Just over a month later (25 February 1825), they were divided up and 
incorporated into the adjacent government Residencies of Kedhu, Pekalongan 
and Semarang (Rouffaer 1905:595). A year later, with the Java War raging and 
the European government hard pressed for cash, the payment of rent to the 
Yogya court was quietly dropped as part of the 17 August 1826 contract re-
storing the second sultan to the throne. The Yogya lands in the two districts 
then became official government territory (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
I:523 note 2, II:440-1; Van der Kemp 1897:38-9).
Despite the apparent ease with which this annexation had been made, 
the move was viewed with deep misgivings at the courts. In Yogyakarta, 
164 Ministerie van Koloniën 4497, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal geheim, 9-9-1823 La A. 
A land swap had already been arranged with Surakarta during De Salis’ Residency (1822-1823), 
when Surakarta had given up some land at Tingkir near Salatiga, in return for some territory in 
Semarang Residency around Boyolali, see S.Br. 55, A.M.Th. de Salis, Radèn Adipati Sasradinin-
grat II, Acte on land transfer of Tingkir district, 24-4-1823.
165 Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/Bogor), 
1-3-1823; Van der Kemp 1897:38. Daendels had previously complained about the raids by wong 
durjana from the forest of Kadhawung, for reference see Chapter VI note 51. On the annexation of 
Jabarangkah, see further Rouffaer 1905:595. On the geographical position of the two districts, see 
Map of central and east Java.
166 AN, Exhibitum, 28-12-1824, G.F. Meylan (Director of State Revenue/Directeur van Lande-
lijke Inkomsten) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 11-12-1824.
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Dipanagara was particularly incensed by the fact that he was not even con-
sulted over the Jabarangkah ‘lease’,167 and that the rent term had been signed 
for 30 years, when as guardian he had a personal responsibility not to commit 
his five-year-old charge, Hamengkubuwana V, to any undertakings which ex-
ceeded January 1836 when he would reach his age of majority (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, II:441). In Surakarta, the new Resident, J.I. van Sevenhoven, 
remarked (Van der Kemp 1897:40):
I cannot hide the fact that when I negotiated with the Surakarta court about this 
rental, they let me feel that they would rather not lease out these lands. Then, be-
cause I was able to refute their arguments, they eventually agreed.
The Sunan himself advanced no objection to the sum of f 100,000 but, in Van 
Sevenhoven’s words, ‘His Highness […] was indeed worried where in the 
future he would be able to get his dodol, a Javanese delicacy [of] fruitcake, 
because the most delicious sort was produced in that district’.168 Quite apart 
from these gastronomic concerns, it was obvious to the south central Javanese 
rulers that the ‘rent’ of the provinces by the government was a mere fiction. 
Their incorporation into the adjoining Residencies so soon after the initial 
negotiations had been completed was proof enough of Van der Capellen’s 
new annexationist policy. Moreover, the fact that the first rent payment for 
these areas was only made at the end of 1825 and then only partially (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:76-7) caused great difficulties for the kraton at a 
time when they needed every scrap of income to support themselves follow-
ing the abolition of the land-rent (Van der Kemp 1896a:388, 1897:41, 47-8). In 
December 1826, the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Sasradiningrat II, would 
unburden himself to a senior Dutch official, the former Surakarta Resident, 
Pinket van Haak, who was on a special commission to the Sunan’s capital, 
complaining that the court had been brought into ‘a crushing poverty […] by 
the loss [of income] from the lands [formerly] rented by Europeans and [by 
the takeover of] Jabarangkah and Karangkobar, regions which all witnesses 
are agreed were not given freely in lease by the Sunan […] but on the con-
trary were extorted’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:5). The inclusion of 
Jabarangkah and Karangkobar also occurred when negotiations were taking 
place for much larger annexations of territory in the western mancanagara and 
167 Du Bus 402, H.M. van der Poll and William Stavers, ‘Verhoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829, testimony 
of Kyai Rosali (Gajali).
168 Van der Kemp 1897:40. Jabarangkah’s role in the export of this delicacy is mentioned in S.Br. 
55, J.I. van Sevenhoven, ‘Nota over de land verhuringen’, n.y. (? 1824), who stated that every year 
a number of pikul (man loads of 62 kilograms) of dodol were sent to Surakarta and that the delicacy 
had a very high durian content. He allowed the delicacy to continue to be delivered to the court 
and also arranged for the transfer of a grave at Séla (p. 265-6) on the borders of Semarang. On the 
special produce from parts of Bagelèn for the Sunan’s table which was accepted in lieu of tribute 
(pajeg), see pp. 25-6.
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nagara agung, namely the takeover of the two rich provinces of Banyumas 
and Bagelèn as a way of replacing the estimated f 1,000,000 income which 
the government would have to forego if it proceeded with the abolition of 
the tollgates.169 Chevallier, never the most diplomatic of officials, had con-
ducted preliminary surveys of both the provinces in the latter part of 1824 
and his journeys had awakened widespread local concern. As we have seen 
(p. 27), the patih had protested to the Dutch commissioners enquiring into the 
working of the tollgates that Bagelèn and Banyumas were vital pillars – liter-
ally ‘hands and feet’ (kaki tangan) of the Principalities – providing valuable 
produce, apanage land and labour for the porters’ guilds. Meanwhile, the 
government was also shown to have acted in bad faith because, whilst these 
negotiations were going forward, including a discussion of the Jabarangkah 
and Karangkobar districts, plans had clearly been made to annex them (Van 
der Kemp 1897:46). In Yogya, Smissaert must have sensed the heated feelings 
which this had aroused for on 14 December 1824, he wrote to his co-commis-
sioner, Van Sevenhoven, asking (Van der Kemp 1897:46):
When Banyumas and Bagelen have not been taken over from the princes, why has 
Jabarangkah been annexed? […] I must stress most strongly that I do not think it 
advisable to annex the Yogya lands in Jabarangkah. Yogya territory is much smal-
ler than that of Surakarta and it has lost much more during the period of Daendels 
and Raffles.
Furthermore, he urged the government to make a quick decision about the 
reimbursement of taxes in the recently annexed districts in order to reassure 
the local population, writing that ‘the uncertainty of the government in this 
matter and the thus floating position of the average peasant, I regard as [ex-
tremely] dangerous [at the present time]’.170 Van Sevenhoven replied that the 
government’s plans for further annexations would be shelved until after the 
return of the recently sailed expeditionary force to Makassar, where Major-
General Joseph van Geen (1775-1846) had been sent with a 10,000-strong 
army of European and Sumenep troops to defeat a hostile coalition of Bugis 
states led by the queen of Bone.171 The lack of European soldiers in Java at 
169 Van der Kemp 1897:46; De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’, The Hague, 8-5-1828. The government’s 
attention had been drawn to the tollgates by Chevallier’s report of June 1824 (full reference Chap-
ter I note 35). But, although the tollgates were abolished in Kedhu in 1824, nothing was done 
about those in the Principalities until 1827. See further note 45.
170 Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to J.I. van 
Sevenhoven (Surakarta), 14-12-1824. On Van Sevenhoven’s reply, which was written from Batavia 
on 29-1-1825, see Van der Kemp 1896a:387. The effects of government policies are also considered 
in Van Hogendorp 1913:141.
171 Van der Kemp 1901, I, I:163, 226 note 5; Payen 1988:126 note 190. On the background to this 
war in South Sulawesi involving the Bugis states of Bone, Suppa and Tanete, which had broken 
out in mid-September 1824, see Sartono Kartodirdjo 1971:35, 127-8; Ricklefs 1993:136-7.
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this time172 and the absence of the governor-general on an inspection visit to 
Maluku (July-October 1824; Chapter IX) seems to have caused the acting gov-
ernor-general, H.M. de Kock, to counsel caution. In fact, the Dutch were lucky 
in that Van Geen’s force returned to Java in late August 1825 just in time to 
help in the defence of central Java against Dipanagara’s north coast allies and 
turn the tide of battle in the areas of Semarang and Demak in early September 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:334-9; Van der Kemp 1901, II:271-3; Payen 
1988:126 note 190). 
Smissaert’s plea with regard to the remission of taxes and the problems of 
the local population in the leased districts was ignored. The result was that 
by March 1825 various disturbances had already broken out on the borders 
of Jabarangkah and Pekalongan. Indeed, the whole area remained in a dis-
turbed state right up to the outbreak of the Java War.173 Thus, on the eve of 
Dipanagara’s great rebellion in Yogyakarta, the government had plunged into a 
series of measures which could only have a profoundly unsettling effect on the 
south-central Javanese courts. The first of these, the abolition of the land-rent 
in May 1823, had been rapidly followed by the partial implementation of Van 
der Capellen’s ideas about further territorial annexations in the Principalities. 
He saw this as a necessary first step towards the complete incorporation of 
the kraton under government control. Both these measures were political dy-
namite. Not only did they spell financial ruin for the courts, but they also – in 
the case of the Jabarangkah and Karangkobar leases – reawakened all the old 
memories and fears regarding land takeovers which dated back to the an-
nexations of Daendels (Chapter VII) and Raffles (Chapter VIII). Meanwhile, 
in Yogyakarta itself, the internal tensions in the kraton and the patih’s corrupt 
style of administration had both worsened due to the lack of leadership and 
control shown by senior Dutch officials. Indeed, the Assistant-Resident and 
Residency interpreter had both cooperated closely with the patih in advanc-
ing his designs. Finally, the guardians of the child sultan were themselves in 
disarray and both Mangkubumi and Dipanagara were effectively cut off from 
any say in the administration of the sultanate. The way was thus open for the 
final build up to the Java War and Dipanagara’s own emergence as the longed 
for Ratu Adil.
172 On the eve of the Java War, European troop strengths in Java were at least 1,000 or 10 percent 
below the complement fixed for the Netherlands Indies army, see Van der Kemp 1896b:540; Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:612.
173 Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Batavia) to A.H. 
Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 29-1-1825 (see also Van der Kemp 1896a:388); Dj.Br. 53, P.F.H. Chevallier 
(Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta), 15-3-1825.
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Dipanagara’s pre-war visions
By early 1824, as we have seen, the break between Dipanagara and his protago-
nists in the Yogya court had become very nearly complete. The difficulties over 
the land-rent indemnities and the patih’s dismissal of two of his close friends 
had been the catalyst. Throughout this time, the prince had continued to lead 
an active spiritual life engaging in periods of silent retreat in his cave of Secang 
at Selarong especially during the fasting month (puwasa; Carey 1981a:246 note 
43) and even going down to the south coast to commune again with the god-
dess of the southern ocean in places like the grotto of Suralanang which seem 
to have been associated with her cult.174 According to Dipanagara’s babad, the 
fifteen months which preceded the Java War from May 1824 to July 1825, were 
a very crucial time for him. During this period, a whole series of dreams and vi-
sions occurred which helped to clarify still further the prince’s view of himself 
and the role he would be called upon to play in the coming upheaval in central 
Java. To some extent, these later visions confirmed and elucidated those which 
the prince had received as a young man (Chapter IV), but they also pointed at 
another level to the irrevocable course which Dipanagara was now about to 
embark upon and which would lead directly to the Java War.
The first vision took place during the fasting month (puwasa) of 1824 on 
21 Ramelan AJ 1751 (AD 19 May 1824), when the prince was at his cave of 
Secang at Selarong. The following is the description in the prince’s babad:
XX. 7  Now we tell
  how in the year Dal
  in the month of Ramelan
  on the date, the twenty-first,
 8 the prince was in a cave
  the name of which was Secang.
  Every month of Ramelan
  thus was the inclination
  of the prince: to associate with the Almighty in prayer
  inside the cave
  without returning home [to Tegalreja].
  Such was his goal.
  He was sitting on a séla gilang [a stone which radiated light] called 
  Ambarmaya.175
174 Dipanagara’s withdrawal to the cave of Suralanang on the south coast in early 1825, is men-
tioned in Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van 
den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 5-5-1831 no. 47, who reported Smissaert’s attempt to get him to come 
from there to a meeting in Yogya ‘some months before the outbreak of the Java War [in July 1825].’ 
The location of this cave is unclear to me.
175 Both séla gilang and Ambarmaya are names for a special stone for performing asceticism 
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 9 These were his pleasures.
  The interior of the cave he regarded as his residence;
  [there was] a bathing pool in a trough
  [and] next to it a pond [formed by] water oozing [from the rock]
  designed like a well.176
  There was a fenced widara tree.177
  Now the audience place
  had a great doorway and steps made of gebang palm trunks.178
  The prince’s eyes were half-closed as though asleep,
  then there was
 10 a man who appeared before him
  accompanied by a wind.
  He stood in front of him
  [and] his clothes
  were like those of a haji [returned Mecca pilgrim].
  The prince was amazed
  and spoke softly:
  ‘I do not know you,
  where are you from?’ The one asked made a gesture of respect 
  [and] said:
  ‘I have no home.
(tapa) which literally ‘radiated light’. The name Séla Gilang also recalls the holy black stone asso-
ciated with the first ruler of the Mataram dynasty (Chapter IV), but the name seems to have been 
used quite loosely by Dipanagara to refer to any stone on which he meditated or performed tapa. 
Thus the stone at his own retreat at Sélareja in the grounds of his Tegalreja estate is referred to by 
the same name, Chapter II note 60. Dipanagara would certainly have been aware of the connec-
tions with Sénapati. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909:437.
176  The meaning of lines d-e in this verse are not very clear. The bathing place in a trough to 
perform ablutions before the five daily prayers is no longer visible at Selarong, but there was 
still a spring on the hillside above the cave of Secang which was used by the local inhabitants 
when the present author visited on 12-12-1971. There was also a waterfall close to the cave with 
a shallow pool at its base. The ‘oozing’ pond may refer to a shallow pool formed by water oozing 
from the adjacent rock which is described by Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:436. They also 
mention a small depression in the rock floor of the second ‘cave’, which formed a shallow (0.35 
metre) deep pond. For a description of Selarong in 1825, see Van den Broek 1873-77, 22:40, who 
mentions ‘water which dropped onto a stone which had the shape of a cup; although it dropped 
continuously the water did not overflow the edges of the cup neither did it go down’; and for 
a rather more fanciful and poetic description dating from the 1860s, which makes Dipanagara’s 
cave complex seem like a veritable underground palace, see Rees 1867, II:63, 66-8. Louw’s reserva-
tions on this, together with his own much more accurate measurements, in part drawn from the 
survey carried out in the early 1890s on his behalf by the controleur of the Yogya Residency, O.E.V. 
Hermens, can be found in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:435-7.
177 A Jujube tree (Zizyphus Jujuba Lam.), a low tree, the fruit of which can be eaten, De Clercq 
1909:347. Dipanagara adds the detail that it was fenced in order to create the impression that it 
was like the waringin kurung (enclosed banyan trees) on the northern alun-alun before the Yogya 
kraton thus giving it a royal aspect, see further Carey 1981a:6-7, 238 note 23, 1984b:54.
178 Corypha Gebanga Bl., a palm tree with fan-shaped leaves which grows everywhere in Java. 
Steps are frequently made out of its sawn trunks in rural Java, De Clercq 1909:210.
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 11 I have come because I have been ordered to summon you, Noble Sir.’ 
  The prince said:
  ‘What is the name of the one who sent you
  and where is his dwelling?’
  The man said calmly:
  ‘Indeed, he has no home;
  all the land of Java
  is regarded as his residence.
  He it is who bears the title of Ratu Adil,
  he is the one who sent me
 12 in truth to call your honourable self.
  At present he stands
  at the top of a mountain,
  which from here
  lies in a southeasterly direction.
  Mount Rasamuni is its name.
  But, my lord,
  you are not permitted to take any retainers.’
  The prince set out immediately, accompanied
  by the man,
 13 as was the wish of God,
  which the prince merely followed.
  In a short time they arrived
  at the foot of the mountain.
  The one who had summoned him disappeared from sight.
  Now we tell
  of the Ratu Adil who
  stood at the mountain top,
  competing in brilliance with the lordly sun
  which for long glowed but palely.179
 14 The prince had not the strength to know
  or to look upon the countenance
  of the Ratu Adil, whose brilliance
  indeed eclipsed the sun.
  Only his clothing was closely observed
  by the prince in its entirety.
  His turban was green
  [and] he wore a white jubah (tabard),
179 For an interesting comparison in the Christian mystical tradition of this perception of the 
sun’s paleness compared to the visionary experience, see Underhill 1961:289-90, St. Teresa of Avi-
la’s (1515-1582) vision of the Hands of Christ, ‘It is not a brightness which dazzles, but a delicate 
whiteness, an infused light giving excessive delight to the eyes […] It is a light so different from 
any light here below that the very brightness of the sun we see, in comparison with the brightness 
and light before our eyes, seems to be something so obscure that no one would ever wish to open 
her eyes again.’
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  white trousers [and] a red shawl.
  He faced to the northwest
 15 standing at the summit of the mountain
  on top of a smooth stone.
  There were no shadows
  and the grass could not be seen.
  It was as clean as if it had been swept.
  The prince from below
  looked upwards
  facing to the southeast.
  Then the Ratu Adil spoke in a friendly way:
  ‘Ah, you Ngabdulkamid,
 16 the reason I have summoned you
  is for you to set my army fighting.
  Let Java be conquered immediately!
  If anyone 
  should ask you 
  for your mandate, it is the Qur’ān.
  Order them to seek it [there]!’
  Ngabdulkamid said:
  ‘I beg leave [for] I am unable to fight
  and I cannot
 17 bear to see death.
  And, moreover, earlier I
  in truth have already carried out
  tasks which were exceedingly [heavy]
  amongst my fellow men.’
  The Ratu Adil said:
  ‘That may not be.
  It is already the wish of the Almighty,
  [for] the fate of Java has been determined by Him;
  he who will perform this role is you
 18 for there is no-one else.’
  Afterwards there was a shattering sound
  as though a dish had been struck by a stone.
  Then he disappeared.
  Thus it was impossible to
  describe this [further].
  So thus were
  the feelings of the prince
  as he stood upon the mountain;
 19 his stance was no different [from that of the Ratu Adil]
  facing to the northwest then did he stand.
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  Great was the prince’s astonishment
  and his chest felt
  as if fireflies were flickering everywhere,
  and he was shaken to the core. Then
  Bocah-Becik
  and Puthutlawa
  screamed, the sea flamed,
  the noise thundered
 20 and roared like Mount Merapi.180
  The prince descended and departed from there
  looking around him immediately.
  But we say no more of this.181
180 There seems to be some confusion here because earlier in his vision he was instructed to 
take no companion with him when he went to meet the Ratu Adil. The description here may in 
fact refer to Dipanagara’s earlier experience during the eruption of Mount Merapi on 29-12-1822 
when he had been awakened by the screams of his servants. Both Bocah-Becik (literally: ‘the good 
lad’) and Puthutlawa were personal retainers (panakawan) of the prince at Tegalreja, BD (Manado), 
II:327, XX.50. The term puthut in Javanese usually refers to the personal retainer of an ascetic or 
the follower/pupil of an adept, Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:332. The name Puthutguritna, in fact, 
occurs in the Pragolamurthi lakon in the wayang repertoire in this context. The name was also 
given to one of Dipanagara’s own panakawan as well as a close supporter, Rongga Puthutguritna, 
during the Java War, BD (Manado), III:125-6, XXV.176-9.
181 BD (Manado), II:311-15, XX (Dhandhanggula) 7-20. mengkana kang winarna/ apan ta panuju/ ing 
taun Edal punika/ sirah-tunggil wulan Ramelan nujoni/ ping salikur tanggalnya. 8. jeng pangéran anèng 
guwa iki/ pan ing Secang arané punika/ saben wulan Ramelané/ mengkana karsanipun/ kangjeng pangran 
ngunjalat iki/ [anèng sajroning guwa/ pan tan kondur-kondur]/ mangkana panuju [ika]/ lenggah anèng 
séla gilang westanèki/ anenggih Ngambarmaya. 9. pan punika kelangènan sami/ jroning guwa minongka 
dalemnya/ bèji [jeroning] kulahé/ jrèjès telaganipun/ kumeranjang sumur upami/ widara kan dhang ika/ pan 
paso[w]anipun/ kori geng gebang tinatar/ kangjeng pangran liyep-liyep kadya guling/ mengkana nulya 
ana. 10. wong sawiji prapta ngarsanèki/ mapan sareng kalawan maruta/ sampun prapta ing ngarsané/ ing-
kang penganggé iku/ kang pinendha lir péndah chaji/ kagyat kangjeng pangéran/ angandika arum/ ingsun 
tambuh marang sira/ wong ing ngendi kang tinanya atur bekti/ kawula tampa wisma. 11. prapta amba 
ingutus nimbali/ mring paduka jeng pangran ngandika/ sapa kang kongkon arané/ lan ngendi omah iku/ 
wong punika aris turnèki/ pan inggih tanpa wisma/ rat Jawi sedarum/ punika minongka wisma/ ingkang 
samya jinulukan ratu adil/ ingkang ngutus kawula. 12. animbali mring paduka yekti/ pan ing mangké 
jumeneng punika/ sapucaké ngardi mangké/ saking ing ngriki iku/ kidul wétan pernah ing ngardi/ Rasa-
muni punika/ nging paduka iku/ tan kalilan bekta réncang/ gya lumampah kangjeng pangéran ing ngir-
ing/ dhateng tiyang punika. 13. kadya sampun karsaning Hyang Widi/ kangjeng pangran anurut kéwala/ 
tanpantara prapta mangko/ sangandhap ardi iku/ kang nimbali musna tan kaèksi/ mengkana kang winarna/ 
ratu adil iku/ jumeneng pucaking ngarga/ rebut sorot lan sang hyang pre[d]onggapati/ dangu surem hyang 
arka. 14. kangjeng pangran tan kuwasa uning/ aningali marang kang wedana/ sang ratu adil cahyané/ 
kasor ing arka tuhu/ nging busana awas ningali/ kangjeng pangran sedaya/ ijem serbanipun/ arasukan juba 
séta/ lan calana séta ngagem sebé abrit/ ngalèr-ngilèn ajengnya. 15. pan jumeneng nèng pucaking ngardi/ 
munggèng séla malinas kéwala/ tan wonten aub-aubé/ myang suket tan kadulu/ resik kadya dipunsaponi/ 
kangjeng pangran ing ngandhap/ pan tumenga iku/ ngidul-ngétan ajengira/ ratu adil nulya angandika aris/ 
Èh Ngabdulkamid sira. 16. marmanira sira sun timbali/ wadyaningsun kabèh sira duwa/ ing Jawa rebuten 
mangko/ lamun ana wong iku/ atetakon marang sirèki/ nuwalanira Kur’an/ kon golèki iku/ Jeng Ngabdulka-
mid aturnya/ amba nuhun sampun tan kuwawa jurit/ lawan tan saged ika. 17. aningali dhumateng pepati/ 
lawan malih rumiyin kawula/ sampun nglampahi yektosé/ pendamel awon lelangkung/ inggih sami-samin-
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Such is the striking description of Dipanagara’s meeting with the Ratu Adil 
as it is related in his babad. It is without doubt the most crucial vision of 
the prince’s life and the one that had the most influence on his subsequent 
actions.182 A question still remains, however, about whether the prince now 
saw himself as the Just King or whether he considered he would merely be 
a temporary agent of destruction preparing the way for a later Ratu Adil 
who would institute an age of justice and plenty. We will return to this issue 
in a moment, but first we must consider the peculiar mixture of Javanese-
Islamic traditions and beliefs which made the vision so remarkable. First, 
there are the specifically ‘Islamic’ elements of the Ratu Adil’s call to arms. 
Thus, Dipanagara was summoned by someone wearing the clothes of a haji 
and the vision itself took place on the evening of the twenty-first of the fast-
ing month, the so-called malem slikur, which together with the evening of 
the twenty-seventh of the same month – malem pitulikur – is particularly cel-
ebrated in Java, probably in remembrance of the lailat al-k adar, the night of 
the heavenly dispensation when the Holy Qur’ān was believed to have begun 
to have been imparted to The Prophet Muhammad by the Archangel Gabriel 
(Juynboll 1930:106-8; Carey 1974a:34-5). We will see shortly how another of 
Dipanagara’s dream-state visions at the end of this period (16 May 1825) – 
that of the eight wali wudhar, prophets who held two offices from God, name-
ly, the administration of temporal justice and the exercise of spiritual duties 
– would similarly occur on a kadar night, the evening of the twenty-seventh. 
Then, when the Ratu Adil himself appeared, there are other details which 
give an Islamic cast to the vision. Thus, the Just King is described as having 
his face turned towards the northwest, the direction which forms the qiblah, 
the position in which Javanese Muslims set their faces when they perform 
the five daily prayers (s alat) to Mecca (Juynboll 1930:59, 67). Interestingly, 
this was not the direction which most mosques in south-central Java were 
ing jalmi/ sang ratu adil nebda/ nora kena iku/ wus dadi karsaning Sukma/ Tanah Jawa pinasthi marang 
Hyang Widi/ kang dhuwé lakon sira. 18. datan ana iya maning-maning/ ri sawusnya kumepruk swaranya/ 
mapan anglir upamané/ panjang binanting batu/ nulya musna kalihanèki/ dadya pan datan kena/ winarna 
puniku/ mangkana mapan anulya/ pangraosnya kangjeng pangéran pribadi/ ingkang jumeneng ngarga. 19. 
datan éwah jumenengirèki/ ngalèr-ngilèn wau ajengira/ jeng pangran langkung getuné/ myang ngraos jaja-
nipun/ kadya konang pating parelik/ mengkana kagyat nulya/ Bocah-B[e]cik iku/ mapan lawan Puthutlawa/ 
alok-alok semudra murub puniki/ lan gumledhug kang swara. 20. lan gumuruh lir ardi Merapi/ kangjeng 
pangran tedhak miyos ika/ tumut aningali mangko/ mapan wus tan cinatur. All corrections in square 
brackets have been made from Rusche 1908-09, I:100-2. Note in particular that lines g-h of verse 8 
are missing in the MS and have been inserted here from the Rusche text. For variant translations, 
see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:130-1; Kumar 1972:101-4.
182 Like many of his other visions, the Ratu Adil appeared to Dipanagara when he was in a 
sub-liminal or semi-conscious state between waking and sleeping/dreaming. For a discussion of 
the various forms of vision often experienced by mystics – intellectual, imaginary, corporeal – and 
the types of communication or voices involved – namely 1. an immediate or inarticulate voice; 
2. a distinct interior voice; 3. a communication through an hallucination or dream, see Underhill 
1961:273, 281-93. 
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aligned in the early nineteenth century. The Mesjid Ageng (Great Mosque) 
in Yogya, for example, faced due west and it was only in the early twentieth 
century that the qiblah was changed to the correct position under the influ-
ence of the Modernist Muslim Muhammadiyah (the Way of Muhammad) or-
ganisation.183 One can only surmise that Dipanagara’s vision of the Ratu Adil 
facing in the right direction may have reflected his stricter approach to the 
practise of Islam which set him apart from his more traditionalist kraton con-
temporaries. Finally, the order given by the Ratu Adil is described as having 
been authorised by the Qur’ān, thus underscoring Dipanagara’s mission as a 
Javanese Muslim to raise up the high state of the Islamic religion in Java and 
to carry out the duties of a ratu paneteg panatagama, a ruler who would stand 
firm as the regulator of religion (Carey 1981a:241 note 30). Indeed, during the 
Java War, he would frequently stress his Qur’ānic mandate, citing it as the 
reason for his summons to Kyai Maja to join him at Selarong at the start of 
the war when the prince felt the need for the advice of a religious scholar well 
versed in the Qur’ān, and referring to it again in September 1827 as the basis 
for his negotiations with Commissioner-General L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies at 
Salatiga which Kyai Maja undertook on the prince’s behalf.184
Besides these Islamic aspects, there are others, not necessarily in conflict 
with the first, which have more to do with traditional Javanese beliefs and 
historical ideas. Thus the clothes worn by the Ratu Adil seem to identify him 
with Sultan Ngrum, the mythical ruler of Turkey who, as we have seen, or-
ganised the peopling and civilising of Java (pp. 159, 483), and from whose 
183 Noer 1973:74. The right qiblah had in fact been indicated in chalk on the floor of the Mesjid 
Ageng by the founder of Muhammadiyah, Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923), who hailed 
from the kauman (firm religious community) of Yogya, much to the consternation of the more 
traditional members of the kauman.
184 BD (Manado) II:392-3, XXII (Asmaradana) 72-7. rumiyin kawula èstu/ mapan kinèn ngangkat 
Kur’an. 73. tan kénging lamun ngéwahi/ dhateng paréntahing Kur’an/ nging kawula saèstuné/ dèrèng 
sumerep sedaya/ Kur’an paréntahira/ marma tyas kula kelangkung/ ajrih bilih kalepatan. 74. Kangjeng 
Pangran Mangkubumi/ mapan aris angandika/ kulup tan ngapaa kuwé/ mapan akèh pra ngulama/ kang 
sumurup jawanya/ ing Kur’an paréntah iku/ wong nanging derma kéwala. 75. kulup marang ing sirèki/ endi 
kang sira kersakna/ wong ngalim Ngayogya akèh/ mèsem ri sang kang misésa/ aris dènnya ngandika/ kiyai 
leres puniku/ nging kula kirang precaya. 75. kyai sampéyan réncangi/ nenuwun dhateng Hyang Sukma/ 
rumiyin kawula anon/ tiyang kakalih punika/ amulang wonten Maja/ ing Kwaron satunggilipun/ punika 
kula precaya. 77. déné sawangipun kalih/ pan samya pekir lakunya/ kados ajrih mring Hyang Manon/ 
kalamun angéwahana/ mring Kur’an paréntahnya / Kwaron tiyangipun sepuh/ ing Maja anèm punika 
(where Dipanagara explains why he summoned Kyai Maja and the much older Kyai Kuwaron to 
Selarong because he trusted their understanding of the Qur’ān); III:297-9, XXIX (Dhandhanggula) 
92-3. Sri Naléndra aris angandika/ sampun kyai kajengé/ lamun dalil saèstu/ ingkang nyegah paréntah-
nèki/ saèstuné punika/ Kur’an kang kula nut/ Ki Maja mapan mengkana/ langkung bungah ing ngilonan 
kajengnèki/ ngraos yèn angsal karya. 93. kangjeng sultan ngandika malih/ hèh Ki Maja paran prayoga/ 
ing dalil Kur’an surupé/ mapan sun iki tuhu/ ingkang dadya èsthining galih/ nanging derma kéwala/ 
anglakoni ingsun/ sabarang paréntahira/ lamun Kur’an ingsun tan nedya gingsiri (where Dipanagara 
stresses to Kyai Maja that he is most concerned to follow the injunctions of the Qur’ān at the time 
of the negotiations with Du Bus). See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:267-8.
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territories the Javanese Just King was thought to originate. On another level, 
the Ratu Adil’s supernatural appearance standing on a mountain top strongly 
suggests the manifestation of an old animistic Javanese mountain god, such 
as Sunan Lawu or the guardian spirit of Mount Merapi, Kyai Sapu Jagad (‘Sir 
Sweeper of the World’).185 Furthermore, the hill of Rasamuni has interesting 
links with Sultan Agung (reigned 1613-1646), the great Mataram ruler of the 
seventeenth century whose spiritual and temporal achievements Dipanagara 
so much admired and whose actions he may have sought to emulate (Chapter 
IV).186 Rasamuni also lies close to the artificial lake formed by a dam across 
the River Opak constructed on Agung’s orders which later gave its name to 
the kraton of Plérèd, first used by Sunan Amangkurat I (reigned 1646-1677) 
and taken over by Dipanagara as a stronghold in 1826 during the early stages 
of the Java War (Gandhajoewana 1940:214-5; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
II:279-99). The site of the mountain on the western abutments of Gunung 
Kidul to the east of the Opak, may also have had some significance in the 
Jayabaya prophecies for in some later recensions a descendant of Sultan 
Èrucakra from Rum (Turkey) is described as returning to Java to set up his 
residence ‘to the east of the Opak River’ in order to rule over a prosperous 
kingdom.187 According to a Dutch official, the inspector of birds’ nests at 
Rongkob in southern Gunung Kidul, who was captured by Dipanagara’s forc-
es early in the war, the prince himself had the intention of becoming ‘sultan 
of the south coast of Java’, indicating that he might have been aware of this 
particular prophecy.188 As we will see shortly, he would reiterate this demand 
for a south coast kraton at the end of the war.
The theme of Arjuna, which has been discussed earlier in connection with 
Dipanagara’s first visions in circa 1805 (Chapter IV) and his marriage to Radèn 
Ayu Maduretna in September 1814 (pp. 401-5), can perhaps be discerned again 
here too. The way in which the prince is summoned from his cave retreat at 
Secang recalls Arjuna’s encounter with the Hindu god Indra, dressed in the 
185 I am grateful to Dr Th.G.Th. Pigeaud for this insight. It is perhaps significant here that some 
of the palaces of the early Islamic rulers of Java were situated on hills and holy mountains such 
as Giri and Tembayat, De Graaf and Pigeaud 1974:142, 260 note 76.
186 Gandhajoewana 1940:215-7. According to popular belief, Agung used the hill as a place 
of meditation and prayer. Certain rocks on the hillside are connected with him and his magi-
cal horse, jaran Sembrani, which was supposed to have carried Agung to Mecca for his Friday 
prayers. There is also a tradition about a meeting between Agung and Ratu Kidul at the same 
place. A lonely grave on the hillside is supposed to be that of Agung’s son by the south sea god-
dess. On the jaran Sembrani (also sometimes referred to as Janggi Gandan), which clearly has 
a resonance with The Prophet Muhammad’s winged horse al-Burak which took Him up into 
heaven, see further Mulyadi 1983:35. 
187 Reksapustaka (Mangkunagaran) Serat Centhini:1814, IV, II (Girisa) 13. ing kono Sang Jayèng-
rana/ wira ing Rum kaya nata/ trah Sultan Èrucakra/ mungguh dènnira akukutha/ ana tanah sawétanya/ 
ing Kali Opak sanyata.
188 Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826).
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clothes of a wandering mendicant in the Arjuna Wiwāha. At the same time, 
Dipanagara’s initial refusal to lead the Ratu Adil’s army in battle because he 
could not bear to see death mirrors Arjuna’s own unwillingness to consent 
to Kresna before his fight with his kinsman Karna in the Bratayuda, the great 
‘brothers’ war’ in the Mahabhārata (Chapter III; Carey 1974a:13; pp. 123-4).
There remains the question of just how Dipanagara saw himself as fulfill-
ing the role ordained for him by the Ratu Adil. This can best be answered after 
a consideration of the remaining dreams and visions which occurred before 
the outbreak of the Java War. Thus, after the prince returned to Tegalreja from 
his fasting month retreat at Selarong, he described how his stepmother, Ratu 
Ageng, had the same dream three times. In it, she heard a voice telling her:
XX.24 ‘Ratu Ageng, Ratu Kencana
  must marry a wali wudhar
  whose residence is to the northwest.
  If this does not take place,
  it is certain that Java will be devastated
  and I will take your life.’189
According to Dipanagara’s babad, Ratu Ageng was as exceedingly afraid as 
she might have been if her own life was under threat (she would in fact live 
for just two more years). She summoned Pangéran Mangkubumi to discuss 
the matter with him and both seemed to have assumed – although this is not 
stated directly in the babad – that the residence to the northwest of the kra-
ton must refer to Dipanagara’s estate at Tegalreja, which was indeed situated 
in that direction.190 Mangkubumi agreed to help in persuading his nephew 
to comply in marrying Ratu Kencana and he dispatched his senior wife, 
Radèn Ayu Sepuh, a daughter of Radèn Rongga’s companion in arms, Mas 
Tumenggung Sumanegara,191 to broach the subject. She apparently had a rath-
er good relationship with Dipanagara and, as we have seen (Chapter III note 
76), was one of the few in the Yogya court who dared to make jokes with him. 
Interestingly, rumours of this proposed marriage between Dipanagara and 
Ratu Kencana seems to have reached the ears of European residents in Yogya 
for both Smissaert and Payen mention it in their writings in August 1825.192 
Nothing came of Radèn Ayu Sepuh’s mission, however. Dipanagara ridiculed 
189 BD (Manado), II:317, XX (Dhandhanggula) 24. Ratu Ageng Ratu Kencanèki/ temokena lawan 
wali ika/ w[u]dhar* lor kulon wismané/ yèn tan kelakon iku/ pasthi rusak ing Tanah Jawi/ sun pundhut 
nyawanira. * MS. has wedhar, I have followed Rusche 1908-09, I:103.
190 The direction of Dipanagara’s residence was also that of the qiblah to Mecca.
191 The former bupati of Padhangan who had been killed with Rongga in revolt on 17-12-1810, 
Chapter VI. She had married Mangkubumi on 30-3-1804, dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Over-
gave’, 4-4-1808.
192 Payen 1988:62, 115-6 note 138 (where Payen notes that ‘one suspects that Dipanagara has 
designs on her’); Dj.Br. 54, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 9-8-1825. See 
further Van der Kemp 1896a:346-9. 
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her attempts to make him consider taking another wife, telling her bluntly 
that in his view there was no woman in Java equal to the daughter of Radèn 
Rongga whom he had married in September 1814.193 Indeed, the fact that Ratu 
Kencana was already in the advanced stages of a severe psychological illness 
at this time, which would later provoke her into a frenzied attack on one of 
her late husband’s unofficial wives (Hageman 1856:40; Van den Broek 1873-77, 
20:480; Carey 1992:504 note 509) and bring her to an early grave (1827), could 
hardly have encouraged Dipanagara to consider her as a potential partner.
Sometime after this, Dipanagara described in his babad how he went him-
self to the kraton to visit Ratu Mas, the childless consort of his late father and 
daughter of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja I, who was then suffering from a mi-
nor illness, and how Ratu Ageng and Mangkubumi had decided to divulge 
the nature of his stepmother’s dreams to the prince. When he heard about 
them, Dipanagara said that in his view they were only a ‘trial’ (kados jajal), but 
that if they really proved to be a warning, then the next time Ratu Ageng had 
a similar dream she should tell the voice to address itself to him. Nevertheless, 
in his heart the prince was troubled and he asked his uncle about the meaning 
of a wali wudhar. Mangkubumi replied that, in his view, it meant an apostle of 
Islam who had failed in his task as a wali.194 On hearing this, Dipanagara de-
scribed in his autobiography, how he felt increasingly perturbed, sensing that 
he had been shamed before God. He returned home to Tegalreja, but his feel-
ings of shame were so overwhelming that he did not even call at his residence 
but went straight to his retreat at Sélareja where he remained in isolation for 
the best part of three days. His friend, Kyai Rahmanudin, the former Yogya 
pengulu, who was then staying at Tegalreja prior to his planned pilgrimage 
to Mecca, noticed that the prince had not come to the verandah (surambi) of 
his nearly completed Tegalreja mosque (p. 86) to recite the Qur’ān with him 
as usual and understood that he was troubled at heart. He, therefore, sought 
him out and found him sitting before his small brick pavilion at Sélareja on the 
séla gilang stone on which he performed meditation and ascetiscism (tapa).195 
The former pengulu then asked Dipanagara about the cause of his sorrow and 
when the prince told him about his uncle, Mangkubumi’s, explanation for Ratu 
Ageng’s recurrent dream, he replied that the meaning of wali wudhar was quite 
otherwise. According to the erstwhile pengulu, it meant a wali who had two of-
fices in that the Almighty had given him power to administer temporal justice 
as well as exercising his spiritual duties.196 It is clear that what Rahmanudin 
193 BD (Manado), II:319-21, XX.29-33.
194 BD (Manado), II:322-3, XX.38. It is possible that Mangkubumi stated this negative view on 
purpose to deflect his nephew’s intentions to rebel.
195 BD (Manado), II:323-4, XX.39-41. On this episode, see further Van der Kemp 1896a:418. On 
the Javanese surambi, see De Graaf 1958:113-6.
196 BD (Manado), II:324, XX (Dhandhanggula) 42-3. pan tegesé wali w[u]dhar punika yekti/ inggih 
wali angiras. 43. cinepengan adil mring Hyang Widi. MS. wedhar, I have followed Rusche 1908-09, 
I:106.
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understood by the term wali wudhar here were prophets (nabi) rather than wali 
in the usual sense of ‘friends of God’ or saints such as is found in the Sufi 
teachings which orthodox Islam came only grudgingly to accept.197 Thus he 
went on to say that amongst the 124,000 prophets, there were only six in his 
view who merited the title of wali wudhar, namely, Adam, Noah, Abraham, 
Moses, Jesus and Muhammad, the final one being the last of the great proph-
ets (nabi pungkasan).198 To these six prophets, Rahmanudin added two from 
Java – Sunan Giri and Sultan Agung – stating that these had also held the dou-
ble office characteristic of a wali wudhar as well as being beloved of God. The 
former pengulu then suggested that Dipanagara might be the ninth but that 
‘God alone knows what the end shall be’.199 Whereupon the prince remem-
bered his recent meeting with the Ratu Adil and thought to himself:
XX.45  ‘So it is not possible
  that I can escape it.’
  But he did not speak this out,
  [but] kept it hidden and smiling said calmly:
  ‘Thanks be to God!
 46  What do men in this life wait for
  if, grandfather, they are not awaiting
  some exceptionally important task?’
  The Kyai Pengulu said:
  ‘Indeed, lord, if they are strong enough [for it]
  then even more excellent
  is the true grace [they receive].’
  The prince said:
  ‘Grandfather, let us render up thanks to God,
  may it prove successful.’200
Thus Dipanagara appears to have accepted Rahmanudin’s explanation and to 
have connected it with the mandate given to him earlier by the Ratu Adil in 
197 I am grateful to Professor Merle Ricklefs for this point. See further Hitti 1974:438-9.
198 Interestingly, Dipanagara would later refer to this line of prophets in his conversations with 
Lieutenant Knoerle on his voyage into exile in Manado, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 14-5, ‘the prince spoke 
to me about Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Isa [Jesus] and ended with Muhammad. I am very 
surprised by the correct opinions of Dipanagara’.
199 BD (Manado) II:325, XX (Dhandhanggula) 44. déné paduka pribadi/ inggih Walahu Alam. I am 
grateful to Professor Merle Ricklefs for pointing out this unique tradition of the wali wudhar. 
Although the number of wali wudhar, if Dipanagara is included, turn out to be nine, the sym-
metrical connection with the nine apostles of Islam (wali sanga) in Java is probably fortuitous. 
200 BD (Manado), II:325-6, XX (Dhandhanggula) 45-6. dadi wus ora kena/ gumingsira ingsun/ 
nanging datan angandika/ pan sinamur mèsem angandika aris/ kaki alkamdulillah. 46. pan wong urip 
punapa dènanti/ lamun kaki datan angantiya/ pakarya kang luwih abot/ Kyai Pangulu matur/ inggih gusti 
lamun kuwawi/ pan langkung utaminya/ nugrahan satuhu/ kangjeng pangéran ngandika/ dawek kaki 
padha sokur mring Hyang Widi/ muga dènlestarèkna. 
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which he had been ordered to combine secular and spiritual responsibilities 
in ruling over Java. Indeed, this idea of Dipanagara being chosen as the ninth 
wali wudhar would become much clearer just under a year later when, as we 
shall see shortly, he had his final pre-war vision at Sélareja and eight wali wud-
har appeared to him in a dream. It also puts in perspective Dipanagara’s strong 
personal admiration for Sultan Agung whom he almost certainly regarded as 
his immediate spiritual predecessor in Java. The former pengulu’s explanation 
thus holds the key to the whole series of visions and dreams which occurred 
to the prince on the eve of the Java War and which appear to constitute a 
unique Javanese historical tradition. It also provides a telling illustration of the 
particular Javanese-Islamic outlook which Rahmanudin and Dipanagara both 
shared, but which in this instance amounted to a major Islamic heresy.201
After his conversation with his friend, Dipanagara describes how his con-
fidence was restored and how he was able to pray again with an undivided 
mind, coming out early every morning to the surambi to recite the Qur’ān with 
the former pengulu.202 The following year, between 18 April and 18 May 1825 
during the fasting month, Dipanagara related how he again went to the cave 
of Secang to meditate and pray.203 In order to solace his troubled heart, he 
wandered through the garden by the cave and sat down beneath the spread-
ing shade of a banyan tree. It was just after the midday prayer and the garden 
where he sat was called ‘Modang’.204 Then Dipanagara described how he 
heard a remote but clear voice speaking to him:
XX. 48  ‘Ah, you, Ngabdulkamid,
 49  you have been given the title
  by the Almighty
  of Sultan Ngabdulkamid
  Èrucakra Sayidin
  Panatagama of Java
  Kalifat Rasulullah.
  Blessings be upon you!’
  Following which the voice vanished.205
201 Thus, although the Qur’ān allows that some prophets are more important than others 
(Arberry 1955, I:308, XVII.57 ‘and we have preferred some Prophets over others’), the idea that 
there were any major prophets after Muhammad is not permitted. Thus one of the most funda-
mental tenets of Islam had apparently escaped Rahmanudin despite his position as a legal scholar 
and former head of the Islamic religious hierarchy in Yogya.
202 BD (Manado), II:326, XX.47.
203 BD (Manado), II:326, XX.48, The Garebeg Puwasa in that year fell on 18-5-1825, see AvJ, A.H. 
Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 18-5-1825. 
204 On the possible meaning of this term, which Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:495 describe as a 
‘white or evenly coloured rectangle or square in the middle of a headscarf’, see Carey 1981a:238-9 
note 24.
205 BD (Manado), II:326-7, XX (Dhandhanggula) 48-9. hèh Ngabulkami[d] sira. 49. aranira mengko 
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Afterwards, the prince returned to Secang where, after the clamorous prayers 
(trawèh)206 which traditionally followed the evening religious observance dur-
ing the fasting month, he emerged to sit on his séla gilang meditation stone 
flanked on both sides by his intimate retainers, Puthutlawa and Puthutgurit. 
Other personal retainers were in the kitchen in the Secang cave complex pre-
paring the evening meal.207 It was the night of the 27 Ramelan AJ 1752 – 
malem pitulikur – in the Javanese year Bé (AD 16 May 1825). Dipanagara ate 
his evening meal and then slept on top of the meditation stone, his two retain-
ers keeping watch, although soon they too fell asleep. A dream then came to 
the prince:
XX. 51 Now the prince
  dreamt in his sleep in the cave [of Secang]
  as though he were [back] at Sélareja.
 52  He was sitting on the séla gilang there
  in the Pulo Waringin [banyan tree island].208 
  Then suddenly
  eight men arrived,
  the ends of their head-dress all hung down.
  The one in front bore a letter
  which he carried in both hands.
  The prince stared [at them]
  [and] came forward intending to greet them,
  looking fearful of the eight, whose radiance
  was like the full moon.
 53 The prince stood before them in respectful greeting
  [but] the arrivals paid no heed to [him]
  and went straight to the pond.
  The prince followed them.
  Then all [eight] stood at the edge,
  Five to the east
dènparingi/ iya marang Rabilngalimina/ Jeng Sultan Ngabdulchamidé/ Èrucakra Sayidu/ pan Panatagama 
ing Jawi/ Kalipah Rasulolah/ samta sira iku/ risampun ical kang swara. On the types of voices heard by 
mystics, see note 182 above.
206 The trawèh usually involves repeating the phrase Muhammad Rasulullah (‘Mohammad, the 
Messenger of Allah’) twelve times. Sometimes other dhikr are used, see Gericke and Roorda 1901, 
I:630-1.
207 BD (Manado), II:327, XX.50. On Dipanagara’s kitchen (pawon) in the Secang cave complex 
whose location could still be identified by the smoke marks on the cave wall when the former 
military officer turned writer, W.A. van Rees (1820-1898), visited for his research on his book on 
Toontje Poland (Colonel Theodorus Poland, 1795-1857), Van Rees 1867, II:66-8, cited in Louw and 
De Klerck 1894-1909, I:436.
208 Pulo Waringin refers to the banyan tree island at Sélareja which Dipanagara had created as 
part of his personal retreat space at Tegalreja, see pp. 86-7.
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  and three to the south.
  The prince joined those
  to the south, making four
  who all faced north.
 54 Those to the east faced westwards.
  The one who bore the letter was in front,
  the others flanking him on both sides.
  Then the letter was read out
  [and] its meaning was the same
  as the voice at [the garden of] Modang.
  It read: ‘His Highness
  Sultan
  Ngabdulkamid Èrucakra Sayidin
  Panatagama
 55 Kalifat Rasulullah
  of the land of Java.’
  Then together [the others] responded:
  ‘‘alaihi ‘s-salām [peace be upon him]!’
  The one who had read [the letter] corrected them sharply with a 
  calm speech:
  ‘That is the wrong response!’
  Those he had reprimanded said:
  ‘How so, Panembahan?’
  The reply of the reprimanding one was delivered quietly:
  ‘This is a matter which exists:
 56 young friends, the response ‘alaihi ‘s-salām
  is for what shall be. But for what already exists
  only the takbīr209 is the response.’
  Then all
  eight recited the takbīr together,
  and the ninth was the prince
  who joined in [the recital of] the takbīr.
  After this, the letter
  was dropped into the pond, sank into the water
  and was seen no more.
 57 The eight men [then] vanished from view.
  From where they had been standing
  [they had evaporated] like smoke
  The prince
  was left standing alone.210
209 The takbīr is the glorification of God by the recital of the phrase Allahu Akbar (‘Allah is 
Great!’), see Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:644.
210 BD (Manado), II:328-9, XX (Dhandhanggula) 51-7. mengkana kangjeng pangéran/ jroning 
néndra supena tan nèng guwèki/ kadya nèng Sélar[e]ja. 52. lenggah anèng séla gilang iki/ Pulo Wringin 
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This dream of the eight wali wudhar completed the series of visions received by 
Dipanagara before the outbreak of the Java War. It brought to a close a period 
of testing and preparation which had begun when Dipanagara as a young 
man had engaged in an extensive withdrawal from the world and ascetiscism 
(tirakat) to achieve spiritual power and insight. He had continued this process 
of tirakat throughout his adult years by his strictly ordered life of prayer and 
meditation at Tegalreja and Selarong (Carey 1981a:236-7 note 14; Chapters II-
IV). In simple terms, Dipanagara had been tested and found to be a suitable 
vehicle for divine grace. As the Ratu Adil had told him, his fate had been fixed 
by the Almighty for there was no one else capable of undertaking the task 
which the Just King had in mind. Although the prince would have preferred to 
be exempted from the early stages of the establishment of the Ratu Adil’s reign 
since these necessarily involved a period of purging warfare and bloodshed, 
he nevertheless resigned himself to them for they fitted in with his philoso-
phy of life as expressed by him to Kyai Rahmanudin that men must undergo 
great trials to achieve God’s grace and that life itself is a constant prepara-
tion for cosmic responsibility.211 In many respects, as the Javanese historian 
Soemarsaid Moertono would have recognised, Dipanagara’s attitude reflected 
a quintessentially Javanese acceptance that everything in eternity has been 
fixed by the Almighty.212 It was in this context that he accepted the former 
mengkana nulya na/ jalma wolu prapta mangké/ dhestar koncèr sedarum/ kang nèng ngarsa bekta nuwali/ 
sinongga kalih asta/ jeng pangran andulu/ tedhak mapan nedya kurmat/ èsmu ajrih kawolu kang cahya 
sami/ lir wulan kang purnama. 53. kangjeng pangran jumeneng ngurmati/ ingkang prapta tan perduli 
ika/ lajeng jujug blumbang baé/ jeng pangran nulya tumut/ pan sedaya ngadeg nèng tepi/ ingkang gangsal 
nèng wétan/ tiga kang nèng kidul/ jeng pang[é]ran tumut ika/ kang nèng kidul dadya sakawan puniki/ 
majeng ngalèr sedaya. 54. kang nèng wétan ngilèn ajengnèki/ ingkang bekta nawala nèng ngarsa/ kalih 
sisih pengapité/ nulya winaos iku/ kang nuwala ungelnya sami/ lawan swaraning Modang/ mungel kang 
Sinuhun/ pan kangjeng sultan punika/ Ngabdulkamid Èrucakra kang Sayidin/ Panata ing agama. 55. 
Kalipat Rasulolah sami/ ingkang anèng iya Tanah Jawa/ samya mengkana jawabé/ ngalaihisalamu/ ing-
kang maos nyendhu sebda ris/ iku luput jawabnya/ kang sinendhu matur/ kadospundi Panembahan/ jawa-
bipun kang nyendhu ngandika ris/ iki prakara dadya. 56. jebeng jawab ngalaihisalami/ mapan bakal déné 
kang wus dadya/ pan nanging tekbir jawabé/ lajeng samya puniku/ maos tekbir kawolu iki/ songa kangjeng 
pangéran/ tumut tekbir iku/ kang surat mapan anulya/ cinemplungaken balumbang amblas ing warih/ 
pan wus datan katingal. 57. jalma wolu musna tan kaèksi/ saking gènnya jumeneng punika/ anglir kukus 
upaminé/ kangjeng pangéran iku/ katon gon jejer pribadi. Note: all corrections in square brackets have 
been made from Rusche 1908-09:108-9 to ensure the text complies with the metre. Variant English 
translations can be found in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:136-7; Kumar 1972:112-3. 
211 These trials are specifically referred to by Dipanagara in his conversation with his wife, Radèn 
Ayu Maduretna, during a period when he was contemplating suicide following his appointment 
as guardian to the child sultan Hamengkubuwana V in December 1822: BD (Manado), II:302-3, 
XIX (Sinom) 82-3. tegesé ingkang panrima/ [th]ukulé* sakèhing wiji/ lamun ora mengkanoa/ tanpa paédah 
wong ngaurip/ wong anèng ing donyaki/ mas mirah kang utamèku/ kang gedhé cobanira/ nging lawan 
nugraha jati/ yèn kuwawa jéku kakasih Hyang Sukma. 83. kelamun ora kuwawa/ kang wiji bosok upami/ 
pan datan tuwuh sadaya/ dadi tuna wong ngaurip/ angur duk kala bayi/ matiya wus datan kétung. MS. 
cukulé, I have followed Rusche 1908-09, I:96.
212 Soemarsaid Moertono 1976:16, referring to the Javanese phrases wis pesthiné (it has been 
predestined’), wis dadi pepesthèn (it is already an inevitability’), wis dadi karsané Gusti Ingkang Maha 
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pengulu’s explanation of the term wali wudhar. Following this explanation, the 
dream of the eight wali wudhar came as final confirmation of the favour which 
Dipanagara had found as God’s tool on earth.
As was the case with Dipanagara’s vision of the Ratu Adil a year earlier, 
the setting in which this final dream occurred is of considerable importance 
for an understanding of the prince’s aspirations. Thus the description of 
Dipanagara falling asleep on his séla gilang in the cave of Secang, strongly 
recalls the historical traditions concerning Sénapati, the first ruler of Mataram 
(reigned circa 1574-1601), which is related in the Babad Tanah Jawi (‘Chronicle 
of the Land of Java’), when in similar circumstances a falling star descended 
over Sénapati’s head prophesying that he would become king of Java (Olthof 
1941, I:75-6, II:78-9; Ricklefs 1974a:398). Indeed, the history of Sénapati was 
familiar to Dipanagara for he described it at length in the opening section of 
his babad and in his Makassar notebooks.213 He was thus certainly aware of 
the relevance of Sénapati’s history for his own situation. Secondly, the direc-
tions in which the wali wudhar face in Dipanagara’s dream are important for 
like the earlier vision of the Ratu Adil, the northern and westerly directions 
once again make up the qiblah of Java to Mecca. Even the turbans worn by the 
eight men seemed to be associated both with the famous apostles of Islam in 
Java such as Sunan Kalijaga (Chapter IV note 17) and with great Javanese-
Islamic rulers such as Sultan Agung.214 Particularly interesting too is the ges-
ture of casting the letter into the pond for in a different way this also had the 
significance of confirming Dipanagara’s new position by contact between the 
living water and the eternal underworld.215 In his handbook of Sjāfi‘i Islamic 
law as practised in Indonesia, Th.W. Juynboll mentions a particular belief in 
the efficacy of water to ward off evil during the second month of the Muslim 
calendar, Sapar.216 On the last Wednesday of that month (rebo wekasan), he 
describes how (Juynboll 1930:115): 
Kuwasa (‘it is already the wish of the Almighty’) as reflecting the Javanese mystic’s quest to under-
stand God’s wishes on earth, such understanding bringing him peace in this life.
213 BD (Manado), I:233-346, VII.1-VIII.138; Makassar MS. Book I:168.
214 De Graaf 1958:138. Interestingly, one of the pieces of evidence used by the Dutch against 
Dipanagara’s major kraton protagonist, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara (post-1830, Pangéran 
Adipati Prabuningrat), when he was exiled to Banda in August 1832, was that according to an 
informant he had had a dream in which four men dressed as haji with turbans on their heads 
had appeared and bowed to him, announcing that he would later become a ruler of Java, see AN, 
Exhibitum 20-9-1832 no. 1, F.G. Valck, interview with Tumenggung Tirtawiguna, Yogyakarta, 6-
8-1832. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:247-52; Houben 1992:241-2.
215 I am grateful to Dr Th.G.Th. Pigeaud for pointing this out. In many countries in the world, 
the pre-Christian belief of casting coins into ponds or wells in order to establish an undertaking 
such as marriage, or to pledge a future wish, is still maintained. In Java, water has a special sig-
nificance because it is the realm of Ratu Kidul.
216 Sapar is thought to be a badly aspected month because it was then that the sickness which 
would ultimately kill The Prophet Muhammad in the third month (Rabingulawal/Mulud) began 
to manifest, Juynboll 1930:114.
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Plate 62. Plate of Dipanagara’s seal, see page 622
One tries to strengthen onself against malevolent forces by drinking water, or by 
bathing in the sea, a river or a well. Particular blessings are thought to accrue from 
water which has been brought into contact with the seven verses in the Qur’ān in 
which Allah has pronounced the words ‘salvation’ or ‘peace’ on particular indi-
viduals. One gets these verses written on a piece of paper by an expert, which is 
[then] thrown into water, this water [subsequently] being drunk or bathed in. In 
Java, it is usual that this blessed water (banyu jimat) is held in readiness on this day 
in the mosques for the many who ask for it.
Finally, the titles which Dipanagara received and which were read out by 
the leading wali wudhar – presumably The Prophet Muhammad himself – 
prefigure those which he would later assume on the 1 Sura AJ 1753 (AD 15 
August 1825) after the outbreak of the Java War when he was at Selarong 
(Carey 1981a:261 note 108, 287 note 218). Roughly translated they can be 
taken to mean ‘Sultan Ngabdulkamid, the Just King (Èrucakra), Lord of the 
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Faith (Sayidin), Regulator of Religion (Panatagama), Caliph of The Prophet 
of Allah (Kalifat Rasulullah)’. On other occasions the prince appears to have 
interchanged these titles with others such as ‘The First among the Believers 
(Kabirulmukminin)’, ‘Hamengkubuwana’ – the title of the Yogya sultans – and 
‘Commander in the Holy War in Java (Sénapati Ingalaga Sabilullah ing Tanah 
Jawi)’.217 Both these last employ phrases which are used in the official title 
of the Yogyakarta rulers, such as Sayidin Panatagama Kalifatulah. They even 
include the sultan’s own name by the use of the words Hamengkubuwana 
Sénapati Ingalaga.218 The assumption of these royal epithets should be un-
derstood against the backdrop of Dipanagara’s attempt to create a new kraton 
and an alternative administration (Carey 1981a:241 note 29), both important 
facets of any major Javanese rebellion as we have seen in the case of Radèn 
Rongga in Madiun (Chapter VI). Thus, the prince later gave out various royal 
titles to members of his family, and he also used many of the administrative 
ranks which had earlier been bestowed in the sultanate.219 Indeed, in many 
cases the incumbents of these posts hailed from families who had served 
the Yogya sultans in a similar capacity.220 Like most of the Yogya nobility, 
Dipanagara was deeply concerned about procuring titles and good marriages 
for his children and relations.221 It was said that after the Java War he was 
217 Cohen Stuart 1872:286; Ricklefs 1974b:244-5. Dipanagara’s full title is also given in Makassar 
MS, Book I:171.
218 Ricklefs 1974b:245 note 1. The full title of the Yogya sultans is Sultan Hamengkubuwana 
Sénapati Ingalaga Ngabdurahman Sayidin Panatagama Kalifatulah. It should be noted that there 
is a substantial difference between the term Kalifatulah (‘Caliph of Allah’) and Kalifat Rasulullah 
(‘Caliph of The Prophet of Allah’) which Dipanagara normally used after 15-8-1825. The former 
epithet, used by the Yogya rulers, is a rather extravagant title adopted earlier by the ‘Abbasīd 
dynasty in decline (Hitti 1974:317), which suggested that the ruler was the caliph (successor) of 
Allah, thus naturally smacking of heretical closeness to the Divine. Kalifat Rasulullah (‘Successor 
of Allah’s Messenger’) is regarded as being more doctrinally correct.
219 dK 221, ‘Bekendmaking van titels aan verschillende vrouwen verleende’, n.y. (? 2-11-1825 
– 10-12-1825), which contains an original note (? by the Resident of Kendhal, O.C. Holmberg de 
Beckfelt) describing the titles given to Dipanagara’s wives. Thus the prince’s first wife, Radèn 
Ayu Maduretna, was styled as Ratu Kedhaton (Appendix IV), and his mother, Radèn Ayu Mang-
karawati, as Ratu Ageng. Other titles given to Dipanagara’s relations can be found in dK 158, 
‘Naamlijsten van Djokjosche hoofden, die aan het Nederlandsch gezag zijn getrouw gebleven of 
de partij van Diepo Negoro houden of zich weder aan ons gezag hebben onderworpen’, Mage-
lang, 3-1829 – 12-1829.
220 Thus a member of the Danurejan family became Dipanagara’s patih (Appendix II); a son of the 
Yogya jaksa (magistrate) became his chief magistrate; a descendant of Yogya’s first pengulu, Pekih 
Ibrahim (Appendix Vb), became the head of of Dipanagara’s religious hierarchy after Kyai Maja had 
refused the office stating that he was not from a pengulu family (BD [Manado], III:47, XXXIII.65); 
and Ali Basah Senthot, great-grandson of Hamengkubuwana I’s famous army commander, Radèn 
Tumenggung Rongga Prawiradirja I (Appendix Vb, Chapter II note 35) became his sénapati (com-
mander-in-chief), see Ricklefs 1974a:87; BD (Manado), III:9-10, XXXII.52-7, III:110, XXXV.28-9.
221 See Van den Broek 1873-77, 22:69; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 34 (on Senthot’s marriage to Dipanaga-
ra’s niece, a daughter of Pangéran Prawiradiningrat, Appendix VIII); Louw and De Klerck 1894-
1909, III:370, 488, 493 on Dipanagara’s use of marriage politics and family relationships with 
Radèn Tumenggung Sasradilaga and other leaders in Jipang-Rajegwesi in 1827.
Plate 63. Piagem (letter of appointment) from Dipanagara to Amad Dalem Ripangi 
(the keeper of the royal graves at Kutha Gedhé) appointing him bupati of Kutha 
Gedhé with the title of Amad Dullah Tumenggung Resasentana. Dated 16 Shaban, 
AH 1241 (AD 26 March 1826). Taken from the H.M. de Kock private collection no. 127 
(Nationaal Archief, The Hague).
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bitterly disappointed that his requests that his eldest son should be allowed 
to keep his wartime title of Pangéran Adipati had been refused by the Dutch 
authorities.222 Traditional hopes for status and continuity in office for families 
who had previously served the sultanate could thus be said to have loomed 
large for Dipanagara and the members of the Yogya aristocracy who fought 
on his side. We will see in the next chapter how Dipanagara’s actions particu-
larly dismayed his leading santri supporters leading eventually to a complete 
break between the prince and Kyai Maja (pp. 629-39).
The prince’s use of the official name of the Yogyakarta sultans did not 
mean, however, that he wished to succeed them. He had made this quite 
clear by his refusal to accept the title of Crown Prince in place of his younger 
brother (p. 325), a refusal which he later stressed emphatically during his 
journey into exile. As Knoerle reported:
Dipanagara told me that he had never aimed at the title of Sultan of Yogyakarta 
[for] he said there was already a lawful ruler on hand for this throne and that it 
had never occurred to him to act against the institutions of The Prophet and expel 
the young sultan.223
Dipanagara’s understanding of his role as a Javanese Just King and his attitude 
towards the Europeans in Java
As for his personal aspirations as a Ratu Adil, Dipanagara referred to them 
succinctly in the same passage when he informed Knoerle that ‘he had al-
ways felt the calling to become a ‘“supreme priest” of Java’,224 a position 
which William Stavers would later translate as raja Islam (ruler of Islam) in 
an exchange of letters with Kyai Maja during the preliminaries to the abortive 
September 1827 peace negotiations (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:249). 
We have already seen what this might have entailed in terms of Dipanagara’s 
demand to adjudicate in cases between Europeans and Javanese on the ba-
sis of Javanese-Islamic law, thus reversing the legal reforms introduced by 
Raffles (pp. 385-8). The issue would come up again at the end of the war in 
correspondence between Dipanagara’s close adviser, Ali Basah Pengalasan, 
and the Flemish officer, Colonel Jan Baptist Cleerens (1785-1850), in mid-De-
cember 1829, which led up to the prince’s agreement to come to Magelang to 
meet with General De Kock in March 1830. The prince’s demand to exercise 
unlimited rights of intervention in neighbouring states and district admin-
istrations to ensure that local rulers and bupati were performing their reli-
gious duties satisfactorily and setting a good example for their subjects was 
222 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 5.
223 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 18. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:304.
224 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 18.
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stressed. Pengalasan also indicated that Dipanagara would establish a new 
kraton in the territory of the south-central Javanese rulers away from the lands 
controlled by the government (Carey 1974b:288). We know from other sourc-
es that his erstwhile headquarters at Sambirata in the Adikarta area of Kulon 
Praga to the west of the Opak River might have been a favoured place for 
this royal capital (pp. 480-1; Bataviasche Courant 109, 12-9-1829). Both of these 
developments would naturally have curtailed the traditional powers of the 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta monarchs as the heads of the Islamic religion and 
independent rulers in south-central Java. And it was on this technicality that 
the ‘peace negotiations’ in Magelang later foundered (Chapter XII). In truth, 
however, the issue was used by De Kock as a convenient pretext for taking 
Dipanagara prisoner, the prince’s fate having been decided long before the 
Magelang conference by the newly arrived governor-general, Johannes van 
den Bosch, who had told the Dutch army commander that ‘if it is possible to 
capture Dipanagara or kill him that would be very desirable […] do not enter 
into any agreement with him’.225 
An order from Kyai Maja to the former sub-demang of Sumawana in the 
Ambarawa district of Semarang gives an indication of the sort of instructions 
being issued in Dipanagara’s name to local officials who had declared their 
support for him. This stated that the former sub-demang – now styled pena-
tus (administrator of one hundred tax-paying peasant cultivators) – should 
observe four strict rules: first, he should follow the precepts of Islam on pain 
of severe penalties; second, he should shave his hair as a mark of his adher-
ence to the Islamic faith; third, he should hand back any goods which he had 
stolen or plundered in the event that the rightful owners came forward to 
reclaim them; and fourth, he should make no changes to the local irrigation 
systems or impose new taxes.226 The concern to hold down taxes was central 
to Dipanagara’s self-image as a Ratu Adil and was something on which he is-
sued public undertakings, promising that in the event of victory he would not 
raise more than four Spanish dollars on a jung of land regardless of whether 
225 dK 23, Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 6-1-1830. Further 
references can be found in the Van den Bosch-De Kock correspondence in NA, J. van den Bosch 
private collection 384. Van den Bosch’s ruthlessness is mentioned in Chapter V note 1.
226 Bataviasche Courant 18, 12-4-1827, report on Secawinangun, sub-demang of Sumawana 
(Ambarawa), who had taken the title of the former penatus, Kertayuda Wirapatih, whom he had 
murdered. On the location of Sumawana, see Dumont 1931:364. On head shaving as a mark of 
adherence to Islam and Dipanagara’s cause during the Java War, see Chapter IV note 10. The earli-
est reference to the practise is in May 1826 when, during the celebration of the Garebeg Puwasa 
of that year, Dipanagara had ordered all the bupati, demang and bekel loyal to him to shave their 
heads prior to his five-day meeting with Kyai Maja at Imagiri, dK 119, ‘Berichten aangaande de 
verblijfplaatsen van de opstandelingen door verschillende personen en spionnen verstrekt, 1826-
1828’, report of a Javanese spy working for the Dutch at Dipanagara’s headquarters at Pideksa (? 
Deksa, Kulon Praga district), 30 Puwasa AJ 1753 (AD 5-5-1826).
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that jung was ‘fat’ (fertile/productive) or ‘thin’ (infertile/unproductive).227 He 
also ordered the public flogging of officials who had demanded more taxes 
than they were officially allowed (Javasche Courant 67, 6-6-1829), and instruct-
ed that booty captured by his forces should be distributed amongst the peo-
ple on a two thirds one third basis, the chiefs only being allowed to retain a 
third.228 We will return to this theme of wartime taxation in the next chapter 
when the thorny issue of military involvement in fiscal administration – an 
early instance of dwifungsi (dual role of the armed forces in military and civil 
affairs) – was hotly debated between Dipanagara and his commanders.
The key to an understanding of the prince’s political and religious aims 
as a Javanese Just King must start with his assumption of the titles of Sultan 
Ngabdulkamid Èrucakra and his reference to himself in his babad as sang 
murtining ngajurit (‘the embodiment of the fight’).229 They indicate that he 
clearly saw himself fulfilling the role of the Javanese messianic Ratu Adil who 
would lead a purging war in Java to establish a new moral order. His babad 
reference once again recalls the Hindu god Wisnu whose seventh incarnation 
as a world ruler bearing the cakra (solar discus) symbol may well have had 
a connection with the Èrucakra title.230 The prince’s lyrical description in his 
own autobiography of the situation at Selarong after he had set up his head-
quarters there at the beginning of the Java War strongly echoed the passage 
in the Jayabaya prophecies dealing with the period of justice and plenty for 
the common people inaugurated by the Ratu Adil (note 227):
XXII.36  So [Selarong] had become a capital.
  Yogyakarta had moved there.
  Its market was very large.
  Everything to be bought was cheap and readily available there;
  [quickly] sold were the goods of the traders,
  thus all were greatly pleased.
  They were no lies or deceit.231
227 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:502-3. For a reference to the golden age of justice and 
plenty which the Ratu Adil (Just King) was expected to institute, see (Mangkunagaran), Serat Cen-
thini, IV:1813, II (Girisa) 6-7. bumi sakjung pajegira / amung sadinar sawarsa/ sawah sèwu pametunya/ 
suwang ing dalem sadina/ wus resik nir apa-apa/ marmané wong cilik samya/ ayem enaké tyasira/ déné 
murah sandhang tedha. 7. tan ana dursila durjana.
228 Bataviasche Courant 18, 12-4-1827, order of Kyai Muhamad Kastuba, former ulama of the 
district of Prapak in southern Kedhu. 
229 BD (Manado), II:392, XXII.72.
230 Carey 1974a:32 note 106. On murti as one of the names of Wisnu, see Gericke and Roorda 
1901, II:483. On Dipanagara’s walking staff, supposedly made for a sixteenth-century ruler of 
Demak and which he received in circa 1815, had a handle fashioned in the shape of Wisnu’s cakra 
weapon, see Chapter III note 66.
231 BD (Manado), II:383, XXII (Asmaradana) 36. mapan wus dadya negari/ Ngayogya ngalih punika/ 
kang peken kelangkung gengé/ murah kang sarwi tinumbas/ pajeng tiyang wadéyan/ dadya samya rena 
sagung/ tan ana kang doracara. See further Carey 1974a:28 note 95, 1981a:241 note 29. The estab-
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The term Èrucakra, the etymology of which is still rather unclear (Cohen Stuart 
1872:285-8; Pigeaud 1947:270-3), almost certainly fitted in with Dipanagara’s 
view of himself as a latter-day wali wudhar, a wali who would combine both 
temporal and spiritual functions. For this particular position of priest-king, 
Dipanagara’s meditative and charismatic character seems to have admirably 
suited. Thus, as we have seen (p. 87; Carey 1974a:26), a number of references 
to the prince withdrawing from the day-to-day business of fighting and ad-
ministration in order to meditate by himself, usually at auspicious places at 
the junction of rivers, or close to waterfalls and ponds, many of them sites of 
Hindu antiquity. During the war itself, he apparently had the habit of send-
ing his gold state umbrella (payung) out to villages to raise support for his 
cause while he himself resided in places far removed from the actual conflict 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:244). At the end of the war, when he came 
under closer scrutiny by Dutch and Indonesian observers, his penchant for 
keeping himself out of the public gaze by hiding his face behind the end of his 
turban or by using a white gauze veil were also mentioned (Van Doren 1851, 
I:328 note 1). Both during his time at Metésih, the island in the Praga River 
which was his temporary residence during the March 1830 peace negotiations 
at Magelang, and at Semarang and Batavia as he boarded and disembarked 
from the steamer, the SS Van der Capellen, which took him on the first stage 
of his journey into exile, he was careful to cover his face from the scrutiny of 
the crowds of curious onlookers who had gathered to see him (Van den Broek 
1873-77, 24:99; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:746). 
Besides this ascetic and secretive side, the awe-inspiring nature of the 
Èrucakra ruler was undoubtedly projected by Dipanagara’s widely believed 
powers of invulnerability and his intuitive judgement of character through his 
mastery of the science of physiognomy (ngèlmu firasat) which enabled him to 
choose capable advisers, officials and military commanders (p. 72). The respect 
in which Dipanagara and his family were held by the local population can be 
seen in the report of the large numbers of Javanese who flocked to join his en-
tourage as he journeyed from Rèmakamal to Magelang in February 1830 prior 
to his March meeting with De Kock.232 At the same time, his third son and 
heir apparent, Pangéran Adipati Anom (post-1830 Dipaningrat) (Appendix 
IV), drew similar crowds when he was brought from from Mangiran in the 
district of Bantul south of Yogya to the sultan’s capital after his capture on 1 
August 1829. As the Javasche Courant (8-8-1829) reported:
lishment of a large market in Selarong during the time Dipanagara used it as his headquarters 
between late July and late September 1825 and the discovery of a huge store of unhusked rice 
(padi) is confirmed in the Dutch sources, dK 197, H.M. de Kock (Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der 
Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 1-10-1825; Bataviasche Courant 40, 5-10-1825.
232 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 28-2-1830, 
reporting that Dipanagara’s ‘chiefs [were] writing letters daily […] to summon the population from 
Bagelèn and Mataram to Menorèh, so that I must suppose his following will grow by the day’.
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Particularly striking is the great influence of Dipanagara on the population. His 
captured son, although bearing no payung [to indicate his status] on the road from 
Mangiran to Yogyakarta, a distance of some fifteen leagues, received much respect 
from the local inhabitants who everywhere prostrated themselves in front of him. 
Although it is likely that Dipanagara was personally conscious of the implica-
tions of the Èrucakra title and of the role which he was required to play, what 
is not so clear is just how he saw himself in the longer cycle of the Jayabaya 
prophecies. Did he regard himself as the designated Ratu Adil or rather as the 
agent of a short spell of purifying destruction such as had been foreshadowed 
in Ratu Ageng’s dream? Did he conceive his task as preparing the way for 
the establishment of another Just King at a subsequent date, perhaps over a 
century later when Indonesia stood on the brink of complete liberation from 
Dutch rule? Might he even have had his Kartasura namesake in mind as an 
example of a previous failed Èrucakra ruler who, according to tradition, had 
seen himself as a path breaker for a later Ratu Adil following the failure of his 
1718-1723 rebellion and his attempt to establish his authority as a Just King 
east of Mount Lawu (p. 492)? It is possible that this question will never be 
answered satisfactorily. At times, Dipanagara clearly believed that he would 
be successful against the Dutch and would be able to establish himself as an 
independent religious ruler – a raja Islam – in south-central Java. Yet, at other 
times, particularly at the end of the Java War, he looked back in terms which 
suggest that he had known from the outset that his uprising would be doomed 
to failure. Thus, as we have seen (Chapter II note 9), Dipanagara later referred 
to the prophecy of Sultan Agung that the Dutch would rule in Java for three 
hundred years following the seventeenth-century Mataram ruler’s death in 
February 1646 and that although one of his descendants would rise against 
them he would be defeated. This prophecy was apparently reiterated when 
the prince’s great-grandfather, Sultan Mangkubumi, saw him as a baby in arms 
and foretold that he would cause greater destruction for the Dutch than he 
himself had done during the Giyanti War (1746-1755), but that only God knew 
the outcome (p. 71). The fact that Dipanagara felt almost instinctively that his 
early battlefield successes against the Dutch would be short-lived can perhaps 
be gauged by the enigmatic Parangkusuma prophecy (Chapter IV note 58):
XIV. 80  ‘You alone are the means,
  but that not for long
  only to be counted amongst the ancestors.’
It might be seen as a natural reaction to the bitterness of defeat and the day-
to-day humiliation of exile for Dipanagara to have justified his failure in this 
fashion. Furthermore, such an explanation would have fitted into the his-
torical cycle outlined in the Jayabaya prophecies in which the rule of the first 
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Èrucakra ruler would give way to a period of confusion in which a foreign 
king from Nusa Srenggi – the land of the overseas ogres or Christians233 – 
would hold sway in Java and from which the island would eventually be freed 
by the appearance of a descendant of the Èrucakra from Rum (Turkey).234 
Finally, as regards the Dutch, Dipanagara’s plans for them and those ad-
vanced by his adviser, Ali Basah Pengalasan, seem to have amounted to a 
return to the situation which had prevailed in Java before Daendels’ arrival in 
January 1808. Thus, in the letter which Pengalasan sent on Dipanagara’s behalf 
to Colonel Cleerens, the Dutch were given two main choices: either return to 
the Netherlands and maintain amicable relations with the Javanese through 
trade, or remain as settlers in the pasisir areas of west Java and the north coast, 
areas which had been traditional places of European serttlement since the sev-
enteenth century (Carey 1974b:285-8). Two subsidiary options were also ad-
vanced: namely, that Dutch military personnel should remain as soldiers serv-
ing Dipanagara as defenders of the ‘divine order’,235 an idea which harked 
back to the late Mataram (circa 1574-1677) and Kartasura periods (1680-1745) 
when VOC troops had been used in support of reigning Javanese monarchs 
against seditious movements such as the Kajoran faction (Ricklefs 1993:55), and 
second that Dutch soldiers and officials should consider converting to Islam 
as some Portuguese and Dutch prisoners-of-war had during Sultan Agung’s 
reign (1613-1646; De Graaf 1958:233-8). In this case their positions would be 
enhanced and they would be given increased authority over both Javanese 
and their fellow countrymen.236 This was the case with the Dutch inspector 
of birds’ nests at Rongkob, Second Lieutenant Paulus Daniel Portier. He was 
captured by Dipanagara’s forces on the south coast in May 1826 and went 
through a public conversion ceremony to Islam in which he proved that he 
was circumcised and had learnt various Islamic prayers including the confes-
sion of the faith (‘There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet’). 
Appointed by Dipanagara as tumenggung (district administrator) of Rongkob, 
he was given a new Muslim name – Mas Nur Samidin – and instructed to wear 
233 See Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:781, where srenggi is seen as deriving from the Sanskrit 
crnggī, literally ‘the horned one’ (Iskandar du’l-Qarnayu). It might also be a version of prenggi 
(Frank, Frankish, hence European), or even an error or word play on Nasarani (Christian), see 
Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:233-4, II:252; Van Praag 1947:230.
234 Reksapustaka (Mangkunagaran) Serat Centhini, IV:1813, II (Girisa) 11-3. ing ngantara taun 
nulya/ ana ratu sabrang saka/ nungsa Srengggi prajanira. 12. jumeneng sri Tanah Jawa/ kukutha nèng lor 
wétannya/ Girindrana namanira/ suku Wukir Candramuka/ ing ngantara taun nulya/ ana wira saking praja/ 
ing Rum nglurugi sang nata/ nungsa Srenggi kang ngajawa. 13. sirna akasoran yuda/ sirna sawadya-bala. 
235 The phrase used in Pengalasan’s letter is dados pedhangipun ing agami, see Carey 1974b:285, 
287.
236 Carey 1974b:285, 287. For a slightly different list of options offered the Dutch at the time 
of the abortive September 1827 Salatiga peace negotiations between Du Bus de Gisignies and 
Dipanagara through the joint intermediary of William Stavers and Kyai Maja, see Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, III:270.
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Javanese dress and use only Javanese in conversation with his superior the 
bupati of Pacitan. His special task was to convert his countrymen in Rongkob 
and Pacitan to Islam.237 Dipanagara told him in a personal interview that even 
though he was answerable to the bupati, he placed more faith in his admin-
istration than that of a Javanese.238 His colleague in Pacitan, J. Wörmer, the 
nineteen-year-old inspector of the government pepper and coffee estates and a 
distant cousin of the former Yogya Resident, Nahuys van Burgst, likewise saw 
which way the wind was blowing and pretended a public conversion to Islam 
making good his escape across the southern mountains to Surakarta dressed 
in the garb of a returned Mecca pilgrim.239
It is doubtful that Dipanagara ever entertained the notion that the Dutch 
should be expelled from Java completely, even though some of his more xeno-
phobic religious advisers, such as Kyai Maja, undoubtedly held this view. Thus 
during the disastrous Battle of Gawok on 15 October 1826, when Dipanagara 
suffered a major defeat just to the west of Surakarta, the prince remarked that 
‘it was as though something within me told me to spare the Europeans be-
cause we could not be in Java without them’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
V:745). Throughout the conflict, Dipanagara’s principal focus was on the inde-
pendent Javanese rulers themselves and only through them with the Dutch. If 
the latter had allowed the prince a free hand in south-central Java to exercise 
jurisdiction over Javanese-Islamic law and religious practice, there seems no 
reason to doubt Pengalasan’s assertion that all Dipanagara asked of the Dutch 
was that (Carey 1974b:288):
he would not be appointed nor take orders from the government, except that they 
[Dipanagara and the European government] would be good friends, neighbours 
and brothers, just like children who have not been on speaking terms and who 
now talk with one another again. They should not order each other, nor should 
they be ordered by each other.
Kyai Gajali, however, declared in an interview with Stavers in October 1829 
that as long as the Europeans in Java were not under Javanese-Islamic law, the 
war would be continued. Only once they had agreed to submit to the syariah 
would Dipanagara’s santri supporters agree ‘to live with them as friends’.240
237 These were mainly Eurasians working in the pepper and coffee estates.
238 KITLV 263, Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826). See further Carey 1981a:294 note 244, where 
his new Javanese-Islamic name is wrongly given as ‘Nur Salim’.
239 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:576-8 (where his name is given incorrectly as ‘Wormser’); 
Carey 1981a:294 note 243, 1986:124. On his relationship to Nahuys, see KB, A.D. Cornets de Groot 
private collection IXe pt. 3:55, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Surakarta) to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr 
(Gresik), 30-10-1821.
240 Du Bus 402, Van der Poll and Stavers, ‘Verhoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829, testimony of Kyai Rosali 
(Gajali).
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Given that Dipanagara, at the urging of Senthot, was toying with the idea 
of extending his conquests beyond Java and recreating a latter-day eastern 
Indonesian empire along the lines of fourteenth-century Majapahit,241 it is 
unlikely that such co-existence with the Dutch would have been of long du-
ration. Indeed, the times were long past when the European government 
could have contemplated a return to the pre-Daendels status quo when the 
European presence in Java had been largely confined to the ‘foreign king-
dom’ of west Java and contacts with the south-central Javanese kraton had had 
the nature of ambassadorial relations between sovereign states. They could 
also not have countenanced Dipanagara’s establishment as an independent 
ruler in south-central Java with special religious powers and spiritual dignity. 
Given the prince’s awareness of historical precedents and Qur’ānic example, 
it is likely that he would have sought to exercise a form of theocratic author-
ity akin to the priest-kings of Giri in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
which had given so much trouble to the VOC and their Mataram allies (De 
Graaf and Pigeaud 1974:137-55; Ricklefs 1993:76). As with Giri, Dipanagara 
presented the Dutch with a formidable foe: a Javanese leader of great per-
sonal charisma and an ability to bind many disparate social elements to his 
cause. If successful, Dipanagara would have spelt the downfall not only of the 
European government but also of the Javanese kraton. 
It was partly the ineptitude of the Dutch representatives in Yogya in the 
critical months before the outbreak of the Java War which prevented the gov-
ernment in Batavia from realising the full scale of the challenge they were 
facing. This meant that when war did engulf much of central Java in July 
and August 1825, it was almost too late. Only the serendipitous return of 
General Van Geen’s expeditionary force from South Sulawesi in early August 
1825, as we have seen, helped to turn the tide of battle.242 Even then more 
than four bitter years of fighting would be needed before the threat from 
Dipanagara’s forces would be fully lifted. During this time, the Dutch would 
241 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 39-40 reported Dipanagara as saying: ‘[he] asked whether Flores, Sum-
bawa, Lombok and Bali did not stand completely under our immediate government. To my 
answer that these islands were beneath our interests, Dipanagara remarked: “How gladly would 
I have gone to these islands with Senthot, Mertanagara, Sumanagara, Dipanagara the Younger 
together with 3,000 prajurit [soldiers] from Java if I had known more closely about their condition. 
Bali, which [even] the English did not dare to conquer, would have fallen into my hands imme-
diately and afterwards the other islands. My Basah [army commanders] are brave and strong 
[….]. Senthot [in particular] had shown signs of an enterprising spirit and in recent times had 
suggested the plan to […] try conquests outside Java.’ Dipanagara spoke once again about the 
conquest of the four islands of Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa and Flores and said that he could have 
founded there a great and mighty empire for the satisfaction of The Prophet.’
242 The success of Van Geen’s troops over Bone was reported in Batavia on 13-5-1825 (Bataviasche 
Courant 13-5-1825) and the news reached Yogya three days later, Dj.Br. 11, ‘Register inhoudende 
korte aanteekeningen der dagelyksche bevelen en verrigtingen van den Resident van Jogjokarta, 
A.H. Smissaert, tweede semester 1825’, entry of 16-5-1825. The official celebrations were held on 
19-5-1825 just after the Garebeg Puwasa, see Van der Kemp 1901, I:163. 
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have considerable difficulty coming to terms with the Javanese-Islamic and 
millenarian aspects of his rebellion. Most thought that this was just another 
rebellion in a long line of dynastic rebellions by disgruntled Javanese no-
blemen. Even an Indies official as experienced as Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven 
misjudged the situation, advising that Dipanagara’s family influence be un-
dermined by fielding the well-born Surakarta prince, Kusumayuda, in battle 
against him,243 and suggesting that confidence in the Yogya sultanate be re-
stored by re-appointing the aged former second sultan to the Yogya throne in 
August 1826 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:410-35; Carey 1992:439 note 
201). Given just how out of touch many senior officials were, it was perhaps 
not so surprising that Smissaert and his junior colleagues in Yogya were poor-
ly briefed. Much depended on the capacity of the local representative. The 
fact that news of Dipanagara’s rebellion reached the Dutch authorities from 
Surakarta rather than direct from the sultan’s capital indicated that the act-
ing Resident, MacGillivray, had his ears much closer to the ground than his 
Yogya colleague (Büchler 1888, II:29; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:252; 
Carey 1981a:292-3 note 241; Payen 1988:91-2 note 26).
Just how the prince prepared for war under the very noses of these insou-
ciant Dutch officials in Yogya will be the subject of the next section.
Preparations for rebellion
 
Even before Dipanagara’s last vision in May 1825, there is evidence that the 
prince had begun to have a series of meetings with Yogya pangéran and officials 
from the Yogya kraton who expressed their concern about recent economic and 
political developments. The post-Java War bupati of Karanganyar in Bagelèn, 
Jayadiningrat, described the first meeting as having taken place at Tegalreja 
as early as 29 October 1824 just before the 4 November Garebeg Mulud, al-
though some of those attending were not in favour of outright rebellion and 
many counselled patience.244 As we have seen, there were also rumours that 
unpleasant incidents had occurred between Dipanagara and the Dutch at the 
official Garebeg ceremonies and at various Residency parties. Jayadiningrat 
recalled that there were even fears that Dipanagara would be poisoned or ex-
iled by the Dutch. This is echoed in the Buku Kedhung Kebo which describes a 
243 Dj.Br. 7, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta/Semarang), 17-11-
1825. On Kusumayuda’s pedigree, see Padmasusastra 1902:161, which shows that he was the 
third surviving son of Pakubuwana IV, his two elder brothers succeeding to the Surakarta throne 
as Pakubuwana V (reigned 1820-1823) and Pakubuwana VIII (reigned 1858-1861) respectively. 
His high birth was later cited as the main reason for his removal by the Dutch as army com-
mander in Bagelèn in January 1829, Carey 1974b:275-6.
244 Jayadiningrat 1855-57:16, gives the date of the first meeting at Tegalreja as 3 Mulud AJ 1752. 
See further Kielstra 1885:412; Carey 1981a:240 note 28.
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party given by Smissaert at Bedhaya to which Dipanagara is supposed to have 
brought a large retinue in order to ensure his protection.245 Even though the 
evidence is largely circumstantial, it does seem certain that Dipanagara began 
to shun the kraton during the latter months of 1824 and the first half of 1825. 
As Chevallier later reported (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:599):
At the time of the presentation of the Emperor’s [Sunan’s] letters in the kraton or 
on the occasion of Javanese festivities [the Garebeg], or recently [19 May 1825, note 
242] for the official announcement of the triumphal victory of Dutch troops over 
the Bonenese, Prince Dipanagara never appeared in the kraton and time and again 
the patih brought this to the Resident’s attention.
In February 1825, Dipanagara may have lent his seal to sanction the pay-
ment of f 5,000 from the kraton treasury which was sent to Surabaya at the 
request of the exiled second sultan to pay for his eighty-strong entourage.246 
Pangéran Adiwinata, one of the second sultan’s sons who joined Dipanagara 
at Selarong in late July 1825 after the outbreak of the war but later went over 
to the Dutch,247 related how Dipanagara entered into secret negotiations at 
this time with some of the second sultan’s allies in the kasepuhan faction and 
with the ‘old’ sultan himself. Pangéran Jayakusuma, one of the former Yogya 
ruler’s staunchest supporters during the British attack in June 1812 (p. 336) and 
245 Jayadiningrat 1855-57:17; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):84-6, VIII.23-30. See further 
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:47 note 1; Van der Kemp 1896a:340, 364. There is a Javanese 
text of a letter from Smissaert to Dipanagara in Yogya kraton MS. A.62 (Babad Dipanagaran):105, 
which seems to have been written early in July 1825, in which the Resident invited Dipanagara to 
attend a party in the main hall of the Yogya fort (bètèng Loji Ageng), but warned him not to bring 
more than two escorts because a larger entourage would cause ‘misunderstandings’ with the 
senior Dutch officers present (angampila abdi pandhèrèk kalih kémawon, awit manawi kathah dhèrèk, 
mbokmenawi angagèt-agèti, adadosaken salah panggraitanipun para Welandi Ageng). See further Van 
der Kemp 1896a:364.
246 Dj.Br. 53, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/Bogor), 
13-2-1825; Ministerie van Koloniën 2480, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 23-2-
1825 no. 3; Dj.Br. 59, Hamengkubuwana II (Surabaya) to Hamengkubuwana V (Yogyakarta), 25 
Jumadilawal AH 1240 (AD 18-12-1824) (announcing his arrival in Surabaya from Ambon); Yogya 
kraton MS. A.62 (Babad Dipanagaran):33, Hamengkubuwana II (Surabaya) to Pangéran Mangkubumi 
and Dipanagara (Yogyakarta), n.y. (? 2-1825) (requesting money from the guardians to pay for his 
81-strong entourage). On Van der Capellen’s decision to allow Hamengkubuwana II back from 
Ambon and the appointment of a commission to ascertain the appropriateness of returning him to 
Yogya, see Ministerie van Koloniën 2477, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 15-7-
1824 no. 3. Smissaert was immediately informed (Dj.Br. 67, Algemeen Secretaris (R. Dozy) to A.H. 
Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 24-7-1824), and later reported the concerns aroused by Hamengkubuwana 
II’s possible return to Yogya and restoration to the Dutch king, vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken 
Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828). 
247 dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto van hetgeen den opstand van Diepo Negoro heeft 
veroorzaakt’ (henceforth: ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’), n.y. (? 1826). Adiwinata joined Dipana-
gara briefly at Selarong at the beginning of the war, but soon after submitted to the Dutch and was 
killed at the ambush at Nglèngkong in the Slèman area on 30-7-1826 when many Yogya princes 
loyal to the Dutch lost their lives, see Carey 1981a:240 note 28, 263 note 113; Appendix VIII.
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soon to be Dipanagara’s most trusted army commander (Chapter III note 3), 
is reported to have visited the prince at Tegalreja at this time.248 Furthermore, 
two court santri, Haji Abdulgani and Haji Badarudin, the former an intimate 
of Jayakusuma and the latter the head of the priestly Suranatan regiment who 
later served Dipanagara in the same capacity (Appendix VIIb), were report-
edly sent to the north coast residencies and to Surabaya to seek the erstwhile 
monarch’s advice.249 One of Hamengkubuwana II’s closest counsellors, Haji 
Amattahir, who had apanage lands at Jatingarang in Kulon Praga, apparently 
encouraged Dipanagara’s plans and kept the old Sultan informed. He was 
even supposed to have told Sultan Sepuh that, in the event of a successful 
uprising in Yogya, he might be reinstated as sultan in the place of his great-
grandson, something which did indeed occur in August 1826 but not under 
Dipanagara’s auspices.250 In June 1825, Amattahir travelled to Yogya where 
he stayed at Jayakusuma’s residence and was given the news of Dipanagara’s 
imminent rebellion which was scheduled to begin in the following month of 
Sura (16 August-15 September 1825).251 At the same time, according to kraton 
sources, Dipanagara held meetings with Jayakusuma and his younger broth-
er to coordinate arrangements for calling up supporters from their various 
apanage villages in the event of an uprising.252 Dipanagara’s son, Radèn Mas 
Alip, stated that these preparations were in train some two months before his 
father’s planned rebellion253 and we know from other reports that the prince 
was remitting the May Puwasa taxes from his tenants so that they could pur-
chase arms and food (Carey 1981a:262 note 112, 290 note 229).
Adiwinata’s statement that by June 1825 Dipanagara was irrevocably 
committed to military action is confirmed in a variety of other sources. Thus 
the former kapitan cina, Radèn Tumenggung Secadiningrat, seems to have 
warned the Dutch authorities in Yogya as early as May about Dipanagara’s 
intentions254 and we have already described the incident at the Residency 
248 dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’, n.y. (? 1826). On Dipanagara’s supposed links with 
Hamengkubuwana II, see Smissaert’s report of 30-7-1825 to H.M. de Kock quoted in Louw and 
De Klerck 1894-1909, I:277.
249 dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’, n.y. (? 1826).
250 dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’, n.y. (? 1826). On Hamengkubuwana II’s restoration 
to the Yogya throne on 17-8-1826, see Chapter VIII; Carey 1992:439 note 201.
251 dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’, n.y. (? 1826); Carey 1981a:242 note 34. A court haji, 
Haji Ali, apparently confided to Danureja IV that the prince was planning to leave Yogya to go to 
his mother’s birth-place at Majasta in the Pajang area on the 8 Sura AJ 1753 (AD 22-8-1825), AvJ, 
Haji Ali (Yogyakarta) to Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 18-7-1825. On Dipanagara’s mother’s birth-
place, see Chapter II note 13.
252 dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’, n.y. (? 1826); Carey 1981a:240 note 28.
253 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 9 pt. 2, ‘Proces-verbaal van Radeen Maas Alip’, 3-8-1825; Nahuys van 
Burgst 1835-7, I:12.
254 dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’, n.y. (? 1826); Carey 1981a:242 note 34. Tan Jin Sing/
Secadiningrat’s knowledge of what was happening at Tegalreja would have been enhanced by his 
involvement in the upkeep of Dipanagara’s bodyguard, see p. 401. 
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party following the Garebeg Puwasa ceremony on 18 May 1825 which sealed 
Dipanagara’s breach with the Dutch. At this Residency function, Chevallier is 
reported to have publicly given out that the prince was ‘mad’ and had gone 
out of his way to ridicule the prince’s entourage following Dipanagara’s early 
departure from the party by refusing to partake in the official banquet.255 The 
attitudes of local Dutch officials towards Dipanagara at this time are well 
reflected in Smissaert’s bemused letter to Van der Capellen written on 19 July 
just a day before the prince’s flight from Tegalreja.
Prince Dipanagara appears for some time now to have given himself over to fanati-
cism […]. He is known as someone who from time to time is tormented by madness 
[…] in which state he had previously, more than once, embarked upon stupid steps 
and forced religious duties […]. All the princes, the patih, the bupati and the other 
nobles strongly disapprove of his actions and ascribe them to zealotry.256
By the time this letter was dispatched, Smissaert had already been informed 
about Dipanagara’s remittance of the Puwasa taxes to his tenants and his con-
tacts with bandit groups (wong durjana) to the south of Yogya (Van der Kemp 
1896a:332; Carey 1981a:243 note 36, 262-3 note 112). His colleague Hendrik 
MacGillivray in Surakarta had also warned Smissaert on 16 July that a large 
force of armed supporters from Dipanagara’s lands in Pajang had gathered in 
the hilly area around the village of Sepikul and that the demang of Grojogan 
near Surakarta, a tenant of the prince, had rendered him no taxes for the past 
three to four months. By 19 July, this same demang together with about 100 
followers was on the march to Tegalreja and he arrived just in time to take 
part in the skirmish with the Dutch at Dipanagara’s residence on the follow-
ing day.257
255 Ministerie van Koloniën 4194, Geheim en Kabinets Archief, 13-3-1827 Litt. 31 no. 35, Ratu 
Ageng and Radèn Ayu Hascuran (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), n.y. (pre 
20-6-1826); Pangéran Mangkubumi (Rejasa, Kulon Praga) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 
n.y. (? 10-1826). See further Van Nes 1844:156. The incident involving the banquet appears to have 
taken place after Dipanagara had been driven home from the party early to Tegalreja in Wirana-
gara’s carriage.
256 Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. 
van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 19-7-1825. Smissaert later repeated the same observations in 
his letter to the Dutch king, vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King Wil-
liam I (he Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828). See further Van der Kemp 1896a:382.
257 Carey 1981a:262-3 note 112, 292-3 note 241. UBL, BPL 616, Port. 9 pt. 2, Hendrik MacGil-
livray (Surakarta) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 16-7-1825; A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to 
Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta), 18-7-1825; Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’, 
Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 19-7-1825. MacGillivray’s cru-
cial letter of 16-7-1825 reached Smissaert when he was at Bedhaya (BPL 616, Port. 9 pt. 2, P.F.H. 
Chevallier, ‘Dag-Register van den Assistant-Resident van Djokjokarta inhoudende aanteekenin-
gen nopens het gebeurde van 16 Julij tot en met 5 Augustus 1825’, entry of 17-7-1825), but he did 
not see fit to return to Yogya until the following Monday (18-7-1825), an inexcusable delay which 
was later cited as one of the grounds for his dismissal by De Kock, dK XLV, ‘Verhaal’, 10-1825. 
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The rapid development of events between May and July 1825 is also re-
flected in Dipanagara’s babad. Thus he described how he returned from his 
cave at Secang at the end of the fasting month and was greeted by the former 
pengulu, who was still residing at Tegalreja, with the news that the Dutch 
were seeking ways to take the prince prisoner. Rahmanudin lent force to his 
warning by stating that large numbers of Dutch troops had recently arrived 
in Semarang and that these would be used against Dipanagara.258 This was 
certainly a false piece of information. Whilst there may have been a concen-
tration of troops in Semarang in January 1825 when reinforcements were sent 
to South Sulawesi to support Van Geen’s Bone expedition (Van der Kemp 
1901, II:226 note 5), the bulk of this force did not return to central Java until 
early August (Louw and De Klerck 1894, I:367-9). Moreover, although similar 
rumours were circulating in Yogya, there was no substance to them. Indeed, 
it was not until the very eve of the Dutch attack on Tegalreja on 20 July that 
suggestions were put forward that Dipanagara should be arrested (Carey 
1981a:256-7 note 92). Then, following Dipanagara’s flight, MacGillivray went 
a step further by sending out secret assassins to try to murder the prince and 
his uncle, Mangkubumi, at Selarong, a mission which proved abortive (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:289 note 4).
Dipanagara appears to have taken Rahmanudin’s warnings seriously and 
he told his friend that he was not afraid but that he would await the outcome 
of events. Whereupon, the former pengulu urged him to give way and, like 
his grandfather Sultan Sepuh, undergo all the ill-treatment which the Dutch 
intended for him. Stating that he himself was not afraid of suffering or death, 
Rahmanudin said that he was already an old man and would not be strong 
enough to join in outright warfare should Dipanagara decide on that course 
of action.259 At this, Dipanagara smiled, and in a clear reference to what he 
now saw as his duty to prepare for a martyr’s (shahid) death a forthcoming 
holy war, spoke softly:
XX.64  ‘Grandfather, I will take pleasure in war:
 death [in battle] is good, so they say.’260
See further Van der Capellen 1860:363, 395; Van der Kemp 1896a:393; Louw and De Klerck 1894-
1909, I:252. Smissaert later said that he had sent the letter on to Chevallier to deal with on the 
evening of 17-7-1825, vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I 
(The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (9-1828). Neither Sepikul or Grojogan are in Dumont 1931, but it seems 
from MacGillivray’s letter that the former was close to the abutments of Gunung Kidul because he 
refers to the gebergte (hilly area) of Sepikul.
258 BD (Manado), II:330-1, XX.59-60.
259 BD (Manado), II:332, XX.62-3.
260 BD (Manado), II:332-3, XX (Dhandhanggula), 64. kula kaki mapan remen yuda/ matiya becik 
ucapé. Dipanagara’s jihad mentality is mentioned in dK 119, Pangéran Bintara report to De Kock, 
27-8-1828, in which he referred to Dipanagara’s speech to local chiefs at his Sambirata headquar-
ters in Kulon Praga: ‘You must realise that the paths to Heaven and Hell are open: those of you 
Plate 64. Drawing of a meeting between A.H. Smissaert (Resident of Yogyakarta), 
Radèn Adipati Danureja IV and Major Tumenggung Wiranagara (commander of the 
Sultan’s bodyguard) in the Yogyakarta Residency house. The sketch may depict them 
planning an attack on Dipanagara’s residence at Tegalreja on 20 July 1825. Taken 
from KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo), p. 51a. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, 
Leiden.
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The former head of the Yogya religious establishment then begged leave to 
depart on a pilgrimage to Mecca, a request which Dipanagara readily acceded 
to, remarking that it was fitting that Rahmanudin should spend the rest of his 
days in Arabia. He urged his friend to seek the intercessions of The Prophet 
as he bowed before the Ka’bah (the tomb of The Prophet), and to invoke the 
prayers of all the imām, presumably the heads of the four fiqh law schools in 
Mecca, that his efforts to serve The True Faith should be successful.261 The 
venerable kyai thereupon took his leave and set out to take ship for the Holy 
Land in Semarang.262
The outbreak of the Java War
The pengulu’s departure took place soon after Smissaert had taken the deci-
sion to repair some of the side roads around Yogya, one of which skirted the 
eastern fence of Tegalreja (Carey 1981a:245-6 note 42). On 17 June 1825, this 
began to be staked out by the Yogya patih’s men. The subsequent blocking 
off of the road caused considerable inconvenience for Dipanagara and for 
those who lived on his estate and the surrounding villages (Carey 1981a:251 
note 64). Moreover, Danureja IV had not informed the prince of Smissaert’s 
order and the first he knew of it was the planting of the marker stakes (Carey 
1981a:246 note 43). Danureja’s omission, which was almost certainly deliber-
ate, amounted to a gross breach of etiquette and inevitably small fights broke 
out between Dipanagara’s retainers and the road workers in which the inhabit-
ants of the villages adjacent to Tegalareja were also involved (Carey 1981a:247 
note 47). This situation lasted through the end of June and into July, when the 
skirmishes over the road took on a more serious aspect as Dipanagara’s sup-
porters and tenants from his more distant apanage lands began to arrive in 
Tegalreja to defend the prince (Van der Kemp 1896a:389-90; Carey 1981a:247 
note 47, 262-3 note 112). Dipanagara’s plans for a general uprising in Yogya 
who go over to the Europeans will go to Hell, while those who die waging war against them will 
attain to Heaven’. Bintara reported Dipanagara’s concerns that if he made a deal with the Europe-
ans he would suffer too much shame. In particular, he feared that those who had died as shahid in 
the Holy War, like his late son-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Natadirja (Gusti Basah; Appendix IV), 
would speak against him in Heaven. According to Bintara, he believed that Natadirja and other 
shahid lived in the neck of the malar munga bird of ill omen, Chapter IX note 169.
261 BD (Manado), II:332-4, XX.64-8. The imām to whom Dipanagara referred were the four heads 
of the fiqh law schools in Mecca: Shāfi‘i, Hanafi, Māliki and Hanbali, Juynboll 1930:19-23. Dipana-
gara later enumerated them on his voyage to Manado in conversations with Knoerle (‘Journal’, 
43), pointing out that the Shāfi‘i school held sway in Java. Dipanagara himself had plans to settle 
in Mecca should his efforts in Java fail, Carey 1974a:29-33.
262 Carey 1981a:259 note 103. Rahmanudin probably departed in the Javanese month of Besar 
which in that year started in mid-July since that was the traditional time for pilgrimages to be 
made, hence its supplementary name of wulan haji (the month of the pilgrims).
Plate 65. A Javanese sketch of the fighting between Dipanagara’s followers and Dutch troops at     Selarong in either September or October 1825. Dipanagara’s personal battle 
pennant with his Èrucakra (‘Just King’) symbol of crossed arrows and solar discus can be seen      on the left. Taken from KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo), f.136r-v. Photograph 
by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
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in mid-August were now brought forward, the dispute ending any lingering 
doubts in Dipanagara’s mind about the need for immediate military action. 
He is supposed to have ordered that the stakes marking the road to be re-
placed by pikes as a sign that he considered the unannounced highway con-
struction a casus belli.263 He also appears to have sent his wives, children and 
older retainers away from Tegalreja to Selarong with money and valuables to 
pay for his troops.264 Meanwhile, Mangkubumi noticed that the prince had 
begun to wear his favourite kris, presumably Kyai Abijaya (Appendix XI), 
which he seldom carried (Van Nes 1844:156, 158; Carey 1981a:277 note 169).
By the middle of July, Danureja’s secretary, Mas Ngabèhi Wiraprana, be-
gan to make detailed reports about the concentration of Dipanagara’s sup-
porters at Tegalreja, indicating that his plans for rebellion were now far ad-
vanced. But immediate action could not be taken against the prince because 
of the patih’s absence from Yogya overseeing the construction of a road near 
Klathèn. Smissaert, meanwhile, was in his inevitable recess at Bedhaya.265 
So a crucial weekend (15-17 July) passed and when the harassed Dutch and 
Javanese officials came together again in Yogya on Monday, 18 July, the initia-
tive for opening immediate negotiations with Dipanagara had been lost. Even 
if this initiative had been taken, however, it is still very doubtful whether 
Smissaert would have acceded to Dipanagara’s main demand that Danureja 
should be dismissed. In fact, the Resident’s handling of the situation, in par-
ticular his insistence that the prince should come to Yogya, left Dipanagara 
with very little room to manoeuvre. The prince was now a prisoner of his own 
supporters, who had pledged themselves to fight and who refused to allow 
him to go to Yogya to confer with Smissaert (Van der Kemp 1896a:394; Carey 
1981a:272 note 146). Why then did Smissaert not go directly to Tegalreja in his 
own carriage to pick Dipanagara up as some of his contemporaries thought 
his predecessor, Nahuys, might have done (Van Hogendorp 1913:147-8)? 
The hapless Resident subsequently justified his behaviour by recalling what 
had happened to a former Resident, Pieter du Puy, in Banten, who had been 
killed trying a similar action against a rebel leader in the kraton of Banten 
in November 1808, his death being the signal for a general uprising against 
263 Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van den 
Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 5-5-1831 no. 47.
264 Carey 1981a:277 note 170; Payen 1988:50, 93 note 36. There is some doubt about when 
Dipanagara’s wives and children were sent to Selarong. Payen states this occurred on or before 
19-7-1825, but Dipanagara in his babad indicates that it was only shortly before the Dutch expedi-
tion arrived on 20-7-1825.
265 Hageman 1856:65 (stating that Smissaert only returned from Bedhaya ‘to save his own 
skin’); Van der Kemp 1896a:383-4, 389-90; Carey 1981a:256 note 90. Smissaert’s justification for 
his (in)action can be found in vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The 
Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828). On the construction of the side 
road to the west of Klathèn from Gondhang to Boyolali, see Carey 1981a:57, 268 note 130.
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Europeans in the residency (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:618 note 1; De 
Graaf 1949:368; Carey 1981a:273-4 note 153):
I felt I must stay in Djokjo [Yogya] to confer with the military commander and to 
keep the peace. […] if I had gone [to Tegalreja] and been killed, my death would 
have put the whole European community in Djokjokarta [Yogyakarta] in danger 
[…] [It] would have worked the Javanese up into a murderous frenzy.266 
Thus the age-old European fear of the Javanese in an amok state was cited as 
the problem. After describing Dipanagara as a fanatic, Smissaert was now 
suggesting that the prince and his followers were in danger of running amok 
as well, although he acknowledged his political importance:
This was not a question of [arresting] a common Javanese or even a robber lea-
der, but a man of extreme importance in the Djokjocartan [Yogyakarta] kingdom 
– a prince who had been appointed as a guardian of the young sultan by the 
Netherlands Indies government itself.
Given these predictable views, it was hardly surprising that the various mis-
sions dispatched by the Resident, Danureja and others in Yogya failed be-
tween 18 and 20 July. The last of these led by the senior court bupati (nayaka), 
Radèn Tumenggung Sindunagara II and Mas Arya Mandura, departed for 
Tegalreja on the afternoon of Wednesday, 20 July. It was backed up by a mixed 
Dutch and Javanese kraton troop detachment organised by Chevallier (Carey 
1981a:271 note 145, 278 note 186, 280 note 185). It seems that the Assistant-
Resident had hoped to take both Dipanagara and Mangkubumi prisoner thus 
ending the incipient rebellion, but the prince had already been alerted to the 
dispatch of the force by blacksmiths in Yogya who had helped in the shoe-
ing of the cavalry horses and the preparation of weapons (Carey 1981a:257 
note 92, 274 note 156). The arrival of this force precipitated an open conflict 
with Dipanagara’s armed supporters at Tegalreja. After a hard-fought skir-
mish, the prince’s residence fell to the Dutch-led expedition and was imme-
diately put to the torch. The princes, however, made good their escape with 
the majority of their followers through the western gate of Tegalreja. Making 
their way across small paths over the unseasonally inundated ricefields, they 
swiftly outrode their pursuers (Carey 1981a:280 note 186, 188). They were 
even able to observe the evening prayer before overnighting in a village just 
north of the Yogya-Sentolo road (Carey 1981a:280 note 188, Map A). Payen, 
who received a full report of the failed military operation from his friend 
and fellow Walloon, Lieutenant Jean Nicolaas de Thierry (1783-1825), who 
commanded the 25-strong hussar detachment, gave a vivid description of the 
princes’ flight:
266 vAE (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I 
(The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828). For a reference to Du Puy’s death, see Hageman 1864:227.
The power of prophecy602
With the cavalry on one side and the infantry on the other, the [Dutch-led force] 
went round the village which enclosed the estate. They could see the rebels withdra-
wing slowly across the ricefields. Pangueran [Pangéran] Dipo Negoro [Dipanagara] 
was not very far away mounted on a beautiful black horse [Kyai Githayu] with a 
superb harness. He was clad entirely in white in the Arab style. The end of his turban 
flapped in the wind as he made his horse prance. The reins attached to his belt, he 
[seemed] to be dancing in the midst of his lance-bearing bodyguard.267
The following day, Thursday 21 July 1825, Dipanagara and his uncle arrived 
at Selarong and there near the cave where the prince had so often meditated 
and spent days in seclusion they set up the standard of revolt. The Java War 
had begun (Büchler 1888, II:25-9; Van der Kemp 1896a:400; Carey 1981a:282 
note 197).
Conclusion
Who could fail to be moved by the poignancy of this moment? Dipanagara 
dressed for the holy war fleeing across the ricefields while the flames rose 
from his beloved Tegalreja. As he unfurled his battle standard as Java’s long 
awaited Ratu Adil in the limestone hills to the south of Yogya the next day, he 
was certainly under no illusions about what this meant. A Rubicon had been 
crossed. There could be no turning back. Ahead lay nearly five years of war 
which would cost the lives of perhaps as many as 200,000 Javanese and dis-
rupt the existence of two million more. During this time the last remnants of 
Java’s old order would be consumed. Just over a century would have to pass 
before Java would again know freedom as part of an independent Indonesia. 
This was history as tragedy as Dipanagara himself would later acknowledge 
in the opening lines of his babad when he spoke of the suffering and shame he 
had been forced to endure (pp. 733-4).
Could it have been otherwise? The rapid deterioration in the living stand-
ards of the rural populations of south-central Java in the years following the 
Dutch restoration in 1816 (Chapter IX), meant that there would have been 
continued peasant uprisings in the latter half of the 1820s even if the Java War 
had never happened. We have already seen how such revolts, many of which 
had a pronounced millenarian character, were becoming more ubiquitous in 
the period 1817-1822. What was unclear was whether a leader of Dipanagara’s 
stature would emerge to give them with focus. Here the actions of Smissaert 
and his Assistant-Resident were clearly critical in tipping the balance. If 
there had been more experienced officials in Yogya, men like Nahuys or Van 
267 Payen 1988:51, referring to Dipanagara seeming to perform a tandhak (dance) in the midst of 
his bodyguard. Payen’s description of Dipanagara’s attire and mount is very similar to that given 
in the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara, Carey 1981a:86-9, 276-7 note 169, 277 note 172.
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Sevenhoven, it is possible that some of the more egregiously offensive ac-
tions which forced Dipanagara into rebellion might have been avoided. Even 
then, any post-1823 Resident of Yogya would have had his work cut out con-
vincing the kraton elite of the government’s good intentions. The combination 
of the land-rent indemnities and Van der Capellen’s annexationist policies 
deepened the prevailing sense of uncertainty in the south-central Javanese 
kraton. The days of the independent courts seemed to be numbered. Nowhere 
more so than in Yogya where the rapid decline in living standards of the elite, 
internal court rivalries and the problems of minority rule, all undermined 
confidence in the sultanate. With events in the natural world – in particular 
the late December 1822 eruption of Mount Merapi and the previous year’s 
cholera epidemic – seeming to portend a coming cataclysm, is it any wonder 
that Dipanagara’s emergence as a Ratu Adil elicited such widespread popu-
lar support? The legendary prophecies of King Jayabaya seemed about to be 
fulfilled. It was against this background that Dipanagara’s pre-war visions 
and dreams occurred. They confirmed what he may have already surmised 
from his youth that he had been chosen as the vehicle for the purification of 
Java. With the image of the Javanese Just King still vivid in his mind and with 
the Qur’ānic mandate of his selection as a wali wudhar seemingly confirmed 
by the support of the south-central Javanese santri communities, the prince 
went to war in July 1825 confident that his prophetic visions would stand the 
test of battle. The vicissitudes of war and the loneliness of exile lay before 
him. During this time, he would come to revise his views about his destiny. 
Instead of seeing himself as the promised Ratu Adil who would drive the 
Dutch from Java, by the end of the war he was indicating that he would 
be content with the restoration of a pre-Daendelian status quo in which the 
Dutch would be allowed to remain on the island as traders and settlers along 
the north coast. By this time his break with the santri communities meant that 
his hopes of gaining recognition as a regulator of religion were fast receding. 
He still failed to realise, however, that it was now impossible to put the clock 
back. A new age of imperialism had dawned. Johannes van den Bosch, the 
governor-general under whom the prince’s fate was sealed, was in no mood 
to compromise. Aware of the international dangers occasioned by the Belgian 
revolt of 1830 and committed to the establishment of a pax neerlandica in the 
Indies, he would ensure that a third of Dipanagara’s life would be spent in 
exile. By the time of the prince’s death in Makassar in January 1855, the Dutch 
colonial regime would be unassailable and Holland, flush with the profits of 
the Javanese Cultivation System, well on the way to its transformation into a 
modern industrial state. Just how Dipanagara experienced the bitterness of 
these years will be the subject of the next two chapters.

Chapter XI
the last stand of the old order
reflections on the Java War, 1825-1830
Introduction
The past ten chapters have described the history of south-central Java from 
Dipanagara’s birth in 1785 through his upbringing at Tegalreja to the outbreak 
of the Java War. They have drawn on the detailed official testimony of the 
Residency archives as well as the rich and often idiosyncratic Javanese babad, 
in particular Dipanagara’s own autobiography. With the outbreak of the Java 
War, however, we enter new territory. Instead of the daily reports of Dutch 
Residents and their staff on the economic and political developments in south-
central Java, the post-July 1825 record is dominated by the military dispatches 
between the Netherlands Indies army commander, Hendrik Merkus de Kock, 
and his senior officers in the field. These military archives, in particular the 
records of the Dutch East Indies general staff, have been the subject of much 
detailed study by Dutch historians. P.J.F. Louw and E.S. de Klerck, both serv-
ing officers of the Nederlands Oost-Indisch Leger (Netherlands East Indies 
Army), are the undisputed authorities here. Their magisterial six-volume his-
tory of the Java War (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909) covers the conflict from 
the Dutch and the Javanese side, drawing extensively on Dipanagara’s babad 
in Dutch and Malay translation.1 In addition, there are a number of works 
which deal with aspects of the war by other former members of the Dutch 
colonial army (De Stuers 1833; Weitzel 1852-53; Lagordt Dillié 1863; Kielstra 
1885, 1896a, 1896b; Schoemaker 1893; Hooyer 1895-97; Booms 1902, 1911; 
Aukes 1935), as well as amateur historians and littérateurs (Hageman 1856; 
Van der Kemp 1896a, 1896b; Somer 1938; Van Praag 1947), former Indies of-
ficials (Nahuys van Burgst 1835-36, 1852, 1858; Van Nes 1844), not to speak of 
1 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:345 note 1; Carey 1981a:xxv-xxvi, lxi note 85. For a good 
description of the rather chaotic and much delayed process of preparing the Dutch and Malay trans-
lations of the BD (Manado) in the 1864-1874 decade under the aegis of the Batavian Society (Batavi-
aasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen), see Van Praag 1947:20-3. Of the two authors, 
Louw (1856-1924) was much more sympathetic to Dipanagara and his babad than his younger col-
league De Klerck (1869-?), who wrote the last three volumes covering the period 1828-1830.
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more recent Indonesian studies (Yamin 1950; Sagimun 1965; Iskandar 1970; 
Djamhari 2003). So it would serve no purpose to go over the same ground 
here. Instead this chapter will adopt a thematic approach looking in turn at 
aspects of Dipanagara’s war effort. The first section will consider Dipanagara’s 
methods of mobilization, armaments and taxation. The second and third will 
deal with the role of women in the conflict, and Javanese cultural and linguis-
tic issues as seen both in the prince’s treatment of Dutch prisoners and in his 
attitudes towards the Chinese. Two further sections will consider leadership 
and regional loyalties, and the support received by Dipanagara from the santri 
communities. The core of the chapter focuses on the breakdown in the prince’s 
relationship with two of his key supporters, namely Kyai Maja and Senthot, 
both of whom decided to make their own peace with the Dutch in November 
1828 and October 1829 respectively. It will seek to probe the origins of the con-
flict between Dipanagara’s kraton and santri followers and assess the impact 
of the prince’s disastrous concession to Senthot over tax revenues. This, it will 
be argued, allowed Senthot’s commanders to exercise a form of wartime ‘dual 
function’ as a military and civilian administrative force leading to the aliena-
tion of the local population from the prince’s cause. Dipanagara’s own decision 
to enter into negotiations with the Dutch four months after Senthot’s defection 
in October 1829 must be looked at in the context of this loss of popular sup-
port. Given that there are no readily accessible accounts in English of the Java 
War, a brief synopsis of the main events will be included in the penultimate 
section dealing with Dutch military and political tactics.
The next chapter (XII) will consider the prince’s decision to meet with the 
Dutch army commander, De Kock, and gives a description of his capture at 
Magelang on 28 March 1830, his subsequent journey into exile (28 March-12 
June 1830) and his period of incarceration first in Manado (13 June 1830-20 
June 1833) and then in Makassar (11 July 1833-8 January 1855), ending with 
his death. Much of the material used here has previously appeared in print in 
the present author’s journal articles and his edition of the Surakarta version 
of the Babad Dipanagara (Carey 1981a).
Mobilization for war: finance, peasant manpower and armaments
By the time Dipanagara and Mangkubumi set up the standard of revolt2 at 
Selarong on 21 July 1825, a number of preparations had already been made to 
mobilize the prince’s peasantry and retainers for war. We have seen in the pre-
vious chapter how a good three months before the Dutch attack on Tegalreja, 
the prince had begun to remit the Puwasa taxes on his estates and to gather 
2 Dipanagara’s personal standard is described in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:208. See 
also plate 65.
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funds to sustain his campaign (p. 594). He later reflected that his unexpected 
flight from Tegalreja on 20 July had caused him to abandon f 3,000 in cash and 
much unhusked rice as well as various other personal items, one of which 
was his official seal (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743; Carey 1981a:266 
note 122), which had been readied for use at the outbreak of war. 
The early organization and financing of the war seem to have followed 
along wholly traditional lines (Carey 1981a:xl). In the opening stages of the 
conflict, the princes and senior priyayi, who rallied to the prince, contributed 
their own valuables such as jewellery, cash and other high value portables 
(ornaments, jewel-encrusted kris sheaths, gold belts). These were often car-
ried into the war zone by their wives and daughters.3 Along with the capture 
of Dutch treasure convoys – such as the one ambushed at Pisangan in the 
Tèmpèl district to the north of Yogyakarta on 24 July 1825 when f 24,000 in 
cash intended for the Dutch garrison in Yogya fell into Dipanagara’s hands 
(Carey 1981a:255 note 83, 290 note 230) – these assets were used to finance 
the initial campaigns. Periodic distributions of cash to the prince’s support-
ers also seem to have occurred although some were unhappy at the amounts 
given out. Radèn Sukur, the son of the bupati of Semarang, Sura-adimanggala 
IV (pp. 364, 465-6), who joined Dipanagara early in the war, complained that 
he had only received two silver réyal (one réyal = f 2.40) from the prince up to 
the time when he, Sukur, had surrendered to the Dutch in August 1829 and 
that he had been forced to sell his official clothes and ornaments to maintain 
himself (Carey 1981a:255 note 83). We will return to this issue of finance later 
in the final section of this chapter in the context of the prince’s arguments 
with Senthot over his involvement in fiscal administration (pp. 649-51). 
As regards armaments, the prince only began to gather weapons after 
he had arrived at Selarong (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:745; Carey 
1981a:275 note 166). However, it seems that many of his followers had pre-
pared for battle by arming themselves with traditional armaments such as 
slings and catapults, as well as staves and lances made of sharpened bam-
boo (Payen 1988:53; Carey 1981a:275 note 166). In late July and early August, 
bands of armed men from villages in the Yogya area appear to have made 
their way to Selarong to receive orders from Dipanagara leaving immediately 
after they had been informed of what was required of them (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, I:262. 400; Aukes 1935:79-81; Carey 1981a:285 note 208). 
The style of warfare favoured by Dipanagara made full use of these local 
levies: thus villagers were ordered to fell trees to block roads as well as burn 
3 Carey 1981a:52; Dj.Br. 7, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 9-8-1825. 
For an interesting comparison with General Sudirman’s use of similar methods of war finance 
following the Second Dutch Police Action in December 1948, see Simatupang 1972:52, 152: ‘Pang-
lima Besar Sudirman ordered two men to enter the city [of Yogyakarta] and ask Bu Dirman for 
jewelry to finance him during the guerrilla war’.
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down the wooden bridges and dig up road surfaces or plant them with sharp-
ened bamboo stakes (Payen 1988:53, 55, 102 note 79). Disruption of commu-
nications to prevent the Dutch bringing in reinforcements was critical just as 
it had been at the time of Radèn Rongga’s rebellion in November-December 
1810 (pp. 248-9) and during the British attack on Yogyakarta in June 1812 (p. 
321). Dipanagara also understood the importance of keeping his own lines 
of supply open; he appointed one of his uncle, Mangkudiningrat I’s, sons 
as his captain of ferryboats on the Praga River and ensured that the bandit 
communities at Kamijara and Mangir, which controlled the key river crossing 
points, were summoned to Selarong in late July 1825 to receive his instruc-
tions (Carey 1981a:243 note 36, 267 note 124). His tactics of disrupting enemy 
communications while maintaining his own supply lines continued through-
out the war. Indeed, as late as August 1828, the Dutch even suspected that a 
British or American smuggling brig, which had been observed at anchor in 
the mouth of the Praga River, had supplied the prince with firearms (Carey 
1981a:275-6 note 166; Djamhari 2003:xviii). 
By delaying the passage of Dutch mobile columns, Dipanagara’s forces 
were able to mount a number of effective ambushes (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, II:486, III:442; Bataviasche Courant, 1-1-1828). According to De 
Stuers, the favoured tactic for these surprise attacks involved the prince’s 
troops hiding in the long grass by the side of the roads, and then deploy-
ing in semi-circular fire attack formation like French franc-tireurs (snipers).4 
Senthot, Dipanagara’s youthful cavalry commander, also developed tech-
niques for camouflaging his horsemen behind bamboo fences and smearing 
the tongues of his mounts with salt to keep them still as they lay in wait 
for the enemy (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:381). In cases of successful 
ambushes, neighbouring villagers, who had seemed to engage in peaceful 
agricultural activities, would take up their farm implements and join in the 
fray, at times cutting off the retreat of Dutch columns which would run the 
risk of being overwhelmed unless they could retreat to the safety of a Dutch 
military stockade or bènthèng (De Stuers 1833:7). In Kedhu, as we have seen 
(p. 55), many of the villages had stone walls, built earlier to prevent pillag-
ing by roving robber bands, and these rudimentary fortifications were used 
to great effect by Dipanagara in the early stages of the war along with other 
fortified places such as Sunan Amangkurat I’s former kraton of Plérèd to the 
4 De Stuers 1833:6-7. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:98, on Dipanagara’s 
troops hiding in long alang-alang grass in southern Kedhu during an operation against Major 
(later Major-General) A.V. Michiels’ forces in May 1827. Besides De Stuers’ book, various other 
studies deal with the military tactics used by Dipanagara’s forces during the war, amongst the 
most important being Lagordt Dillié 1863; Iskandar 1970 and Djamhari 2003. On the destruction 
of the stone walls besides the main roads between Yogya, Magelang and Surakarta to prevent 
ambushes by Dipanagara’s troops early in the war, see Chapter I note 139.
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southeast of Yogya.5 Even villages protected only by bamboo thickets could 
be turned into formidable defensive positions, especially when the prince’s 
supporters ringed them with skilfully concealed mantraps (borang) in which 
lethally sharpened bamboo skewers had been set.
Dipanagara’s regular troops had firearms and there are references in the 
Yogya archive to the prince ordering the purchase of rifles.6 It is also clear 
that captured Dutch weaponry, including cannon, were used by his forc-
es (Djamhari 2003:80). As one Dutch mobile column commander reported 
following the capture of a fortified strongpoint defended by Dipanagara’s 
white-clad and shaven-head regulars at Mergalunyu near Gombong in west-
ern Bagelèn (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:115):
never had they shown me such resistance. Their weapons were all good and of the 
usual European model.7 […] The sole artillery piece, which they had left behind in 
their fort, was a fine one pounder. 
It is clear that European artillery techniques were also studied; one of the 
prince’s commanders, who had taken part in the siege of Yogyakarta in July-
September 1825, noted that Dutch cannon invariably fired too high because 
the defending artillerymen used too much gunpowder.8 Although captured 
Dutch supplies were extensively used, Dipanagara also obtained propellants 
from local villages in the districts to the south and west of Yogya. These in-
cluded Samèn in the Pandhak sub-district near Bantul to the south of the 
sultan’s capital (Carey 1981a:243 note 36, 275 note 166; pp. 49, 101-2), Into-Into 
on the Praga River (Javasche Courant 111, 16-9-1828; Lagordt Dillié 1863:32), 
and the villages of Geger (Samigaluh) and Deksa in Kulon Praga,9 an area 
where tin cannonballs were also cast for the prince’s artillery (Javasche Courant 
129, 28-10-1828). Experiments were even made in the Menorèh district with 
the manufacture of bullets made out of tightly packed rush matting (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:243), the materials presumably being obtained 
5 De Stuers 1833:2; p. 571. On the construction by Dipanagara’s troops of earthenwork ram-
parts and bamboo stockades as defensive positions in Banyumas, see Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, III:126.
6 Dj.Br. 6, ‘Vergadering bij den raad uitmakende het bestuur over den rijk van Djokjo in naam 
van den minderjarige sultan’, entry for 2-2-1826. See further Djamhari 2003:80.
7 On the Prussian infantry flintlock musket with ball shot, which was in general issue in the 
Netherlands Indies Army during the Java War, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:226-8. It 
generally failed on every fifteenth round. In 1828, 200 new percussion rifles, which were being 
introduced into the French army for the 1830 Algiers expedition, were brought to Batavia for fire 
testing purposes. Although they were found to be much more reliable, failing only on every 290th 
shot, they arrived too late for general use in the Java War.
8 Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826), quoting Pangéran Natapraja (Radèn Mas Papak).
9 On the involvement in villagers in the manufacture of gunpowder in Kulon Praga, see AN, 
Exhibitum, 6-12-1831 no. 1 (papers relating to the exile of Mangkudiningrat II), La F, J. Jansen, 
Report of Spies (Note of F.G. Valck), 22-10-1831.
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from the neighbouring pradikan (tax-free) villages of Pesantrèn and Bendha 
in southern Kedhu which specialised in mat weaving (p. 469). The former in 
particular was mentioned in the Dutch reports as a staunch centre of support 
for the prince during the war (Bataviasche Courant 33, 17-5-1827). 
According to the Dutch military historian, P.M. Lagordt-Dillié (1863:32), the 
gunpowder produced locally for Dipanagara, particularly that manufactured 
in Into-Into, was of very high quality, women often helping in its preparation. 
A former indigo factory at Tegalweru to the west of Yogya appears to have 
been used as a production centre (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:562-3), 
but the main armaments centre was Kutha Gedhé (p. 8). The presence in the 
town of a large community of artificers, and metalworkers – known locally 
as the kalang (Carey 1992:473 note 348) – provided the skilled labour force for 
the manufacture of shot, flints and gunpowder. Moreover, its status as a neu-
tral city – militarily inviolate by virtue of its joint Surakarta and Yogyakarta 
administration and the presence of its ancient royal graveyard (burial site 
of Panembahan Sénapati) – made it a place where people could take shel-
ter.10 The four bupati tasked with the town’s administration – two each from 
Surakarta and Yogyakarta – had the duty of ensuring that no supplies from 
the main market reached the sultan’s capital.11
Certainly, there were good profits to be made from supplying Dipanagara’s 
forces. After the initial sinophobic attacks of the early months of the war had 
abated, the Chinese in Jana in eastern Bagelèn appear to have done a brisk 
trade selling gunpowder and opium to the prince’s troops (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, II:215-6). Enterprising Semarang-based suppliers even 
smuggled gunpowder in loads of dried salted fish at the time of Dipanagara’s 
campaign against Surakarta in October 1826 (Carey 1981a:276 note 166). 
Sulphur from the Ijen plateau near Banyuwangi on the Bali Straits appears to 
have been used in gunpowder manufacture in Java at this time (Raffles 1817, 
I:180), but rumours that Dipanagara sourced supplies from as far afield as 
Lombok and Sumbawa, where he had family connections (p. 76), would seem 
to be without foundation, as were reports that he had received armaments 
from American or British smugglers (Carey 1981a:275-6 note 166). 
Porters, who earned their livelihood on the roads of south-central Java, 
were the main conduit for the transport of military provisions with gunpow-
der being moved and stored in heavy leather bags (Louw and De Klerck 1894-
1909, III:557). Professional bandits, the scourge of the pre-Java War coun-
10 BD (Manado), III:276-7, XXIX (Dhandhanggula) 42. Kitha Ageng punika yèn kanging/ kados 
sanget Kangjeng Sultan susah/ sabab punika bandhané/ sagung aprang puniku/ lawan dados pangung-
sènèki/ sagung tiyang sadaya/ lan kinarya iku/ pakèndelan Sénapatiya/ lamun gilir ing ngriku pang-
gènanèki/ tata pélor sandawa*. * Rusche 1908-09, I:284 has tata mimis lan obat. See further Carey 
1981a:275 note 266. On Kutha Gedhé during the Java War, see further Van Mook 1972:23-4. 
11 Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826).
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tryside, also served as auxiliaries (Carey 1981a:243-4 note 36). Meanwhile, 
traditional weapons were frequently used in action against Dutch troops 
and their Indonesian allies.12 In a report from eastern Bagelèn in July 1826, a 
Dutch mobile column commander related that:
The ordinary village people here are at one with the rebels so much so that they 
immediately joined the enemy and assailed our men with sling shots with the 
result that some on our side were [badly] bruised.13 
According to De Stuers, the most ubiquitous weapon was the Javanese stab-
bing dagger (kris). Mounted at the end of a length of thick bamboo, this made 
a very serviceable pike or lance which could be used to dismount Dutch cav-
alry before they could reload their carbines (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
II:380; pp. 7, 332). De Stuers went on to describe how Javanese peasants could 
move easily from their agricultural duties to participating in local ambushes of 
Dutch and Indonesian troops. They did this by keeping their kris blades always 
at their side, usually secreted in the folds of their short trousers or loin cloths 
while they worked their fields. During a military action they would prepare 
themselves as pikemen by mounting this weapon on a bamboo stave. When 
the ambush was over, they would break the haft of their weapon, remove the 
kris blade and melt back into the countryside resuming their previous identi-
ties as peaceable peasant cultivators. The war thus took on the aspect of a clas-
sic agrarian insurgency, part peasant jacquerie (uprising) as in the Vendée in 
the west of France in 1793-1795, part organised military campaign (De Stuers 
1833:4-10; Tilly 1964:331-9). At the same time, the tactics adopted by the Dutch 
to overcome this type of guerrilla warfare were also, in De Stuers’ view, in-
spired by the famous French Revolutionary general, Lazare Hoche (1768-1797), 
whose ruthless counter-insurgency operations in the west of France had broken 
the back of the Vendéan revolt in the mid-1790s.14 We will return to these Dutch 
counter-insurgency tactics in the penultimate section of this chapter.
12 dK 197, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 30-7-1825 (on the use of 
slingers); Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:401 (on villagers from Mangir, a village close to the 
confluence of the Kali Bedhog and Kali Praga, killing members of the Mangkunagaran legion 
with cudgels). On the weapons used by Dipanagara’s troops, see further Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, V:630-1.
13 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:364, report of Lieutenant-colonel Johan Diell (1776-1827), 
Waja (Bagelèn), 22-7-1826.
14 Dj.Br. 19��, De Stuers, ‘Inleiding tot de geschiedenis van den Java-oorlog’, n.y., 5. For a refer-
ence to the sadistic methods supposedly employed by Dutch commanders to punish Dipanagara’s 
civilian supporters, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 32, ‘Dipanagara told me about a ‘cannibalistic’ habit of 
which an officer [? Lieutenant-colonel Joseph Le Bron de Vexela, commander of the 3rd Mobile 
Column based at Pisangan, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:644] of which an officer of our army 
at Pisangan [to the northwest of Yogyakarta on the main Yogya-Magelang road] was guilty. This 
officer had buried an aged Javanese woman, who had gone to Pisangan to buy padi [unhusked 
rice], up to her breast in a pit and had given her as a prey to ants and other creeping creatures. 
Dipanagara told me about this inhuman act with gestures which portrayed his horror.’
Plate 66. François Victor Henri Antoine ridder de Stuers (1792-1881), major-adjutant 
and aide-de-camp and son-in-law of General H.M. de Kock, who accompanied 
Dipanagara on his journey from Magelang to Batavia (28 March-8 April 1830). 
Lithograph by Demoussy (circa 1833-1836). Photograph by courtesy of the Stichting 
Iconografisch Bureau, The Hague.
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The role of women
 
In February 1831, when the Dutch authorities were deciding what to do with 
Kyai Maja’s part-Balinese wife, Radèn Ayu Maja (note 46), who had remained 
in east Java following her husband’s capture by the Dutch in mid-November 
1828 and had subsequently moved to Yogya after his exile to North Sulawesi 
in February 1830, the Resident of Kedhu, F.G. Valck,15 suggested she be sent 
to join her husband. This advice was in no way inspired by compassion; rath-
er it was based on the conviction that she was ‘enterprising and dangerous’. 
In Valck’s view, and that of his colleague, Lawick van Pabst,16 the Radèn Ayu 
was a ‘restless woman of enterprising character who could reawaken old dis-
contents’ if allowed to remain in Yogya. The Resident of Kedhu then made an 
interesting observation:
When one calls to mind the scenes of the recently ended war and takes a mo-
ment to dwell on the harm and mischief wrought by various wives of prominent 
Javanese chiefs, one can in particular list [certain] women who excelled themselves 
in committing acts of cruelty.17
Radèn Ayu Maja, Valck hastily added, was not in the same category as these 
viragos. But she needed to be dealt with nevertheless.
Who then were these women whom Valck was referring to? He had two in 
mind: Radèn Ayu Sérang, also known as Nyai Ageng Sérang (circa 1769-1855), 
the mother of Pangéran Sérang II, whom we have already come across as a 
scion of the prestigious Kalijaga line of wali (apostles of Islam) in central Java 
(Plate 13; Mashoed Haka 1976), and Radèn Ayu Yudakusuma, a daughter 
of the first sultan (Mangkubumi), who was married to a Yogya eastern man-
canagara bupati, who served initially as district administrator of Grobogan 
Wirasari (circa 1792-1812) and then (1812-1825) Muneng.18 
As regards the first, she appears to have been a female official of the Yogya 
court who had moved following her marriage to her much older husband, 
Pangéran Sérang I, to his family seat in the enclave of Sérang near Demak on 
15 Valck served as Resident of Kedhu from 1826 to 1830 and was in post when Dipanagara was 
taken prisoner in Magelang on 28-3-1830, Carey 1982:25.
16 Van Pabst was serving at this time (1830-1834) as commissioner for the annexed districts of 
the Principalities, see Houben 1994:54.
17 Dj.Br. 17, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta), 12-2-1831, in J.I. van 
Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 16-2-1831. Valck’s rather 
convoluted Dutch text reads: dan wanneer men zich de toonelen van den jongst geindigden oorlog in 
het geheugen terug roept en daarbij een oogenblik blijft stil doen bij het kwaad en de onheilen welke eenige 
vrouwen van aanzienlijke Javaansche hoofden hebben bedreven en in het bijzonder kunnen worden gerang-
schikt de moeder van Pangerang Serang en de Radeen Ajoe Joyo Koesoemo van Muneng die in het plegen 
van wreedheden hebben uitgemunt.
18 Dj.Br. 17, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta), 12-2-1831. Valck referred 
erroneously to Radèn Ayu Yudakusuma as ‘Radèn Ayu Jayakusuma’ in his letter, see note 17.
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the north coast. Following the outbreak of the Java War, she took up arms in 
support of her son, Pangéran Sérang II, and is mentioned in the Dutch military 
reports as having led a 500-strong force in the Sérang-Demak area in the first 
months of the war.19 She was also, as we have seen, renowned for her spir-
itual power (kasektèn) acquired through lengthy periods of meditation in iso-
lated caves of Java’s south coast (Carey 1981a:284 note 205; Carey and Houben 
1987:21, 35 note 15). In mid-1826, the captured Dutch official, Paulus Daniel 
Portier, referred to her son, Pangéran Sérang II, travelling down from the pa-
sisir to consult with her while she was ‘performing tapa [asceticism] in a south 
coast grotto’.20 Her fame as a member of the celebrated Kalijaga wali family, 
not to speak of her life as a fighter and female ascetic, enabled her to continue 
to exercise a significant influence over the populations of her home region 
of Sérang-Demak long after formal hostilities had ended in March 1830. In 
August 1831, for example, she was interviewed in Ungaran21 and cautioned by 
the Assistant-Resident of Semarang about her ‘magical practices’, in particular 
her distribution of metal jimat (amulets) made out of thin strips of welded cop-
per, tin and silver three inches long and one inch across which were covered 
in sacred texts (rajah). These had apparently been given to people in Demak 
who had known her late husband, Pangéran Sérang I.22 Surviving into her late 
eighties, she outlived both her son and her kinsman, Dipanagara, eventually 
passing away on 10 August 1855 much to the relief of the Dutch authorities in 
Yogya who had kept a close eye on her during her last two decades.23
The second of Valck’s prominent Java War female fighters was Radèn Ayu 
Yudakusuma. Married to the Yogya bupati of Grobogan-Wirasari, one of the 
eastern mancanagara districts annexed by the British in July 1812 (p. 379), she 
is said to have refused to depart from her kabupatèn without express instruc-
19 Ricklefs 1974a:241-4 (references to Radèn Ayu Sérang’s association with the Yogya court 
under Hamengkubuwana I); Dj.Br. 7, Captain H.F. Buschkens (Demak) to Major-General Joseph 
van Geen (Semarang), 3-9-1825 (on Radèn Ayu Sérang’s leading role in her son, Pangéran Sérang 
II’s, attacks on Purwadadi and Demak in late August early September 1825). See further Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:369-91; Carey and Houben 1987:21, 35 note 14.
20 KITLV H 263, Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826). The cave appears to have been that of 
Trisik (? Sirisik), whose location is unclear, see further Chapter IV note 45, Chapter X note 30; 
Carey 1981a:284 note 205.
21 She was staying at the time with her grandson Pangéran Natapraja (Radèn Mas Papak) 
who had been given command of his own barisan (troop) by the Dutch which was then posted at 
the Dutch fort at Ungaran. It was disbanded on 16-6-1832 in accord with the governor-general’s 
besluit of 19-5-1832 no. 22 and both Natapraja and Radèn Ayu Sérang, who was given a lifetime 
allowance of f 100 per month paid by the Yogya court in addition to the f 1,000 in jewels she had 
received at the time of her surrender on 21-6-1827 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:573), were 
brought to Yogya to live in Pangéran Mangkubumi’s erstwhile dalem (princely residence).
22 AN, Exhibitum 6-12-1831 no. 1, H.M. Le Roux (Assistant-Resident Semarang) to Pieter le 
Clercq (Semarang), 19-8-1831.
23 Dj.Br. 1, W.C.E. Baron de Geer, ‘Politieke verslag der Residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 
1855’, 31-3-1856.
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tions from the third sultan and resolutely stood her ground against the British 
officer, Lieutenant George Richard Pemberton, dispatched by Raffles to take 
over the administration of the province. After the arrival of the royal mes-
senger from Yogyakarta confirming the annexation, she reluctantly agreed to 
depart but had to take charge of all the removal arrangements for her house-
hold because of the indisposition of her husband. This she did according to 
the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ because ‘she was a lady of shrewd 
intelligence, outstanding ability and manly ingenuity’ (Carey 1992:122, 297, 
456 note 272). These qualities were much in evidence during the Java War 
when from her base at Muneng her husband’s new kabupatèn to the east of 
the Madiun River, she masterminded the attack on the Chinese community 
in Ngawi on 17 September 1825.24 Although the descriptions of this attack as 
a full-scale ‘massacre’ seem to be overdrawn,25 she soon gained a reputation 
as a ruthless fighter. ‘A clever but much dreaded woman’ in Louw’s words 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:510), she became one of Dipanagara’s 
senior cavalry commanders in the eastern mancanagara and joined forces 
with Radèn Sasradilaga in Jipang-Rajegwesi during his 28 November 1827-9 
March 1828 rebellion (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:510). At the time of 
her eventual surrender to the Dutch in October 1828, it was noted that, along 
with other members of her extensive family, she had shaved off all her hair 
as a sign of her dedication to the holy war against the kafir Dutch and their 
‘apostate’ Javanese allies (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:514-5).
Although Valck does not give more details of the other wives of promi-
nent Javanese chiefs who made a name for themselves during the war, we 
can surmise that they would have included erstwhile members of the elite 
prajurit èstri (Amazon) corps. As we have seen (p. 5), they provided close pro-
tection for the rulers and security for their private apartments at night. Given 
their proficiency with weapons, which had impressed no less a figure than 
Marshal Daendels when he witnessed their adroit manoeuvres on horseback 
at the time of his official visit to the Yogya court in July 1809 (p. 210), and 
sealed the fate of the one British officer to die during the Raffles’ attack on the 
kraton in June 1812,26 they were well placed to assume leadership positions as 
24 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:525; Carey 1984:1-2. Her husband’s extensive debts to 
Chinese moneylenders in east Java and the oppressive role played by Chinese customs post keep-
ers (bandar) in the years before the Java War clearly did not endear the inhabitants of the Middle 
Kingdom to the feisty Radèn Ayu, see further Carey 1992:456 note 271.
25 See Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:525, 545, 560-1; Carey 1984:1-2, both appear to exagger-
ate, especially the latter. It is clear from the available contemporary sources that only about 12 of 
the 40 strong Chinese community were killed during the 3 a.m. attack, the rest managing to barri-
cade themselves in their houses and attic storage areas. Their houses were eventually set alight and 
the survivors taken prisoner to Purwadadi on the road between Ngawi and Maospati in Madiun.
26 See p. 349 for a reference to the female defender whom the British officer, Lieutenant Hector 
Maclean of the 14th Regiment of Foot (Buckinghamshires), unwisely tried to pick up and who 
literally went for the jugular with her stabbing dagger.
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battlefield commanders during the war.
Nor was it only well-born Javanese women who took the initiative: in 
Ngawi and the adjacent customs’ post of Kudur Brubuh, a peranakan Chinese 
woman was apparently instrumental in setting up a local police force to en-
sure security following Radèn Ayu Yudakusuma’s 17 September attack.27 
In Semarang, meanwhile, the wife of the pensioned bupati, Kyai Adipati 
Sura-adimanggala IV, a highly educated and intelligent lady of part Arab 
descent (Crawfurd 1820, I:48-9; De Haan 1935a:640-1), had apparently been 
the driving force in persuading her youngest son, Radèn Mas Sukur, to join 
Dipanagara by going over to Pangéran Sérang II’s forces in Demak in late 
August 1825.28 Her action may have contributed to the arrest of both her 
husband and her eldest son, Radèn Mas Salèh, during the first year of the 
war, an ordeal which certainly hastened her husband’s death in 1827. At the 
end of the war, the mother of one of Dipanagara’s key commanders in eastern 
Bagelèn, Ali Basah Jayasundarga, was reported to have refused to follow her 
son and daughter-in-law into surrender and had to be shot dead by Dutch 
forces when they stormed her hiding place in the Gunung Persada area.29 So 
the reports of women helping in the preparation of gunpowder in the villages 
to the west of Yogya (Lagordt Dillié 1863:32), bringing cash and valuables into 
the war zones (p. 607) and being found in full male battle dress (prajuritan) 
amongst the slain during the siege of Yogya in August 1825 (note 50) seem 
to be consistent with what we know of their pre-war role in Javanese society 
(Carey and Houben 1987:12-42). These were very definitely not the simper-
ing radèn ayu of late nineteenth-century Dutch colonial literary fiction (Carey 
and Houben 1987:13), nor would their destiny as warriors be forgotten when 
Indonesia at last had the opportunity to fight for its independence in the mid-
twentieth century (Carey and Houben 1987:21).
27 Dj.Br. 7, Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta) to P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang), 30-12-
1825.
28 UBL BPL 616 Port. 12 no. 8, ‘Verklaring van Radèn Mas Machmoed, een gevangen muiter’, 
1-8-1829. Sukur claimed that he had overheard a conversation between his mother and his elder 
brother, Salèh, in which the former had declared that, ‘Soekoer is not courageous enough to stand 
by the Javanese and drive the Europeans from Java’. He had thus been shamed into leaving Sema-
rang and joining Pangéran Sérang II’s forces in Demak, but see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
I:365 note 2, where Sukur’s mother’s actions are put in a rather different light: she was reported 
to have urged her husband to report Sukur’s disappearance to the Dutch authorities, but he had 
postponed doing so, an oversight which was one of the reasons for his and his eldest son’s intern-
ment on a Dutch warship in Semarang harbour, Soekanto 1951:35-8.
29 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 17-11-1829, 
reporting the shooting of Jayasundarga’s mother in her hideout at Paningran. It should be noted 
that there is both a Gunung Persada (Mount Persada) and a village by the name of Gunungper-
sada, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:Map. Cleerens’ base was at the latter.
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Xenophobia and identity: changing attitudes towards the Chinese and issues of 
Javanese language and culture
Radèn Ayu Yudakusuma’s involvement in the attack on the Chinese commu-
nity in Ngawi also underscored another salient feature of the early months of 
the Java War, namely the intense xenophobia which gripped many who rose 
in support of Dipanagara, a xenophobia which often went hand in hand with 
a form of Javanese cultural and linguistic chauvinism. This was most tellingly 
displayed in Dipanagara’s treatment of Dutch prisoners-of-war and in his at-
titude towards the Chinese, and it is to these subjects that we must now turn. 
Given the invidious role which the inhabitants of the Middle Kingdom 
had been called upon to play by the returned Dutch administration in the 
years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Java War (pp. 467-80), it 
is understandable that they should have been singled out in the opening 
months of hostilities as objects of particular popular vengeance. In all, some 
25,000 mainly mixed blood (peranakan) Chinese were thought to be at risk 
(Carey 1981a:260 note 106). Payen observed in his diary on 10 August 1825 
that ‘every where the Chinese are massacred, they spare neither women or 
children’ (Payen 1988:62, 116 note 141). Besides the communities at Ngawi 
and other customs posts along the Sala River, the large Chinese weaving set-
tlements in eastern Bagelèn such as Jana and Wedhi on the Lèrèng River were 
also targeted. For a time, the population in Jana managed to hold out by con-
structing their own fortified redoubt (bènthèng) where they could shelter from 
the initial attacks (Payen 1988:74, 131-2 note 215). They also attempted, as we 
have seen, to come to a modus vivendi with Dipanagara’s forces by supplying 
them gunpowder and opium. But eventually in 1827 the entire community of 
147 men, 138 women and 185 children had to be evacuated to Wanasaba from 
whence most made their way to the greater safety of Semarang and Magelang 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:86, 108-9). Although the local Javanese 
population later begged for their return in June 1829 stating that they wanted 
them back as traders rather than as market tax collectors so that they could 
dispose of their products more cheaply (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
V:433), it does not seem that the community was ever re-established.
The fate of the Jana Chinese was replicated in many areas of south-central 
and east Java during the course of the war, but it would be wrong to draw 
the conclusion that Dipanagara’s prang sabil was an anti-Chinese battue. True, 
there were some like Kyai Maja who were diehard xenophobes said to be giv-
en to gratuitous acts of cruelty (De Stuers 1833:15; Carey 1979:73, 1981a:260 
note 106), but as the war progressed the picture became more varied. Not 
only did Chinese merchants supply arms and money (Van den Broek 1873-
77, 20:561), but some even fought alongside Dipanagara’s forces. This was the 
case in Tuban and Lasem on the north coast during Radèn Aria Sasradilaga’s 
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abortive campaign from late November 1827 to early March 1828, where the 
local Chinese community, most of them converts to Islam and descended 
from mixed-blood Chinese families long resident on Java’s pasisir, collabo-
rated closely with the Javanese and were threatened with dire reprisals by the 
local Dutch authorities after Sasradilaga’s defeat.30 
In inland areas, however, such instances of Sino-Javanese cooperation were 
rare. The bloody events of the first months of the war had traumatized the 
Chinese and a deep suspicion of Javanese intentions remained an abiding 
legacy of this period. These attitudes of fear and distrust were reciprocated 
by the Javanese. Dipanagara himself led the way by forbidding his command-
ers to have intimate relations with the Chinese. Here he was only reflecting 
what his great-grandfather, Sultan Mangkubumi, had said about not allow-
ing Chinese to have too close a relationship with the ruling family in Yogya 
since it would occasion discord in the kraton (p. 399). These warnings were 
echoed by Pakualam I during a conversation with the Dutch Ambassador 
Extraordinary Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk in September 1816 when he had 
complained about Tan Jin Sing’s elevation to the position of a Yogya bupati.31 
But Dipanagara went even further, instructing his commanders to desist from 
all forms of sexual relations with the Chinese and forbidding them to take per-
anakan mistresses and wives from the local population. He regarded such al-
liances as bringing inevitable misfortune (Carey 1984:2). Here he was putting 
forward a prescription which had definitely not been insisted on in pre-war 
kraton circles. Indeed, liaisons between Javanese rulers and attractive Chinese 
peranakan women had been so frequent that they barely rated a mention in 
the Javanese sources (Carey 1984:14-5). One striking example of this was the 
prince’s own grandfather, Hamengkubuwana II, whose favourite unofficial 
wife was of partly Chinese descent.32 She had given birth to none other than 
Dipanagara’s closest Java War commander Pangéran Ngabèhi, that ‘well built, 
intelligent and discerning nobleman’ who had inherited the pale yellow skin of 
his mother (Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:83). As we have seen, it may have even 
been the case that Dipanagara’s first official wife, Radèn Ayu Retnakusuma, 
hailed from the same part-Chinese lineage (Chapter III note 3). 
So why the radical change in Dipanagara’s attitude? Much can be ex-
plained by the context of the Java War and its antecedents, in particular the 
30 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:444-5; Carey 1984:2 note 5. The Resident of Rembang, F.E. 
Hardy (in office 1827-1828), wanted to hand them over to the military authorities to be shot and 
their houses and personal belongings burnt, but De Kock refused. Instead, he proposed that Chi-
nese who misbehaved should be handed over to their own constituted authorities (kapitan cina), 
or if they were found with weapons in hand fighting for Dipanagara, they should be dealt with by 
the relevant Dutch military commanders in the same way as all other Javanese prisoners-of-war.  
31 Baud 306, Van IJsseldijk, ‘Rapport’, 11-12-1816. On Sino-Javanese relations, see further Rem-
melink 1994:5.
32 This was Mas Ayu Sumarsonawati, Mandoyokusumo 1977:21 no. 30; Van den Broek 1873-
77, 24:87. See further Carey 1984:20-1.
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role of the Chinese as tax collectors, but the prince also seems to have had 
a personal reason for warning against such sexual liaisons. In his babad, he 
relates that he himself had succumbed to the charms of a captured Chinese 
girl from the Pajang area who had been brought to him as a masseuse just 
before the disastrous battle of Gawok in mid-October 1826. The following is 
the brief and rather coy passage in which he makes his admission of sexual 
infidelity:
XXXVIII. 13  in Kedarèn
 at night, the one who was ordered to provide a massage
 was a female prisoner, a Chinese woman [nyonyah]. 
 His Highness the sultan behaved wrongly.
 Because of his feelings for his wife [Ratu Kedhaton]
 confused was the [sexual] solace.33
Dipanagara implicitly suggests that his subsequent defeat in this key battle 
was in part due to this moment of weakness. He may also have reflected 
that the two wounds he received on the battlefield were an indication that 
his invulnerability and other spiritual powers had been temporarily neutral-
ised by his sexual indulgence, something which he took care to hide from 
his wife on his return to his Kulon Praga headquarters (p. 121). He reverted 
to this theme later in his babad when he blamed his brother-in-law, Radèn 
Aria Sasradilaga’s, successive defeats in Rembang and Jipang-Rajegwesi in 
January 1828, the last of which effectively ended his rebellion, on his blatant 
breach of his instructions prohibiting sexual congress with Chinese females. 
According to Dipanagara, Sasradilaga had forced himself34 on one of the per-
anakan ladies from Lasem after that coastal town to the east of Rembang had 
fallen briefly under his control on 31 December 1827.35
Underlying these cross-racial sexual insecurities, another important 
theme may be discerned – what Valck would later characterise as a ‘feeling 
of [Javanese] nationality’ (gevoel van nationaliteit; Preface note 9). This can be 
seen most clearly in Dipanagara’s treatment of Dutch prisoners whom he in-
sisted should speak High Javanese (krama) rather than Malay, that ‘language 
of chickens which no ruler in Java wished to hear’ (p. 109), dress in Javanese 
not European dress, and consider conversion to Islam.36 This last was some-
33 DN (Manado) III:227, XXVIII (Sinom) 13. ana ing Darèn punika/ anèng ing dalu kinèn meteki/ 
kang boyongan nyonyah cina/ kangjeng sultan salah kardi/ saking tyasé mring kang rayi/ kinarya pangli-
pur wuyung. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:517 note 1; Carey 1981a:260 note 106. 
34 The term used by Dipanagara in his babad, anjamahi, also has the meaning of ‘rape’. See also 
note 35. 
35 BD (Manado) IV:11, XXXII (Maskumambang) 71-3. cina ing Lasem sadaya. 72. mapan sampun 
samya manjing agami/ Dèn Sasradilaga/ dadya supé weling aji/ anjamahi nyonyah cina. 73. pan punika 
ingkang dadi marginèki/ apes juritira. 
36 KITLV H 263, Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826); Carey 1974b:285, 287.
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thing which the prince also expected of Chinese who came over to his side, 
the process of ‘becoming a Muslim’ for them being quite simple: namely, 
having their pigtails cut off, undergoing circumcision and uttering the dec-
laration of The Faith (sahadat) ‘There is no God but God and Muhammad is 
His Prophet’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:465; Carey 1981a:259 note 
106). 
Perhaps this was really not so unusual. After all, in the early seventeenth 
century, Sultan Agung (reigned 1613-1647), whom Dipanagara took as a mod-
el in so many things, made efforts to have Dutch prisoners circumcised in 
preparation for their conversion to Islam (De Graaf 1958:102). But the insist-
ence on Javanese sartorial and linguistic codes which went with this conver-
sion process, was rather striking. It can perhaps be seen as a reaction to the 
powerful Europeanising influences which had been sweeping over the south-
central Javanese courts following the Dutch restoration in 1816 (page 459, Plate 
54). Paulus Daniel Portier, the inspector of the birds’ nest rocks at Rongkob, 
who was captured on the south coast in mid-1826 and wrote a remarkable 
report on his two months’ captivity (August-September 1826),37 gave some 
insights into the pressures which were placed on Dutch prisoners to adopt 
Javanese cultural and religious norms. Told that he must convert to Islam 
to save his life, Portier was assured that if he did so he would be appointed 
a troop commander with the appropriate pay and privileges. Since he was 
already circumcised, his ‘conversion’ was not so difficult. Indeed, we have al-
ready seen how that was handled at Dipanagara’s Kulon Praga headquarters 
(pp. 588-9). In the meantime, he promised to fight on the prince’s side. Given 
the new Muslim name of Nur Samidin, he was immediately invested by the 
pensioned bupati of Pacitan, Kyai Tumenggung Jagakarya (p. 589), with his 
‘symbols of office’, namely a horse, a kris with a gold sheath and a Javanese 
striped (lurik) cotton jacket. Contemplating his changed appearance, Portier 
wrote that ‘he had [now] become just like a Javanese even down to my dress’. 
Brought across the Praga River to Dipanagara’s headquarters at Kemusuh by 
way of the village of Rejasa where the prince’s uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, 
was looking after the women and children of Dipanagara’s senior command-
ers, he was greeted by Mangkubumi’s exclamation: ‘Well, that European! One 
would scarcely give him that name. He looks just like a Javanese, in fact he 
bears a close resemblance to [the Yogya Residency interpreter] Dietrée!’
We would need many more accounts like Portier’s to build up a full pic-
ture of how Dutch prisoners were treated. Javanese sartorial codes, for exam-
ple, were not always insisted upon: after his surrender in mid-October 1829, 
Senthot apparently forbade the soldiers of his barisan (troop) from wearing 
Javanese dress (Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:93), although the Dutch had hopes 
37 KITLV H 263, Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826).
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of persuading him otherwise.38 Furthermore, some Dutch prisoners were 
clearly not as fortunate as the inspector of birds’ nests from Rongkob. The 
government inspector of cultures in Pacitan, F.H. van Vlissingen, for exam-
ple, who was a particular object of the pensioned bupati’s hatred, was sum-
marily beheaded. There was even an attempt to drink his blood.39 Another 
European, a French landowner by the name of François Deux (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, I:609, 612-3; Chapter X note 84), who lived like a Javanese 
and went around with a peci, a small black hat often worn by Javanese males 
especially on Friday visits to the mosque – an indication that he had become 
a Muslim – was likewise detested by the bupati as a lackey of the decapitated 
inspector. Conversion to Islam on its own was thus no guarantee of accept-
ance. According to Portier, Jagakarya himself lost no opportunity to express 
his hatred for Europeans in general. As we have seen, he considered them 
completely lacking in religious feelings (p. 449) and he now no longer feared 
them because in his view the balance of force had shifted decisively in favour 
of the Javanese.40
Leadership and regional loyalties 
The role of the pensioned bupati of Pacitan during Portier’s two-month captiv-
ity raises questions about the nature of leadership on the Javanese side during 
the war. Although the part played by local officials was crucial to the success 
or failure of Dipanagara’s cause in certain areas, in the early stages of the 
conflict the main leadership initiative was provided by the Yogya princes and 
senior officials who rallied to Dipanagara (Appendix VIII). Members of the ru-
ral Islamic communities were also important here. As regards the first group, 
many came to Selarong to receive their commands from Dipanagara in late 
July and early August 1825. According to Payen and Willem van Hogendorp, 
most set fire to their Yogya residences before going over to Dipanagara to 
prevent them falling into enemy hands (Payen 1988:56, 105 note 95; Van 
38 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Banaran/Panjer) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 3-1-1830, stating 
that ‘the turban is now going out of fashion [de tulbaan […] zijn reeds lang buiten de mode]. […] I 
think that Senthot will also abandon the turban. He wrote me a polite letter in which he called 
himself Kangjeng Radèn Ali Basah’. Cleerens made strenuous efforts to persuade Dipanagara’s 
captured commanders in Bagelèn to give up wearing their turbans and re-adopt the Javanese 
‘national’ head-dress – namely the blangkon – by pointing to three examples of ‘well-dressed Java-
nese’ in his entourage: Pangéran Blitar II, Radèn Tumenggung Sawunggaling, the serving Yogya 
bupati of Bagelèn, and the ‘old’ Kyai Wangsasetra, presumably a pensioned Yogya bupati.
39 KITLV H 263, Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826), stated that Van Vlissingen was beheaded 
on the orders of Radèn Mas Papak (Pangéran Natapraja’s) younger brother, Radèn Tumenggung 
Setradipura, but a mistake was made and instead of drinking Van Vlissingen’s blood that of a 
recently executed Javanese was drunk instead.
40 KITLV H 263, Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826).
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Hogendorp 1913:173-4). While he was still at Tegalreja, Dipanagara had ap-
parently sent out letters of authority (piagem) mandating various princes and 
senior priyayi to act on his behalf as military commanders. These letters car-
ried his princely seal and were intended as declarations of war. The buku adds 
the detail that Dipanagara announced his intention of waging a holy war and 
urged the local commanders, whom he had appointed, to gather the village 
people together and make known that they would be participating in a prang 
sabil. According to this source, Dipanagara proclaimed himself as the head 
(imam) of the Islamic religion in Java.41 
During his flight from Tegalreja, Dipanagara’s personal seal which bore 
his full princely title of ‘Bendara Pangéran Aria Dipanagara’ was, as we have 
seen, left behind and he had a new one made in pégon (Javanese written in 
unvocalised Arabic) script with the inscription ingkang jumeneng Kangjeng 
Sultan Ngabdul Khamid Èrucakra Kabirul Mukminin Sayidin Panatagama rasullahi 
s.a.w. ing Tanah Jawi (He who is raised as His Highness Sultan Ngabdulkamid 
Èrucakra, the First among the Believers, Lord of the Faith, Regulator of 
Religion, [Caliph] of The Prophet of God, may peace be on Him, in Java; pp. 
580-1; Carey 1981a:266 note 122). This inscription would later appear in bold 
black Arabic calligraphy on his yellow silk standard. So much in demand 
were these letters of authority with Dipanagara’s seal that the prince’s follow-
ers from as far afield as the north coast and the eastern mancanagara, begged 
him for them. One of these, Pangéran Sérang II, who claimed kinship to the 
famous south-central Javanese apostle of Islam, Sunan Kalijaga (pp. 132-3), 
was invested by Dipanagara, while he was at Selarong, as a commander in 
the holy war in his home district of Sérang near Demak and given the title of 
‘he who fixes firm the Islamic religion’.42 Both Dutch and Javanese sources 
also indicate that Dipanagara appointed a number of princely and senior pri-
yayi commanders in the areas around Yogyakarta to coordinate the siege of 
the city in the first weeks of the war. At the same time some of these well-
born commanders were used to take the banner of rebellion into adjacent 
districts like Pajang and Sokawati further to the east (Carey 1981a:53-5, 266-7 
notes 123-5, 124, 284 note 206). The majority of the letters of authority (piagem) 
bearing Dipanagara’s seal were, however, distributed by members of the reli-
gious communities, in particular leading ulama, who helped spread news of 
Dipanagara’s revolt to the furthest reaches of the princely territories (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:629-30). The process of mobilization thus had 
a formal aspect which depended on the receipt of letters from Dipanagara 
written both before and after his flight from Tegalreja. This pattern would 
continue throughout the war with the prince investing his commanders with 
41 KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):89, IX.7-8.
42 Sénapatining prang sabilollah ingkang anetepaken agami Islam, see Carey 1981a:241 note 30.
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titles such as ali basah (‘The High Pasha’; p. 153) or dullah43 and new Muslim 
names, and using members of the religious communities to maintain contacts 
with his far-flung supporters and to encourage others to join the holy war 
against the Dutch.
The war also appears to have had strong regional aspects, based as it was in 
south-central Java with only limited campaigns in other areas such as Demak 
(1825), Madiun (1825-1826) and Rembang and Jipang-Rajegwesi (1827-1828). 
It is clear that regional rivalries undermined the prince’s war effort at crucial 
moments. This was the case when frictions arose between Kyai Maja’s Pajang 
troops and Mataram levies loyal to Dipanagara during the prince’s advance 
on Surakarta in early October 1826 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:499, 
520). There were also tensions inspired by such regional loyalties involving 
Dipanagara’s commanders. Senthot, for example, apparently objected strongly 
in early 1829 to the marriage of Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara (Ali Basah 
Ngabdulkamil II),44 to Dipanagara’s daughter, Radèn Ayu Basah, the widow 
of Senthot’s half-brother, Radèn Tumenggung Natadirja (‘Gusti Basah’), who 
had died of battle wounds in early August 1828 (Appendix IV), because the 
bridegroom hailed from Rèma (Bagelèn) rather than Mataram.45 The situation 
was complicated later in the war when Dipanagara began recruiting Balinese 
soldiers from Klungkung and Buleleng through the contacts of Radèn Ayu 
Mangkubumi, the divorced part Balinese wife of his uncle, Mangkubumi, 
who later married Kyai Maja.46 A number of Bugis from South Sulawesi also 
fought for the prince. Hailing from the Bugis regiments which had served in 
the Yogya kraton before 1812 (pp. 5, 379), at least two of these soldiers of for-
43 Seemingly a shortened version of ‘Abdullah’. This junior commander title is sometimes ren-
dered in the Javanese sources as amad dullah, see Carey 1982:5 note 22.
44 Mertanagara was a son of the former Yogya patih, Danureja II (in office 1799-1811), by an 
unofficial wife, see Appendix II.
45 BD (Manado), IV:129, XXXV.85. See further Appendix IV.
46 Carey 1981a:250 note 58; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 23. In his babad, Dipanagara mentioned that Maja’s 
previous official wife, Nyai Maja, had died in childbirth in early 1828, leaving behind many young 
children, who were now motherless because Maja’s two other secondary wives had also died. 
Dipanagara had taken pity on them and given Maja a cousin of his own recently deceased wife, 
Ratu Kedhaton, as a bride. According to Dipanagara, who had an eye for such things (Chapter III), 
she was a rather attractive young woman with yellow skin, a rich widow with no children of her 
own, BD (Manado) IV:45, XXXIII (Sinom) 44-5. mapan nulya dèntrimani/ ingkang santana kangjeng 
ratu kang swargi. 45. randa anom inggih dèrèng gadhah anak/ ayu kuning tur sugih. In his conversations 
with Knoerle (‘Journal’, 23), she is referred to as the ‘granddaughter’ (? great-granddaughter) of 
Hamengkubuwana I’s Balinese army commander, Mas Tumenggung Malangnegara, and a daugh-
ter of Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara, the former Yogya bupati of Padhangan who had died in 
rebellion with Radèn Rongga on 17-12-1810, see p. 248. According to Dipanagara, she had been 
divorced from his uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, for three years and had remained a divorced 
Radèn Ayu in Dipanagara’s following during the war. However, in his babad (BD [Manado] IV:45, 
XXXIII.45), her previous name is mentioned as Radèn Ayu Prawiradiningrat, which indicates that 
she may have been married to Dipanagara’s younger brother, Pangéran Prawiradiningrat. On the 
role of Balinese and Bugis mercenaries in Java, see further Remmelink 1994:20.
Plate 67. Pangéran Natapraja, Pangéran Sérang II and Pangéran Purwanegara discussing      their attack on Demak in late August 1825. KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo). 
Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
Plate 67. Pangéran Natapraja, Pangéran Sérang II and Pangéran Purwanegara discussing      their attack on Demak in late August 1825. KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo). 
Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
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tune, Rangga Daèng Makincing and Ngabèhi Daèng Maréwa, rose to become 
military commanders of Dipanagara’s elite troops and are mentioned in the 
prince’s babad (Carey 1981a:253 note 72).
According to Dipanagara, the fighting quality of his troops varied consid-
erably from district to district and he later observed to De Stuers that (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743):
the people of Madiun are good at resisting a first attack and they acquit themselves 
well, but afterwards they are not much use. The people of Pajang are also brave, 
but likewise for a short space of time. The people from Bagelèn are better, but 
they must fight in their own area; if they are outside they collapse quickly. But 
the people of Mataram are the best of all: they fight well, they persevere and they 
know how to withstand the hardships of war.
This echoed what Dipanagara’s eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, was report-
ed to have said after the Java War about the qualities of the men of Mataram; 
namely, that they could keep secrets, had a generous heart, and were strict 
about the observance of their religion (Chapter II note 8). Interestingly, simi-
lar observations about the regional variations in fighting capacity amongst 
the populations of south-central Java were made later during the Indonesian 
Revolution (1945-1949), when military commanders from Kedhu and Bagelèn 
were singled out for praise, along with those from Banyumas who were 
dubbed the ‘Prussians of Java’.47
The role of the santri communities
The second group which rallied to Dipanagara at Selarong were the ‘men 
of religion’ or santri. A rough survey of the available Dutch and Javanese 
sources has yielded a list of some two hundred men and women who af-
forded Dipanagara assistance at some stage during the war (Appendix VIIb). 
Amongst these were some Arabs and mixed blood Chinese (peranakan). The 
majority had affiliations with the rural based religious communities and 
with the south-central Javanese kraton, a sizeable number originating from 
the strict religious community (kauman) in Yogya. They included court santri 
who were members of the official religious hierarchy or the special corps of 
religious officials like the Suranatan and Suryagama serving in the kraton, as 
well as inhabitants of the Yogya-administered tax-free villages (pradikan) and 
47 Simatupang 1972:76. The fact that the Indonesian army commander General Sudirman 
hailed from Banyumas was not coincidental. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:109, 
who cite the description in the archive of the 1830 commissioners for the regulation of affairs 
in the princely territories (commissarissen tot regeling der zaken in de vorstenlanden) that Mataram, 
Pajang and Sokawati were producers of soldiers in contrast to Bagelèn which was seen as a source 
of coolie labour. 
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religious schools in the Mataram area. Another large group was brought over 
by Kyai Maja when he joined the prince at Selarong in early August. These 
included members of his extensive family and students from his pesantrèn at 
Maja and Badhèran in the Delanggu area (pp. 91-2, Plate 10). 
Of those whose titles can be readily identified, twenty-two were re-
turned Mecca pilgrims (haji) and seventeen are listed as sèh (Syeikh) or sarif 
(Sherif), an epithet which was usually only given to Arabs of good birth or 
those who claimed kinship to the family of The Prophet. In Java, however, 
it was often used at this time to denote men of influence in religious affairs. 
The descendants of the families of the wali or apostles of Islam in Java were 
frequently referred to by this title. Leaving aside Kyai Taptajani, the former 
head of the centre for scholars of Islamic law at Melangi, and Mas Lurah 
Majasta, the head of the small Islamic religious boarding school at Majasta 
near Tembayat, only three of those on the list – namely, Sèh Abdul Ahmad 
bin Abdullah al-Ansari and his son-in-law, also known as Sèh Ahmad, both 
of whom hailed from Jeddah, and Sarif Samparwedi (Hasan Munadi), who 
commanded Dipanagara’s ‘priestly’ Barjumungah bodyguard regiment – can 
be clearly identified as Arabs. In addition, there were some eighteen religious 
and mosque officials (pengulu, ketib, modin) as well as keepers of holy sites 
and graveyards (amad-dalem, jimat/jurukunci). At least ten on the list were re-
ligious teachers (kyai guru), namely heads of pesantrèn from Bagelèn, Kedhu, 
Mataram, Pajang, Panaraga and Madiun. A further three, Nyai Maja, Kyai 
Maja’s official consort who died in childbirth in 1828, Nyai Gedhung Gubah, 
the wife of Maja’s former pupil Haji Imamraji, and Nyai Muhamad Hasan, 
Maja’s sister from Pulo Kadang, were respected female members of these 
same religious communities (Carey 1987:277).
The remaining 121 were referred to as kyai, a term used loosely in Java as 
an honorific epithet for old men or revered country gentlemen as well as for 
teachers of religious and spiritual disciplines. All those listed as kyai in the 
Dutch reports, which form the basis for the present survey, may not have 
been men of religion in the strict sense although most undoubtedly were. 
They included several kyai who were adept in the mystical ‘sciences’ (ngèlmu) 
and had special skills in the instruction of their followers in the esoteric arts of 
warfare, ranging from the inculcation of warlike virtues (ngèlmu kadigdayan) 
and the art of striking fear (ngèlmu kawedukan) to invulnerability to bullets 
and sharp weapons (ngèlmu kaslametan; Carey 1981a:253 note 75). Amongst 
the special charms and amulets (jimat) they specialised in were pieces of 
wood and strips of paper with intricately written sacred texts or rajah. These 
were carried into battle in the folds of turbans or sewn into the white tabards 
of Dipanagara’s elite troops (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:208; Aukes 
1935:74; Carey 1981a:276 note 168). Widely considered to confer protection 
from danger, they were believed to have the power to turn Dutch gunpowder 
The power of prophecy628
and lead into water (Payen 1988:72, 129 note 200). Likewise, the banners car-
ried into battle by the prince’s troops were also seen to have magical powers. 
Blessed by the ulama, they were decorated with crescent moons, snakes and 
sentences from the Qur’ān (Javasche Courant, 20-10-1829; Booms 1911:34; p. 
152). Every unit of 150 men had a separate battle banner in red, black, white 
or yellow colours. 
Dipanagara’s own personal standard, as we have seen, was a large yellow 
silk square with his royal titles as Sultan Èrucakra inscribed in black Arabic 
lettering. When he took to the field, however, a green triangular pennant with 
a black disc in the centre appears to have indicated his presence amongst his 
troops. Senthot’s was red (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:208; p. 153, Plate 
65). It is clear that the prince himself was considered to have magical powers 
as a living jimat. According to Smissaert, some in Yogya thought he could fly, 
make it rain or be dry (Carey 1981a:276 note 168), while other sources refer 
to his invulnerability to bullets and intuitive capacity to tell people’s char-
acter through the study of their faces (ngèlmu firasat; Carey 1981a:276 note 
168; Chapter III). Not surprisingly, many desired to develop closer links with 
him. In September 1826, Kyai Banjarsari, the head of the well-known religious 
school in the Madiun area, wrote to him begging him for a ‘jimat of his blood’ 
in the person of his sister, Radèn Ayu Sasradiwirya, to reinforce his kinship 
ties with the prince’s family (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:568; Carey 
1981a:276 note 168). 
Dipanagara’s status in the eyes of his santri supporters was greatly en-
hanced by the religious character of his struggle against the Dutch and their 
‘heathen apostate’ Indonesian allies. As we have seen (pp. 583-91), this took 
on many of the aspects of a ‘holy war’ or prang sabil, something which the 
Dutch Minister of the Colonies C.Th. Elout (in office 1824-1829), pointed 
out in a March 1827 letter to the king, when he rejected the idea of buying 
Dipanagara out with a separate principality made up of lands taken from the 
Yogya sultanate. Underscoring how religious influences had played a crucial 
role in the fighting, he described how in nearly every engagement groups 
of religious scholars or ulama, clad in their distinctive white or green tab-
ards and turbans, had helped to stiffen the resolve of Dipanagara’s troops 
through chanting endlessly repeated phrases from the Qur’ān.48 Elout’s de-
scription was confirmed by Lawick van Pabst, who mentioned that both men 
and women, who joined Dipanagara, had shaved their heads, wore ‘priestly’ 
dress and went into battle chanting dhikr.49 In fact, the cutting off of hair only 
seems to have become a mark of the holy war following Dipanagara’s vic-
tory at Kasuran on 28 July 1826 (Chapter IV note 10), and not all the prince’s 
48 NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 4194, GKA 46k, C.Th. Elout (The Hague) to King William I 
(The Hague/Brussels), 19-3-1827.
49 Dj.Br. 6, Van Pabst, ‘Nota ter betoogen’, 5-11-1828. See further Carey 1987:277 note 17. 
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supporters, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, were clad in tabards and tur-
bans; during the siege of Yogyakarta in early August 1825, the body of one of 
the female fighters, who may have been a member of the court Amazon regi-
ment (prajurit èstri), was found to be clothed entirely in male Javanese fight-
ing dress (prajuritan).50 Dutch field commanders, however, were sufficiently 
concerned about the role of the ulama on Dipanagara’s side in the fighting 
that they took the precaution of attaching religious scholars to their own mo-
bile columns, ordering them to lead the chanting of dhikr before their men, 
who included many Madurese and other Indonesian troops, went into battle 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:293). They also included prominent reli-
gious figures, often sayyid (descendants of The Prophet) or those who passed 
themselves off as such, in their various negotiations with Dipanagara before 
1830 in the hopes that this would enhance their negotiating position (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:248-50, V:584-5; Carey 1987:278 note 19; p. 511 
note 18, p. 676). After the war, they likewise took care to find places for many 
of Dipanagara’s leading religious supporters as pengulu and assistant pengulu 
in the newly created government regencies (kabupatèn) carved out of the ter-
ritories annexed from the courts in 1830 (Carey 1987:278 note 20).
It was precisely the marked religious character of the war which caused 
Elout to reject suggestions made by some senior Dutch officials that hostilities 
should be brought to an end by recognising Dipanagara as an independent 
prince in the same way that Mangkubumi (Hamengkubuwana I), Radèn Mas 
Said (Mangkunagara I) and Natakusuma (Pakualam I), had been recognised 
in 1755, 1757 and 1812 respectively. In Elout’s view, Dipanagara’s claim to be 
recognised as a protector and regulator of religion, and his intimate associa-
tions with the religious communities made any such concessions impossible. 
The war in his opinion threatened the very foundations of Christian European 
authority in Java, the religious factor alone setting it apart from the dynastic 
struggles of previous centuries.51
Satria and santri: the breakdown in relations between Dipanagara and Kyai Maja
Why did the santri rally to Dipanagara in 1825? The question is worth asking 
because if one considers the course of Javanese history up to the Java War, 
relations between the court and the religious communities in south-central 
Java had been marked more by hostility than cooperation. One thinks here of 
50 Dj.Br. 7, F.D. Cochius (Magelang) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 3-8-1825 (on the discovery 
of the body of a female soldier dressed in full male battle dress [prajuritan] on the outskirts of 
Yogya). See further Carey 1981a:xliii.
51 NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 4194, GKA 46k, C.Th. Elout (The Hague) to King William I 
(The Hague/Brussels), 19-3-1827.
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the bloody events of Sunan Amangkurat I’s reigned (1646-1677) when thou-
sands of ‘men of religion’ and their families had been put to the sword on 
the northern alun-alun (great square) of the kraton of Plérèd in circa 1650. The 
so-called Javanese ‘Succession Wars’ of the late seventeenth and early eight-
eenth centuries had also highlighted the inherent tensions between the kraton 
and the kauman (firm religious community). This saw religious scholars and 
revered ‘saints’ like Panembahan Rama of the Kajoran religious dynasty near 
Tembayat participating in major rebellions against royal authority such as that 
led by the young Madurese nobleman, Radèn Trunajaya, a man with strong re-
ligious convictions, in 1676-1680 (De Graaf 1940:273-328; Ricklefs 1993:30-57).
Why should the Java War have been different? The uniqueness of 
Dipanagara’s upbringing at Tegalreja (Chapter II) may have counted for 
something here. Certainly, his personal commitment to Islam and his exten-
sive contacts with the santri communities in south-central Java (pp. 98-101) 
marked him out as a rather unusual product of kraton society. But this was not 
without its problems. Just where did his loyalties lie? Did he remain at heart 
a Yogya nobleman who happened to have experienced an unusual childhood 
and exposure to the teachings of Islam? If this was the case, was he no more 
than an ascetic version of Pangéran Buminata, the pious Surakarta grandee 
renowned as a patron of religious teachers in the Sunan’s capital (Chapter 
II)? Or had he abandoned entirely the respect due to him as a satria (warrior 
prince; member of the Yogya ruling family), in order to throw in his lot with 
the santri? For the author of the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara52 
the answer was not in doubt: Dipanagara was an ‘egg-saint’, a hypocrite san-
tri, white outside but inside all yellow (Carey 1981a:19):
II. 8  ‘It is a sham his giving himself over to religion,
 9 and often going away to perform asceticism.
   He is hand in glove with the santri.
   He has given up the sense of honour of the satria,




   He mixes with the scum of the nation
   [and] is arrogant enough to invite battle.
   But these santri, what do they amount to?
Another contemporary Javanese source, the Buku Kedhung Kebo, put it slightly 
differently. The problem for the author of this text53 was not so much the 
52 On the authorship of this text, see Carey 1981a:xvii-xix.
53 On the authorship of the Buku Kedhung Kebo, see Carey 1974b:259-84.
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genuineness of Dipanagara’s commitment to Islam, but rather the appropri-
ateness of his decision to vest political power in the santri. Again the reply 
was unequivocal:
XIV.35   The santri cannot govern the state
 for that is the character of the santri.
 They seek themselves.
 They cannot wield political authority
 for their minds are narrow.
 Very different is the charisma of a king.
Dipanagara himself seems to have been deeply conflicted. On the one hand, 
he was waging a holy war and for this he needed the support of the santri, not 
least to ensure that he interpreted his Qur’ānic mandate correctly (Chapter 
X note 184). On the other hand, he was a traditional Javanese, quintessen-
tially so as Nicolaus Engelhard, the veteran former VOC official, had pointed 
out (p. 510). As a prominent member of the Yogya royal house, he naturally 
thought in terms of setting up a kraton with all the trappings of monarchy, 
albeit one with a distinctive Javanese Islamic hue. This was clear to Dutch 
captives like Portier,54 who was brought to Dipanagara’s temporary head-
quarters at Kemusuh55 in Kulon Praga district in mid-1826, and rode with the 
prince to the neighbouring village of Kepurun. In Portier’s eyes, the journey 
had all the aspects of a royal progress with Dipanagara attired in full state 
regalia,56 drummers going before him, his elite Bulkio bodyguard regiment 
with lances providing his personal guard of honour,57 and Kyai Maja in his 
signature ‘priestly garb’ (dark green tabard and white turban; Somer 1938, 
II:443), and the Yogya princes riding immediately behind. The Dutchman had 
the impression that as many as 10,000 armed men were on the move but 
this must have been an exaggeration. On their arrival at Kepurun, the prince 
held court on a bamboo throne in a traditional Javanese pendhapa (open-sided 
pavilion), giving out letters of authority (piagem), approving battle plans and 
questioning Kyai Maja about progress on the Salatiga-Boyolali front. Maja 
and the assembled princes, the latter all dressed in white ‘priestly’ clothes, sat 
on the floor before him as in a formal kraton audience, answering his ques-
tions. This was a traditional style of governance, a kraton in the wilderness 
54 All references from Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826).
55 For the location of Kemusuh see US NIMA Geonames Server (S 7˚ 42’ 0” E 110˚ 17’ 16”, 
Kabupaten Kulonprogo), which gives its position between Nanggulon and the Praga River, close 
to the village of Resaja, where the wives and children of Dipanagara and his top commanders 
were kept. I am grateful to Amrit Gomperts for this reference.
56 For descriptions of Dipanagara’s attire as Sultan Èrucakra and leader in the holy war, see 
Carey 1981a:276-7 note 169; Payen 1988:95 note 48; Chapter X. 
57 For another description of Dipanagara’s personal bodyguard of 3-400 turbaned ‘priests’ 
(presumably members of priestly Barjumungah regiment) and as many cavalry, all armed with 
lances, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:553.
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much like Sultan Mangkubumi’s wartime residence at Yogya in 1749 or his 
temporary pavilion (pesanggrahan) at Gamping (1755-1756) where he lived 
prior to the occupation of his newly built Yogya kraton (Ricklefs 1974a:79-80). 
Dipanagara reinforced this image of a court by conferring titles on his close 
family (Chapter X note 219; Appendix IV), marrying key supporters to mem-
bers of his family,58 distributing traditional largesse to his supporters at the 
time of the Garebeg ceremonies,59 having one of his santri advisers act the 
court jester (Chapter XII note 75), and giving yellow payung (state umbrellas) 
to his princely followers and military commanders as a mark of their status in 
the holy war.60 The fact that these quintessential kraton symbols of office were 
described in the Javanese sources as ‘signs of the holy war’ (pratandha prang 
sabil) is a measure of the confusion which seems to have prevailed about what 
Dipanagara was doing. Was he establishing a kraton or fighting for something 
entirely different – a new moral order in Java in which the high state of the 
Islamic religion would be restored? This is what the prince and those close to 
him said they were doing,61 but it was certainly not how Kyai Maja came to 
58 Amongst these marriages was that of Kyai Maja to the divorced wife of Dipanagara’s uncle, 
Pangéran Mangkubumi, see note 46.
59 See Bataviasche Courant 44, 2-11-1825 (on preparations for Dipanagara’s celebration of Gare-
beg Mulud when he gave out the same presents to the ‘priests’ [ulama] as the Yogya sultan); Dj.Br. 
7, H.M. de Kock (Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 27-10-1825 (on Dipan-
agara’s celebration of the Garebeg Mulud at Dagèn to the south of Selarong, reporting that ‘the 
priests from the royal burial ground at Mangiran [on the Praga River] who usually go to Yogya 
to pay their respects to the sultan [will now pay their respects to Dipanagara], for there is now 
the general belief that if the rebel [Dipanagara], who has recently been raised as sultan, is able 
to celebrate this holy feast undisturbed, this will gain him a great following amongst the float-
ing masses’); Javasche Courant 53, 1-5-1828 (on Pangéran Dipanagara II celebrating the Garebeg 
Puwasa in the company of his army commanders with ‘princely lustre’ at the village of Alang-
Alang Ombo in western Bagelèn, the local inhabitants bringing him presents of tribute cash [pajak], 
meat, fruit and rice, and decking his house out ‘in the usual style with palm fronds’).
60 Carey 1981a:285 note 209, 286 note 215. See also Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:244 on 
Dipanagara’s practice of sending his personal payung out to the villages to raise support.
61 Carey 1987:279-81. As a senior ulama who went over to the Dutch with Kyai Maja in mid-
November 1828 put it: ‘The conduct of Dipanagara is due to the fact that both princes [the Sunan 
of Surakarta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta] have forgotten to protect the Islamic religion. Many 
[Javanese] Muslims cannot read the shahadat [confession of The Faith] and forget to pray five 
times a day. They do not fast and do not give to the priests the lawful tithe of their income [zakat]. 
Moreover, they do not go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. Besides these five points, some [Java-
nese] Muslims use strong drink and associate with women without being married to them. Both 
[south-central] Javanese rulers are entirely indifferent to this and do not complain about these 
shortcomings’, Carey 1987:279-80. This rather orthodox statement of Dipanagara’s war aims was 
later underscored by the prince himself in his various negotiations with the Dutch officers who 
arranged his surrender in early 1830 (Carey 1987:281). Speaking to De Stuers on his journey from 
Magelang to Semarang in late March and early April 1830, he remarked: ‘If I insisted on [my] 
known demands then it was out of the conviction that people at the courts did not follow the old 
adat [custom] so scrupulously as before and above all neglected religion’ (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, V:744).
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perceive Dipanagara’s wartime priorities. When the kyai surrendered to the 
Dutch on the slopes of Mount Merapi on 12 November 1828, it soon became 
apparent to the Dutch officers negotiating with him that relations between 
the prince’s kraton and santri supporters had irretrievably broken down. As 
Maja himself put it to his Dutch captors (Carey 1987:282):
The first proposal which won me over to waging war was that Dipanagara pro-
mised me the restoration of our Faith. Believing this, I joined him wholeheartedly, 
but later I discovered this was not his real aim as he speedily began setting up 
and organising a kraton. I made representations to him which he took very much 
amiss so much so indeed that we exchanged bitter words. Since that time I was in 
disagreement with Dipanagara, which led to him ordering me to bring the war to 
an end in one way or another.
De Stuers would later corroborate this after discussions with Dipanagara fol-
lowing his capture in Magelang (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:742):
That occasion comfirmed what [we] had often heard tell formerly by various 
Javanese – namely, that when Kyai Maja was lowered in rank and regard, matters 
had less cohesion amongst the rebels [brandhal] as that priest [Maja], who passed 
for being very learned in knowing the Qur’ān completely by heart, had succeeded 
by the exact rules laid down in it in establishing his influence and authority among 
the people to such an extent that even priests who had often been to Mecca had 
shown themselves in everything inferior to Maja.
When Dipanagara learnt before his departure for Batavia in early April 1830 
that two of his closest religious associates – Mas Pengulu Kyai Pekih Ibrahim, 
who had served as his pengulu (in office 1828-1830), and Haji Badarudin, the 
erstwhile head of the Suranatan regiment in Yogya (Appendix VIIb) – both of 
whom he had known from his youth up and who had followed him through-
out the war, had decided not to share his exile, he burst out bitterly (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:742):
These are the men who should have been the first to adhere loyally to me […] for 
what do I know of the Holy Books except what they taught and told me? They are 
thus the people I have always relied on […] they are now the ones who desert me! 
Such clear evidence of a complete rift between the two principal leaders of 
the Java War, a war which had earlier impressed men like C.Th. Elout with 
the strength of its religious zeal and the degree of cooperation between the 
prince’s kraton and santri supporters, raises important questions about the 
nature of Dipanagara’s leadership. How can we explain the unravelling of 
this once mutually supportive relationship?
One element relates to the regional rivalries already referred to. Dipanagara’s 
base was Mataram, whereas Kyai Maja’s loyalties lay in Pajang. After Maja had 
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rallied to the prince at Selarong in August 1825, many of the ulama in his en-
tourage joined the prince’s elite bodyguard regiments (Turkio, Arkio, Bulkio) 
and were appointed to important positions in the civil administration under 
Dipanagara’s control (Carey 1987:287). In late August 1826, following a string 
of victories by the prince’s forces, which had resulted in much of Pajang falling 
under his sway, Maja began to press for an attack on those places which had 
yet to be overrun (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:469-70). These included 
Kalitan and Boyolali, but his ultimate prize was Surakarta. The kyai saw this as 
his natural sphere of influence. As Dipanagara relates in his babad, he boasted 
that the previous generation of princes in Surakarta had studied under his fa-
ther, Kyai Badhèran, and now their sons were all his pupils. At the same time, 
he belittled the prince’s own standing in Surakarta, stating that although the 
court was generally well disposed towards him in the early stages of the war, he 
received little support from the Sunan’s kraton as the conflict had developed.62 
Dipanagara describes how he became increasingly irked by this arrogant atti-
tude. As we will see shortly, the momentum of his military advances was held 
up by these disputes and precious weeks were lost so that when on 15 October 
1826 the prince’s 5,000-strong army began to move into position for an attack 
on Surakarta, he suffered a major defeat at Gawok just to the west of the city. 
Bitter recriminations followed. His kraton and santri supporters blamed each 
other for the disaster. In particular, Kyai Maja and his family were accused of 
having recklessly pressed the attack on the Sunan’s capital to further their own 
interests (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:496-520; Carey 1987:287). What 
had been a festering rivalry, noted as early as May 1826, when the minister 
of the colonies’ Malay-speaking son, Major C.P.J. Elout, had relayed a report 
from the village head of Tèmpèl in the Slèman district that Dipanagara had 
not wished to remain with Kyai Maja following the end of the fasting month,63 
was now an open conflict.
This appears to have widened in August 1827 at the time of the peace ne-
gotiations brokered by William Stavers and Kyai Maja (Louw and De Klerck 
62 BD (Manado) III:188-9, XXVII (Pucung) 12-5. marmanira Ki Maja pan saya dadra. 13. tekaburnya 
mengkana pangucapipun/ sapa dènandelna/ wong Sala iku kabèh/ bapakané pan murid bapak ingwang. 14. 
ing saiki mapan kabèh murid ingsun/ mengkana jeng sultan/ Kyai Maja dèndukani/ pan nanging ya kèndel 
sakedhap kéwala. 15. sabab Pajang pan sampun radin sadarum/ nanging kantun Sala/ lawan ing Kalitan 
iki/ Boyalali punika kang dèrèng bedhah. 16. nanging sampun sedaya tan saged metu/ marma Kyai Maja / 
kelangkung tekaburnèki/ saben dina ngaturi bedhah Kalitan. On Maja’s views about Dipanagara’s lack of 
influence in Surakarta and the limited support for him there, see NA, Exhibitum 27-6-1829 no. 119k 
geheim, Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies (Batavia/Bogor), 7-2-1829. 
63 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:267, quoting C.P.J. Elout (Tèmpèl) to H.M. de Kock (Mage-
lang), 15-5-1826. Major Elout did not mention the end of the fasting month, but it is clear from 
the date of his letter that the Garebeg Puwasa had just taken place. Maja, according to Elout, had 
departed in the direction of Magelang with the majority of the ‘priests’ (ulama) while Dipanagara 
had made for the former coffee estate at Kembangarum on the slopes of Mount Merapi (Chapter 
X). On Elout’s knowledge of Malay, see Van der Kemp 1914.
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1894-1909, III:264-76), when a major dispute arose between Dipanagara and 
his chief religious adviser over the nature of political authority. According 
to the account given in the prince’s babad, Maja attempted to challenge the 
prince’s position as Sultan Èrucakra by asking him to consider dividing his 
sovereignty into four parts, that of ratu (king), wali (apostle of religion), pan-
dhita (one learned in the law) and mukmin (the believers). Maja suggested that 
Dipanagara should choose for himself one of these four functions, implying 
that if he chose that of ratu, he, Maja, would take that of wali and enjoy undis-
puted religious authority. This Dipanagara refused stating that Maja – whom 
he addressed as ‘uncle’ (paman) thereby acknowledging his status as a senior 
kyai despite the fact that he was seven years his junior – clearly wished to 
exercise authority over him. He even drew a comparison between Maja and 
the prominent spiritual lords of Giri in the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries who, according to Dipanagara, had exercised power over the sultans of 
Demak.64 Later, when the prince tried to curb Maja’s ambitions by suggesting 
that he should take over as his pengulu or head of his religious establishment 
from his first appointee Haji Imamraji (in office 1825-1828; Appendix VIIb), he 
cited the example of the early sixteenth-century Sunan Kudus, a wali whom 
Dipanagara averred had acted more like the pengulu of the sultan of Demak, 
and who was thought by the prince to have been amenable to carrying out 
the temporal demands of the Demak rulers.65 This time Maja refused stating 
that he was not from a pengulu family anyway and thus could not possibly 
contemplate such a post. Instead, he wished to be recognised as imam or head 
of the whole Islamic religious community.66 This ambitious claim Dipanagara 
dismissed, pointing out that the argument over the delineation of functions 
in his royal administration was a specious one because God had chosen him 
and him alone as the caliph of The Prophet of God in the holy war between 
Muslim and heathen in Java, and that only the Almighty knew when that 
commission would be withdrawn.67
A Javanese manuscript, which originates in the Kampung Jawa Tondano, 
Minahasa (North Sulawesi) village where Kyai Maja and some sixty-two of 
64 He also pointed out that while he may have turned to Maja for advice, he was not his pupil, 
BD (Manado) III:331, XXX (Asmaradana) 129-30. ingsun weruh karepira/ mapan jaluk wasésa/ kaya 
Sunan Giri iku/ dadi ingsun sira karya. 130. kaya Sultan Demak dhingin/ ingsun dudu* muridira. * BD 
(Manado) has dumèh, I have followed Rusche 1908-09, I:312.
65 BD (Manado) IV:45-6, XXXIII (Sinom) 52-3. dhawuhna karsa mami/ mring si paman Maja/ déné 
sasèlèhira/ Pangulu Kaji Mamraji/ si paman Maja/ ingkang sun kon gentèni. 53. dadi iku pan wus nora 
ketanggungan/ kaya dhèk Demak dhingin/ wali pangulunya/ Suhunan Kudus ika.  
66 BD (Manado) IV:46, XXXIII (Sinom) 56. lamun dadi pangulu dika aturna/ pan sanget lumuh 
mami/ namung dadi Imam*/ punika karemen kula/ kalamun pareng Nerpati/ nanging punika/ ingkang 
kula bumèni. BD (Manado) Iman, I have followed Rusche 1908-09, II:46.
67 BD (Manado) IV:59, XXXIII (Sinom) 112-3. déné sun iki Dulmajid/ karsa Hyang Sukma/ anèng 
ing Tanah Jawi. 113. pan kinarya Kalipah Jeng Rasulolah/ dadi pangirid sabil/ Èslam lawan laknat/ pan 
nugrahan kéwala/ pinundhuta rina wengi/ tan weruh ingwang/ iku kagungan Widi.
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his close associates were exiled in early 1830,68 gives an insight into how Maja 
may have seen things. It states that Dipanagara still sought worldly goals69 
and also continued to violate the syariah (Islamic religious law; Babcock 
1981a:302). The prince’s attempt to establish a kraton was already evidence of 
such worldly ambitions. He was also, according to Maja, too taken up with 
Javanese superstitions and beliefs. One incidence of this was his fascination 
with pusaka (heirloom) daggers, some of which he had obtained through as-
cetic practices and encounters with the Javanese spirit realms, a relationship 
deemed inappropriate for a strict follower of Islam (Babcock 1981a:302 note 8; 
Appendix IV note 2). However, Maja himself was not above worldly involve-
ments. A political man of the world in Babcock’s words, he had served as an 
emissary in Pakubuwana IV’s secret correspondence with various Indonesian 
rulers in 1811-1812, carrying messages to the Raja of Buleleng an act for which 
the British imprisoned him for a period in the Surakarta kepatihan (chief min-
ister’s offices; Chapter VII note 87). He was also prepared to contradict the 
Surakarta pengulu. Indeed, contemporary documents from the Surakarta court 
speak of his self-opinionated and intractable character (Babcock 1981a:301; 
Carey 1981a:262 note 110). He clearly had great ambitions for his family in 
Pajang. It is thus hardly surprising that the long-drawn out argument between 
Dipanagara and his chief religious adviser, which drew on the historical exam-
ple of the wali, proved impossible of resolution. The fact that Maja was almost 
certainly the more intelligent of the two, and had been the main driving force 
behind the war from the start, made things worse (Somer 1938, II:447-8).
Although Kyai Maja’s initial peace negotiations with the Dutch in August 
1827 seem to have had Dipanagara’s full backing, the same cannot be said for 
his initiatives in late October and November 1828. After insisting that he be 
provided with a 500-strong force, which included 300 men of the elite Bulkio 
regiment under seasoned commanders such as Muhamad Ngusman Ali Basah 
(Appendix VIIb), he entered into negotiations with the Major Tumenggung 
Wiranagara and the Javanese-speaking Dutch infantry captain, Johan Jacob 
Roeps, at the centre for scholars of Muslim religious law at Melangi (p. 99). 
The Kampung Jawa Tondano manuscript suggests that Kyai Maja was keen 
to make a settlement with the Dutch for the benefit of the ‘servants of Allah’, 
for the well-being of Java and for the preservation of Islam.70 But it seems 
68 For a discussion of the size of Kyai Maja’s party and the actual dates of their departure from 
Batavia (they may have travelled to North Sulawesi in two groups via Makassar and Ambon), see 
Babcock 1981a:281-92. Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 49, referred to ‘the high priest Kyai Maja together with 
62 of his followers having arrived in Manado’.
69 Babcock 1981:302 gives nedi ‘aradl dunya, which must be a Javanese-Arabic rendering of 
nedhi aral dunya.
70 Babcock 1981a:303 note 11, which cites the Kampung Jawa Tondano MS as stating that 
Maja’s mission was amrih mashlahaté kawulaning Allah, sedaya sarta amrih karaharjané negari [lan] 
lestariné Agami Islam. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:595-602, which describes 
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from the account given in Louw and De Klerck (1894-1909, IV:590-6) that he 
used the presence of this force to gain leverage in the negotiations by arraying 
them in battle formation just outside Melangi directly in front of Lieutenant-
Colonel Joseph Le Bron de Vexela’s 3rd mobile column which had been dis-
patched to provide security for the Dutch and Javanese negotiators. Exactly 
what Maja had in mind is unclear. He may have been seeking to have his 
family returned to Pajang with special privileges from the European govern-
ment. These may have included his recognition as a regulator of religion at 
the courts (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:590-1) backed perhaps by a 
military force or barisan (troop) made up of former Bulkio, which he may 
have thought the government would accord him. Such barisan had been per-
mitted to certain prominent noble supporters of Dipanagara who made their 
peace with the Dutch,71 but what Maja failed to realise was that the Dutch 
were far more lenient with members of the nobility who came over to their 
side than with prominent santri like himself whom they deemed principally 
responsible for stoking the fires of religious zealotry during the war (Somer 
1938, II:447; Babcock 1981b:77 note 9). 
Between the first and the second round of the negotiations, which took 
place on 31 October and 5-9 November 1828 respectively, Maja appears to 
have demanded a further 500 troops from the prince’s reserve, a request 
which was refused. This sparked a bitter argument with Dipanagara’s senior 
military adviser, Pangéran Ngabèhi, into which the prince himself was drawn 
leading to a further fraying of their already tense relationship.72 Keeping 
entirely silent about his intentions, according to Dipanagara, Maja then de-
parted again for Melangi with the intention of cutting a separate deal with 
the Dutch. But no deal was on the table. In fact, Le Bron’s column had been 
tasked with making sure that Maja and his force did not escape. Thus when 
the negotiations broke down on 10 November and it became clear that the 
kyai was attempting to make for Pajang,73 he was intercepted on the slopes 
of Mount Merapi near Bouwens van der Boyen’s former estate at Babadan. 
Given two minutes to make up his mind between unconditional surrender 
and immediate battle under unfavourable conditions (Le Bron had Maja’s 
force as good as encircled), Maja opted for the former. Even then the kyai’s 
in detail the two meetings between the Dutch and Maja on 31-10-1828 and 5-11-1828, and the 
prominence that Maja gave to the position of Islam in contemporary Javanese society, and his 
willingness to recognise the Dutch as ‘the sword of religion’ (pedhangipun ing agami), see further 
Carey 1974b:285.
71 These included Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II and Pangéran Natapraja, a grandson of Radèn 
Ayu Sérang (Chapter IV), who had come over to the Dutch on 10-12-1826 and 21-6-1827 respec-
tively, and would subsequently be the case for Senthot, when he made his peace on 16-10-1829.
72 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:602-4; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 24-5.
73 It seems that Kyai Maja was intending to make for his eponymous pradikan village to begin 
new negotiations, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:610.
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pretence that he was joining the Dutch of his own free will was maintained. 
Entering Klathèn under Dutch escort on 14 November, his still fully armed 
force, according to Nahuys van Burgst’s eyewitness account, came into the 
town as though celebrating a victory, striking up ‘religious songs from the 
Qur’ān’ as they marched (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:617). It was only 
with great difficulty and after a shouting match with Nahuys, that Maja was 
prevailed upon to allow his force to be partially disarmed.74 The Kampung 
Jawa Tondano manuscript, which gives a seemingly accurate account of these 
events, maintains the fiction that far from surrendering the venerable kyai was 
being ‘invited’ to confer with ever more highly placed Dutch officials as he 
proceeded via Salatiga and Semarang to Batavia. The reality was quite oth-
erwise. Maja was detained for a year in the city gaol in the vain hope that he 
would use his good offices to win over a number of other Java War leaders. 
When that failed, he was banished from Java for life (Babcock 1981a:304). 
After the war, when Dipanagara and Kyai Maja initially found themselves 
sharing the same Minahasan exile,75 the attitudes of the two men were a 
study in incompatibility. The prince showed continuing solicitude for Maja, 
complaining to Knoerle during his voyage to Manado that the kyai had not 
been allowed to bring his part Balinese wife into exile with him and dictat-
ing a request on his arrival in Manado that she be allowed to join her hus-
band in Tondano along with the wives of three of the senior commanders 
who had been taken prisoner with him.76 He also sent Maja a present of 
f 50 and received at least two individuals from the kyai’s entourage, one of 
whom may have helped him as an amanuensis in writing his babad.77 Maja 
74 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:618-9. Their kris were not taken from them until they 
reached Surakarta on 16-11-1828.
75 Kyai Maja and his 62-strong party appear to have arrived in Manado on 1-5-1830 after 
lengthy stopovers in Makassar and Ambon. In accord with the instructions of the governor of 
Maluku, they had been given a place to stay in the interior of Manado Residency, namely Tonsea 
Lama near Tondano, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 49; Babcock 1981a:284.
76 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 23; vdB 391, ‘Voorstellen [van den] Pangerang Diepo Negoro aan den 
Luitenant Adjudant Knoerle in de tegenwoordigheid van den […] 2e Luitenant [C.] Bosman’, 
Manado, 19-6-1830, proposal 3. The commanders (tumenggung) in question were Urawan, Pajang 
and Brajayuda. Radèn Ayu Maja, who had lived in Bojonegoro and Madiun for most of the two 
and a half years following her husband’s capture and had come to Yogya in late 1830 through the 
good offices of the princely guardians of Hamengkubuwana V, was eventually allowed to join 
him in Tondano, but, as we have seen, not out of compassion on the part of the Dutch authorities, 
Dj.Br. 17, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to J. van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 16-2-1831, enclos-
ing a letter from F.G. Valck (on temporary commission to Yogyakarta) of 12-2-1831.
77 AN Exhibitum, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to J. van den Bosch (Batavia/
Bogor), 22-4-1831. The letter contains a list of those who were with Dipanagara in Manado. These 
included two people from Kyai Maja’s entourage from his first exile settlement in Tonsea Lama 
(Tondano), a ‘priest’, whose name is given alternatively as ‘Suranata’ and ‘Satruna’, who was 
sent to help Dipanagara at the start of the fasting month (Puwasa) of AJ 1759 (AD 22 February 
to 24 March 1831), and with whose services Dipanagara was said to be displeased; and Kyai 
Tirtadrana, ‘a very able man’ who was able to speak fluent Malay and served as the Resident 
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on the other hand refused to have anything to do with his former comrade 
in arms: he sent back the fifty florins stating that the monthly allowance he 
was receiving from the government was more than enough for himself and 
his followers. He also failed to respond to Dipanagara’s request for copies of 
quotations from the Qur’ān.78 At the same time, two haji from Maja’s entou-
rage, whom the prince had specifically asked to join him in Manado, possibly 
under pressure from Maja, refused to leave the kyai’s settlement at Tonsea 
Lama in Tondano district.79 The Dutch authorities appear to have encouraged 
this breach, pointing out to Dipanagara after his original dispatch of his cash 
gift that close relations with Maja would not be permitted.80 The Java War 
protagonists would never meet again. Maja died in his fifty-ninth year in 
Tondano on 20 December 1849 (Babcock 1981a:307), while Dipanagara, who 
outlived him by six years, expired three months before his much younger 
army commander, Senthot (note 106). Thus the Java War leaders passed from 
the scene, divided in death just as they had been separated in life by the vi-
cissitudes of war and the irreconcilable polarities of personal ambition and 
social identity. The temporary alliance of satria and santri may have imbued 
the five-year conflict with a unique social breadth not to speak of religious 
fervour, but it was a deeply unstable relationship which even a santri prince 
of Dipanagara’s stature could not bridge.
Dutch military and political tactics
Before considering how Dipanagara’s position unravelled in the final fifteen 
months (December 1828-February 1830) of the war as further defections, no-
tably that of Senthot, and battlefield losses, in particular that of Ngabèhi, 
undermined his capacity to fight, it is necessary to turn aside for a moment 
to consider what problems the Dutch faced. If the prince’s side was so riven 
with internal rivalries, in particular those between his kraton and religious 
supporters, how come it took the Dutch so long to gain the upper hand in the 
conflict? Why were nearly two years lost (1825-1827) before De Kock and his 
fellow commanders came up with a winning strategy, namely the combined 
of Manado, D.F.W. Pietermaat’s (in office 1827-1831), interpreter and spy in his dealings with 
Dipanagara, AN, Exhibitum, 30-10-1830 no. 28, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to J. van den Bosch 
(Batavia/Bogor), 20-8-1830. It was this man who may have served as Dipanagara’s amanuensis in 
the writing out of his babad from 20-5-1831 to 3-2-1832, Carey 1981a:lxi note 82; p. 733 note 232. 
78 AN, Exhibitum, 2-7-1831 no. 15 (Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade), J.P.C. Cam-
bier (Manado) to J. van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831. 
79 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 51. The haji in question were referred to as Haji Muhamad Tajib and Haji 
Ali in Knoerle’s account, see further Appendix VIIb and Chapter XII notes 154 and 200. 
80 AN Exhibitum, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to J. van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 
22-4-1831.
The power of prophecy640
use of temporary battlefield fortifications – the so-called bènthèng system – 
and a greatly increased number of mobile columns?81
Part of the answer must be sought in the glaring inadequacies of the 
Dutch colonial army. Deficient in resources, its officers took time to come 
to an understanding of the nature of the war they were waging. During the 
first two years, 6,000 infantry were deployed with a further 1,200 artillery 
and cavalry (Djamhari 2003:79). There were no reserves. Although close on 
2,400 men were sent out from the Netherlands during the course of 1826 to 
replace those killed and wounded (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:501 
note 2, 1904, III:131), they could not be immediately deployed because of their 
lack of knowledge of the terrain and the challenges of the climate. At the 
same time, their classic European military training was also found to be a 
poor preparation for the Vendéan style counter-insurgency warfare which 
they were called upon to fight in south-central Java. Attrition rates amongst 
these newly arrived troops were also very high. Many succumbed to disease 
soon after their arrival in Indonesia. Of the 6,000 European infantry on active 
service in south-central Java between July 1825 and April 1827, 1,603 or 27 
percent were dead by the end of this period (Djamhari 2003:81). 
Commissioner-General Du Bus de Gisignies’ (in office 1826-1830) economy 
measures also had a deeply demoralising effect on Dutch troops in the field: 
equipment, pay and soldier’s welfare all suffered and it proved difficult to 
recruit new troops – in Indonesia at least – because conditions were so poor. 
Van Geen, who served as the main Dutch field commander during these first 
two years,82 decided that a doubling of the Dutch troop strength was required 
and by late 1826 he was requesting a further 6,000-strong expeditionary force 
be sent out from the Netherlands. But these did not start to arrive until May 
1827 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:573-4, III:131-3). By this time, the 
newly-introduced system of temporary battlefield fortifications had begun to 
81 Djamhari 2003:88 lists eight mobile columns at the time of the introduction of the bènthèng 
stelsel in May 1827 with the names of their commanders and areas of operation. These stretched 
from Banyumas in the west to Boyolali in the east, each covering an area varying from a full Resi-
dency (Banyumas, Yogyakarta) to a single district (Menorèh, Kalijengking). By the end of the war, 
the number of columns had reached fourteen according to De Stuers 1833:Plate 3, although the 
highest number referred to by Djamhari (2003:201 ) is twelve, and Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
V:644 only list eleven with one (mobile column 9) having been suspended.
82 Although Lieutenant-General H.M. de Kock was the overall commander of Dutch forces 
during the Java War, his position as lieutenant governor-general and frequent absences in Batavia 
– for example in early January 1826 when he had to assume temporarily the governor-generalship 
during the interregnum between Van der Capellen’s departure and the arrival of Du Bus (1-1-1826 
– 16-1-1826) – meant that many of the day-to-day battlefield decisions were the responsibility of 
the Gent-born Major-General Joseph van Geen. Radèn Aria Sasradilaga’s revolt in Rembang on 
28-11-1828, however, caused De Kock to abandon his plans to hand over temporary command of 
Dutch forces in Java to Van Geen, who eventually left for Europe on 24-6-1828, after much criti-
cism of his battlefield tactics.
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transform the course of the war as we shall see in the next section (Djamhari 
2003:87-8). 
The small number of European troops made it difficult for the Dutch 
commanders to take offensive action against Dipanagara’s fast moving forc-
es in the pre-April 1827 period. Nor was the presence of large numbers of 
Indonesian auxiliaries much help. Apart from the Madurese, in particular 
those from Sumenep and Sampang (pp. 358-9), they were of doubtful mili-
tary value. Their increasing addiction to opium and their insistence on bring-
ing their wives and families on campaign greatly complicated the logistics 
of moving Dutch mobile columns through enemy-held territory. It turned 
what should have been a tight fighting force of around 500 troops,83 into a 
lumbering juggernaut which looked more like a baggage train than a military 
formation (Djamhari 2003:80-1).
The military tactics used to contain Dipanagara during the period 1825-1827 
were also inappropriate. As we have seen, this was neither a European war 
of sieges and set-piece battles, nor a Napoleonic-style campaign of swiftly 
marching armies and decisive battlefield encounters. Rather it was a guerrilla 
conflict marked by ambushes, rapid movement and unconventional attacks 
designed for surprise (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:633-4). The Javanese 
proved excellent guerrilla fighters able to subsist on minimal rations such as 
dried rice, edible roots, and fruits gathered from forest areas (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, V:632). They learnt how to wear down the enemy without 
allowing them chances for pitched battles, and proved adept in using cap-
tured weaponry against them. The three expeditions sent against Dipanagara’s 
first headquarters at Selarong in the period 21 July-9 October 1825 not only 
failed to capture the prince and his top commanders, but also proved inef-
fective in easing pressure on Yogyakarta which remained under siege until 
20 September when it was relieved by a heavily armed Dutch military col-
umn from Surakarta (Payen 1988:79-80). By the time the Dutch and Indonesian 
forces were destroying Dipanagara’s meditation cave at Guwa Secang on 10 
October, the prince was already planning his move across the Praga River to 
his new base at Deksa (4 November 1825-4 August 1826) and dividing his 
army into three fast-moving battle groups, two of which were sent to the 
north and southeast of the sultan’s capital, and a third westwards into Kulon 
Praga and eastern Bagelèn (Djamhari 2003:67). Throughout the rainy season 
of November 1825 to April 1826, these forces continued to move with vir-
tual impunity through the Mataram countryside and when the rains eased in 
83 The usual composition of a 500-strong Dutch mobile column was 350-400 infantry of whom 
100-120 were Europeans and the rest Indonesian auxiliaries (hulptroepen), 30-40 hussars, two 
mounted artillery pieces, a pioneer detachment (25 men), a medical officer, a quartermaster and a 
37-40 strong horse train with five days of supplies, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:206; Hooyer 
1895, I:62; Djamhari 2003:88.
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April 1826, 800 of his troops began to ensconce themselves in the old kraton at 
Plérèd. On 9 June, Colonel Frans David Cochius (1787-1876), De Kock’s most 
senior engineer officer, had to bring a 4,200-strong force to bear to dislodge the 
defenders in a bloodbath which left all but 40 of the 400, who stayed to guard 
the crumbling ruin, dead (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:297-9).
Undeterred by this loss, the following month (July 1826), Dipanagara’s 
forces, commanded by Senthot, began winning a series of victories which 
took them from the east bank of the Praga River to the very outskirts of 
Surakarta. In quick succession, victories at Kasuran (28 July),84 Lèngkong 
(30 July), where the flower of the Yogyakarta nobility perished, Bantul (4 
August), Kejiwan (9 August), and Delanggu (28 August), brought a large 
proportion of the south-central Javanese heartland under Dipanagara’s con-
trol. In desperation, the Dutch began stripping their outer island garrisons of 
troops and bringing up soldiers newly arrived from Europe.85 De Kock was 
determined to hold the Salatiga-Surakarta defence line. But by 11 October 
members of the Sunan’s bodyguard, who had just taken part in the Garebeg 
Mulud celebrations, had to be hurriedly thrown into the fight to clear the 
prince’s vanguard from the outlying western kampung of Surakarta (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:509). The Dutch position seemed hopeless. Only 
the arguments between Kyai Maja and Dipanagara over tactics on the Pajang 
front described in the previous section allowed them to concentrate sufficient 
troops to gain a victory over the prince at Gawok on 15 October 1826. Even 
then Dipanagara’s forces remained present in much of Pajang and Mataram 
for most of the following year. 
By the end of 1827 a new front had opened in Rembang and Jipang-
Rajegwesi when Dipanagara’s brother-in-law, Radèn Aria Sasradilaga, 
went into revolt. An erstwhile tumenggung (captain) of the sultan’s troops, 
Sasradilaga had considerable military experience and was able to count on 
the loyalty of a number of former kraton prajurit (court bodyguard troops), 
whom he had earlier commanded when he was serving as deputy head of 
the Yogya forces in alliance with the Dutch in 1825-1827 (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, III:370). He also had strong family connections and influence in 
Jipang-Rajegwesi where his father had been bupati and he himself had been 
born and brought up (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:370, 490). According 
to the pengulu of Rembang, who had married his sister, Sasradilaga had gone 
84 Van Geen reported that Dipanagara’s forces had charged at the Dutch lines in a seeming 
frenzy with blood-curdling shrieks and lowered heads, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:378. 
On the losses sustained by Dipanagara’s forces at Plèrèd, see KITLV H 263, Portier, ‘Verklaring’, 
n.y. (?9-1826).
85 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:501 note 2 on the arrival in Semarang in early September 
of 241 regulars from Makassar (with another 141 expected) and a further 468 with 15 officers from 
Padang/west coast of Sumatra in October. In the last four months of 1826, De Kock received a total 
of 2,632 new troops with 64 officers, including those from outer island garrisons and direct from 
Europe.
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into revolt largely because of the actions of the Yogya patih, Danureja IV, who 
had thwarted his ambition to replace his recently slain Javanese commanding 
officer. Leaving the kraton secretly with his troops, Sasradilaga had made his 
way along the south coast to the eastern mancanagara eventually ending up in 
Jipang (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:490). For some anxious weeks be-
tween early December 1827 and mid-January 1828 the government’s overland 
communications between Semarang and Surabaya were cut. De Kock had to 
cancel plans to return to the Netherlands and hand over temporary command 
of the army to Van Geen (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:391-400), a ser-
endipitous decision given the hatred aroused by Van Geen’s scorched earth 
tactics, his summary execution of prisoners, and his indiscriminate brutal-
ity towards the local populations in central Java, which included the burial 
of suspects up to their necks in earth to be eaten by ants and other insects 
(Knoerle ‘Journal’, 32; Chambert-Loir 2000:284; Djamhari 2003:68-9). 
A good year before reports of the new revolt in Rembang began to arrive in 
late 1827, Dutch military and civilian officials had embarked on a series of in-
tensive consultations aimed at finding a suitable policy to end the war (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:573-8). Both initially blamed the other for the mili-
tary stalemate. Dutch field commanders accused the Residents of failing to 
prevent the local population from joining Dipanagara’s forces, while the senior 
civilian administrators berated De Kock and his generals for failing to grasp 
the wider socio-economic implications of their military failure. It was plain to 
see that the south-central Javanese economy was at a standstill, taxes could not 
be gathered, Javanese officials were still deserting in droves and the colonial 
state was sliding into bankruptcy (Van der Kemp 1901, II:271-2; Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, II:573-7; De Prins 2002:137; Djamhari 2003:69). Even sup-
posedly loyal rulers like Sunan Pakubuwana VI could not be counted on (p. 
559). Two-faced at best, the mercurial Sunan protested his loyalty to the Dutch 
while preparing to throw in his lot with the prince should the Dutch military 
position become untenable (Carey 1981a:292-3 note 241; Djamhari 2003:69). 
Meanwhile, high-level disputes between Du Bus and De Kock over tac-
tics made the search for a peaceful resolution to the war even more diffi-
cult. The commissioner-general fancied himself as a military strategist even 
though his sole experience of war was as a minor Napoleonic functionary in 
his native Doornik (Tournai) and later as a deputy district administrator in 
West Flanders during the June 1815 Waterloo campaign.86 He had no time for 
the expense and patient planning involved in De Kock’s fortification system. 
Instead, he thought in terms of the shock tactics of the French Revolutionary 
86 Du Bus had served as adjoint au maire (deputy mayor) of Tournai (Doornik) during the 1813 
allied advance on France and then as sous-intendant (deputy district administrator) of Courtrai 
(Kortrijk), both towns near his birth-place at Dottenijs (Dottignies) in West Flanders, during the 
Waterloo compaign of June 1815, De Prins 2002:148, 285. 
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Plate 68. Patih (prime minister) and the Sultan of Madura (formerly Panembahan 
Cakraningrat V of Pamekasan) discussing the sending of Madurese troops to help 
the Dutch. KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo). Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, 
Leiden.
levée en masse (mass mobilization of the population) and the quick break-
throughs which might come through direct negotiations with enemy lead-
ers. He tried both in September 1827 at Salatiga, coming in person to central 
Java to participate in the talks initiated by William Stavers and Kyai Maja the 
previous month, and issuing a grandiloquent appeal for a general popular 
uprising against Dipanagara on 26 September (De Prins 2002:148-9). Both fell 
flat. In the words of Du Bus’ biographer, Bart de Prins ‘the princely states 
and Yogyakarta were not France or Paris, [and] to the great annoyance of De 
Kock and his generals, Du Bus completely failed to see it’ (De Prins 2002:149). 
One of the few initiatives taken by the commissioner-general at this juncture, 
which did address some of the underlying causes of the war, was his 17 May 
1827 decision to end Van der Capellen’s 1823 prohibition of the land-rent in 
the princely states (p. 529). The short-term benefits of this were immediately 
apparent. They helped to resolve some of the problems faced by Javanese 
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noble landowners in the years immediately preceding the Java War and per-
suaded many to throw in their lot with the government in the closing years 
of the conflict (De Prins 2002:147-8).
Other political strategies for bringing the war to an end, canvassed in this 1826-
1827 period, were rejected as impractical. One such was the Surakarta Resident 
Hendrik MacGillivray’s suggestion that Yogyakarta should be dismembered 
and divided between the government, the Susuhunan and the Mangkunagaran. 
De Kock thought this altogether too radical. Indeed, MacGillivray was himself 
deemed to be rather less than credible as an authority on Javanese court af-
fairs. Within months of making his proposal, he would be suspended from 
his position as Resident for administrative malpractice (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, II:411-6; Appendix IX). Another was the idea of splitting Yogyakarta 
and offering Dipanagara an independent principality. As we have seen, this 
was dismissed out of hand by the Dutch Minister of the Colonies C.Th. Elout as 
inappropriate given the religious character of the war, although it was brought 
up again by Lawick van Pabst on 28 February 1830 when it became clear that 
Dipanagara was prepared to negotiate a peace deal.87 The only initiative which 
was taken up was the restoration of the exiled second sultan of Yogya. This oc-
curred on 17 August 1826 in a hastily convened ceremony presided over by Du 
Bus in the governor-general’s palace in Bogor, the sultan returning to Yogya on 
20 September and taking over the royal administration two days later (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:433-43). But this did not have the desired effect. 
The seventy-six year old second sultan was in his dotage and lacking in energy 
(Chapter VIII). Dominated by his rapacious, low-born and immensely fat last 
official consort, Ratu Sultan,88 an erstwhile commander of his Amazon corps, 
the sixteen months of his third and last period as ruler were deeply demoralis-
ing for the Yogya court. In Dipanagara’s words: ‘The restoration of [the] old 
sultan […] was an unrighteous act for his sons and grandsons could expect 
nothing good from this sultan’ (Knoerle 1835:151).
Although de Kock’s hopes that the old sultan’s return would restore 
the moral authority of the sultanate were misplaced (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, II:435; Carey and Houben 1987:32; Carey 1992:438 note 201; Djamhari 
2003:77-8), he took the opportunity to make a close study of the military situa-
tion, coming up with a five-point strategy which combined both political and 
87 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:724-5 (which prints a fragment of the text of Lawick van 
Pabst’s note of 28-2-1830); Kielstra 1896a:86 (quoting Weitzel 1852-53, II:530-32). This proposal 
should be read with Van Pabst’s earlier concept note (‘Nota ter betoogen’, 5-11-1828, for full title 
see Chapter X note 20), which compared the Java War with Sultan Mangkubumi’s rebellion in 
1746 and reflected on the relevance of the 1755 Giyanti peace settlement for the prospects of a 
similar agreement with Dipanagara. In his second concept note, Van Pabst spoke of establishing 
the prince as a quasi-independent ruler like Radèn Mas Said (Mangkunagara I) with 4,000 cacah 
(households) of land. But it was never seriously considered.
88 Formerly Radèn Ayu Andayaningrat, see Carey 1992:413 note 73.
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military elements. First, he decided to develop a closer relationship with the 
sultanate so that the remaining princes and senior officials did not go over 
to Dipanagara. Second, he resolved to deepen political and military ties with 
Surakarta so that both Sunan Pakubuwana VI and Mangkunegara II remained 
loyal. Third, he made a commitment to take back those areas of Mataram still 
under Dipanagara’s control and restore an effective system of administration 
and security so that the economy could be revived. Fourth, he determined 
to contain the prince’s forces within a narrow strip of mountainous land be-
tween the Praga and Bagawanta rivers in the districts of Kulon Praga, south-
ern Kedhu and eastern Bagelèn so that they could be isolated and worn down. 
This would create what in today’s military parlance would be called a ‘killing 
area’ (Djamhari 2003:78-9). Finally, he resolved to capture Dipanagara and the 
other leaders of the rebellion, if necessary by putting a price on their heads.89
The key to the success of De Kock’s plans was the system of temporary 
battlefield fortifications (bènthèng stelsel) pioneered by his chief engineer of-
ficer, Colonel Cochius, whose experience of setting up such fortification sys-
tems had long preceded the Java War.90 Early in the conflict (October 1825), 
Cochius had set up his first bènthèng at Kalijengking in southern Kedhu on 
the Magelang-Yogya road to provide protection for military convoys as well 
as overnight shelter for his troops. Other mobile column commanders fol-
lowed suit. One such was the Gent-born Major Eduard Marie de Bast (1789-
1827), who constructed his own fortification at Trayem in southern Kedhu on 
the road from Magelang to Beliga in late 1825 (Djamhari 2003:83). Cochius’ 
original design was very simple. After choosing a suitable strategic location, 
usually on a hill top or some other natural defence, he built a rectangular 
barrack-like structure sufficient to house at least a platoon (25-30) of soldiers. 
He then defended it by erecting a stout coconut palm-tree trunk stockade 
roughly 1.7 metres high with one or possibly two elevated gun-emplacements 
at the corners where cannon could be mounted on earthwork redoubts. Given 
the temporary nature of the construction, such fortifications could be easily 
abandoned and new bènthèng built in other locations where there was greater 
need for close support of troops in the field (Weitzel 1855-7, I:39; Louw and 
89 Djamhari 2003:78-9. On the day of Pangéran Ngabèhi’s death in the Kelir mountains on 
21-9-1829, De Kock offered a reward of 10,000 Spanish dollars (f 20,000) for anyone handing in 
Dipanagara dead or alive, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:377-8; Soekanto 1965:401.
90 Djamhari 2003:87, states that Cochius had served under Daendels in Java as a young first 
lieutenant-engineer tasked with establishing fortifications in strategic north coast cities (Batavia, 
Semarang and Surabaya) to prevent a British landing, but there is no mention of his previous Java 
experience in his service record in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:260 note 1. This indicates that 
Cochius only arrived in Java in May 1816 as a captain-engineer, and received his appointment as 
adjunct director of fortifications six years later (22-6-1822). Djamhari gives a note (2003:87 note 
34) to substantiate his assertion, which purports to refer to a document in the De Kock collection, 
but this has seemingly nothing to do with Cochius. Many of Djamhari’s notes seem to be out of 
sequence.
XI The last stand of the old order 647
De Klerck 1894-1909, II:578-80; Djamhari 2003:84-5, 231-2, 305-8). 
Introduced on a systematic basis from May 1827 as part of De Kock’s 
new integrated battlefield strategy, the bènthèng, along with the eleven mo-
bile columns which were operational in south-central Java by the end of the 
war (note 81), were the key to Dutch military success against Dipanagara.91 
Indeed, by March 1830 no less than 258 such temporary fortifications had been 
constructed throughout central and east Java, the largest number (90) being 
built in 1828.92 They covered a vast area stretching from the district capital 
of Banyumas in the west to Panaraga in the east. At least sixteen of the struc-
tures were large enough to house over 100 troops and could mount a number 
of cannon (Djamhari 2003:315). Cochius’ own contribution would later be set 
in stone through the construction of one of the largest of these fortresses – 
the post-war Fort Cochius at Gombong in the Kebumèn Residency of western 
Bagelèn (Houben 1994:111) – which would subsequently serve as one of the 
first postings of an obscure Javanese corporal of the Royal Netherlands Indies 
Army by the name of Soeharto (1921-2007) who would later become the sec-
ond president of Indonesia (1966-1998). In this fashion the bènthèng stelsel was 
destined to have a continuing resonance in modern Indonesian history.
Dipanagara’s fiscal regime; Senthot and the problems of dwifungsi
How then did this new strategy impact on Dipanagara and his commanders 
in the closing stages of the Java War? To answer this, it is necessary to take 
a closer look at the prince’s fiscal administration which was so critical to his 
war effort. After the initial phase of the war when ad hoc financing had been 
the norm, Dipanagara began to organize his own administration to raise taxes 
– such as land tribute and levies on local markets – in the areas under his con-
trol. As we have seen, certain places, such as Kutha Gedhé and the villages of 
Into-Into on the Praga River and Geger in Kulon Praga, were designated as 
centres for the manufacture of gunpowder and armaments and were appoint-
ed to channel taxes as well as vital supplies of food and war matériel to the 
prince’s forces (Carey 1981a:275 note 166, 288 note 221). Although most of the 
taxes in money and kind raised from the local populations were handed over 
to Dipanagara’s army commanders, a real attempt seems to have been made 
to keep military and administrative duties separate. Occasionally, bupati ap-
pointed by Dipanagara would take a direct part in the fighting, but mostly 
91 For a recent analysis of the impact of the bènthèng stelsel, see Djamhari 2003:78-215. Djam-
hari’s work is important, based as it is on original research, but there are problems with his meth-
ods of footnoting (note 90) and use of evidence.
92 According to Djamhari 2003:319, up to May 1827, only ten such fortifications had been con-
structed, but 30 followed in May-December 1827, 90 in 1828, and 53 in 1829, with a further 75 
whose date of building is unclear.
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they were restricted to a purely administrative role. Indeed, the men chosen 
by the prince for high office in his war administration were usually drawn 
from the ranks of the senior court priyayi who had served the sultanate in a 
similar capacity before the war. One such family was the Danurejan who had 
supplied all the chief ministers (patih) in Yogya up to Sumadipura’s appoint-
ment in December 1813 (pp. 395-7; Chapter X note 220; Appendix Va). 
As regards his appointments to senior commands within his army, howev-
er, Dipanagara adopted slightly different criteria. Here suitability was judged 
not on the basis of previous family position in Yogya, but by the yardstick of 
personal bravery and military flair on the battlefield. In Dipanagara’s view, 
courage was essentially a youthful quality so many of his senior commanders 
(basah) were very young, either in their late teens or early twenties.93 He later 
expressed astonishment at the age of the Dutch generals, men like De Kock, 
Van Geen and Holsman,94 all of whom were already well into late middle age 
by the time of the Java War.95 Although a number of the prince’s command-
ers were scions of Yogya noble families or closely related to him by mar-
riage, there were a few, like Kyai Maja’s nephew and son-in-law Tumenggung 
Pajang (Appendix VIIb), who were of more humble birth.96 All, however, 
93 On the capture of three fifteen year-old boys, who had participated in the siege of Yogya 
as members of Dipanagara’s forces, see Dj.Br. 54, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock 
(Surakarta), 16-8-1825.
94 Godfried Jacob Holsman (1771-?), was commander of the First Large Military Division 
(Eerste Groote Militaire Afdeeling) at the time of the outbreak of the Java War. This covered 
the whole of west Java and part of central Java from Anyer on the Sunda Straits to Cirebon and 
Cilacap in western central Java. It also included the districts of Lampung and Padang in Sumatra. 
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:664. He was given command of troops in the field in 1827-1828, 
see below note 95.
95 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 18, ‘[Dipanagara] asked me why our generals and army commanders 
were old men because, he said, it was a truth that bravery was less met with in the old than in 
persons of a young age’. The three senior Dutch generals in post during the Java War were: De 
Kock (born 25-5-1779), Van Geen (born 1-9-1775), and Holsman (born 4-7-1771). They were thus 
aged 46, 49 and 54 respectively when the war broke out. Holsman’s last major command was 
against Radèn Aria Sasradilaga’s forces in Rembang. This occurred when he was 57 and he fell 
ill during the operations (11-2-1828), having to be replaced by his second-in-command, Lieuten-
ant-Colonel W.A. Roest, a former military adjutant to Governor-General Van der Capellen. Hols-
man retired from active service in November 1828 and was given a pension the following year 
(10-5-1829). The only relatively young general whom the Dutch appointed to supreme command 
during the Java War was Major-General Benjamin Bischoff (born 22-9-1787 – died 7-7-1829), who 
had distinguished himself during the early stages of the expedition against Boné in 1824 and had 
subsequently served as governor and military commander of Makassar (1824-1827). However, he 
died shortly after arriving in Java on 13-5-1829. Even Bischoff had been brought out of retirement 
in Holland to take up his post.
96 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 24, ‘[Dipanagara] told me […] that during the war he had tried to bind 
the braver and more enterprising upper officers in his army to him by marriages as the surest 
means of devotion […] He told me that Tumenggung Pajang was a young man of lowly birth, 
who had been appointed a tumenggung in view of his courage and discretion. He had been two 
years the son-in-law of Kyai Maja.’
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had been required to distinguish themselves by individual acts of bravery 
on the battlefield. Even ordinary soldiers aspiring to join Dipanagara’s elite 
regiments had to undergo tests of personal courage such as leaping across 
deep ravines (Carey 1981b:55 note 5). Those who distinguished themselves 
for military command were advanced first to the position of tumenggung – a 
military title at this time – and then to the senior rank of ali basah (High Pasha) 
which carried with it an independent command (p. 153). 
The most important of these teenage army commanders was, of course, Ali 
Basah Abdul Mustapa Prawiradirja alias ‘Senthot’ (1808-1855), a nom-de-guerre 
derived from the Javanese mak senthot meaning ‘to fly’ or ‘to dash’.97 This il-
literate young Yogya nobleman, a son of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III by 
an unofficial wife (Chapter II note 35), whom Dipanagara had tried in vain to 
educate as a santri,98 had joined the prince at Selarong in August 1825 when 
he was just seventeen. Described by De Stuers as ‘young, fiery and in every 
respect a brilliant Javanese […] who knew how to blaze a trail for himself by 
virtue of his energy and shrewdness’ (Soekanto 1951a:42; De Stuers 1833), he 
gained a name for himself for his courage and leadership qualities on the bat-
tlefield, even earning praise from those Dutch officers who felt the threat of 
his rapid advances and deadly ambuscades. By late 1828, when he was in his 
twentieth year, he had already emerged as Dipanagara’s leading strategist and 
military commander.99 By this time, despite some brilliant victories, which in-
cluded the destruction of Major H.F. Buschkens’ 8th mobile column at Kroya 
in eastern Bagelèn at the beginning of October 1828 (Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, IV:492-502), the tide of war was starting to turn against the prince. 
As we have seen, in mid-November 1828, Kyai Maja had allowed himself to 
be taken prisoner with 500 seasoned troops on the slopes of Mount Merapi, 
and the prince with his remaining forces were being gradually hemmed into 
an increasingly narrow strip of territory between the Praga and Bagawanta 
rivers. In this area, the Dutch strategy of establishing temporary battlefield for-
tifications (bènthèng) to protect the villages recently ‘pacified’ by their troops, 
described in the previous section, was already beginning to deny Dipanagara 
97 Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:753; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 40, ‘[Dipanagara] said that this name was 
an allusion to his character and prevailing behaviour. “Senthot” means to escape, flee, withdraw 
oneself or fly, and in general people mean by this a character which it is not easy to get to know, 
a man of a wily, complicated temperament. [He] remarked that Senthot had always shown signs 
of an enterprising spirit, and that in recent times he had suggested a plan to Dipanagara to try 
conquests outside Java.’ See further Chapter X note 241.
98 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 40, ‘Senthot can neither read nor write and from his earliest childhood 
had shown a violent dislike for the intention of Dipanagara […] to educate this basah for the posi-
tion of a “priest”’.
99 See further Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 15-6, ‘Senthot is his hero [and] he [Dipanagara] said that he 
had given him the same name as his father, Rongga Prawiradirja III (‘the most excellent hero’) […] 
Dipanagara told me that Senthot had lost eight horses shot from under him during […] the war, 
that he was often wounded and that he […] had the calling to die as a commander in battle just as 
his father [had done] during the period of Marshal Daendels’. See further pp. 191-2, Plate 21.
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and his commanders vital supplies. In particular, difficulties were experienced 
in the collection of taxes for the upkeep of the prince’s elite regiments and 
Dipanagara’s patih, Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja (Appendix II), was 
blamed by some commanders for his ineffective administration. 
It was against this deteriorating situation that Senthot wrote to Dipanagara 
in December 1828 requesting first that he should be placed in overall com-
mand of his forces in the field, and second that he be allowed to levy taxes 
for his men directly, thus bypassing the patih’s administration (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, IV:673). The latter request greatly concerned Dipanagara, 
who was acutely conscious of his role in the eyes of the local population as 
a Ratu Adil (Just King) who would ensure a light taxation regime and the 
provision of cheap food and clothes (Carey 1981a:xxxix-xl). He feared that 
if Senthot, who was renowned for his ostentatious and spendthrift lifestyle 
(Carey 1981b:56 note 8), was allowed to combine both administrative and 
military responsibilities, the common people would be oppressed and their 
support for his holy war would evaporate. He thus convened an urgent meet-
ing of his principal advisers to discuss the matter, in particular asking his 
uncle, Pangéran Ngabèhi, about his central concern: 
XXXV.47  ‘If he who holds the sword
 is also given the holding of money, how [then]?
 Might that not lead to neglect?100
In these three short lines in his babad Dipanagara seemed uncannily to pre-
figure late twentieth century debates in Indonesia about the appropriateness 
of the dual function (dwifungsi) of the army as a military and socio-political 
force (Crouch 1978:25; Carey 1981b:51), debates which have yet to be fully 
resolved. But this is to get far ahead of our tale and our time. 
Ngabèhi and the prince’s other advisers sought to reassure the prince, 
stressing that such a move would give greater unity to his war effort and 
would prevent delays in getting supplies through to his troops as had oc-
curred earlier under Danureja. Dipanagara reluctantly agreed. He now or-
dered that the f 3,000 a month from the market taxes in Kulon Praga and east-
ern Bagelèn be divided between Senthot and himself, with two-thirds going 
to his army commander and the rest being retained for his own use (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:674). He soon regretted his decision. In his ba-
bad, he related that shortly thereafter the Dutch started building a large new 
100 BD (Manado) IV:116, XXXV (Dhandhanggula) 46. lamun tiyang nyepeng pedhang/ dipunsambi 
nyepeng arta kadospundi/ punapa tan kapiran. Kapiran from the root pir is a rather difficult Javanese 
word to translate. It also has the sense of ‘disappointment’ and is translated as such in the Dutch 
and Malay translation of the BD (Manado) supervised by A.B. Cohen Stuart, Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, IV:673. I have followed Pigeaud 1938:167.
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bènthèng at Nanggulon101 in central Kulon Praga on the road between Sentolo 
and the Bagelèn border, but Senthot did not react quickly enough because he 
was totally preoccupied with receiving official reports and money, and with 
the administration of the army.102 When the youthful ali basah did eventually 
order a full-scale attack, he found the Dutch too firmly entrenched and his 
troops were beaten off with considerable loss of life (8 January 1829; Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:678-82). Even after this reverse, Dipanagara la-
mented that Senthot was still spending too much time in long-running dis-
putes with the ineffectual patih.103 Meanwhile, the young army commander’s 
own tax collectors had begun to act harshly towards the local population. 
In June 1829, the month in which the Dutch captured part of Dipanagara’s 
administrative archive in an engagement on the south coast of Kulon Praga 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:207), Ngabèhi wrote to Senthot inform-
ing him that one of his tax officials had been punished with a public beat-
ing for levying more taxes than was permitted (Carey 1981a:xl). At the same 
time, a report by one of Senthot’s subordinate officers, Radèn Tumenggung 
Pancaatmaja, in July 1829 lamented that food supplies were getting scarcer 
and more expensive. Local officials, who had once supported the prince’s 
cause, he wrote, were now turning against him by choosing to return to ar-
eas under the control of the Dutch bènthèng where they could be assured of 
a better livelihood and protection against sudden attack. Ready money for 
the upkeep of Dipanagara’s forces was also scarce because, in the view of 
this officer, the number of markets under Dipanagara’s control had stead-
ily dwindled. Dipanagara would fight on, according to Pancaatmaja, but the 
morale of his uncle, Mangkubumi, and the other Yogya pangéran, who were 
with the families of the prince and his top commanders at Rejasa, was very 
low because there was nothing for them to eat.104 There were even isolated 
cases in the last year of the war (1829-1830) of local people turning against 
unpopular officials allied with Dipanagara and finishing them off so great 
was their craving for peace (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:516, 519-20). 
The policy of the Dutch bènthèng commanders may also have had an influ-
ence here. They apparently tried to win the local population over to their side 
101 This was a sizeable structure, the third largest ever built by the Dutch, capable of housing 
221 troops and defended by several canon, Djamhari 2003:315.
102 BD (Manado) IV:119-20, XXXV (Dhandhanggula) 56. laknatolah langkung agengnèki/ karya 
bètèng anèng Penanggulan/ kang punggawa katiganèki/ datan kuwawi iku/ anadhahi nulya tur uning/ 
dhumateng Radèn Basah/ pan katungkul iku/ anampani kang lapuran/ lawan arta lan nyambi nata pra-
jurit. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:675.
103 BD (Manado) IV:123, XXXV (Dhandhanggula) 67-8. Radèn Basah katungkul/ udur arta lan Dèn 
Dipati/ dadya Sri Naranata/ sayang ngles tyasipun/ rumaos dinukan Suksma/ sabab saben-saben nurut 
aturnèki/ ingkang para niyaka. 68. datan wonten kang karsa pribadi.
104 Dj.Br. 9B, ‘Kiai Sentot 1830’, Report of R.T. Pancaatmaja, 12 Sura AJ 1757 (AD 13-7-1829). See 
further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:682; Soekanto 1951a:18-19; Carey 1981a:xl.
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by promising them free ploughs, draught animals and seeds if they moved 
to areas under their control. They also lowered tax rates, diminished corvée 
demands and paid higher rates for day labourers in the immediate vicinity 
of their fortified outposts to encourage the settlement of peasant cultivators 
and their families (Carey 1981a:lxviii note 185; Houben 1994:20; Chapter I 
note 124). The inevitable result of these developments was that by the end 
of September 1829, the fourth year of the war, organized resistance to the 
Dutch in the fertile rice plains of south-central Java was at an end (Djamhari 
2003:217). The crucial bonds of trust and cooperation between Dipanagara’s 
forces and the local population had been sundered and without them there 
could be no successful prosecution of the guerrilla campaign.
By this time Senthot had already surrendered to the Dutch (16 October 1829). 
He had fought bravely throughout and had suffered many battle wounds,105 
but there are strong indications that he had hedged his bets to ensure that 
things would turn out as well as possible for him. As early as July 1829, when 
his junior officer was reporting problems with food supplies, he had already 
entered into tentative negotiations for his surrender and when he did even-
tually come over it was on distinctly favourable terms. The Dutch permitted 
him to keep his own government-financed 500-strong troop or barisan, which 
subsequently saw service in west Sumatra against the Padri (1832-1833) and 
he was paid a retainer of f 5,000.106 The same period, meanwhile, witnessed 
the nadir of Dipanagara’s personal fortunes. On 21 September 1829, one of his 
last remaining senior commanders, Pangéran Ngabèhi, and his two sons, were 
killed in a bloody encounter in the Kelir Mountains on the Bagelèn-Mataram 
border. Shortly thereafter on 11 November 1829, following his near capture 
by Major A.V. Michiels’ 11th mobile column in the Gowong mountain region 
to the west of Kedhu when he had to leap into a ravine and hide under tall 
pampas grass (glagah) to escape. Abandoning his horses, heirloom pike107 and 
wardrobe108 (Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:91; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
105 According to a Javanese spy working for the Resident of Kedhu, F.G. Valck, Senthot had lost 
the use of his right arm just before his surrender, dK 160, ‘Notas van den Resident van Kadoe […] 
over de verblijfplaatsen, plannen enz. van Diepo Negoro naar inleiding van hem door verschil-
lende inlanders verstrekte inlichtingen, 5-10-1829 – 18-11-1829’ (henceforth: Valck, ‘Inlichtingen’), 
entry for 6-10-1829. It is unclear whether this was a permanent disability.
106 Soekanto 1951a:60 note 18. The young commander’s subsequent fate was less fortunate, 
however. Accused of collusion with pro-Padri leaders, he was exiled to Bengkulu (1833-1855) 
dying there on 17-4-1855 some three months after Dipanagara’s own demise in Makassar, Louw 
and De Klerck 1908, V:405; Soekanto 1951a:31-46. See further p. 746 note 267.
107 This was Kyai Rondan, see Appendix XI. Dipanagara believed that this holy pike gave him 
forewarning of impending difficulties and danger. Its loss thus affected him deeply and he took 
it as a sign from the Almighty that he had been betrayed by three of his commanders (basah) in 
Mataram, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:496.
108 This contained his apparel for the holy war, see Chapter X; ‘no great wardrobe’ according 
to the Dutch mobile column commander, Major (later Major-General) Andreas Victor Michiels 
(1797-1849), Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:493.
XI The last stand of the old order 653
V:490-6), Dipanagara decided to wander off into the jungles of western Bagelèn. 
Only his two panakawan (intimate retainers), Banthèngwarèng and Rata, ac-
companied him for the entire journey (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:423; 
Carey 1974a:25). These wanderings, which would take Dipanagara initially 
to the remote Rèma area between Bagelèn and Banyumas, would continue 
until mid-February 1830 when his first direct negotiations with Colonel Jan 
Baptist Cleerens (1785-1850) began. These eventually resulted in the abor-
tive ‘peace conference’ at Magelang (8-28 March 1830), his arrest (28 March), 
25-year exile in Sulawesi (12 June 1830-8 January 1855) and death (8 January 
1855; pp. 752-3). As he dragged his weary and malaria-ridden body along the 
rhinoceros’ paths to the peasant huts in which he hid for over three months 
(mid-November 1829-late February 1830; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
V:525-6; Carey 1981b:56 note 10; Chapter III), Dipanagara may have reflected 
that although his defeat was probably inevitable – both the Parangkusuma 
prophecy (Chapter IV) and a further divine prompting (wangsiting Hyang 
Agung), which he told his uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, he had received in 
late September 1829 (Chapter XII), had warned as much – it had undoubt-
edly been hastened by his disastrous concession to Senthot just over a year 
earlier. In terms of social unity and cooperation between the local population 
and Dipanagara’s troops, the short-lived experiment with ‘dual function’ had 
been a disaster. Admittedly, Senthot’s own youthful and headstrong character 
was partly to blame. Had a more experienced commander like Ngabèhi been 
in charge, things might have worked out differently. But the very fact that up 
to December 1828, Dipanagara had taken great care to see that administrative 
and military duties were kept separate shows that he was acutely aware of 
the dangers which might ensue if they were exercised together. It was only 
under extreme pressure that he went against this conviction and then he 
quickly regretted his decision. He remained to the end a supreme pragmatist 
in matters of statecraft, drawing on his own experience as a skilful adminis-
trator and financial manager of his estate at Tegalreja and far-flung apanage 
lands (p. 78). This experience had taught him if nothing else that the loyalty 
and support of the common people would only be forthcoming if they were 
treated with consideration (Carey 1981a:xl, 240 note 27).
Conclusion
The Java War constituted a huge upheaval in Javanese society, which, as 
we have seen (Preface), affected two million Javanese, one third of the to-
tal population of the island. An estimated 200,000 Javanese civilians died 
and one fourth of the cultivated area of Java sustained damage. In secur-
ing their pyrrhic victory, the Dutch lost 8,000 of their own troops as well as 
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7,000 Indonesian auxiliaries. The 20 million guilder cost to their exchequer 
would only be recouped through Van den Bosch’s Cultivation System, which 
brought an estimated 832 million guilders to the Dutch home exchequer be-
tween 1831 and 1877 (Ricklefs 1993:123). 
The last stand of Java’s ‘old order’, the Java War witnessed the dismem-
berment of the south-central Javanese courts in 1830 as the remaining manca-
nagara territories were finally annexed by the colonial government (Houben 
1994:17-72). As such it could be seen as part of a long line of military disasters, 
beginning in the late seventeenth century with the Trunajaya Rebellion (1676-
1679), which had destroyed the power of the once mighty empire of Mataram. 
By the end of the conflict, the Dutch remained in undisputed control of the 
island. Their rule would last for the next 112 years.
In retrospect, it seems strange that the Dutch took as long as they did to 
get a grip on the military challenge posed by Dipanagara’s rebellion. Given 
the inherent tensions between the prince’s santri and kraton supporters, the 
intense regional rivalries and conflicts over war aims, all of which would 
ultimately pull Dipanagara’s war effort apart, it is surprising that two years 
had to pass before the Dutch hit on a winning strategy – namely, the com-
bined application of Cochius’ bènthèng system and the near doubling of their 
mobile columns. It is a truism that generals are always fighting the last war. 
In the Dutch case, the memory of the Javanese dynastic conflicts of the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, seem to have coloured their judgement. 
They spent too much time thinking that Dipanagara might be bought off with 
a quasi independent principality and his problems explained by thwarted 
political ambition. But he was not a Radèn Mas Said (Mangkunagara I) or 
even a Sultan Mangkubumi. It did not help that their colonial army was so 
ill adapted to the challenges of fighting a guerrilla war, nor that the relation-
ship between the Dutch civilian and military authorities – epitomised by the 
conflicts between Du Bus and De Kock – was so poor. The parlous state of 
the colonial finances during these years also limited their room for manoeu-
vre, as did the political problems experienced by the Kingdom of the United 
Netherlands during the build up to the Belgian revolt of 1830.
Perhaps the greatest deficiency lay in the Dutch analysis of the Islamic 
aspects of the war. Here they were fighting blind. There was no Christiaan 
Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936)109 to advise them. If there had been, De Kock 
and other senior military commanders might have been encouraged to exploit 
109 Perhaps the most famous nineteenth-century Dutch scholar of oriental cultures and lan-
guages, who became Professor of Arabic at Leiden University in 1906. He had served as adviser 
on Arab and native affairs to the Netherlands Indies government (1889-1906) and had used his 
knowledge of Islamic cultures to devise strategies to crush the resistance in Aceh in the late 1890s 
while acting as political adviser to the Dutch military commander and governor of Aceh, General 
J.B. van Heutsz (1851-1924; in post as governor, 1898-1904). 
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the tensions between Dipanagara’s santri and kraton supporters much earlier 
and to greater effect. Certainly, some of the more egregious errors associated 
with Van Geen’s scorched earth strategy in south-central Java in 1825-1827 
and the alienation of the local civilian populations might have been avoid-
ed. A policy of attraction based on the honouring of Islamic institutions and 
practices, in particular a restoration of the competence of the Islamic courts 
(surambi) (pp. 386-7), might have gone a long way to satisfying the religious 
grievances of Dipanagara’s santri supporters.
One area which was probably non-negotiable was that of Javanese iden-
tity. While Valck’s analysis regarding Javanese ‘nationalism’ may have been 
overdrawn, it is indisputably the case that a key aspect of Dipanagara’s strug-
gle was a desire to defend Javanese culture. After all, he had lived through a 
period when Javanese society had been turned upside down by the ruthless 
colonial policies of Daendels and Raffles. His own experiences of the British 
attack on the Yogya kraton, his treatment at the hands of the representatives of 
the post-1816 returned Dutch administration and the seemingly unstoppable 
spread of European influences in everything from clothing to language, had 
convinced him that alongside the raising up of the high state of the Islamic re-
ligion, the restoration of specifically Javanese values was a key priority. Hence 
the treatment meted out to non-Javanese during the war, especially the Dutch 
and the Chinese. In many ways, the Java War was the last attempt by the 
Javanese ancien régime to turn back the tide of Dutch colonialism. As such it 
was a magnificent failure. But it had the capacity to inspire future generations 
as we will see in the next chapter. Transported on the first stage of his journey 
into exile on that most quintessential of products of the new industrial age 
– the first steamship in Netherlands Indies service – Dipanagara would have 
ample opportunity to reflect on the bitterness of defeat and the fate of those 














pahlawan yang berhati suci.1
Part One: The road to Magelang and Batavia
Introduction
By the end of September 1829, it was clear that the war was drawing to a close. 
Earlier that month, just before the decisive battle of Siluk (17 September) in 
the Selarong hills just to the east of the Praga River, when Dipanagara’s uncle, 
Pangéran Prabuningrat, had been killed defending the prince’s retreat,2 the Java 
1 A popular Indonesian song about Dipanagara, which translates roughly as follows: ‘Yet there 
is in Sulawesi/ in a most quiet spot/ near the wild jungle/ far from the hurly-burly/ a place set 
apart/ the grave of Dipanagara/ a true hero/ who defended our people/ a hero with a pure heart’.
2	 Prabuningrat	had	been	taken	by	surprise	by	a	Dutch	attack	when	he	was	resting	with	Dipana­
gara in the Selarong hills. He had covered his nephew’s retreat by a rearguard action involving 
fifty	cavalry,	but	had	been	killed	by	a	sabre	stroke	as	he	was	returning	to	join	Dipanagara’s	main	
force.	Lieutenant­Colonel	B.J.	Sollewijn,	the	commander	of	the	1st	mobile	column,	described	what	
happened: ‘an unusually well-dressed rebel, who had escaped by luck from the crush [of the cav-
alry	charge],	hastily	attempted	to	escape	[…]	but	his	horse	was	suddenly	shot	from	under	him	[…]	
Sergeant Cassenhoven begged permission to charge with the cavalry and he rushed up to him 
and sabred him to death’. The dead man was subsequently recognised as Pangéran Prabuningrat 
by his diamond-studded kris which was found by the local village inhabitants of Sélanangkul, 
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:386-9. Dipanagara later stated that the cannon shot, which felled 
Prabuningrat’s	horse,	took	off	his	uncle’s	left	leg,	Knoerle,	‘Journal’,	16.
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War leader had confided to Mangkubumi that he had received a divine instruc-
tion (wangsit) that his efforts would come to nought. Nothing remained for him 
in this world, he confided to his grey-haired and goitre-afflicted kinsman, but 
to die a martyr’s death on the field of battle.3 This conviction was confirmed 
four days later by the gruesome deaths of another of the prince’s uncles, his 
senior army commander and trusted adviser, Pangéran Ngabèhi, who together 
with his two sons, Adikusuma and Jayakusuma, were ambushed in the Kelir 
mountains.4 When news of this terrible loss reached Dipanagara, he confided 
in his babad that he realised that he now remained alone in this world and he 
felt he could no longer control events for those who remained behind.5
We have seen in the previous chapter how the combination of the Dutch 
system of temporary battlefield fortifications and the near doubling of their 
mobile columns had begun to hem Dipanagara into an increasingly narrow 
strip of land between the Praga and Bagawanta rivers. If September 1829 had 
been a black month for the prince with an unprecedented number of his top 
commanders and supporters, including his uncle, Mangkubumi, givin g them-
selves up,6 October was no better: Senthot, who negotiated his own surrender 
3 BD (Manado) IV:178-9, XXXVII (Asmaradana) 50-4. sang nata angandika alon/ dhateng Kangjeng 
Panembahan/ kyai pan kawula/ tampi wangsiting Hyang Agung/ kalamun badhé kawula. 51. punika wekas-
anèki/ apan tan dados punapa/ dadya kang sinuwun mangké/ samya tumungkul sadaya/ kalamun semu waspa/ 
Panembahan alon matur/ paran sultané ingkang dadya. 52. ing bésuk wekasanèki/ […]. 53. […]/ sri naléndra 
ngandika/ kénging tan kénginga iku/ kyai mapan kawula. 54. namung nuwun ambélani / dhumateng kang 
samya prapta/ inggih ing sabilollahé. It should be noted that since August 1825, Mangkubumi had 
borne the title of panembahan, usually given to respected senior male members of the royal family. 
In the same passage in his babad,	Dipanagara	spoke	bitterly	against	Pangéran	Purbaya	(the	future	
Pakubuwana VII, reigned 1830-1858) and the other princes of the Surakarta court who, in his view, 
had sinned greatly against the Almighty and His Prophet by allying themselves with the Dutch.
4 Pangéran Ngabèhi and his two sons along with a twenty-strong mounted following had 
been cornered in the Kelir Mountains on 21-9-1829. Seeing that they had no way out, they had 
declared that they were kangjeng gusti (princes of the blood), but the ngabèhi	 (junior	officer)	of	
the Indonesian barisan (troop) involved had ordered them to hand over their kris, stating that he 
recognised no kangjeng gusti	on	the	rebel	side.	When	they	refused,	the	junior	officer	then	ordered	
his	men	to	go	in	and	finish	them	off.	Once	they	had	been	killed,	the	heads	of	the	corpses	were	cut	
off	and	placed	on	bamboo	poles,	their	bodies	being	thrown	down	the	ravine.	Only	when	their	
identities had been discovered were the heads of Ngabèhi and his two sons given a decent Islamic 
burial, see the report of Colonel J.B. Cleerens in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:395-6.
5 BD (Manado) IV:188, XXXVII (Asmaradana) 97. sarta mijil wespanèki/ rumaos kantun pribadya/ 
lawan ing Tanah Jawané/ rumaos tan saged nata/ lamun amrih salaminya/ dhumateng kang samya kantun. 
‘Tears	welled	up	[and]	the	sultan/	felt	he	was	left	alone/	in	the	Land	of	Java./	He	felt	he	could	not	
control,/ even if he strove to all the time,/ those that remained behind.’
6 See the list of surrendered commanders in Sagimun 1965:401. Appendix VIII also gives 
dates. On the death of Pangéran Ngabèhi and his two sons, see Chapter XI note 89. On Mang-
kubumi’s surrender, see Dj.Br. 9B, Report of Radèn Tumenggung Pancaatmaja, 12 Sura AJ 1757 
(AD 13-7-1829), stating that the wong cilik	(‘little	people’)	would	be	happy	when	Mangkubumi	
submitted	to	the	Dutch	because	they	always	regarded	him	as	‘greater’	than	Dipanagara.	In	fact,	
people had lined the roads for fourteen leagues when Mangkubumi eventually came to Yogya 
from Kulon Praga in October 1829.
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(p. 652), and Dipanagara’s mother and daughter, Radèn Ayu Gusti (Appendix 
IV), who were captured in a village in southern Kulon Praga (Chapter II note 
17), were in Dutch hands by the month’s end. Following his near capture 
in mid-November 1829 (pp. 652-3), Dipanagara would struggle on virtually 
alone for another three months, hiding out in shacks and abandoned houses 
in the jungle fastnesses of western Bagelèn assailed by acute tropical malaria7 
and accompanied for most of the time only by his two panakawan (intimate 
retainers). But with Dutch military strength at its peak, a f 20,000 price on 
his head (Chapter XI note 89), and at least eleven mobile columns searching 
for him and his remaining commanders (Chapter XI note 81), it was clear he 
could not live a fugitive life forever. It would only be a matter of time before 
he was forced to negotiate his own surrender. 
The present chapter describes the process whereby Dipanagara was even-
tually brought to the negotiating table and forced to abandon his fugitive 
existence for permanent exile in Sulawesi. It is divided into two parts. The 
first deals with the process of negotiations through to the prince’s capture at 
Magelang on 28 March 1830 and his subsequent stay in Batavia where he was 
held for nearly a month (8 April-3 May 1830) in the Stadhuis (Town House) 
awaiting the decision of the new governor-general, Johannes van den Bosch, 
regarding his exile. The second covers his exile proper from his sea voyage 
to Manado (3 May-12 June 1830) until his death in Makassar on 8 January 
1855. The first part contains three sections, which begin with a consideration 
of the background and course of the prince’s February 1830 negotiations with 
the Dutch field commander in Bagelèn and Banyumas, Colonel Jan Baptist 
Cleerens (1785-1850), and what Dipanagara thought had been offered him by 
way of safe conduct by the Flemish officer as he made his way to Magelang 
on 8 March for the start of his ‘peace negotiations’ with De Kock. The second 
section explains the circumstances of his arrest on 28 March from the perspec-
tive of both Dipanagara’s own babad and De Kock’s official diary. The third 
section describes the prince’s transfer to Batavia in the company of De Kock’s 
son-in-law, Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers, and the Javanese-speaking infantry cap-
tain, Johan Jacob Roeps,8 and his month-long sojourn in the colonial capital. 
7 See Chapter III note 67. Dipanagara had to seek help from an elderly female dhukun (herb-
alist/healer) in the village of Sabédha (Sebada) by the name of Nyai Asmaratruna, whom he 
described	as	a	coquettish	widow	who	flirted	and	made	jokes	with	him,	see	BD	(Manado)	IV:230,	
XXXVIII	 (Mijil)	 158­9.	 ing Sebédha na dhukun sawiji/ wus sepuh pawèstri/ gumati kelangkung. 159. 
mapan dhateng kangjeng sri bupati/ ragi kenès mangko/ rondha nyai Asmaraturuné.
8 For a biography of Roeps, see Javasche Courant, 4-7-1840; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:283 
note 2. Born on 1-1-1805 in The Hague, he came to Java in 1816 with his father who was posted as a 
lieutenant-adjutant in the Dutch colonial army. His mother and nine of his ten siblings died when he 
was in his early teens, and he was brought up by a Javanese nyai (housekeeper; concubine) speaking 
fluent	Javanese.	A	graduate	of	the	Semarang	Military	School,	he	was	a	second­lieutenant	at	the	age	
of 18 (12-8-1823), and had participated in the Boné expedition (1824-1825). During the Java War, he 
served in Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Le Bron de Vexela’s 3rd mobile column in the Mataram area, 
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The second part continues the story, beginning in section four with the former 
Java War leader’s sea voyage to Manado under the escort of Van den Bosch’s 
German adjutant, Second Lieutenant J.H. Knoerle. The subsequent section 
gives an account of the prince’s initial three-year exile in North Sulawesi, 
where his experiences with the local population appear to have been less than 
happy, but where he was able to complete his autobiography and start a new 
family with Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, the only one of his surviving official 
wives to accompany him into exile. It is followed by a final section which con-
siders the reasons for Dipanagara’s rather abrupt transfer to Makassar in July 
1833 and the more constrained pattern of his exile life during his last twenty-
two years, as well as the fate of his family both during his exile and following 
his death on 8 January 1855. A conclusion sets the prince’s life in the wider 
sweep of Javanese history and attempts an assessment of his significance as 
an historical figure in the context of contemporary Indonesia. 
The colonel’s promise: Dipanagara’s negotiations with Cleerens in February 1830 
and the question of safe conduct
Following his comprehensive defeat on 17 September 1829 at Siluk (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:385-9), Dipanagara and a small number of his 
troops escaped back across the Praga River.9 Then, following the death of 
Ngabèhi and his sons in the Kelir Mountains on 21 September, the prince de-
cided to move even further west. On the night of 26-27 September 1829, much 
to the surprise of Cleerens who thought that the prince would never cross the 
Bagawanta, he forded the upper reaches of the river with a fifty-strong escort 
and travelled on into central Bagelèn.10 Djamhari describes these events as 
marking the end of the Java War in military terms (Djamhari 2003:217):
Heavy pressure [from the Dutch] now meant that Dipanagara’s troop commanders 
had no other choice but to end their resistance and surrender. [His] strength had 
lost its critical mass for in these last stages [of the war] his forces no longer had the 
energy and will to fight. The majority of his troop commanders now gave them-
selves up out of frustration and sheer exhaustion.
earning	a	name	for	his	bravery	and	the	unofficial	motto	semper idem (‘always the same’). He died 
from	wounds	sustained	fighting	the	Acehnese	at	Baros	in	East	Sumatra	on	23­3­1840.
9 Dipanagara’s knowledge of the fording places across the Praga was critical here, allowing 
his force to cross in safety whereas the pursuing Dutch cavalry were caught in the deep mid-
stream and had their horses swept away from under them. Even so a Dutch hussar got close 
enough	to	fire	a	pistol	shot	at	him	before	being	run	through	by	lance	thrusts	from	Dipanagara’s	
bodyguard, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:388-9, 700-1.
10 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:425-6. On the Javanese belief that no Mataram prince 
should cross the Bagawanta River because Sultan Agung (reigned 1613-1647) had taken exception 
to its disgusting name, see Multatuli 1862-77, IV:286; Van Praag 1947:13.
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In early October, one of his commanders, Ali Basah Hasan Munadi,11 the head 
of his priestly Barjumungah bodyguard regiment, apparently counselled 
the prince to make for the mountain region of Rèma between Bagelèn and 
Banyumas, the home district of the Danurejan family (Appendix Va). Here 
his young supporter, Ali Basah Ngabdulmahmud Gandakusuma (Appendix 
II), a son of the murdered Danureja II, was said to be still holding out with 
some 300 troops.12 Two other members of the same family, Gandakusuma’s 
elder brother, Ali Basah Ngabdulkamil Mertanagara, a trusted confidante 
and son-in-law of the prince, and Dipanagara’s patih, Radèn Adipati Abdullah 
Danureja, a younger sibling of Danureja II, were also able to draw substan-
tial local support from the district. Further to the north, in the Ledhok area 
of northwestern Kedhu and in the adjacent region of Karangkobar, another 
commander with whom Dipanagara was in contact,13 Basah Imam Musbah, 
continued to harry the Dutch from his mountain base high up on Mount 
Sundoro (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:304-5, 431-2). Dipanagara’s eldest 
son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, would join him there in mid-December (note 
17). Rèma thus made sense as a place for Dipanagara to lie low and give some 
respite to his fever-wracked body as he contemplated his next move. 
Hasan Munadi, who claimed to have talked extensively with the prince be-
fore his move to Rèma, asked him whether he would ever give himself up to 
the government and if so whether he might be content with Yogyakarta as a 
consolation prize. No, answered Dipanagara, he would never surrender to the 
government because he would feel too ashamed if his plans to become ‘prince 
over Java’ failed. As for being appointed sultan of Yogya ‘then I should have 
only half succeeded in my plans and all our troubles would have been in vain’. 
In underscoring these political ambitions, Munadi appears to have dismissed 
Dipanagara’s plans to ‘raise up the high state of the Islamic religion’ as a ploy 
to cover up his real motives. As for the Europeans, Munadi reported the prince 
as saying that they could remain in Java, but only as traders and then only in 
specially designated ports on the north coast, which we know from another 
source included Batavia and Semarang.14 The administration of the interior 
would be his and his alone, the Sunan and the sultan serving as his subordi-
nates.15 Finally, Munadi stated that, despite the price on his head, Dipanagara 
11 See Appendix VIIb under Kyai Haji Samparwedi.
12 dK160, Valck, ‘Inlichtingen’, entries of 5-10-1829, 6-10-1829, reports of Hasan Munadi.
13 dK 160, Valck, ‘Inlichtingen’, 6-10-1829, report of Hasan Munadi on Dipanagara’s contacts 
with Musbah. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:524.
14 dK 209, Report of Ngabèhi Kramadimeja of interview with Mas Tumenggung Kudatirta 
(Lengis), a member of Dipanagara’s entourage in Bagelèn, for Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh), 
25-2-1830.
15	 Pengalasan	reported	that	Dipanagara	had	not	attacked	Yogya	in	1825	‘out	of	self	interest’	
but for the ‘welfare of Java’ and because the sultan (Hamengkubuwana V) was not able to act as 
protector of the Islamic religion, dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock 
(Magelang), 25-12-1825. On Dipanagara’s views of the Surakarta court, see note 3.
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would never be killed or taken prisoner as a result of his supporters’ actions. 
His people would never betray him. Instead, the only way he would be brought 
to submission would be by outright military defeat or capture.16
We will see shortly how much of Munadi’s assessment was close to the mark, 
although his refusal to give credence to the prince’s desire to be recognised as 
a ‘regulator of religion’ in Java overlooked a central plank in Dipanagara’s war 
effort. It was this issue above all else which would make it impossible for the 
Dutch to offer him terms and agree a negotiated peace at Magelang in March 
1830. Munadi also missed something else, the possibility that Dipanagara might 
have had a hidden strategy designed to exhaust the Dutch treasury by prolong-
ing the war for another one or two years. As the son of the deceased Pangéran 
Blitar (Appendix VIII) put it when Cleerens assured him that the Dutch would 
fight for as long as it took to bring Dipanagara to submission, 
Yes, that is what you say colonel, but people outside believe differently. Dipanagara 
says that the government cannot sustain its present-day expenditure and if he can 
remain hidden for one or two more years the government will not be able to pay 
its troops.17
If this was indeed Dipanagara’s strategy, it seemed to be working. For three 
whole weeks following the prince’s narrow escape from Major Michiels’ mo-
bile column in Gowong on 11 November (p. 652), there was no firm news 
of his whereabouts. Then came a partial breakthrough. Ali Basah Kerta 
Pengalasan, the battle-scarred opium addict,18 who had led the defence of 
Plèrèd (Chapter XI) and taken a key part in the battle of Gawok before becom-
ing one of Dipanagara’s most prominent commanders in Bagelèn, had surren-
dered on the very day of Dipanagara’s near capture by Major Michiels’ mobile 
column (Carey 1974b:281). He had been brought to Cleerens’ headquarters 
at Kedhung Kebo (post-1830, Purwareja) and been treated more as a per-
sonal friend than a captive.19 Keen to ingratiate himself with the Dutch high 
command and secure himself a post and salary similar to that achieved by 
Senthot, of whom he was intensely jealous, he promised to open peace nego-
tiations with Dipanagara. In particular, he undertook to write to Dipanagara’s 
16 dK 160, Valck, ‘Inlichtingen’, 6-10-1829, report of Hasan Munadi.
17 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 22-12-1829, 
reporting Blitar’s son as saying in broken Malay: Ya itu Kolonel punya perbilang tetapi orang dari luar 
perchaya lain. Dipo Negoro bilang Kumpeni tiada bisa tahan kluar begitu banyak wang seperti sekarang 
dan kapan dia tinggal sembuni satu dengan dua tahun Kompeni tiada bisa bayar dia punya serdadu.
18 Pengalasan’s partiality to opium is mentioned in dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kedhung Kebo) 
to	H.M.	de	Kock	(Magelang),	14­11­1829,	stating	that	after	Pengalasan’s	surrender	on	13­11­1829,	he,	
together with the three tumenggung	and	eleven	officers	(panji, ngabèhi, rangga) who came over with 
him, ‘took a good piece of opium’ provided by Cleerens from the Dutch military stores.
19 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Bubutan) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 26-9-1829, referring to 
Pengalasan as ‘a well-known name for us’ and asking De Kock to treat him leniently and with 
respect, especially in view of his wife’s connections with the Yogya court (she was apparently a 
daughter of Pangéran Blitar I).
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patih, Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja, who was then at Kecawang20 in the 
Karanganyar district of western Bagelèn along with a number of Dipanagara’s 
close family and supporters (Carey 1974b:281-2). This he could do with ease 
given his fluency with the pen.21
Pengalasan’s letter had the desired effect. On 2 December, his messengers 
arrived back in Cleerens’ bivouac at Gunungpersada, reporting that they had 
been well received by Danureja at Kecawang. The prince’s patih along with 
two of the prince’s sons, Pangéran Dipanagara II22 and Pangéran Dipakusuma 
(Appendix IV), a younger brother, Pangéran Adisurya (Appendix VIII),23 
the two Danurejan siblings, Mertanagara and Gandakusuma, and various 
tumenggung, including Dipanagara’s brother-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung 
Dipawiyana, who would share his exile in Manado, had talked through the 
night about the implications of Pengalasan’s missive.24 The desire for peace 
was palpable and emotions were running high: the envoys reported how the 
younger Pangéran Dipanagara had wept as he asked for news of his wife 
and child whom he had not seen for many months.25 Danureja now asked for 
a fourteen-day ceasefire, but this was refused by De Kock. There would be 
no ceasefire until Dipanagara, whose whereabouts were still unclear, wrote 
in person stating that he was prepared to negotiate.26 To ease the proceed-
ings Pengalasan asked for good Dutch import paper,27 ink and pens, and 
suggested that white bread, refined white sugar and tea be sent as presents 
to Danureja, another reflection of the Europeanised tastes of the early nine-
teenth-century kraton elite.28 He then sprang a surprise. Instead of a letter 
direct from the Java War leader, Pengalasan attempted to ventriloquise for 
him by drafting a text which purported to reflect ‘His Highness the Sultan of 
Java’s’ conditions for a peace settlement (Carey 1974b:285-8). 
Unlike Hasan Munadi, Pengalasan gave due prominence to the prince’s 
wish ‘to restore the high state of the Islamic religion throughout the whole 
20 Kacawang is a village just to the southwest of Kajoran in the Karanggayam sub-district of 
Karanganyar Residency in present-day south Banyumas, see Schoel 1931:139, sub: ‘Kajoran’.
21 Cleerens reported that Pengalasan ‘writes much for a Javanese and expresses himself well 
or so I hear’, Carey 1974b:282.
22	 He	would	soon	afterwards	(12­12­1829)	leave	to	join	Imam	Musbah	in	Ledhok,	see	Louw	
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:526.
23	 Adisurya	would	die	soon	afterwards	(circa	8­12­1829)	on	Mount	Sirnabaya,	see	Louw	and	
De Klerck 1894-1909, V:516-7.
24 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 2-12-1829.
25 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 2-12-1829.
26 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 3-12-1829, 5-
12-1829; H.M. de Kock (Magelang) to Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada), 4-12-1829. De Kock 
had	tasked	Hasan	Munadi	with	taking	his	letter	to	Dipanagara.	
27 Blauw & Bril, see Carey 1974b:285.
28 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 3-12-1829; dK 210, 
Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja (Winong/Kebumèn) to Ali Basah Kerta Pengalasan (Gunungper-
sada),	n.y.	(?	mid­December	1829),	acknowledging	the	gift	of	tea,	sugar	and	white	bread.	On	the	
spread of Europeanised tastes in food at the south-central Javanese courts, see Chapter V note 65.
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of Java’, stating that ‘my own guess, Sir, is that if the Sultan of Java does 
not	succeed	in	his	determination	to	raise	up	[the	Islamic]	religion	[…]	he	
would rather depart this earth.’ The Dutch, meanwhile, were offered four 
choices: first, if they wished to remain in Java as soldiers in the pay of the 
Javanese, they would be allowed to keep their ranks and stipends provided 
they became ‘the sword of religion’, a reference to the VOC period when 
Dutch troops had been used against seditious movements such as the Kajoran 
faction. Second, if they ‘felt at home in Java’ and were willing to stay in a pri-
vate capacity and trade, they would be allowed to do so only if they agreed to 
remain in a specially designated area on the north coast. Third, if they wished 
to return home to the Netherlands, ‘we will continue to be forever as brothers 
with each other’. But then came the sting. If the Dutch wanted any Javanese 
produce they would have to pay the right price for it and if they wanted ‘to 
cultivate ricefields in Java’ – namely lease land – they would have to rent it 
for the right rent. Finally, if the Dutch ‘entered the True Faith’ and became 
Muslims then their livelihood and positions would be improved. 
Pengalasan indicated that Dipanagara would take lands for his upkeep 
from both Yogyakarta and Surakarta, and spoke of the relationship of his 
kraton with the Dutch, envisaging a return to an idealised pre-Daendels’ past: 
the prince and the Netherlands Indies government would be as ‘good friends, 
neighbours, and brothers, just like children who have not been on speaking 
terms but now talk to each other again. They should not order each other, nei-
ther should they be ordered by each other’. Finally, he gave some impression 
of what Dipanagara’s role as ‘regulator of religion’ might entail taking the 
example of the Rèma district where the prince was now ensconced. If the lo-
cal ruler or district head was prepared to perform the obligatory prayers and 
ordered his followers to pray, then he could remain in authority without let or 
hindrance. But, in the event that he was not willing to perform the obligatory 
prayers then he would be changed, and if this could not be done peacefully 
he would be attacked (Carey 1974b:287-8).
Pengalasan’s letter was so detailed and seemed to reflect so accurately the 
prince’s thoughts that the Dutch began to suspect that he was the man whom 
Dipanagara had chosen to open negotiations with them. Cleerens in particu-
lar was in no doubt about this:
I cannot believe Pengalasan himself could have written so stupid a letter. I think it 
must be the work of Dipanagara who earlier had been on a sort of pilgrimage and 
filled his head with such fancies29	[…]	I	think	more	and	more	that	Pengalasan	is	
the man that Dipanagara has sent to negotiate with us.30
29 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 14-12-1829. 
The	Dutch	had	great	difficulty	translating	Pengalasan’s	letter	into	Dutch	and	even	the	élève voor 
de Javaansche taal, C.L. van den Berg, who was serving at that time in Magelang, was not able to 
decipher his colloquial Javanese. See further Chapter III note 79.
30 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Panjer) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 16-1-1830.
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In fact, the colonel was mistaken. Although Pengalasan was favoured by the 
prince and appeared to exercise a certain influence over him at the February 
1830 meetings in Rèmakamal and Kecawang, and during Dipanagara’s fort-
night stay in Menorèh,31 he was not his chosen emissary. What he managed to 
do in his letter was to relay with skill many of the key issues which Dipanagara 
would later raise in Magelang. Reflecting the general ignorance about the 
Islamic world amongst Europeans in Java at this time, however, Cleerens, 
read too much into the text, purporting to see the long hand of the Ottoman 
Empire behind the Ali Basah’s epistolary initiative: Rèma was not the epony-
mous district between Bagelèn and Banyumas, he told De Kock, but Turkey 
(‘Rum’) and ‘the Great Turk [Ottoman Sultan]’ would protect the prince. So 
exercised was the Flemish officer about this supposed Ottoman link that he 
went out of his way to relay to Pengalasan the news from the Russo-Turkish 
War,32 which ended with the fall of fortress town of Adrianople (Edirne) to 
the Russians on 30 July 1829.33 
After Cleerens had moved to Panjer in Kebumèn district on 4 January 1830 
in order to be closer at hand in the event that direct talks could be opened 
through Pengalasan and the prince’s patih with Dipanagara, another bogey-
man came out of the good colonel’s closet: England. A rumour was now 
spreading in Bagelèn, Cleerens said, that the English would return to Java to 
help Dipanagara become the raja agama (regulator of religion).34 This same 
fear of perfidious Albion and its long-term designs in the archipelago, as we 
will see shortly, would drive the Dutch to transfer Dipanagara from his all too 
exposed Minahasan (North Sulawesi) exile to the greater safety of Makassar 
in July 1833.
As Cleerens moved ever closer to the longed for breakthrough with 
Dipanagara, what was the Dutch negotiating position? Just what were they 
31 dK 210, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Panjer) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 9-2-1830; Colonel 
J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830, refer to the ‘great favour’ 
which	Pengalasan	enjoyed	with	Dipanagara	and	his	influence	over	the	prince.
32 This news was carried in the Javasche Courant of 7-1-1830, citing the article ‘Oorlog in Turki-
jen’ (War in Turkey) from the Journal d’Anvers of 23-8-1829.
33 On 21 December 1829, when news came through that the Russian army was only seven days 
march	from	the	Adrianople,	he	confided	to	De	Kock,	‘I	hope	the	Muslims	take	a	knock	and	the	
Russians remain as rulers in Constantinople. Then we could say to our friends: the Turks have 
been	defeated	in	battle	by	the	Russians’	(Ik hoop de Musulmanes klop blyve krygen en dat de Russen in 
Constantinople zullen blyven regeeren dan zoude wij aan ons vrienden kunnen zeggen, orang Rum soeda 
kala prang sama orang Rus), dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Mage-
lang), 21-12-1829, See further Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Banaran/Panjer) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 
3-1-1830, thanking De Kock for sending him a copy of the Javasche Courant of 3-1-1830 which car-
ried news from the Adrianople front and which he had translated for Pengalasan because he had 
become	curious	when	he	heard	the	title	‘Pasha’	with	reference	to	Hasan	Ali	Pasha,	the	Ottoman	
governor of Smyrna (Izmir), who had been sent to Adrianople to defend the fortress city; Carey 
1979:217 note 93.
34 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Panjer) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 12-1-1830.
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prepared to offer him now that the war was ending in their favour? The answer 
would not be long in coming. On 29 December, De Kock had given Cleerens 
full powers to negotiate with Dipanagara through his patih, but had ordered 
him to make sure that the area where the prince was hiding out should be 
surrounded in the event that negotiations failed.35 Danureja apparently got 
wind of this because he asked for the Dutch bènthèng commanders not to 
come too close to the Menorèh mountain region between eastern Bagelèn 
and southwestern Kedhu where he said Dipanagara had now moved – false 
information as it turned out. There was even talk of exchanging hostages.36 
On 26 December, Pengalasan wrote to reassure Danureja that no harm would 
come to Dipanagara once negotiations were opened.37 But he had no right to 
give such an assurance. 
Shortly after Pengalasan’s letter was sent, on 4 January 1830, His Dutch 
Majesty’s sailing ship Rupel slipped into Batavia harbour.38 On board was the 
new governor-general, Johannes van den Bosch, carrying instructions from 
King William I himself. ‘The absolute will of the king’, De Kock reported soon 
afterwards to his deputy, Colonel Cochius, ‘is that there should be no further 
negotiations, only an unconditional surrender will be permitted.’39 Indeed, a 
bare two days after his arrival, Van den Bosch, as we have seen (page 584), 
was hurrying to underscore his monarch’s instructions by urging De Kock to 
capture or kill Dipanagara:
Do	not	enter	into	any	agreement	with	him	[…]	only	on	the	understanding	of	life	
imprisonment can his surrender or capture be sanctioned. No other understanding 
whatsoever [can be permitted].40
While some Dutch officials were prepared to try and arrange Dipanagara’s 
assassination (page 595), De Kock was not one of them. A humane man, who 
had himself experienced the bitterness of defeat and wartime detention in 
35 dK 210, H.M. de Kock (Magelang) to Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada), 29-12-1829.
36 dK 210, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Binong; ? Binangun) to Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja 
(Winong/Kebumèn), 7-12-1829; Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja (Winong/Kebumèn) to Colo-
nel J.B. Cleerens (Binong; ? Binangun), 7-12-1829. Cleerens had asked that Dipanagara’s eldest son 




37 dK 210, Ali Basah Kertapengalasan (Gunungpersada) to Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja 
(Winong/Kebumèn), 27 Jumadilakir AJ 1757 (AD 26-12-1829).
38 Prins 2002:203, states that Van den Bosch arrived ‘in Java’ on 2-1-1830, whereas Louw and 
De Klerck 1894-1909, V:529, give 4-1-1830 as the date that Z.M. Rupel docked in Batavia. The dis-
crepancy in dates may refer to Van den Bosch’s initial landing at Mérak in the Sunda Straits and 
his eventual arrival in Batavia.
39	 H.M.	de	Kock	(Magelang)	to	Colonel	F.D.	Cochius	(commanding	the	army	in	the	field),	11­
1-1830, quoted in Kielstra 1896b:299.
40 dK 23, Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 6-1-1830.
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England (1811-1813) after Java had fallen to the British in September 1811 (p. 
287), he had a certain sympathy for the Javanese. Writing to a friend in June 
1831 after he had returned to Holland and been given command of the Dutch 
army in Zeeland during the Belgian Revolt, he confided that he thought the 
Belgians ‘infinitely worse’ (oneindig slegter) than the Javanese, although he 
acknowledged that the southern Netherlanders had not always been prop-
erly treated by his countrymen.41 Following his meeting with Dipanagara at 
Magelang, he would form a rather favourable view of the prince as would 
many members of his staff.42 Van den Bosch’s hard line filled him with fore-
boding. How could he possibly accomplish Dipanagara’s surrender if no ne-
gotiations were allowed? 
On 29 January, after handing over temporary command of the Dutch forces 
in the field to Cochius,43 De Kock hurried to Batavia to reason with the new 
governor-general (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:531; Kielstra 1896a:90). 
By 8 February, he was writing to his deputy, ‘General Van den Bosch is no 
longer so completely set against negotiations, he only says that in Europe peo-
ple are very much against [such a course of action]’ (Kielstra 1896a:90). Two 
days later the commander-in-chief reported that he was preparing to return to 
Magelang, ‘perhaps I can be useful there: although affairs are in just as good 
hands with you [Cochius] as with myself, perhaps Dipanagara will agree to 
negotiate with no one else [but myself]’ (Kielstra 1896a:90). The following day, 
with Van den Bosch’s blessing, he sent Dipanagara another letter assuring him 
that if he did agree to a meeting ‘he would be well received’, a condition which 
Senthot had indicated Dipanagara would insist on given his touchiness about 
the way he had been treated previously by Europeans (Kielstra 1896a:90; pp. 
550-2). Eventually, on 25 February, after De Kock had received reports that 
Dipanagara had placed himself in Cleerens’ hands, he boarded the same ship 
which had brought Van den Bosch to Java and sailed for Semarang.
41 UBL, BPL 1346 ‘J.B. de Salis brieven’, H.M. de Kock (Dutch Army HQ Zeeland) to J.B. de 
Salis (Utrecht), 22-6-1831. On De Kock’s Zeeland command (1831-36), see Genealogie De Kock 
1996-7:419.
42	 In	the	words	of	Van	den	Bosch,	‘our	officers	who	have	associated	much	with	him	[in	Mage-
lang] over the past few days speak with praise about his intelligence and frank character, and 
General de Kock completely shares that opinion’, Van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor) to King William 
I (The Hague), 14-3-1830, quoted in Van den Kemp 1896a:416. See further Carey 1981a:lxix note 
194. On Major de Stuers’ view that during the war Dipanagara had shown ‘a superiority of char-
acter	little	found	amongst	present­day	Javanese,	princes’	(une superiorité de caractère peu commune 
aux princes Javanais de nos jours), see Kielstra 1896a:92, quoting De Stuers 1833.
43	 A	 highly	 experienced	 engineer	 officer,	 Cochius	 was	 not	 deemed	 to	 have	 any	 political	
savoir-faire	 in	 ‘native	 affairs’	 (Louw	and	De	Klerck	 1894­1909,	V:510),	 unlike	Cleerens	 and	 the	
mobile	column	commander	in	Kedhu,	Lieutenant­Colonel	Louis	du	Perron,	who	was	specifically	
requested by Cleerens to come down to Kedhung Kebo as his temporary replacement in late 
December 1829, when he moved to Kebumèn to open negotiations with Dipanagara, due to his 
‘iron patience with the Javanese’, dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock 
(Magelang), 22-12-1829. 
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De Kock was right about Dipanagara. The prince’s patih had told Cleerens, 
following his surrender on 16 January, that the Java War leader would refuse 
to speak to any other Dutch officer but the commander-in-chief in person and 
that he was aggrieved that since Kyai Maja’s capture in mid-November 1828, 
he had received no letters from De Kock.44 He also requested to be addressed 
by his title of sultan.45 De Kock’s flexibility over negotiations (he would refuse 
to use the sultan’s title) was not, however, backed up by Van den Bosch. After 




favours as reflecting any feelings for his character and bravery. How would it ap-
pear if we should show favour to a man who has been so far beaten that he was 
reduced to wandering in the forests with only two followers?46 
The most he was prepared to consider was a temporary exile for the prince 
in Bandung or some other place in the Priangan area of west Java,47 with a 
vague promise that he might be allowed to return to the princely states when 
the political situation had calmed down sufficiently. He might even be al-
lowed to undertake the haj (pilgrimage to Mecca). ‘But in any event’, Van den 
Bosch observed, ‘once he has come to Magelang, he should not be allowed to 
slip through our fingers.’48 We will see shortly, how, as soon as Dipanagara 
had been captured, the new governor-general would forget entirely about his 
earlier more lenient considerations.
Far away in western Bagelèn, Cleerens had the tricky task of convincing 
the prince’s intermediaries that it was in their sovereign’s best interests to meet 
De Kock and open peace talks. If persuading him to meet with the Dutch 
commander-in-chief was not such a problem, what would be the bait which 
would make the subsequent negotiations of value for the prince? In his babad, 
Dipanagara devotes nearly four cantos, or almost a tenth of his entire chron-
icle, to the process of the peace negotiations. These describe developments 
from the receipt of the first letters from Cleerens and De Kock, which Radèn 
Adipati Abdullah Danureja had been asked – but failed – to pass on to him 
44 dK 210, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kemit) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 20-1-1830.
45 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830.
46 dK 23, Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 12-3-1830. See 
further Carey 1982:7.
47	 This	is	where	the	Padri	leader,	Imam	Bonjol	(1772­1864),	was	initially	exiled	after	his	capture	
by the Dutch in 1837. Complaints by the Resident of Preanger about having a prisoner of Imam 
Bonjol’s stature under his authority and the inadvisability of allowing the aged Padri leader to 
come	into	close	contact	with	the	local	Sundanese	inhabitants	forced	his	removal	first	to	Ambon	
(1839-1841) and then to Manado (1841-1864), Dobbin 1972:18-9.
48 dK 23, Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 12-1-1830. See 
further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:570.
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on 7 December 1829, to the end of the account of his capture in Magelang on 
28 March 1830.49 The tone of the first part of the babad describing these peace 
contacts is one of extreme caution. At first, Dipanagara refused even to receive 
the initial letters until persuaded by the arguments of one of his religious ad-
visers, Kyai Melangi (Appendix VIIb), who pointed out that in the time of The 
Prophet, if a letter arrived it would be studied to ascertain whether its contents 
were good or bad, and then replied to accordingly.50 Dipanagara, who seemed 
to place more trust in his santri advisers than his patih, was suitably impressed 
by the kyai’s knowledge of the traditions of The Prophet.51 Immediately, he 
was ordered to go down to Kecawang to bring Danureja and the letters back 
to his mountain headquarters in Rèma.52 But, no sooner had Melangi arrived 
at Danureja’s former base in mid-January 1830, than he fell sick. The patih, 
who had tried to hide himself with five followers in a hut deep in the adjacent 
wilderness of the Rawa Tambakbaya (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:524), 
decided at this moment to surrender to Cleerens at Panjer.53 So precious weeks 
were lost until in early February Dipanagara – who described himself as feel-
ing that it was as though it was God’s Will that he should experience suffering 
and shame in this world54 – relates how he was convinced by his santri advis-
ers that he should open direct talks with Cleerens, ‘a man whose heart could 
be trusted’ in the words of his babad.55 The prince had also heard separately 
from Senthot, who had written to him through the intermediary of Danureja, 
inviting him to make peace with De Kock.56 His pengulu, Kyai Pekih Ibrahim, 
and long-time friend, Haji Badarudin, were thereupon delegated to go to the 
bènthèng at Kemit in the Gombong district of Karanganyar, where Cleerens 
49 BD (Manado) IV:251-399, XXXIX.108-XLIII.118, covers the whole process of the negotiations 
up to Dipanagara’s capture in Magelang and his departure for Semarang on 28-3-1830. 
50 BD (Manado) IV:260-1, XXXIX (Pucung) 169-72. Ki Melangi mangkana ingkang winuwus/ […]. 
171. […]/ kalamun pinirsa/ inggih dhateng ngèlminèki/ pan rumiyin duk jeneng Jeng Rasulullah. 172. 
lamun wonten serat pan pinirsa tuhu/ awon saénira/ mapan lawan dènwangsuli.
51 BD (Manado), IV:261, XXXIX.173-4, describing Dipanagara’s delight at Kyai Melangi’s expla-
nation, he asked him why he had not told him this tradition before, to which the kyai replied that 
he was too afraid of Kyai Maja and his supposedly superior knowledge of the Qur’ān and Hadith 
to do so. 
52 Dipanagara appears to have been at Sampang just to the west of Gunung Kebo in west-
ern Bagelèn (present-day south Banyumas), see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:Map. This is 
where he rode out from on 16-2-1830 for his meeting with Colonel Cleerens at Rèmakamal, BD 
(Manado), IV:285, XL.87.
53 BD (Manado), IV:261-2, XXXIX.176-179; dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Panjer) to H.M. de 
Kock (Magelang), 16-1-1830, 17-1-1830, reporting Danureja’s submission and his subsequent 
departure under escort to meet De Kock in Magelang and brief him on Dipanagara’s situation.
54 BD (Manado), IV:267, XXXIX (Pucung) 212. pan mengkana osiking tyas kang sinuhun/ baya 
karsaning Hyang/ ingsun kinon anglakoni/ lara wirang apan gon ingsun nèng donya.
55 BD (Manado) IV:280, XL (Megatruh) 61. marma kang tyas pan langkung pitajengipun/ nulya 
sang nata nuruti.
56 DK 127, Dipanagara (Sampang) to Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kemit), 17 Syaban, AH 1245 (AD 
14-2-1830).
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had now moved, to make the appropriate arrangements. The Flemish officer 
was to be invited to meet with him at Rèmakamal on the upper reaches of the 
Cingcingguling River some sixteen kilometres due north of the Dutch bènthèng 
at Rèma Jatinegara on Tuesday, 16 February.57
According to Cleerens, the prince asked for presents. These included enough 
black cloth for some 400 mounted troops, half of whom would come with him 
as his bodyguard from Rèmakamal,58 f 200 in cash to pay for them, one gold 
state umbrella (payung) to mark his royal status and two pairs of scissors, pre-
sumably to cut his own and his troops’ hair.59 As Dipanagara journeyed to-
wards Magelang in late February and early March, these requests would grow 
exponentially: by the time he reached Menorèh, Pengalasan was reporting that 
the prince required an advance of f 10,000 to cover his troops’ stipends with a 
further f  200 being needed just to provide him with a new wardrobe. Additional 
quantities of black cloth were also needed to outfit another 400 men, a case 
perhaps of creative financing on the part of Dipanagara’s army commanders.60 
Cleerens for his part also made a request of the prince: that he put his demands 
for the proposed meeting in the form of a letter so that he could show De Kock 
in Batavia that Dipanagara was serious about peace negotiations.61 
When this epistle eventually arrived, it caused consternation. The prince 
had placed his pégon seal in the middle of his text, and was deemed to have 
used inappropriately coarse Javanese. This seemed to the authorities in 
Yogya, where the letter was sent for analysis, to be the type of Low Javanese 
(ngoko) language which was usually employed by the sultan to junior officials 
in the kraton. As for the placement of the seal, this indicated, according to J.F. 
Walraven van Nes, the acting Resident of Yogyakarta (in office 1827-1830), 
that Dipanagara ‘stood in the centre of Java, and with his arms [outstretched], 
as it were, wished to draw everything to him and take it under his protec-
tion’.62 In his babad, Dipanagara gave a very different explanation, stating that 
57 BD (Manado) IV:267-70, XXXIX.213-36. Both Rèmakamal and Rèma Jatinegara are in present-
day southern Banyumas, an area which at this time was within the old borders of Bagelèn.
58 Dipanagara was accompanied by some 200 mounted troops – mainly armed with pikes 
– when he came down to Rèmakamal from Sampang on 16-2-1830, and he was expecting a fur-
ther 200 to join him there and accompany him to Kecawang and Kalireja. In fact, by the time 
he reached Menorèh on 21-2-1830, his armed entourage had grown to at least 700, and this had 
increased still further to over 800 when he entered Magelang on 8-3-1830, see note 80. 
59 dK 210, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kemit) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 9-2-1830.
60 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830, 
27-2-1830, reporting that Pengalasan had asked for satu laksa rupiah (10,000 rupiah), of which 
f  1,000 should be made available immediately. Cleerens gave him the f 200 to purchase clothes 
for Dipanagara, but told him that the prince would have to speak with him in person about the 
larger amount, which did not happen before Dipanagara reached Magelang.
61 dK 210, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kemit) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 9-2-1830.
62 dK 208, J.F. Walraven van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 18-2-1830. 
Van	Nes	had	shown	the	letter	to	the	Yogya	patih, Danureja IV, and Major Tumenggung Wirana-
gara – now styled Pangéran Prabuningrat – who both said that they had seen nothing like it.
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he had told Cleerens at the Rèmakamal meeting that he had placed his seal as 
Sultan Ngabdulkamid in the centre of the letter because that was the position 
of The Prophet’s city, Mecca, which in the view of all devout Muslims was 
considered as standing in the very centre of the world. ‘You may not wish 
to pay your respects to The Prophet, who is most excellent’, he reported he 
had told Cleerens, ‘but it is my duty because in truth I am a believer in the 
religion of The Prophet’.63 As for the tone of the letter and the language used, 
Dipanagara was giving instructions to Cleerens and his deputy commander 
in the Bagelèn-Banyumas region, Major H.F. Buschkens. In particular, he was 
asking them to prepare pesanggrahan (temporary bamboo pavilions) for his 
reception and that of his army commanders at Rèmakamal, Kecawang and 
Kalireja in the Pagebangan sub-district of Karanganyar, where Dipanagara 
expected De Kock to come to meet him. If questioned about this, his reply 
would undoubtedly have been that it was appropriate as a ruler that he 
should use such Low Javanese language to his subordinates.64
63 BD (Manado) IV:289-90, XL (Megatruh) 113-5. lawan kurnèl marmané pratandhaningsun/ ika 
sun prenah iki/ nèng tengah tulisan iku/ sab iya Kangjeng Nabi/ negarané Mekah mangko. 114. Mekah iku 
satengahing jagad satuhu/ marma yèn sira tan [k]apti/ iya angurmati iku/ mring Kangjeng Nabi ta iki/ 
Muhamad sun tan ayun. 115. sabab ingsun iki mapan darma tuhu/ kang duwé Agama Nabi.
64	 BD	(Manado),	IV:281­2,	XL.	65­9.	Dipanagara’s	original	letter	in	pégon script is in dK 208. It 
reads as follows: ingkang serat Ingkang Sinuhun Kanjeng Sultan tumekaa marang sira Kornèl Kalèrès 
apadéné marang sira Mayor Bekes ing sawusé tabéningsun marang sira karo-karoné marmané isun aputu-
san bocahinsun si Pengulu Peqih Ibrahîm karo si Dolah Haji Badaruddîn apadéné si Dolah Melangi sabab 
isun mirsa khabar yèn bocahisun si Perwiradirja awèh layang marang bocahisun si Adipati Danureja 
layang bakal katur isun yèn isun diaturi pedhama karo Jénderal anadéné khabaré yèn isun biyèn mengko 
yèn diaturi pedhama isun iya andhangani anadéné khabaré yèn isun wis andhangani ya ing pedhama iku 
mau bocahisun si Perwiradirja bakal nungsul maréné séba marang isun kang sarta Kornèl Nahus apadéné 
Kornèl Kawakis mulané isun utusan marang sira sabab penggalihisun sira ora béda ya karo Kornèl Nahus 
apadéné Kornèl Kawakis sabab déné si Peng[a]lasan ora béda karo si Perwiradirja ananging ingkang dadi 
kersaningsun isun mundhut pesanggerahan si Romakamal lan si Kejawang karo sira Kornèl Kalèrès Mayor 
Bekes padha methuka marang isun ana ing Romakamal yèn isun wus ketemu karo sira laju isun mesang-
gerahan ana ing Kajawang pamerihisun persaka lan sira sabab isun mirsa khabar yèn Jénderal saiki ora 
ana dadi isun angantèni saktekaning Jénderal yèn upama Jénderal wis teka sun perih Jénderal kirima 
layang marang isun, isun mundhut pesanggerahan ana Kalireja ing kono muga isun ketemua lan Jénderal. 
Kaserat ing dinten Jum’ah wulan Sya’ban tanggal kaping pitulas ing taun Jimawal hijratannabi s.m. min 
Makati li’l-Madînati’sysyarîfah 1 2 4 5.	‘This	letter	of	His	Highness	the	Sultan	[is]	to	you	Colonel	
Cleerens	and	moreover	to	you	Major	Buschkens.	After	my	greetings	to	you	both,	the	reason	I	sent	
as messengers my followers Pengulu Pekih Ibrahim together with Haji Dullah Badarudin and 
also Dullah Melangi is because I heard the news that my follower [Ali Basah Senthot] Prawira-
dirja	had	given	a	letter	to	my	follower	Adipati	[Abdullah]	Danureja,	a	letter	which	was	to	be	given	
to me and in which I was asked [to make] peace with the general [De Kock]. Just as in former 
times, when I was asked to make peace, I was in agreement, so also now there is the news that 
I had agreed to the aforementioned peace. [I request] that my follower Prawiradirja will come 
here to have an audience with me together with Colonel Nahuys and Colonel Cochius. That is 
why	I	sent	messengers	to	you	because	in	my	opinion	you	are	no	different	from	Colonel	Nahuys	
and	Colonel	Cochius,	just	as	[Ali	Basah	Kerta]	Pengalasan	is	no	different	from	Prawiradirja.	But	
my wish is to ask you for pesanggrahan [temporary bamboo audience halls] at Rèmakamal and 
at Kecawang, and [I request] Colonel Cleerens and Major Buschkens to await me at Rèmakamal. 
Plate 69. Letter of Pangéran Dipanagara to Colonel (later Major-General) Cleerens 
(1785-1850) and Major (later Major-General) Hendrik Frederik Buschkens (1795-1860), 
dated 17 Shaban, AH 1245 (14 February 1830; Islamic calendar from the date of the 
flight of The Prophet AD 622 from Mecca to Medina) in pégon (unvocalised Arabic) 
script dealing with the negotiations for a meeting at Rèmakamal in north-eastern 
Bagelèn to discuss peace terms. Dipanagara’s seal which bears the royal title which 
he assumed at Selarong on 1 Sura, AJ 1753 (15 August 1825; Javanese year – lunar era 
inaugurated by Sultan Agung [reigned 1613-1646] in 1633), is placed in  the middle of 
the letter and reads as follows: ‘Ingkang Jumeneng Kangjeng Sultan Ngabdul Chamid 
Herucakra Kabirul Mu’minin Sayidin Pantagama [...] Rasullah s.a.w. ing Tanah Jawi’.
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The Rèmakamal meeting itself seems to have passed off well despite 
Cleerens’ late arrival.65 Dipanagara had ridden down to the meeting from 
his mountain headquarters at Sampang accompanied by his mounted body-
guard with his heirloom kris, Kyai Ageng Bandayuda, being carried before 
him to ward off danger.66 When the colonel eventually arrived, he had shown 
the prince all due respect, dismounting from his horse some way from the 
meeting pavilion and walking the last distance with his cavalry kepi off even 
though it was a very hot day.67 His adjutant, Second Lieutenant Carl Philip 
Conrad Steinmetz, followed at a short distance together with the prince’s 
patih and his former Bagelèn commander, Pengalasan. Pleasantries and jokes 
were exchanged, including some light-hearted banter about the number of 
guns which should be fired to salute the prince as he passed by the vari-
ous Dutch bènthèng on his journey to Kecawang and Kalireja.68 After refus-
ing both the cannon salutes and the three horses offered him by Cleerens 
and Buschkens, Dipanagara asked to leave for Kecawang accompanied by 
Steinmetz and four Dutch hussars. The meeting had lasted just two hours. 
Cleerens, meanwhile, returned to Kemit to make further preparations for the 
prince’s journey onwards to Kedhu taking care to avoid the crossing of riv-
ers like the Bagawanta and the Elo in southern Kedhu, which Dipanagara 
insisted no prince of Mataram blood could pass over.69 Cleerens’ own report 
is missing but his superior, Cochius, described the encounter as ‘polite and fa-
miliar’ despite the fact that no major undertakings were given by Dipanagara 
or conditions agreed on (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:554, 721). 
With De Kock still absent in Batavia, Dipanagara initially intended to await 
his return in western Bagelèn, but Cleerens persuaded him to journey on 
When I have met you [there] I will go to the pesanggrahan at Kecawang. My wish is to be near you 




Medina ‘5 4 2 1’ [17 Syaban AH 1245 or AD 12-1830]’. I am grateful to the late Dr Th.G.Th. Pigeaud 
for making the transliteration and helping me with the translation.
65	 BD	(Manado),	IV:285­9,	XL.87­107,	states	that	the	original	plan	was	for	Cleerens	to	arrive	first	
at midday and for Dipanagara to follow an hour later, but Cleerens did not leave Kemit until 10 
a.m. by which time Dipanagara was already waiting for him at the pesanggrahan at Rèmakamal.
66 BD (Manado), IV:285-6, XL.87-93. The pusaka kris had been carried by Ali Basah Mertana-
gara,	who	had	been	given	responsibility	for	ensuring	that	the	journey	passed	off	safely.
67 BD (Manado), IV:287, XL.98-9.
68	 BD	(Manado),	IV:289­90,	XL.108­112,	states	that	Cleerens	offered	to	fire	a	25­gun	salute,	but	
Dipanagara asked for a 75-gun salute instead since he was the representative of The Prophet in 
Java. He stated that the ‘friends’ of The Prophet were 74 in number, so a 75-gun salute would 
honour them all at once, together with The Prophet himself. ‘But’ said Dipanagara, ‘you have 
paid	me	enough	respect	already	–	during	the	five	years	of	war,	you	must	have	fired	over	100,000	
cannon shots in my honour!’ 
69 BD (Manado) IV:301-2, XL.182-3; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:554, 721.
Plate 70. Letter of Dipanagara to Major-General J.B. Cleerens, dated Makassar, 
23 Ruwah, AJ 1763 (14 December 1835): AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-
Generaal in rade, 15-3-1837, no. 57. See Appendix XIII part B.
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with him to Menorèh and sit out the general’s return there. He arrived on 21 
February, his entourage having nearly doubled to 700 en route, the local popula-
tion of this part of southern Kedhu showing him particular respect. According 
to Dutch reports, many local people in the mountain settlement were amazed 
at the speed with which the prince had come over, some doubting the testi-
mony of their eyes that this was indeed the legendary Java War leader in their 
midst (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:723). Everywhere he went, food and 
fruit were brought for him, some even being sent up to him from Bagelèn dur-
ing his stay by provincial chiefs who had never taken his side in the war (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:554-5, 723). He apparently got on very well with 
the Dutch officers and mobile column commanders whom he was introduced 
to during his journey, but was adamant that he would not meet with any of the 
Javanese officials who were in the employ of the government or of the south-
central Javanese courts (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:554).
The prince would spend just over a fortnight at Menorèh before setting off 
for Magelang on 8 March. During this time, he allowed himself to be treated 
by a Dutch military doctor for his malarial fever and commenced prepara-
tions for the start of the fasting month which began on 25 February (Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:723). The prince’s experience of western medicine 
did nothing to alter his views about the superiority of traditional Javanese 
herbal remedies (p. 117). Despite his robust constitution – a constitution ‘made 
of iron’ in De Kock’s words (p. 116) – it was clear that he was suffering from 
the privations of his long months in the forests of western Bagelèn. Cleerens 
reported that ‘more than anyone else, [he] needs rest, his whole body is tired 
out’.70 His physical condition may have been one of the reasons for his willing-
ness to enter into negotiations with the Dutch at this time.
Dipanagara’s period at Menorèh is well documented in Cleerens’ dis-
patches and it was here that an issue came up which would have long-term 
consequences for both the prince and his Flemish host. This concerned the 
undertaking which he thought Cleerens had given him with regard to his 
forthcoming negotiations with De Kock; namely, that if they proved not to his 
liking he would be allowed to return unmolested to Bagelèn to continue his 
struggle (Appendix XIII note 7). He specifically requested his pengulu, Kyai 
Pekih Ibrahim, to ask the colonel for such an undertaking (Carey 1982:19), and 
after his capture in Magelang, he discussed the issue at length with one of his 
two Dutch officer escorts, Captain Johan Jacob Roeps, telling him that he had 
been under the impression that if he could not come to an agreement with the 
general on this occasion, that people should have ‘let him return without hin-
drance to the mountains’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:741). We will see 
shortly how even De Kock would describe in his official report of his 28 March 
70 Kielstra 1896b:299, quoting Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kecawang) to Colonel F.D. Cochius 
(Magelang), 18-2-1830.
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1830 meeting with the prince, which resulted in his capture, how the prince 
had complained bitterly about the way he was being treated. Indeed, the prince 
never forgot this betrayal. Five years after the war, when Cleerens had returned 
to Java loaded with honours as a titular major-general, Dipanagara wrote se-
cretly to him from Makassar reminding him of his previous ‘statements’. This 
communication would prove fateful for both men. It immediately led to much 
tighter restrictions on the prince’s freedom of movement in Fort Rotterdam 
in Makassar, and may have contributed to the Flemish officer’s sudden relief 
from his position as military commander of Sumatra’s West Coast.71 
While there is nothing in the colonel’s letters to suggest that he made any 
promises of this nature, he certainly went out of his way to reassure the prince, 
who was exactly his age, stating that he held himself personally responsible 
for his interests (Appendix XIII note 7) and repeating De Kock’s promises that 
no harm would ever be done to him.72 He also treated him with respect, ad-
dressing him as ‘sultan’ and speaking to him directly in Malay. Privately, how-
ever, he took a critical view of the Java War leader describing him as ‘either 
a very stupid or a very dissembling person’ and belittling his understanding 
of Islam – ‘he prays a lot and speaks constantly about the law of Muhammad 
but he knows little of The Faith’ – stating that he badly needed the presence 
of the Surat-born Sayyid Hasan as his religious adviser at the forthcoming 
Magelang meeting with De Kock.73 In this context, Cleerens was very critical 
of the ‘young men’ who seemed to make up the inner circle of the prince’s en-
tourage. He feared they were misleading him due to their lack of knowledge 
and self-interest, and tried in vain to encourage the prince’s patih to take a more 
proactive role.74 He also noticed how one of the santri advisers in Dipanagara’s 
entourage, Haji Ngisa, seemed to be acting the role of court jester.75 Constantly 
71 Appendix XIII. The abrupt end to Colonel Cleerens’ career as military commandant of 
Sumatra’s west coast on 31-5-1837 is mentioned in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:326 note 1. It 
occurred	shortly	after	the	government	decided	to	impose	more	stringent	restrictions	on	Dipana-
gara’s freedom of movement in Makassar. Cleerens had only just turned 52, and was well short of 
the	usual	military	retirement	age	(55)	for	general	officers.	He	was	also	only	accorded	a	colonel’s	
pension not that of a major-general to which he was entitled by virtue of his 1835 promotion. 
Administrative incompetence rather than suspicion of his dealings with Dipanagara, however, 
appears to have been the main cause of Cleerens’ ouster since he went on to make a career for 
himself as Resident of Preanger (1844-1846) and governor of Maluku (1846-1850), postings which 
were dogged by his lack of administrative capacity, Van ’t Veer 1979:199. See further note 191.
72 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830.
73 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830. On 
Sayyid Hasan, see Chapter X note 18.
74 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830. Clee-
rens	specifically	mentioned	the	‘clique’	around	Basah	Gandakusuma	(born	1810),	which	included	
his elder brother, Mertanagara (born circa 1808), and Pangéran Dipanagara II (born circa 1803).
75 On Haji Ngisa’s role as the ‘clown’ (hansworst) in Dipanagara’s entourage at Menorèh, see 
dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830. On his 
links with Kyai Maja’s family’s pradikan village of Pulo Kadang, see Appendix VIIb.
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on the look out for evidence of the prince’s ‘treachery’, such as his supposed 
failure to keep a promise not to increase his armed following by accepting new 
recruits from Bagelèn, Gowong and Mataram,76 the colonel pressed Cochius to 
send him a few hundred more cavalry and infantry so that he could be certain 
that the prince would not be able to escape either from Menorèh or during 
his forthcoming journey to Magelang.77 On the evening before Dipanagara’s 
departure, Cleerens signalled a change in attitude towards him by dropping 
his royal style as ‘His Highness Sultan Ngabdulkamid’ and addressing him 
for the first time by his old princely title of Pangéran Dipanagara, something 
which De Kock would also do when the prince eventually arrived in Magelang 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:564).
Treachery or honourable submission? Dipanagara’s arrest at Magelang, 28 March 
1830
As soon as De Kock returned to Magelang from Batavia at the beginning of 
March, he ordered Cleerens to bring Dipanagara and his entourage up to 
his Kedhu headquarters to meet him. Although the prince agreed to leave 
immediately, no sooner had he begun his journey than he asked to return to 
Menorèh. There was no point in going to Magelang, he told Cleerens, because 
all he could do would be to pay De Kock a polite visit. No serious discussions 
could take place during the fasting month. All negotiations would have to 
wait until it was over on 27 March. The Flemish officer should have known 
this because once the fast had begun on 25 February Dipanagara had gone 
into daily retreat in Menorèh and had refused all Cleerens’ entreaties that he 
compose a letter to De Kock stipulating his negotiating demands.78 Eventually 
a compromise was reached; Dipanagara would go to meet De Kock but only 
for a courtesy visit. He would then observe the fast with his entourage in a 
specially prepared encampment at Magelang in an area by the Praga River 
just to the northwest of the Residency House known locally as Metésih.79 
Only when the fast was ended would proper talks begin.
76 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 28-2-1830.
77 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 27-2-1830.
78 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 25-2-1830. 
Cleerens had tried to persuade him by telling him that in the opinion of some ulama ‘good things’ 
could be done during the fasting month, and that it was also possible to transact business at night 
after	the	fast	had	been	broken,	but	Dipanagara	had	still	refused.	He	had	also	pointed	out	that	
since De Kock had put nothing in writing about the nature of the negotiations, there was nothing 
for him to reply to.
79 This encampment was reconnoitred during a special advance visit by Cleerens, Pengalasan 
and Haji Ngisa to Magelang, with the cooperation of the Resident of Kedhu, F.G. Valck, Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:562.
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When all the preparations had been completed on 7 March, De Kock 
sent word to Cleerens. The following day at around noon Dipanagara with 
his young army commanders and an entourage which had now swollen to 
around 80080 – far greater than the modest fifty-strong mounted escort which 
Cleerens had originally envisaged would accompany him from Menorèh81 
– entered the town. Many of these were former prajurit (soldiers) and mem-
bers of the prince’s erstwhile bodyguard regiments who had joined him dur-
ing his journey through Bagelèn and southern Kedhu. Armed mostly with 
pikes, they were now accoutred in black turbans and tabards made out of the 
cloth provided by Cleerens during the prince’s progress from Rèmakamal 
to Menorèh. There were fears on the Dutch side that with so many Javanese 
troops in the heart of the garrison town and more expected when Pangéran 
Dipanagara II and Imam Musbah arrived from their base on Mount Sundoro 
in northern Kedhu, they might have a fight on their hands should the Java 
War leader have to be seized manu militari.82 As a precaution, advance units of 
two of the Dutch mobile columns, which had been operational in Bagelèn and 
Kulon Praga, were brought to Magelang earlier on the morning of 8 March 
to supplement the forces already present at Dutch military headquarters.83 
‘Dipanagara still possesses much support, everywhere people show him re-
spect’, an anxious Van den Bosch reported to the minister of the Colonies in 
The Hague,84 and the prince himself mentioned the steady stream of Yogya 
officials, court artisans, grooms, goldsmiths and others who made their way 
to Magelang, along with former soldiers from Pajang, Kedhu and Bagelèn, to 
80 Some impression of the number of armed followers Dipanagara had with him at this time 
can be seen from the list of weapons which Major Michiels collected during the disarming of 
Dipanagara’s prajurit	at	Metésih	following	his	arrest.	These	included	832	pikes,	87	rifles	(presum-
ably	infantry	flintlocks)	and	a	huge	number	of	kris which were later returned to their original 
owners	after	Dipanagara’s	departure	from	Magelang,	Louw	and	De	Klerck	1894­1909,	V:598.
81 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 27-2-1830.
82 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830. 
Cleerens	advised	that	Senthot	should	not	be	permitted	to	bring	too	many	of	his	troops	to	Mage-
lang	in	the	event	that	he	was	brought	up	from	Yogya	to	attend	the	meeting	presumably	because	
he feared they might join with Dipanagara’s forces against the Dutch should it come to an armed 
showdown.	In	the	end,	Senthot	did	not	attend	the	Magelang	meeting.	According	to	Dipanagara,	
Pangéran Dipanagara II, brought 50 soldiers with him from northern Kedhu, BD (Manado), 
IV:368, XLII.181.
83 These were the infantry of Cleerens’ 7th mobile column commanded by Captain Lamber-
tus Gennet, and the jager	(riflemen)	of	Captain	B.G.	Rinia	van	Nauta’s	6th	mobile	column	com-
manded by Lieutenant F.C. Gilly de Montela, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:562, 644. 
Other troops, which were already in the town, included Major Michiels’ 11th mobile column from 
Wanasaba, units of Lieutenant-Colonel Louis du Perron’s 16th, 17th and 18th Kedhu garrison 
companies (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:758), and about 200 cavalry from the 7th Hussar 
regiment under command of Major Johan Jacob Perié.
84 NA, GKA, 30-7-1830 no. 32k geheim, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Minister of the 
Colonies (The Hague), 14-3-1830. 
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offer him their services.85 The town was overflowing with people, according 
to Dipanagara, and five buffaloes had to be slaughtered every day to feed 
them. So great were the corvée demands for the construction of temporary 
bamboo shelters that many Magelang inhabitants decided to move away tem-
porarily to escape the burdensome labour services.86
De Kock’s detailed report of the events concerning Dipanagara during his 
stay at Magelang, up to and including what the general discretely termed the 
prince’s ‘coming over’ (overkomst) – namely his capture on 28 March – is a major 
source for this three-week period.87 It can usefully be set besides Dipanagara’s 
own babad account, which naturally gives a very different perspective on these 
same events. What is especially interesting about De Kock’s account is its ele-
ment of self-reflection. Albeit written from the perspective of a senior Dutch 
military officer and former lieutenant-governor-general of the Netherlands-
Indies, De Kock was clearly troubled by the manner of the Java War leader’s 
arrest. This can be seen in the juxtaposition of his description of the prince’s 
formal reception on 8 March and what he wrote shortly afterwards about the 
propriety of his own behaviour towards Dipanagara. Thus he relates that he 
received the prince, his commanders and religious advisers with due honour 
in a formal meeting attended by his entire staff and senior Dutch officials in 
the Residency House. All local Javanese officials and princes of the blood from 
the courts, who were at Magelang at the time, had been excluded out of respect 
for the prince’s wishes. De Kock welcomed him as ‘Pangéran Dipanagara’ and 
let him sit directly to his left, his entourage being placed on a row of chairs 
ranged further along on both sides of the general. The meeting was short. The 
commander-in-chief opened by saying that out of respect for ‘different ways of 
thinking and the stipulations of other religious persuasions’, the prince would 
be left in peace during the fasting month, but he hoped that after it was over, 
matters between the two of them would be speedily settled. Now that they 
had been enemies for five years, he trusted that their friendship would en-
dure much longer, the Netherlands Indies government being ‘just and mild’. 
Dipanagara then stayed for a few minutes, speaking, according to De Kock, in 
a friendly way with the assembled Dutch officers and civilian officials before 
being escorted by the Resident of Kedhu, Valck, to his prepared encampment 
at Metésih. De Stuers would later capture this event in a deftly executed sketch 
showing a sombre prince riding up to the large bamboo and palm-leaf roofed 
pesanggrahan surrounded by his pikemen (De Stuers 1833: Plate 12).
85 BD (Manado), IV:353-4, XLII.68-72.
86 BD (Manado), IV:354, XLII (Gurisa) 73-4. Maglang kathah ngili samya/ pan langkung awrating 
karya / pan iya sadina-dina. 74. karya pasanggrahan ika/ pan kebak-kebak kéwala/ langkung kathah segah 
ika/ maésa gangsal sadina.
87 See KITLV H 340, H.M. de Kock, ‘Verslag van het voorgevallene met den Pangeran Dipo-
Nagoro	kort	vóór,	bij	en	na	zijne	overkomst’	(henceforth:	De	Kock,	‘Verslag’),	Magelang,	1­4­1830;	
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:560-75, 588-90, quote from it in extenso.
Plate 71 (above) The ‘old’ Residency 
House (Karesidenan Lama) at Magelang 
where Dipanagara was taken prisoner by 
the Dutch on 28 March 1830. The door 
leading to the room where he conducted 
his ‘negotiations’ with the Dutch com-
mander, Lieutenant-General Hendrik 
Merkus de Kock (1779-1845) is on the 
extreme right of  the picture underneath 
the pendhapa. 
(left) The study where General De 
Kock held his talk with Dipanagara 
just before his arrest, now a local mu-
seum. Photographs taken by Peter Carey, 
February 1972.
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Plate 72. Photograph of the interior of the study used by De Kock where Dipanagara 
was arrested on 28 March 1830. The chairs are supposedly originals, that on the 
right (shrouded in white cloth and under a glass case) supposedly the one used 
by Dipanagara during his ‘negotiations’ with General De Kock. Against the wall at 
the back of the picture (in the glass case) is the tabard (jubah) supposedly worn by 
Dipanagara during the war (with a cindhé edging supposedly sown by his Chinese 
mistress) and on the table is a copy of a Taqrib (fiqh) text with a diagram at the back 
showing the location of certain graves, which was supposedly owned by Dipanagara’s 
religious adviser, Kyai Melangi. Photograph taken by Peter Carey at the ‘old’ Residency 
House (Karesidenan Lama) at Magelang in February 1972.
Soon afterwards, De Kock confided his doubts about the propriety of his be-
haviour towards the prince in his Magelang diary (Louw and De Klerck 1894-
1909, V:566-7):
Already, according to some people, I should have placed Dipanagara under imme-
diate arrest because he is a rebel who has waged an insurrection against his ward 
and legal sovereign [Sultan Hamengkubuwana V] and against the Netherlands-
Indies government. As a subject of one of the Javanese rulers, he really had no 
right to any special consideration. At the same time, had he perceived, after being 
in Magelang for some time, that his wishes would not be met, it was not inconcei-
vable that he would have silently departed and recommenced hostilities.
I realised that such a way of acting on my part was ignoble and dishonest [onedel 
en oneerlijk] since Dipanagara had come to Magelang in good faith to meet me. 
Furthermore, he himself could have harboured no hostile designs because he had 
not the slightest idea how he would find everything in Magelang, and for anyone 
with even the slightest knowledge of the Javanese, the high degree of trust evinced 
by Dipanagara was striking.
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[But] if I had placed Dipanagara under immediate arrest, although the war 
would have been brought to an end more speedily, such conduct would in general 
have	 created	 an	 unfavourable	 impression:	 […]	 the	 princes	 and	 Javanese	 chiefs,	
who had one by one submitted to the Netherlands Indies government, would have 
been brought into uncertainty [thinking perhaps] that after the chief rebel had 
been captured by guile, some of them would be forced to share his fate.
Although it was already clear that Dipanagara was governed by his own pride 
and self-interest, because his following was already double that stipulated at 
Rèmakamal and there was little hope that he would come forward with moderate 
proposals, I had the intention of acting openly and honourably and winning his 
trust in all ways possible. So that if need be I could act forcibly at the end of the 
fasting month. [In this way] both Europeans and Javanese would be convinced 
that Dipanagara had only his own rash behaviour to blame for forcing me to take 
such drastic measures.
I also wanted to get the submission at Magelang of Imam Musbah and Pangéran 
Dipanagara the Younger [who were] still at large in the Karangkobar area before 
proceeding against the latter’s father. This I succeeded in doing.
De Kock’s behaviour towards Dipanagara was thus governed principally by 
political considerations, namely, to ensure the full submission of Dipanagara’s 
principal army commanders before he moved against the prince himself, to 
lull the latter into a false sense of security and to make his arrest appear not as 
a treacherous act but as a direct outcome of his own intransigent behaviour. It 
was neither open nor honourable to proceed in this fashion, but in De Kock’s 
view the end justified the means. In a private communication with Van den 
Bosch after his 8 March meeting with Dipanagara, he told the governor-general 
that in his view the prince’s arrival in Magelang constituted a de facto submis-
sion (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:569). De Kock’s gestures of friendliness 
and consideration towards Dipanagara, however, continued. Immediately af-
ter the prince’s arrival he made him a special present of a fine grey horse and 
provided f 10,000 in two instalments for the upkeep of his followers during 
the fasting month. He also allowed members of his family, who were being 
detained in Yogya and Semarang, to join him in Magelang.88 Meanwhile, senior 
members of De Kock’s staff, such as his adjutant and son-in-law, Major F.V.H.A. 
de Stuers, and the Resident of Kedhu, were frequent visitors to Dipanagara’s 
88 Dipanagara mentions in his babad that his mother, his third eldest son, Pangéran Adipati 
Anom (later Pangéran Dipaningrat), and his two young daughters, Radèn Ayu Basah (also known 
as Radèn Ayu Gusti) and Radèn Ajeng Munthèng (he meant Randèn Ajeng Impun), came up to 
join him, BD (Manado), IV:351, XLII.51-3. His two youngest sons, Radèn Mas Jonèd (born circa 
1815) and Radèn Mas Raib (born circa 1816; Appendix IV), were also with him at Metésih, Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:591, as was his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, who had come 
to Magelang with Ali Basah Imam Musbah from northern Kedhu. It is not certain exactly which 
family members were brought from Semarang, but they may have included Pangéran Adipati 
Anom	and	his	second	eldest	son,	Pangéran	Dipakusuma,	who	had	submitted	to	Colonel	Tumeng-
gung Wiranagara on 8-1-1830, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:319-20, 744; Sagimun 1965:303. 
There	is	internal	evidence	from	Dipanagara’s	letter	to	his	mother	written	from	Batavia	before	he	
left	for	Manado	on	3­5­1830	that	she	was	with	him	in	Magelang,	see	Appendix	XIII.
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encampment at Metésih enquiring solicitously about his needs (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, V:572). The Resident, however, appears to have riled the 
prince by what he later referred to as his ‘stupid and piffling questions’ (p. 
109). In particular, he took umbrage at Valck’s insistence that those flocking 
to join him were tax dodgers and corvée labour evaders rather than bona fide 
soldiers.89 The Resident also appears to have created difficulties with the small 
gifts of palm sugar and sugar cane which the local inhabitants brought, the 
prince having to point out to him that although he had no particular love for 
sweets, it was a Javanese custom to bring presents and he had to accept them as 
tokens of their respect for him as the ‘leader of Java’ (lajering Jawa).90
De Kock appears to have met Dipanagara on three separate occasions dur-
ing this period, twice for pre-dawn walks in the Resident’s garden and once 
when he came in person to his encampment before the start of the daily fast 
(Carey 1982:9 note 36). According to Dipanagara’s testimony, these meetings 
took place in a pleasant and unrestrained atmosphere, the two men exchang-
ing jokes91 and finding mutual pleasure in each other’s company. The fact that 
both were still mourning the death of their wives, to whom they had been 
especially devoted and who had died within months of each other in 1828, 
appears to have made them feel particularly close.92 
While this rapport was being established, De Kock was coming to the re-
alisation that Dipanagara would never surrender himself unconditionally to 
the government. A spy, Tumenggung Mangunkusuma, whom the Resident 
of Kedhu had placed in the prince’s entourage, reported that the prince was 
steadfast in his intention of obtaining recognition as sultan over the southern 
part of Java. Other senior officials stressed that Dipanagara wanted nothing 
less than the position as ‘royal maintainer and regulator of religion in Java’ 
(ratu paneteg panatagama wonten ing Tanah Jawa sedaya), or ‘head of the Islamic 
religion’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:573, 585; Carey 1982:10). Realising 
89 BD (Manado), IV:359, XLII (Gurisa) 112-3. pan tiyang Kedhu punika. 113. kathah kang lumebet 
ika/ prajurit dhateng paduka/ dados kèthèr damel kula/ kelawan supaosnya.
90 BD (Manado), IV:361, XLII (Gurisa) 128-31. hèh Residhèn wruhanira/ prakara wong padha prapta. 
129. kang wèwèh mring ingsun padha/ aja dadi atinira/ pan wus adaté wong Jawa/ lamun iku ngrungu 
warta. 130. ingsun parek pan padha prapta/ anggawa duwèkira/ tan étung tebu lan gula/ dènpenging 
mongsa kenaha. 131. jer iku wis padha ngrasa/ yèn lajering Jawa ika.
91 These jokes were occasioned by the fact that neither Dipanagara nor De Kock were accompa-
nied	on	these	pre­dawn	walks	by	their	adjutants	or	senior	officials	–	Basah	Mertanagara	in	the	case	
of Dipanagara, and Major De Stuers and Resident Valck in the case of De Kock – their absence giving 
rise to ribaldry by the two men about De Stuers’ need for a lot of sleep, and Ali Basah Mertanagara 
and Valck’s relationship with their wives and partners, Valck being reluctant to leave his Javanese 
mistress too early in the mornings for fear of being chided, BD (Manado) IV:375-7, XLII.237-54. See 
further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:576; p. 440 (on Valck’s Javanese mistresses).
92 BD (Manado), IV:377, XLII (Gurisa) 255. déné sadaya punika/ samya mukti sukawirya/ kawula 
lawan paduka/ dadya jodo samya priya. Dipanagara’s wife, Radèn Ayu Maduretna (Ratu Kedhaton), 
had died on 28-2-1828 (Appendix IV), and De Kock’s partner, Luise Fredericke Wilhelmine Ger-
trud	Baroness	von	Bilfinger	(born	Berlin	1788),	had	died	in	Magelang	on	28­11­1828,	see	Genealo-
gie De Kock 1996:7.
Plate 73. Sketch of Dipanagara and his armed followers (pikemen; prajurit) entering the prepared        encampment at Metésih, a settlement near the Praga River just below the ‘old’ Residency House 
(Karesidhenan Lama) at Magelang, on 8 March 1830 before the ‘peace’ negotiations with the Dutch     which ultimately led to his arrest on 28 March 1830. Uncoloured litograph by the Dutch painter 
and lithographer, Wilhelmus van Groenewoud (1803-1842), based on a sketch made by the Dutch        officer, Major (later Major-General) F.V.H.A. Ridder De Stuers (1792-1881). Print from De Stuers 
1833: Atlas, Plate 12. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
Plate 73. Sketch of Dipanagara and his armed followers (pikemen; prajurit) entering the prepared        encampment at Metésih, a settlement near the Praga River just below the ‘old’ Residency House 
(Karesidhenan Lama) at Magelang, on 8 March 1830 before the ‘peace’ negotiations with the Dutch     which ultimately led to his arrest on 28 March 1830. Uncoloured litograph by the Dutch painter 
and lithographer, Wilhelmus van Groenewoud (1803-1842), based on a sketch made by the Dutch        officer, Major (later Major-General) F.V.H.A. Ridder De Stuers (1792-1881). Print from De Stuers 
1833: Atlas, Plate 12. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
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that such demands could not even begin to be met by the government without 
compromising the position of the existing south-central Javanese rulers, De 
Kock took the decision to act decisively after the end of the fasting month. 
On 25 March, two days before the fast officially ended, he gave secret 
orders to two of his senior infantry commanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Louis 
du Perron and Major A.V. Michiels, who had sizeable troop contingents in 
Magelang (note 83), instructing them that when Dipanagara came to him to 
discuss his peace terms, all the necessary military preparations should have 
been put in place to secure his arrest. Thus the troops were to remain in full 
uniform with equipment at the ready in their barracks and cavalry mounts 
saddled up, so that at the first word of command all military personnel could 
immediately assemble under arms. On the day that Dipanagara was expected 
– 28 March 1830 – the usual guard at the Residency House was to be doubled, 
a move which was not expected to arouse suspicion because it was a Sunday 
when a larger than usual number of soldiers in full dress uniforms always 
gathered for the Sunday parade. On De Kock’s instructions a detachment of 
hussars was to be immediately dispatched to Bedono on the Kedhu-Semarang 
border to take over as an escort for the last stage of the prince’s journey to 
Semarang. All other Dutch officers without special commands were to gather 
at the Residency House to keep an eye on the chiefs whom Dipanagara would 
bring with him to his conference and who would be waiting outside in the 
long front gallery. Meanwhile, the carriage of the Resident of Kedhu was to be 
held in readiness to take Dipanagara immediately away from Magelang. The 
senior infantry officers were enjoined to go about their task with the greatest 
possible composure and to see that no one was harmed unnecessarily. Any 
resistance, however, was to be met by overwhelming force (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, V:589; Carey 1982:10 note 39). In this fashion everything 
was held in readiness to secure Dipanagara’s capture, disarm his 800 armed 
followers, and head off any last-minute opposition.
Was it possible that Dipanagara, as he suggested in his babad, was totally 
oblivious to these preparations? Did his sudden arrest during a courtesy visit 
to De Kock to mark the end of the fasting month really take him so com-
pletely by surprise? Gandakusuma, his young Rèma-based commander, who 
had followed him to Magelang, would later remark that this was very far 
from being the case. In his heart of hearts, Dipanagara always knew that he 
would be arrested Gandakusuma asserted. Decades afterwards in the late 
1870s when the now grey-haired former ali basah was coming to the end of a 
distinguished career as patih of Yogyakarta (Appendix Va), he was engaged in 
conversation by the then Dutch Resident of Yogyakarta, A.J.B. Wattendorff (in 
office 1873-1878). The following is the Dutch historian E.B. Kielstra’s report of 
this exchange (Kielstra 1896a:85-6; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:573-4):
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During a conversation with the patih [Gandakusuma] about the events and con-
ditions of past times, Mr Wattendorff expressed the opinion that the capture of 
Dipanagara could not be reconciled with the highest standards of justice. The patih 
showed himself to be considerably surprised.
‘But Dipanagara already knew beforehand that it would turn out thus!’
According to the patih, Dipanagara’s pride prevented him from taking any other 
solution. He always put forward his demands to be recognised as sultan and head 
of the Islamic religion in Java, knowing full well that General De Kock would ne-
ver permit them. He was malu [ashamed and embarrassed] to drop them, but he 
saw no ignominy in submitting to superior force. In this way his prestige in the 
eyes of the people would remain undiminished.
Mr Wattendorff is convinced that the patih was quite sincere in his observations. 
Already nearly half a century had elapsed and what had happened in 1830 and in 
previous years had become pure history. The man who had followed his father-in-
law93 during the whole rebellion, could have had no cause to do any violence to 
the truth and the way he related the event bore the stamp of authenticity.
Gandakusuma undoubtedly had his own reasons for stressing the inevitabil-
ity of Dipanagara’s arrest by the Dutch. By the time Wattendorff met him, he 
had been a senior official of the Yogyakarta sultanate for over forty years and 
his position as patih entailed special responsibilities to the Dutch (p. 168). He 
was thus unlikely to have wanted to cause them undue offence by dwelling 
on the darker aspects of their rule in Indonesia. But there is much more than 
mere diplomatic deception in his explanation of the way in which Dipanagara 
succumbed to his fate. 
In the prince’s own babad, there are many indications that although De 
Kock’s volte-face took him by surprise and pained him deeply as a betrayal 
of personal trust and friendship, the arrest itself was not totally unexpected. 
In the view of Muslims, there is no dishonour in submitting to superior force 
and the way in which Dipanagara described the event and its antecedents in-
dicates that he had long since given himself up to his destiny. The key phrase 
with which he introduced the sombre Maskumambang metre of the last canto 
of his autobiography relating his capture and exile – ‘we talk of the sultan 
[how] on the morning [of 28 March 1830] he was like gold being carried along 
by water’94 – exactly indicates his state of mind at the time. This was later con-
firmed by De Stuers, who wrote after his voyage to Batavia with the prince 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:746):
93 Gandakusuma was not in fact Dipanagara’s son-in-law although the prince had strongly 
urged	 that	he	 should	marry	his	widowed	daughter,	Radèn	Ayu	 Jayakusuma,	after	 the	end	of	
the	Java	War,	see	Appendix	XIII.	Wattendorff	may	have	confused	Gandakusuma	with	his	elder	
brother, Mertanagara, who at various stages had been married to no less than two of Dipanagara’s 
daughters, see Appendix IV note 5.
94 BD (Manado), IV:382, XLII.290. The key phrase is lir mas kèntir toya. See further Carey 
1982:12.
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If a trait in Dipanagara struck Captain Roeps and myself in particular, then it was 
his unchanging indifference, resignedness or submission – I do not quite know 
how to describe this feeling as it manifested itself in Dipanagara – concerning the 
dispositions which would be pronounced regarding his future life in exile and 
which he had requested he might speedily hear.
The prince thus felt himself swept along by forces outside his control, an 
impression further strengthened by a brief conversation between himself and 
Gandakusuma on the very morning of his arrest. The latter had come to the 
prince after the morning prayers in his small chapel to suggest that all his 
armed followers should accompany him to the Residency House. According 
to Dipanagara’s own testimony, he realised that such was not God’s Will. 
Smilingly, he rebuked Gandakusuma, stating that such a move would cause 
unpleasant surprise and that everything should happen ‘as normal’. Hearing 
this, Gandakusuma wanted to remonstrate but kept silent out of fear despite 
his heart’s deep forebodings.95 If such an incident did indeed occur – and in 
fact we know from other sources that Dipanagara actually brought around 
one hundred armed men with him to the Residency House (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, V:590) – then it is likely to have reinforced any feelings that 
Gandakusuma might have already had regarding Dipanagara’s premonition 
of what was in store for him. 
Meanwhile, the prince described in his autobiography how he departed 
for the Residency House at around eight o’clock on the morning of 28 March 
‘suspecting nothing’.96 He mentioned that he had not even bothered to wear 
his official clothes, but was dressed informally as though for a pleasure trip.97 
It was the same with his close entourage, none of whom carried any insignia 
of office. Amongst these latter were his three sons – Pangéran Dipanagara II, 
Radèn Mas Jonèd and Radèn Mas Raib – four of his principal army command-
ers – Gandakusuma, Mertanagara, Suryawinata and Imam Musbah – two 
of his closest religious advisers – Haji Ngisa and Haji Badarudin – and his 
two faithful panakawan (intimate retainers), Banthèngwarèng and Jayasurata 
(‘Rata’).98 On his arrival at the Residency House, he was greeted by Valck and 
shown into De Kock’s study. His three sons, religious advisers, two panakawan, 
along with Ali Basah Mertanagara, accompanied him. The others sat on stools 
just outside the room where Dipanagara could see them. On the Dutch side, 
95 BD (Manado), IV:382-3, XLIII.1-5. See further Carey 1982:12.
96 BD (Manado), IV:383, XLIII.6. De Kock states that Dipanagara arrived at 7.30 a.m., Louw 
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:590.
97 BD (Manado), IV:383, XLIII.6. Radèn Salèh’s famous painting of Dipanagara’s capture (1857) 
depicts him dressed in a green turban, long white jubah (tabard) worn over pantaloons, long-
sleeved jacket, broad gold cloth belt with a string of prayer beads (tasbèh)	attached	and	shawl	
flung	over	his	shoulders.	A	contemporary	Indonesian	source	(Van	den	Broek	1873­77,	24:99)	con-
firms	that	the	prince	wore	very	similar	attire	during	his	original	journey	to	Magelang	on	8	March	
but with the addition of a white gauze veil to hide his face from the prying eyes of the multitude 
who gathered to see him pass.
98 BD (Manado), IV:383-4, XLIII.7-12.
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Lieutenant-Colonel W.A. Roest, one of De Kock’s staff officers, Major-Adjutant 
De Stuers and the military interpreter for Javanese, Captain J.J. Roeps, sat with 
the prince’s immediate entourage inside the study. The other Dutch officers 
present, amongst them Lieutenant-Colonel A. de Kock van Leeuwen, the field 
artillery commander, and Major Johan Jacob Perié, who was in charge of the 
cavalry detachment, remained outside in the inner gallery on De Kock’s instruc-
tions to keep an eye on Dipanagara’s followers and engage them in ‘friendly 
conversation’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:590-1). By this time, the offic-
er in command of the troops at the Residency House, Lieutenant-Colonel Du 
Perron, had already departed to put De Kock’s orders for the day into effect. 
The number of men fully equipped and armed in the vicinity of the Residency 
House apparently aroused no suspicions amongst Dipanagara’s party. None 
considered that anything untoward was afoot (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
V:590). Indeed, Dipanagara remarked that everyone in his group felt fully at 
ease because De Kock behaved no differently than before.99 
The conversation, as reported in the prince’s babad, opened with De Kock 
remarking that Dipanagara should not return to Metésih but should remain 
in the Residency House with him, to which the prince replied: 
Why should I not be allowed to return [general]? What should I do here? I have only 
come for a short time to pay you a friendly visit such as is the Javanese custom after 
the fasting month. At this time, those who are younger go to the homes of those who 
are older to nullify all the faults which have been committed [during the previous 
year]. In this case you, general, are the older party and the same situation holds.100
At this De Kock replied: ‘the reason I [want to] detain [you] is that I wish to 
clear up all the matters between us this very day’.101 
With the conversation now taking an unexpected turn, Dipanagara re-
marked with great surprise: ‘What matters, general? Indeed, I have neither 
matters on my mind nor do I harbour any [in need of discussion between 
us]‘. 
Valck then explained that for as long as Dipanagara had been at Magelang, 
the general and his officers had thought of nothing else by the issues to be set-
tled between the prince and the Dutch. To which Dipanagara’s commander, 
Mertanagara, immediately interjected that political affairs (prakawis) were far 
from the prince’s heart and that another day should be set to discuss them. 
‘No!’ answered De Kock, ‘that cannot be allowed. Whether he wants it or not 
I wish to finish everything now!’102
99 BD (Manado), IV:384, XLIII.15. See further Carey 1982:13.
100 BD (Manado), IV:384-6, XLIII.15-26. See further Carey 1982:13-14.
101 BD (Manado), IV:385, XLIII.20-1.
102 BD (Manado), IV:385-6, XLIII.22-7.
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De Kock’s own testimony in his diary – though less dramatically phrased 
– accords well with Dipanagara’s autobiography on most points (Louw and 
De Klerck 1894-1909, V:14):
I told him that I was responsible to the governor-general [Van den Bosch] and 
that I would be blamed if I did not make a speedy end to all outstanding matters 
because the costs of the war were rising and the time for repatriating the Dutch 
troops and Indonesian auxiliaries had almost passed. Again Dipanagara answered 
me that he could not discuss any matters with me today because he was not prepa-
red for it. He asked me [to allow him] to return home so that he could think things 
over [and] would tell me later when he wished to come to speak with me. I told 
him a second time that matters must be ended now [and] that he had had enough 
time to think everything over during the fasting month. Whereupon Dipanagara 
observed that during that time he had not thought at all about political matters. I 
replied that I had thought about little else and that the welfare of my troops and 
that of the Javanese people had caused me to be continually mindful about ways 
in which the war could be brought to a [speedy] end. Since God had now given me 
the opportunity, I should make use of it [and] that I would not be put off by any 
further delays or promises. But in the name of the governor-general I now orde-
red Dipanagara to tell me what his intention had been when he requested to meet 
me, what he had to say to me and in what way he desired that the war should be 
brought completely and utterly to a close.
When this was translated for Dipanagara,103 De Kock reported how the prince 
complained bitterly about the way he was being treated, saying that he had 
come to Magelang of his own free will and that, according to the undertaking 
of Colonel Cleerens, he should be at complete liberty to depart if he could 
not come to a satisfactory agreement. Similar reactions are described – albeit 
more forcefully – in Dipanagara’s babad: 
The sultan [Dipanagara], when he heard the words of the general, remembered 
the order of The Almighty regarding the ruler of Java [Ratu Tanah Jawa] and his 
double role as a soldier. Then he recalled his enemy. The sultan’s courage was thus 
aroused and he said: ‘What is this now? Are people looking for a quarrel without 
there being any reason for it? If you are seeking to dispense justice, I am not as-
103 On the translation arrangements during the Magelang meeting, see Louw and De Klerck 
1894-1909, V:599 note 1, quoting De Kock, ‘Verslag’, 1-4-1830: ‘The Resident [Valck] was of con-
siderable help to me since he speaks the Malay language very well; he translated into Malay 
what I said in Dutch, while Haji Ngisa translated this further into Javanese for Dipanagara. Since 
Haji Ngisa, who was apparently afraid, did not translate everything correctly, Captain Roeps 
offered	me	admirable	assistance.’	On	Dipanagara’s	knowledge	of	Malay,	see	dK	209,	Colonel	J.B.	
Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 25-2-1830 (‘I spoke to the chief rebel 
[Dipanagara]	in	Malay	[…]	[his	patih] Danureja translating although I had every reason to believe 
that he understood what I said’); NA, GKA, 20-9-1830 no. 58k geheim, Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers 
(Semarang) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 31-3-1830, ‘Dipanagara always says that 
he understands no Malay, but he was forced to put aside his pretence due to the circumstances 
[he	now	finds	himself	in]	and	he	often	speaks	Malay	with	me	even	though	he	finds	it	unpleasant’.	
See further p. 107; Carey 1982:14 note 53.
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king for your judgement! If you, General De Kock, indeed feel compelled to invite 
a quarrel, summon Colonel Cleerens and Ali Basah [Pengalasan] here first. Once 
they have arrived, I will investigate the matter for I did not come here with the 
intention of seeking a quarrel [or] asking for judgement. Now you are concluding 
in your own fashion! [In fact], the two [Cleerens and Pengalasan] said you wan-
ted to make peace as well as negotiate. I asked what was meant by “peace” and 
they answered, “sound discussions and deliberations”. Likewise, earlier you sent 
someone to give me a horse, “as a sign of your friendship” [sobat] in Mang[un]-
kusuma’s words. When I asked him the meaning of the word “friendship”, he said, 
“returning to friendly association [pisanakan] again, [and] wiping out all faults 
[which have been committed]. When Muslims come together [all is forgotten], 
[and] the only discussions are on fitting things which give satisfaction to all. Since 
you have already given me a mark [of your friendship], sooner I do not reciprocate 
[this present]. But notwithstanding all that, in truth I am not looking for a quarrel. 
Therefore bring the [ali] basah and the colonel here!’ General De Kock bowed his 
head [and] replied: ‘If, Tuwan [Sir], you are asking that these two come [here], it is 
now too late.104 If you had asked for it earlier, I would certainly have brought them 
both here.’ The sultan said: ‘Heh, general! You are a thoroughly evil man! Why do 
you say now that there is so much hurry [when] earlier during the fast you gave 
no indication that you had such thoughts? If I had known [beforehand] that your 
heart was not clean, I would certainly have insisted that the two should not be al-
lowed to return [to Bagelèn] for they are the ones who hold [the key to] the issue. It 
was for this reason that I totally trusted you, General De Kock, when you ordered 
them to return for I thought there were no longer any issues [between us], only 
harmonious discussions [which could be completed] at our pleasure. But now it is 
clear that your heart is evil. When I arrived here earlier, you welcomed me by my 
old name which I no longer use. For, in truth, I have already bestowed it on my [el-
dest] son. So, in fact, general, your evil behaviour [rusuhira] is plainly evident, [for 
how] can a father and a son both have the same name?’ General De Kock answered 
with his head still bowed: ‘Yes, but was not your name, Tuwan, in former times 
actually Pangéran Dipanagara? And moreover, the reason I am enquiring about 
your wishes, Tuwan, is that [formerly] you gave an undertaking. If you have no 
issues to discuss, who then has been the leader in the war which has been waged 
for so long in Java? I am therefore asking what your wishes are now?’105
This whole conversation is omitted in De Kock’s report. He merely noted that 
after Dipanagara’s complaints about the way he was being treated, ‘much 
conversation occurred between Dipanagara and the people with him. But 
when he saw that I could not be moved to change my previous decision [in-
sisting on immediate negotiations], the big words came out: Dipanagara said 
that he wanted nothing else than to be the head of the Islamic religion in 
Java and to retain his title of sultan. He left all the other arrangements en-
tirely up to the discretion of the government’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
104 Colonel Cleerens and Ali Basah Pengalasan had returned to Cleerens’ military headquarters 
at	Kedhung	Kebo	in	Bagelèn	immediately	after	escorting	Dipanagara	to	Magelang	on	8­3­1830.
105 BD (Manado), IV:386-90, XLIII.27-55. See further Carey 1982:15-6.
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V:595). Immediately on hearing this, De Kock told his staff officer Lieutenant-
Colonel Roest to go outside and order Lieutenant-Colonel Du Perron to march 
his troops out of the Magelang barracks and bring them to the Residency 
House, while the Residency guard was to come into the front gallery where 
Dipanagara’s other followers were seated (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
V:597). The prince’s arrest was just minutes away.
Dipanagara also referred to De Kock’s orders to the awaiting Dutch troops, 
but before doing so he reported a much more extensive and emotional con-
versation between himself and the Dutch commander-in-chief:
‘You ask who is the chief man [panggedhé] of the war in Java. He is none other than 
I, General De Kock! Muslims do not leave their own kind. If people engage in war 
there must be an opposing party. People do not quarrel with their own friends. It is 
you, general, who out of your own wishes, want to dispense justice. [But] who has 
ever heard of such a case in which one of the quarrelling parties acts as magistrate 
[jeksa]? If such is the situation, it only occurs because of your wickedness. I am not 
afraid of death. In all the fighting I escaped it. [As for my followers] they merely 
carried out my orders during the war in Java and thus cannot be held responsible. 
Now indeed nothing else remains [for me] except to be killed [and] I am not in-
tending to avoid it. But I charge you, when I am dead, to bring my body back to 
Jimatan [Imagiri] so that I can be together with my wife [Radèn Ayu Maduretna; 
Appendix IV].’ General De Kock could not raise his eyes, as though exceedingly 
ashamed, so he just [sat] with bowed head and said softly: ‘Indeed, Tuwan, I have 
no intention of killing you. But the question of the letters106 is not the same as that 
of religion. It would not be fitting to follow your desires here for if they were fol-
lowed, the Sunan [of Surakarta] would be deeply ashamed [isin].’107
In his report, De Kock also touched on this important point and mentioned 
Dipanagara’s request to be killed on the spot rather than be sent away into 
exile:108 
I told Dipanagara that his conduct up to that time had made me fear that he would 
come up with such rash demands [and] that he could have easily concluded that 
the government could not now permit what had not even been discussed in 1827 
106 De Kock was referring to the fact that he had addressed Dipanagara as ‘His Highness Sultan 
Ngabdulkamid’ during his correspondence with the prince in 1827, as had Commissioner-Gen-
eral Du Bus de Gisignies in September 1827 at the time of the Salatiga negotiations, BD (Manado), 
IV:390-1, XLIII.55-62; Carey 1982:17. This had seemed to recognise his royal pretensions as holy 
war leader and regulator of religion in Java.
107 BD (Manado), IV:390-2, XLIII.55-73. See further Carey 1982:17-8.
108 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:597-8. See also Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to 
Colonel W.A. Roest (?) (Magelang), 29-3-1830, stating that Dipanagara preferred death to impris-
onment	and	wanted	to	be	buried	with	his	forefathers	at	Imagiri.	The	recipient	of	Van	Nes’	letter	is	
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[at the time of the Salatiga peace negotiations]. He knew well that the government 
had promised and given protection to the Sunan of Surakarta and the sultan of 
Yogyakarta for the past five years, and that these rulers were, according to eastern 
custom, themselves the heads of religion in their own lands. Dipanagara then said 
that if what he wanted was not accorded him, the government could do with him 
what it chose, but that he himself was not going to give up his demands.
To which De Kock replied that in his view Dipanagara had forfeited all further 
trust and that he could detain him as a prisoner, and send him to Ungaran or 
Salatiga, leaving subsequent decisions as to his fate to the governor-general 
(Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:597). De Kock was in fact being less than 
honest with the prince by stating that he would be kept at one of these two cen-
tral Javanese towns to await Van den Bosch’s further instructions. As we have 
seen, arrangements had already been made with De Kock’s adjutant, De Stuers 
and the military interpreter, Captain Roeps, to escort Dipanagara to Semarang 
and then on to Batavia following his arrest. Perhaps the commander-in-chief 
wanted to pretend that Dipanagara would be kept initially at one of these plac-
es in order to reassure him that he would not be required to leave the Javanese 
heartland or kejawèn. If so he was being severely economical with the truth.
‘Hereupon’, noted De Kock, ‘Dipanagara protested strongly asking about what 
in fact the government would permit. I answered that it was at present too late to 
return to that again because he was now entitled to neither trust nor consideration. 
If he had wanted to live as a simple pangéran [prince] with his family and a good 
income in the territories of the government, or if he wanted to make the journey 
[haj] to Mecca, the governor-general might well have allowed him his more modest 
requests. But after the obstinate pride he had shown, there was nothing more to 
be done with him, and moreover the peace of Java and the protection which the 
government had promised the Javanese rulers urgently demanded that he should 
be removed from the princely territories.’
During the time when this conversation was taking place, Major Michiels with 
soldiers from his own mobile column and units of Du Perron’s Magelang gar-
rison force were nearing the Residency House. Michiels was given orders to 
go straight to Dipanagara’s encampment at Metésih with some of the local 
Javanese chiefs to disarm the prince’s armed troop who were then on morn-
ing exercises. Thanks to the negotiating skills of Haji Ngisa,109 this occurred 
peacefully and once De Kock was informed, he immediately ordered the dis-
arming of the hundred or so troops who had accompanied Dipanagara to the 
Residency House. Their commanders, who were sitting in the front gallery, 
were also required to hand over their kris. One of these, Imam Musbah, would, 
following Dipanagara’s arrest, be bound in chains and sent to prison, as would 
two other junior commanders whose Kedhu provenance made them liable to 
109 Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel W.A. Roest (?) (Magelang), 29-3-1830, 
mentions the role of ‘Senthot’s priest’ Haji Ngisa.
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detention in Magelang.110 As a measure of prudence, De Kock told the prince 
that he must leave at once under the escort of the two designated officers, but 
any of his wives and children who wished to follow him had permission to 
do so. To which Dipanagara replied, in the general’s words, ‘very simply that 
he did not wish to depart and that I could have him killed on the spot for he 
did not want to be sent away. [Moreover,] the treatment he was receiving was 
wholly contrary to what had been promised him [by Cleerens].’ 
‘I told him’, reported De Kock, ‘that he must not forget that he had been the 
guardian of the young sultan of Yogyakarta, and that instead of protecting him he 
had betrayed and hurt his pupil, [acting entirely] contrary to the prohibitions of 
the Qur’ān. That notwithstanding all the misfortunes he had brought to Java and 
which he himself had experienced, he could not be dissuaded from his detestable 
plans for which reason he could count on no compassion [from me]. That [any 
such treatment] would betray great weakness on my part and that I had not waited 
so patiently until the end of the fasting month [to behave so].’
Dipanagara then asked his chiefs and children whether they would allow him 
to be carried off in this manner, but they all cast their eyes to the ground and 
did not answer. Soldiers encircled the Residency House. At this point, accord-
ing to De Kock (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:598-9),
Dipanagara wanted absolutely to talk with his pengulu, Kyai Pekih Ibrahim, who 
was brought into the room. ‘Did you not ask Colonel Cleerens on my behalf’, 
Dipanagara said, ‘that I would be free to return if I did not reach an agreement 
with the government?’ ‘Yes!’ answered the pengulu. After which Dipanagara spoke 
again with his chiefs and took a cup of tea. When I saw it was nearly ten o’clock111 
and that he must depart, I let the carriage [of the Resident] drive up and ordered 
Major-Adjutant De Stuers and Captain Roeps to take the prisoner on the first day 
to Ungaran and the following one to Semarang, and from there to depart by the 
first shipping opportunity to Batavia. I gave these officers a written order and it 
was just striking ten o’clock when the disturber of the peace of Java, stripped of all 
his greatness, was taken away as a prisoner. Gelukkig [Thank goodness]! Praise be 
to God! All is concluded. After Dipanagara’s departure, everyone showed their un-
feigned joy. A few of the men who had remained loyal to him to the last said they 
had feared that Dipanagara would be unlucky because his claims were too great.
Such ‘unfeigned joy’ was indeed recorded on the lips of those who had fought 
for the Dutch. One such was the future post-war bupati of Purwareja (Kedhung 
110 Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel W.A. Roest (?) (Magelang), 29-3-1830 (on 
Musbah’s imprisonment); Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:104, on the placing in stocks of Kertasiluman 
and Dullah Sumadilaga.
111 There is a discrepancy in the Dutch sources regarding the time of Dipanagara’s departure 
from	Magelang:	whereas	De	Kock	states	that	it	was	shortly	after	ten	o’clock,	De	Stuers	(Louw	
and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:741) reported that the prince was taken away ‘at about nine o’clock’, 
which seems too early; Van Nes suggests that it was eleven o’clock which seems more likely, see 
Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel W.A. Roest (Magelang), 29-3-1830.
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Kebo) in Bagelèn, Radèn Tumenggung Cakrajaya (post-1832, Radèn Adipati 
Cakranegara, in office 1830-1862) whom Cleerens reported as saying: ‘This is 
good [news], now the war is over, well and truly over’.112 News of the event was 
immediately sent to the governor-general, the Residents of Java, and to some of 
the senior officers and officials in the princely states. A special supplement to 
the official government newspaper, the Javasche Courant, published an account 
on 1 April and soon all the European community in Java were apprised. On the 
same day as the Java Gazette announcement, De Kock wrote out his report on 
the proceedings for the governor-general. At the end he made three interesting 
observations. First, that throughout the proceedings Dipanagara had shown 
not the slightest fear. Second, that he, De Kock, regarded the report as a way 
of defending his actions against the censure of future critics who might accuse 
him of treachery. Third, that had Dipanagara not come to him at the Residency 
House, he would have sought ‘to carry him off’ (oplichten) from his own en-
campment. But such a course of action, in his view, would have been fraught 
with difficulties and it was more than likely that the prince would have left 
everything and escaped (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909 note 1). The general’s 
tactics of feigned friendship and seeming accommodation had thus paid off. 
Dipanagara was arrested without bloodshed and De Kock could boast that af-
ter five years of bitter fighting he had brought the war to an end by his own 
diplomacy and military skill. When he arrived back in the Netherlands to a 
hero’s welcome in late October 1830, he would commission the most celebrated 
Dutch history painter of his age, Nicolaas Pieneman (1809-1860), to execute a 
tableau of the moment when he came out on the steps of the Residency House 
to point Dipanagara into the Resident’s waiting coach which would take him 
to Semarang and into exile.113 As Radèn Salèh’s biographer, Werner Kraus 
(2005:282), points out, Pieneman made Dipanagara and his retainers look duly 
submissive. All seemed to understand that De Kock’s stern action was for the 
best for the Javanese and that he had no choice but to send the prince away 
‘just like a loving father sending a misguided son away to teach him a valu-
able lesson’. Here was no ‘monstrous colonizer’ but ‘an educated and civilized 
gentleman, respected leader of the freemasons in the Indies’ (Kraus 2005:282). 
All those depicted in the painting are relaxed – even those in tears. ‘There is no 
resistance, no commotion and high above the pageant flies merrily the Dutch 
tricolor	[…]	Pieneman’s	painting	is	a	tribute	to	the	glory	of	the	Dutch.	The	pain	
112 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kedhung Kebo) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 30-3-1830, stat-
ing that Cakrajaya had shown himself to be ‘unusually gay’ on hearing the news of Dipanagara’s 
capture, exclaiming, begitu baik, sekarang prang habis, betul, sungu-sungu. For a biography of Cakra-
jaya/Cakranegara, see Carey 1974b:271-8.
113 Kraus 2005:279, 282. Pieneman’s tableau entitled ‘De onderwerping van Diepo Negoro aan 
Luitenant-Generaal De Kock, 28 Maart 1830’ (The submission of Dipanagara to Lieutenant-Gen-
eral De Kock, 28 March 1830), was based on a sketch made by De Stuers. It hung in De Kock’s 
house	in	The	Hague	and	was	eventually	given	by	his	family	to	the	Rijksmuseum	in	Amsterdam	
in	1907	some	sixty­two	years	after	De	Kock’s	death,	see	Carey	1982:1	note	2.
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of the Javanese is nowhere to be seen’ (Kraus 2005:282-5).
But this is not how Dipanagara or most of his followers saw it. After De 
Kock had pointed out that any change in the supervision of religion in south-
central Java would cause shame and embarrassment to the Sunan, the prince 
replied in Low Javanese to indicate his disdain for the Dutch commander-in-
chief:114
‘Heh, general, I think a man with such ideas will have a lot of trouble with my 
religion! Moreover, general, why are you, who do not [even] follow [my] religion 
talking thus? In truth, I am not asking about the religion which I practise. Even if 
you should leave [the regulation of] your [Christian] religion in my hands, I cer-
tainly would not be willing, [for] what should I do with it? But as for Muslims who 
misrepresent their religion, I desire to put them in order. [Now] there’s a difficult 
business! They do not side with you, but it is not sure that they will side with me 
[either]. What should one call people who act thus, general? All the same, have them 
choose between my religion and yours [and see] which they choose. Only then will it 
be apparent what they have set their hearts on.’ The general answered: ‘That would 
be to my liking!’ His Highness the sultan replied: ‘If, general, this is what you are 
content with, I cannot go on to parley with you. And, moreover, as concerns the let-
ters, they are pointless. For all the letters were in truth nothing but fabrications by 
you and [Commissioner-]General Du Bus. They [did not reflect] your true wishes. 
Similarly, with the language of the letters: the style used by [Commissioner-]General 
Du Bus and yourself [was not a reflection] of your real intentions. The only purpose 
of my coming here was to press you to make good what you had earlier written in 
those letters, [namely] your promised undertaking that I should become head of the 
Islamic religion in Java. Now you have broken [this promise], I stand as a witness 
to all your treachery. For earlier, Colonel Cleerens made me a promise that if the 
discussions came to nought, I would be invited to return to Kecawang.’ The general 
spoke thus: ‘If, Tuwan, you return war will not fail to break out again.’ His Highness 
the sultan replied: ‘Why are you fearful of war if you are soldiers and real men?’ 
General De Kock said, ‘If it is thus, as a matter of fact I cannot settle the question, 
because I am no longer in a position to do so.115 But at Salatiga there is someone 
with a further mandate. He can settle it. So you had better go to Salatiga.’116 His 
Highness the sultan said in a friendly voice: ‘Why should I go to Salatiga? What 
would I seek there, general? I have not the slightest intention of seeking justice in 
Salatiga! Moreover, if you, De Kock, want [to finish things] here now, I am not wil-
ling.’ General De Kock then went out and with a thunderous voice ordered all the 
troops to enter the Residency [compound].
114 Dipanagara’s use of coarse Low Javanese (ngoko) in his rejoinder to De Kock is mentioned in 
Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel W.A. Roest (?) (Magelang), 29-3-1830. It is not 
evident from the language of his babad that Dipanagara had spoken to De Kock in a particularly 
rough form of ngoko, see Carey 1982:20-1 note 69.
115 A reference to De Kock’s subordinate position to Van den Bosch, and his relinquishment of 
the	office	of	lieutenant­governor­general	on	16­1­1830	when	the	latter	took	office.
116 Although Dipanagara misrepresented De Kock’s conversation at this point, it is clear that 
the	latter	was	guilty	of	deception.	Van	den	Bosch	was	not	in	central	Java	at	this	time,	but	remained	
throughout	in	Bogor,	where	he	was	suffering	from	an	illness	which	prevented	him	from	working,	
see below page 703.
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A Dutch source related that at this point one of the prince’s followers drew his 
kris and placed himself in front of Dipanagara as though to protect him,117 an 
observation which is borne out in his babad where the Java War leader men-
tioned the behaviour of his eldest son,
Now it is related that Pangéran Dipanagara [the Younger], because he was still 
youthful, got up from his seat thinking of his soldiers and came close to the 
Resident [Valck]. Whereupon the sultan winked to Radèn Basah Mertanagara 
and said: ‘General, you are bringing everything into a difficult pass!’ Through 
the Will of the Almighty, Radèn Basah Mertanagara did not [burst into] anger. 
Thus the sultan smiled when he looked at the Radèn Basah, Haji Ngisa and Haji 
Badarudin who were [all] mindful of the Lord’s Providence and conscious of their 
dependants and the baseness [of which they were now the victims]. Then De Kock 
took His Highness by the hand and brought him to sit on the sofa. The general did 
likewise. Time and again, the sultan debated in his heart: ‘If I kill the general, the 
end will be trouble for it is beneath the dignity of a prince to fight as one who runs 
amok. It would bring me into disrepute. [The Dutch are perpetrating] an unheard 
of treachery. But despite that I have no companion [kanthi] [and] it is better that 
I give myself up to my fate. To those who remain it can be left to decide whether 
they wish to follow my orders in life and death as many have already done. I had 
better share their lot!’ The sultan then instructed that Mas Pengulu [Pekih Ibrahim] 
should	be	summoned.	Once	he	had	come	[…]	the	sultan	said,	‘How	comes	it	pen-
gulu that things have turned out thus?’ Mas Pengulu replied: ‘It is best, Highness, 
that you just follow the instructions of your brother [De Kock].’ The sultan smiled 
[and] said in a companionable way: ‘Come on, Major [De Stuers] let us depart!’ 
The general then said: ‘Will you not [take] your sons, army commanders and sol-
diers?’ The sultan replied: ‘[No], De Kock, that would [only] give more trouble!’ 
His Highness then got into the coach, only one intimate retainer [panakawan] fol-
lowed him, Rata by name, who bore the sultan’s betelbox. [They sat] together with 
Captain	Roeps	[and]	Major	de	Stuers	[…].	The	sultan	was	greatly	ashamed	at	heart	
and was prepared to die. It was on a Sunday, the second of the [Javanese] month 
Sawal in the [Javanese] year Jimawal [28 March 1830] that His Highness departed 
from the land of Java. The wish of His Highness was to go on the pilgrimage [to 
Mecca] because of his great shame. He was not attached to all his high dignity 
nor to his loved ones, to his mother [and] his children. As regards his followers, 
nothing remained for them but to await the sultan’s yielding to superior power 
and resigning himself to God’s dispensation. It was for this reason that the sultan’s 
heart accepted grief and affliction in this world, for it was [all] solely in redemp-
tion of His Highness’s pledge in the event that he should prove unable to reinstate 
[the Islamic] religion throughout Java. For this reason, acceptance of his lot was 
just the wish of the sultan. Ever increasing shame [in the eyes] of the Almighty was 
the principal reason for his heartfelt grief.118
Thus Dipanagara closed his account of the dramatic and – in his view treach-
erous – meeting with De Kock in Magelang. It must remain an open question 
117 Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel W.A. Roest (?) (Magelang), 29-3-1830.
118 BD (Manado), IV:392-9, XLIII.73-118. See further Carey 1982:20-4.
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whether from the start Dipanagara really came to Magelang under the impres-
sion that his demands to be appointed as ‘regulator of religion’ in Java would 
be met or whether, as Gandakusuma later averred, he came in the full knowl-
edge that he would be taken prisoner. Such an outcome was probably what 
he expected despite the numerous references to Colonel Cleerens’ supposed 
guarantee of safe conduct. Not only would this demonstrate to his family and 
followers that he had been forced to bow to superior force, but it would salve 
his pride. It would also guarantee his place in history as we can see from look-
ing at another artistic composition depicting the prince’s capture.
Twenty-seven years after Pieneman painted the heroic scene of the prince’s 
‘submission’, another artist, Javanese this time, Radèn Salèh Syarif Bustaman 
(circa 1811-1880), produced a very different tableau. Entitled in German ‘Ein 
historisches Tableau, die Gefangennahme des Javanischen Häuptlings Diepo 
Negoro’ (‘A historic tableau, the arrest of the Javanese chief Dipanagara’), which 
he later presented to the Dutch king, William III (reigned 1849-1890) in a curi-
ous back-handed gesture (Carey 1982:1, 1988:139 note 239), this composition 
has an extraordinary emotional quality. A clearly furious Dipanagara stands at 
the centre of the painting having just emerged onto the steps of the Residency 
House. Struggling to keep his feelings under control, his look is charged with 
a fiery determination. His left hand clenched across his waist, he stretches out 
his right to console a weeping Javanese woman – perhaps his wife, Radèn 
Ayu Retnaningsih, a piece of artistic license here119 – who is clutching dis-
traughtly at his leg. As Kraus (2005:285-6) has vividly described, the faces of 
De Kock and the other Dutch officers are frozen as though staring into the 
middle distance. Whereas in Pieneman’s version, the prince is placed a step 
lower than the victorious Dutch commander-in-chief, Salèh sets Dipanagara 
on the same level, but to the general’s right thus placing the Dutchman on 
the weaker female side in the Javanese spatial order. Instead of pointing the 
prince out of his country, the Java War leader is being ‘invited’ by a somewhat 
helpless De Kock to enter the waiting coach. Most significantly, the heads of 
the principal Dutch officers120 are slightly out of proportion, too big for their 
bodies, whereas those of the grieving Javanese, who witness the arrest, are of 
the right size. No error this, but a message: the heads of the Dutch officers are 
those of raksasa (monsters). Given De Kock’s position to the left of the prince, 
Saleh is perhaps suggesting that the general should be seen as a female raksasa, 
a particularly revolting form of ogre. The major difference, Kraus argues, is in 
the perspective with which Pieneman and Salèh chose to depict the drama. 
Whereas the Dutch artist constructed his painting from the northwest, Salèh 
took the northeast as his point of departure. In Kraus’ (2005:286) words, 
119 No women were in Dipanagara’s entourage at the time of his capture.
120	 See	Carey	1982:25,	who	identifies	from	the	left	Captain	J.J	Roeps,	Major	J.J.	Perié,	De	Kock	
and Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers.
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the Dutchman Pieneman introduced a sharp wind from the west – common in 
Holland – that gives the Dutch flag a very dynamic appearance. In Raden Saleh’s 
work the atmosphere is absolutely quiet. The universe holds its breath, no leaf and 
certainly no flag is moving. [In fact,] Raden Saleh has ‘forgotten’ the Dutch tricolor 
altogether.
In Salèh’s painting it is morning, the dawn of a new day: not only the dawn 
of a new colonial era, but also one which would herald the collapse of that 
order. The memory of Dipanagara – his genius and his suffering – would one 
day – Salèh seems to be telling us – redeem the nation from the shackles of 
colonialism (Kraus 2005:278). As if in response, nature itself would put on its 
own display of awesome power as a counterpoint to the drama of that his-
toric morning in Magelang, the garrison town whose name in High Javanese 
means ‘obstinate’ or ‘stubborn’ (Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:521). Early in the 
afternoon, as the Dutch mobile column commanders made their way back to 
their respective posts in Bagelèn and Kulon Praga, the heavens opened and 
sheets of torrential rain lashed the south-central Javanese countryside sweep-
ing away the horse of Colonel Cleerens’ second-in-command, Captain Rinia 
van Nauta, as he attempted to ford a swollen river on his journey back to 
Kedhung Kebo (Purwareja).121 So the Java War ended as it began under the 
storm clouds of the west monsoon.122
Steamboat to Batavia: how Dipanagara received the governor-general’s life sentence
‘How have I come to this? How did I come to this?’, Dipanagara’s periodic 
exclamations broke the silence in the carriage which bore him on his way 
under cavalry escort to Bedono on the borders of Semarang Residency. 
There he transferred into a tandhu (sedan-chair) which took him up the steep 
mountain road through the Jambu hills to the eponymous sub-district capital 
where another carriage was waiting to take him to Ungaran (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, V:741). Still suffering from malarial fever, he did not speak 
a word throughout this part of the journey. Reaching Ungaran in the late af-
ternoon, the party rested and Dipanagara asked to be excused to go and pray 
on the battlements of the small Dutch fort, his first s alāt al-maghrib (evening 
prayer) as an exile. De Stuers and Roeps watched him from a short distance. 
Afterwards, he was invited to take dinner with the commandant and the two 
officer escorts, De Stuers observing that he ‘had a very good understanding of 
European customs. I had until then never seen a prince from the Yogyakarta 
121 DK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kedhung Kebo) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 28-3-1830.
122	 On	 the	 unseasonal	 rains,	which	 had	 turned	 the	 fields	 around	Dipanagara’s	 residence	 at	
Tegalreja into mud and prevented the Dutch cavalry from following him as he made his escape 
across the sawah on 20 July 1825, see p. 601.
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court sit and eat so decently at table’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909:741). 
During the hour-long meal, the prince spoke ‘affectedly’ about his young 
army commander, Ali Basah Mertanagara, but did not mention any of his 
children, although he would later entrust Roeps with letters for his mother 
and eldest son, in which he showed particular concern for his widowed teen-
age daughter, Radèn Ayu Jayakusuma (Appendix IV, XIII). He also asked De 
Stuers to write to De Kock telling the commander-in-chief ‘to inform his peo-
ple so that they would not be sad about his absence, to say that God had thus 
ordained it, that his people should keep as united as possible and that [the 
general] should be certain to keep a good eye on them and look after them 
well’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:741). He also asked that some of his 
wives and followers – including his pengulu, Pekih Ibrahim, and his long-
time friend and adviser, Haji Badarudin – as well as his baggage should be 
sent up to him. Amongst the wives who joined him in Semarang was Radèn 
Ayu Retnaningrum,123 a daughter of his uncle Pangéran Panengah (post-1812, 
Dipawiyana I, Appendix VIII), whom he had married in January 1828. The 
prince’s ‘favourite concubine’ according to De Stuers, she would subsequently 
plead illness, declining to accompany him on the steamship from Semarang 
to Batavia on 5 April, a refusal which brought to mind for Dipanagara the 
similar fate which had befallen the second sultan when his favourite official 
wife, Ratu Kencana Wulan (post-1812, Ratu Wétan), had refused to share his 
temporary banishment in Ambon (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:746; p. 
441). His two religious advisers, as we have seen (p. 638), would also decline 
his invitation to travel on with him into exile.
Arriving in Semarang on the evening of 29 March, Dipanagara spent a 
week in the Residency House in Bojong, Van den Bosch having decided not 
to hold him temporarily in the town jail.124 Eating every day at the table of 
the Resident, he refused the wine offered him, but developed a liking for 
the freshly baked bread.125 He also seems to have grown accustomed to the 
Dutch potatoes (kentang Welanda) – kentang sabrang (‘exile’s potatoes’) in the 
punning words of his panakawan, Rata – which would become his daily fare 
during his sea voyages to Batavia, Manado and Makassar.126 Although he 
was watched by a strong guard, and was never allowed out of sight of his of-
ficer escorts,127 the prince ‘gradually got into a good mood and was pleased 
123 See Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:105, who states that Dipanagara’s two wives, Radèn Ayu 
Retnaningsih and Radèn Ayu Retnaningrum, his brother-in-law, ‘Dullah’ (Radèn Tumenggung) 
Dipawiyana, and some 40 followers were sent to Semarang on 30-3-1830, from Yogya.
124 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers (Semarang) to Johannes van den 
Bosch (Bogor), 31-3-1830.
125 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 34 (liking for bread), 47 (refusal of wine).
126 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 4, 11-3. 
127 De Stuers even slept in his room at night, AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, F.V.H.A. de 
Stuers (Semarang) to Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor), 31-3-1830.
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with the considerate treatment at the Residency House’. Both De Stuers and 
Roeps, who would be recommended by Van den Bosch to the Dutch king for 
the Order of the Netherlands Lion for their political services at this time,128 
took the opportunity to question him about the Java War and its antecedents, 
information which they speedily passed on to the governor-general.129 On 3 
April, when they informed him that they would be taking the steamship, the 
SS Van der Capellen,130 to Batavia, the prince ‘expressed immediate readiness, 
only requesting that when we arrived there [in Batavia] long negotiations 
would not be held with him again, ‘People know that I long to have my legal 
rights131 or be sent to Mecca or to [some] other place.’ That this ‘other place’ 
might mean exile in eastern Indonesia was clearly on the prince’s mind be-
cause he asked De Stuers whether Ambon was a large island (Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, V:742, 744). The major, however, encouraged him in the 
belief that he would decide his own fate, only breaking the news to him that 
he would be placed at the disposal of the governor-general once they had 
boarded the steamer.132 
On the morning of 5 April, Dipanagara’s nineteen-strong party, which in-
cluded his wife, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, his sister, Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana 
and brother-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Dipawiyana, went down to the har-
bour to board their vessel. De Stuers reported that (Louw and de Klerck 1908, 
V:746),
Dipanagara was in good heart but silent, perceiving many people on the wharf, who 
had gathered there out of curiosity, [he] covered his face with an end of his turban, 
which excited the multitude even more but caused at the same time a great disap-
pointment. Our embarkation went to plan [and] when we left land he looked around 
on all sides but I saw no emotion in him. On board everything suited him very well, 
‘Here I am’, he said, ‘entirely at my ease, so I could quite remain thus. I am perfectly 
content provided people treat me in a polite and friendly manner (looking at us) [as 
he spoke], but my present situation is the consequence of the surly and contemptu-
128 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to H.M. de Kock (Mage-
lang),	19­4­1830.	Both	Roeps	and	De	Stuers	were	gazetted	as	knights	of	the	order	(Ridder	der	orde	
van den Nederlandsche Leeuw) on 5-7-1831, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:267 note 1; II:283 
note 2.
129 AN, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 58k, F.V.H.A. de Stuers (Batavia) to Johannes van den Bosch 
(Bogor), 9-4-1830. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:745.
130 The SS Van der Capellen	was	the	first	steamship	in	service	in	the	Netherlands	Indies	and	had	
been plying the Semarang-Batavia route since 1825, Broeze 1979:268. Its skipper was the young 
Scotsman, Captain Andrew Davidson (circa 1809-1831), who was employed by the Thompson, 
Robert & Co steamship company, Van Enk 1999:219 note 86. 
131 De Stuers explained that these ‘legal rights’ meant that ‘he [would have] the authority to 
appoint one priest at Yogya and one in Solo, who would exercise the law according to the Qur’ān 
and not according to our [European] laws’, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744. For a full dis-
cussion of this issue of legal jurisdiction, see Chapter VIII.
132 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830, F.V.H.A. de Stuers (Semarang) to Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor), 
31-4-1830.
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ous treatment which I had to experience before [at the hands of Smissaert, Chevallier 
and	Dietrée].’	[…]	[He]	appeared	to	have	confidence	in	us	[and]	he	was	extremely	
genteel in his social relations. He was neither difficult nor exacting and seemed to 
avoid everything that he thought could draw attention to our watchfulness and vi-
gilance, by which [he] showed that he could be what he was not at Metésih. 
To fortify his spirits, he drank a bottle of zemzem water from Mecca which 
had been given him in Magelang by a haji recently returned from the holy 
city. This water ‘imbibed by leading Muslims who had been initiated into 
the sublime secrets of the religious system of The Prophet’ had the power, 
according to Dipanagara, to rid pilgrims of all earthly desires and preserve 
the spirit of the faithful against temptation. So fortified, he prepared to learn 
what the governor-general had decided for him when he arrived in Batavia 
three days later.133 
Although news of the prince’s arrival had not been published in the 
Government Gazette (De Haan 1935b, II:222 note 1), crowds of curious European 
onlookers chartered small boats or gathered at the wharf to watch him dis-
embark. One of these was a young Scotsman, George Frank Davidson, who 
had arrived in Java in 1823 to work for the firm which his elder brother, John 
Davidson, had set up (Davidson 1846:9):134
I	saw	him	landed	at	Batavia	[…]	from	the	steamer	which	had	brought	him	from	
Semarang. The governor[-general’s] carriage and aide-de-camps were at the wharf 
to receive him. In that carriage he was driven to gaol, whence he was banished, no 
one	knows	whither,	and	he	has	never	been	heard	of	since	[…]	Poor	fellow!	How	
his countenance fell, as well it might, when he saw where the carriage drew up! 
He stopped short on putting his foot on the pavement, evidently unwilling to enter 
the gloomy looking pile. [He] cast an eager eye around and, seeing there was no 
chance of escape, walked in. Several gentlemen followed. Before the authorities 
had the door closed, I saw the fallen chief, with his two wives,135 confined to two 
miserable looking rooms. 
‘The gloomy looking pile’ referred to by Davidson was the Stadhuis, the Town 
House of Batavia, where Dipanagara stayed from the 8 April-3 May 1830 (Van 
Doren 1851, II:54; De Haan 1935b, II:222). However, he was not incarcerated 
in the police prison situated below the Stadhuis, where Kyai Maja and his 
party had been held in terrible conditions from early 1829 to February 1830, 
133 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 42. On the zemzem spring, see Juynboll 1930:121-2, who relates the story 
of Hagar wandering in desperation between the hills of Safā	and	Marwah	in	the	vicinity	of	Mecca	
looking	 for	water	 for	herself	 and	her	 son	 Ishmael	 (Ismā’īl)	 after	being	driven	out	by	Abraham,	
eventually	finding	a	spring	of	pure	water	bubbling	from	her	son’s	feet	after	seven	fruitless	journeys.	
Dipanagara related the same story to Knoerle, but with Abraham not Hagar in the central role.
134	 This	was	the	firm,	Macquoid,	Davidson	&	Company,	Van	Enk	1999:112,	213,	who	gives	his	
name as ‘Gordon Frank Davidson’. See further Campbell 1915, II:780.
135 Davidson clearly mistook Dipanagara’s sister, Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana, for his second wife. 
Of his three remaining wives, only Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih accompanied him into exile.
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and where Maja’s brother, Kyai Hasan Besari, had died just three months 
previously.136 Instead, he was lodged in the Batavia jail warder’s quarters im-
mediately above the cellar prison, a place often used for detaining prominent 
Indonesians and Europeans (De Haan 1935b:222). During his time in the co-
lonial capital, he was met by members of the Batavian city administration 
led by the chief magistrate (hoofdbaljuw) – equivalent of the local Resident – J. 
van der Vinne, a man of great idealism and energy, who served as vice-presi-
dent the Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen (Batavian 
Scientific Society) and had a particular interest in the development of educa-
tion in the colonial capital (Nieuwenhuys 1973:82). The harbourmaster, J.N. 
Olijve, and the Assistant-Resident of the Bataviasche Ommelanden (Batavian 
Environs), Adrianus Johannes Bik (1790-1872),137 a gifted draughtsman who 
did a charcoal life drawing of the prince which now hangs in the Musium 
Kota in Jakarta, were also present.138 Bik’s sketch gives a striking impression 
of the Java War leader showing him with very high cheek bones and slightly 
sunken cheeks, a result of the bouts of malaria from which he was still suffer-
ing and which would continue throughout his voyage to Manado. 
Dipanagara clearly found his three-week stay in the Stadhuis a trial, later 
telling his officer escort Knoerle during his Manado journey that ‘his health 
did not permit him to remain in Batavia where he was exposed to the frightful 
heat prevailing in the place’.139 The prince was not the only dignitary suffering 
from poor health in that month. Sixty kilometres away in the cooler mountain 
climate of Bogor, the prince’s nemesis, Johannes van den Bosch, was also seri-
ously indisposed. Unable to work, he was being treated by his doctors with 
mercury chloride for an undisclosed illness.140 In his babad, Dipanagara states 
that because of a ‘heavy sickness’, which had confined him to his bed, Van 
den Bosch could not see him.141 Instead, the governor-general summoned 
Captain Roeps, who had remained in Batavia with the prince, to give him a 
personal report on what he had learnt from his conversations with the Java 
War leader during his journey from Magelang. The infantry officer seems to 
have dwelt particularly on the religious aspects of the war and the influence 
136 For a description of these conditions, see De Haan 1935b, II:222. The cellar below the Stad-
huis, which had been rebuilt in 1710, was six feet deep and was used as the police jail of Batavia 
until 1846. Built for a maximum of 100 prisoners, 300 were apparently kept there in 1845 when 85 
percent died of typhus and dysentery within four months, a mortality rate which convinced the 
town authorities to order its closure. On Hasan Besari’s death, see Appendix VIIb.
137 Bik had also served as baljuw (magistrate) of Batavia from 28-8-1828, see Bervoets 1977:2.
138 The Jakarta City Museum, which is housed in the former Stadhuis in the Kota (downtown) 
district of the Indonesian capital.
139 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 47.
140 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Jan Izaäk van Seven-
hoven (Yogyakarta), 30-4-1830, mentioning his calomel (mercury chloride) treatment.
141 BD (Manado), IV:421, XLIII (Maskumambang) 283. sabab Jèndral teksih sanget gènnya sakit/ 
pan kalih tileman.
Plate 74. Adrianus Johannes Bik (1790-1872), baljuw (magistrate) of Batavia and guar-
dian of Dipanagara during his stay in the Stadhuis (8 April-3 May 1830). Both A.J. Bik 
and his younger brother Jannus Theodorus were trained artists. Oil painting made 
circa 1842 and possibly by Ernest Hardouin. Bik is shown wearing the Order of the 
Netherlands Lion (Ridderorde der Nederlandsche Leeuw). Photograph by courtesy of 
the Stichting Iconographisch Bureau, The Hague.
Plate 75. Charcoal sketch of Dipanagara by A.J. Bik. It shows him dressed in  the 
‘priestly’ garments which he wore during the Java War, namely a turban, an open-
necked kabaya (cotton shirt) and a jubah (loose outer robe). A sash hangs over his right 
shoulder and his pusaka kris (heirloom dagger), Kangjeng Kyai Bandayuda, is stuck 
in his flowered silk waist band. The slightly sunken cheeks, which accentuate the 
prince’s high cheek bones, were the result of successive bouts of malaria from which 
he had been suffering since his wanderings in the jungles of Bagelèn at the end of the 
war. Photograph by courtesy of the Musium Kota, Jakarta.
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of the ulama. Indeed, on 19 April, Van den Bosch was confiding to the Raad 
van Indië (councillor of the Indies), Pieter Merkus (1787-1844), who was then 
serving as one of the newly appointed commissioners for the regulation of 
the affairs of the princely states,142 that ‘the perturbation of priests’, in par-
ticular their discontent over the abolition of penalties of the Qur’ān (Chapter 
VIII), had been the main reason for the widening of the Java War after its 
‘fortuitous’ outbreak.143 He asked Merkus to enquire into ways of ‘pacifying 
the priestly class’ and suggested that the government should be more accom-
modating over the issue of the implementation of Islamic law. He cited here 
the example of the British, who had taken over the administration of former 
Dutch settlements on the Malabar coast of India and had continued to allow 
the practise of satī (self-immolation of widows on the funeral pyres of their 
husbands). The governor-general suggested that punishments according to 
the law of the Qur’ān should again be permitted.144 He also stressed that he 
was determined to reassert the power of the civilian authority over the army 
after five years of war had distorted the relationship.145
With regard to Dipanagara, he showed himself considerably less flexible. 
All idea of allowing the prince to remain in Java was rejected as being too po-
litically sensitive. He was to be banished ‘for the peace of the island’ and held 
as a state prisoner (staatsgevangene) in Manado – ‘the most suitable place out-
side Java’, whither Kyai Maja and his party had recently been dispatched.146 
Given Van den Bosch’s illness, the actual details of the terms under which the 
prince would be held, which included special instructions for the Resident 
of Manado, were worked out by two Indies councillors, J.C. Goldman and J. 
Bousquet, in Batavia. On 29 April, they sent their draft besluit (government 
order) and instructions up by special courier to Bogor for the governor-gen-
eral’s signature.147 The following day both were officially approved.148 The 
142	 A	Leiden­trained	lawyer,	Merkus	was	bitterly	opposed	to	Van	den	Bosch’s	policies,	in	particu-
lar his re-introduction of the old VOC system of forced crop deliveries which developed into the 
‘Cultivation	System’	(1830­1870).	He	died	in	office	as	governor­general	(1841­1844),	Stapel	1941:91.
143 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Pieter Merkus (Com-
missaris ter regeling der Vorstenlanden, Yogyakarta), 19-4-1830, stating that ‘every priest who 
could read the Qur’ān was deeply disturbed about the abolition of its penalties’.
144 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Pieter Merkus (Com-
missaris ter regeling der Vorstenlanden, Yogyakarta), 19-4-1830.
145 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Jan Izaäk van Seven-
hoven (Yogyakarta), 30-4-1830.
146 NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 2538, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 30-4-
1830 no. 1 (henceforth: Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 30-4-1830 no. 1), pream-
ble and instruction no. 1 for the Resident of Manado. On Kyai Maja’s exile, see Chapter XI.
147 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, J.C. Goldman and J. Bousquet (Batavia) to Johannes van 
den Bosch (Bogor), 29-4-1830.
148 Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 30-4-1830 no. 1. This meant that it was 
the	first	order	signed	by	Van	den	Bosch	on	that	day	without	the	Raad	van	Indië	(council	of	the	
Indies) being in session.
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order stipulated that ‘a suitable residence’ would be found for Dipanagara ‘in 
accord with his rank’, if possible on a river with a piece of adjacent ground 
where he could ‘wander’ and where a garden could be laid out for him. This 
would be chosen by the Resident of Manado, D.F.W. Pietermaat (1790-1848; 
in office 1827-1831) and by the prince’s officer escort, Second-Lieutenant J.H. 
Knoerle. 
In his babad and his conversations with Knoerle during his voyage to 
Manado, Dipanagara also mentions these stipulations, but suggests that they 
were part of a promise made to him by Van den Bosch through the medium 
of Captain Roeps. In Knoerle’s words:
Dipanagara made it appear as if his removal to Manado was due to his own wishes 
[…]	people	had	promised	[him]	gardens,	carriages,	and	as	it	were	unconstrained	
use	of	his	personal	liberty.	[…]	[He]	always	seeks	every	available	[opportunity]	to	
persuade me that his freedom may not be hampered in Manado.149
It is possible that, as had happened with De Kock in Magelang, the Dutch of-
ficers and officials with whom Dipanagara dealt in Batavia, especially Roeps, 
were less than honest about what lay in store for him. They may have en-
couraged him in the notion that his exile to Manado constituted a form of 
temporary ‘retirement’ which would give time for a letter to be sent back to 
Holland to request the Dutch monarch’s approval for the prince’s pilgrimage 
(haj) to Mecca, a journey on which he set much store and on which hoped 
he might be accompanied by former santri supporters who were already haji 
(returned Mecca pilgrims).150 
That this was far from the spirit of Van den Bosch’s order can be seen 
from the stipulations regarding Dipanagara’s status as a state prisoner. These 
speak more of Manado as part of a Dutch eastern Indonesian ‘gulag’151 than 
149 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 47.
150 BD (Manado), IV:417-8, XLIII (Maskumambang) 251-5. sun dhingin ayun kongkonan. 252. geli-
sira sun wetara pitung sasi/ angkat ulihira/ mapan dadi patbelas sasi/ marma becik ing ngantènana. 253. 
nèng Menadhu mapan kiwa lawan sepi/ gedhé omahira/ lan jembar polantanèki/ lan parek gunung segara. 
254. kebon jembar akèh omah becik-becik/ lamun ayun dolan/ anèng gunung pan parek iki/ ana ing kéné 
pan iya. 255. nora nana lamun ayun dolan iki/ lawan srerawungan/ lan wong akèh kéné iki/ sirèku weruh 
pribadya.	251.	‘I*	must	send	first	[to	Holland].	252.	The	most	speedy	journey	is	about	seven	months/	
there	and	back/	then	becomes	fourteen	months/	therefore	it	is	better	to	wait	253.	in	Manado,	which	
is secluded and quiet,/ [where] there is a large house/ and the view extensive/ and close to moun-
tains	and	sea	254.	[Where	there	are]	many	large	gardens/	fine	houses/	[and]	if	you	wish	to	wander/	
to those mountains/ which are over there 255. there will be nobody who will wish to walk there/ 
for company./ There are many people here [in Batavia]/ as you yourself know.’
* Captain Roeps reporting Van den Bosch’s supposed conversation. On Dipanagara’s hope that he 
would be allowed to make the haj to Mecca, perhaps in the company of Haji Badarudin and Haji 
Ngisa, who had both twice made the pilgrimage (Appendix VIIb), or with Kyai Maja himself, see 
Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 21, 25.
151 The loss of the Dutch possessions in Cape Colony and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), which had been 
taken over by the British in stages between 1795 and 1806 during the Revolutionary and Napo-
Plate 76. A view of the Stadhuis (Town House, Batavia) by Johannes Rach (1789). During     his confinement Dipanagara was kept on the second floor of the jailer’s house (ci-
pierswoning) which appears to the left of the main building in the picture. The Holland-       sche Kerk or ‘New Church’ and railings in the right foreground were demolished 
in 1808, twenty-two years before Dipanagara’s arrival. Coloured aquatint with etching.        Photograph by courtesy of the Musium Pusat, Jakarta.
Plate 76. A view of the Stadhuis (Town House, Batavia) by Johannes Rach (1789). During     his confinement Dipanagara was kept on the second floor of the jailer’s house (ci-
pierswoning) which appears to the left of the main building in the picture. The Holland-       sche Kerk or ‘New Church’ and railings in the right foreground were demolished 
in 1808, twenty-two years before Dipanagara’s arrival. Coloured aquatint with etching.        Photograph by courtesy of the Musium Pusat, Jakarta.
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a place of honourable temporary retirement. As many as fifty soldiers were to 
accompany Dipanagara on his Manado voyage. On their arrival, the Resident 
was to retain a sufficient number of troops to guard the prince and ensure 
that he could not escape. Indeed, the former Java War leader’s surveillance 
was made the particular responsibility of the Resident. He was to ‘closely 
observe’ his behaviour and actions and that of his followers, and see that no 
one visited him without the Resident’s express consent. At least once every 
three months, a report of the prince’s situation was to be sent back to Java. In 
the event that important events occurred, these reports were to be made more 
frequently, their dispatch to Java depending on the availability of shipping. 
Despite this close surveillance, Dipanagara was to be treated ‘in a friendly 
fashion’ by the Resident and due account taken of his birth and rank. The 
same monthly stipend of 600 guilders (half in silver and half in copper) was 
to be given to the prince as had been accorded to both the exiled second 
sultan, Hamengkubuwana II, in Ambon in 1817-1825,152 and the more recent-
ly banished last ruler of Palembang, Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin (reigned 
1804-1812, 1813, 1818-1821), who was then ending his days in Ternate.153 In 
addition, a special allowance of f 400 in silver was to be made available by 
the director-general of Finances to defray the costs of the prince’s six-week 
voyage to Manado. As we have seen (p. 638), he was also to be permitted 
to choose two ‘priests’ or haji from Kyai Maja’s following in Tonsea Lama 
(Tondano) to assist him in his religious duties.154
At the same time, the order made arrangements for Dipanagara’s family. 
The prince had spoken warmly about his mother and clearly hoped that she 
might join him in exile. In fact, both she and her grandsons chose to remain in 
Java.155 Since none of the prince’s children wished to follow him to Manado, 
it was proposed, seemingly at the prince’s own suggestion, that his eldest 
son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, and other family members should be allowed to 
return to live at Tegalreja.156 Van den Bosch agreed to this, provided ‘they did 
leonic wars, had deprived the Netherlands Indies government of traditional places of exile of 
members of the Javanese elite, see further p. 372 (on Pangéran Dipakusuma’s family in Ceylon) 
and p. 500 (on Radèn Kaap’s family in Cape Colony). The only alternative was imprisonment in 
one of the royal castles in Holland, which was proposed for Dipanagara in 1833, but rejected by 
the Dutch king (pp. 735-8).
152 This sum had been recouped by the government from the Yogya court, and the same process 
was proposed in Dipanagara’s case.
153 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, J.C. Goldman and J. Bousquet (Batavia) to Johannes van 
den Bosch (Bogor), 29-4-1830.
154 Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 30-4-1830 no. 1. On the refusal of the two 
haji chosen by Dipanagara from Kyai Maja’s entourage to join him in Manado, see p. 723. 
155 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Pieter Merkus (Yogya -
kart a), 19-4-1830; Dj.Br. 65A, ‘Ingekomen stukken van het Gouvernment’, Johannes van den Bosch 
(Bogor) to Commissarissen ter regeling der Vorstenlanden (Yogyakarta), 22-4-1830.
156 On Dipanagara’s suggestion that Pangéran Dipanagara II should live at Tegalreja, see BD 
(Manado), IV:419, XLIII.263. He may not have understood the extent of the damage sustained by 
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not constitute a danger for Java’. Others, such as the prince’s second eldest son, 
Pangéran Dipakusuma, and his third son, Pangéran Dipaningrat,157 were to 
be given quarters in the Yogya kraton. Finally, the draft decree made provision 
for the division of Dipanagara’s heirloom kris and pikes, Captain Roeps being 
tasked with distributing them amongst the prince’s family (Appendix XI). 
The only exception was Dipanagara’s personal kris, Kyai Ageng Bandayuda, 
a major pusaka which had been made from the melted metal of three of the 
prince’s previous heirloom weapons (Appendix XI note 2). The prince had this 
with him in Batavia158 and it remained in his personal possession through-
out his exile in Sulawesi, eventually being interred with him, according to 
Dipanagara family oral tradition, in his grave in the Kampung Melayu in 
Makassar (Appendix XI note 2). 
On 27 April, Knoerle, who was then serving as one of Van den Bosch’s 
military adjutants, received his secret orders relating to his mission as officer 
escort during the prince’s voyage to Manado. These were given him directly 
by the governor-general, who had now resumed work following his month-
long sickness.159 The second-lieutenant was chosen because of his supposed 
knowledge of Javanese, Roeps not being available160 and Dipanagara having 
insisted on being accompanied by an officer who could converse with him in 
his mother tongue rather than in Malay which he spoke poorly and which he 
found deeply distasteful.161 Knoerle departed for Batavia with the governor-
general’s signed order on 30 April and immediately called on Dipanagara at 
the Stadhuis to introduce himself and reassure him about the coming voy-
his former residence when it was burnt following the Dutch expedition on 20-7-1825 at the start 
of the Java War. Indeed, it does not seem to have been inhabitable at this time. On its later use 
as an orchard by Pangéran (post-1829, Panembahan) Mangkubumi and a place where the Yogya 
Resident obtained grass for his horses, see Chapter II note 56.
157 During the war, Dipanagara had given him the title of Pangéran Adipati Anom or crown 
prince, but De Kock had required him to take the more modest name of Pangéran Dipaningrat 
after	his	 father’s	arrest	on	28­3­1830,	Van	den	Broek	1873­77,	24:105.	Exiled	 to	Ambon	 in	1840	
along with his two brothers, Pangéran Dipakusuma and Radèn Mas Raib, he was described in 
the Dutch reports as insane, Chapter II note 37; AN, Brieven Ambon 1189b, ‘Staat der te Amboina 
aanwezige Staats Gevangenen onder ultimo December 1841’. 
158 Bik’s charcoal sketch of Dipanagara in the Stadhuis shows it tucked into his belt.
159 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 1. On Van den Bosch’s resumption of his usual work schedule, see AN, 
Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven 
(Yogyakarta), 30-4-1830.
160 Roeps had been given leave to return on two-years’ furlough to Holland during which time 
he was invited to serve again under De Kock, this time with the Dutch Army in Zeeland – mobi-
lised to prevent a possible French invasion from the Southern Netherlands (post-1830, Belgium). He 
departed Java in July 1830, see Appendix XIII note 2; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:283 note 2.
161 On Dipanagara’s conversation with Roeps as reported in his babad, see BD (Manado), IV:430, 
XLIII (Maskumambang) 275-6. lawan maning jaluk mami/ iya marang Jèndral/ [apan] Walonda sawiji/ 
sun gawé lelirunira. 276. nging bisa cara Jawa lir sirèki/ sabab ingsun iya/ cara Lumayu tan ngerti/ Kapi-
tan matur sandika. On Dipanagara’s views on Malay and Knoerle’s doubtful linguistic ability, see 
further pp. 106-7, 109.
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age.162 He then went down to the harbour to board the Dutch naval corvette,163 
the Pollux, which was lying at anchor in Batavia roads. Recently arrived from 
Europe with the commander-in-chief of the Dutch Indies navy (note 176), it 
was deemed the most suitable available transport for the prince, equipped 
as it was with a deck battery of sixteen small calibre naval guns sufficient to 
deter attack by Buginese pirates or other hostile boarding parties.164
Although it had originally been envisaged that Dipanagara would embark 
with his party on 1 May, there was a delay due to the need to prepare suitable 
accommodation for the exiled leader and his party.165 The corvette also had to 
take on six weeks’ supply of fresh water and food, no stopovers being envis-
aged because of the political sensitivities surrounding the corvette’s principal 
passenger.166 Eventually, at eight o’clock on the morning of Monday, 3 May, 
Dipanagara and his followers167 came on board, accompanied by Roeps and 
the same Batavian city administration officials who had greeted the prince on 
his arrival from Semarang.168 They were met by the corvette’s commander, 
Kapitein-ter-zee (naval captain) Eeg, his junior officers and the ship’s doctor, 
Surgeon Major H. Schillet, an expert on cholera (Schillet 1832), whom the 
162 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 2. Knoerle also apprised Dipanagara of the details of Van den Bosch’s 
30­4­1830	official	order	regarding	his	exile,	Knoerle	1835:166.	On	the	morning	of	Dipanagara’s	
departure on 3 May, the secretary of the Netherlands Indies government, J. van Schoor, had also 
come to the prince in the name of the governor-general to pass on Van den Bosch’s regrets at not 
being able to see him in person during his stay in Batavia, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 47.
163	 During	the	Napoleonic	Wars,	corvettes	or	sloops­of­war	were	around	100	feet	in	length,	dis-
placed 380-400 metric tonnes, were armed with 16-18 muzzle loading smooth bore naval cannon 
mounted	on	a	single	flush	deck,	and	had	a	crew	of	90­120,	Gresham	2002:12­7,	87.
164 Although the Belgian Revolt had yet to break out (24-8-1830), raising the spectre of a new 
European war and potential hostile British naval operations in Indonesian waters, the Dutch 
authorities were all too aware of how tenuous was their writ in the eastern Indonesian archi-
pelago	at	this	time.	For	a	reference	to	the	loading	of	six	guns	in	the	battery	on	board	the	Pollux 
with shot when a small bark hove into view and the dispatch of the Pollux’s sloop to investigate 
an English ship, The Regret (Captain Carr), sailing from Banda with a cargo of spices (nutmeg) for 
Batavia later in the voyage, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 19, 31.
165 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 1. On the arrangements for Dipanagara and his party, see note 176.
166	 Knoerle,	 ‘Journal’,	 16­7,	 on	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 corvette’s	 commander,	 Kaptein­ter­zee	
(referred to by Knoerle as ‘Colonel’) Eeg, not to make for Surabaya to take on further supplies, to 
which Knoerle noted ‘from a political point of view I backed up the colonel. Our appearance in 
the roads of Surabaya would naturally cause much ado as much amongst the Europeans as more 
especially with the natives [Javanese]’. 
167 Van den Bosch’s 30-4-1830 besluit gives the names of 17 followers, whereas Knoerle, ‘Jour-
nal’, 1-2, lists nineteen (11 men and 8 women) who accompanied him to Manado. Two others 
– Tirtadrana, who functioned as Dipanagara’s scribe, and Suranata, who was perhaps a member 
of the Yogya ‘priestly’ Suranatan regiment – joined him from Kyai Maja’s following at Tonsea 
Lama	(Tondano)	after	he	had	arrived	in	Manado	on	12­6­1830,	see	Appendix	XII.
168	 J.	van	der	Vinne,	J.Th.	Bik,	and	the	harbourmaster,	J.N.	Olijve.	Dipanagara	also	mentions	
two colonels, one of whom was the commandant of the First Military Division based in Batavia, 
and the other was Kapitein-ter-Zee (naval captain) Eeg, the commander of the Pollux, who also 
bore the army rank of colonel, BD (Manado), IV:423-4, XLIII.297-307.
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prince took an instant liking to because his face reminded him of the former 
British Resident, John Crawfurd.169 Once the prince’s luggage had been load-
ed, the city officials took their leave, the hoofd baljuw (chief magistrate), Van 
der Vinne, stressing that if Dipanagara had any requests he should not hesi-
tate to address himself to the Resident of Manado, who was vested with the 
same authority as himself.170 At eleven, Roeps also departed. Knoerle then 
saw to the furnishing of Dipanagara’s cabin and repeated again the assur-
ances given to him at the Stadhuis regarding the respect which would be 
paid to the women in his party. The prince had apparently shown particular 
anxiety that his two radèn ayu (noblewomen) – namely his wife and sister 
– might be insulted or otherwise taken advantage of by the Dutch crew.171 
There being no wind the corvette rode at anchor for almost a day and a night, 
much to Dipanagara’s annoyance. He gave Knoerle the distinct impression 
that he was anxious to put Java behind him once and for all, further sight-
ings of the Javanese coastline ‘causing him an unpleasant feeling’. ‘He was 
ashamed ever to see Java again’, Knoerle reported, ‘he longed for his arrival 
in Manado [where] he would ask the governor-general for money and a ves-
sel for a journey to Mecca as soon as he was strong and his heart was calm 
and at rest again’.172 At five o’clock the following morning of 4 May, a light 
breeze began to blow off the land and the corvette set sail as the first streaks 
of dawn stole over the Bay of Batavia.173 A new chapter in the prince’s life had 
begun. He would never set foot on the island of his birth again. A quarter of 
a century of exile and imprisonment lay before him.
Part Two: The sultan over the water
The Radeau de Méduse: surviving the corvette Pollux, 4 May-12 June 1830
For a Javanese for whom the nearest encounters with the ocean had been 
a brief pilgrimage to the south coast in circa 1805 (Chapter IV) and subse-
quent meditations in the grotto of Suralanang (p. 543), Dipanagara’s nearly 
six weeks at sea – much of it becalmed – would not be a pleasant experience. 
The prince’s reference to this purgatorial odyssey in his babad is suitably la-
conic: 
169 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 40-1. On Dipanagara’s supposed relationship with Crawfurd, see pp. 109, 
375-7.
170 BD (Manado), IV:423-4, XLIII.300-3.
171 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 2.
172 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 8, 14.
173 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 2; the departure of the Pollux	with	Dipanagara	and	his	party	was	offi-
cially	reported	in	the	Government	Gazette	on	6	May,	Javasche Courant 53, 6-5-1830.
Map 6. Dipanagara’s journey into exile in Manado (1830-1833) on the corvette Pollux (4-5-1830 –          12-6-1830) and his subsequent voyage to Makassar (1833-1855) on the sailing sloop Circe 
(20-6-1833 – 11-7-1833. Map drawn by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
Map 6. Dipanagara’s journey into exile in Manado (1830-1833) on the corvette Pollux (4-5-1830 –          12-6-1830) and his subsequent voyage to Makassar (1833-1855) on the sailing sloop Circe 
(20-6-1833 – 11-7-1833. Map drawn by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
Makassar 
                     (11-7-1833/8-1-1855)
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XLIII. 308  The sails were set and [we] left
   Batavia for Manado,
  but there was no wind
  and the boat was exceedingly slow. 
	 309	 […]	many	of	the	accursed	[Dutch	crew	and	soldiers]	were	sick
   and died
  on board ship.
  The sultan was troubled at heart. 
 310 Maybe we will all be damned [to die] and not reach
  Manado.
  We speak no further of this.
  They arrived in Manado. 
 311 Two and a half months long [sic]
  was the sultan’s journey
  from Batavia to Manado
  because there was no wind.174
Knoerle’s own diary closely echoes the spirit of Dipanagara’s account. At 
seven in the morning of the first day, for example, the prince summoned the 
second-lieutenant to his cabin and requested he be taken on deck, one of 
only six occasions, according to Knoerle, during the whole forty-day voyage 
when the exiled leader came up from his cabin (Knoerle 1835:167-8). ‘The 
compass, the ship with sails set on high and the motion of the vessel’ caught 
the prince’s delighted attention, but death, which stalked the ship daily, had 
already shown its grim face:
The detachment of troops had one dead who at that moment was sent overboard. 
The burial ceremony caused the prince to ask whether the deceased had been a 
captain. On [my] answer that he was an ordinary soldier, Dipanagara asked why 
we paid more attention to a dead than a living person.175
In the first five days alone, four died, the ceremonies for the burials – the slow 
march of the honour guard of soldiers and the muffled drums – being heard 
distinctly by the prince in his cabin below the quarter deck.176 Laid low by his 
174 BD (Manado), IV:425, XLIII (Maskumambang) 308-11. nulya babar layar mangkat sing Betawi/ 
mring Menadhu ika/ mapan datan angsal angin/ langkung remben kang baita. 309. lawan laknat mapan 
kathah ingkang sakit/ myang kang modar/ sajroning baita sami/ susah kang tyasing sri naléndra. 310. bok-
menawa telas jidhèt* tan dumugi/ ing Menadhu ika/ mangkana wus tan winarni/ ing Menadhu sampun 
prapta. 311. mapan ngantos kalih tengah wulan iki/ lampahnya naléndra/ Menadhu saking Betawi/ sabab 
tan wonten anginnya. * Rusche 1908-09, II:266 has pejah. I have followed the sense of that correction 
in the translation.
175 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 4.
176 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 12. The location of Dipanagara’s cabin, known as the ‘front cabin’ (voorka-
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recurrent malarial fevers and afflicted by repeated vomiting from sea sickness, 
the prince’s face grew steadily more sunken and thin. He thought that perhaps 
his own time had come. A week into the voyage, he confided to Knoerle that he 
was content to die, trusting absolutely in The Almighty. As his fever-wracked 
body was gently rubbed down with eau-de-cologne provided by the German 
officer, his wife, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, lay weeping at his feet.177 
Despite the intensity of his bouts of malaria and his increasingly cadaver-
ous appearance, Dipanagara was not yet at death’s door. A great believer in 
traditional Javanese remedies, he regularly dosed himself with freshly pre-
pared beras-kencur made of camphorated galanga root, turmeric, rice flour 
and palm sugar, forcing Knoerle on occasion to beat a hasty retreat from his 
cabin so close and overpowering was the smell of the herbal concoctions.178 
In the periods when his fever lifted, Dipanagara showed an intense interest in 
his surroundings. The geography of eastern Indonesia fascinated him. How 
far was Ambon from Manado? Was Manado a long way from Makassar or 
the tanah Bugis (Bugis region) of South Sulawesi? Could he see the map of 
‘Makassar’ which he had noticed up on the fore-deck so that he could ac-
quaint himself with the shape of the island of Sulawesi?179 When Knoerle de-
murred saying that the ship’s chart of Sulawesi was the only one available for 
navigational purposes, the prince did not give up. He wanted to know about 
the sea route to Jeddah. Were the coasts of Sulawesi navigable and what sort 
of inhabitants lived there, Christians or Muslims?180 Was it the custom in 
Europe, Dipanagara wanted to know, to exile a leader who had been defeated 
in battle to a far off island and cut him off from all his relatives? What was 
the Java War leader planning? Another Elba-style escape? Another Hundred 
Days? Knoerle could well wonder. He cited the example of Napoleon, like 
Dipanagara just forty-four years old when he was sent into exile, but did so 
‘in a gentle way omitting all painful remiscences’.181 Eventually, tiring of these 
‘peculiar questions’, he let the prince see a copy of the British map maker 
juit), which had served as the personal quarters of the commander of the Dutch East Indies Navy, 
Colonel Wardenburg, during his recent voyage to Batavia from Europe (November 1829-April 
1830), see Knoerle 1835:166-7. The cabin connected directly with another in which his wife, Radèn 
Ayu Retnaningsih, his sister, Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana and brother-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung 
Dipawiyana, were lodged, and was adjacent to a third in which the rest of his 19-strong following 
were accommodated.
177 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 11-2. Knoerle, ’Journal’, 8-9, gives a description of Retnaningsih, ‘the 
Radèn Ayu of Dipanagara is a lady of about twenty to twenty-two years of age. She has a beauti-
fully formed face and large eloquent eyes. The whole composition of her face is striking and the 
diffidence	and	fear	which	it	expresses	increases	the	desire	of	the	well­intentioned	man	to	treat	her	
with courtesy’. 
178 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 33.
179	 Knoerle,	‘Journal’,	44,	where	Dipanagara	referred	to	Sulawesi	as	the	‘lima	Bugis’,	the	five	
Bugis ‘peninsulas’.
180 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 45.
181 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 8.
The power of prophecy718
and hydrographer James Horsburgh’s (1762-1836) sea chart of the Indonesian 
archipelago to give him an explanation of the various islands. Dipanagara’s 
interest remained focussed on Ambon, Makassar and the sea route to Jeddah 
which could only be traced on the chart as far as Pulau Pinang.182 
Knoerle clearly found the prince at turns fascinating and exasperating. On 
14 May, at two o’clock in the morning as heavy storm showers swept up from 
the south off the mountains of Japara, ‘Dipanagara rushed out of his cabin all 
of	a	sudden	and	shrieked	to	me	to	come	to	him;	[…]	the	commander	of	the	
corvette should drop anchor immediately!’ The officer escort had to explain 
the infeasibility of this suggestion, pointing out that they could make use of 
these showers to advance their journey by putting out more sail and tacking 
along the coast.183 The next day, the eleventh of their voyage, Knoerle con-
fided in his diary that ‘Dipanagara was unbearably capricious, the sea was 
dead calm, it was very hot, and we were near the coast of Lasem’, the sight 
of the Javanese coastline making the exile feel deeply uneasy. ‘The prince 
asked me to procure some sirih (leaf for the preparation of betelnut) during 
the journey past Surabaya or Madura, and if possible also some fruit.’184 His 
requests could not be granted given the necessity of avoiding port visits. Even 
encounters with the pilots of Sidhayu or Surabaya, who might have had sirih 
on board, were deemed inexpedient.185 Yet, here was the same prince who 
insisted on sending Knoerle rice cakes every day from his table and inviting 
him to breakfast off potatoes, sambal (hot spiced chilli condiment), tea and 
ship’s biscuits served by his Radèn Ayu while sitting side-by-side with him 
on his large straw mattress, who delighted in the pictures in the books and 
almanacs which Knoerle lent him (p. 109), and in the Rhenish and Cape wines 
which his officer escort procured for him as ‘medicine’ for his impromptu 
wine tastings.186 The same prince who asked to have the oil portrait of King 
William I (reigned 1813-1840), which hung in Captain Eeg’s quarters, to be 
brought to his cabin so that he could show it to his womenfolk.187
182 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 45, where he refers to having sorted out ‘Horsburgh’s map of the Indian 
archipelago’. See further Horsburgh 1817, I. 
183 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 13.
184 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 14.
185 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 16-7.
186 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 36-7, ‘never again will I be in a position to see a face so striking as that of 
Dipanagara	while	engaged	in	wine	tasting.	The	two	bottles	[of	Rhine	wine	and	sweet	Cape	Con-




by the wife of the Yogya Resident, A.H. Smissaert, just before the Java War, see p. 524.
187 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 12, ‘Dipanagara hung the portrait for a moment on the door of his cabin 
and	told	me	[…]	that	he	would	gladly	like	to	have	this	painting,	but	that	he	could	not	hang	it	in	a	
place where it was visible to ordinary people, [since] it was inappropriate and would give rise to 
false expectations amongst his retinue – as though he as a great man was showing another great 
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During these encounters – ‘conversations on a straw mattress’ as Knoerle 
later depicted them188 – in which Dipanagara would address the second-lieu-
tenant in Low Javanese as kowé (familiar ‘you’),189 the prince ranged over a 
staggering range of topics. These included Javanese history and mythology 
as well as reminiscences of his own life and times. His wartime experiences 
loomed large, no doubt because of Knoerle’s line of questioning, his diary be-
ing compiled as an intelligence briefing for the governor-general on the caus-
es and consequences of the Java War. For example, when the ‘Pollux’ passed 
Sumbawa, the island where Dipanagara’s great-grandmother, Ratu Ageng 
Tegalreja’s, maternal family hailed from (p. 76), and the prince began to talk 
of the long-standing small prau (outrigger sailing boat) trade between Bima, 
Lombok and Blambangan in the eastern salient of Java, Knoerle immediately 
sought to probe him for further information on his supplies of war matéri-
el. The German officer suggested that the government ‘knew full well’ that 
he had received gunpowder during the war from these eastern Indonesian 
sources, a suggestion which Dipanagara vigorously denied.190 
Knoerle’s personal view of the prince was predictably contradictory: on 
the one hand, he was full of praise for the Java War leader’s ‘strong and en-
terprising character’, ‘shrewdness’, and ‘acute judgement’ (p. 107). On the 
other, he was disdainful of his religious convictions. Here he betrayed the 
prejudices characteristic of even the most enlightened of his nineteenth-cen-
tury European contemporaries. One thinks, for example, of the great Dutch 
author, Multatuli (Eduard Douwes Dekker, 1820-1887), who dismissed the 
prince as a ‘poor fanatic’ (armen dweeper) during his conversations with 
Colonel Cleerens in the Preanger Highlands in 1845-1846.191 Knoerle pre-
man	such	honour!	[…]	Dipanagara	asked	me	if	our	king	was	a	son­in­law	of	the	king	of	England	
[George III, reigned 1760-1820] and who was the most powerful of the two, and if King William 
had been informed that he, Dipanagara, was being taken to Manado.’
188 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 14.
189	 Knoerle,	‘Journal’,	13,	Dipanagara	‘preferred	on	our	journey	during	our	confidential	con-
versations	when	we	are	sitting	on	his	straw	mattress	to	call	me	kowé [familiar ‘you’ in Javanese]. 
I have so far called him Kangjeng Tuwan Pangéran [‘honourable sir prince’]. I asked him what 
meaning he gave to the word kowé	[…]	[and	he]	said	it	was	from	a	sincere	heart	(manah waras) 
and that I must consider it a token of [his] friendship.’ It is clear that Knoerle relied heavily on his 
Javanese servant, Sagareja, to help him with the translation of Dipanagara’s rapid conversation, 
much of it in Low Javanese.
190 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 32, remarking that Dipanagara ‘steadfastly denied it remarking that he 
did not need this supply in view of the fact that there were enough people in his army who knew 
how to manufacture gunpowder’. See further p. 610.
191 Multatuli 1862-77, IV:286; Van Praag 1947:15. Multatuli later made it appear that his conver-
sations with Colonel Cleerens had taken place at Batu Gajah, the governor’s residence in Ambon, 
when Cleerens was governor of Maluku (1846-1850). But since Multatuli only arrived in Ambon 
in	1852,	two	years	after	Cleerens’	death,	this	is	an	impossibility.	Paul	van	’t	Veer	(1979:193,	454	
note 183) suggests that Multatuli was remembering a conversation with Cleerens from his meet-
ing	with	the	Flemish	officer	in	Cianjur	or	Parakan	Salak	either	from	late	1845	or	the	first	half	of	
1846, when Cleerens was Resident of Preanger. See further note 71.
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Plate 77. The bay of Manado with a three masted schooner (probably a mail boat) an-
chored off the town. Photograph taken between 1860 and 1870, perhaps by Woodbury 
and Page. Courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
figured Multatuli’s views in his concluding letter to Van den Bosch on his 
arrival back in Java:
I got to know this selfsame state prisoner Javanese prince as a zealot, who consi-
dered his religious principles as the highest and most elevated on earth, and who 
wished to erect his religious establishment on the ruins of all other systems. 192
By 1 June, the corvette had sailed to its furthest point east arriving to within 
sight of the small islet of Paloe on the same longitude as Endeh off the north 
coast of Flores, a sighting which caused Dipanagara to express surprise when 
he learnt that the Dutch had yet to appoint a Resident on the island.193 From 
here it turned to the north making for the Bangka Strait off the northern 
tip of Minahasa. Ten days later, it was in front of the Dutch trading post at 
192 A.H. Knoerle (Surabaya) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 9-7-1830, in Knoerle 
1835:171.	Knoerle	had	by	this	time	learnt	of	his	promotion	as	first	lieutenant	in	recognition	of	his	
successful	mission	as	officer	escort	of	Dipanagara.
193 Knoerle, Journal’, 37. Dipanagara suggested quite sensibly that the government would one 
day require a Resident on Flores to provide assistance to Dutch ships which might be in need of 
assistance. Knoerle had argued against the necessity of such a move. See further Chapter X note 
241.
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Likupang situated in the strait itself (Map 6). A number of small fishing boats 
came up to sell local produce, but even here it was not possible to acquire 
sirih for Dipanagara. The corvette commander decided to sail on. Finally, on 
12 June 1830 at eleven in the morning, the Pollux dropped anchor in the roads 
of Manado. The following day the prince and his followers disembarked and 
were escorted to Fort New Amsterdam, the Dutch military strongpoint – later 
destroyed by American bombing in World War II – which would be their 
home for the next three years.
A Minahasan interlude: Dipanagara’s Manado years, 1830-1833
According to the prince’s babad, Van den Bosch had promised him through the 
intermediary of Captain Roeps ‘seclusion and quiet’ in a large house with an 
extensive view close to mountains and sea, in a place where there were many 
large gardens, fine houses, and places to wander undisturbed (note 150). So 
what did Dipanagara find in Manado? The British naturalist, Alfred Russel 
Wallace (1823-1913), who visited the Minahasan capital just four years after 
Dipanagara’s death in January 1855, described it in glowing terms (Wallace 
1890:185):
The little town of Menado [Manado] is one of the prettiest in the East. It has the 
appearance of a large garden containing rows of rustic villas, with broad paths 
between, forming streets generally at right angles with each other. Good roads 
branch off in several directions towards the interior, with a succession of pretty 
cottages, neat gardens, thriving plantations, interspersed with wilderness of fruit 
trees. To the west and south the country is mountainous, with groups of fine vol-
canic peaks 6,000 or 7,000 feet high, forming grand and picturesque backgrounds 
to the landscape.
Although the scenery may have lived up to the governor-general’s promise 
and the freedom granted the prince was immediately honoured,194 it soon 
became clear that Van den Bosch’s original intention that the Java War leader 
should be lodged in a secure location in the interior of Manado Residency 
was impractical. When Knoerle met with Resident Pietermaat on the day 
of the arrival of the Pollux, it was decided that the prince should be lodged 
temporarily in a four-room house in Fort New Amsterdam, the main Dutch 
fortress in Manado. The designated building, which had large verandahs to 
the front and rear, was normally used as the Residency offices, and to make 
it more habitable for Dipanagara’s stay, a wash-house with an outside gallery 
194	 Knoerle,	‘Journal’,	50,	mentioned	that	a	day	after	Dipanagara’s	arrival,	the	prince	made	a	
tour	on	horseback	with	him	of	three	leagues	(fifteen	kilometres)	outside	the	town	and	they	bathed	
together, presumably in an adjacent lake or waterfall.
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was hurriedly constructed.195 Suitably ‘elegant’ furniture was also acquired. 
This included a book shelf and writing desk with drawers, as well as a large 
standard lamp equipped with the latest patent oil light.196 No less than twen-
ty-four oil lamps were also purchased for the prince’s quarters.197 Dipanagara 
clearly intended to undertake some writing during his time in Manado. In 
addition, six gun lanterns (geschutlantarnen) were transferred from the Pollux 
to help the military detail tasked with the guarding of Dipanagara in Manado 
and his fellow exile, Kyai Maja, in distant Tondano, to illuminate their respec-
tive guard posts. Two horses were also bought for the prince so that he could 
undertake excursions outside the town and he asked for three saddles and 
harnesses to be sent out to him from Magelang.198
By the time Knoerle departed for Java on 20 June, the decision had been 
taken that the prince would stay in Manado, there being nowhere in the inte-
rior to put him. In the intervening days (14-17 June 1830) Knoerle had made an 
extensive tour of the interior travelling through the mountainous districts of 
Tomohon, Tonsawang, Tondano and Sonder. It soon became clear that the only 
suitable location in the interior for Dipanagara was Tondano. But there was 
a problem which Knoerle had not anticipated. Kyai Maja and his 62-strong 
following had arrived in Manado from Ambon on 1 May and had been set-
tled at Tonsea Lama in this selfsame district (Knoerle 1835:173-5; Chapter XI 
note 75). Their transfer and settlement in Tondano had been physically chal-
lenging. According to the second-lieutenant, only the allocation of two coffee 
gardens by the Resident, had made it possible for such a large community to 
195 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 49-50.
196 Knoerle 1835:173. For a list of the furniture acquired for Dipanagara, see AN, Besluit van 
den Gouverneur-Generaal, 12-2-1831 no. 25, ‘Staat en inventaris van de voor rekening van het 
gouvernement	 […]	 ingekochte	meubelaire	goederen	benevens	 twee	paarden	 ingevolge	besluit	
van	 de	Resident	 van	Manado	 in	 dato	 14	 Junij	 no.	 15	 ten	 diensten	 van	den	 Staatsgevangenen	
Pangerang Diepo Negoro’, Manado, 16-6-1830. This shows that the Dutch authorities in Manado 
spent f 912 in copper and f	24	in	silver	(the	latter	the	cost	of	the	standard	lamp	referred	to	as	a	grote 
lantaarn met eene patent lamp, most likely a Dutch import) on the following items: a dozen chairs 
(f 100), two clothes cabinets (lodekantje), one without curtains (f 25) and one with large curtains 
(f 35), a book case and writing table (f 70), a large dining table with ebony wood legs and copper 
feet (f 70), a mirror with a gilded surround (f 60), two small ebony wood drinks tables (knaapen, 
Carey 1981a:247 note 48), four large serving plates and six smaller plates with gold edgings 
(f  180), three cupboards (hangstalpen) (f 75), two cut-glass wine carafes (f 10), six wine glasses 
(f 6), six beer glasses (f	6),	four	large	rattan	floor	mats	(rottings matten) (one for each room) (f 70), 
two low wooden beds (rustbanken) (f	100),	two	copper	spittoons	(f 30), one Japanese screen (f 20), 
and one lacquered tray with handles (f 15). In addition, f 200 was spent on acquiring the two 
horses,	which	were	soon	afterwards	returned	to	their	original	owner	when	Dipanagara	decided	
against riding, AN, Exhibitum 30-10-1830 no. 28, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van 
den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 20-8-1830. See further p. 726.
197 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 12-2-1831 no. 25, D.F.W. Pietermaat 
(Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 3-7-1830.
198 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 12-2-1831 no. 25, D.F.W. Pietermaat 
(Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 3-7-1830.
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sustain themselves by their agricultural activities (Knoerle 1835:175). All the 
ricefields and houses – apart from a dwelling used by the Resident during his 
inspection journeys into the interior which had been temporarily allocated 
to Kyai Maja199 – had had to be constructed from scratch. It was feared that 
even though Dipanagara’s party was smaller, such a move would be equal-
ly physically challenging. But the key issue was political. Both Knoerle and 
Pietermaat considered it entirely inappropriate that the Java War leader and 
his chief religious adviser should end up in exile in the same Minahasan loca-
tion (Knoerle 1835:173-4). No matter that relations between the two men were 
at rock bottom, something which Knoerle soon surmised from the refusal of 
the two haji from Maja’s party to accede to Dipanagara’s request to join him 
in Manado,200 the mere possibility that Maja and the prince could again be in 
199 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 12-2-1831 no. 25, D.F.W. Pietermaat 
(Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 3-7-1830.
200 Knoerle 1835:174; Chapter XI note 79. According to Pietermaat, Haji Amad Tajib and some 
of	Kyai	Maja’s	other	followers	had	come	in	secret	to	visit	Dipanagara	in	Manado	shortly	after	his	
Plate 78. ‘Fort Nieuw Amsterdam’, Manado (completed in 1705) where Dipanagara 
was kept between June 1830 and June 1833. The Resident’s house in which he had 
his accommodation can be can be seen through the open gateway. The fort was later 
destroyed by American bombing (circa 1944). Photograph probably taken in the 1930s. 
Courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
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close contact was anathema. Pietermaat and Knoerle’s task was made easier by 
Dipanagara’s clear preference to remain in the Minahasan capital on account 
of the climate – he feared the chill of the high Tondano plateau where the 
early morning temperature could fall to below seventy degrees Fahrenheit.201 
The two Dutch officials thus revised Van den Bosch’s original instructions and 
made a unilateral decision to keep the prince in Fort New Amsterdam pend-
ing the arrival of an engineer officer from Ternate tasked with undertaking a 
survey of alternative accommodation in the environs of Manado.202
On 19 June, just a week after the ‘Pollux’ arrived, the corvette’s commander 
and ship’s officers came to the fort to take their formal leave of Dipanagara. 
They were returning the next day to Batavia via Surabaya, a journey which 
would be completed in just nineteen days. Some fifty-three soldiers,203 under 
the command of Second-Lieutenant C. Bosman remained behind to guard the 
prince. Unfortunately, this junior officer, unlike Roeps and Knoerle, lacked the 
diplomatic and linguistic skills needed to handle Dipanagara. Within weeks, 
his ‘rough and inconsiderate’ behaviour had caused Pietermaat to arrange his 
transfer to Ternate, where the 40-strong garrison was in need of an additional 
officer.204 In his babad, Dipanagara mentions this courtesy visit and the conver-
sation which took place between himself and Knoerle and Captain Eeg. After 
confirming his monthly stipend of 600 guilders, the commander of the ‘Pollux’ 
suggested that the prince might have a personal message for the governor-
general. Perhaps he would like to send a letter back to Java which he could 
take for him? ‘No’, Dipanagara replied, ‘I have no desire to send a letter for I 
cannot	write	[…]	just	send	my	regards	to	General	Van	den	Bosch!’205 
This pretence of illiteracy on Dipanagara’s part was somewhat disingenu-
ous. The prince could write in Javanese albeit with many grammatical errors 
(Appendix XIII). Indeed, we will see shortly how, when necessity demanded, 
arrival,	leading	to	a	tightening	of	Dutch	military	surveillance	of	Kyai	Maja’s	Tondano	settlement,	
AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 12-2-1831 no. 25, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) 
to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 3-7-1830.
201 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 51. The Tondano plateau is at 892 metres of elevation and the lowest 
mean temperature is around 69 degrees Fahrenheit, Atlas 1990:26; Wallace 2002: paragraph 179.
202 AN, Exhibitum 12-4-1831 no. XI, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch 
(Batavia/Bogor),	13­1­1831,	reference	to	the	imminent	arrival	of	an	engineer	officer	from	Ternate	
whose task was to survey a suitable building for Dipanagara and his family in the environs of 
Manado.	Since	there	are	no	further	references	in	the	Manado	Residency	letters	to	this	engineer	
officer	or	to	Dipanagara’s	move	to	alternative	accommodation	in	Manado,	it	seems	that	the	prince	
and his family remained in Fort New Amsterdam up to the time of their transfer to Makassar on 
20-6-1833.
203 BD (Manado) IV:426, LXIII.314-21.
204 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 30-10-1830 no. 28, D.F.W. Pietermaat 
(Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 20-8-1830, referring to Bosman’s ‘lack of 
consideration’ in his dealings with Dipanagara.
205 BD (Manado), IV:426, XLIII (Maskumambang) 319-20. pan ingsun tan darbé karsa. 320. kirim 
layang pan ingsun tan bisa nulis/ ya mung tabé ingwang/ sira tekakena iki/ mring Jéndral Van de Bos ika.
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he could get letters – and even major literary endeavours like his 43-canto au-
tobiographical babad – written, especially if he had the services of an amanu-
ensis. So pleading lack of literary skills was perhaps a way of sending his own 
message to Van den Bosch that the governor-general’s failure to meet him 
during his three-week sojourn in the colonial capital had not gone unnoticed. 
Privately, however, Dipanagara did seek to get some messages through to 
‘his exalted friend’ in Batavia. In particular, he asked – in a formal agreement 
drawn up by Knoerle and witnessed by Bosman – that his wives, who had re-
mained behind in Yogya (Appendix IV part 2), and those of Kyai Maja and his 
fellow exile commanders, who were sharing the kyai’s banishment in Tonsea 
Lama, should be sent out from Java to be reunited with their husbands. He 
also requested that his two close religious advisers, Haji Badarudin and Haji 
Ngisa, should be allowed to join him in Manado, and that Van Den Bosch 
should remain the ‘protector’ of his children in Mataram. 206 Although Kyai 
Maja’s wife was indeed brought over to Minahasa – although not on compas-
sionate grounds (Chapter XI note 76) – all Dipanagara’s other requests were 
met in the negative. None of his other wives wished to share his exile. Nor too 
did the two haji. They were too busy making new careers for themselves in 
the post-war Netherlands-Indies, Haji Badarudin as chief pengulu of Bagelèn 
(Appendix VIIb) and Haji Ngisa as religious adviser to Senthot and his gov-
ernment-sponsored barisan (troop) in Ungaran.207
Dipanagara’s life as an exile in Manado would not be easy. Soon after the 
departure of the Pollux, according to the account given in Dipanagara’s babad, 
Manado was visited by a serious epidemic – possibly cholera or dysentery – 
during which many of ‘the accursed’ (laknat), by which Dipanagara presum-
ably meant the local Dutch, non-Muslim Chinese and Christian Manadonese 
inhabitants, died.208 At the same time, the sudden contraction of the prince’s 
world to four rooms in Fort New Amsterdam in the company of his wife, 
sister and brother-in-law, after five years of war and the solitude of his last 
months as a fugitive in the mountains of western Bagelèn, was hard to bear. 
Scarcely a month after his arrival, the prince decided that he no longer wished 
to ride out into the surrounding countryside, the environs of Manado not be-
206 vdB 391, ‘Voorstellen [van den] Pangerang Diepo Negoro aan den Luitenant-Adjudant 
Knoerle	 in	de	 tegenwoordigheid	van	den	 […]	 2e	Luitenant	 [C.]	Bosman’, Manado, 19-6-1830, 
proposals 3, 4 and 6.
207 NA, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k geheim, ‘Verbaal Hadjie Ngisoh [Haji Ngisa]’, 20-4-1830.
208 BD (Manado), IV:427, XLIII (Maskumambang) 322. mapan langkung pageblug ingkang dha-
tengi/ laknat kathah pejah/ mangkana wus tan winarni. The Dutch sources are silent on such an epi-
demic in 1830-1832, but there are references to a severe drought in April-November 1833, which 
led	to	serious	fires	in	the	interior	of	Manado	in	August	1833	and	heavy	fevers	(possibly	cholera,	
bile fever or dysentry) which claimed 17-18 lives in the Chinese quarter (kampong cina) near Fort 
New	Amsterdam	and	spread	into	the	interior	with	devastating	effects	in	neighbouring	Gorontalo	
where	all	the	local	Dutch	officials	apart	from	the	Resident	fell	sick	or	died,	AN,	Geheim	Verbaal,	
23-7-1834 no. 172k, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 13-2-1834.
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ing suitable, in his view, for excursions on horseback and the saddles which 
he had asked for from Magelang not having arrived.209 The two horses, which 
had been bought for him by the local Dutch authorities, were returned to 
their previous owners.210 He now asked that henceforth he should just be 
addressed as ‘Pangéran Ngabdulkamit’, a title which he would alter to the 
more spiritual epithet of fakir (mendicant) Ngabdulkamit after his transfer to 
Makassar in July 1833 (pp. 151-2).
In keeping with his mendicant aspirations and with an eye to saving money 
for his long planned pilgrimage to Mecca,211 Dipanagara began to be very close 
fisted with his cash stipend. By late August 1830, Resident Pietermaat became 
alarmed that he might be building up a ‘war chest’ so substantial were his sav-
ings in money and jewels.212 He took the immediate decision to cut the prince’s 
monthly income by two-thirds to just 200 guilders. This was clearly too drastic 
as Dipanagara needed over half this stipend just to pay his servants and kitchen 
expenses, but out of pride he appears to have kept silent only remarking, ‘It is 
well. The government fixed my income at f 600 without consulting me and can 
[now] only but act as it thinks fit!’213 Eight months later, Pietermaat’s temporary 
replacement, J.P.C. Cambier (in office 1831-1842), decided to raise this to f 311 a 
month, a move which Dipanagara again greeted with studied indifference. His 
‘extreme obstinacy’ and pride, in Cambier’s words, prevented him from ever 
asking for more money from the Dutch authorities.214 Although this stood at 
209 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 30-10-1830 no. 28, D.F.W. Pietermaat 
(Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 20-8-1830.
210 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 12-2-1831 no. 25.
211 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) 
to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831, referring to the report by Dipanagara’s 
scribe, Tirtadrana, that Dipanagara was still hoping that Captain Roeps would arrive in Manado 
with a suitable sailing vessel to take him to Jeddah, the prince’s greatest desire being to make the 
haj to Mecca, a voyage for which he was saving regularly out of his monthly allowance.
212 By April 1831, according to his scribe, Tirtadrana, Dipanagara had saved f 1,762.50 out of 
the f 5,422 he had received since his arrival in Manado in June 1830, his only luxury being the 
purchase of a gold kris sheath for his heirloom dagger, Kangjeng Kyai Ageng Bandayuda. This 
sheath had been sold at auction in Manado and purchased on Dipanagara’s behalf for f 214.50. 
The	acting	Resident	of	Manado,	J.P.C.	Cambier	(in	office	1831­1833),	reckoned	that	by	this	time,	
Dipanagara had built up savings of f 4,000, including money and f 400 in jewels which the prince 
had brought out from Java. His f 311 monthly allowance was divided as follows: 1. f 110 for the 
upkeep of his household; 2. f 111 to pay the wages of his servants (see further Appendix XII); 3. 
f  50 for his wife, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, and f 20 each for his sister and brother-in-law, AN, 
Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to Johan-
nes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831.
213 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 30-10-1830 no. 28, D.F.W. Pietermaat 
(Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 20-8-1830; AN, Besluit van den Gouver-
neur-Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Bata-
via/Bogor), 22-4-1831, relating Dipanagara’s comment.
214 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) 
to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831, referring to Dipanagara’s verregaande 
stijfhoofdig[heid].	Cambier	was	in	confirmed	in	post	on	24­4­1834.
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f 350 in July 1837 after the government had taken the decision to send the bulk 
of the prince’s followers back to Minahasa, it was still not sufficient – given 
Dipanagara’s growing family – to prevent his household descending into a 
state of near poverty by the late 1840s (note 268).
In an extraordinary piece of creative accounting tellingly illustrative of the 
way in which the Dutch made their fortunes in the post-Java War Indies both 
the Resident of Yogyakarta, F.G. Valck (in office 1831-1838, 1838-1841), and the 
director-general of Finances in Batavia advised that the Yogya court, which was 
being charged the full costs of the prince’s upkeep, should not be informed that 
Dipanagara’s monthly stipend had been cut in half. Instead, they proposed that 
the sultan’s treasury be made to pay a lump sum of f 22,200 for the first three 
years of the exile’s maintenance, which included his period in Batavia, that 
sum being immediately credited to the account of the Resident of Manado.215 
Even the small purchases of sirih and other necessities, which the prince had 
made during his three-week sojourn in the colonial capital, were to be included 
in the Dutch accounts.216 Such pettifoggery on the part of the Dutch authori-
ties, the same mean-mindedness which would make the exile life of the Padri 
leader, Tuanku Imam Bonjol (1772-1864), such a misery when he was moved to 
Manado in 1840 (Dobbin 1972:19), appear to have taken their toll on the prince. 
Like Bonjol after him, Dipanagara does not seem to have been very well re-
ceived by the local Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the Minahasan capital. 
The popular tradition that the prince had been so incensed by the abuse he had 
suffered in the local market (pasar) that he had flung his heirloom walking staff 
on the ground causing the ground to rock as though in an earthquake (Chapter 
III note 66), may be a reflection of this. So too was the Resident’s account of the 
rebuff administered to the prince by a leading Muslim inhabitant of Manado, 
Lieutenant Hasan Nur Latif, whose daughter’s hand Dipanagara had sought in 
marriage (p. 119). A commissioned officer in the Dutch East Indies Army, Latif 
had remarked that the union would bring his child ‘ill fortune’, a sentiment 
endorsed by the acting Resident who observed that from a political point of 
view it was unsuitable for a prominent Islamic citizen like Latif to be linked by 
marriage with the exile prince.217 Despite Latif’s refusal, Dipanagara continued 
to lead an active sexual life during his period in exile in Manado and Makassar. 
215 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C. Baud) in rade, 24-4-1833 no. 
19; 4-7-1833 no. 10, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Director-General of Finances (Batavia), 18-5-1833; 
Director-General of Finances (Batavia) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 29-5-1833. Van den Bosch 
decided to charge the sultan f 600 a month, ‘with anything remaining to be returned at the end 
of the year’, thus enabling the government to recoup all its additional expenses before any reim-
bursements were made to the sultan’s treasury.
216 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C. Baud) in rade, 24-4-1833 no. 19, 
J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 22-2-1833, listing f 81.90 for goods received 
by Dipanagara in Batavia between 9-4-1830 and 3-5-1830.
217 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) 
to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831.
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As we have seen (pp. 117-8), Cambier’s predecessor, Pietermaat, had already 
reported that Dipanagara’s ‘greatest conversation is about women of whom 
he seems to have been a great lover’, and he would go on to have no less than 
seven children in exile, some by Javanese women other than his official consort, 
Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih (Appendix IV).
The growing tensions of family life in the enclosed confines of Fort New 
Amsterdam, however, clearly made for difficult inter-personal relations with-
in the prince’s immediate family. In April 1831, the acting Resident was re-
porting that,
The prince at present leads a very unpleasant life and his own intolerant humour 
is	 the	entire	cause	of	 it	 […]	most	of	 the	 time	he	 is	quarrelling	with	his	sister,	or	
with his wife and brother-in-law [Radèn Tumenggung Dipawiyana], [who] have 
pressed for buying [him] a garden.218
Purchased and laid out for the sum of f 254, this garden lay one and a half 
leagues (7 kilometres) from Manado close to the Saria River with a hill be-
hind.219 A pleasant spot, but one which Dipanagara cared less and less to vis-
it. Instead, it was given over to growing vegetables for the prince’s table, the 
f 40 bamboo dwelling, which had been constructed on the adjacent hillside 
as a meditation hut, being used by the prince’s sister and brother-in-law to 
put some distance between themselves and their increasingly cantankerous 
relative. Dipanagara’s physically imposing younger sister, who shared the 
prince’s commoner stock on her mother’s side,220 seems to have been at the 
heart of this growing family rift. Described by Knoerle as ‘resolute and free, 
[…]	and	of	a	very	vivacious	spirit’,221 Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana appears to have 
gone head-to-head with her elder brother in numerous family tiffs. In his ba-
bad, Dipanagara mentions that after he had been in Manado for some time,
XLIII.329 many trials
  came to test the sultan.
  Often his own
  younger sister
  Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana
218 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) 
to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831.
219 AN, Exhibitum 12-4-1831 no. XI, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch 
(Batavia/Bogor), 13-1-1831, reporting that now that a garden had been laid out for him, Dipana-
gara was taking more recreation and spending more money. At Dipanagara’s request, f 25 had 
been spent on purchasing a small plot of land on the hill behind his garden where a small medita-
tion pavilion (pendhapa) could be constructed.
220 Mandoyokusumo 1977:33 no. 30, gives her mother’s name as ‘Bendara Mas Ajeng Sasmi-
taningsih’	which	indicates	that	she	was	of	commoner	stock.	A	well­born	unofficial	wife	(garwa 
ampéyan) of a Javanese ruler would have been accorded the title of Bendara Radèn Ayu.
221 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 9, describes Dipanagara’s sister as ‘strongly built’.
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  caused him feelings of shame
  together with the tumenggung [her husband].
  But the sultan paid the two no attention.
  Night and day
  only the Almighty
  afforded the sultan protection,
  [along with] the grace of [His] Holy Prophet.222
Soon the Resident was reporting that, given a free choice, all Dipanagara’s 
family, including his wife, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, and his servants would 
have liked to leave the prince and return to Java. Since the Resident’s instruc-
tions, received from his counterpart in Batavia, J. van der Vinne, explicitly 
stated that all these individuals shared Dipanagara’s status as state prison-
ers (staatsgevangenen), Cambier first had to seek permission from Batavia. 
Enquiries by the governor-general indicated that there would be no objec-
tion to either Retnaningsih or any of the prince’s other followers from return-
ing to their respective homes in Java. They had all accompanied him vol-
untarily and were not considered ‘dangerous for the general peace’.223 Thus 
reassured, Van den Bosch passed a decree in council on 2 July 1831 giving 
Dipanagara’s wife and followers formal leave to repatriate themselves.224 
In the end, Retnaningsih, who had just been delivered on 4 January 1832 
of Dipanagara’s first child born in exile, Radèn Mas Kindar, also known as 
Radèn Mas Abdurrahman,225 elected to stay with her husband, leaving the 
prince’s younger sister and brother-in-law, together with their intimate re-
tainer (panakawan), Rajamenggala, to return to Java with their wives, servants 
and children in August 1832.226 For Dipanagara, it must have been a merciful 
222 BD (Manado), IV:428, XLIII (Maskumambang) 329-32. sareng sampun lami sri bupati iki/ 
wonten ing kitha Menadhu sangsaya iki/ gung coba mring sri naléndra. 330. ingkang rayi pribadi sring 
karya iki/ lingsem ing naléndra/ Dèn Ayu Dipayanèki/ pan katut tumenggungira. 331. nging sang nata 
pan wus tan ningali kalih/ nging Allah Tangala/ kang linundhungan nerpati/ lan supangat Nabi kita. 332. 
siyang dalu .
223	 Van	den	Bosch’s	enquriries	were	made	via	Commissioner	for	the	Regulation	of	Affairs	in	the	
Princely States, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, who took soundings with the newly appointed Resi-
dent of Yogyakarta, F.G. Valck. This last had been present in Magelang – as Resident of Kedhu (in 
office	1826­1830)	–	when	Retnaningsih	and	Dipanagara’s	other	followers	elected	to	accompany	
the prince into exile, Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten der uitgaande brieven aan den Gouverneur-Generaal 
van den Commissaris aan de Hoven [Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven]’, 1-1-1831 – 31-1-1831, J.I. van 
Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 30-7-1831.
224 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15.
225 BNg, III:373, LXII.11-12, gives the birth date as Rebo Pon, 1 Shaban, taun Dal AJ 1759 (AD 
4-1-1832), and the child’s name as ‘Radèn Mas Menadhorahman’. But there is no mention of this 
name in Dipanagara’s babad or in the Dutch sources. See further Appendix IV.
226 By 27-8-1832, Radèn Tumenggung Dipawiyana and Rajamenggala together with their 
respective wives, were back in Batavia, and by 10-9-1832, they had reached Yogyakarta, where 
the ever suspicious Resident, F.G. Valck, complained that the Batavian authorities had not held 
them long enough to check their characters and backgrounds, AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-
Generaal in rade, 4-10-1831 no. 12, J.F.W. van Nes (Batavia) to Johannes van den Bosch, 27-8-1832; 
Plate 79. Daniel François Willem Pietermaat (1790-1848), Resident of Manado 
(1827-1831) and deputy governor of Makassar (1833). He oversaw Dipanagara’s trans-
fer from Manado to Makassar in June-July 1833, and later became Resident of Batavia 
(1834-1837) and Resident of Surabaya (1839-1848), where he died. Lithograph proba-
bly made in 1838, when he was on sick leave in the Netherlands. The house depicted 
through the open window is probably the Residency House of Batavia or Het Huis 
Simpang in Surabaya. Photograph by courtesy of the Stichting Iconografisch Bureau, 
Den Haag.
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relief to be rid of his feisty sibling and her equally difficult husband. The four 
rooms in Fort New Amsterdam were now left free for the prince and his wife 
to care for their eight-month-old son, whose birth, according to Cambier, had 
given the prince much pleasure.227 Radèn Mas Kindar would grow up, ac-
cording to an official report, into a strikingly handsome and energetic young 
man whom Dipanagara would take care to educate – along with his younger 
brothers, Radèn Mas Sarkuma (1834-1849) and Radèn Mas Dulkabli (alias 
Radèn Mas Mutawaridin; born circa 1835),228 – ‘as a priest’, namely in the pe-
santrèn (religious boarding school) style. He would develop into a warm and 
zealous Muslim with a deep hatred of all things Dutch.229
One of the ways in which Dipanagara sought to educate his children in 
the iniquities of Dutch rule was by entertaining them with accounts of his 
life and times. In the words of the Civil and Military Governor of the Celebes 
(Sulawesi) Colonel Alexander van der Hart (1808-1855; in office, 1853-1855, 
who reported to the governor-general immediately after Dipanagara’s death 
on 8 January 1855, the prince had kept (Sagimun 1965:360):
his sons constantly engaged in prison [in Fort Rotterdam, Makassar, 1833-1855] 
with	tales	of	his	life	and	adventures	[…]	an	embittered	father,	he	considered	us	[the	
Dutch] as his [sworn] religious enemies and the cause of all his misfortunes and 
protracted suffering. He thus imprinted little love for us on his children’s [minds].
The principal vehicle for Dipanagara’s instruction was his autobiography 
whose inception the prince described somewhat fancifully as follows (Carey 
1981a:lx note 78):
XLIII.322 Resident Pietermaat
 323 enquired of the sultan [Dipanagara]:
  ‘What is the reason
  Your Highness came here?’
  Smiling the sultan replied:
F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 10-10-1832. 
227 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C. Baud) in rade, 24-4-1833 no. 
19, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 22-2-1833. Radèn Mas Kindar sub-
sequently bore the title of Pangéran Abdurrahman, but this was not recognised by the Dutch, 
Appendix IV note 8.
228 Radèn Mas Sarkuma (1834-1849), and possibly Radèn Mas Mutawaridin (Pangéran Dulk-
abli) (born circa 1835), are mentioned in the Dutch reports as children of Dipanagara by Retnan-
ingsih, see Appendix IV notes 8-9. 
229 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal 10-5-1855 La R, Colonel A. van der Hart 
(Makassar) to A.J. Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 12-1-1855, stating that Radèn Mas Kindar 
and his younger brother, Radèn Mas Dulkabli (Radèn Mas Sarkuma had since died, 3-1849), had 
received a ‘complete priestly education’ from Dipanagara, but that Kindar had matured into a 
‘warm and zealous Muslim’ rather than a ‘fanatic’ (dweeper). See further Sagimun 1965:359-60.
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 324 ‘Ah, Resident, if you ask me, promise me
  can you
  deliver this letter [requesting permission to depart on the haj]
  to the King of the Netherlands [William I, reigned 1813-1840]? 
 325 If you promise it, I will indeed tell you the reason
  why I came
  to Manado.
  If you cannot promise, then it is in vain
 326 that I tell you the real facts.’
  The Resident gave his pledge.
  Then he was given
  the chronicle from the very beginning
 327 until the final arrival in Manado.
  Resident Pietermaat,
  when he heard the truth,
  became deeply ashamed
 328 because of the perfidy of his countrymen,
  how they had been able
  to end the war in this treacherous fashion.
  We talk no more of this.
Pietermaat may well have encouraged Dipanagara to write down his person-
al memoirs, although by the time the prince began to compose his babad on 20 
May 1831, the Dutch official had already departed from Manado to take up 
a post in Batavia.230 We know from the late nineteenth-century scholar, A.B. 
Cohen Stuart, that the manuscript, which ran to over 1,000 folio-sized pages 
in pégon, the script favoured by the more self-consciously religious communi-
ties in Java, remained in the hands of Dipanagara’s descendants in Makassar 
after his death and was presumably considered by them as a family heir-
loom.231 It was divided into two parts. The first part – roughly a third of the 
230 NA, Koloniaal Archief A.272, Stamboek [service record] of Mr Daniel, Francois, Willem 
Pietermaat (born Schiedam 2-10-1790, died Simpang, Surabaya 30-11-1848), states that he was 
granted	 two­years’	 leave	 in	 the	Netherlands	 in	 January	 1831,	 and	 left	 the	Manado	Residency	
the following month in the hands of J.P.C. Cambier, who served as acting Resident (1831-1834). 
Pietermaat does not seem to have taken his furlough at this time because the next entries on his 
record indicate that he was immediately appointed a deputy judge of the Hooggerechtshof (High 
Court)	in	Batavia	(1832­1833).	After	supervising	Dipanagara’s	transfer	to	Makassar	(20­6­1833	–	
12­7­1833),	he	briefly	served	as	deputy	governor	of	Makassar	and	Resident	of	Semarang	(both	
posts held in 1834), before becoming Resident of Batavia (1834-1837). Health reasons then forced 
him to ask to take his delayed two-year leave in the Netherlands (1838-1840). On his return to the 
Indies, he served as Resident of Surabaya (1840-1848), dying in post.
231 Carey 1981a:lix note 73. Unfortunately, the two pégon script copies made by Cohen Stuart’s 
scribes in Batavia in the mid-1870s are now illegible because of the oxidisation of the ink on the 
thin paper used. The Makassar original is also now no longer extant. See further pp. xvi-xvii.
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entire work – gives the history of Java from the fall of Majapahit (circa 1527) 
to the peace of Giyanti (1755). The second part deals with the prince’s own 
life and times from his birth in 1785 to his exile in Manado. Completed in just 
under nine months (20 May 1831-2 February 1832), it was written precisely 
during the period when the tension between Dipanagara and his close family 
members was at its height. Given the intensity of Dipanagara’s output – over 
one hundred folio pages a month – for which he had only the help of a single 
amanuensis,232 it is not hard to surmise that during this period Dipanagara 
would have had his attention completely focussed on his literary production. 
No wonder that he eschewed horse rides and visits to his garden plot and 
meditation hut. No wonder that he proved a cantakerous and difficult com-
panion to his increasingly exasperated family during these months in Fort 
New Amsterdam. What author, cooped up in four rooms in a hot fortress 
town whose inhabitants were indifferent if not hostile, and with argumenta-
tive relatives would not have felt as he did? The pains of exile and authorship 
hardly come more purgatorial than this. But what a manuscript would result. 
The source of Dipanagara’s anti-Dutch teachings for his growing family in 
Manado and Makassar, it would prove to be one of the great historical pro-
ductions of modern Java – a national treasure strangely without honour in 
contemporary Indonesia. Here is how this magnificent work begins:
I. 1 ‘I lay out the feelings of my heart
  in the [sad] Mijil metre.
  Created to bring solace to my heartfelt desires,
  it was done in the town of Manado 
  without being seen by anyone,
  but the grace of The All-Knowing One. 
232	 This	may	have	been	 the	 former	Kedhu	village	 official,	Kyai	Tirtadrana,	who	had	 joined	
Dipanagara from Kyai Maja’s entourage in Tonsea Lama in August 1830 (Appendix XII), and 
served as a Dutch spy reporting to Pietermaat and Cambier on Dipanagara’s movements. 
Described	by	Pietermaat	as	a	‘very	able	man’	fluent	in	Malay,	he	accompanied	the	Resident	on	
visits to Dipanagara in Fort New Amsterdam, AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in 
rade, 30-10-1830 no. 28, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 
20-8-1830. F.G. Valck, then serving as Resident of Yogyakarta (1831-1841), however, character-
ised him as untrustworthy. He had apparently been dismissed as a head demang of the Grabag 
district in northeastern Kedhu before the Java War for corruption and extortion. Taken on by 
Valck during the war as a spy based in Magelang, he was supposed to report the movements of 
Dipanagara’s	forces,	but	had	betrayed	Valck’s	secrets	and	had	plotted	with	Dipanagara’s	forces	
to kill the head opium pachter (tax farmer) of Kedhu, Johannes (? an Armenian), and capture his 
tax farm moneys as he was travelling from Magelang to Yogya, Dj.Br. 17, J.I. van Sevenhoven 
(Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 30-7-1831. The only other possibilities 
are that the priest, referred to various as ‘Sataruna’ or ‘Suranata’, who was sent over from Tonsea 
Lama, to help Dipanagara’s religious duties during the fasting month of March-April 1831, and 
who presumably could write Javanese in pégon script; or that his brother-in-law Dipawiyana, who 
was	reported	to	be	fluent	in	both	Javanese	and	pégon script (Knoerle:10), were the amanuenses 
used by Dipanagara for the composition of his babad.
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 2 Much does my heart feel
  of [past] discordant actions.
  So now my heart is fixed.
  How would it be with my actions
  if there was not also
  the forgiveness of The Almighty?
 3 I have experienced shame and suffering,
  but my request
  is that all former things should be set aside,
  [and] that my family should truly observe
  the Religion of The Prophet
  thereby gaining succour.233
Closing the circle: the state prisoner of Fort Rotterdam, Makassar, 1833-1855
Even as Dipanagara was dictating these lines, half a world away in the 
Kingdom of the United Netherlands, events were taking place which would 
alter radically the conditions under which the prince and his family were held 
in exile. Exasperated by the same Dutch quest for immediate profit which had 
led to such suffering in south-central Java before the Java War (Chapter IX), 
the inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands had risen in revolt following an 
insurrection in Brussels on 24 August 1830. Belgian independence had been 
proclaimed (4 October 1830), but despite the pressures from the great powers 
and the elevation of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg as the new Belgian monarch (21 
July 1831, reigned 1831-1865), the Dutch king, William I (reigned 1813-1840), 
had refused to disarm. A series of military engagements had ensued which 
eventually led to a French army entering Belgium in support of the national-
ist forces and bombarding the citadel of Antwerp where a Dutch garrison 
under General David Hendrik Chassé (1765-1849)234 eventually surrendered 
after a heroic two-year siege (December 1832). In early 1833, it seemed that 
the French might even cross the Dutch-Belgian border into Zeeland. With a 
European war looming, Van den Bosch became seriously alarmed that ‘an un-
scrupulous enemy’ – by which he clearly meant the British – might seek to use 
the large numbers of exiles in the ‘outer possessions’ for political purposes. 
In particular, he was concerned that Dipanagara might take advantage of the 
233	 BD	 (Manado)	 I:1,	 I	 (Mijil)	 1­3.	 sun amedhar suraosaning ati/ atembang pamiyos/ pan kinarya 
anglipur brangtané/ anèng Kitha Menadhu duk kardi/ tan ana kaèksi/ nging sihing Hyang Agung. 2. 
mapan kathah kang karasèng galih/ ing tingkah kadudon/ pan mangkana ing tyas pangasthiné/ kaya paran 
solah ingsun iki/ yèn tan ana ugi/ apura Hyang Agung. 3. lara wirang pan wus sun lakoni/ nging panu-
huning ngong/ ingkang karilan kang dhingin kabèh/ kulawarga kang ngèsthokken yekti/ mring Agama 
Nabi/ olèh apitulung.
234	 A	Waterloo	veteran,	he	was	nicknamed	‘Général	Baionette’	(General	Bayonet)	by	Napoleon	
because of his predilection for the use of this weapon in close hand-to-hand combat.
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opportunity of a new European conflict to escape and return to Java to lead 
a new rebellion.235 It was clearly inappropriate for him to remain in the town 
of Manado close to the shipping routes where British naval forces might re-
appear at any moment to repeat their previous 1795-1797 and 1808-1810 am-
phibious operations when nearly all the Dutch outer island possessions had 
fallen into their hands. The trusted Pietermaat was thus delegated to leave 
his post at the High Court in Batavia and return immediately to Manado to 
arrange for Dipanagara’s transfer to a newly constructed strongpoint deep in 
the Minahasan interior.236
Once in Manado, Pietermaat soon realised that Van den Bosch’s proposals 
were impractical. The Netherlands Indies Government had no legal sover-
eignty in Minahasa, its authority depending on a contract with the local chiefs 
dating back to 1810. It thus had no rights over land. Without the permission 
of the local authorities no fort could be built in the interior. Besides, none of 
the chiefs, in Pietermaat’s view, would believe that such a strongpoint was 
being constructed only to house an ‘unimportant person’ like Dipanagara. 
They would suspect that it was a move by the government in the direction 
of outright annexation and they would resist it. If it came to war, what could 
a garrison of 40 Dutch and native troops in Manado do against a hostile 
Minahasan population of 80,000? Furthermore, the British were well liked in 
Minahasa. During the period of their rule (1811-1817), they had treated the 
population well giving lavish presents to the local chiefs and demanding no 
forced deliveries or personal labour services from the peasant cultivators. If 
they landed they would be welcomed with open arms.
An alternative strategy would have to be found. One such alternative ac-
tively canvassed by Van den Bosch both during his period as commissioner-
general of the Netherlands Indies (1832-1834) and as minister of the Colonies 
(1834-1839), was to send Dipanagara, along with other prominent Indonesian 
exiles, back to the Netherlands. His suggestion was that they should be held 
in one of the royal fortresses which served as state prisons for members of the 
Dutch elite, such as Loevestein in Gelderland237 and Woerden in the province 
of Utrecht.238 All the costs would be met by the Indies exchequer, meaning, in 
Dipanagara’s case, the Yogya court. If Dipanagara had rejected Tondano with 
235 NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 2846, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C. 
Baud) in rade, 8-3-1833 no. 2.
236 AN, Exhibitum 20-3-1833, Geheim Verbaal no. 470a, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johan-
nes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 9-3-1833. 
237 A water fortress at the junction of the Maas and Waal rivers, Loevestein was built between 
1357	and	1368.	 It	was	 renowned	 for	 the	celebrated	escape	of	 the	Rotterdam	scholar,	Hugo	de	
Groot (1583-1645), who smuggled himself out hidden in a book case.
238 Built in 1410 and extensively altered and rernovated through the years, Woerden had served 
as a none too arduous billet for the gentlemen-prisoners of the Dutch Directory in 1798, Schama 
1977:324.
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its 69 degree Fahrenheit mean early morning temperature as too cold (note 
201), no leap of the imagination is necessary to contemplate how many Dutch 
winters he would have survived in the damp fortresses of the Netherlands 
‘water line’ frontier defence system.239 It was fortunate for the prince that 
the Dutch king rejected Van den Bosch’s proposal out of hand as politically 
unacceptable.240 Indeed, it would not be until the early twentieth century that 
239	 Built	partly	out	of	the	profits	of	Van	den	Bosch’s	Cultivation	System	(1830­1870),	these	nine-
teenth­century	frontier	defense	works,	comprised	a	line	of	canals,	sluices	and	fortifications	south	
of Utrecht in western Holland, known as the Nieuwe Hollandse waterlinie (‘New Dutch Water 
Line’). They were originally designed to prevent another French invasion like that of 1795-1796 
when the French Army of the North had crossed the frozen canals and rivers into Holland and 
had established a pro-French regime in The Hague.
240 Correspondence relating to Van den Bosch’s proposal can be found in the besluit of the Min-
ister of the Colonies, 28-7-1834 no. 177k, in NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 4234, Geheim Verbaal, 
23-7-1834 no. 177k geheim. See further AN, Exhibitum, 9-12-1834 La R geheim, J.C. Baud (Batavia/
Bogor) to Johannes van den Bosch (The Hague), 2-2-1834; Johannes van den Bosch (The Hague) 
to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 28-7-1834), King William I (The Hague) to Johannes van den Bosch 
(The Hague), 9-12-1834.
Plate 80. A view of Fort Rotterdam, Makassar looking towards the north-east bastion 
(Bastion Mandarsaha), probably taken in the late nineteenth century. The building 
which housed Dipanagara and his family is the second from the left immediately be-
hind ‘landward’ gate (landpoort). The tall building over the wall in the foreground hou-
sed the guardhouse and powder-magazine of the Bastion Mandarsaha. Photograph by 
courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
Map 7. Groundplan of Fort Rotterdam, Makassar (now Benteng Makassar) showing 
the main buildings and Dipanagara’s quarters, 1833-1855. Outline taken from the NA 
(Nationaal Archief), Leupe Collection 1309, ‘Hoofd plan van ’t Kasteel Rotterdam [...]’, 
door C.F. Reimer, n.y. [1770?]. The relevant places relating to Dipanagara are: F – the 
house of the VOC storekeeper (winkelier) which after August 1809 was converted into 
officers’ quarters (no. 6); F1* – officers’ dwelling no. 7, the location of Dipanagara’s 
quarters near the main guardhouse with an attic view over Makassar harbour and 
which in 1844 were enlarged by the addition of two rooms from the adjacent officers’ 
dwelling no. 6; G – the main guardhouse or hoofdwacht. Map drawn by J. Wilbur 
Wright of Oxford.
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Indonesian exiles were sent back to the Netherlands and then as in-country 
detainees rather than as state prisoners incarcerated in royal fortresses.241
With his plans to transfer Dipanagara to the Netherlands finding little fa-
vour, Van den Bosch hit on an Indies alternative. The prince would be moved 
south in deepest secrecy to Makassar where he would be held until his dy-
ing breath in Admiral Cornelis Janszoon Speelman’s (1628-1684) great strong-
hold of Fort Rotterdam.242 Instead of Manado’s puny 40-strong garrison, the 
south Sulawesi fortress boasted a complement of 200 soldiers and powerful 
gun batteries mounted on its five great bastions which covered all the ap-
proaches from sea and land. It was altogether a more formidable defensive 
structure. In this way, Dipanagara and his followers243 would exchange Fort 
New Amsterdam for Fort Rotterdam travelling the length of the Dutch east-
ern Indonesian gulag by naval schooner, a clandestine twenty-one day (20 
June-11 July 1833) odyssey made all the more poignant by the name of the 
vessel tasked with transporting them, the Circe, styled after the queen god-
dess in Homer’s epic who could transform men into animals. Van den Bosch 
went to enormous lengths to ensure that even the local Dutch authorities in 
Manado were not informed of Dipanagara’s true destination. Acting Resident 
Cambier was to be told that the prince was bound for Ternate. Meanwhile, 
the schooner’s captain was only to be instructed to hold course for Makassar 
when he had cleared the roads of Manado. On reaching Makassar on 11 July 
1833, the ship’s officers were sworn to secrecy and forbidden to enter into any 
correspondence regarding their voyage. The ship’s log was altered and imme-
diately after depositing the prince and his party, it sailed to Ambon making 
it look as though the Moluccas had been its original destination all along. 
On arrival in Ambon, the captain was relieved of any obligation to report his 
movements to the local Dutch authorities in Fort Victoria. 244 But even these 
strict instructions seem to have been of little avail in preventing the schoon-
er’s Indonesian sailors from reacting badly to the former Java War leader’s 
241	 The	three	founders	of	the	Indische	Partij	(Indies	Party),	E.F.E.	Douwes	Dekker	(Setiabuddhi,	
1879-1950), Radèn Mas Suwardi Suryaningrat (Ki Hadjar Dewantara, 1889-1959), and Dr Tjipto 
Mangunkusumo (1885-1943), were exiled to the Netherlands by the Indies government in 1913 
and were only allowed to return at the end of World War I (1914-1918).
242	 Named	after	Speelman’s	birthplace	in	Holland.
243 Besides Dipanagara, his wife, Retnaningsih, and eighteen-month old son, Radèn Mas 
Abdurrahman (Radèn Mas Kindar), twenty-three followers accompanied the prince, AN, Exhi-
bitum 13-10-1834 La E geheim, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Makassar) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 23-7-
1834; Appendix XII.
244 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C. Baud), 8-3-1833 no. 2; AN, 
Geheim Verbaal, 13-10-1834 La E, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 9-3-
1833; J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor) to Governor of Makassar, 20-3-1833 zeer geheim (secret instruc-
tions handed over by Pietermaat to the governor of Makassar on the arrival of the Circe); D.F.W. 
Pietermaat (Manado) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 20-6-1833 (reporting Dipanagara’s embarka-
tion);	11­7­1833	(reporting	his	administration	of	oath	to	ship’s	officers	of	Circe on arrival in Makas-
sar). 
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presence in their midst. Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven (in office 1832-1839), who 
served as a member of the Raad van Indië (Council of the Indies), would later 
advise that Dipanagara should never again be moved by a Dutch warship 
given the possibility of mutiny amongst the ship’s crew. Any further transfers 
should be by ‘colonial trader’, namely by ordinary merchantman.245 
Unlike in Manado, neither the prince nor his followers were to be allowed 
outside the walls of Fort Rotterdam, at least not until the state prisoner had 
breathed his last (8 January 1855). Dipanagara was to be held in an officer’s 
billet, previously home to two lieutenants,246 close to the main guardhouse 
with an attic view over Makassar harbour and with the high inner curtain 
wall of the fort blocking the landward perspective towards the town (see Map 
7). The prince was permitted to take exercise under escort within the bounds 
of the fort but only between the hours of sunrise and sunset. At sunset, the 
military commandant was to check that both he and his followers were back 
in their quarters. No-one was to be allowed to visit the prince except with 
the express permission of the governor. The only exceptions were the com-
mandant, the officer in charge of the guard detail and the senior Dutch in-
terpreter in Malay. Special attention was to be paid that neither Dipanagara 
nor his followers struck up relations with the local Indonesian soldiers, serv-
ants, other exiles and members of the chain gangs working inside the fort. 
Garrison personnel were also to be discouraged from spreading any gossip 
about Dipanagara’s presence in their midst. In the event of war in Europe 
and the threat of a naval landing, the governor of Makassar could consider 
moving Dipanagara immediately into the interior to a place such as Maros, 
or further along the coast to Bonthain or Bulukumba by Bugis prau (schooner) 
under the guard of an officer. Finally, the Makassar harbourmaster was to 
ensure that all private correspondence being sent out from the port was to be 
addressed to the governor-general ad interim, J.C. Baud,247 so that it could 
be opened and inspected in the Algemene Secretarie (General Secretariat) in 
Batavia before being passed on to the addressees. At the same time, skippers 
245 AN,	Geheim	Besluit	van	den	Gouverneur­Generaal,	15­7­1837	no.	57,	written	advice	of	J.I.	
van Sevenhoven, 16-12-1836.
246	 These	officers’	quarters	had	been	created	on	Daendels’	orders	 in	1809	 from	 the	previous	
houses of the chief administrator (hoofdadministrateur), preacher (predikant) and storeman (win-
kelier), so that the whole military garrison could be housed inside the fort, KITLV H 817, A.J.A.F. 
Eerdmans, ‘Algemeene geschiedenis van Celebes’, volume I, part 2:355-6, referring to Daendels’ 
report of 23-8-1809 to the Minister of Colonies (The Hague). I am grateful to Professor C. Camp-
bell Macknight for this information, personal communication, Leiden, 10-12-1975. The reference 
to	 the	 particular	 officer’s	 billet	 no.	 6,	 occupied	 by	Dipanagara,	 having	 been	 the	 home	 of	 two	
lieutenants, is in AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (Pieter Merkus) in rade, 
10-5-1841 no. 3, R. de Bousquet (Makassar) to Governor-General ad interim (Batavia/Bogor), 14-
12-1840.
247 Baud served as ad interim governor-general from 10-1-1833 to 31-1-1834, while Van den 
Bosch carried out his duties as commissioner-general, see Appendix IX note 6. 
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of Bugis prau and other local vessels were to be warned to take no parcels or 
letters to Java.248
Just how easy it proved for Dipanagara and his followers to breach these 
seemingly comprehensive restrictions on their freedom can be seen in the 
aforementioned episode of the prince’s correspondence with the recently pro-
moted Major-General J.B. Cleerens, who had negotiated the 16 February 1830 
Rèmakamal meeting. Not only was Dipanagara informed of the Flemish of-
ficer’s return to Java within weeks of his arrival in Batavia on 13 October 1835, 
but he was also able to dictate a formal letter to him complete with yellow 
silk cover and seal, which he succeeded in delivering to Java by clandestine 
means (Appendix XIII part B). So much for Van den Bosch’s elaborate security 
instructions. How could it be otherwise? Dipanagara’s family and extensive 
following could hardly be insulated from contacts with the rest of Indonesian 
society in Fort Rotterdam. Although the prince himself was accommodated 
with his wife and son in the two-room former officers’ residence right by the 
main guardhouse, his followers lived in the servants’ quarters in an adjacent 
part of the fort where they could mix freely with the locally born civilian and 
military members of the garrison. There would thus have been plenty of op-
portunity to smuggle news in and outside the prince’s fortress prison. Besides, 
Makassar was not Manado. Unlike Christian Minahasa – the so-called ‘thir-
teenth province of Holland’249 where a majority Christian population tend-
ed to be hostile towards pious inner island Muslim exiles like Dipanagara 
and Tuanku Imam Bonjol – neither the Makassarese nor the Bugis had any 
love for the Dutch. The prince’s devotion to Islam, albeit one coloured by his 
Javanese beliefs, would also have commanded their respect. And the feeling 
was mutual. In April 1844, after Dutch de facto recognition of Belgian inde-
pendence in 1840 had removed any lingering threat of Holland’s involvement 
in a European war, the governor of Makassar had asked Dipanagara wheth-
er he might like to be transferred to another part of the Netherlands Indies 
where there would be less restrictions on his freedom and more living space 
for his growing family. No, answered the prince, he wished to spend the rest 
of his days in Makassar, a decision reinforced five years later by his request to 
be buried in the South Sulawesi capital close to the grave of his second son250 
248 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C.Baud), 11-3-1833, geheim, La A.
249 Holland traditionally had seven provinces to which four ‘Generaliteitslanden’ (Generality 
lands; Limburg, Vlaanderen, Brabant and Gelre [Venlo]) had been added between the treaties 
of Westphalia in 1648 and Utrecht in 1713, thus making eleven ‘provinces’. The Christianised 
regions	of	Ambon	and	Minahasa	 (Manado)	were	sometimes	referred	 to	 in	 jest	as	 the	 ‘twelfth’	
and ‘thirteenth’ provinces of Holland given their staunchly pro-Dutch stance during the colonial 
period (1602-1942). 
250 This was Radèn Mas Sarkuma (born July 1834), who had died prematurely aged 13 in March 
1849 (Appendix IV), and had been buried in the Kampung Melayu (Malay quarter) of Makassar 
where Dipanagara’s grave would also be situated. 
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rather than have his mortal remains transferred back to Java for interment in 
the royal graveyard at Imagiri close to the grave of his beloved wife Radèn 
Ayu Maduretna (Ratu Kedhaton) (?1798-1828).251 Is it any wonder then that 
despite his incarceration in Fort Rotterdam, Dipanagara had the means of 
communicating secretly with Java, in particular through correspondence tak-
en by skippers of Indonesian trading ships?
Even after most of his followers had been separated from him in June 
1839, leaving just one Javanese woman to do the heavy household chores 
and three Javanese intimate retainers (panakawan) to look after his children,252 
news of Dipanagara’s situation continued to reach the outside world. Just 
before the outbreak of the February 1848 Revolution in Paris, for example, an 
article appeared in the French press fiercely critical of the way in which the 
prince was being treated in exile. It spoke of him being held ‘in the Moluccas 
[Maluku]’ (Carey 1982:3):
enclosed between the four walls in a little fort, separated from his family, closely 
watched, denied the means of writing either to the governor-general or to whoever 
else, treated over the past eighteen years with a harshness and a cruel severity little 
worthy of the government of this country [the Netherlands].
The question of how such news about Dipanagara got out is an intriguing 
one. After the clampdown which followed his communication with Cleerens 
in December 1835, the restrictions placed on the former Java War leader 
and those serving in his household were so severe that the Dutch authori-
ties could persuade no Makassarese or Bugis to take employment with him. 
And this despite the fact that the governor very much wanted a trusted local 
to work with the prince so that he could report on his movements. Those 
Javanese who remained with Dipanagara were now no longer allowed to 
251 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 21-6-1844 no. 16, P.J.B. de Perez (Gov-
ernor of Moluccas) (Makassar) to Pieter Merkus (Batavia/Bogor), 9-4-1844; AN, Geheim Besluit 
van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, P.J.B. de Perez (Makassar) to J.J. Rochus-
sen (Batavia/Bogor), 20-3-1849 (on Dipanagara’s decision to be buried in Makassar rather than at 
Imagiri as he had originally intended when he was exiled in 1830).
252 These were Gunadanti (alias Trunadanti), who served as Dipanagara’s principal domestic 
helper, Dipanagara’s panakawan, Sahiman (alias Rujakbeling) and Kasimun (alias Wangsadikrama/
Sadikrama),	the	latter’s	wife,	Sarinah,	and	Teplak	(alias	Fikpak,	alias	Rujakgadhung),	who	was	
originally described as a ‘man servant’ but seems to have become more like a panakawan	after	the	
transfer of the bulk of Dipanagara’s other followers to Tondano via Ambon in June 1839, NA, 
Ministerie van Koloniën 4502, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 16-9-1837, citing 
the	secret	letter	of	Governor	of	Makassar,	R.	de	Bousquet,	10­7­1837	no.	La A; AN, Besluit van den 
Gouverneur­Generaal	in	rade,	19­5­1850	no.	8,	enclosing	‘Nominatieve	Lijst	van	den	staatsgevan-
gene Pangerang Diepo Negoro en famille [sic] benevens volgelingen en bedienden’, Makassar, 
7-11-1849, which refers to Rujakgadhung as a ‘follower’ (volgeling) rather than a ‘servant’ (bedien-
der). See further Appendix XII nos. 7, 12-13 and 18. By the time this register was drawn up in late 
1849, Dipanagara is listed as having two additional male servants (Godek and Dalima), in addi-
tion to seven women (three of whom were the wives of his panakawan) and four children born to 
members of his household.
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marry Makassarese or Bugis but had to choose their partners from amongst 
the Javanese community in the local Kampung Jawa (Javanese quarter) or 
the families of Javanese soldiers serving in the garrison. Even then their par-
ents-in-law were to be informed that they would be placed under surveil-
lance and no longer permitted to mix freely with the locals.253 Yet, still news 
of Dipanagara’s situation leaked out. How could this have happened? The 
Indonesian crew of the schooner Circe, which had transported Dipanagara 
from Manado in mid-1833, may well have talked with their families and 
friends in Java. We also know that Dipanagara continued to write to his rela-
tives. In late 1839, for example, he attempted to send a letter through to his 
mother, Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati, in Yogyakarta which the Dutch authori-
ties refused to pass on because he insisted on styling himself with his old 
Java War titles.254 The decision to open Makassar as a free port in 1848 in or-
der to help the Dutch withstand the increased commercial competition from 
Singapore (Van Marle 1971:37) led to many more Indonesian and Arab ves-
sels visiting the South Sulawesi harbour town. This in turn opened up new 
opportunities for contact with the outside world.255 It is possible that through 
such informal channels, the Semarang-based family of the Javanese painter, 
Radèn Salèh Syarif Bustaman, which had close contacts with the Yogyakarta 
court,256 were informed of Dipanagara’s plight. Indeed, the present author 
has even suggested that Salèh himself was the source of the report which ap-
peared in the French press given that he visited Paris frequently in the late 
1840s and made a number of lengthy stays in the French capital in order to 
work with leading French artists (Carey 1982:3-4; Scalliet 2005:253).
The Dutch authorities certainly took the report seriously. Baud, who was 
then serving as minister of the Colonies (in office 1840-1848), reported to King 
William II that he had ordered the Dutch ambassador in Paris to refute stren-
uously the charges in the French press (Carey 1982:4). The points which Baud 
insisted the Dutch representative make in the correspondence column of the 
253 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 21-6-1844 no. 16, P.J.B. de Perez (Makas-
sar) to Pieter Merkus (Batavia/Bogor), 9-4-1844.
254 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-1-1840 La B.
255 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, P.J.B. de Perez 
(Surabaya) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 20-3-1849, stating that now that Makassar was a free 
port Dipanagara would have greater ease in escaping by using one of the numerous ‘native boats 
which constantly crowded Makassar harbour’. But in the governor’s view, Dipanagara showed 
no signs of wanting to escape and start new political disturbances in Java. In 1846, two years’ 
before Makassar’s opening as a free port, the governor had taken the precaution of reissuing the 
rules	relating	the	settlement	of	foreigners	in	Makassar	which	required	them	to	ask	his	permission	
first,	Staatsblad van Nederlandsch Indië 54, 12-10-1849, referring to regulation 9-9-1846 no. 7 of the 
governor of Celebes en Onderhoorigheden.
256 Salèh’s second wife, Radèn Ayu Danudireja, was a daughter of Dipanagara’s former junior 
army commander (amad dullah) in Bagelèn, Mas Kertawangsa Kalapa-aking, Carey 1982:5 note 
22. 
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French newspaper in question are revealing both of aspects of the prince’s life 
in Makassar and the self-perception of the Dutch government.257 The prince, 
Baud stressed, was not being held in Maluku, still less in a small fort but 
in the ‘spacious surroundings’ of Fort Rotterdam where he occupied one of 
the officer’s quarters. Far from being deprived of his family, he had his wife 
and seven children born to him in exile around him, one of whom was now 
of marriageable age. Indeed, so extensive had Dipanagara’s family become 
that an adjacent officer’s dwelling had had to be converted for his use.258 
Although he was not allowed to write letters in view of his status as a state 
prisoner (staatsgevangene), he could write for his own amusement and had 
with him books and Javanese manuscripts copied for him at government ex-
pense in Surakarta for the education of his children.259 Governor of Makassar 
(post-1847, Celebes) Petrus Johannes Baptiste de Perez (1803-1859; in office 
1840-1848), whose official residence was situated inside Fort Rotterdam, also 
spoke frequently with him about his needs and requirements. In short, ac-
cording to Baud, Dipanagara was being treated in the same humanitarian 
fashion which Governor-General Van den Bosch had originally envisaged 
when he signed the orders relating to the prince’s exile on 30 April 1830.260 
As Baud indicated, one of the key features of Dipanagara’s life in his lat-
ter years in Fort Rotterdam was the attention he paid to his family, in par-
ticular his children. In January 1844, he asked the governor for a number 
of Javanese texts which he wanted to have to hand for the education of his 
five sons, three of whom were reaching puberty. This was the age when as 
young male Javanese they might have contemplated setting off for further 
study in various local pesantrèn as most of the prince’s sons by his previous 
wives had done during his years at Tegalreja.261 It is significant that at least 
two of the texts which the prince requested at this time, the Serat Ménak and 
the Asmara Supi, a romance related to the Ménak cycle, had strongly Islamic 
themes, dealing as they did with the life of The Prophet, the exploits of his 
257 NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 4340, GKA, 24-1-1848 geheim, J.C. Baud (The Hague) to King 
William II (The Hague), 24-1-1848.
258 This occurred in April 1844 when one upstairs and one downstairs room of the adjacent 
officers’	billet	no.	7	was	made	available	to	Dipanagara	and	his	family	through	knocking	down	the	
partition wall at the cost of f 1,062, the bulk of it (f	877)	for	the	renovation	of	alternative	officer’s	
accommodation for the displaced artillery lieutenant, AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in 
rade, 21-6-1844 no. 16, P.J.B. de Perez (Makassar) to Pieter Merkus (Batavia/Bogor), 9-4-1844; Major 
J.W.D. Kobold (garrison commander, Makassar) to P.J.B. de Perez (Makassar), n.d. See Map 7.
259 These texts, which were apparently copied for Dipanagara in the Surakarta kraton library, 
are discussed in Chapter III and Chapter III note 34. See further Carey 1981a:lxiii note 112.
260 NA, Ministerie van Koloniën, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 30-4-1830 
no. 1, Johannes van den Bosch, ‘Instructions for the Resident of Manado’, paragraph 7, ‘Dipana-
gara is to be treated in a friendly way by the Resident in accordance with his high birth and 
rank’.
261 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 25-10-1844 no. 6, P.J.B. de Perez 
(Makassar) to Pieter Merkus (Batavia/Bogor), 29-1-1844.
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uncle, Amir Hamza, and of the latter’s fictive descendant, Asmara Supi.262 
These were the type of texts often studied in religious boarding schools in 
Java at this time. There is a note in Low Javanese in the dispatch sent by the 
governor – seemingly in Dipanagara’s own rather untidy hand – which gives 
very specific instructions regarding the passages which the prince wished to 
have copied. For the Ménak, these were to include The Prophet’s life up to his 
war with Raja Lakad, and for the Asmara Supi, the hero’s exploits up to the 
time of his return to Banjar Alim.263 The prince was also very insistent that all 
the drawings and figures in the originals should be copied into his texts. After 
much delay, the Javanese translator in Surakarta, C.F. Winter Sr (in office 
1820-1859), reported that none of the texts had drawings and the costs would 
come to a hefty f 368, over a month’s wages for a middle-rank Dutch colonial 
officer (chief secretary) at this time (Houben 1994:92). Pleading poverty, the 
government took the decision to drop one of the texts. Their choice fell on 
the Serat Ménak perhaps because its subject matter – The Prophet’s life – was 
too sensitive. After all, why should the government be helping Dipanagara to 
bring up his children as devout Muslims? It would not be until August 1847, 
a few months before Baud wrote to the Dutch ambassador in Paris, that all 
the copies were finished and dispatched to Makassar, a delay of three and a 
half years from the prince’s original request.264
If the government was not prepared to help Dipanagara obtain suitable 
reading material on Islamic themes from libraries in Java, the prince was 
quite able to create his own. ‘Writing for his own amusement’ in Baud’s words 
was a feature of the prince’s life in Makassar just as it had been in Manado. 
A decade before Baud’s letter, the prince had already begun the composition 
of another two substantial manuscripts in pégon, entitled Sejarah Ratu Tanah 
Jawa (‘The history of the kings of Java’) and the Hikayat Tanah Jawa (‘Chronicle 
262 Pigeaud 1967-80, I:132-3, 212-4, 223. The name Asmara Supi is derived from the Arabic sūfī, 
an adept in mysticism.
263 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 25-10-1844 no. 6, P.J.B. de Perez 
(Makassar)	to	Pieter	Merkus	(Batavia/Bogor),	29­1­1844,	containing	a	handwritten	note	in	Java-
nese possibly by Dipanagara, in which he asks for the Surat Ménak laré kang ngantos dumugi Lakad, 
and the Surat Semara Supi ngantos mantuk dhateng Banjar Alim as well as the Surat Gandakusumu 
kang ngantos dumugi Jakaradéya, the Surat Manikmaya, the Surat Purwa kang ngantos dumugi Brong-
tayuda and the Surat Angrèni kang ngantos demugi [sic] Panji Lalèyan.	The	first	text	would	have	dealt	
with The Prophet’s birth (how his mother Aminah conceived him), His shaving (Paras Nabi), and 
His	Ascension	to	Heaven	(Mikrad).	Dipanagara’s	requests	proved	difficult	for	the	Dutch	authori-
ties	in	Surakarta	to	fulfill.	Apart	from	one	text,	the	Serat Manikmaya, all the other texts were hard 
to procur in Surakarta and the assistance of Pakubuwana VII was requested. The copies were 
eventually made in stages under the supervision of the Assistant-Resident of Surakarta between 
15-5-1846 (Serat Manikmaya) until 27-8-1847, when the longest, the Purwa cycle of wayang plays 
up to the great ‘Brothers’ War’ (Bratayuda) was completed. See further Chapter III note 34.
264 The dates of the copies were made by a clerk of the Algemene Secretarie (General Secretariat) 
in	Batavia	onto	the	letter	of	the	Assistant­Resident	of	Surakarta	to	Algemeen	Secretaris	(Batavia),	
10-10-1844, in AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 25-10-1844 no. 6.
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of the Land of Java’), they were written on Netherlands-Indies government 
paper cut into small octavo sized sheets probably for reasons of economy. 
The first bears the date 5 Dulkijah AJ 1765 (AD 24 January 1838) and has 
175 pages. The second is undated and runs to 245 pages.265 Both texts were 
composed during the period when the prince’s freedom had been severely 
restricted following the discovery of his letter to Cleerens. Unlike his babad, 
his two Makassar notebooks are in prose and not tembang (Javanese verse). 
They are written in a curious Javanese style with many Arabic words and 
phrases, a style which recalls the prose form of Dipanagara’s personal letters 
(Appendix XIII) rather than the literary cadences of his babad. 
The first book – the Sejarah Ratu Tanah Jawa – deals with the history of 
Java and Javanese historical legends from Adam to the fall of Majapahit 
in circa 1527 and the coming of Islam. It thus appears as a prelude to the 
historical survey at the beginning of the prince’s babad. But unlike the lat-
ter, which follows a strictly chronological order, the Sejarah is written in 
anecdotal fashion with many digressions on diverse topics such as wayang, 
legendary heroes and holy sites. It is as though the prince was having a se-
ries of conversations with his family and had set down on paper a number 
of lengthy discourses on a variety of subjects for their subsequent instruc-
tion and entertainment. The second book, the Hikayat Tanah Jawa, specifi-
cally states that it was composed by Dipanagara who referred to himself 
by the titles he had adopted during the Java War, Sultan Ngabdulkamid 
Èrucakra Kabirul Mukminin Panatagama Kalifat Rosulullah s.m. ing Tanah 
Jawa (Sultan Ngadulkamid, the Just King, the first among the Believers, cal-
iph of The Prophet of God, may peace be on Him, in the Land of Java). The 
contents deal with the prince’s understanding of Islam, his own religious 
experiences, Sufi prayers used by the Naqs habandīyya	and	Shat t ārīyya	
mystical brotherhoods, whose teachings had influenced him during his 
years at Tegalreja (pp. 111-4), and various meditation techniques most of 
which involved the control of the breath. Diagrams (daérah) for the utter-
ance of Arabic words and breathing exercises during prayer as well as local 
Javanese mystical traditions (ngèlmu) are frequently referred to. Indeed, the 
whole book is rather reminiscent of a Javanese divination manual or prim-
bon (Carey 1981a:xxx-xxxi). These then were the texts which Dipanagara 
composed for the edification of his family in Makassar and which were still 
in the hands of his descendants in Makassar when the present author did 
his fieldwork there in September 1972. 
In April 1844, some three months after Dipanagara’s request for the 
Javanese manuscript copies from Surakarta, the governor of Makassar re-
ported that the prince was preparing for the circumcision ceremony of his 
265 This second notebook seems incomplete and has been heavily damaged by water and ter-
mites.
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eldest son, Radèn Mas Kindar (Ngabdurrahman). At the same time, the three 
intimate retainers (panakawan), who had followed Dipanagara from Java and 
been charged with the care of his male children born in exile (note 252), had 
reached marriageable age. It was this news which persuaded the governor to 
order the enlargement of the prince’s quarters and to look again at the rules 
regarding the marriage of his family and followers. It was also at this point 
that De Perez decided to canvass Dipanagara’s views about whether he might 
like to move to another part of the archipelago where he might face fewer 
restrictions on his living space.266 Dipanagara’s refusal to contemplate such a 
step may have indicated a certain resignation on his part with regard to his 
fate as an exile. Fort Rotterdam was now his home. Indeed, in the last decade 
of his life, the prince was clearly preparing for his own death. In late 1848, he 
asked the governor if he might be allowed to see two of his sons, Pangéran 
Dipakusuma and Radèn Mas Raib, who had been exiled to Ambon in 1840, 
along with their insane sibling, Pangéran Dipaningrat. He also enquired anx-
iously after his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, whose whereabouts as 
an exile in Sumenep were still unknown to him.267 Although the Dutch au-
thorities were now showing the prince greater compassion – for example by 
raising his monthly stipend in view of the increase in the members of his 
household and the quasi-impoverishment of his family268 – there were limits. 
Bringing the former Java War leader together with his sons, who were now 
sharing his fate as exiles in Madura and Ambon, clearly overstepped these. 
Perhaps, they reasoned, it was better that Dipanagara did not learn the full 
scale of the tragedy which had overwhelmed his family following his exile – 
the death of his second youngest son Radèn Mas Jonèd in a brawl with a sol-
dier of the Yogya garrison in 1837 (Hageman 1856:412; Appendix IV note 2), 
266 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 21-6-1844, P.J.B. de Perez (Makassar) to 
Pieter Merkus (Batavia/Bogor), 9-4-1844.
267 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 19-5-1850 no. 8, P.J.B. de Perez (Makas-
sar) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), n.d. (? 11-1848). Dipanagara II had been exiled to Sumenep 
in July 1834 for supposedly gathering a band of followers in Kedhu, shunning contacts with 
Europeans and announcing the immediate return of Dipanagara and Senthot from exile to start 
a new war against the Dutch, Houben 1994:238-9. He was subsequently transferred to Ambon in 
1851, Appendix IV.
268 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 19-5-1850 no. 8, report of Governor of 
Makassar	(?	P.J.B.	de	Perez),	13­10­1849,	on	Dipanagara’s	situation	in	Fort	Rotterdam	as	‘border-
ing on poverty’. The f	4,200	annual	allowance,	which	had	been	fixed	on	16­9­1837,	following	the	
decision to transfer the bulk of Dipanagara’s followers to Tondano, was found to be inadequate 
for the upkeep of Dipanagara’s growing family, and the government decided to raise it to f 6,000, 
the extra costs to be recouped from the Yogya treasury if possible, but failing that – and Hameng-
kubuwana V was pleading poverty – the government itself agreed to pay, Algemene Secretaris 
(Batavia) to Baron A.H.W. de Kock (Yogyakarta), 28-2-1850; Baron A.H.W. de Kock (Yogyakarta) 
to	J.J.	Rochussen	(Batavia/Bogor),	11­3­1850,	stating	that	the	‘finances	of	Hamengkubuwana	V	are	
still	in	a	very	critical	and	confused	state	[…]	Dipanagara’s	allowance	of	f 350 per month is greater 
than many of the princes allowances in Yogyakarta’.
XII Enduring the unendurable 747
the banishment of his other sons, at least one of whom had gone mad, in 1834 
and 1840 (Houben 1994:243), the cavalier treatment of two of his daughters by 
his erstwhile army commander, Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara (Appendix 
IV note 5), the spinsterhood of his other female offspring whom no Yogya 
priyayi (official) would dare to marry, and the transformation of part of his 
erstwhile estate at Tegalreja into grazing land for the Yogya Resident’s horses, 
and a vegetable plot and orchard for his uncle, Mangkubumi (Chapter II note 
56). As late as June 1849, when one might have expected that Dipanagara’s 
name would no longer evoke any terror on the part of the government, one 
of the prince’s brothers, Pangéran Arya Rangga, was sent into exile in Ternate 
for no greater a crime than having contact with ‘priests’, conducting himself 
as a pious Muslim, and referring to his elder sibling as ‘Sultan Èrucakra’ for 
whom he was prepared to sacrifice himself (Houben 1994:243-4). So much for 
Van den Bosch’s promise to look after Dipanagara’s family. As the last ves-
tiges of the Dipanagaran were expunged from the Yogya kraton,269 even the 
princely moniker of the Java War leader seems to have become an anathema 
never to be bestowed again on any post-1830 member of the south central 
Javanese ruling elite (p. 369). 
In these months when Dipanagara was looking to take his leave of his 
children, a letter arrived in Makassar completely out of the blue.270 It was 
from the prince’s aged mother, Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati (Chapter II note 
11), and was included in a package forwarded by the Resident of Semarang. 
Dealing as it did with family affairs, the Dutch authorities in Makassar saw 
no difficulty in handing it over to the prince. Suddenly, in De Perez’s words, 
Dipanagara was put into a state of ‘high excitement’. He immediately asked 
for a special audience with the governor. Stating that he had been much af-
fected by the letter, not least because he thought that his mother was long 
since dead, he intimated that his dearest wish was to live out the rest of his 
days with his parent at his side. How should he go about asking for official 
permission for her to join him in Makassar? De Perez counselled against such 
an official request fearing that if Dipanagara met with a rebuff from the gov-
ernor-general, J.J. Rochussen (in office 1845-1851), it would close the door on 
any further negotiations. Instead, he promised that he would put out feelers 
by unofficial channels and see what could be done. One sticking point, he 
thought might be if Mangkarawati insisted on travelling to Makassar with 
a large entourage. No, stated Dipanagara, that was unnecessary. His mother 
should come over with only a few trusted servants and one intimate retainer 
269	 Even	 the	official	portrait	 of	Dipanagara	 (Plate	 12),	which	 appears	 to	have	been	made	at	
the time of his marriage on 25-7-1807, was removed from the kraton and given to Dipanagara’s 
family, interview with Ibu Dr Sahir (lineal descendant of Pangéran Dipanagara II), Kota Baru, 
Yogyakarta, May 1972.
270 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, P.J.B. de Perez 
(Surabaya) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 20-3-1849. De Perez had moved to Surabaya as Resi-
dent on 8-12-1848, see Klaassen 1979:26.
Plate 81. Dipanagara’s death certificate dated 8 January 1855; AN BGG, 10 May 1855, 
La R geheim. Photograph by courtesy of the Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
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(panakawan), who could then depart once they had carried out their escort du-
ties. In fact, he knew exactly whom that panakawan should be – his erstwhile 
commander Ali Basah Kerta Pengalasan, who had settled in Semarang after 
the war (Hageman 1856:412-3; Carey 1974b:282). 
In early March 1849, some four months after his audience with De Perez in 
early March 1849, tragedy struck when Dipanagara’s second son, the fourteen-
year-old Radèn Mas Sarkuma, died after a short illness. Buried in a small plot 
of government land in the Kampung Melayu (Malay quarter) of Makassar, this 
sudden bereavement set the prince thinking. He asked for a meeting with the 
new governor, De Perez, having departed the previous December for Surabaya 
to fill the post of the recently deceased Pietermaat (note 230). He offered the 
governor a deal. If he was allowed to live the rest of his days in Makassar with 
his mother by his side he would no longer insist on his mortal remains being 
transferred back to Java after his death. Instead, he would be content to be 
buried in Makassar close to the grave of his son. Stating that he was now ad-
vanced in years and did not expect to live much longer, he made a number of 
suggestions with regard to future arrangements for himself and his family. He 
wanted his son’s grave to be encircled by a low stone wall and a burial plot set 
aside for himself immediately adjacent to it. He also asked that the government 
build a house for his wife and family, as well as outhouses for his servants and 
a small mosque for himself in the same area as his son’s gravesite so that he 
could enjoy more freedom in his remaining years. The money he had saved in 
Manado, which he said had amounted to f 120 a month and which had been 
deposited in the government treasury in the Minahasan capital,271 should be 
more than sufficient, in his view, to meet the costs of this construction provided 
the government donated the land. Even if he was not allowed to live outside 
Fort Rotterdam, a residence should still be prepared for his wife and surviving 
family in Makassar so they would have somewhere to live on his demise.
Canny to the last in financial matters, the prince made a persuasive case 
for providing for his family after his death and De Perez promised to convey 
his detailed proposals to the authorities in Batavia. Dipanagara also entrusted 
the governor with a letter and special presents for his mother, including a 
ring with a black gemstone, which he himself had worn, and f 100 in silver 
coin.272 Despite the straitened circumstances in which his family lived in the 
late 1840s, the former Java War leader still apparently had jewelry and cash 
271 On the initial savings made by Dipanagara in Manado before his monthly allowance was 
cut, see above note 212.
272 The other presents included: 1. from Dipanagara: two pieces of white linen to make jackets, 
and a pot of ambergris oil (amberolie); and 2. from Retnaningsih, a jacket, a sarong (bathik wrap-
around) and some parem (dried linament made of ground herbs and water which is prepared by 
immersion in warm water), listed in AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 
11-5-1849 La V, Dipanagara and Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih (Makassar) to Radèn Ayu Mangkara-
wati (Yogyakarta) , 25 Rabingulakir AJ 1777 (AD 20-3-1849).
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Plate 82. Dipanagara’s grave (foreground) and that of his son (Radèn Mas Sarkuma, 
died March 1849) behind the house in the Kampung Melayu, Makassar (present-day 
Jl. Irian no. 83), which was built by the Dutch for his widow after his death on 8 
January 1855. These graves were moved to the main Kampung Melayu burial ground 
in  the late nineteenth century. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
savings to hand. Indeed, there is a reference in one of the governor’s reports 
to the prince having spent another f 100 on gold ornaments, which he had 
made up in April 1849 perhaps in connection with the items sent to his moth-
er.273 In his letter to his parent, he carefully explained the arrangements he 
had proposed for her voyage from Semarang in the company of Pengalasan. 
It would only involve a five-day sea passage, he reassured her, a reference to 
the new steamers which had begun to link Java and the outer islands in the 
1840s and which had cut journey times dramatically, making sea voyages an 
altogether less daunting prospect than the purgatorial sailing odysseys which 
Dipanagara had been forced to endure over a decade and a half earlier.274 In 
273 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 19-5-1850 no. 8, Governor of Celebes 
(Makassar) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 9-11-1849.
274 This requirement to send a steamer to pick Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati up in Semarang 
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Plate 83. The grave of Dipanagara (left) and his last wife, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, 
in the Kampung Melayu public graveyard, Makassar. The graves of Dipanagara’s 
children and other relations are in the foreground. Photograph taken from M.Ch. van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, ‘Het graf van Dipanagara te Makassar’, Tropisch Nederland, 
jg. 1928-29, p. 207.
a heart-rending image of an exile’s unrequited longing, he told her that from 
now on whenever a ship steamed into Makassar harbour, both he and his 
grandchildren would be climbing the stairs to the attic to look out over the 
port to see if she had arrived. Come quickly was the message, but if you can-
not come ‘no matter since we are both friends’.275
Mangkarawati was, however, too old and infirm to contemplate such a 
journey. Although delighted to hear from her son, she told the Yogya Resident, 
Baron A.H.W. de Kock (in office 1848-1851), that she was now ‘nearly 
eighty’276 and suffering from dropsy,277 a condition which would kill her just 
because	a	 long	 sailing	voyage	would	prove	 too	 tiring	 for	her,	 is	 specifically	mentioned	 in	De	
Perez’s advice to the government and it is likely that he had discussed it with Dipanagara, see 
AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 11-5-1849 La V.
275 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, Dipanagara and 
Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih (Makassar) to Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati (Yogyakarta), 25 Rabingulakir 
AJ 1777 (AD 20-3-1849).
276 This refers to her age according to the Christian calendar. At this time she was already 82 in 
Javanese years, see further p. 74.
277	 A	condition	in	which	watery	fluid	gathers	in	the	tissues	and	cavities	of	the	body	making	
movement	painful	and	difficult.
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three years later (Chapter II). Very hard of hearing and almost blind, she was 
totally dependant on her spinster granddaughter, Radèn Ajeng Munthèng 
(Appendix IV), with whom she was then living in Yogyakarta. She thus had 
no energy or capacity to undertake the sea voyage to Makassar. De Kock gave 
her two days to think things over and even summoned six of Dipanagara’s 
brothers – including the soon to be exiled Pangéran Rangga – to put pres-
sure on her, but she was adamant. Instead, she sent her son a letter explain-
ing her aged condition and stating that her dearest wish was they should 
both enjoy prosperity (wilujeng) until they returned together to eternity.278 
In the same dispatch in which De Kock forwarded Mangkarawati’s letter, he 
strongly advised Governor-General Rochussen against allowing Dipanagara 
to reside outside Fort Rotterdam. In his view, the political situation in the 
Yogya kraton was still too delicate, and there were fears that the prince might 
try to escape now that Makassar had become a free port. Developments at the 
sultan’s court (a reference to the knotty issue of finding a suitable successor 
to Hamengkubuwana V),279 the Resident added, should be allowed to run 
their course before any changes were made to the conditions under which 
Dipanagara was being held in Makassar.280 
And so it was decided. The governor-general passed a secret decree on 11 
May 1849 that Dipanagara would spend the rest of his days within the walls 
of Speelman’s great fortress. Apart from the issue of the prince’s finances, a 
subject of obsessive Dutch correspondence, for which a resolution was even-
tually found a year later (19 May 1850) when it was decided to raise his al-
lowance to f 500 a month, there are no further references to the former Java 
War leader in the Dutch records. None that is until the morning of Monday, 
8 January 1855, when the Dutch authorities in Fort Rotterdam were roused 
early from their beds. One of the prince’s followers had appeared at the gov-
ernor’s residence to announce that the prince had died just after sunrise at 
6.30, almost the same time as the moment seventy years earlier when he had 
uttered his first cries after coming into the world before the pre-dawn fasting 
month meal in the women’s quarters of the Yogya kraton (Chapter II). After 
the governor had hurried over to the prince’s quarters to confirm the decease, 
a three-man commission was immediately appointed to authenticate an im-
278 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, Radèn Ayu 
Mangkarawati (Yogyakarta) to Baron A.H.W. de Kock (Yogyakarta), 24 Jumadilawal, AJ 1777 (AD 
18­4­1849).	Mangkarawati’s	letter	only	exists	in	Dutch	translation,	but	the	key	words	one	surmises	
that she might have used would have been slamet or wilujeng ‘safe and sound’ (namely, good 
health, spiritual prosperity and welfare) and ngantos mantuk nèng donya akérat (until we return to 
eternity).
279 For a good discussion of the tensions surrounding the choice of a successor to the near 
impotent Hamengkubuwana V in the period 1847 to 1855, see Houben 1994:199-214. 
280 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 11-5-1849 La V, Baron A.H.W. de Kock 
(Yogyakarta) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 23-4-1849.
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portant document. The death certificate witnessed by the Assistant-Resident 
of Makassar, the military commandant and the chief medical officer to the 
garrison stated the course of death as ‘diminished physical strength (verval 
van krachten) due to advanced years’ (Sagimun 1965:358).
Today, the eighth of January [eighteen] fifty-five, we the undersigned went to 
the room[s] in Fort Rotterdam which serve as the residence of the state prisoner, 
Pangeran Diponegoro [Dipanagara] and his family and following, and found that 
the aforementioned state prisoner had died this morning at half past six o’clock 
and indeed according to the findings of the co-delegated officer of health as a re-
sult of diminished strength due to advanced years.
Thus made in quadruplicate to be used where and when this might be required. 
The delegates,
[signed:]
J.G. Crudelbach (Assistant-Resident and magistrate),
J.T. Lion (infantry major),
F.A.M. Schnetz (health officer first class).
A special burial allowance was immediately made available to the family un-
der the terms of the 19 May 1850 financial arrangements for the prince’s up-
keep and on the same afternoon Dipanagara was laid to rest in the Kampung 
Melayu.281 According to the notice which appeared a month later in the 
Javasche Courant and was subsequently carried in the Dutch national press 
– a modest recognition of the interest taken of the prince’s passing in the co-
lonial metropolis – the burial ceremony had occurred ‘with full Islamic rights 
and	with	respect	for	his	high	birth	[…]	in	accordance	with	the	wishes	of	the	
dead man, he was interred in the Kampong Melayu near the grave of his son 
[Radèn Mas Sarkuma]’.282 
Seven days after Dipanagara’s death, his widow and children had a pre-
arranged meeting with the acting governor, Colonel Alexander van der Hart, 
to discuss their future. According to the governor’s report, they were ‘unani-
mous’ in their wish to remain in Makassar so that they could be near the grave 
of their recently departed father. It was perhaps lucky that were so minded 
for the government soon formed the view that they should under no circum-
stances be permitted to return to Java. Van der Hart, whose description of the 
way in which Dipanagara had brought up his children has already been men-
tioned, feared that the prince’s male offspring, especially his highly capable 
281 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1855 La R, Colonel A. van 
der Hart (Makassar) to A.J. Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 12-1-1855.
282 Javasche Courant 10, 3-2-1855, the notice was carried in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant 
(NRC 92), which had received the news by colonial mail overland from Marseilles, on 2-4-1855.
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eldest son, Radèn Mas Kindar, could become the ‘centres of rebellion’ if they 
were allowed back. Their high noble birth, in Van der Hart’s view, would give 
them great potential influence in Yogya, whereas in South Sulawesi, despite 
their ‘religious connections’, they would be unlikely to exercise much sway 
over the local Makassarese and Bugis population.283 These sentiments were 
echoed by the Yogya Resident, W.C.E. Baron de Geer (in office 1855-1856), 
whose enquiries with Hamengkubuwana V revealed a firm determination 
on the sultan’s part that Dipanagara’s family should never again set foot in 
the Principalities.284 Such arguments won the day with the governor-general, 
Albertus Jacobus Duymaer van Twist (in office 1851-1856), who passed a se-
cret decree in council on 10 May 1855 ordering that Dipanagara’s widow and 
children should continue to be treated as exiles and confined to Sulawesi, but 
that they would be allowed to retain the prince’s former f 6,000 annual stipend 
which would continue to be paid by the Yogya court.285 He also permitted 
them to live freely in Makassar where a residence would be found for them.
Both Van der Hart and his predecessor, De Perez, had advised that the 
government acquire land for Dipanagara’s family. Following his early March 
1849 meeting with Dipanagara, De Perez had suggested that f 10,000 be set 
aside for this purpose,286 whereas Van der Hart had recommended that the 
family be given a sufficiently large plot to plant fruit trees and develop some 
ricefields, arguing that if the prince’s children were able to find useful em-
ployment they would find better ‘direction for their energies’ and perhaps 
make good marriages (whether to local Makassarese or to Javanese domiciled 
in Makassar he did not say) thus dissuading them from involvement in anti-
Dutch activities.287 Subsequently, a sizeable block of land amounting to just 
under a hectare288 was acquired by the government in the area immediately 
adjacent to the graves of Dipanagara and his son. It had sufficient space for 
orchards, a market garden and sawah as well as a modest Dutch colonial style 
house, which stands to this day at no. 83 Jalan Irian. This was very much in 
line with what the prince had asked for at the time of his early March 1849 
283 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1855 La R, Colonel A. van 
der Hart (Makassar) to A.J. Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 30-1-1855.
284 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1855 La R, Hamengkubuwana V 
(Yogyakarta) to W.C.E. Baron de Geer (Yogyakarta), 16 Jumadilakir AJ 1786 (AD 5-3-1855); W.C.E. 
Baron de Geer (Yogyakarta) to Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 12-3-1855. 
285 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1855 La R. The arrange-
ments for the f	6,000	stipend	are	referred	to	in	the	letter	of	the	inspector	of	Finances	(Batavia)	to	
A.J. Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 30-4-1855.
286 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, P.J.B. de Perez 
(Makassar) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 23-1-1849.
287 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1855 La R, Colonel A. van der Hart 
(Makassar) to A.J. Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 30-1-1855.
288 The actual size of the plot acquired by the government was 9,372 square metres, with two 
roads (present-day Jalan Andalas and Jalan Irian) running through it and bounded on the east by 
Jalan Diponegoro.
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audience, and this is where his family and household retainers moved to 
during the course of the year following his death. His descendants continued 
to live there in the early 1970s when the research for the present book was 
undertaken in Makassar (Appendix IV note 10).
After the death of Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih later in the century, Dipanagara’s 
grave and that of his son were moved to the main Kampung Melayu public 
graveyard, which had just been opened on a 52 square metre block of land 
between present-day Jalan Andalas and Jalan Irian a short distance from the 
family house. A private burial ground, demarcated by a low brick wall, was set 
apart in the innermost part of the graveyard for the Dipanagara family (Plate 
83) and two imposing white stuccoed tombs were erected for the prince and 
his consort (Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1928:208). Known locally as the ‘grave 
of the sultan of Java’ (kuburan sultan Jawa), the area around the twin tombs 
would become the final resting place for most of the prince’s Makassar-born 
descendants. The street adjacent to his grave would subsequently be given his 
name at the instigation of local supporters of the Indonesian nationalist cause 
(Kalff 1927-28:523). However, although Dipanagara’s memory was revered 
in Makassar and more widely in Indonesia, especially by nationalist youth 
groups of the inter-war years such as Jong Celebes (‘Young Celebes’) and Jong 
Java (‘Young Java’), as well as by the recently established Partai Kommunis 
Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party), which had portraits of Dipanagara 
displayed at its 1921 Party Congress in Semarang and in its Madiun office 
(Ricklefs 2007:233), his family seems to have found the upkeep of the site 
beyond their very limited means. During the course of the century following 
Dipanagara’s death, most of the orchards and ricefields were sold to provide 
cash for the family. A report from the late 1920s speaks of the grave site as a 
collection of ‘dirty moss-covered stones, a broken down limestone-leached 
little wall and the rotting remains of vegetation’ (Kalff 1927-28:523). It would, 
however, eventually become a place of national reverence after the prince 
was recognized as a pahlawan nasional (national hero) by the newly independ-
ent Republic of Indonesia in the early 1950s. In January 1955, for example, 
the hundredth anniversary of the prince’s death was celebrated at the now 
restored grave site with considerable ceremony (Sagimun 1965:455). So the 
wheel of history turned full circle. The much feared exile of Fort Rotterdam 
had become the hero par excellence of the modern Indonesian state. This pious 
and complex man, whom the Parangkusuma prophecy would warn would 
only be ‘counted amongst the ancestors’ for a brief moment, was now vested 
with immortality in the national pantheon of a country he had never dreamt 
of in his lifetime. Historical transformations rarely come stranger than this. 
Meanwhile, both Makassar governors under whom Dipanagara was incarcer-
ated would meet untimely deaths.289
289 Klaassen 1979:26 (on the death at sea of De Perez on 18-3-1859 during the Second Boné Expe-
dition); and Kielstra 1911:1030 (on the murder of Van der Hart by one of his servants in May 1855).
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Conclusion
It is a truism that men and women are shaped by the age in which they live. 
Dipanagara was no exception. Nine years before the prince’s birth, Thomas 
Paine had written that ‘these are the times that try men’s souls’, a reference 
to the troubled onset of the American Revolution. Such ‘interesting times’, as 
the Chinese adage has it, certainly characterised the epoch Dipanagara lived 
through half a world away in Java. Born into the seemingly immutable ‘old 
order’ of the late eighteenth-century Principalities, he died in the high colo-
nial era of Governor-General Duymaer van Twist, an era when steamboats 
had begun to ply the inter-island sea routes and the new commercial sys-
tem of free ports had replaced the closed monopoly of the Dutch East Indies 
Company. The Agrarian Law (1870), which would open the Indies up to mas-
sive private investment, was only a decade and a half away. This was the 
age when the Dutch were reaping unimaginable wealth from the Cultivation 
System at the expense of Javanese peasant cultivators who in certain areas, 
such as Grobogan and Demak, were experiencing terrible famines (1849-1850) 
and typhoid epidemics (1846-1850; Elson 1994:99-127), an age when, as Radèn 
Salèh, laconically put it, the only conversation amongst colonial Indies society 
was café et sucre, sucre et café (‘coffee and sugar, sugar and coffee’).290 These 
were the years which Multatuli would later give voice to in his Max Havelaar 
of de Koffij-veilingen der Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (‘Max Havelaar or 
the coffee auctions of the Dutch Trading Company’) (1860) in the figure of 
Droogstoppel (‘Dry Stubble’), the brass-is-brass Amsterdam coffee broker 
who knew the price of everything and the value of nothing (Nieuwenhuys 
1973:149-50). 
What price then for a mystic prince in such a universe? Not much for the 
Dutch judging from the rather brief paragraph published in their colonial and 
national newspapers at the time of his death, but what about the Javanese? 
What did Dipanagara mean for them? It is clear that he was a pivotal figure 
in the history of modern Java, his death occurring at almost the exact mid-
point between the treaty of Giyanti (1755) and the declaration of Indonesian 
independence (1945), but how much of this was due to his own innate quali-
ties and how much to the times in which he lived? Just imagine for a moment 
that he had been born a hundred years earlier in 1685 or a century afterwards 
in 1885. The first would have placed him full square in the turbulent dec-
ades of the Kartasura period (1680-1742) which, if he had survived and not 
suffered the fate of his namesake, the first Pangéran Dipanagara (exiled to 
Cape Colony in 1723 following an abortive rebellion, see Chapter IX), might 
290 D’Almeida 1864, II:292. The full quote reads: Café et sucre, sucre et café, c’est tout-ce qu’on parle 
ici. C’est vraiment un air triste pour une artiste.	‘Coffee	and	sugar,	sugar	and	coffee,	this	is	all	that	
people talk about here. It is really a sad atmosphere for an artist’.
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have seen him emerge as one of the luminaries of Pakubuwana II’s (reigned 
1726-1749) court with an interest in the type of Sufi-inspired Javanese-Islamic 
literature favoured by the circle around the queen mother, Ratu Pakubuwana 
(died 1732; Ricklefs 1998:39-91, 106-26, 254-60, 253-309). But would he have 
been cast in heroic mould of a Ratu Adil or Just King leading a popular upris-
ing against the colonial power? Hardly. The second would have situated him 
at the heart of the founder generation of the Indonesian ‘national movement’ 
with the likes of Dr Tjipto Mangunkusumo (1885-1943), Radèn Mas Soetomo 
(1888-1938), and Radèn Mas Suwardi Suryaningrat alias Ki Hadjar Dewantara 
(1889-1959) as his direct or near contemporaries. Given Dipanagara’s personal 
abilities, his deep root of faith, administrative and financial acumen, as well 
as his interest in the modern world – witness his fascination with the navi-
gational instruments on the corvette Pollux – it is likely that he would have 
made his mark in some capacity on modern Indonesia: a republican prince 
perhaps? But it is unclear whether he would have emerged as quite the cru-
cial figure which he became at the time of the Java War. 
The unusual epoch in which Dipanagara lived is thus vital for an under-
standing of his life. His experience underscores the truth of Karl Popper’s 
dictum that history is the struggle of men and ideas, not just of the material 
conditions of their existence. Had it not been for the peremptory violence 
visited on the south-central Javanese courts by Daendels and Raffles in the 
four short years between 1808 and 1812, violence which tore the heart out 
of the Yogya kraton, one can imagine Dipanagara living in relative obscurity 
at Tegalreja, attending to his religious duties and dying in mid-century as a 
quirky santri prince, scourge of the Yogya aristocracy and the kafir (heretic) 
Dutch. Despite his evident abilities – witness the brief reference to these in 
Panular’s ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ (Chapter VIII) – the fact that he 
rates not a single reference in the British reports (1811-1816), a period when 
he was supposedly functioning as a key adviser to his father, the third sultan, 
and mentor to his younger brother, the fourth sultan, indicates that he was 
not quite the prominent figure in the political life of the sultanate he sought 
to portray in his babad (Chapter VIII). Nahuys van Burgst probably had his 
measure better when he described Dipanagara and his uncle, Mangkubumi, 
before the Java War as men who ‘stood quite neutral and were universally 
considered as good quiet persons without the least ambition’ (Chapter X). 
The agrarian crisis of 1823-1825 and the ineptitude of the Dutch representa-
tives in Yogyakarta in the two years leading up to the Java War were the 
twin catalysts for the prince’s emergence as a major political figure, much 
as Governor-General Van Imhoff (in office 1741-1750) and the issue of the 
leasing of Mataram’s coastal dependencies had been at the time of Sultan 
Mangkubumi’s rebellion in 1746 (Ricklefs 1974a:40-3). Once cast in a leader-
ship role, however, Dipanagara brought to his task a competence and ap-
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peal greater even than that of his revered great-grandfather, Mangkubumi. 
A devout Muslim, who believed himself part of the international community 
of Believers, he was what Ricklefs has described as the personification of the 
‘mystic synthesis’ in Java (Ricklefs 2007:8) – a Javanese Muslim who saw no 
problem with contacting the goddess of the Southern Ocean, undertaking 
pilgrimages to holy sites associated with Java’s spirit guardians and rulers, 
and drinking bottles of ‘medicinal’ sweet Cape wine, while maintaining a 
staunch commitment to his Islamic duties. Part of the ‘long shadow of Sultan 
Agung’,291 Dipanagara fought both for the restoration of an idealized Javanese 
past, and the establishment of a new moral order in which the teachings of 
Islam, especially its legal codes, would be enforced. This was the essence of 
his popular appeal for the religious communities and his importance for the 
future, where his particular form of ‘mystic synthesis’ would form one of the 
key strands of Islamic piety in post-1830 Javanese society (Ricklefs 2007:30-83). 
His insistence on Javanese cultural norms in language, dress and etiquette 
also cast him in the role of a proto Javanese nationalist. Here was a man who, 
in Nicolaus Engelhard’s words (p. 510), was ‘in all matters a Javanese and 
followed Javanese custom’. But one cannot pursue this too far. There is no 
indication that he entertained any notions of national independence in the 
modern sense, not even for his native Java. Indeed, it would be nearly an-
other century after the Java War before such ideas gained universal currency 
amongst the Indonesian nationalist elite. The most Dipanagara could con-
ceive was a return to the seventeenth-century status quo. From the evidence 
of Hasan Munadi and Ali Basah Pengalasan, he had in mind the era when the 
Dutch had been confined to the northeast coast of Java as traders and were 
not involved politically in the affairs of the south-central Javanese courts. He 
even talked, Munadi suggested, of allocating the Dutch two north coast cities 
– Batavia and Semarang – where they would be allowed to reside and pursue 
their commercial interests unhindered, just so long as these did not exploit 
the local population (Dipanagara’s insistence on market prices being paid for 
Javanese products and land lease contracts was prescient considering what 
would happen under Van den Bosch’s Cultivation System). This harked back 
to the situation which existed during Sultan Agung’s reign (1613-1646) before 
the political disasters of his successor, Amangkurat I (reigned 1646-1677), had 
opened a high road to Dutch intervention in the Javanese hinterland.
That this was an impossible dream is self-evident. Despite the insecurities 
of Holland’s transition from patrician republic to nation state between 1785 
and 1813 – precisely the period of Dipanagara’s youth and early manhood 
– there was no possibility of a Dutch retreat to the status quo of the early 
Company era. Daendels’ mailed fist and the insufferable arrogance of the 
English were proof enough that a new form of European power was now 
291 Merle C. Ricklefs, ‘Islamising Java; The long shadow of Sultan Agung’, Archipel 56:469-82.
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being applied to colonial affairs. The European Prometheus had been un-
bound. Despite the 1815 mutiny, sepoy bayonets continued to sustain Raffles’ 
ramshackle regime (1811-1816), and even when the inexperienced post-1816 
returned Dutch administration came close to disaster first by exacerbating 
the agrarian crisis which precipitated the Java War and then by wasting two 
years (1825-1827) before the tide of battle could be turned, the possibility of 
a Dutch exit from Java was never an option.292 The importance of Java for 
the post-1830 Dutch economy would be argument enough for this – witness 
the plans by Palmer & Company of Calcutta, the Dutch colonial state’s main 
creditor bank, to send sepoys to Java in May 1826 to help turn the tide of bat-
tle and ensure the security of their six million Sicca rupee loan (p. 428). Yet 
Dutch insecurities remained. The successful Belgian revolt of 1830 intensified 
them, temporarily threatening the Netherlands with French invasion and a 
new European war. For Dipanagara this would mean summary arrest and 
exile, an exile in which Dutch fears dictated an increasingly restrictive regime 
which for the last twenty-two years kept him and his family prisoners in 
Fort Rotterdam. Dipanagara’s pitiful death in Makassar points to the human 
tragedy at the heart of this tale. The waste of a life, the suffering of a family, 
the ruin of a society. The policies imposed by Van den Bosch may have been 
the saving of the Dutch state, but they spelt disaster for the Javanese. After 
1830 a new world had been born. It was a turning point as significant as any 
in colonial history. But it would exact a terrible cost.
292 Although it is clear that Dipanagara had no chance of winning the war, the teaching materi-
als	currently	provided	at	the	Dutch	Royal	Military	Academy	(Koninklijke	Militaire	Akademie)	at	
Breda indicate that Dutch army historians are still exaggerating the military threat posed by the 
prince in order to pretend that Holland had conquered a truly formidable enemy in 1825-30, see 
http://www.nimh.nl/nl/geschiedenis/tijdbalk/1814_1914_nederlands_indie.
I am grateful to Amrit Gomperts for this reference.
Ratu Kadipatèn (c. 1734 – 17-10-1803) (sister of R. Rongga Prawiradirja I, 
bupati wedana of Madiun, c. 1760-1784; post-2-4-1792, Ratu Ageng (Tegalreja), 
emban of Pangéran Dipanagara from 1793 to 1803)
(1) x Sultan Hamengkubuwana I (born c. 4-8-1717, r. 1749-1792)
Ratu Kedhaton (died 14-7-1820) (daughter of Kyai T. Purwadiningrat, 
bupati of Magetan, of Madurese descent from Pangéran 
Cakraningrat II séda Kamal, died 1707)
Sultan Hamengkubuwana II 
(born 7-3-1750, r. 1792-1810, 1811-1812, 
1826-1828)
(1) x
Ratu Bendara x Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat 
(army commander of Hamengkubuwana II, killed 




Pangéran Mangkubumi (later 
Panembahan Mangkurat, 





Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati 
(c. 1770-1852) (descendant of 










Pangéran Dipanagara (born Yogya, 11-11-1785- died in 
exile, Makasar, 8-1-1855) (Sultan Ngabdulkamit Èrucakra, 
leader of the Java War 1825-1830) 
Ratu Mas (later Ratu Kulon) died 1824 (daughter 
of Pangéran  Pakuningrat and Ratu Alit, d. of 
Pakabuwana II of Kartasura/Surakarta, r. 1726-1749)
(2) x Hamengkubuwana II
Pangéran Mangkudiningrat I (exiled 3-7-1812 to Pulau 
Pinang; then Ambon 10-1-1817, took name Radèn Panji 
Angon Asmara, dhukun/herbalist, died 13-3-1824)
(1) x
daughter of 
Radèn Ayu Sérang 
(c. 1769-1855)
Hamengku-
buwana III (2) x
Ratu Kencana (later Ratu Ibu) (daughter of R.T. Sasra-
diningrat I, bupati of Jipang-Rajegwesi, and Radèn Ayu 
Sasradiningrat, d. of Hamengkubuwana I, died 20-6-1826) 
Radèn T. Mangkudirja 
(Pangéran Natapraja also 







 (daughter of Hamengkubuwana III 
by a selir, divorced 1817)
x 
Radèn Tumenggung Mangkuwijaya (post-
1829, Pangéran Adipati Mangkudiningrat II, 






Ratu Mas (daughter of Radèn Rongga 
Prawiradirja I of Madiun; 
post-11-1814, Ratu Kulon) 
Ratu Kencana Wulan (c. 1780-1858) 
(earlier R.A. Sri Wulan, daughter of Kyai Bener 









Ratu Wandhan (daughter of Radèn Tumenggung Yudakusuma II 
of  Grobogan-Wirasari, c. 1790-1812, and Radèn Ayu Yudakusuma, daughter 
of Hamengkubuwana I), divorced during Hamengkubuwana III’s reign
APPENDIX I
Family tree of the Yogyakarta sultanate*
*  Details taken from Dwidjosoegondo and Adisoetrisno, 1941:97-105; Mandoyokusumo 1977:1-330.
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Sultan Hamengkubuwana I 
(born c. 4-8-1717, r. 1749-1792) x (2) 
Bendara Radèn Ayu Srenggara 
(Kedhu dynasty) 
 Radèn Ayu 
Danukusuma I 




Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja II 





Radèn Adipati Danureja II 
(patih of Yogya, 1799-1811; 
strangled 28-10-1811)
x 
Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III
(bupati wedana of Madiun, 1796-1810, killed in revolt, 
17-12-1810)
Radèn  Rongga Prawiradiningrat 
(bupati wedana of Madiun, 
1822-1859; post-1830, Pangéran 
Adipati Prawiradiningrat)
Radèn Ayu Natakusuma (daughter of
Kyai T. Purwadiningrat, sister of Ratu 
Kedhaton), post-1812, Ratu Pakualam
Pangéran Natakusuma (born 21-3-1764, 
appointed Pakualam I, 22-6-1812, 
by the British, r. 1812-1829)
x 
Ratu Anom (born c. 1793-died 14-9-1859;
 post-1-1811, Ratu Ayu; post-1-1830, 
Ratu Pakualam) 
x Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat 
(born 25-6-1786, r. as Pakualam II, 1829-1858)
Pangéran Suryasasraningrat
 (born c. 1827, r. as Pakualam III, 1858-1864)
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Ratu Kadipatèn 
(Ratu Ageng Tegalreja) (1) x
Sultan Hamengkubuwana I 
(1749-1792) Bendara Radèn Ayu Srenggarax (2) 
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Hamengku-
buwana II x Ratu Kedhaton
Bendara Radèn Ayu 
Danukusuma
R.T. Danukusuma I 
(strangled mid-January 1812)x 
Hamengku-
buwana III Ratu Anggèr x







(later P. Suryabrangta) x
      Radèn Ajeng Supadmi (post-1807, Radèn Ayu 
Retnakusuma, daughter of bupati of Panolan, 
Natawijaya III, in office 1803-1811)









(2) xMas Ayu Pulangyun







Basah Gandakusuma (earlier Lurah 
Sukapja) later Radèn Adipati 
Danureja V, patih of Yogya, 1847-1879
Radèn Ayu Sayinah 









Radèn Ayu Danureja 
(daughter of R.T. Mertawijaya
by an earlier marriage)




(patih of Yogya, 1755-1799;
brother-in-law of Hamengkubuwana I)
R. Ng. Tirtadiwirya later 
R.T. Danunagara, kliwon of 
Kyai Adipati Danureja III
x daughter of Hamengkubuwana I
Radèn Ria Mandura (later Kyai Tumenggung 
Sindunagara I, appointed Danureja III, acting patih 
1811-1813; retired as Kyai Adipati Purwa)
R.T. Mertawijaya (later R.T.  Danukusuma II, Basah of Rèma 
and patih of Dipanagara (1828-1830); who took the title 
R. Adipati Abdullah Danureja; later R.T. Danuningrat)
(2) x













Tuwan Sarip Ahmad (Sayyid 





(widow of Danureja II) daughter x 
Kyai Ng. Danukrama, patih of Danureja II 
(1806-1811) later Radèn Tumenggung Danuningrat
bupati of Kedhu (1813-1825), killed by Dipanagara’s 
forces, 30-9-1825. Also known as Sayyid Alwi.
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Kyai Rongga Wirasentika (Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja I) 
army commander of Hamengkubuwana I and bupati wedana 







Radèn Ayu Rongga Jamus Radèn Ayu Kreja
Radèn Rongga Mangundirja**
(Prawiradirja II), bupati wedana
(with intermissions) 1784-1796 (went blind)
Radèn Rongga Prawirasentika 
acting bupati wedana 1811-1826
(dismissed for corruption)
Pangéran Dipasana 
(exiled to Ambon after 
revolt in Feb. 1822)
x daughter of Hamengkubuwana I







Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III, 
bupati wedana of Madiun
1796-1810, killed in revolt 17-12-1810




Ratu Maduretna (daughter of
Hamengkubuwana II) died 
16-11-1809, buried at Giripurna 
(Gunung Bancak)
x 
Pangéran Dipakusuma (c. 1760-1822, born
in exile in Ceylon, grandson of Amangkurat 
III, acting bupati wedana, 1811-1822)
x 
Kyai Banjarsari, pradikan 





Radèn T. Natadirja (Ali Basah Iman 
Muhamad Ngabdulkamil (Gusti Basah)





daughter of Paku Alam II
Senthot (Radèn Tumenggung Nataprawira)
Ali Basah Abdul Mustapa Prawiradirja
(1808-1855) died in exile in Bengkulèn
x 




*  Details taken from Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoerejan:127-31.
** Radèn Rongga Mangundirja (Prawiradirja II) seems to have married two daughters of Hamengkubuwana I, see Mandoyokusumo 
1977:12, 14, the latter being referred to as Bendara Radèn Ayu Rongga Sepuh, Carey 1980:38.
*** Served as co-bupati wedana with Radèn Rongga Prawirasentika (1822-1826). After the Java War given the title of Pangéran Adipati 
Prawiradiningrat. He was the first full bupati wedana since Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III who was killed in revolt on 17-12-1810.
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Nyai Ageng Dathuk Sulèman x Kyai Ageng Dathuk Sulèman (son of sultan of Bima, Sumbawa)
Kyai Ageng Derpayuda
(buried at Majangjati, Sragèn) x 
Nyai Ageng Derpayuda
(buried at Kuncèn, Yogya)
Mas Rara Juwati
(Ratu Ageng Tegalreja,




x Nyai Ageng Pengulu
Pengulu Pekih Ibrahim (Dipaningrat)
(in office, c. 1755-1798, grandson of 




Kyai T. Resagota 
bupati Sokawati 
(buried at Bayem, Madiun)
Nyai T. Resagota 
(buried at Kuncèn) x 








Ratu Sultan (earlier Radèn Ayu
Andayaningrat commander of the 
Yogya kraton prajurit èstri) – no issue
Radèn Ayu Pengulu
Kamalodiningrat (buried








Radèn Ayu Madubrangta, died at Tegalreja
pre-1825, daughter of Kyai Gedhé Dhadhapan,
mother of Pangéran Dipanagara II, see Appendix IV
(3) x
Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih (daughter of Radèn Tumenggung Sumaprawira, bupati of Kenitèn 
(Madiun), a relation (sentana) of Ratu Maduretna. Sumaprawira may have been a younger 




Pangéran Dipanagara’s wives,  
family and children
Tegalreja (c. 1793-1825)1
MarriagesRadèn Antawirya (Dipanagara) c. 1803
 x (1)  Radèn Ayu Madubrangta, 
  daughter of Kyai Gedhé   
  Dhadhapan, head of the pathok  
  negari of Dhadhapan in the   
  Slèman district. Died at Tegalreja  
  before July 1825.
 27-2-1807
  x (2)  Radèn Ajeng Supadmi (later
  Radèn Ayu Retnakusuma), 
  daughter of Radèn Tumenggung 
  Natawijaya III, Yogya bupati of 
  Panolan (Jipang-Kepanolan), 
  in office 1803-1811. 
 c. 1808
 x (3) Radèn Ayu Retnadiwati, died at  
  Tegalreja before July 1825.
 c. 28-9-1814
  x (4) Radèn Ayu Maduretna, daughter
  of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III 
  of Madiun and Ratu Maduretna  
  (daughter ofHamengkubuwana  
  II). Followed Dipanagara during  
  the Java War. Appointed Ratu  
  Kedhaton (August 1825), died 
  18-2-1828, see below II.
1 The details are taken from BD (Manado) IV:4, XXXII. 21-26; Tanojo n.y.:42-3; dK 158, ‘Lyst 
der Djocjokartasche Prinsen op dato dezes als muitelingen den oorlog tegen het Nederlandsche 
Gouvernement voerende’, Magelang, 10-3-1829. Dipanagara also appears to have had other sons 
who are not mentioned in this list: one, known as Radèn Mas Alip, was described as ‘mad’ in the 
Dutch sources and went over to the Dutch side before 1827, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 
III:560 and Nahuys van Burgst 1835, I:10-14.
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Children of (1) Radèn Antawirya II (born c. 1803). Appointed Pangéran  
   Dipanagara II (August 1825). Remained in Magelang   
   after the Java War, but later exiled to Sumenep (east 
   Madura) in October 1834 because of suspected anti-Dutch  
   sentiments; later (1851) moved to Ambon. During his   
   exile he used the Javanese-Islamic name of Radèn Mantri  
   Muhamad Ngarip and under that name wrote a 
   prophetic historical account of his life and times which  
   is known by the title Babad Dipanagara, Surya Ngalam 
   (LOr 6488).
 of (2) Radèn Suryaatmaja (born 1807 or early 1808). Appointed
   Pangéran Adipati Anom (August 1825); later Pangéran  
   Dipaningrat (April 1830). Exiled to Ambon (April 1840).  
   Went mad.
 of (4) ? (1) Radèn Mas Jonèd (born c. 1815). Killed in a brawl  
   with a soldier of the Yogya garrison in c. April 1837.2
   ? (2) Radèn Mas Raib (born c. 1816). Exiled to Ambon  
   (April 1840). A devout Muslim.
 1826
 of (3) Radèn Ayu Basah x (1) Radèn Tumenggung Natadirja  
   (Iman Muhamad Ngabdulkamil Ali Basah, also known as  
   ‘Gusti Basah’), an elder brother of Senthot Ali Basah. 
   Died of battle wounds early August 1828
 x (2)  Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara (Ali Basah   
   Ngabdulkamil II). Divorced 1837. 
Children whose mothers are unknown 
son3  (1) Radèn Dipaatmaja (born c. 1805).Appointed Pangéran
  Dipakusuma (August 1825). Exiled to Ambon (April 1840).
daughters4 (1)  Radèn Ayu Jayakusuma x Pangéran Jayakusuma II (son of 
  Pangéran Jayakusuma I, post-Aug 1825, Pangéran 
  Ngabèhi), who was killed with his father and younger  
  brother in the Kelir mountains (Bagelèn-Kedhu) 21-9-1829. 
2 See Hageman 1856:412; and B.Ng. III:388, LXIV.48, which states that Jonèd was killed at the 
beginning of AJ 1765 (April 1837). According to Dipanagara’s descendants in Makassar, Radèn 
Mas Jonèd, ran amok on the steamship carrying his father from Semarang to Batavia and was 
killed by the ship’s officers. Every year offerings are made in Semarang harbour to commemorate 
his death.Interview with Raden Mas Jusuf Diponegoro and Raden Saleh Diponegoro, Jalan Irian 
83, Makassar, 8-9-1972. There is nothing in the Dutch sources to confirm this tale and the dates do 
not fit because Dipanagara was moved from Semarang to Batavia in April 1830. In fact, it seems 
from Hageman 1856:412, that he died in a brawl with a soldier or NCO in Yogya in 1837.
3 It is likely that this was a son of Dipanagara’s second wife Radèn Ayu Retnakusuma.
4 It is possible that these were daughters of Dipanagara’s fourth wife, Radèn Ayu Maduretna 
(Ratu Kedhaton).
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 (2)  Radèn Ajeng Impun, unmarried in 1830.5 
 (3)  Radèn Ajeng Munthèng (also known as Radèn Ayu Gusti); 
  unmarried. Lived with her grandmother (Dipanagara’s 
  mother), Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati, in Yogyakarta, see  
  AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 11-5-1849, 
  La V geheim. 
Java War (1825-1830)6
In January 1828, Radèn Ayu Maduretna (Ratu Kedhaton) fell sick whilst six months 
pregnant and persuaded Dipanagara to marry:
 x (1)  Radèn Ayu Retnaningrum, daughter of Pangéran 
   Panengah (post-1812, Dipawiyana I, a son of 
   Hameng ku buwana II). She accompanied Dipanagara as 
   far as Semarang on his journey into exile and then 
   deserted him (5-4-1830).
On 18 February 1828 (2 Ruwah AJ 1755), Radèn Ayu Maduretna (Ratu Kedhaton) 
died at Kawisarja in the Kulon Praga area and was buried at Imagiri. About two 
months later, Dipanagara took two new wives: 
 x (1)  Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, daughter of Radèn   
   Tumenggung Sumaprawira, pre-1812, Yogya bupati of  
   Jipang-Kepadhangan, post-1812, bupati of Kenitèn 
   (Madiun) and a relation (sentana) of Radèn Ayu 
   Maduretna (see above).7 She accompanied Dipanagara 
   into exile where she bore him at least two children both 
   sons (see below). 
 x (2)  Radèn Ayu Retnakumala, daughter of the Kyai Guru of the 
   pathok negari of Kasongan (near Bantul), who had been 
   killed in fighting at Selarong on 25-10-1825. She did not 
   accompany Dipanagara into exile. 
5 In c. 1837, Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara repudiated his official wife, Radèn Ayu Basah, 
and secretly married her sister who was in his care and who was expecting a child by him, see Dj.Br 
18, Valck, ‘Geheime Memorie’, 31-3-1840.This sister was almost certainly Radèn Ajeng Impun who 
is mentioned as being in his care in April 1830, see Dj.Br. 19II, ‘Nota over het Tractement van de 
Bassa Merto Negoro benevens van zijne volgelingen over de maand Sawal [March-April 1830]’.
6 The details are taken from BD (Manado) IV:4 XXXII.21-26; B.Ng. III:109, XXVII. 1-4.
7 Radèn Tumenggung Sumaprawira bore the same name as one of the two younger brothers 
of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III, who was captured along with Rongga’s mother and sent back 
to Yogya following the collapse of Rongga’s rebellion in December 1810, Dj.Br. 46, Lieutenant 
Thomas Paulus (Maospati) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 11-12-1810. This may point to a strong-
er family connection with the Prawiradirjan. See further Carey 1992:454-5 note 264.
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Manado and Makassar (1830-1855)8
Only Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih accompanied Dipanagara into exile and she bore him 
the following children 
1 Manado (12-6-1830 – 20-6-1833) (1) Radèn Mas Kindar (later ‘Pangéran’ 
  Abdurrahman), born 4 January 1832. 
2 Makassar (11-7-1833 – 8-1-1855)  (2) Radèn Mas Sarkuma (born July 1834, 
  died March 1849).
Children whose mothers are unknown9
 (1) Radèn Mas Mutawaridin (later 
‘Pangéran’Abdurrahim), born c. 1835. 
 (2)  Radèn Ayu Putri Munadima, born c. 1836. 
 (3)  Radèn Mas Dulkabli (later ‘Pangéran’ Abdulgani), 
  born c. 1836. 
 (4)  Radèn Mas Rahab (later ‘Pangéran’ Abdulrajab).10
 (6)  Radèn Mas Ramaji (later ‘Pangéran’ Abdulgafur).
8 The details are taken from Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 1; BD (Manado) IV:428, XLIII.322-4, p. 
428; AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 24-4-1833 no. 19, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to 
Commissioner-General (Johannes van den Bosch), 22-2-1833; AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-
Generaal, 10-5-1855 La R, Colonel Alexander van der Hart (Governor of Celebes) to Governor-
General (A.J. Duymaer van Twist), 12-1-1855, in which seven surviving children of Dipanagara 
are mentioned; and from a family tree kindly loaned by Raden Mas Jusuf Diponegoro of Jalan 
Irian no. 83, Makassar. It is not clear whether all the children listed were indeed offspring of 
Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih and this is confirmed by a statement of the governor of Makassar in 
July 1834 who mentioned that of the three male children born to Dipanagara since his arrival in 
Fort Rotterdam (July 1833), only one, Radèn Mas Sarkuma, was by an official wife (Radèn Ayu 
Retnaningsih), see AN, Kabinet, 13-10-1834 La E geheim, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Makassar) to J.C. 
Baud (Batavia/Bogor), ?7-1834; on Dipanagara’s other female followers, see below Appendix XII.
The honorific ‘Pangéran’ before the names of the prince’s offspring appears in Raden Mas Jusuf 
Diponegoro’s family tree and was probably not recognised officially by the Dutch government. 
9 Some of these children may have been from Dipanagara’s official wife, Radèn Ayu 
Retnaningsih, but most were probably not, see above note 8.
10 Radèn Ayu Mariati, a daughter of this son of Dipanagara, died in Makassar in late 1972. 
The present author was privileged to meet her during an interview with the family of Raden Mas 
Jusuf Diponegoro in Makassar in September 1972.
APPENDIX Va
Chief ministers (patih) of Yogyakarta and 
Surakarta (1755-1847)
Yogyakarta1
Danureja I 13 February 1755-19 August 1799
 previously Radèn Tumenggung Yudanagara (bupati of Banjarnegara 
in Banyumas) from the Gandakusuman family. 
Danureja II 9 September 1799-28 October 1811
 previously Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara, grandson of the 
above. Strangled on the orders of Sultan Hamengkubuwana II in 
the Yogya kraton, hence known as patih séda kedhaton (‘the patih who 
died in the kraton’).   
Danureja III 7 November 1811-2 December 1813
 previously Kyai Tumenggung Sindunagara I, eldest son of Danureja 
I. Never given the title of ‘Radèn Adipati’ but referred to by his 
‘commoner’ title of ‘Kyai Adipati’. Acting patih 7 November 1811-
 22 January 1812, when he took the oath of allegiance to the British 
government. Retired as Kyai Adipati Purwa on 2 December 1813. 
Danureja IV 2 December 1813-22 February 1847
 previously Mas Tumenggung Sumadipura, bupati of Japan 
(Majakerta) in east Java, supposedly of Balinese descent from 
Untung Surapati. Retired to Majakerta as Pangéran Adipati 
Kusumayuda and died there in c. 1849.
1 Details taken from Rouffaer 1905:607 and from typed notes on the Yogyakarta patih in the 
Widya Budaya library of the Yogya kraton. Rouffaer’s dates have been checked against the avail-
able Residency letters.  
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Surakarta2
Jayaningrat July 1784-6 July 1796
 dismissed by Pakubuwana IV.  
Mangkupraja II 7 July 1796-5 April 1804
 previously Radèn Tumenggung Sasrawijaya I. Exiled to Ayah 
in Banyumas for intrigues with Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III 
of Madiun and strangled by the Surakarta bupati of Banyumas, 
Radèn Tumenggung Yudanagara, on the orders of Sunan 
Pakubuwana IV.
 Danuningrat 26 April 1804-8 January 1810
 dismissed on Daendels’ insistence because of an armed incursion 
into Pekalongan from the Surakarta district of Delimas (present-
day Limpung) in October 1809.
Cakranagara 6 February 1810-18 July 1812 
 exiled to Surabaya by Raffles for his part in the secret corre-
spondence with Yogyakarta in 1811-1812.
Sasradiningrat II 17 August 1812-30 January 1846
 previously Radèn Tumenggung Sasrawijaya II, a son of 
Mangkupraja II. Died in office.  
2 Details taken from Rouffaer 1905:607; Ricklefs 1974a:428. The dates have been checked in 
the following sources: S.Br. 53, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 
10-7-1796; Van der Chijs 1895-97, XV:10-4 (decree of 8-1-1810 dismissing Danuningrat); Dj.Br. 27, 
H.W. Daendels (Batavia) to G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta), 13-1-1810; Dj.Br. 37, Hamengkubuwana II 
(Yogyakarta) to Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta), 16 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (19-7-1810); IOL Mack.Pr. 2, 
‘Chronology of Java’,1816; MvK 4132, Lawick van Pabst, ‘Nota’, 1826. On Ayah as a place of exile 
for the Surakarta court, see Remmelink 1994:19.
APPENDIX Vb
Major officials of the Yogyakarta  
administration, 1755-1825
Bupati wedana of Madiun1
Pangéran Mangkudipura 1755-c. 1760
 former Kartasura appointee related to the Kartasura 
court and descended from a line of former Kartasura 
bupati of Madiun with their residence at Wanasari in 
the southern part of Madiun town. Did not have the 
trust of Hamengkubuwana I.
Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja I  c. 1760-1784
 previously Kyai Tumenggung Wirasentika, brother-
in-law and favourite of Hamengkubuwana I. Served 
as his army commander and given the military title 
of ‘Rongga’. Known as the champion (gegedhug) of 
Sokawati.
Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja II  1784-June 1790, 27 October 1794-15 January 1796
 also known as Radèn Rongga Mangundirja and 
Radèn Rongga dhongkol Maèspati – ‘the early 
retired Radèn Rongga of Maospati’, the last a  
reference to his residence 10 kms to the west of 
Madiun, later the official seat of the bupati wedana 
under his son, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III, until 
December 1810. A son-in-law of Hamengkubuwana 
I known for his piety. Retired early from his position 
because of blindness.
Radèn Tumenggung June 1790-27 October 1794
Sasradiningrat I son-in-law of Hamengkubuwana II and father-in-law 
of the Yogya Crown Prince (later Hamengkubuwana 
III). Served as interim bupati wedana because of the 
incapacity of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja II. Became 
senior bupati of Jipang-Rajegwesi until his death in 
May 1807.
1 Details taken from KITLV H 699, Rouffaer, ‘Archiefstukken (diverse) over de vorstenlande n’, 
loose notes on the bupati wedana of Madiun; Adam 1940:331-6. 
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Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III  14 January 1796-17 December 1810
 son of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja II and son-in-law 
of Hamengkubuwana II; killed in revolt 17-12-1810. 
*Pangéran Dipakusuma 5 January 1811-1822
 descended in the female line from Sunan 
 Amangkurat III (1703-1708) and Radèn Mas Garendi 
(Sunan Kuning). Born in Ceylon. Acting bupati 
wedana until his death in 1822.
*Radèn Rongga  5 January 1811-February 1826
Prawirasentika son of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja I and son-in-law 
of Hamengkubuwana II. Acting bupati wedana until 
his dismissal for maladministration in 1826. Allowed 
to continue as bupati of Tunggul. 
Pangéran Rongga 1822-1859 
Prawiradiningrat son of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III by Ratu 
Maduretna, a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II 
and Ratu Kedhaton. Acting bupati wedana with 
Radèn Rongga Prawirasentika 1822-1826. After 
1826, became the first full bupati wedana of Madiun 
since the death of his father on 17-12-1810, and 
subsequently (1830) appointed to title of ‘Pangéran 
Adipati Prawiradiningrat’. 
  * Joint acting wedana.
Pengulu2
Pekih Ibrahim (Dipaningrat I) c. 1755-21 October 1798
Muhamad Sapingi November 1798-20 June 1812
 previously wedana of the Suranatan, of Sundanese 
origin. Fled back to west Java at time of British 
attack on kraton.
Kyai Rahmanudin July 1812-September 1823
 previously member of the Suranatan. Dismissed by 
Danureja IV and made the haj to Mecca in July 1825.
Ketib Abuyamin, later  September 1823-c. 1835
Pengulu Kamalodiningrat son of an ordinary priest, but married to a sister 
of Hamengkubuwana II’s last official consort, Ratu 
Sultan, formerly Radèn Ayu Andayaningrat, 
 commander of his Amazon corps.3
2 Details taken from B.Ng. I:33, VIII. 38-40; I:39, X.11; II:170-4, XLI. 1-39; BD (Manado) II:113, 
XIV.40; II:118, XIV.54-5; Carey 1992:116, 284, 441 note 210.
3 For a brief biography of Ratu Sultan/Radèn Ayu Andayaningrat, see Carey 1992:413 note 73.
Appendix Vb774
Patih of the Kadipatèn4
Mas Tumenggung Wiraguna  c. 1780-30 April 1807
 father of Radèn Tumenggung Major Wiranagara. 
Married to a village woman claiming to be a 
descendant of Surapati. Illiterate and of village 
stock. Had served Hamengkubuwana I as a bupati 
during Giyanti War, but too uneducated to be given 
a high post in post-1755 Yogya administration.
Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja I  30 April 1807-died pre-1810
 father of Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja II, bupati of 
Kerja and Masaran in Sokawati.
Mas Tumenggung Sumadirja c. 30 April 1807-died pre-1810
 (bupati of Japan/Majakerta, father of Danureja IV).
*Kyai Tumenggung  1810-died pre-1812
Cakradipura
*Radèn Ngabèhi Jayasentika 1810-21 June 1812 
 of Madurese descent; killed on orders of Pangéran 
Mangkudiningrat I.
  *Joint patih
Bupati wedana (nayaka) of the kraton5
1786 (Memorie of J.M. van Rhijn)
Wedana jero (Inner bupati)
 Radèn Tumenggung Mangundirja
 Kyai Tumenggung Mangundipura (kliwon of Danureja I, 
appointed 1786)
 Mas Aria Mandura
 Radèn Aria Sindureja
Wedana jaba (Outer bupati)
 Radèn Tumenggung Natayuda I (bupati bumija, wedana of Kedhu)
 Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (appointed 1794)
 Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma
 Pangéran Dipakusuma (wedana gedhé prajurit; troop commander)
4 Taken from BD (Manado) II:141-2, XV. 39-41; Dj.Br. 38, M. Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to B.F. von 
Liebeherr (Surakarta), 30-4-1807.
5 Details taken from Rouffaer, ‘Archiefstukken (diverse) over de vorstenlanden’, loose notes 
on the ‘Hoofd Regenten van Jogjakarta’, and from the various Memorie van Overgave. The full 
number of nayaka should be 8 (4 inner and 4 outer), but often smaller numbers are given in the 
Memorie. 
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1798 (Memorie of W.H. van IJsseldijk)
Wedana jero
 Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (appointed 1797)
 Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura (appointed 1797)
 Radèn Aria Sindureja
 Mas Tumenggung Mangundipura (wedana bandar; head of
 tollgates) 
Wedana jaba
 Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma I (kliwon of Danureja I)
 Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara (kliwon of Danureja I)
 Mas Aria Mandura
 Radèn Tumenggung Mertalaya (appointed 1795; grandson of 
Pangéran Ngabèhi)
1803 (Memorie of J.G. van den Berg)
Wedana jero
 Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat
 Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura
 Radèn Aria Sindureja
 Mas Tumenggung Mangundipura (wedana bandar)
Wedana jaba
 Radèn Tumenggung Natayuda I (bupati bumija of Kedhu, 
 poisoned 29-11-1804)
 Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara I (kliwon of Danureja II; 
 previously Mas Aria Mandura)
 Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat (appointed 1805)
 Radèn Tumenggung Mertalaya
1808 (Memorie of M. Waterloo)
Wedana jero
 Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat 
 (suspended March 1807-early 1808)
 Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura 
 (dismissed 25-11-1810)
 Mas Tumenggung Mangundipura
 Radèn Aria Sindureja
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Wedana jaba Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat 
 (banished to Meester Cornelis, Batavia, and Cirebon, 
17-12-1810 – 29-12-1811)
 Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara I 
 (appointed Kyai Adipati Danureja III, 6-11-1811)
 Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma I (dismissed 
November 1811, murdered mid-January 1812)
 Radèn Tumenggung Mertalaya
1811 (Report of John Crawfurd)
Wedana jero
 Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat 
 (killed in battle 20-6-1812)
 Radèn Aria Sindureja
 Radèn Tumenggung Mertalaya
 Mas Tumenggung Mangundipura
 Radèn Tumenggung Ranadiningrat 
 (wedana gedhé prajurit; kraton troop commander)
Wedana jaba
 Radèn Tumenggung Danunagara (appointed 
 11-11-1811, served as kliwon of Danureja III)
 Radèn Tumenggung Sindunagara II (appointed 
 2-12-1811)
 Radèn Tumenggung Tirtadiwirya
 Radèn Tumenggung Sasradiningrat II
 Kyai Tumenggung Reksanegara (wedana bandar; 
head of tollgates)
1816 (Report of John Crawfurd)
Wedana jero
 Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara II (son of 
Pangéran Demang by daughter of Danureja I, 
 dismissed for corrupt practices, pre-August 1816)
 Radèn Tumenggung Sasradiningrat II
 Mas Tumenggung Mangundipura
Wedana jaba
 Radèn Tumenggung Danunagara (kliwon of 
Danureja IV)
 Radèn Tumenggung Sindunagara II
 Mas Arya Mandura (wedana gladhag; head of porters’ 
guild)
 Radèn Tumenggung Major Wiranagara (wedana 
gedhé prajurit, appointed 1817)
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Kapitan cina6
To In c. 1755-1764
Gan Ke Ko 1764-1776
Tan Lek Ko 1776-c. 1793
 previously kapitan cina of Kedhu
Qué Jin Sing c. 1793-1803
 previously kapitan cina of Kedhu.
Tan Jin Sing 27 September 1803-6 December 1813
 son of above; previously kapitan cina of Kedhu, later 
Radèn Tumenggung Secadiningrat (6-12-1813), sub-
sequently Radèn Tumenggung Purwa (31-12-1830), 
died 10-5-1831.
Qué Wi Kong 6 December 1813-20 August 1828
 relation of above.
Qué Pun Sing 20 August 1828-?
 son of above.
6 Details taken from the available Residency letters.
APPENDIX VI
List of country estates/rural retreats (pesanggrahan), 
hunting lodges and royal pleasure gardens  
(kelangenan-Dalem) built in Yogyakarta by  
the first four sultans, 1755-18221
Built by Hamengkubuwana I, 1749-1792
1 Pulo Kenonga (saha antéronipun, Taman Sari).
2 Pulo Gedhong (Taman Sari) 




Built by Hamengkubuwana II when still Crown Prince, 1758-1792
1 Rajakusuma∗
2 Rajawinangun (Arjawinangun)∗
3 Purwareja∗ [8 jung]
4 Pelemsèwu
Built by Hamengkubuwana II, 1792-1810, 1811-1812, 1826-1828




5 Alas [J]eruk Legi2
6 Alas Prapti
7 Gunung Kidul
1 NBS 133, no. 8, ‘Lyst van de tuinen en lusthoven van den Sultan van Djodjo’ (Javanese title: 
‘punika pemut yasa dalem kelangenan. Ka[ng]jeng Sinuhun ingkang kaping sapisan ingandhap 
punika pratélanipun’), Rebo, 25 Rejeb, Jimawal, AJ 1757 (21-1-1830), and see also Kota Jogjakarta 
1956:116-7. For a description of the term pesanggrahan, see the glossary. The land measurements 
are from Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:591.
2 Text has ‘Ceruk Legi’.




10 Kudur Brubuh Kadisona.
11 Tanjungtirta∗ [8 jung]
12 Banyaksak
13 Drakila (Indrakila).




17 Toyatumumpang (Banyutumumpang) 
18 Prèh Binatur
19 Telaga, Gunung Telaga (Gamping) [40 jung]∗ 
20 Ambarketawang 
21 Sanapakis∗ [3 jung]
22 Tegilyasa
23 Tegilpengawé
24 Sanasèwu∗ [12 jung]
Built by Hamengkubuwana III when still Crown Prince, 1792-1810, 1811-1812




Built by Hamengkubuwana III, 1812-1814
1 Ngandong Santun
Built by Hamengkubuwana IV, 1814-1822
1 Bangsal Panggung (kraton Yogya)
 and repairs undertaken to previous pesanggrahan 
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List of religious boarding schools (pesantrèn,  
pondhok), centres of scholars learned in fiqh law 
(pathok negari), and tax-free areas set aside  
for men of religion and keepers of royal grave- 
sites (pradikan, pamutihan, jurukuncèn) in 
Yogyakarta pre-18321
[Numbers refer to the locations given in Map 8]
1 Amberkatawang (Gamping) pamutihan kalangenan, previously three jung, 
in 1832 no more land given; kalangenan built 
by Hamengkubuwana II when sultan 
  (see Appendix VI). 
2 Blunyah  pamutihan jurukunci, burial place of Kyai 
Kelipa of Jipang and Kyai Bimacilik, later 
Radèn Tumenggung Prawiradiningrat, a 
younger brother of Ratu Ageng (pre-1812, 
Ratu Kedhaton) was buried there with his 
descendants; previously three jung, in 1832 
only one jung. 
3 Balong (Guyangan)  pamutihan jurukunci, burial place of Radèn 
Ayu Menyangan and Nyai Purwadiningrat 
with their sentana (relations); previously 
  ½ jung, in 1832 still ½ jung. 
4 Dhongkèlan  pathok negari, tanah tiyasa Ratu Kedhaton, 
mosque, religious living and pradikan land 
set up by and in the gift of Ratu Kedhaton, 
mother of Hamengkubuwana III; previously 
25 cacah, in 1832 three jung. 
1 KITLV H 698 b, ‘Diverse aanteekeningen uit het gewone (niet geheime) Residentie Archief 
te Jogjakarta’, iic-ic, ‘Opgave van den pengoeloe der landen aan priesters afgestaan voor het 
onderhouden van graven’; Dj.Br.77II, ‘Rapport van den Kyai Pengulu Kamalodiningrat aan-
gaande zijne onderhebbende priesters dewelke in onderscheidene kampongs aan kinderen het 
onderwijs geven in den godsdienst (ngaji)’, 9-1831.  For a description of the terms pradikan, pamu-
tihan, pathok negari, see the glossary.  
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5  Gadhing pamutihan, previously 1½ jung, in 1832 no 
more land given. 
6 Grojogan pamutihan, previously 2 jung, in 1832 no more 
land given. 
7  Gunung Gemak pamutihan jurukunci, according to the jurukunci, 
previously ½ jung given for the upkeep of the 
grave of Pangéran Cakraningrat, in 1832 no 
more land given. 
8 Gunung Kelir pamutihan jurukunci, grave of Ratu Malang, 
Pangéran Cakraningrat (Pangéran Sampang) 
and Radèn Ayu Lembah; previously ½ jung 
given for the upkeep of the graves, in 1832 
still ½ jung. 
9 Jalasutra pamutihan jurukunci, grave of Kyai Ageng 
Bengkung, previously three jung given for the 
upkeep of the grave, in 1832 only ½ jung. 
10 Jati  pamutihan, previously 1 jung, in 1832 no more 
land given.
11 Jejeran pamutihan jurukunci, grave of Kyai 
Tumenggung Gajah, Radèn Tumenggung 
Sumadiningrat and Radèn Tumenggung 
Wiryawinata; previously two jung for the 
jurukunci, in 1832 only one jung. 
12 Jumeneng pamutihan, previously ½ jung, in 1832 no more 
land given. 
13 Kasongan pamutihan pathok negari, previously seven 
jung, in 1832 no more land given. 
14 Kricakan pamutihan, previously two jung, in 1832 no 
more land given. 
14a Lempuyangan (Yogya) burial place of Kyai Adipati Mangkupraja, 
Pangéran Sumedhang, Pangéran Adi pati 
Madura, Mas Ayu Pulungyun, mother of 
Radèn Tumenggung Colonel Mertanagara.2
15  Mancingan pamutihan kalangenan, graves of Sèh Maulana 
Maghribi and Sèh Belabelu; previously 
  1½ jung for the upkeep of the pesanggrahan at 
Parangtritis and Parangwédang (see 20-21),
  in 1832 no more land given. 
16 Melangi pathok negari, tanah tiyasa kaluwarga Danurejan, 
mosque, religious living and pradikan land of 
the Danurejan family; previously 
  25 cacah of land, after 1832 three jung. 
2 Note of G.P. Rouffaer. Mas Ayu Pulungyun’s name is usually spelt ‘Pulangyun’, see 
Appendix III. She was the daughter of the patih of Kendhal on the north coast, Mas Ngabèhi 
Cakrasemita, and was born in Kaliwungu, see Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kandanoerejan:151.
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17 Palérèd Kauman previously one jung, after 1832 no more land 
given. 
18  Palérèd  grave of Ratu Pelabuhan, previously two jung of 
land for the jurukunci, in 1832 ½ jung.
18a  Palérèd ing Trayeman pamutihan, previously 1½ jung, in 1832 no more 
land given. 
19  Papringan ingkang wau pathok negari, previously 25 cacah of 
land, in 1832 pathok negari abolished. 
20  Parangtritis pesanggrahan
21  Parangwédang pesanggrahan (see 15)
22  Pakuncèn pamutihan jurukunci, grave of the royal ancestor
  Nyai Ageng Derpayuda (mother of Ratu Ageng 
Tegalreja) and her children and grandchildren; 
previously three jung, in 1832 still three jung. 
22a  Pencar(sari) pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 none. 
23  Pengawatreja (Ngawatreja) pamutihan kalangenan, previously three jung for 
wong mutihan, after 1832 no land given; kalan-
genan built by Hamengkubuwana II when sultan 
(Appendix VI).
24  Pijènan pamutihan jurukunci, previously two jung for the 
jurukunci, after 1832 no land. 
25  Plasajené (Plasakuning) pathok negari, previously 25 cacah, in 1832 three 
jung; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana III 
when still Crown Prince (see Appendix VI).
26  Pucang Anom pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 no land 
given.
27  Purwareja pathok negari, previously 25 cacah, in 1832 three 
jung; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana II 
when still Crown Prince (see Appendix VI).
28  Rejadani pamutihan, previously one jung, after 1832 still 
one jung. 
29  Rejakusuma pamutihan kalangenan, previously one jung, 
after 1832 no land given; kalangenan built by 
Hamengkubuwana II when still Crown Prince 
(see Appendix VI).
30  Rejawinangun pamutihan kalangenan, previously one jung, 
in 1832 no land given; kalangenan built by 
Hamengkubuwana II when still Crown Prince 
(see Appendix VI). 
30a  Samas  pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 no land 
given; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana II 
when still Crown Prince (see Appendix VI).
List of religious boarding schools 783
30b  Sèwon pamutihan jurukunci, grave of Ratu Kencana 
Wulan previously ½ jung from the legacy of the 
Ratu, in 1832 no land given; previously three 
jung for jurukunci, in 1832 no land given.
31  Tangkilan pamutihan kalangenan, previously one jung, in 
1832 no land given; unknown when kalangenan 
built. 
32 Tanjungtirta pamutihan kalangenan, previously one jung, 
in 1832 no more land given; kalangenan built 
by Hamengkubuwana II when sultan (see 
Appendix VI). 
33  Gunung Telaga (Gamping) pamutihan jurukunci kalangenan, previously one 
jung, after 1832 no more land given; kalangenan 
built by Hamengkubuwana II when sultan (see 
Appendix VI). 
34  Turi pamutihan, previously 25 cacah of land, after 1832 
no land given.
35  Wanacatur pamutihan kalangenan, previously one jung, in 
1832 no more land accorded; kalangenan built 
by Hamengkubuwana II when sultan (see 
Appendix VI). 
36  Wanakrama pamutihan, previously three jung, after 1832 still 
three jung. 
37  Wanasari pamutihan, previously two jung, after 1832 none.
38  Wanayasa pamutihan, previously two jung, after 1832 none.
39 Wotgalèh pamutihan jurukunci, previously three jung, in 
1832 none; grave of Ratu Giring with her son 
Panembahan Purbaya and descendants; 2½ jung 
for jurukunci, after 1832 still 2½ jung. 
Mardikan areas held by Surakarta in Gunung Kidul
a Giring (Playèn district, Gunung Kidul) grave of Ki Ageng Giring; one bau of 
land from Surakarta, in 1832 still one bau.3 
b Panithikan (Nithikan, Semanu district, grave of Pangéran Pamot, Ratu 
  Gunung Kidul) Pakubuwana and her descendants; previously 12 
jung of land from Surakarta, in 1832 still 12 jung. 
3 1 bau = 7096.5 m2; 1 cacah = unspecified number of bau; 1 jung = 4 bau. Usually 1 cacah 
referred to the amount of land which could be worked by an able-bodied tribute paying peas-
ant (wong sikep) and his immediate family and dependants (numpang, rayat, bujang), who could 
number anywhere between five and thirty people.
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Mardikan areas in Yogya whose location is unclear
1 Bacinan pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 none. 
2 Duwungas pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 still one 
jung. 
3 Kebon (? Kebanaran) pamutihan, previously ½ jung, in 1832 none. 
4 Plotingan  pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 none.
5 Warak pamutihan, previously three jung, in 1832 none. 
Mardikan areas outside Yogya
1 Pekalongan pamutihan, earlier no land, after 1832 still no 
land; the site of the grave of Sunan 
  Amangkurat I (r. 1646-1677) séda Tegalarum. 
Religious teachers in Yogya (1831)
Kampong Religious teachers and numbers of pupils Total
1 Kadanurejan Nur Samsi (10); Mustakak (5); Nur Iman (2) 17
2 Kauman Ngusman (3); Suryadi (15); Rakiman (15); 
  Ngabdullah (5); Iman (8) 46
3 Kraton Amad Ripangi (5); Amad Anom (2) 7
4 Mangkubumèn Abjani (4); Abdul Samad (3); Amad Sangi (4);
  (Mangkuratan)  Nur Samsi (5); Amad Kalipah (7) 23
5  Pakualaman Muntaka (7); Amad Ripangi (14); Ngarpani (5); 
  Nitireja (7); Resamenggala (3) 36
6  Prabuningratan Amad Anom (4) 4
7 Suranatan Waladaka (2); Mulyani (2); Amad Ngali (2); 
  Sarawidi (10); Amad Ngijan (6); Amad Masam (7) 29
8  pathok negari4 Melangi (Kyai Melangi) (50)
  Pekalongan (Kyai Sakaputa) (12)
  Plothingan (Haji Abdullatip) (30)
  Wanakrama (Kyai Mukiba) (30) 122
(Total number of pupils)  (284)
4 Before 1825, religious instruction (ngaji) had been given in the pathok negari of Dhongkèlan, 
Kasongan and Plasa Kuning and in the pamutihan of Wanasari and Wanayasa, but by 1831 there 
were no more santri at these places.
Map 8. Location of religious boarding schools (pesantrèn, pondhok), centres of scholars 
learned in fiqh law (pathok negari), and tax-free areas set aside for men of religion 
and keepers of royal gravesites (pradikan, pamutihan, jurukuncèn) in 
Yogyakarta pre-1832. The numbers refer to the places listed in Appendix VIIa.
APPENDIX VIIb
List of kyai, haji and religious officials associated 
with Dipanagara1
Name Titles Location, position and relationship
Abdulgani  Haji panakawan of Pangéran Jayakusuma 
  (post-1825, Pangéran Ngabèhi).
Abduljaki Haji accompanied Dipanagara to Magelang.
Abdulkadir  Sèh Haji dullah of the Bulkio regiment, also known 
as Haji Mustapa (Adimustapa) and 
Tumenggung Urawan (Yudapenawang).
Abdullah  Sèh ulama ageng of Papringan. 
Abdullatip Sèh Haji ulama of the pesantrèn of Kasongan, killed 
in fighting at Selarong in October 1825.
Abdulrahman Kyai guru guru and pradikan ageng of the pesantrèn
  (Sèh Abutalah)  of Kuweron (Kedhu).
Abdulrahman Kyai Gambiran.
Abdulraup Kyai guru guru and ulama ageng of the pesantrèn of 
  (Abdulrangup)  Kasongan near Selarong.
Abdulrahim Kyai Pulo Kadang.
Abdulwahab Haji follower of Kyai Maja from the pradikan 
désa of Maja. 
Abukasan Kyai abdi-dalem of Dipanagara at Tegalreja and 
son of Kyai Jayamustapa. 
Abuyamin Kyai Pengulu pengulu of Yogya (1823-25) and supporter 
 (earlier Ketib)  of Dipanagara.
Adam, Hasani Kyai pradikan désa of Wotgalèh, Maja.
1 The details have been taken from BD (Manado), II-IV: B.Ng. I-III; Jayadiningrat, ‘Schetsen’; 
UBL BPL 616, Port. 11 pt. 11, ‘Samenkomst met Kyai Maja en zijne gevangenneming’, list of 
prisoners sent to Semarang, 16-11-1828 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:889-90, and Javasche 
Courant 148, 11-12-1828). Although Javanese proper names are usually written with a ‘nga’ prefix 
(hence: ‘Ngabdulgani’) this has been omitted for the sake of clarity. It should be noted that this 
list is of a tentative nature and by no means complete. 
List of kyai, haji and religious officials associated with Dipanagara 787
Name Titles Location, position and relationship
Ahmad Sèh  full name Sèh Abdul Ahmad bin Abdullah 
al-Ansari (alias Ahmad Ansar Sharif, alias 
Sèh Habib Ahmat al-Ansari). Arab trader 
from Jeddah who had married into the 
family of Pangéran Blitar I and served as 
adviser of Dipanagara at Tegalreja and 
during the war. Submitted January 1828. 
Ahmad Sèh  son-in-law of the above and adviser of 
Dipanagara at Tegalreja. Killed in fighting 
at Selarong in October 1825.
Ali, Iman Kyai from pradikan désa of Melangi.
Ali Haji guru and pradikan ageng of Melangi 
  (Muhamad bin-Ngali)  (also known as Haji Muhamad Salim). 
Killed at Kalijengking, September 1825. 
See further Pekih, Muhamad.
Ali, Muhamad Haji follower of Kyai Maja from Kali Cebong/
Karang. Exiled to Manado (1830). One of 
the two haji in Maja’s entourage (the other 
was Haji Amad Tajib) whom Dipanagara 
wished to have with him for a lengthy 
stay in Manado, but who refused to join 
him, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 51.
Alwi Haji wedana (commander) of Suranatan corps
Amad Pekih Kyai Haji see under Pekih.
Amad Rawi Kyai dullah of the Arkio regiment. 
Amattakar  Haji confidante of Hamengkubuwana II; 
  (Jayamenggala)  later appointed demang of the désa of 
Samèn: a follower of Dipanagara and 
expert in gunpowder manufacture. Also 
known as Kyai Muhammadahir and listed 
as holding lands in Jatingarang (? in the 
Nanggulon sub-district of Kulon Praga), 
Carey and Hoadley 2000:332.
Andataruna Kyai  from Rejasa (Kulon Praga).
Anggamerta Kyai from Grobogan, later appointed as bupati 
of Grobogan by Pangéran Sérang. 
Ansari Sèh see under Ahmad.
Ansari Sèh  ulama; served Dipanagara in Bagelèn. 
Asnawi, Muhamad Sèh  ulama from Gadhing (Kedhu); also 
referred to as Sèh Muhamad.
Atmawijaya  Radèn  son of a ? haji, served 
  (Bagus Bakir)   Hamengkubuwana II in Ambon;
    appointed Radèn Atmawijaya. 
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Badarudin Haji lurah of the Suranatan regiment in Yogya, 
served Dipanagara in the same 
  capacity; made the haj twice; from the désa 
of Ngawèn, west of Yogya and just to the 
north of Tegalreja. Appointed pengulu of 
Bagelèn after the Java War.
Badhèran Kyai see under Wirapati.
Bahwi, Muhamad  Kyai pengulu of Ratu Ageng at Tegalreja (1793-
1803), became the basah of the Bulkio 
regiment with the name of Muhamad 
Ngusman Ali Basah.
Baina, Ahmad Kyai Kajoran.
Baji Kyai Gorangan.
Balad Kyai jurukunci pasaréyan Imagiri.
Banjarsari Kyai pradikan ageng and guru of the pesan-
trèn Banjarsari (Madiun); supporter of 
Dipanagara, see also Tapsir Anom. 
Barmawi Sèh Kyai senior ulama from Celereng (Kulon Praga). 
Béji Kyai  Cucuhan.
Besari, Hasan Kyai see under Hasan Besari.
Brajayuda Demang Krapyak.
Budu Kyai Elo Gedhé.
Bunari, Muhamad Kyai abdi-dalem of Dipanagara at Tegalreja.
Busu Kyai Kemasan.
Citrajaya Kyai Krapyak.
Dhadhapan Kyai see under Gajali (Ajali).
Diman (Ngadiman) Kyai Demangan.
Duku Kyai Gurangan.
Édris (Idris) Sèh Kyai associate of Umar Mahdi, Bagelèn (1817), 
  pengulu of landraad (1830), associate of
  Hamengkubuwana II.
Élias  Bagus a son of Hasan Besari and nephew of Kyai
  (Tumenggung Pajang)  Maja; pradikan of Karang; appointed as 
Tumenggung Pajang in 1825. One of 
Dipanagara’s bravest and youngest 
  military commanders.
Élias Kyai from pradikan désa of Maja.
Gajali (Ajali) Kyai pradikan of Bendhasari (Kedhu), a son 
of Kyai Musa and a nephew of Kyai 
Taptajani.
Gajali (Ajali) Kyai see Kyai Taptajani. 
Gajali (Ajali) Kyai Iman ulama from Dhadhapan
  (Kyai Dhadhapan)  (Tèmpèl, Yogya); ? relation of Kyai Maja. 
Gamawijaya Kyai from Panjer (Bagelèn), a follower of 
Dipanagara.
Gedhung Gubah Nyai wife of Haji Imanraji.
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Gendhong Kyai Gadhing.
Hasan Haji lurah of the Suryagama corps in 
Yogyakarta, served Dipanagara in the 
same capacity. Made the haj twice. 
Hasan Besari Kyai pradikan ageng and guru pesantrèn of 
Tegalsari (Panaraga); sympathetic to 
Dipanagara but afforded him no active 
support. 
Hasan Besari Kyai elder brother of Kyai Maja from Maja, 
served Dipanagara as a basah. May have 
died in prison in Batavia. Cleerens men-
tions the death of a ‘Kyai Hasan Besari’ 
on 16-1-1830, dK 49, Cleerens (Panjer) to 
H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 16-1-1830.
Hasan, Muhamad Nyai sister of Kyai Maja from Pulo Kadang.
Hasan Munadi  see under Samparwedi.
Husein Kyai Kejené.
Ibrahim Haji a confidante of Hamengkubuwana II 
from the désa of Wanasari (near Boyolali). 
Served Dipanagara.
Ibrahim, Pekih  see Kusèn, Muhamad.
Ibrahim  Muhamad Wonggo. Follower of Kyai Maja.
Idris Kyai see Édris
Imam, Hasan Kyai Mugup.
Imampura Kyai son of Kyai Maja, studied at Tegalsari.
Imamraji Haji ulama from Papringan (also mentioned as 
from Ngapaingan to the east of Yogya); 
served Dipanagara as pengulu (1825-1828); 
earlier a pupil of Kyai Maja. Later married 
Nyai Gedhung Gubah. 
Imamraji Kyai Melangi.
Iskak Kyai follower of Kyai Maja from Bojong.
Ismangil Sèh Kyai ulama ageng from Gerajèn (? Krajan, south 
of Yogyakarta). 
Jaèlani, Muhamad Kyai abdi-dalem of Dipanagara at Tegalreja, 
from the désa of Béji to the west of 
Yogyakarta.
Jagakarya Kyai from Tegal (pasisir); served Dipanagara.
Jagaprawira Demang Pluning.
Jagasura Sèh  pradikan désa unknown.
Jalasutra, Muhamad Kyai jurukunci from Jalasutra.
Jamjani  Kyai amad-dalem (jurukunci) of Kutha Gedhé 
(present day Kota Gede).
Janom Kyai abdi-dalem of Dipanagara at Tegalreja; 
appointed as tumenggung by Dipanagara 
in 1825.
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Jayanodin Kyai abdi-dalem of Dipanagara at Tegalreja. 
Jayaprawira Mas Abdullah son of Kyai Melangi submits 1828.
Jayamenggala  see under Amattakar.
Jemetri Kyai from pradikan désa of Maja.
Jenal Ngabidin  Kyai Pengulu pengulu of Madiun, and close associate 
of Kyai Banjarsari. Also known as Zainal 
Ngabidin.
Jenari, Ahmad Kyai Pecawor (? Pejawaran).
Jinan, Imam Sèh  member of the Suryagama regiment in 
Yogya karta and a follower of Dipanagara.
Jirengga Kyai member of the pasukan (troop) of Jaya-
mustapa.
Kalifah, Bagus  see under Maja.
Kalifah Kyai jurutulis (scribe) of Kyai Maja.
Kamalodiningrat Haji pengulu of Yogya, see Abuyamin, Ketib.
Kamprèt Kyai from pradikan désa of Maja.
Karang Kyai from pradikan désa of Karang.
Karip Kyai from pradikan désa of Maja.
Kasidin Kyai Jelegong.
Kasiman Kyai from pradikan désa of Maja.
Kastuba Bagus ulama of Jatinom.
Kastuba, Berangkal Sèh  senior ulama in Bagelèn, guru of pesantrèn 
of Alang-alang Ombo. 
Kastuba, Muhamad Tumenggung earlier pengulu of Prapak, Medhana, 
Kedhu.






Ketib, Iman Kyai kaum from Yogya.
Kuncong Kyai Bakungan.
Kurmèn Imam nephew of Kyai Maja.
Kusasi Kyai from pradikan désa of Karang.
Kusèn, Muhamad Kyai nephew of Kyai Pengulu Pekih Ibrahim, 
pengulu of Yogya (c. 1755-1798); appointed 
as the pengulu of Dipanagara with the 
name of Pekih Ibrahim (1828-1830). 
Later friend of Radèn Tumenggung 
Wiranagara (post-1829, Pangéran Adipati 
Prabuningrat).
Kuwaron  Kyai  from pradikan désa of Kuwaron; an older 
ulama well versed in the Qur’ān whom 
Dipanagara summoned to Selarong along 
with Kyai Maja at the start of the Java War.
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Lestari Haji religious teacher (guru) of Bagus Santri.
Maja (Bagus Kalifah) Kyai pradikan and guru of Maja, youngest son of 
Kyai Guru Badhèran. 
Majasta Mas Lurah Arab guru of pondhok of Majasta, follower 
of Dipanagara at Selarong.
Mangon Kyai Dèrèsan.
Mansur Haji Dullah lurah of the Suryagama regiment. 
Mansur Kyai Pulo Kadang.
Mansur Kyai from désa of Pangéran.
Margèwuh Kyai from Nanggulon (Kulon Praga).
Martani Kyai Maja.
Marjan Haji ulama; follower of Sèh Barmawi at 
Celereng (Kulon Praga).
Maruf Kyai Rejakusuma.
Melangi Kyai see under Ali.
Mesir Kyai from pradikan désa of Badhèran.
Mopid Kyai ulama from Guyangan (near Balong), 
also served as a jurukunci. Follower of 
Dipanagara at Tegalreja. 
Mudha Haji ulama from Kedhu, a brother of Haji Musa 
and a follower of Dipanagara at Tegalreja.
Mukmin Kyai from pradikan désa of Pulokadang.
Murdiyah Kyai from Yogyakarta, joined Dipanagara at 
Tegalreja.
Mursam, Muhamad Kyai kaum from Yogyakarta, joined Dipanagara 
at Tegalreja.
Mustarip, Ahmad Kyai Candhi.
Musa Kyai Haji  ulama from Kedhu, brother of Haji Mudha 
and father of Kyai Gajali, pradikan of 
Bendhasari.
Mustapa Sèh Haji dullah of the Bulkio regiment; a colleague 
of Haji Abdulkadir.
Ngarfah, Muhamad Kyai ulama from Kedhu. Joined Dipanagara 
at Selarong; appointed as Tumenggung 
Secanegara; a brother of Mas 
Mulyasentika (later Tumenggung 
Kertanegara).
Ngarip, Muhamad  Kyai ulama from Melangi, also known as 
Ahmad Ngarip, adviser of Dipanagara 
at Tegalreja. Later (1830) joined Pangéran 
Prabuningrat and became his guru.
Ngisa Haji follower of Kyai Maja and pradikan from 
Pulo Kadang; served Dipanagara as a 
  dullah and advised him at the Magelang 
  conference (28-3-1830). Described as 
acting the role of jester (hansworst) in 
Dipanagara’s entourage at Menorèh 
  (21-2-1830 – 6-3-1830), Chapter XII note 75.
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Ngusman, Amad Kyai lurah of the Suranatan corps in Yogyakarta 
and abdi-dalem of the kadipatèn; later tutor 
of Hamengkubuwana IV. 
Ngusman, Muhamad Ali Basah see Bahwi, Amad.
Nitipraja Kyai pathok negari (ulama); son of the jaksa 
(magistrate) of Yogyakarta Kyai Nitipraja; 
appointed by Dipanagara to follow his 
father.
Nurngali Sèh Bengali dhukun (physician and herbalist) 
of Dipanagara; possibly a sepoy deserter 
who stayed on after 1816.
Paci Kyai Raman.
Pekih, Muhamad Kyai Melangi. Also known as Kyai Melangi. 
Son of Haji Ali, guru and pradikan ageng of 
Melangi (killed September 1825). Trusted 
religious adviser of Dipanagara at the 
time of his negotiations with Colonel 
Cleerens in western Bagelèn, Jan-Feb 1830, 
see Chapter XII.
Prayatruna Kyai Ceper.
Rahman Kyai from Mamdu, pradikan désa of Maja.
Rahmanudin Kyai Pengulu pengulu of Yogyakarta (1812-1823); 
  a confidante of Dipanagara. Made the haj 




Resakusuma  Kyai  chief jurukunci at Imagiri. Married to a
  (Reksakusuma)   daughter of Hamengkubuwana II.
Resamenggala Kyai bekel wong pinggir from Wanakriya.
Resanegara  Tumenggung pradikan, follower and nephew of Kyai 
Maja from Pulo Kadang. 
Resayuda Kyai modin of Cilacap (Banyumas); afforded 
help to Kyai Modin, Kyai Jayanodin and 
Kyai Jayamustapa on their pilgrimage to 
Nusa Kambangan. 
Ripangi Kyai amad-dalem of Kutha Gedhé. Joined 
Dipanagara and appointed as Amad 
Dullah Tumenggung Resasentana, bupati 
of Kutha Gedhé (26-3-1826). 
Sahidin  Bagus Santri from pradikan désa of Badhèran, later at 
Tulung Miliran. Involved in 1832 uprising.
Salim Haji Muhamad see under Ali.
Sahiman Ahmad Karangkajèn.
Sahiman Kyai Imagiri.
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Samparwedi Kyai Haji ulama appointed as dullah of the 
Barjumungah regiment with the name 
of Hasan Munadi. Used by De Kock as 
a go-between in the negotiations with 
Dipanagara in 1829-1830. Also referred 
to as ‘Tuwan Sarif Samparwedi’ in 
Dipanagara’s babad, Louw and De Klerk 
1894-1909, V:527.
Sanget, Muhamad Haji Madiun.
Santri, Muhamad Kyai lurah kaum of Yogyakarta: reader of the 
Qur’ān to the sultan at the Garebeg, joined 
Dipanagara at Tegalreja.
Sarija Kyai from pradikan désa of Maja.
Sariman Kyai from pradikan désa of Maja.
Sastrawinangun  Kyai abdi-dalem and jurutulis (scribe) of 
Dipanagara at Tegalreja. 
Secadirja Bekel Manjong.
Semangi Kyai Perigaror (?).
Semangun Kyai from traitors’ graveyard of 
Banyusumurup.
Sepawi  Kyai Suro (? Banyumas).
Seri Kyai Gambiran.
Setrawijaya Kyai from pradikan désa of Mutihan.
Singadangsa Kyai Wotgalèh.
Singep, Muhamad Kyai from Jobong.
Sis Kyai from pradikan désa of Maja. 
Soban Kyai adviser of Dipanagara at Tegalreja.
Supingi, Muhamad Kyai Badhèran.
Supri Kyai Ngèmplak.
Suradrana Kyai from pradikan désa of Maja.
Tajib, Muhamad Sèh Kyai follower of Maja from Boyolali; served 
Dipanagara as dullah of Suryagama 
regiment. A colleague of Haji Muhamad 
Hasan; exiled to Manado (1830). Appears 
to have made the haj. Was one of two 
members of Kyai Maja’s entourage – the 
other was Haji Muhamad Ali – whom 
Dipanagara wished to have with him for 
a lengthy period in Manado, but who 
refused to join him, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 51.
Tapsir Anom Kyai pradikan ageng of Banjarsari (Panaraga).
Taptajani Kyai ? of Arab descent; guru and pradikan ageng 
of Melangi until 1805; moved to Surakarta; 
associated with Kyai Maja and a brother-
in-law of Kyai Musa. Tutor of Pangéran 
Adisurya, mystic brother of Dipanagara.
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Tèlaksana   from pradikan désa of Karang.
Termis Kyai Maduan.
Tirtadrana  Kyai dismissed head demang of Grabag in 
northern Kedhu. In Magelang during Java 
War; exiled with Kyai Maja and later
  scribe of Dipanagara in Manado in 
  1830-1831.
Tomjèd  Kyai from pradikan désa of Maja.
Unus Kyai Ajanjer.
Urawan Tumenggung demang of Plantaran. 
  see also Abdulkadir.
Wahid Kyai ulama, follower of Kyai Maja from pradikan 
désa of Dèrèsan (Yogyakarta). 
  Also referred to as Kyai Wahada.
Wanapeti Kyai guru of pondhok of Wanapeti near Wates, 
  (alias Kyai Kembang  Kulon Praga, follower of Kyai Maja.
  Lampir)
Wanasari Kyai senior ulama from Wanasari (? Gunung 
Kidul).
Wangsadirja Kyai See Pekih, Muhamad
Wijaya, Murma Kyai pradikan and guru of Kapundhung (Yogya-
karta) born in the pradikan désa of Maja. 
Had connections with both courts. Exiled 
to Ambon in 1817. Allowed back to Java in 
September 1824 and died soon afterwards.
Wirapatih  Ketib Iman pradikan of Badhèran; eldest son of Kyai
  (Kyai Badhèran)  guru of Badhèran and elder brother of 
Kyai Maja.
Wotgalèh Kyai ulama and jurukunci from Wotgalèh (near 
Kutha Gedhé), follower of Kyai Maja.
  See also Adam, Hasani.
Yudapenawang Tumenggung see Abdulkadir. 
Zainal Ngabidin  see Jenal Ngabidin.
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Major officials of the Dutch East Indies Company,  
the British interim administration and the 
Netherlands Indies government 1780-18561
Governors-general, 1780-1855
Willem Arnold Alting  1780-2 November 1796
Pieter Gerardus van Overstraten  2 November 1796-22 August 1801
Johannes Siberg 22 August 1801-15 June 1805
Albert Henricus Wiese 15 June 1805-14 January 1808
Herman Willem Daendels 14 January 1808-16 May 1811
Jan Willem Janssens 16 May-18 September 1811
Gilbert Elliott Lord Minto2  6 August-19 October 1811
Thomas Stamford Raffles3 11 September 1811-12 March 1816
John Fendall  12 March-19 August 1816
Godert Alexander Gerard Philip
  baron van der Capellen4 19 August 1816-1 January 1826
Leonard Pierre Joseph burggraaf
  du Bus de Gisignies 4 February 1826-16 January 1830
Johannes van den Bosch 16 January 1830-31 January 18345
1 The following details are taken from Rouffaer 1905:601-2; De Haan 1935:477-681; Soekanto 
1952:175–7; Poensen 1905:73-346, and Veth 1898, II:369-70, and many dates have also been 
checked against the available Residency letters.  Wherever possible the dates given refer to the 
date of transfer of office rather than to the date of appointment.  
2 Lord Minto was governor-general of India (1807-1813), the dates refer to the time he spent 
in Java during the conquest of the island by the British.  
3 Both Raffles and his successor John Fendall held the rank of lieutenant-governor; the dates 
refer to Raffles’ official appointment by Lord Minto and the day on which Fendall landed in Java.
4 Van der Capellen combined his post of governor-general with that of commissioner-general 
in the period 19-8-1816 to 16-1-1819. He was assisted as commissioner-general by two colleagues, 
C.Th. Elout and A.A. Buyskes. He handed over responsibility for the day-to-day administration 
of the Netherlands East Indies to Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock on 1-1-1826 and 
sailed for the Netherlands on 2-2-1826.
5 Van den Bosch combined the post of governor-general with that of commissioner-general 
in the period 1832-34, a post which gave him quasi-dictatorial powers to act on King William I’s 
(r. 1813-1840) behalf at a time when the Cultivation System (1830-1870) was being implemented 
and the war against the Padris in West Sumatra was entering a crucial stage, see Stapel 1941:85.
Appendix IX808
Jean Chrétien Baud 31 January 1834-29 February 18366
Dominique Jacques de Eerens 29 Feb 1836-30 May 1840 (died in post)
Pieter Merkus 6 Jan 1841-2 August 1844 (died in post)7
Jan Jacob Rochussen 30 September 1845-12 May 1851
Albertus Jacobus Duymaer van Twist 12 May 1851-22 May 1856
 
Governors of Java’s Northeast Coast, Semarang, 1780-1808
Johannes Siberg  September 1780-September 1787
Jan Greeve  September 1787-1 September 1791
Pieter Gerardus van Overstraten 1 September 1791-2 November 1796
Johan Frederik baron van Reede tot
  de Parkeler  2 November 1796-6 March 1801
Nicolaus Engelhard 6 March 1801-13 May 1808 
 (dismissed by Daendels and the post 
abolished)
Residents at Surakarta, 1790-1858
Johan Frederik baron van Reede tot
  de Parkeler  August 1790-September 1796
Barend Jan van Nieuwkerken, 
  genaamd Nijvenheim  September 1796-18 August 1803
Johannes Gerardus van den Berg 18 August 1803-January 1806
Bogislaus Friedrich von Liebeherr January 1806-4 April 1808
Jacob Andries van Braam (1) 4 April 1808-November 1810
Willem Nicolaas Servatius 
  (Assistant Resident)  November 1810-July 1811
Jacob Andries van Braam (2) July-11 November 1811
Lt. Col. Alexander Adams 11 November 1811-31 July 1812
Hugh Hope 31 July 1812-14 August 1813
Lt. Richard Hart (Assistant Resident) 14 August-17 December 1813
Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson 17 December 1813-14 August 1816
Diederik Willem Pinket van Haak 14 August 1816-15 April 1817
Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk 15 April-12 May 1817
 (died at his post)
Hendrik Ferdinand Lippe (1) 12 May 1817-19 January 1818
6 Baud had served as ad interim governor-general with responsibility for the oversight of 
day-to-day administration after his arrival in Java on 10-1-1833 to 31-1-1834 while Van den Bosch 
was serving as commissioner-general (see above note 5). He was confirmed in post following 
Van den Bosch’s departure to assume the post of minister of the colonies (1834-1839), see Stapel 
1941:85.
7 Merkus had been appointed ad interim governor-general on 3-10-1840 but could only take 
up his post in early 1841. He was confirmed in post on 14-2-1843. After his death on a sea voyage 
to Surabaya to restore his health, the vice-president of the Council of the Indies, Jonkheer J.C. 
Reynst, served as ad interim governor-general until the arrival of J.J. Rochussen on 29-9-1845, see 
Stapel 1941:93.
Major officials 809
Rijck van Prehn 19 January 1818-4 December 1819
 (suspended)  
Hendrik Ferdinand Lippe (2) 4 December 1819-8 March 1820
Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst 
  (acting Resident) 8 March 1820-29 April 1822
Adriaan Mauritz Theodorus 
  Baron de Salis 29 April 1822-15 July 1823
Hendrik Mauritz MacGillavry (1)
  (acting Resident) 15 July 1823-January 1824
Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven January 1824-7 January 1825
Hendrik Mauritz MacGillavry (2) 7 January 1825-August 1827 
 (suspended)
Mr. Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (2) August 1827-November 1830
Mr. Johan Frederik Walraven van Nes 
  (acting Resident) Nov-Dec 1830
Hendrik Mauritz MacGillavry (3) Dec 1830-March 1834
Frans Gerhardus Valck 
  (acting Resident) March-December 1834
J.F.T. Mayor December 1834-September 1843
C.L. Hartmann September 1843-26 June 1846
Mr. Willem Carel Emile Baron de Geer 26 June 1846-December 1850
Hendrik Frederik Buschkens March 1851-October 1858
  (acting Resident)  (retired)
Residents at Yogyakarta, 1786-1855
Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk September 1786-January 1798
Johannes Gerardus van den Berg January 1798-26 July 1803
Matthijs Waterloo 26 July  1803-14 April 1808
Pieter Engelhard (1) 14 April-3 December 1808 
Gustaf Wilhelm Wiese 3 December 1808-9 March 1810
Johannes Wilhelmus Moorrees  9 March-24 August 1810
Bartholomeus Jacobus Driessen
  (acting Resident) 24 August-1 September 1810
Pieter Engelhard (2) 1 September 1810-15 November  1811
John Crawfurd (1) 15 November 1811-24 April 1813
Lt. Arthur Aston Homer
  (Assistant-Resident) 24 April-December 1813
John Crawfurd (2) December 1813-12 April 1814
Col. John Eales (acting Resident) 29 May-5 July 1814
John Crawfurd (3)  5 July-31 August 1814
Capt. Robert Clement Garnham 20 September 1814-31 August 1815
Lt. Edward Taylor (Assistant-Resident) 31 August-1 November 1815
Dr. Daniel Ainslie  1 November 1815-22 January 1816
John Crawfurd (4) 22 January-14 August 1816
Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (1) 14 August-6 October 1816
Appendix IX810
Johan Diederik Kruseman 
  (provisional Resident)  6 October 1816-24 January 1817
Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (2)  24 January 1817-October 18188
Robbert Christiaan Nicolaas d’Abo 
  (Assistant Resident)  October 1818-5 May 1819
Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (3)  5 May 1819-1 November 1822
Adriaan Mauritz Theodore   1 November 1822-11 February
  Baron de Salis (acting Resident)  1823
Anthonië Hendrik Smissaert  11 February 1823-26 September 1825   
(dismissed)
Hendrik Mauritz MacGillavry 
  (acting Resident)  26 September-28 October 1825
Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven 
  (acting Resident)  28 October 1825-10 March 1827
Pieter Herbert Baron van 
  Lawick van Pabst  10 March-October 1827
Mr. Johan Frederik Walraven van Nes 
  (acting Resident)  October 1827-November 1830
Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven 
  (acting Resident)  November-December 1830
Mr. Johan Frederik Walraven van Nes (2)  December 1830-March 1831
Franciscus Gerardus Valck (1)  March 1831-5 July 1838
J.F.T. Mayor (acting Resident)  5 July-14 December 1838
Frans Gerhardus Valck (2)  14 December 1838-July 1841
Arnold Adriaan Buyskes (acting Resident)  July 1841-May 1845 
R. de Fillietaz Bousquet  May 1845-24 November 1848
  (suspended)
Albert Hendrik Wendelin baron de Kock   28 December 1848-May 1851
J.J. Hasselman  8 July 1851-January 1855 
Mr Willem Carel Emile Baron de Geer Feb. 1855-6 May 1856 (died in post)
8 According to Rouffaer in Winter 1902:124 note 1, Nahuys van Burgst left  ogyakarta some-
time between 10 and 16 October 1818.
Rice prices in Yogyakarta and throughout Java 811
APPENDIX X
Rice prices in Yogyakarta (1804-1826)  
and throughout Java (1817-1825)1
Yogyakarta2
1804  (May) ƒ 9.68 record high prices in Yogya and Java
 (June) ƒ 9.38
 (December)  ƒ 3.00/3.25 pasar Payaman, northern Kedhu
  ƒ 5.00 best quality
  ƒ 4.50 poor quality
1806  (February) ƒ 4.80/5.40 cheapest quality
1808  (August) ƒ 3.40 best quality, Surakarta
1811  ƒ 3.50/4.20 poor/best quality
1812  (July) ƒ 4.50 aftermath of British attack on kraton
1817 (June) ƒ 3.00/4.50 poor quality, Surakarta/Yogya
 (August) ƒ 3.00/3.65 poor quality, Surakarta/Yogya
1819  (January) ƒ 4.90 poor quality
1820  (January) ƒ 5.50 poor quality
 (June) ƒ 5.50 poor quality
 (December)  ƒ 5.50 poor quality
1821 (January) ƒ 6.00 poor quality
 (May) ƒ 6.50 drought in south-central Java
 (November) ƒ 7.50 drought in south-central Java
1822  (January)  ƒ 7.20/8.90 drought in south-central Java (poor/best)
 (March)    ƒ 7.20/9.60 drought in south-central Java (poor/best)
 (June)       ƒ 8.55 drought in south-central Java
 (August)   ƒ 5.00/5.50 poor quality
 (October)  ƒ 5.00/5.50 poor quality
1 All prices are per pikul (shoulder load) of 61.761 kilograms.
2 The details are taken from the available Yogya Residency letters and from Louw and De 
Klerck 1894-1909, II:576. After 1817, the prices are those quoted by the Yogya Resident for the 
revictualling of the Yogya garrison, which were slightly below normal market prices. ƒ = Indies 
guilder (Indische gulden) which exchanged at an agio of 15-20 percent below the Dutch guilder in 
the period 1816-1826.
Appendix X812
1823  (January)   ƒ 5.50/6.10 scarcity in Yogya after Mount Merapi 
   eruption
 (March) ƒ 5.00 poor quality
 (April) ƒ 4.55 poor quality
 (July) ƒ 4.90 poor quality
 (August) ƒ 4.00 poor quality
 (November) ƒ 4.00 poor quality
1824 (March) ƒ 4.00 drought in south-central Java 
 (April) ƒ 4.00 drought in south-central Java; lowest quality
 (May)  ƒ 5.00/5.50 drought in south-central Java; poor quality3
 (November) ƒ 6.00 poor quality
1825 (January) ƒ 7.00/8.00 poor quality
 (July) ƒ 10.00–12.00 harvest failure in Kedhu
 (August) ƒ 200/300  Yogya under siege conditions
 (September) ƒ 200/300 Yogya under siege conditions
 (November) ƒ 10.00 Yogya after siege lifted; war inflation
1826 (December) ƒ 15.60 Yogya after siege lifted; war inflation
Java4
Year  Batavia Semarang Surabaya
1817  ƒ 2.56 
1818  ƒ 2.56 
1819  ƒ 2.00 
1820  ƒ 3.50        Government approximation per pikul
1821  ƒ 4.13 
1822  ƒ 4.13 
1823 (October) ƒ 3.80 
1824  (January) ƒ 4.00 
 (April) ƒ 4.00 
 (July) ƒ 3.26 
 (October) ƒ 3.30  ƒ 3.16
1825 (January) ƒ 5.13  ƒ 4.00
 (April) ƒ 3.66/4.16 ƒ 4.40 ƒ 3.00
 (July) ƒ 3.66/4.03 ƒ 2.88 ƒ 3.00/3.33
3 Magelang market price.
4 Baud 251, ‘Pryzen der ryst op Java’, which cites market prices based on quotations in the 
Bataviasche Courant.  

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
 
 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Letters written by Dipanagara from Batavia (1830)  
and Makassar (1837)
A
The following two letters were probably written by Dipanagara from Batavia 
before his departure on 3 May 1830.1 They were addressed to close members 
of his family and are the only letters known to exist which were written in his 
hand and not by a scribe. The unusual carelessness of the handwriting, the 
unnecessary doubling of the letters (aksara) in some places, and the occasional 
grammatical errors, all confirms Dipanagara’s later admission to Lieutenant 
J.H. Knoerle that ‘he wrote Javanese very defectively’ (Knoerle to Van den 
Bosch, 9 July 1830 in De Oosterling, volume 2 (1835), page 172). The originals 
are on Dutch government paper and were found by the Dutch scholar, J.J. 
de Hollander, in a file of correspondence between Javanese bupati, post-com-
manders and Dutch authorities relating to the Java War (1825-1830) in the 
archive of the Royal Military Academy at Breda. De Hollander published 
them in Javanese script with Dutch translations in Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- 
en Volkenkunde 25:192-6. He retained the original spelling and included copi-
ous corrections in his notes which have not been reproduced here. This is the 
first time the letters have been published in Romanised script with English 
translations. 
(i) Dipanagara to his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara the Younger, n.d.
 Sawusé salam dunganingsun Kulup Dipanegara marang sira apa déné 
marang adhinira Basah Mertanegara Basah Gadakusuma apa déné 
1 The letters may have been given to Captain Johan Jacob Roeps to take back to south-central 
Java when Dipanagara took leave of him on board the Corvette Pollux in Batavia harbour on 3 
May 1830, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 2. A passage in Dipanagara’s autobiography suggests that he gave 
Roeps special instructions to keep an eye on his children at this time: BD (Manado) IV:320, XLIII 
(Maskumambang) 272-4. ingsun banget lega yekti/ sira mulih mring Mentaram. 273. pan dènbisa sirèku 
ngopèn-opèni/ mring kang kèri pada/ sabab bocah padha meksih/ tanggung pesthi kèh kurangnya. 274. 
ingkang pikir. Roeps’ departure on leave for Holland in July 1830 may have meant that he was 
never able to deliver the letters, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:283 note 2. 
Letters written by Dipanagara from Batavia and Makasar 823
adhinira kabèh aja padha mikir marang ingsun sawab ingsun wos 
dadi karemnaningsun bakal sun tutugaken olé ingsun lelana karu déné 
manahé Sibèng Jayakusuma banget temen welasingsun iku yèn pareng 
padha sarjuné dhaupna karu adhènira Basah Gadakusuma aja tanggung 
olèhira dowé sadulur apa déné olé ingsun duwé anak apa déné sira 
kabèh wus aja na kuwatir sawab wus sun titepaké marèng Gupermèn 
karo déné manahé pamanira Kapitan Rup iku bangeng pracayaningsun 
wekasingsun marang sira Dipanegara Mertanegara Gadakusuma yèn 
ana keng dadi kasusahan atènira becik pamanira Kapitan sira ajak kar-
erembungan. 
 English translation:
 After my greetings and prayers to you my son, Dipanagara, and also to 
your younger brothers Basah Mertanagara2 and Basah Gandakusuma3 
and to all your younger brothers and sisters, do not concern your-
selves about me because I am well content to continue my wanderings. 
Moreover, for your younger sister, little girl Jayakusuma,4 great indeed is 
my heart’s concern. If they agree to it, marry her to your younger brother 
brother Basah Gandakusuma. Do not neglect to care for your siblings, 
my children, and do not be concerned, all of you, for I have entrusted you 
to the [Dutch] government. Furthermore, my heart has the fullest trust in 
your uncle Captain [Johan Jacob] Roeps [and] I order you Dipanagara, 
Mertanagara [and] Gandakusuma that if there is anything troubling your 
hearts, it is good that you ask advice from your uncle the Captain. 
(ii) Dipanagara to his mother, Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati, n.d.
 Sampuning sembah kula ingkang kathah-kathah katura ing sampéyan 
2 Ali Basah Ngabulkamil Mertanagara (earlier Lurah Jayapermadi) was the eldest son of 
Radèn Adipati Danureja II (in office 1799-1811) by an unofficial wife, Mas Ayu Pulangyun. He 
followed Dipanagara throughout the war and by the end had become one of his most trusted 
advisers, especially after his marriage to one of Dipanagara’s daughters, Appendix IV. He was 
later an influential figure at the Yogya court and was close to the Crown Prince, Pangéran 
Mangkubumi (later Hamengkubuwana VI, reigned 1855-1877). But this influence was tempered 
by general revulsion at his immoral behaviour, Dj.Br. 18, Valck, ‘Geheime Memorie’, 31-3-1840; 
Appendix IV, pt. 1 note 5.  
3 Ali Basah Abdul Mahmud Gandakusuma (earlier Lurah Sukapja) was a younger brother of 
the above. He also became a trusted adviser and army commander of Dipanagara at the end of 
the Java War, but declined marriage with Dipanagara’s widowed daughter, marrying instead the 
favourite sister of Hamengkubuwana V, Mandoyokusumo 1977:38 no. 8. He later became patih 
of Yogya with the title Radèn Adipati Danureja V (in office 1847-1879), after serving for long as 
senior administrator of the royal domains (bupati pamajegan-Dalem).
4 On Radèn Ayu Jayakusuma see Appendix IV.
Appendix XIII824
kula ngatar pirsa dhateng sampéyan lampah kula wilujeng ing samargi-
margi boten sanès kalih wonten Magelang mila kula ngatari pirsa dhateng 
sampéyan mugi sampun dadus kasusahan anggalih dhateng kula sawab 
sampun dados suka-pirenanipun manah kula piyambak kalih kula pas-
rah wayah-wayah sampéyan sedaya punapa déné awak kula piyambak 
rumaos ageng temen kalepatan kula dhateng sampéyan ing lair punapa 
déné ingkang batos mugi wontena sih pengapunte[n] sampéyan dhateng 
kula ingkang ageng punapa déné dhateng Kanjeng Rama inggih sami 
ugi lepat kula mila wayah-wayah sampéyan yèn dhangan sami ngaosna 
dhateng Kanjeng Rama niyata nyuwonaken apunte[n] dhateng kalepatan 
kula ingkang lair punapa déné ingkang batos. 
 English translation
 After my many humble obeisances to you [mother], I offer you the news 
that my course has been fortunate throughout my whole journey, no 
different from what it was at Magelang. The reason I am informing you 
of this is that you should not be concerned about me because my heart 
is already fully satisfied, and I entrust to you all your grandchildren. 
Moreover, I myself feel how truly enormous are my faults towards you 
both outward and inward. May there be much forgiveness on your part 
towards me. Likewise towards His Highness, my father,5 [many] also are 
my faults. Thus, when they have the opportunity, your grandchildren 
must offer up to His Highness, my father, the religious intention of beg-
ging forgiveness for my faults both outward and inward. 
B 
The following letter was written by Dipanagara from Makassar on 14 Decem-
ber 1835 to Major-General Jan Baptist Cleerens (1785-1850),6 the Flemish officer 
(then a colonel) who had negotiated with him at Rèmakamal and Kecawang in 
northern Bagelèn, and at Menorèh in southern Kedhu in February 1830, and 
had persuaded him to go on to meet General H.M. de Kock in Magelang on 8 
March 1830 where he was later arrested on 28 March 1830. This letter together 
with another which Dipanagara wrote in the following year to the guardians 
of Hamengkubuwana V about the marriage of one of his daughters caused 
considerable consternation in Dutch official circles. First, because of the royal 
style adopted in the letters in which Dipanagara referred to himself by some 
of the titles he had used during the Java War, such as ‘Sultan Èrucakra’ (The 
Just King), ‘Kabiril Mukminin’ (The First among the Believers), and ‘Kalipah 
Rasulollah Jawa’ (The Caliph of the Prophet of God in Java), and because he 
5 Sultan Hamengkubuwana III (1812-1814) of Yogyakarta. 
6 For details of Cleerens’ army career, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:326 note 1.
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addressed Cleerens in Low Javanese (ngoko) and as ‘younger brother’ (rayi, 
adhi). Secondly, Dutch officials were concerned that Dipanagara both knew 
about Cleerens’s return to Java on 13 October 1835, a bare two months before 
this letter was written, and had the means of communicating secretly with 
Java, usually through sealed correspondence taken by skippers of Indonesian 
trading ships, in particular Makassarese praus. Finally, the letter seemed to 
draw Cleerens’s attention to a promise which Dipanagara thought had been 
made to him guaranteeing his safe return to Bagelèn if the Magelang ‘peace’ 
negotiations were not to his liking.7 These concerns formed the background 
7 Dipanagara’s view of Cleerens’ undertaking to him before his journey to Magelang can be 
seen quite clearly in his autobiography, BD (Manado) IV:299-301, XL (Megatruh) 170-9 mengkana 
ngandika aris/ Hèh Kurnèl apa rembagmu/ kalamun prayaga iki/ iya lawan karsaningong. 171. sun turuti 
mengkana Kurnèl turipun/ ingkang kepanggih Déwaji/ raosing manah pukulun/ Paduka mapan prayogi/ 
ngrumiyinana mring Kedhu. 172. mupung Jéndral pan dèrèng dhateng puniku/ pan dugi kawula Déwaji/ 
datan ngantos Siyam tuhu/ Jéndral pesthi nunten prapti/ sabab kawula Sang Katong. 173. anusuli serat 
yèn Paduka éstu/ pan arsa panggih pribadi/ mila dugi nunten wangsul/ punika yèn saupami/ karsa-Dalem 
boten dados. 174. Paduka Ji kawula aturi wangsul/ inggih mring Bagelèn malih/ sanadyan dados satuhu/ 
pan tangled sami Welandi/ kawula pan nemah Katong. 175. nging panuhun kawula mapan satuhu/ 
Panjenengan-Dalem ugi/ mapan sampun ngantos iku/ kagepok mring lepatnèki/ lan damel perkawis 
mangko. 176. amiwiti kalamun cidra Sinuhun/ pan mongsa wandéya panggih/ mring awak pribadènipun/ 
mengkana Sri Narapati/ sareng mirsa aturipun. 177. Kurnèl Klérès lawan Mayor Bokus iku/ ingkang tya/s 
Nata pan gampil/ kadya wus karsa Hyang Agung/ nanging sumedhé mring tekdir/ èsmu wirang Jeng Sang 
Katong. 178. lamun ngantos sumingkir dum-duman iku/ iya wong anèng dunyèki/ mengkana Ingkang 
Sinuhun/ mapan nulya ngandika ris/ hèh Kurnèl aturirèku. 179. sun turuti. 170. then softly spoke [the 
Sultan]:/ ‘Eh, Colonel, what is your advice?/ If it is appropriate/ with my wishes 171. I will follow 
it.’ Thus was the Colonel’s speech/ ‘[If] it suits, Your Highness,/ my heart’s feelings/ are that it 
would be desirable, Highness, /[for you] to go first to Kedhu. 172. Although the General [De Kock] 
has still not arrived there,/ my opinion, Highness,/ is that in truth before the fasting month,/ the 
General will certainly arrive/ for I have already. 173. sent a letter to reach him that Your Highness 
really wishes/ to meet him in person./ Thus I think he will soon return./ But if, for example,/ 
Your Highness’s wishes are not accomplished 174. [then] Sultan, I invite you to return/ indeed to 
Bagelèn again./ Even if it really comes/ to resistance with the Dutch/ I will chance it Sultan. 175. 
But truly my request/ is that Your Highness also/ must not go so far as to be/ affected by [personal] 
faults/ and make an issue. Besides, 176. if Highness, treachery is initiated,/ those involved will 
not fail to have to do/ with me personally.’/ Now the Sultan,/ when he heard the speech 177. of 
Colonel Cleerens and Major Buschkens (*),/ was easy at heart./ It was as if it was the wish of the 
Almighty/ that he should resign himself to his fate./ Openly ashamed would be the Sultan 178. if 
he went so far as to escape his lot/ as a man in this world./ Thus His Highness/ straightway spoke 
in a friendly fashion:/ ‘Ah, Colonel, that speech of yours. 179. I will follow’.
(*) Major Hendrik Frederik Buschkens (1795-1860), a Dutch officer who was second-in-com-
mand to Colonel Cleerens at the time of the negotiations with Dipanagara in Bagelèn and Kèdhu 
in February 1830. For a further discussion of Dipanagara’s assumptions about the undertakings 
he thought Cleerens had given him, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:564-5. Cleerens’s 
own version of the negotiations can be found in the dispatches which he wrote to his superior, 
Colonel F.D. Cochius; in Magelang from 16 February until 28 February 1830 which are in dK 
209. These show that he treated Dipanagara, openly at least, with respect, addressing him by his 
title of ‘Sultan’ (something which De Kock later refused to do in Magelang), and speaking to him 
directly in Malay, dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 
25-2-1830, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:544, 564-6.
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to the secret decision of the Governor-General in Council (AN Besluit van den 
Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 15-3-1837 no. 57, geheim) which ordered that a 
large part of Dipanagara’s entourage should be separated from him and sent 
to Ambon (in fact they were sent to Kyai Maja’s settlement in Tondano via 
Ambon in June 1839, see Appendix XII); that Dipanagara should be guarded 
more closely in Makassar, his contacts limited to his immediate family and 
servants; and that all his mail should be opened. A further recommendation 
that the prince’s monthly allowance should be substantially reduced was 
apparently not complied with by the governor of Makassar, see Appendix 
XII note 2.
The letter, which was probably dictated by Dipanagara to a scribe, was writ-
ten on Dutch government paper in black ink with thick flowing pen strokes 
probably made with an arèn palm pen. Unlike his later letter to the guard-
ians of Hamengkubuwana V and most of his other writings in Makassar it 
is in Javanese not pégon script. The yellow silk envelope (again a symbol of 
Dipanagara’s royal pretensions) was addressed in a different hand with a 
thin quill pen. Both the envelope and original letter are now on display in 
the Arsip Nasional (National Archives) in Jakarta. A photograph of the lat-
ter together with a faulty Javanese transliteration and Indonesian translation 
have been published in Sagimun 1965:350-3. 
Ngalamat serat dhumatenga Ingkang 
Rayi Jinderal-Mayor Kalères,
Cleerens also seems to have assured the prince that he was personally responsible for his 
interests, although there is nothing in his dispatches to indicate that he gave him any specific 
undertaking about ensuring his return to Bagelèn should the Magelang ‘peace’ conference fail. 
Privately, he took a critical view of Dipanagara describing him as ‘either a very stupid or a very 
hypocritical person’ and belittling his understanding of Islam, see dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens 
(Menorèh) to F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830. At the same time, he pressed Cochius to send 
sufficient reinforcements to enable him to carry out a coup de main against the prince and secure 
his arrest during the negotiations. In order to justify such conduct, Cleerens was constantly 
on the look out for evidence of ‘treachery’ on Dipanagara’s part: for example, he often drew 
Cochius’s attention to the prince’s supposed failure to keep a promise not to increase his follow-
ing by accepting new recruits from Bagelèn, see dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to F.D. 
Cochius (Magelang), 27-2-1830. Of these private views and plans, Dipanagara seems to have 
been unaware. Even after his capture at Magelang, he continued to refer to Cleerens’ supposed 
undertaking, see the report of Captain J.J. Roeps’s conversation with Dipanagara at Ungaran on 
28 March 1830 cited in ‘Aanteekeningen gehouden door den Majoor Adjudant de Stuers bij het 
overbrengen van den gearresteerden Hoofdmuiteling Prins Diepo Negoro van Magelang naar 
Batavia’, 9-4-1830, in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:741; and further Chapter XII. 
Letters written by Dipanagara from Batavia and Makasar 827
Ingkang pratadha Sinuwon Kajeng Sultan Ngabdulkamid Garucakra 
Kabiril Mukminin Kalipah Rasulollah Jawa, dhumatenga Ingkang Rayi 
Jinderal-Mayor Kalères, sawisé tabéningsun kang akèh-akèh Adhi 
Jinderal-Mayor Kalères marang sira, marmané ingsun akirim tulis sabab 
saking déné bangeté petengé penggalihingsun, awit Magelang saper-
ana-saperené adhi nura nana kang sun galih-galih nanging paturanira 
marang ingsun, sabab sabarang paturanira akèh kang manujuni kalawan 
kang sabarang kang dadi karsaningsun, déné paturanira kang manujuni 
lan sabarang kang dadi karsaningsun iku anggèré ingsun aja nganti 
kagepok marang kaluputan baé, marmané adhi dadi banget temen 
cuwané galih ingsun sabab durong nganti tutug goningsun tatepungan 
lawan sira, wekasan ingsun dadi nemu susah banget kaya mengkéné 
sabarang lara ku[m]pul ana ing galihingsun kabèh, kaya wong wus tan 
karuhan arané bareng ingsun mireng kabar terang lamun sira adhi ulèh 
pitulongé Gusti Alah Tangala bisa bali marang Jawa manèh, kaliwat 
padhangé galihingsun Adhi Jinderal-Mayor Kalères mongsa bodhoa 
pamikirira marang ingsun, tinulis Mekasar dina Isnèn tanggal ping telo-
likur sasi Ruwah taun Alip. 
English translation
The declaration of His Highness Sultan Ngabdulkamid Èrucakra Kabiril 
Mukminin Kalipah Rasulullah of Java to his younger brother Major-
General Cleerens. After my many greetings to you younger brother 
Major-General Cleerens, the reason I am sending this letter is because 
of my heart’s great gloom. From Magelang until now, younger brother, I 
have thought over nothing except your statements to me, because there 
was much in your statements which were in accord with my wishes. The 
[particular] statement of yours which was in harmony with my desires, 
dear [sir], was that I should not go so far as to be affected by [personal] 
faults. For this reason, younger brother, great indeed was my heart’s 
disappointment that my acquaintance with you was not fulfilled. In the 
end, I met with this great sadness [when] all sorts of grief gathered in 
my heart. [But] I was like a senseless man, so I should say, when I heard 
the certain news that you, younger brother, had, with the help of the 
Almighty, been able to return to Java again. Exceeding was my heart’s 
joy, younger brother Major-General Cleerens, [and now] it is up to you 
what your thoughts are for me. 
Written in Makassar on Monday the twenty-third of the month Ruwah in 
the year Alip [AJ 1763] (14 December 1835). 
APPENDIX XIV
Javanese and Western chronology AD 1785-18551
Windu-cycles
Javanese lunar years of 354 days are divided into eight-year (windu) cycles, each year 
being named in the following order: 1. Alip, 3. Éhé, 3. Jimawal, 4. Jé, 5. Dal, 6. Bé, 7. 
Wawu, 8. Jimakir. In the following table the beginning of each new windu-cycle is 
indicated by a space through the columns of the years. Thus AJ 1723 is the Alip year 
of a new windu-cycle. 
Months
The lengths of the months in the Javanese calendar vary from year to year, but all 
months in all years are either 29 or 30 days long. Their names are: 1. Muharam (Sura), 
2. Sapar, 3. Rabingulawal (Mulud), 4. Rabingulakir (Bakda Mulud), 5. Jumadilawal, 
6. Jumadilakir, 7. Rejeb, 8. Ruwah (Saban), Puwasa (Ramelan, Pasa), 10. Sawal, 11. 
Dulkangidah (Séla, Apit), 12. Besar (Dulkijah). 
Table of conversions
The Javanese year (AJ) is given here together with the date in the Western calendar 
(AD) upon which the AJ and, in most cases, the AH or Anno Hijrah years began. In 
some years, however, the AH year began one day before or after the AJ year. For more 
detailed information and tables, see Tijdrekening 1905:401-15, or Balai Poestaka 1932.
 AH AJ AD
 1200 1712 4 November 1785
 1201 1713 24 October 1786
 1202 1714 13 October 1787
  1203 1715 2 October 1788
 1204 1716 21 September 1789
 1205 1717 11 September 1790
 1206 1718 31 August 1791
 1207 1719 19 August 1792
 1208 1720  9 August 1793
 1209 1721 29 July 1794
 1210 1722 18 July 1795
 1211 1723  7 July 1796
1 Taken from Ricklefs 1974a:430-1, and Balai Poestaka 1932:13-5.
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 AH AJ AD
 1212 1724 26 June 1797
 1213 1725 16 June 1798
 1214 1726  5 June 1799
 1215 1727 25 May 1800
 1216 1728 15 May 1801
 1217 1729  4 May 1802
 1218 1730 23 April 1803
 
 1219 1731 12 April 1804
 1220 1732  1 April 1805
 1221 1733 22 March 1806
 1222 1734 11 March 1807
 1223 1735 28 February 1808
 1224 1736 17 February 1809
 1225 1737  6 February 1810
 1226 1738 26 January 1811
 
 1227 1739 16 January 1812
 1228 1740  4 January 1813
 1229 1741 25 December 1813
 1230 1742 14 December 1814
 1231 1743  3 December 1815
 1232 1744 22 November 1816
 1233 1745 11 November 1817
 1234 1746 31 October 1818
 
 1235 1747 21 October 1819
 1236 1748  9 October 1820
 1237 1749 28 September 1821
 1238 1750 18 September 1822
 1239 1751  6 September 1823
 1240 1752 26 August 1824
 1241 1753 15 August 1825
 1242 1754  4 August 1826
 1243 1755 25 July 1827
 1244 1756 13 July 1828
 1245 1757  3 July 1829
 1246 1758 22 June 1830
 1247 1759 11 June 1831
 1248 1760 31 May 1832
 1249 1761 20 May 1833
 1250 1762  9 May 1834
 1251 1763 29 April 1835
 1252 1764 17 April 1836
 1253 1765  7 April 1837
Appendix XIV830
 AH AJ AD
 1254 1766 27 March 1838
 1255 1767 16 March 1839
 1256 1768  5 March 1840
 1257 1769 22 February 1841
 1258 1770 11 February 1842
 1259 1771  1 February 1843
 1260 1772 21 January 1844
 1261 1773 10 January 1845
 1262 1774 30 December 1845
 1263 1775 19 December 1846
 1264 1776  9 December 1847
 1265 1777 27 November 1848
 1266 1778 16 November 1849
 1267 1779  6 November 1850
 1268 1780 26 October 1851
 1269 1781 15 October 1852
 1270 1782  4 October 1853
 1271 1783 23 September 1854
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APPENDIX XVI
Comparative values of paper and metal 
currency circulating in Java in 18111
Value of coins circulating in Java
      Dfl2
rupiah mas (gold rupee) coined in Batavia 
  and varying greatly in quality    19.20
half rupiah mas      9.60
Dutch/Venetian ducats      5.76
silver ducatoon (minted in Holland)     3.20
Spanish dollar (SpD) (silver)      2.56
real batu (an old mutilated silver coin, usually Portuguese cruzados 
  or German crowns [francas], in general circulation, but not issued by 
  the Dutch government)      2.40
half silver ducatoon (minted in Holland)     1.60
Dutch guilder/half real batu/Surat rupee in general circulation in 
  Batavia and the north coast areas       1.20
half Dutch guilder/quarter real batu      0.60
quarter Dutch guilder (6 stuivers)      0.30
dubbeltje (2½ stuivers) poor quality copper coins produced in      0.15
wang baru (2 stuivers) Surabaya at the Tawangsari mint (post 1808),   0.10
tengah wang baru (1 stuiver) often debased in value.      0.05
wang Bengal  small round copper coins imported from      0.08
half wang Bengal Dutch factories in Bengal.      0.04
duit (dhuwit)  old copper coins minted during the VOC period;      0.02
half duit (sigar)  the most popular currency in the Javanese countryside.      0.01
1 Taken from IOL, Eur. F 148/4 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 4):173-4, Raffles, ‘Memorandum 
on Currency and Coin’, Malacca, 1-1811 –  2-1811, For further details on coins in circulation at 
this time, see Hageman 1860:335-7; Netscher and Van der Chijs 1864:76-88, 225-30.
2 The relative values of the coins are quoted in Dutch Indies guilders and cents. Until 1826, 
these were exchanged at an agio of 15-20 percent against coins of an equivalent face value minted 
in Holland until 1826.  
Appendix XVI838
Value of coins and paper money circulating in Batavia 
gold ducat       4.32
ducatoon      3.20
Spanish dollar (SpD)    2.56
rix dollar (rijksdaalder)    2.40
rix dollar (government paper currency, discounted at 15-20 %  
  against pre–1811 coin)    1.92
rupiah (Java rupee)    1.20
Dutch guilder      0.80
Austrian-Netherlands schilling   0.24
dubbeltje (Dutch 10 cents piece)   0.10
stuiver (Dutch copper penny piece)   0.04 
Relative value of Dutch Indies coins in exchange with English currency (£.s.d.) in 18113
    £ s d.
gold ducat (rose noble/11 guilders) 0 19 9
ducatoon (3 guilders)  0 5 8
rijksdaalder (2½ guilders)  0 4 6
guilder     0 1 9
schilling (6 stuiver)   0  0 6
dubbeltje (2 stuiver)  0 0 2½ 
stuiver (8 duit)     0 0 1¼ 
copper duit (2 penning)  0 0 ¼ 
 
3 All coins referred to are silver unless otherwise stated.  
Glossary of Javanese words
Note: These definitions give only those senses in which the words have been used in 
the present study
abdi-Dalem royal official or retainer usually living in the immediate envi-
rons of the royal palace (namely within the walls of the kraton, 
see below)
adat custom, time honoured practice both in social etiquette and in 
legal matters
adipati used in conjunction with pangéran to indicate a senior prince 
often with an extensive apanage and a quasi-independent 
 position in the kraton
ali basah title accorded by Dipanagara to certain select army during the 
Java War, from the Turkish Ali Pasha (the ‘High Pasha’)
alun-alun the great square or open field in front of and behind the kraton; 
it was usually planted with two boxed waringin (banyan) trees 
as symbols of royal authority
babad Javanese historical texts written in chronicle form and divided 
into cantos (each with a separate metre); from the Javanese 
verb, mbabad, to clear (the jungle)
bandar a keeper of a tollgate or customs post on the main roads and 
rivers in south-central and east Java before the outbreak of 
the Java War; the tollgate keepers were usually Chinese who 
farmed the rent of customs, first from the Javanese courts and 
later (after 1812) from the European government
batik intricately designed wax-dyed fabric
batur porter or coolie who carried goods by shoulder load, referred 
to in Javanese as a pikul (see below), on the main roads in Java 
during the nineteenth century               
bupati high administrative official: the title was used for heads of 
provincial areas (especially in the mancanagara, see below) and 
for the chiefs of administrative departments in the kraton; thus 
kabupatèn, the residence, office or administrative area of a 
 bupati. See also wedana below
cacah household, used as a unit of measurement for land and popu-
lation in Java. It was usually reckoned as the amount of land 
which could be worked (and provide a livelihood) for a family 
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of five; thus the size of the cacah varied according to the quality 
of the ground and the availability of irrigation
dalem princely residence or home of a high court official; it usually 
comprised an extensive central building with private apart-
ments and a large front veranda (pendhapa, see below) for 
receiving visitors, a wide yard and outhouses for servants and 
relations. The whole complex was usually surrounded by a 
wall or bamboo fence and looked like a kraton in miniature
demang middle-ranking provincial official with special tax collecting
 responsibilities 
désa village or complex of houses with ricefields and orchards 
attached in rural areas
dhalang puppeteer in the wayang theatre; he is the key figure in wayang 
performances having the task of moving the puppets, repro-
ducing the speech of the various characters, telling the story of 
the plot, singing snatches of song and making jokes. He also 
has the duty of ensuring that the performance (which starts at 
about 9 p.m.) is over and complete before the break of day (at 
about 6 a.m.) 
emban guardian or nurse of a young child or youth below the age of 
majority, which in Java is sixteen years 
Èrucakra title of the Javanese ‘Just King’ (ratu adil, see below) who is 
believed to make his appearance after a period of economic 
decline and moral decadence. The characteristics of his reign 
are low taxes, fair justice, cheap food and clothes, and feelings 
of common brotherhood. The origin of the title Èrucakra is 
unclear, but may be connected to the Hindu god Wisnu’s sun 
disc (cakra) weapon, see Chapter IX note 147
gamelan Javanese orchestra comprising mainly percussion and wind 
instruments 
Garebeg thrice-annual Javanese-Islamic feasts, consisting of the Garebeg 
Mulud in celebration of the birth of The Prophet Muhammad, 
Garebeg Puwasa to celebrate the end of the fasting month, and 
Garebeg Besar in commemoration of Abraham’s willingness to 
sacrifice his son (Ishmael/Isaac) and of the pilgrimage to Mecca
gunung mountain or large hill (usually over 600 meters in height); it 
was also a title used in Surakarta for police and tax officials in 
the villages who were answerable to the patih (in Yogya, they 
were known as Tamping). The title probably derived from the 
gunungan (large mounds of decorated rice) which these officials 
had to bear in procession during the Garebeg ceremonies (see 
above) in Surakarta
guwa cave, grotto
haji the title of a pilgrim who has been to Mecca; the haj (pilgrimage 
to Mecca) is one of the five central obligations of a Muslim, the 
others being: the shahadat (the confession of The Faith: ‘There 
is no God but God and Muhammad is His Prophet’); salat (five 
daily prayers); zakat (the giving of alms) and puwasa, the obser-
vation of the fast during the fasting month 
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jimat amulet or talisman (usually small pieces of different sorts of 
metal, wood or paper with writing in Arabic script containing 
secret formulae) which are believed to ward off sickness and 
danger, and provide invulnerability in battle
jung a unit of land measurement (usually about 600 square feet): like 
the cacah (see above) it varied in size according to the quality of 
the ground. In some areas it is reckoned as being four times the 
size of the cacah and enough to provide a livelihood for four 
families of cultivators 
jurukunci doorkeeper or guardian of the keys of a grave or holy place 
(see pradikan below)
kadipatèn  residence of the Crown Prince (Pangéran Adipati Anom) at the 
south-central Javanese courts 
kali a large river; also ‘Bengawan’ in the case of the Sala river
kampung village or urban settlement, the latter often occupied by a 
 particular ethnic group or community, hence Kampung Melayu, 
Kampung Cina, the Malay and Chinese quarters of a town
kapitan Cina head of the Chinese community in a town or provincial area
kauman strict religious community in the court cities who resided in the 
area near the Great Mosque (Mesjid Ageng)
kebathinan Javanese spiritual and mystical disciplines which can range 
from varieties of Islamic mysticism to magical practices. In 
general kebathinan is the science of the soul or the inner man 
(bathin) and is concerned with providing methods for spiritual 
growth and the unity of man with his Creator
kècu robber, bandit or thief (see wong durjana below)
kepatihan office and residence of the chief administrator (patih, see below) 
at the Central Javanese courts
krama ‘High Javanese’, one of the two basic forms of Modern Javanese 
(see also ngoko below): used to address superiors in age or 
social standing 
kraman rebel, one who sets himself up against the established authority 
kraton royal palace, court and residence of a ruler. This comprises the 
royal apartments and meeting halls etcetera, and also 
 numerous houses inhabited by the families of royal retain-
ers. The whole complex, which in Yogya contained between 
10-15,000 people in 1812 and extended three miles in circumfer-
ence, is surrounded by a large defensive wall, see page 4.
kris Javanese dagger or small stabbing sword often considered 
to possess supernatural powers. The blade can be straight or 
undulating and the metal is inlaid with meteoric iron. This 
damascening (or pamor in Javanese) produces many different 
shapes and figures and gives each kris a unique character
kyai  honorific title for old men or country gentlemen, especially 
teachers of religious and spiritual disciplines see ulama below. 
The title is also used to refer to special kris and other pusaka 
(see below) 
lakon a plot which is enacted in a wayang drama (see wayang below)
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lurah chief or head, especially used as a title for village leaders; also 
the head of any administrative branch or group (hence kyai 
lurah, the title of the patih amongst court officials)
mancanagara  the outer regions or distant provinces of a kingdom (as distinct 
from the inner areas near the court, see nagara agung below). 
These outlying regions, which were originally added to the 
royal patrimony by conquest, were administered directly by 
their own bupati as opposed to the nagara agung which was 
governed in the name of the sovereign by the patih. 
 The mancanagara areas to the east and west of the princely 
 territories were finally annexed by the Dutch in 1830
mantri  title of an official of lower rank in the royal administration 
mas title of nobility, used for distant relations (male) of the royal
 families
mesjid   mosque or place of worship; hence Mesjid Ageng (‘Great 
Mosque’) at the courts
nagara agung  the core regions of a kingdom, the lands in the vicinity of the 
court. These were used as crown lands (narawita, bumi pama-
jegan-dalem) for special types of produce, taxes and labour 
 services for the court, and as apanages (lungguh) or usufruct 
land for members of the royal family and high court officials 
nayaka adviser to the ruler. There were eight of these in each of the 
south-central Javanese courts comprising the patih and the 
heads of kraton administrative departments (the four Inner and 
the four Outer bupati, known as wedana jero and wedana jaba) 
ngoko ‘Low Javanese’, one of the two basic forms of Modern Javanese 
(see krama above); used to address close equals or inferiors (in 
age or social standing) 
panakawan intimate retainer of a ruler, nobleman or official: these retainers 
occasionally had something of the humour and wisdom 
 associated with the clown-servant advisers in the wayang 
 theatre 
panembahan high princely title usually reserved for respected, older male 
members of the close royal family, for example, the uncles and 
elder brothers of a ruler 
pangéran prince, male offspring of a ruler by official and unofficial wives
panji young man of high nobility; a title given to youths who served 
as intimate retainers of the rulers and to military commanders 
at the courts 
pasisir coast, in particular the north coast of Java, also used to indicate 
regions not in the heartland (princely territories) of 
 south-central Java
pathok negari centres for the ulama (experts in fiqh or Islamic law) who acted 
as the advisers of the pengulu (chief religious functionary) 
in the religious courts. Before they were abolished in circa 
1830, there were four pathok (alias ‘pillars’) at both Yogya and 
Surakarta answerable to the pengulu at the centre, thus recalling 
the five pillars of Islam
patih chief minister of the Javanese kingdoms: his full title was patih 
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jaba (prime minister dealing with affairs outside the court) to 
distinguish him from the patih jero who had primary 
 responsibility over matters within the kraton (see nayaka above). 
The title was also used more generally for the head of an 
administration, hence patih kadipatèn the head of the Crown 
Prince’s establishment
payung state umbrella, used as an insignia of rank or royal birth
pégon Javanese written in Arabic characters (usually unvocalised), 
often used by the more self-consciously religious members of 
the south-central Javanese communities, for example, the santri, 
see below
pendhapa large covered audience hall or veranda in front of a Javanese 
house for receiving visitors 
pengulu  head of the religious hierarchy in the court towns who also 
played a leading role as an interpreter of Islamic law codes in 
the religious courts (surambi) of the south-central Javanese 
 kraton 
pesanggrahan  pavilion, overnight stopping place or royal hunting lodge 
pesantrèn   religious boarding school comprising dormitories, places of 
instruction and adjacent ricefields, which were frequented by 
students of religion (see santri below)
pikul a weight (usually about 62 kilograms) which is carried in two 
baskets, weighted evenly and borne on a carrying pole slung 
across the shoulders
pondhok  small religious boarding school set up on the same lines as a 
pesantrèn but on a much smaller scale
pradikan   tax-free areas given by the courts and usually set aside for 
those engaged in religious pursuits or for guardians of graves 
and holy places (see jurukunci above); hence pradikan ageng, the 
head of such a tax-free area
prajurit  soldier, member of the palace guard
prang sabil holy war; a war waged for (Islamic) religious ideals, which is 
one of the obligations of a Muslim
priyayi member of the official class in south-central Java, literally para 
yayi, the ‘younger brothers of the ruler’
pusaka holy regalia or heirloom handed down from one generation to 
the next in a particular family; often considered to have super-
natural powers (see kris above)
radèn title of middle nobility given to persons distantly related to the 
main royal families
radèn mas title of high nobility given to close male descendants of the 
main royal families
ratu   principal official wife of the ruler: in the south-central Javanese 
courts the rulers usually had four such principal wives, one for 
each point of the compass. The one for the southern quarter 
(Ratu Kidul) was the queen of the spirit kingdom in the south-
ern ocean (see below)
ratu adil   see above under Èrucakra
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Ratu Kidul the goddess of the southern ocean. According to popular 
Javanese beliefs, she rules over a court inhabited by spirits. The 
rulers of the south-central Javanese courts are expected to enter 
into a spiritual marriage with the goddess in order to ensure 
the support of the spirit kingdoms during their period of rule
santri a student of (Islamic) religion, follower of a religious way of 
life, pupil at a pesantrèn or pondhok (see above)
sawah wet ricefield
sèh (syèh)   title given to high religious dignitaries, especially to teach-
ers and scholars who were Arabs from the Hadhramaut or 
who claimed descent from the family of The Prophet (Arabic 
Shaykh)
selir unofficial wife of a prince or ruler
sénapati  commander-in-chief of an army
sengkala  chronogram list 
sentana   member of the sultan’s family, usually a distant relative such as 
a second or third cousin
tapa  to engage in asceticism: an ascetic, mystic, man of religion. See 
also tirakat
tembang  verse; scanned verse used in chronicles etcetera
tirakat to go on retreat and practice meditation and asceticism. See 
also tapa
tumenggung title of high administrative rank usually given to bupati (see 
above)
ulama Muslim scholar especially applied as a title to those learned in 
Islamic law (fiqh)
wali early apostle or saint of Islam in Java; the wali are usually said 
to have been nine in number
wayang Javanese puppet theatre of several types. Those mentioned in 
this study are as follows: wayang kulit, shadow theatre with 
flat leather puppets; wayang purwa, plays dealing with ancient 
mythology (principally  the  Ramayana  and Mahabharata 
cycles); wayang wong, theatre performance using dancers, and 
wayang topèng, a masked dance             
wedana                     high administrative official; the title, like that of bupati, was 
used both for officials within the kraton and for those in charge 
of extensive administrative areas such as the eastern and west-
ern mancanagara where the senior official was known as bupati 
wedana                                                
wong cilik common people                                       
wong durjana robbers, tramps, bandits, or ‘evil folk’ in general (see kècu above)
wong putihan            students of religion or religious officials living a communal life 
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Abbas, Lieutenant (Malay interpreter 
to 1813 Sambas expedition)  410-1 
(appointed tutor in Malay to HB IV) 
‘Abbassīd, caliphate  581
‘Abd al-Aziz, Wahhābī leader  114 
(conquers Nejd and holy cities)
‘Abd al-Hamid I, Ottoman sultan 
(reigned 1773-87)  152
‘Abd al-Rahim ba’Chaiban (Tuwan Sarif 
Ahmad; father of Radèn Tumenggung 
Danuningrat, bupati of Kedhu)  763
‘Abd al-Samad al-Palimbāni  273
Abdul Arifin, see Natapura, Pangéran 
(son of PB IV)
Abdul Gang Singh, sepoy deserter  see 
Singh
Abdulgani, Haji  593 (sent by 
Dipanagara to confer with HB II), 786
Abdulhamit, Pangéran  see Dipanagara
Abdullah, Kyai (brother of Kyai Murma 
Wijaya)  447
Abdulsalam, Haji  281 (brings HB II 
news of developments in Cirebon)
Abdul Wahid, Haji (kraton santri leads 
official court haj to Mecca)  89
Abdurrahman, ‘Pangéran’  see Kindar, 
Radèn Mas
Aberdeen (Scotland)  457, 465
Abijaya, Kyai (Dipanagara’s pusaka kris)  
154, 600 (worn at Tegalreja, July 1825)
Abimanyu, wayang hero  247
d’Abo, R.C.N. (1786-1824; Assistant-
Resident Yogya, 1817-23)  120, 437-
9 (divorces wife), 457 (appointed 
Assistant-Resident), 503 (encourages 
debauchery in Yogya), 506, 513 
(describes Mt Merapi eruption), 519-
20 (dismissed as Assistant-Resident), 
537-41 (shows Dipanagara and 
Mangkubumi round Bedhaya), 810
Abraham, Prophet  574, 702
Abubakar, Muhamad (?1765-1826; 
pre-1810, Dipawijaya I), Pangéran  50 
(contacts with bandits), 129 (plans 
for haj), 235 (shaves head as santri), 
271 (as head of Yogya court priyayi 
pradikan), 333 (wears haji dress during 
British assault,  20-6-1812), 797 (killed 
30-7-1826)
Abubakar, Sèh  445
Abuyamin, Ketib (pengulu of Yogya, 
1823-?)  546-6 (appointed), 773
Aceh  xvii, 414, 654
Acehnese  660 (Roeps killed by)
Adam, Nabi (Prophet)  574, 745
Adams, Colonel Alexander (Resident of 
Surakarta)  298, 320, 322, 324, 359, 378 
(problems with PB IV)
adat (custom)  77, 632 (Dipanagara’s 
insistence on)
Adikarta, district (Kulon Progo), post-
1830 Pakualam landholdings in  11, 
38, 73, 395, 463, 584
Adikusuma, Pangéran (son of HB I)  254, 
272 (robs Natakusuma’s residence 
during exile, 1810-1), 795 (loyal to 
Dutch)
Adikusuma, Pangéran (?1800-1829; son 
of Pangéran Jayakusuma / Ngabèhi)  
658 (killed in Gunung Kelir) 
Adinagara, Pangéran (post-1825 
Suryèngalaga; son of HB III)  75, 
88, 121 (sent women’s clothes by 
Dipanagara), 188 (brought up by 
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Sumadiningrat), 208 (greets Daendels 
at Kalasan), 368 (appointed pangéran), 
369, 403, 481, 795 (joins Dipanagara)
Adinagara, Pangéran (bupati keparak; 
nephew of HB I; died pre-1825)  181, 
254 (on expedition against Rongga)
Adipala, sub-district (Banyumas)  20
Adiprakasa Lala Jayamisésa, sultan  128 
(satria lelana name of Radèn Mas Said/
MN I)
Adisurya, Pangéran (?1800-1829; son of 
HB III)  90, 111, 368, 663 (died on Mt 
Sirnabaya), 666, 795
Adiwinata I, Pangéran (?1783-1826; son 
of HB II)  254, 796 (loyal to Dutch; 
killed 30-7-1826)
Adiwinata II, Pangéran (son of HB II), 
326, 592 (joins Dipanagara at Selarong, 
7-1825), 796
Administrate der Houtbosschen  see 
Forestry Administration
Adrianople (Edirne)  665 (falls to 
Russians, 1829)
agama Buda (pre-Islamic religion in Java)  
485 (in Tengger highlands)
agami Islam  see Islamic Moral Order
Ageng, Ratu (?1734-1803; pre-1792, 
Ratu Kadipatèn; pre-1755, Mas Rara 
Juwati; guardian of Dipanagara 
at Tegalreja)  75, 77 (piety and 
character), 78 (trading activities), 80-3 
(develops Tegalreja), 94-5, 127, 135 
(grave at Imagiri), 190, 365, 405, 444 
(possible links with Kyai Murma), 719 
(Sumbawa family links of), 760, 762, 
765, 782  see also Derpayuda
Ageng, Ratu (?1750-1820; formerly 
Ratu Kedhaton, consort of HB II)  365 
(appointed, June 1812), 407 (fears HB 
IV will not rule), 461 (death), 760, 762, 
764, 780  see also Kedhaton, Ratu
Ageng, Ratu (?1780-1826; pre-1814, Ratu 
Kencana; pre-1820, Ratu Ibu)  62, 
74, 100 (affair with Wiranagara), 228 
(pays Kyai Murma to kill HB II), 325, 
366 (plate), 367-8 (character), 398-9 
(heads Danureja IV and Wiranagara 
clique), 410 (takes control of court 
finances), 412 (orders HB III’s selir 
to sleep with teenage HB IV), 421 
(attitude during sepoy conspiracy), 
440 (lover of Wiranagara), 444-8 
(relations with Kyai Murma), 452-3 
(reacts to Dipanagara’s cancellation 
of appointment of gunung), 533 (land-
rent indemnities), 541-2 (indemnity 
for Bedhaya), 543-6 (role in dismissal 
of Kertadirja II and Rahmanudin), 549 
(refuses to deal with abuse of court 
women), 552 (dies of a broken heart, 
June 1826), 572-3, 587, 760
Agrarian Law (1870)  756
agrarian crisis  see agriculture
agriculture, 210 (techniques discussed 
with Daendels, 31-7-1809), 475 (crisis 
in, 11-1824), 757 (agrarian crisis, 1823-
5)
Agung, sultan (reigned 1613-46)  71 
(prophecy about Dutch), 135-6 
(Dipanagara’s vision of), 147 (meeting 
with Ratu Kidul), 517 (prophecy 
about Dutch), 559, 571, 574-5, 587, 
620, 660 (prescription against crossing 
Bagawanta), 627 (Javanese lunar year 
cycle of), 758  see also Kali Bagawanta
Ahmad, Encik (Malay Indian orderly of 
John Crawfurd)  332
Ahmad, Sèh (son-in-law of Sèh al-
Ansari)  627
Ainslie, Dr Daniel (Resident of Yogya, 
1815-6)  427, 809
Ajar Rawana (Imanreja) (religious 
teacher Sréngat)  486
ajat (religious feast)  78
Aji Saka, myth (peopling of Java)  153, 
483
Alang-alang Ombo, village (Bagelèn)  
632 (Garebeg Puwasa celebrated at)
al-Burak (winged mount of The Prophet)  
571 (Janggi Gandan)
alcohol  188 (Sumadiningrat’s 
attachment to), 354 (served in Tan 
Jin Sing’s house), 437 (Crawfurd’s 
parsimony with), 459 (increased post-
1816 consumption at courts), 524 
(Dipanagara’s love of sweet wine), 549 
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(Chevallier’s addiction to), 552 (death 
of Chevallier from)
Alexander I, tsar (reigned 1801-25)  500
Alexander of Macedon  167  see also Serat 
Sakondhar
Algemeen Rijksarchief (Brussels)  xix
Algemene Secretarie (General Secretariat 
Batavia)  739  see also Baud
Algiers  609
Ali, Haji (Yogya kraton santri)  593 
(reports Dipanagara’s plans), 639 (in 
Tondano with Maja), 723 (refuses to 
join Dipanagara), 787, 793
Ali, Muhammad (Pasha of Egypt, 
reigned 1805-49)  114
Ali, Muhamad (Banyumas)  426 (takes 
‘Pangéran Jayakusuma’ title)
Ali Basah (‘High Pasha’), title  xvi, 153, 
623, 648-9
Ali Pasha, Hasan (Ottoman governor of 
Smyrna/Izmir)  665
Alip, Radèn Mas (‘mad’ son of 
Dipanagara)  97, 101, 507, 593, 766
alun-alun (Plérèd)  630 (murder of santri 
on c. 1650)
alun-alun (Yogya)  see Yogyakarta
Alwi, Sayyid  see Danuningrat
Ahmad Dullah, title  623
Amad Petaja (Menayu village, 
Barabadur)  497 (gives away 
Dipasana’s supporters)
Amangkurat I, Sunan (reigned 1646-
77)  132, 137, 290, 337 (example cited 
during British attack on Yogya), 495 
(grave cleaned during 1821 cholera 
epidemic), 571, 608, 630, 758  see also 
Tegalarum
Amangkurat II, Sunan (reigned 1677-
1703)  386
Amangkurat III, Sunan (reigned 1703-8)  
237
Amangkurat IV, Sunan (reigned 1719-26) 
369, 444
Amattakar, Haji (confidante of HB II)  
593, 787  see also Jayamenggala
Amazon corps (prajurit keparak èstri / 
pasukan Langenkusuma, Yogya)  5, 76-7, 
210, 225, 283 (HB II exercises), 336-7 
(around HB II during British assault), 
350 (seek shelter in Natakusuman), 
615 (military training used by women 
fighters in Java War), 629, 645
Ambarawa, district (Semarang)  584
Ambarketwatang  36  see also Gamping
Ambarmaya, séla gilang (meditation 
stone)  564
Ambarrukmo  209
Ambiyah, Radèn Mas  see 
Hamangkubuwana IV
Ambon, as place of exile  76, 111, 181 
(Dutch garrison in), 257, 320, 353, 
363 (HB II in), 416, 427 (exile of 
Mangkubumi to), 441 (HB II in), 447-8 
(Kyai Murma in), 498, 544 (Kertadirja 
II in), 558 (PB VI in), 592 (HB II returns 
from), 636, 638, 668 (Imam Bonjol as 
exile in), 700-1, 710 (HB II and Sultan 
Mahmud Badarrudin of Palembang 
in), 711, 717-9, 722, 738, 740-1, 746 
(Dipanagara II transferred to, 1851), 
816-20 (Dipanagara’s followers in exile 
sent to, 6-1839)
Ambonese, troops  157 (in Klathèn 
/ Yogya garrisons), 235, 283 
(slaughtered at Meester Cornelis, 26-
8-1812), 297 (Yogya garrison relieved), 
304 (‘colonial corps’), 356 (Yogya 
ruler’s dragoon guards), 427
ambushes (Java War)  608  see also 
Papringan
Americans  608 (smuggling brig), 610
Amiens, Peace of (1802)  xii
Amir Hamza  see Ménak Amir Hamza
amok, mental state  353-4, 601 (Smissaert 
accuses Dipanagara of)
Amongraga, Sèh  140  see also Centhini
Amoy  399
Ampèl, holy graves at (Surabaya)  250, 
291, 486  see also Ngampèl Dentha
Ampèl, estate/village on Surakarta-
Boyolali road  38, 44 (Chinese 
sugar factories in), 56 (Dezentjé’s 
bodyguards at), 454 (land-rent at), 470 
(tollgate at), 531  see also Dezentjé
Ampèl-Dentha  see Ngampèl-Dentha
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Amsterdam  162, 535-6, 695  see also New 
Amsterdam, fort
amutih (‘white’ food fast)  492
Anbiya, Serat (lives of the Prophets)  103
Andayaningrat, Radèn Ayu (post-1826, 
Ratu Sultan)  645, 765
Anggèr, Ratu (daughter of HB II; wife of 
Danureja II)  219, 224
Angger Agung (‘great’ law code)  499
Angger Arubiru (law on disturbing the 
peace)  499
Angger Gladhag (code regulating porters’ 
guilds) 196, 201
Angger Gunung (village police code)  15, 
38, 196 (recodification of, 26-9-1808), 
217
Angger Sepuluh (agrarian law code)  458 
(October 1818 revision), 499
Angling Driya (Serat Gandakusuma)  
105
Anglo-Dutch War see Fourth Anglo-
Dutch War (1780-3)
Anglo-Mysore War see Fourth Anglo-
Mysore War (1798-99)
Angon Asmara, Panji see 
Mangkudiningrat I
Angrèni, Serat  105 (Dipanagara asks for 
copy of, 1844)
Anom, Ratu (?1793-1859; pre-1811, 
Radèn Ajeng Suratmi; post-1811, 
Ratu Ayu; post-1830, Ratu Pakualam; 
daughter of HB II and Ratu Kencana 
Wulan; wife of Natadiningrat / 
Pakualam II; mother of Pakualam III)  
79, 221 (offered to Radèn Rongga after 
Ratu Maduretna’s death), 225 (accused 
of lasciviousness by Daendels), 237, 
313 (as Ratu Ayu), 761
Anom, Ratu  see Suratmi, Radèn Ajeng
Ansari, Sèh Abdul Ahmad bin Abdullah 
al-Ansari (alias Habib Ahmad al-
Ansari)  101, 129, 627, 787
Ansari, Radèn Ayu Sèh (daughter of 
Pangéran Blitar I)  101
Ansari II, Sèh Ahmad (son-in-law of 
Sèh Abdul Ahmad bin Abdullah al-
Ansari)  101, 787
Antang, district (east Java)  162, 266
Antawirya, Bendara Radèn Ayu  88  see 
also Retnakusuma, Radèn Ayu
Antawirya, Radèn  see Dipanagara, 
Pangéran
Antwerp, citadel  734  see also Chassé 
Anyer, port (Sunda Straits)  157, 648
apanage system (Yogya)  9, 14 (fief 
holders), 16 (plate), 34  see also 
lungguh
apostates (kapir murtad)  xvi, 129
apostles of Islam  see Demak
Arabia  68, 114, 410, 483, 543, 597
Arabic language  47 (study of Arabic 
letters/alip-alipan), 483-4, 487, 489, 
506 (formula used in Usali prayer 
for dead), 622 (inscription on 
Dipanagara’s standard), 654 (Snouck 
Hurgronje as Professor of)
Arabs, in Java  8 (Gresik gun foundries), 
21 (Java-Trengganu traders), 215, 
272 (Gresik gun makers), 320 
(in Surakarta), 414 (Wahhābhī 
disturbances), 511 (Sayyid Hasan as 
tutor of HB IV), 616, 626-7 (as santri 
supporters of Dipanagara)
Arafat, plain of (Mecca)  81
Ardia, Janissary regiment  152
ari kiyamat (Final Day of Judgement)  147
Arjawinangun  see Rajawinangun
Arjuna, wayang hero  117 (Dipanagara 
compared to), 153, 156, 403 
(Dipanagara as), 404 (plate), 405, 411, 
571-2
Arjuna Sasrabahu, text  410
Arjuna Wijaya, text  105
Arjuna Wiwāha, text  105, 154, 156, 572
Arkio, regiment (Java War)  152, 634  see 
also Ardia
armaments  606-11 (during Java War), 
647  see also weapons
armaments foundries  see Gresik, Kutha 
Gedhé, Yogyakarta
artillery  8 (kalantaka /culvereens), 183 
(mounted horse artillery for MN 
Legion), 216 (ordered for Yogya kraton 
defences, November 1809), 272 (new 
orders from Gresik), 329 (new guns 
on Yogya kraton walls), 335 (British 
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bombardment), 336 (low morale 
amongst Yogya gunners), 345 (Yogya 
batteries dismantled), 350 (ordnance 
transported to Residency), 536 (given 
to European land-renters to defend 
estates), 609 (in Java War)
Arung-Binang (Lord of the Red Pikes), 
Radèn Tumenggung (Surakarta bupati 
of Karanganyar/Bagelèn)  9, 481
Asmara Supi, text  105, 744 (Dipanagara 
orders copy of)
Asmaratruna, Nyai (female dhukun)  659  
(treats Dipanagara for malaria)
Assey, Charles Chaston (1779-1819) 443
Auchmuty, Sir Samuel (1756-1822; 
general and C-in-C British invasion 
force, 1811)  290
augury  496  see also dhukun
Aurora, S.S. (Dutch naval brig)  498 
(transports Dipasana to Ambon, 1824)
Ayah, sub-district (Banyumas)  20, 771
Ayu, Ratu  see Anom, Ratu
babad, Javanese chronicles  70, 102, 350 
(plundered by British), 351 (disposal 
of Yogya kraton MSS)  see also Javanese 
literature
Babad Bedhah ing Ngayogyakarta 
(Chronicle of the Fall of Yogyakarta)  
188, 295, 321, 332, 336-7, 340-2 
(description of final minutes in 
Yogya kraton), 342 (HB II’s capture), 
348 (plight of court officials), 357-
9 (HB III’s investiture parade), 397 
(description of Danureja IV), 406 
(deathbed of HB III), 440 (origins of 
mother of author of), 757
Babad Dipanagara (Manado version)  
xvi-xvii, 86, 108 (composition of), 
128, 291, 313, 319 (description of 
secret correspondence, 1811), 320 
(transcription of in Surakarta 1949), 
324, 332-42 (account of fall of Yogya), 
376, 380, 388, 564, 595 605-6, 626, 650 
(translation into Malay), 659, 670, 725, 
731-4
Babad Dipanagara (Surakarta version)  
xvii-xviii, 48, 77, 170, 452, 606, 630 
(compares Dipanagara to egg-saint)
Babad Dipanagaran Surya Ngalam 
(allegorical/prophetic text written by 
Dipanagara II)  97, 403
Babad Dipanagaran (Yogya kraton text)  
545
Babad Kraton, text  167, 410
Babad Ngayogyakarta, text  313  see also 
Suryanagara, Pangéran 
Babad Pacitan, text  193
Babad Pakualam, text  218-9, 224, 228, 
277, 292, 311, 329, 340 (description of 
surrender scene in Yogya kraton)
Babad Spèhi (Chronicle of the Sepoy 
War), text  331
Babad Tanah Jawi, text  147 (description 
of Agung’s meeting with Ratu Kidul), 
492, 579
Babadan, coffee estate (Slèman district, 
flanks of Gunung Merapi)  535-6, 637  
see also Bouwens van der Boyen
Badarudin, Haji (commander Suranatan 
corps; post-1830, pengulu of Purwareja 
/ Bagelèn)  89, 152, 481, 593 (emissary 
of Dipanagara to HB II, July 1825), 
633, 671, 688, 697, 700, 707, 725, 788
Badarrudin, Sultan Mahmud of 
Palembang (reigned, 1804-12, 1813, 
1818-21)  323 (British expedition 
against 1812), 710 (Ternate exile of)
Badhèran, Kyai (Ketib Iman Wirapatih, 
elder brother of Kyai Maja)  634, 794
Badhèran, pesantrèn  91, 627, 794  see also 
Maja
Badran, dam  36
Bagelèn  8-9, 11-2, 17, 19, 23-7, 34, 
37-8, 43-4, 49, 90-1, 116, 129, 153, 
161 (Lowanu), 164 (proposed 
annexation of), 185, 254, 333 (troop 
reinforcements sent to Yogya from), 
368-9 (Dipanagara’s apanage holdings 
in), 383 (tobacco exports from), 394 
(Pakualam landholdings in), 399 (Tan 
Jin Sing’s apanage in), 405, 408, 415, 
455 (pepper plantations in), 463 (local 
inhabitants’ hatred of indigo in), 
465, 474 (idea of annexation to pay 
for tollgate abolition), 480-3 (Umar 
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Mahdi disturbances in), 493 (low 
sugar prices in, 1822),  520 (plans for 
annexation of), 553, 561-2 (plans for 
annexation of, 1824-5), 586, 591, 610 
(fate of Chinese during Java War), 
611, 617, 623, 626 (fighting qualities 
of men of), 627 (followers of pesantrèn 
in), 632, 641 (Dipanagara moves to), 
646-7, 650 (Dipanagara raises taxes in), 
651, 653 (Dipanagara flees to western 
jungles of), 659, 660, 661 (Dipanagara’s 
supporters in Rèma), 664-5, 668-9, 673, 
675, 677, 691, 699, 725, 742 (Kalapa-
aking as commander in)  see also 
Lowanu
Bah Co, Chinese businessman (east Java) 
398
Bahwi, Kyai Muhamad (post-1825, 
Muhamad Ngusman Ali Basah, 
commander of Bulkio regiment; 
pengulu of Ratu Ageng Tegalreja, 
1793-1803)  89, 636 (commands Bulkio 
at time of Maja’s surrender, 11-1828), 
788  see also Ngusman, Muhamad Ali 
Basah
Baillard, Lieutenant-colonel (artillery)  
207  see also Rauws
Baker, Captain G.P. (1786-1850, 7th 
Bengal Light Infantry; superintendant 
of public works in the Native Princes’ 
dominions, 1814-6)  20-1, 23, 267, 391 
(survey of western mancanagara), 397 
(view of Danureja IV)
Balad, Kyai (Yogya jurukunci / jimat at 
Imagiri)  135, 788
Balambangan  see Blambangan
Balé Sigala-gala (wax palace)  140
Bali, Balinese  5 (soldiers in Yogya), 20 
(pirates on south coast), 165 (pirates), 
183 (slaves), 222 (Dipanagara’s 
troops), 248 (connections of Mas 
Tumenggung Sumanegara), 281 (raja 
contacted by rulers of Yogya/Sala), 
333 (troops mobilised to fight British 
assault), 341 (prang puputan in), 379 
(disbandment of Yogya kraton troops), 
398 (ancestry of Danureja IV), 465, 590, 
610 (straits of), 623 (soldiers recruited 
for Dipanagara from), 638  see also Bali 
Buleleng
Bali Buleleng, ruler of  281 (PB IV 
corresponds with, 1811-12), 623 
(soldiers fight for Dipanagara), 636 
(Kyai Maja as emissary to)
Balong Tjok, village (Panaraga)  258 
(Rongga’s army commander killed at)
baluwerti, pojok  see Yogyakarta, 
fortifications
Banda, island  162, 364 (place of exile), 
368 (Wiranagara sent to, 1832), 378 
(idea of sending dismissed Surakarta 
patih to), 579 (place of exile), 712 
(British merchant vessel from)
bandar  see tollgates, tollgate keepers
Bandayuda, Kyai (Dipanagara’s pusaka 
kris)  124, 154, 636, 673 (carried to 
ward off danger), 705 (plate), 711 
(?buried in grave), 726 (gold sheath 
purchased for), 813
bandits, highwaymen (wong durjana)  xiv, 
31, 48-50, 55-6, 60, 102 (ferry bandits 
at Mangir), 195 (raid on Bunder), 215, 
220 (in Madiun/Panaraga), 231 (attack 
Demak), 267 (in Galuh / Cauwer 
wétan), 274 (rise in robberies, 1811-2), 
287 (attacks after Janssens’ defeat, 16-
9-1811), 294 (attack Pieter Engelhard, 
11-1811), 381 (in eastern mancanagara), 
382 (robberies in Yogya), 391 
(supposed decline in British period), 
464 (attacks on European estates), 
474 (prey on traders on Yogya-Kedhu 
road), 475 (rise in activities pre-
Java War), 496 (Kedhu chiefs assist 
Dipasana, 1822), 535-6 (attacks on 
estates after land-rent abolition, 6-
5-1823), 547, 560 (in Kadhawung), 
594 (Dipanagara contacts prior to 
rebellion), 610 (assistance in Java War), 
673, 711  see also pirates, smuggling
Bandung  668  see also Priangan
Banget, kabupatèn (Madiun)  268 (created 
1811)
Bangil, district  251, 484-5
Bangka, island  345, 391 (as place of 
exile), 498
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Bangka strait (Minahasa)  720
Bangsal Kencana (Golden Pavilion), 
Yogya kraton  74, 315 (Ratu Kedhaton 
imprisoned in), 361-2 (Raffles 
announces Kedhu annexation and 
appointment of Pakualam in), 407 (HB 
III’s body laid out in)
Bangsataruna, Mas (inhabitant of désa 
Ngebel, Panaraga)  219
Banjermasin  379, 391   see also Hare, 
Alexander
Banjarnegara (Banyumas)  99  see also 
Danurejan, family
Banjarsari, Kyai (pradikan ageng of 
pesantrèn Banjarsari)  628, 764, 788  see 
also Sasradiwirya, Radèn Ayu
Banjarsari, pesantrèn  491-2, 628
Banten  217 (disturbances in, 1809), 457, 
489 (1888 revolt in), 516 (millenarian 
expectations in), 520 (Chevallier 
as Assistant-Resident of), 555, 600 
(Resident Du Puy murdered in, 11-
1808)
Banthèngwarèng, panakawan (dwarf 
retainer of Dipanagara)  405, 653, 688, 
817
Bantul  xx, 11, 87, 369 (Dipanagara’s 
apanage lands in), 475 (tollgate in), 
535, 586, 609, 642 (battle of, 4-8-1826)
Bantulan, royal pesanggrahan  209 (HB II 
meets Daendels at, 31-7-1809)
banyu jimat (holy water from Mecca)  580
Banyumas  11, 19, 20 (population), 21 
(piracy in), 23, 27 (fighting quality 
of men of), 40 (population), 164 
(proposed annexation of), 186 
(labourers for postweg from, 1808), 
266 (land exchanges under 1-1811 
treaty in), 280, 369 (Dipanagara’s 
apanage lands in), 399, 405, 426, 474 
(annexation to indemnify tollgate 
abolition, 1824), 520 (plans for 
annexation, 1823), 553, 560, 562 (plans 
for annexation), 609, 626 (inhabitants 
compared with Prussians), 640 
(mobile columns in), 647 (bènthèng in), 
653, 659, 663-4, 669
Banyusumurup, traitors’ graveyard 
(Gunung Kidul)  257 (Rongga buried 
in), 293 (Danureja II buried in), 313 
(Danukusuma I buried in), 371-2 
(exhumations from), 793 (santri 
supporter of Dipanagara from)
Banyuwangi  181, 610 (sulphur from Ijen 
plateau), 833
Barabadur  497
barisan (troop)  652 (of Senthot)
Barjumungah, ‘priestly’ bodyguard 
regiment of Dipanagara  627, 631, 661  
see also Munadi
baroe datang (European newcomers to 
Java)  433
Baros (east Sumatra)  660 (Roeps killed 
at)
Barutuba, Kyai (Dipanagara’s pusaka 
pike)  154
Basah, Gusti  see Natadirja, Radèn 
Tumenggung
Basah, Ali  see Ali Basah (title), Senthot
Basah, Radèn Ayu (daughter of 
Dipanagara; wife/widow of Natadirja/
Gusti Basah)  see Gusti, Radén Ayu 
Basah
Bast, Major E.M. de (1789-1827)  646 
(constructs bènthèng at Trayem)
Batang, holy gravesite at  265, 291
Batavia  xi, xvii, 2 (stone buildings in), 41 
(population), 68, 71, 81-2, 106, 115-6, 
157, 160-1, 167-8, 178, 181 (Dutch 
garrison in), 194, 197, 206 (British 
capture stores in), 216 (Dutch military 
HQ in), 236-7 (Rongga to be exiled 
to), 243, 252 (exile of Natakusuma / 
Natadingrat to, 1810-1), 253, 264, 276, 
283 (mass burial site after Meester 
Cornelis battle), 285, 291, 320 (place 
of exile), 323 (Yogya force sent to, 
1793), 327, 345 (city wall demolished 
in, 1812), 346, 353, 373, 379, 385 
(supreme court at), 410, 423-4, 426, 
428, 433 (Indo-European families in), 
441 (HB II arrives back in, 3-1816), 
447 (Nahuys sick leave in), 455, 475 
(Finance Department in), 487 (Iman 
Sampurna exiled to), 494 (cholera 
epidemic in, 1821), 503, 519, 531, 
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547, 559, 590 (division of Java), 609 
(percussion rifles fire tested in, 1830), 
612, 633, 638 (Maja detained in city 
gaol in), 646, 659, 661, 666 (harbour), 
670, 673 (De Kock in), 687, 693, 700, 
702 (Dipanagara brought to, 8-4-1830), 
703 (lodgings in Stadhuis), 708-9 
(plate of Stadhuis), 711 (Dipanagara’s 
kris with him in), 712 (harbour 
roads), 716 , 724 (Pollux returns to), 
727 (Dipanagara’s expenses in), 729, 
730 (plate of Residency House), 
732 (Pietermaat’s service in), 758 
(reference in peace proposals)   see also 
Bataviasche Ommelanden
Batavia, Bay of  159, 713 (Dipanagara 
sails from, 4-5-1830)
Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten 
en Wetenschappen  605, 703 (J. van 
der Vinne as vice-president of)
Batavian Legion  157, 183  see also 
Daendels
Batavian Republic (1795-1806)  xii, 501, 
735 (Dutch Directory)
Bataviasche Bovenlanden (Batavian 
Highlands)  186 (Banyumas labourers 
for postweg)
Bataviasche Ommelanden (Batavian 
Environs)  41, 106 (Nicolaus 
Engelhard’s villa in), 527, 703 (A.J. Bik 
as Assistant-Resident of)  see also Bik, 
Cililitan
Bathara Guru  247 (Radèn Rongga 
compared to), 403 (HB III as)
Bathara Katong (Panaraga)  140, 220
batik  25, 311 (post-1812 developments 
in industry), 365 (importance of local 
manufactures in Yogya), 384 (attempts 
by British to manufacture textiles with 
batik patterns), 465
Batu Gajah (governor’s residence, 
Ambon)  719  see also Ambon, Cleerens
Baud, J.C. (1789-1859; Algemeen 
Secretaris, 1819-21; governor-general 
ad interim, 1833-4; governor-general, 
1834-6; minister of the Colonies, 
1840-8)  739, 742-3 (reaction to Paris 
press report on Dipanagara, 1848), 
744, 808
Baumgarten, F.W. (?-1818; Yogya 
Residency surgeon)  56 (widow 
robbed, 1-1819), 205, 324 (secret 
meeting of Crawfurd and Jayasentika 
in house of, 1812), 382 (attack on 
widow of, 1-1819)
Bauwerna, district  255, 265, 379 (1812 
annexation of)  see also Prawirasentika
Bayly, C.A.  260
beamtenstaat (bureaucratic state)  433 
(Dutch colonial society as)
Beauharnais, Hortense de (1783-1837; 
queen of Holland; consort of Louis 
Bonaparte)  275
Bedhaya, country retreat (Gunung 
Merapi)  120, 352 (dinner parties given 
by Nahuys at), 456, 462 (problems 
of coffee workers at), 520 (d’Abo 
oversees coffee plantations at), 523-4 
(Smissaert uses as family home, 
1824-5), 535 (bandit attacks on), 537-42 
(negotiation of indemnity for), 538-9 
(plate), 592, 594, 600  see also Nahuys 
van Burgst
bedhaya, dancers  400 (Tan Jin Sing 
maintains troupe of)
Bedono (Kedhu)   686 (hussar escort for 
Dipanagara at), 699
beeswax  469 (for batik industry)
beggars, vagrants  3 (in Yogya)
Beijlen, Catharina Gasparina (1776-1821)  
see Wiese, Mrs G.W.
Béji district (Klathèn)  34
bekel (village tax collectors)  15-7, 
33, 67, 196 (regulated by Angger 
Gunung), 380 (Crawfurd advocates 
as ‘landowners’), 405 (as personal 
retainers of Dipanagara during flight 
through western Bagelèn, 11-1829), 
444 (Dipanagara’s reforms of), 458 
(relieved of duties by European land-
renters), 464, 548, 584 (instructions 
for conduct in Dipanagara’s war 
administration)
beksan lawung (lance dances)  548
Belambangan  see Blambangan
Belgium, Belgians  xiii, 20, 25, 107, 603 
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(1830 revolt), 654, 667 (De Kock’s view 
of), 711, 734 (independence declared), 
740 (Dutch recognition of), 759 (revolt)
Beliga (Bligo), village (southern Kedhu)  
229 (visit of HB II to, 9-1810), 254 (HB 
II considers moving to), 646
Bendara I, Ratu (daughter of HB I; 
divorced wife of MN I)  75, 224, 369, 
382
Bendara II, Ratu (daughter of HB II; 
wife/widow of Sumadiningrat)  75, 
219, 401
Bendha, pradikan village/ pesantrèn 
(Kedhu)  469, 496 (during Dipasana’s 
revolt, 1822), 610 (provides help for 
Dipanagara in Java War)  see also 
Pesantrèn, village
Bengal  xiii, 41, 206 (looted Yogya 
treasure shipped back to), 275, 301, 
347 (remittance of prize money to), 
351, 384 (textile imports to Java from), 
422 (British in), 423 (problems of cash 
remittances to), 425-6, 466 (Radèn Mas 
Sukur’s education in)  see also Light 
Infantry Volunteer Battalion
Bengal Lancers  427 (seconded to Dutch 
post-1816)
Bengali sepoys/bodyguards  56, 116 
(Dipanagara’s dhukun / herbalist), 275, 
302 (plate of Light Infantry sepoy), 328 
(plate of havildar / corporal), 420 (plate 
of jemadar / captain)  see also sepoys
Bengawan Sala  56, 157 (Van den Bosch’s 
trip down, 27-7-1832), 159, 193 (prau 
pengluput on), 221, 240, 248, 256-7 
(Radèn Rongga killed on banks of, 
17-12-1810), 380, 384-5 (British abolish 
tollgates on, 2-1814), 473-4, 617
Bengkulèn (Bangkahulu, West Sumatra)  
107, 652 (Senthot’s exile to, 1832)
Bengkung, pond (Imagiri)  133, 135
bènthèng stelsel  (fortification system) 
xvii, 44 (wages for workers in), 608, 
617 (Chinese inhabitants in Jana 
construct), 651-2 (commanders attract 
local population), 654
benzoin  469
beras-kencur, herbal potion  117  see also 
jamu
Berg, Anna Louisa van den (1792-1825; 
wife of R.C.N. d’Abo, 1805-1823; and 
of H.G. Nahuys van Burgst, 1824-5)  
120, 438-9 (affair with Nahuys)
Berg, Professor C.C.  320
Berg, C.L. van den (1798-1873; élève voor 
de Javaansche taal, 1822-32)  120, 664 
(difficulty translating Pengalasan’s 
letter)
Berg, J.G. van den (1762-1842; Resident 
of Yogya, 1798-1803; Surakarta, 1803-6) 
50, 57-8, 91, 174 (fluency in Javanese), 
189-90, 224 (view of Danureja II), 
230 (linguistic ability), 237 (political 
memorial on Yogya court), 290 
(memorial read by Crawfurd), 809
Beringharjo, pasar / market (Yogya)  3, 
225, 303 (incidents with members of 
sepoy garrison in), 383 (market tax 
taken over by British), 473
Besar, Javanese month (wulan haji / 
pilgrims’ month)  401  see also Garebeg 
Besar
Besari, Muhamad (pengulu Sréngat)  
486 (involvement in Iman Sampurna 
events, 1819)
Besari, Hasan  see Hasan Besari
betelnut (sirih)  44, 122 (Dipanagara’s 
addiction to), 166 (Residents no longer 
have to serve to rulers), 479 (opium 
laced), 697 (Dipanagara’s box)
Betha, Kyai (Yogya pusaka kris)  273
Bhoma Kāwya, text  105
Bik, A.J. (1790-1872; Assistant-Resident 
Bataviasche Ommelanden, 1824-8; 
chief magistrate / hoofdbaljuw of 
Batavia, 1828-32)  115 (sketches 
Dipanagara), 703 (draws Dipanagara 
in Stadhuis), 704 (plate), 705 (plate 
sketch), 712
Bik, J.Th. (1796-1875, artist, younger 
brother of above)  704
Bilfinger, Luise Fredericke Wilhelmine 
Gertrud von (1788-1828)  see Kock, 
Mrs H.M.
Bima, sultanate of  76, 281 
(correspondence with, 1811), 719, 765 
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(Ratu Ageng Tegalreja’s ancestry from)
Bima, wayang hero  137 (as Wéjasena)
Bima Raré, wayang plays / lakon  137
Bintara, Pangéran (?1802-?; son of HB 
II)  352 (joins Dipanagara), 595, 597 
(report on Dipanagara), 796
Birawa, Kyai (Surakarta pusaka kris)  445
bird of ill-omen  see malar munga
birds’ nest rocks  17, 169, 291 (revenues 
from), 322, 454  see also Karang Bolong
Bischoff, Major-General Benjamin (1787-
1829)  648
Blambangan (Oosthoek)  5, 291, 440, 546, 
719
Blambangan Sepuh, Yogya kraton 
regiment  5
Blanck, Dutch burger (Surakarta)  266 
(lends money to PB IV)
blandhong, teak forest workers  30, 213, 
258
blangkon  621 (as Javanese ‘national’ 
head-dress)
Blitar, district (east Java)  457
Blitar I, Pangéran (?1784-1828; son of 
HB I)  101, 534 (financial distress after 
land-rent abolition), 550 (reports on 
mistreatment of Dipanagara’s selir by 
Chevallier), 662 (daughter married to 
Pengalasan), 796
Blitar II, Pangéran (son of above)  621, 
662 (discusses Dipanagara’s war 
tactics)
blood money  see diyat
Blora, district (Surakarta)  164, 211 (teak 
trade in), 213-4, 234, 249, 253, 265, 
319, 378 (annexed by Raffles in lieu 
of financial reparations), 379 (1812 
annexation of)
Bocah-Becik, panakawan (Dipanagara’s 
personal retainer at Tegalreja)  568
Bogor (Buitenzorg)  236, 237-9 (Radèn 
Rongga to be sent to), 244, 252, 276, 
291, 351 (Javanese MSS sent to Raffles 
in), 529, 645 (restoration of HB II at, 
17-8-1826), 696, 703 (Van den Bosch 
sick at), 706
Bojonegoro, district (east Java)  249, 638 
(Radèn Ayu Maja in)
Bojong, district (Kedhu)  286-7, 381, 
497 (during Dipasana revolt)  see also 
Danuningrat
Bojong, quarter (Semarang)  700 (Dipa-
na gara stays at Resident’s house at)
Bölüki, Janissary regiment  152
Bombay  422
Bonang, holy graves at  250
Bonang, Sunan  482
Bonaparte, Louis (1778-1846; king of 
Holland, 1806-10)  xii-xiii, 157, 161, 
174, 183, 187, 199, 270 (bestows 
ridderorde on PB IV and Prince Regent 
/ HB III), 275
Bonaparte, Napoleon  see Napoleon
Boné, sultanate of (South Sulawesi)  
307, 424, 562 (alliance of Bugis states 
against Dutch under queen of, 9-1824), 
590, 592, 595 (Dutch reinforcements to, 
1-1825), 648, 659 (expedition against), 
755
Bonjol, Tuanku Imam (1772-1864; Padri 
leader)  668 (exile of), 727 (misery 
in Manado), 740  see also Padri War, 
Preanger, Sundanese
Bonthain  739
Borneo  xv, 379, 401 (Nahuys’ 
commission to west coast of, 1818)  see 
also Kalimantan
Bosch, Johannes van den (1780-1844; 
governor-general 1830-2 / 
commissioner-general, 1832-4)  xi, 
102-3, 106-7, 114, 157-8 (gratuitous 
brutality of), 544, 558, 584, 603, 654, 
659, 666 (arrives in Batavia), 666-8 
(insists on Dipanagara’s capture), 
693, 696, 700-1, 703 (sickness of), 
706-7 (decision on Dipanagara’s 
exile), 710-11, 720 (Knoerle reports 
on Dipanagara to), 721 (modification 
of exile order in Manado), 724-5, 727 
(and Dipanagara’s finances in exile), 
729, 735-6 (suggests Dipanagara’s 
transfer to the Netherlands), 739 (as 
commissioner-general), 740, 743, 
758-9, 807-8  see also Cultivation 
System
Bosman, Second-lieutenant C.  724 
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(guards Dipanagara in Manado)
‘bottom’ tax (pajak bokong)  475
Bousquet, J. (1776-1831; Resident of 
Batavia, 1821-2; Algemeen Secretaris, 
1822-8; Raad van Indië, 1827-31)  706
Boutet, J.D. (French land-renter)  457, 
465 (view of situation of Kedhu 
peasantry), 497, 501 (on PB V’s love of 
horses), 535-6  see also Sempu
Bouwens van der Boyen, baron 
P.M.M. (?1796-?)  463 (estate at 
Kembangarum), 536 (status as 
political exile), 636 (Kyai Maja 
captured near estate of)  see also 
William II, king
Boyolali  38, 45 (dairy trade in), 164 (new 
division of Java proposed through), 
238, 266, 421, 514, 531 (Boyolali-
Salatiga road), 560 (land swap at), 600 
(Gondhang-Boyolali road), 631, 634, 
640 (mobile columns in)
Braam, J.A. van  (1771-1820; Resident 
of Surakarta, 1808-10/1811; President 
Hooge Regeering, 1810-11; Raad van 
Indië, 1819-20) 38, 160-1 (character 
assessed), 166, 169, 171, 174 (as ‘little’ 
governor-general), 175 (compares 
reaction of courts to ordnance on 
ceremonial and etiquette), 183, 
187, 200-1, 205, 223, 227, 235, 236-9 
(mission to Yogya during Rongga 
crisis), 262 (SpD 10,000 reward), 
264, 270, 277-8 (sends letters 
about execution of Natakusuma / 
Natadiningrat), 290 (meeting with 
Captain Robison, 22-9-1811), 291 (PB 
IV insists on removal of)
Braam, Mrs J.A. van (née Ambrosina 
Wilhelmina van Rijck)  181, 200 
(possible affair with Daendels), 277 
(wants execution of Natakusuma / 
Natadiningrat)
Brajayuda, Tumenggung (troop 
commander in Java War)  638
Bratasena, robber chief (Panaraga)  220
Bratayuda, wayang play  105, 744 
(Dipanagara asks for copy of)
Brayut, tollgate (Kedhu)  497 (Chinese 
keeper murdered at)
bread (white)  663, 700
Brebes, district (north coast) 215
Breda, Royal military academy  822
Brèngkèlan, village (southern Kedhu)  37
Brethonnière, P. Hamar de la (land-
renter Surakarta)  532
Britain  xii, 260 (imperial meridian of)
British  9, 61, 74-5, 178 (threatened 
attack on Java), 275 (line regiments 
for Java expedition), 286, 288-9 
(attack French gunboats), 554 
(policy during interregnum), 608 
(smuggling brig possibly supplies 
firearms to Dipanagara), 610, 665, 
735 (fear of attack on Minahasa, 
1833), 758  see also English
   annexations (1812)  15, 39, 266
   attack on Yogya (20-6-1812)  6-7, 61, 
82, 151, 188, 210, 257-8, 296, 301, 
331-42, 334 (map of), 345, 365 (last 
forces leave Yogya, 3-7-1812), 375, 
377, 388-9 (humiliation for kraton 
inhabitants), 399 (anti-Chinese 
feelings during), 413, 440 (opens 
way for sexual exploitation of court 
women), 592, 615, 655
   as asset strippers and looters  103, 206, 
221 (cultural kleptomania of), 346-
52 (plunder of court artefacts), 347 
(prize money seized), 364, 388
   brutality of  283 (blood lust at Meester 
Cornelis), 335 (Javanese casualties 
during assault)
   conspiracy against (1811-2)  76, 314,   
     316-9, 377-8
   interregnum in Java (1811-6)  xiii, xxii, 
5, 11, 41, 61, 165, 206-7, 303 (problem 
of sources), 376 (Dipanagara’s view 
of), 399 (reward for Tan Jin Sing), 
424, 447, 558
   invasion of Java (4-8-1811)  163, 200, 
215 (rumours spread about), 269 
(firm intelligence reaches Java), 
271, 275 (preparations for), 281-7 
(description of campaign), 312, 515
   legal reforms of  104
   line regiments in Java  290, 304
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   naval blockade of (1796-1802 / 
1803-11)  81, 89, 159, 174-5, 273 
(interdicts court pilgrimage to 
Mecca, 1811), 276 (prevents transfer 
of Natakusuma / Natadiningrat 
to Makassar), 279 (disrupts coffee 
sales), 384, 479 (effects on opium 
trade), 712 (fear of reimposition of, 
1830-33), 735
   plans for retaking Java (post-1816)  
500, 665 (rumours of, 1830), 734-5 
(possible Manado landing, 1833)
   secret correspondence with courts 
from Malaka (1810-11)  163, 317-9
   secret treaty with Hamengkubuwana 
III  see treaties
British-Indian army  422 (dependence on 
sepoys)
British-Indian troops  304 (British 
reliance on), 320 (attacks on in 
Surakarta), 346-52 (plunder of Yogya), 
357-9 (in investiture parade)  see also 
sepoys
Brosot, village (Kulon Praga)  23, 124
Brumund, J.F.G.  80-1, 85-6
Brussels  504, 734 (insurrection in, 24-8-
1830)
Büchler, A.P.  93
Buckinghamshire regiment (14th 
Regiment of Foot)  290 (deployed in 
Surakarta, 9-1811), 304, 349 (death 
of Lt Maclean), 351, 357 (at HB III 
investiture parade, 21-6-1812), 358 
(plate), 615  see also Maclean, Lt. 
Hector
Buddhism, Singhalese  109-10
buffalo, meat  44, 46
Bugis
   kraton regiments, soldiers  5, 333 
(mobilised to defend kraton), 337   
(fire powder magazine in fort), 379 
(disbandment of)
   in Makassar  739-40 (smuggling 
of letters), 740 (attitude to 
Dipanagara), 741-2,  754-5 (relations 
with Dipanagara’s family)
   pirates 20-1
   states  562-3 (alliance against Dutch, 
9-1824)  see also Boné
   tanah Bugis  717
   troops  183, 222 (raised by Daendels), 
623-4 (fight for Dipanagara)
Buitenzorg  see Bogor
Buku Kedhung Kebo, text  406, 410 
(Dipanagara advises on HB IV’s 
education), 461, 517, 546, 591, 622, 630
Buleleng  see Bali
Bulkio, bodyguard regiment  152, 559 
(PB VI abuses captured soldiers from), 
631, 634 (ulama from Maja’s following 
join), 636 (taken by Maja at surrender), 
637 (Maja hopes for recognition as 
personal barisan)
bullets  609 (made from rush-matting)
bullock carts  56
Bulu, village (Kedhu)  513 (destroyed by 
Merapi eruption, 28-12-1822)
Bulukumba  739
bumi narasuwita-Dalem (crown lands)  16
bumi pamajegan-Dalem (royal domain 
land)  8, 268 (Sélamanik as)
Buminata, Pangéran (son of PB III)  93, 
162 (tyrannical behaviour towards 
wife), 320, 436 (as friend of Nahuys), 
445 (Murma affair), 531 (protests land-
rent abolition), 555, 558-9 (passed over 
as successor to PB V), 630 (as patron 
of religious communities in Surakarta) 
see also Megatsari
Bunder, Chinese trading community / 
tollgate (Kertasana)  12, 51 (attack on, 
5-1808), 195-6
bupati bumi (Surakarta bupati wedana / 
chief administrator Kedhu)  381
bupati bumija (Yogya bupati wedana / chief 
administrator Kedhu)  12, 381
bupati dhongkol (prematurely dismissed 
bupati)  381
bupati gedhong (senior treasury officials, 
Yogya)  390
Burak (winged mount of The Prophet)  
see al-Burak
burgers (Indo-European inhabitants of 
Yogya),  see Europeans
Burhānpūri, Muhammad ibn Fadl Allāh 
al-  100  see also Tuhfa
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Burslem, Colonel N. (C-in-C British 
army in Java, 1815)  422
Bus, L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies  see 
Gisignies
Buschkens, Major H.F. (1795-?1860; 
inspector of military school in 
Semarang, 1823-6; Acting Resident 
of Yogya, 1851-8; 8-1-1858, titular 
major-general) 649 (mobile column 
destroyed at Kroya, 10-1828), 671-2 
(Dipanagara’s letter to), 809
Bustaman, Radèn Salèh Syarif  see Salèh
Bustān as-Salaţīn (Garden of kings), text  
99-100
Butug, village  491
Buyskes, Rear-Admiral A.A. (1771-1838; 
vice-president Council of the Indies / 
Raad van Indië, 1808-9; commissioner-
general, 1814-8)  xiii, 174-5, 176 (plate), 
200, 209, 429, 807
Byzantium, eastern Rome  153
Cabéyan, village (Jipang-Pasekaran)  248
cacah (peasant-cultivator unit of 
productivity)  9, 63, 67
cacah gesang (‘living’ or inhabited cacah)  
63, 399
cacah pejah (‘dead’ or abandoned cacah)  
63
cadastral registers  39-40, 60-2, 66   see 
also Klepu, Book of, Serat Ebuk Anyar
cahya (lustre / charisma)  115, 388 (Yogya 
kraton tarnished)
cakra (solar discus weapon of Wisnu)  
116, 492, 585   see also Dipanagara, 
pilgrim staff
Cakradiningrat, Pangéran Arya 
(Surakarta bupati wedana of eastern 
mancanagara)  487, 491 (arrests Sunan 
Waliyullah in Kedhiri)
Cakradiwirya I, Radèn Tumenggung 
(bupati of Mataram)  292-3 (strangled 
with white thread)
Cakradiwirya II, Radèn Tumenggung 
(bupati of Mataram; son of above)  274 
(investigates robberies)
Cakrajaya, Radèn Tumenggung  see 
Cakranegara I
Cakrakusuma, Pangéran (Surakarta 
army commander)  181
Cakranagara, Radèn Adipati (Surakarta 
patih, 1810-2)  228, 280-1 (initiates 
secret correspondence with Yogya), 
295, 305, 316-9 (role in secret 
correspondence), 378 (exiled to 
Surabaya)
Cakranegara I, Radèn Adipati (?-1862; 
bupati of Purwareja, 1830-62; pre-1832 
Radèn Tumenggung Cakrajaya)  44-5, 
135, 695
Cakraningrat II, Panembahan of 
Pamekasan (Madura)  74, 219
Cakraningrat IV, Panembahan of 
Pamekasan (post-1808, Sultan 
Madura)  181-3 (appointed sultan), 
318, 424
Cakraningrat V (Sultan Madura)  644 
(plate)
Cakraningrat family (Sampang, Madura) 
781 (graves of)
Calcutta  341, 347, 351 (sons of Sura-
adimanggala IV to, 7-1812), 364, 428-9, 
759
Calcutta Insurance Co  429
Cambier, J.P.C. (1799-1842; Acting 
Resident of Manado, 1831-4; Resident 
of Manado, 1834-42)  726 (castigates 
Dipanagara’s ‘obstinacy and pride’), 
729, 732-3, 738
Campbell, Major Archibald (prize agent, 
1812)  348
Candhi Cétha  140
Candhi Mendhut  497
Candhi Sèwu  418-9 (plate of cleaning, 
1807), 421
Candhi Sukuh  140, 524 (Smissaert plans 
holiday to)
Canning, George (1770-1827; British 
Foreign minister, 1822-7)  428 (refuses 
to send sepoys to Dutch, 5-1826)
cannon  see artillery
Cantervisscher, J.T. (Assistant-Resident 
Pacitan, 1838-42)  449
cap ageng (great seal)  see Yogyakarta
Cape Colony (South Africa)  278 
(Janssens as governor-general of), 
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282, 285, 290 (Capt Robison’s marriage 
to Dutch woman from), 423, 429, 
492 (as place of exile), 500, 707, 718 
(Constantia wine from), 756  see also 
Dipanagara (son of PB I), Constantia, 
Janssens
Cape Dutch language  290, 500
Cape Dutch wine  see Constantia
Capellen, G.A.G.Ph. van der (1778-1848; 
governor-general, 1816-26)  xiii, 43, 
67, 102, 168 (visits to courts), 375 
(appoints Nahuys to Yogya), 412 
(assessment of HB IV), 428-9, 431, 432 
(plate), 433 (Nahuys’ view of), 435, 
455 (strong line on land-rent), 457, 
461, 469 (minting of copper coins), 474 
(appoints commission on tollgates), 
478, 498 (commutes death sentence 
for Dipasana), 501, 503-4, 508-9 
(endorses De Salis’ arrangements 
for HB V minority), 517 (opposed to 
Nahuys), 519-20 (appoints Smissaert 
to Yogya), 521 (orders collection of 
statistics on Java), 525-6 (sits on throne 
/ dhampar during 1819 visit to Yogya), 
527-32 (abolition of land-rent and its 
consequences), 552, 553-5 (annexation 
plans), 554 (second visit to courts), 
559-61 (annexation plans), 563 (voyage 
to Maluku, 7-1824), 592 (returns HB II 
from Ambon), 594, 603, 640, 644 (land-
rent abolition), 648, 807
Capellen, Jacqueline Elisabeth baroness 
van der (1781-1865; née Tuyll van 
Serooskerken; wife of above)  168, 525-
6 (sits on dhampar / throne during 1819 
visit to Yogya)
Capellen, S.S. van der (Batavia-Semarang 
route)  115, 429, 586, 655, 701-2  see 
also Davidson (Captain Andrew), 
steamships
carbines, cavalry  7, 77 (adroitness of 
Amazon corps with), 333
card games  54, 391 (British ban on 
gaming / cockfighting, 7-1813)
carik-Dalem (royal scribes)  62
Carr, captain (British merchant captain)  
712  see also Regret, The
Caruban, district (east Java)  164
cash crops  165, 210 (discussion during 
Daendels’ 7-1809 visit)  see also coffee, 
cotton, indigo, pepper, sugar
cash economy  66  see also currency
cassava  43  see also diet
Cassenhoven, Sergeant  657
castration  388 (loss of kris as symbolic 
form of)
Castlereagh, Lord (1769-1822; British 
Foreign Minister, 1812-22)  429
castor-oil plants  475
cattle murrain  394
Cauwer Wétan, district (Banyumas)  266-
7, 269  see also Galuh
Cekel Amongraga, wayang lakon  see 
Arjuna
Cemara Tunggal, female hermit  140-1  
see also Ratu Kidul
Centhini, Serat  114, 140
Cephas, Kassian (1844-1912; Yogya court 
photographer)  179
Ceremonial and Etiquette, edict on (28-7-
1808)  166-7, 290-1 (demand for return 
to pre-1808 situation by PB IV)  see also 
Daendels
Ceuvelaire, Captain de (French 
land-renter Yogya)  542  see also 
Karanganyar
Ceylon (Sri Lanka)  247, 372 
(Dipakusuma born in), 423, 707 (as 
place of exile)
Chambert-Loir, H.  xix
Chassé, D.H. (1765-1849; general, 
defender of Antwerp, 1830-2)  734
Chasteauvieux, Lieutenant-colonel L.B. 
de (Yogya garrison commander, 1808-
11)  205, 208
chess  99, 122, 512 (Dipanagara plays)
Chevallier, P.F.H. (1795-1825; Assistant-
Resident Yogya, 1823-5)  119, 439, 496, 
510, 520-1 (and Yogya postal service), 
535 (on high interest rates in Yogya), 
540 (indemnity for Bedhaya), 542-3 
(complaints of Dipanagara about), 
548-9 (sexual misconduct of), 552 
(death of, 11-11-1825), 563, 592, 601, 
603, 702 (Dipanagara’s bitterness 
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towards)
children  40 (age structure of 
population), 41-2 (deaths from 
smallpox), 47 (contribution 
to household income), 71-80 
(Dipanagara’s childhood), 75 
(adoption / lending of), 80, 349 
(evacuated from Yogya court, 20-6-
1812)
China  68 see also Manchu court (Peking)
Chinese, south-central Java  xvii, 2-3 
(shop-houses and role in Yogya), 15 
(as land-renters), 19 (as demang), 54 
(as tailors), 55-6 (as bodyguards), 97 
(part Chinese origins of Dipanagara’s 
first wife), 98 (Chinese selir of HB 
II), 165, 195-6 (in Bunder), 205 
(contribution to Daendels’ war 
treasury), 215, 222 (in eastern 
mancanagara), 276 (at declaration of 
Franco-Dutch government in Yogya, 
28-2-1810), 277 (female servant of 
Natakusuma), 335 (during prang cina, 
1741-3), 337, 354 (difficult situation 
post-British attack), 386 (judicial 
cases with), 400 (views of Tan Jin 
Sing), 462 (changed behaviour of), 
464 (Crawfurd’s sinophobe views), 
467 (flight from Kedhu, 1825), 467-78 
(as tollgate keepers), 472 (plate), 482 
(during Umar Mahdi revolt, 1817), 
485 (anti-Chinese movement in 
Malang, 1819), 524 (testimonial for 
Smissaert), 606, 617-9 (during Java 
War), 655 (Dipanagara’s treatment 
of)
   armaments makers / gun foundries 
(Gresik)  8, 272, 617 (suppliers 
during Java War)
   businessmen  398
   theatrical performances  411 (wayang 
jenggi / masquerades at HB IV’s 
wedding, 5-1816)
   currency dealers  252, 279
   Java War  610 (in Jana, Bagelèn), 615 
(Ngawi massacre, 9-1825), 617-20 
(treatment by Dipanagara)
   land-renters  15, 455 (problems in
 Cirebon), 457 (in Principalities), 462 
(changed behaviour to Javanese), 
499, 527-9 (problems following 
abolition)
   in Manado  725 (deaths from 8-1833 
epidemic)
   miners  401 (in Borneo)
   moneylenders  19, 383 (land tax), 
464 (in Kedhu), 534-5 (land-rent 
indemnities), 553 (turned away 
from Surakarta kraton following 
death PB IV), 615 (debts of R.T. 
Yudakusuma to)
   Muslims (in pasisir)  250 (during Radèn 
Rongga’s rebellion), 617-8 (in Tuban 
/ Lasem during Java War), 619-20, 
626 (support for Dipanagara)  see 
also Lasem, Tuban, Sidhayu
   quarter (pacinan)  3, 382, 524 
(testimonial of inhabitants for 
Smissaert)  see also Tan Jin Sing
   palanquins  363
   Rongga rebellion  249-50, 256-7
   sexual relations with  606, 618-9
   sugar factory workers  44 (at Ampèl 
and Kedhu), 493
   Sunan (Yellow sunan / Sunan Kuning)  
see Garendi, Radèn Mas 
   Surakarta  291
   tax-farmers  19, 230 (in Demak), 233 
(in Demak), 279 (currency dealing, 
1811), 385, 399
   timber merchants (eastern 
mancanagara)  211
   tollgate keepers  12, 21, 48, 50-1, 55-
6 (bodyguards / prisons of), 66, 
195 (attacked in Bunder), 250 (in 
eastern mancanagara), 337 (attacked 
during British assault), 385, 467-8, 
615 (attacked in Ngawi, 9-1825), 
616 (Chinese woman sets up police 
force)
   traders / opium suppliers  24-5 (in 
Bagelèn), 123, 193 (lease prau 
pengluput from Rongga), 610, 617
Chinese War (1741-3)  see prang cina
chintz, cloth  98
cholera (1821 epidemic in Java)  456 
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(death of C.H. Coster from), 489-90, 
494-5, 504, 516, 603
Christians, Christianity  110 
(Dipanagara’s view of), 449 (saying 
of grace), 696 (in Sulawesi), 717 
(Dipanagara enquires about in 
Sulawesi) 725 (in Manado), 727 
(attitude to Dipanagara in Manado)  
see also Cantervisscher, Manado, 
Trinity (doctrine of)
Chronicle of the Fall of Yogyakarta  see 
Babad Bedhah
Cianjur (West Java)  719
Ciasem and Pamanukan lands (west 
Java)  454-5 (leases in)
Cibkakak, Kyai (great-grandfather of 
Mas Ayu Téjawati / mother of HB 
I)  444
cigarettes  479 (opium laced)  see also 
rokok
Cilacap  21, 164, 185, 648
Cililitan (Bataviasche Ommelanden)  106 
(Nicolaus Engelhard’s villa at)
cindhé (embroidered edging)  681
Circe, naval schooner  738 (transports 
Dipanagara to Makassar, 1833), 742
circumcision ceremonies (supitan)  70, 
411, 512
Cirebon  21, 49 (rebel leader in), 185, 
187 (Bagus Rangin rebellion in, 
1808-12), 252 (exile of Natakusuma 
/ Natadiningrat to), 277, 285-6, 376, 
553, 555
Citradiwirya, Radèn Tumenggung 
(kadipatèn Yogya)  354 (killed in 
amok attack, 20-6-1812)
Cleerens, Colonel J.B. (1785-1850; 
27-5-1835, titular major-general; 
military commander of Sumatra’s 
West Coast, 1836-7; Resident of 
Preanger, 1840-6; governor of 
Moluccas, 1846-50)  583, 588, 616, 
621 (tries to end wearing of turban), 
653, 659, 661-73 (persuades fugitive 
Dipanagara to negotiate peace), 
674 (plate of Dipanagara’s letter 
to), 675-7 (with Dipanagara at 
Menorèh), 677-8 (brings Dipanagara 
to Magelang), 690-1 (presumed 
undertaking from), 694 (promises 
of), 696, 698 (safe conduct of), 719 
(conversations with Multatuli), 740 
(Dipanagara’s letter to, 1835), 745, 
822, 824-6 (text of Dipanagara’s 
letter)
Clive, Robert, 1st baron (1725-74)  342
cloth production (Bagelèn)  23-4, 37, 49  
see also ginggang
cloth, white (mori)  292-3 (used to 
strangle courtiers)
cloth, black  670, 678 (Dipanagara’s 
troops dressed in)
cloth imports from Europe  see textiles
Cochius, Colonel F.D. (1787-1876; 
engineer officer, deputy director 
of fortifications, 1822-5; acting 
commander of army in the field, 
1830; 1830, titular major-general; 
commander of Netherlands Indies 
army, 1835-47)  642, 646-7 (architect 
of bènthèng stelsel), 654, 666-7, 671, 
673
Cochius, fort (Gombong)  647  see also 
Soeharto
cockfighting (Yogya)  188, 391 (British 
ban, 7-1813)
Coen, Jan-Pieterzoon (1587-1629; 
governor-general, 1618-23, 1627-9)  
167
coffee  15, 279 (exports held up by 
British blockade), 346, 455, 462 
(problems for Javanese estate 
workers), 466-7 (impact of Kedhu 
coffee plantations), 479 (opium 
seasoned), 479-80 (harvest slametan 
/ feast in Pacitan), 494 (effects of 
1821 drought in Pacitan), 527, 535 
(flight of estate workers post-land-
rent abolition), 542, 722 (gardens in 
Manado)
Cohen Stuart, A.B.  xix, 650 (supervises 
Malay translation of Babad 
Dipanagara, Manado version), 732
coinage  18, 230 (Japanese red copper), 
252 (currency dealing), 279 (1811 
debasement), 290 (PB IV demands 
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payments in good coin), 347 (specie 
thrown into circulation post-fall 
of Yogya kraton), 382-3 (land-tax 
payment demands in silver), 433 
(problems of printing new Java 
Rupee notes in The Hague, 1815), 
468-9 (import of copper coins from 
pasisir), 469 (export silver specie 
from Principalities)  
Colebrooke, Captain William (Royal 
Artillery)  331, 333 (reports British 
assault / Papringan ambush), 353 
(describes investiture ceremony of 
HB III)
Colonial charter (1803)  159
Colonial corps  318-9  see also Ambonese, 
Javanese
Commissioners-general (1814-8)  373  see 
also Buyskes, Capellen, Elout
Committee of Public Safety (Paris, 1793-
4)  316
Comité tot de Zaken van de Oost-
Indische Handel en Bezittingen 
(1796-1800)  2
Constantia wine (South Africa)  524 
(Dipanagara’s preference for), 718, 
758
Constantinople  665  see also Ottoman 
empire
Convention of London (1814)  427 
(returns Java to Dutch), 429
copper coin  see coinage
core regions  see nagara agung
Cornelius, Engineer Major H.C. (1774-
1833; surveyor of Prambanan / 
Candhi Sèwu, 1805-7)  184, 418-9 
(plate)
Cornets de Groot Jr, A.D. (1804-29; élève 
voor de Javaansche taal, 1819-23; 
Assistant Resident Surakarta, 
1823-7)  413, 507-8 (in Yogya 
for appointment HB V), 514-5 
(description of Merapi eruption)
corvée (labour) services  8, 16, 58-9 (of 
eastern mancanagara bupati), 466 
(demands in Kedhu)
Coster, C.H. (1780-1821, Dutch pepper 
planter Pacitan)  456  see also cholera
cotton piece goods  380, 384 (post-1812 
Javanese cotton industry)  see also 
textiles
cotton (kapas), raw  469, 475 (crop 
destroyed in 1824 drought), 497 (used 
for garrotting)
cotton weaving / skeins (tugel)  32 
(plate), 56-7, 380 (exports from 
Pacitan), 384 (taxes on exports to 
pasisir), 469
Council of State (nayaka council, Yogya)  
238-9, 409
Council of the Indies (Raad van Indië)  2, 
81, 174, 264
court jester  see Ngisa, Haji
Courtrai (Kortrijk)  643
craftsmen’s patents  59
Crawfurd, John (1783-1868; Resident 
of Yogya, 1811-14/1816)  xviii, xx, 11, 
15, 17-9, 25, 27-8 (and British cotton 
imports), 35 (view of apanage system), 
36, 39, 46, 56, 64, 109 (knowledge of 
Javanese / Dipanagara’s view of), 184, 
225, 294-5, 296 (plate), 301 (censured 
by Raffles), 303 (letters missing from 
archive), 304-5 (protests style of HB II 
letter to Raffles), 307-8, 311 (appointed 
as de facto patih in 28-12-1811 
treaty), 313, 315-6 (failure to refer to 
Dipanagara in correspondence), 317, 
321 (meeting with Natakusuma), 322-4 
(negotiations with future HB III), 
326-9, 331-2 (during British attack), 
346 (leases lands from HB III), 350-1 
(sorts through plundered kraton 
library), 351 (friendship with Sura-
adimanggala IV), 356 (forces down 
necks of older princes when greeting 
Raffles), 361-2 (with Raffles during 
Kedhu annexation announcement and 
appointment PA I), 371-2 (poor view 
of administrative talent in Yogya), 374, 
375-7 (relations with Dipanagara), 
380, 382 (leases lands from MN II), 391 
(replaced by Garnham), 393 (failed 
attempt at salt monopoly), 395-7 
(appointment of new patih), 399-400, 
409 (assessment of Natakusuma / 
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PA I), 411 (view of HB IV), 412, 421 
(orders sketches of Prambanan, 
11-1812), 427 (returns to Yogya as 
Resident), 429-30, 433, 437 (parsimony 
as dinner party host), 464 (argues 
for money taxes in Kedhu), 473 (on 
rice trade in Kedhu), 713 (ship’s 
doctor reminds Dipanagara of), 809
criminal underworld (Yogya)  31, 101, 
165, 382  see also jago
crocodiles  87  see also Kali 
Cingcingguling
Cromwell, Oliver (1599-1658) xvii
crown domain lands   see bumi 
narasuwita-Dalem
Crudelbach, J.G. (Assistant-Resident, 
Makassar)  753
Crusade, First (1095-99)  109-10
Cultivation System (1830-70)  xi, 35, 463 
(population movements caused by), 
654, 706, 736, 756, 758
currency  see coinage
Dabatul Ali (false prophet of the last 
hour)  483
Daendels, H.W. (1762-1818; governor-
general, 1808-11; governor of Guinea 
Coast, 1815-8)  xi-xii, 13, 53, 64, 76, 
128-9, 151, 154, 157, 158 (plate), 159-62, 
164 (creates Forestry Board), 165-6 
(abolishes Semarang governorship), 
167 (division of Java), 168 (problems 
with court visits), 170 (edicts on 
Ceremonial and Etiquette, 28-7-1808), 
171, 173-4, 175 (‘Thundering 
Marshal’ epithet), 177 (bankruptcy 
of government), 178, 181-2 (in 
Semarang), 186-7, 194-200, 204, 206 
(indemnity from Yogya), 208-10 (visit 
to Yogya, 30-7-1809), 211-2 (timber 
demands from eastern mancanagara), 
217 (dismissal of Surakarta patih), 
218 (orders shooting of demang of 
Tersana), 221, 223, 233, 236 (letter to 
HB II about Rongga), 238-9 (letters 
given to HB II), 245, 252 (exile of 
Natakusuma / Natadiningrat), 253-4 
(military activities during Rongga 
rebellion), 255, 258-60, 261-5 (in 
Yogya, 12-1810), 266 (1811 treaties 
with courts), 270 (lawlessness of 
forces), 275-6 (institutes Franco-Dutch 
government), 277-8 (tries to murder 
Natakusuma / Natadiningrat), 278 
(replaced by Janssens), 286, 290 
(grievances of courts with), 294, 
309-10, 312-3, 317, 320 (travel passes 
for ulama), 322 (birds’ nest revenues),  
329, 342, 375, 377, 380-1, 413, 424 (as 
governor of Guinea Coast, 1815-8), 
443, 454, 505, 527, 553, 560, 562-3, 
588, 590, 603, 615, 646 (Cochius’ 
supposed service under), 649, 655, 664, 
757-8, 807, 814  see also Franco-Dutch 
administration
Daëng Secadipura, kraton regiment 
(Bugis)  5
daérah (diagrams for regulating breath 
and prayers during dhikr)  111-2 
(plate), 406, 745  see also dhikr
Dagèn, village (Bantul)  632
Dahlan, Kyai Haji Ahmad (1868-1923)  
570  see also Muhammadiyah
dairy products  45, 421 (sepoy 
involvement with)  see also sepoys
dalem (residences of Yogya princes / 
priyayi)  389 (firing by owners prior to 
joining Dipanagara, 1825)
Dalima (servant of Dipanagara in 
Makassar)  741
Dalton, Major D.H. (1771-1828; 
commander Light Infantry Volunteer 
Battalion; commandant of sepoy 
garrisons in Yogya, Klathèn and 
Surakarta,, 1812-5)  339, 407
Damar Wulan, cycle of wayang plays  191 
(Rongga as author of), 411
dams (in Principalities)  36-7
dancers  see bedhaya, serimpi, topèng
Danuatmaja, Radèn Tumenggung (son 
of Danureja II)  550 (wife seduced by 
Dietrée / Chevallier)
Daniel, William (1769-1837; artist)  302, 
328, 360, 420
Danudireja, Radèn Ayu (second wife of 
Radèn Salèh, artist; daughter of Mas 
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Kertawangsa Kalapa-aking)  742
Danukusuma I, Radèn Tumenggung 
(murdered 1-1812)  10, 98-9, 285-6 
(commands Yogya force at Serondhol), 
287, 313 (sent into exile in Pacitan and 
strangled), 315, 371 (body exhumed 
from Banyusumurup), 512, 761-2, 774-
6, 799
Danukusuma I, Radèn Ayu (wife of 
above)  10, 98-9, 371, 512 (love of chess)
Danukusuma II, Radèn Tumenggung 
(pre-1812, Radèn Tumenggung 
Mertawijaya; post-1825, basah of 
Rèma; post-1828, Radèn Adipati 
Abdullah Danureja; post-1830, 
Radèn Tumenggung Danuningrat)  
80 (as father-in-law of Pangéran 
Dipaningrat), 272-3, 371, 650-1, 661, 
663, 665, 668-9, 671, 676, 763, 799
Danuningrat, Radèn Adipati (Surakarta 
patih, 1804-10)  93, 185 (accompanies 
Daendels to Surabaya), 187 
(investigates riflemen affair), 217 
(dismissed), 228
Danuningrat, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya)  see Danukusuma II
Danuningrat, Radèn Tumenggung 
(bupati Kedhu, 1813-25; alias Sayyid 
Alwi; pre-1812 Kyai Ngabèhi 
Danukrama, mantri of Bojong 
[Kedhu])  381, 486-7, 799
Danureja, Radèn Adipati Abdullah  see 
Danukusuma II
Danureja I, Radèn Adipati (?1703-99; 
Yogya patih, 1755-99)  42, 99, 222, 224, 
400
Danureja II, Radèn Adipati (?1772-1811; 
Yogya patih, 1798-1811)  82, 99, 163, 
178, 188-9, 194 (debts of), 199, 206-
7, 216, 219, 222-3, 223-5 (character 
assessed), 227, 232, 235 (humiliated 
by HB II), 238, 239 (restored to 
full functions), 243, 244 (discovers 
Rongga’s letters), 254, 264, 268, 270, 
271 (as member of karajan party), 272, 
276, 286, 292 (murdered, 31-10-1811), 
295 (buried at Banyusumurup), 301, 
307, 315, 372 (body moved to Melangi, 
1865), 411, 550, 623, 761-2, 770
Danureja III, Kyai Adipati (?1740-1814; 
Yogya patih, 1811-3)  211, 269, 293 
(official investiture of, 7-11-1811), 
304-5, 371, 374 (in negotiations with 
Crawfurd over 1812 treaty), 380, 395-6 
(replaced, 2-12-1813), 763, 770  see also 
Sindunagara
Danureja IV, Radèn Adipati (?1780-
?1849; pre-1813, Radèn Tumenggung 
Sumadipura; Yogya patih, 1813-47)  
61, 99-100, 122 (opium addiction of), 
265 (married to Ratu Sasi), 354, 366-
7 (in audience with Ratu Ibu), 396-8 
(appointment as patih, 2-12-1813), 408 
(appointed to Regency Council, 11-
1814), 410 (takes over finances from 
PA I), 449-53 (quarrel with Dipanagara 
over gunung), 450-1 (slapped over 
face / plate), 461 (altercation with 
Dipanagara over land-rent), 503, 508-
9 (in charge of court finances), 510 
(hampers authority of Dipanagara 
as guardian), 517 (corrupt rule of), 
522 (Smissaert’s poor view of), 533 
(negotiates land-rent indemnities), 
537 (accompanies Dipanagara 
/ Mangkubumi to Bedhaya), 
541 (negotiations over Bedhaya 
indemnity), 542, 543 (complaints 
of Dipanagara), 544-5 (dismisses 
Kertadirja II), 546-8 (corrupt rule of), 
548 (as patron of wayang wong), 549 
(sexual abuses of), 552, 563, 592-3, 596 
(plans to attack Tegalreja / plate), 600-
1, 643 (alienates Sasradilaga, 1827), 
648, 670, 770, 805  see also Sumadipura
Danureja V, Radèn Adipati (1810-?1885; 
Yogya patih, 1847-79)  79, 99, 762  see 
also Gandakusuma
Danurejan family  10, 82, 90 (tanah tiyasa 
/ religious apanage fief at Melangi), 
99, 223-4, 371-2, 396, 550, 581, 648, 
661 (family lands in Rèma), 762-3 
(family tree), 770 (list of patih)  see also 
Gandakusuma, Rèma, Yudanegaran
Danurejan  see kepatihan (Yogya)
Darlang, F.Ph.F (Dutch land-renter 
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Surakarta)  532
Dasamuka (Rawana)  247 (Rongga’s 
army commander given name), 255 
(killed), 257
Dathuk Sulèman, Kyai (son of Sultan of 
Bima, Sumbawa)  765
Dathuk Sulèman, Nyai (wife of above)  
765
Davidson, Captain Andrew (?1809-31; 
captain of S.S. Van der Capellen)  701  
see also Thompson, Robert & Co
Davidson, George Frank (?brother of 
above)  702 (sees Dipanagara landed 
at Batavia)
Davidson, John (elder brother of above)  
702  see also Macquoid, Davidson & Co
Davy, Captain L.H. (4th Bengal Volunteer 
Battalion)  307-8 (prepares Raffles’ 
visit to courts, 12-1811)
Day, Clive  529
day labourers (batur)  48
Day of Judgement  see ari kiyamat
Dayak troops  222 (raised by Daendels)
Dayawati, Mas Ayu (selir of Radèn 
Rongga; ? mother of Senthot)  79 (died 
12-3-1810)
Dayeuhluhur, district (Banyumas)  267, 
280 (Raffles’ 20-12-1810 letter to courts 
forwarded by Ngabèhi of)
Deans, John (Assistant-Resident Yogya, 
1811-3)  339, 340 (present at time of 
Sumadiningrat’s death, 20-6-1812), 377 
(receives gift of horse from HB III), 541 
(friendship with HB III remembered)
Deans, Scott & Co (British agency house, 
Semarang)  339, 429  see also Deans, 
John
debt of honour  see Ethical Policy
debts  169 (of Residents to rulers), 194 (of 
Rongga and Danureja II to HB II)
De Hersteller, Dutch fort (Salatiga)  287 
(Janssens flees to, 16-9-1811)
deer hunting  232  see also dhèndhèng
Deksa, village (Kulon Praga; military 
headquarters of Dipanagara, 1825-6)  
584, 609, 641
Delanggu  91-2, 190 (Rongga murder of 
Surakarta inhabitant in), 232, 242, 403, 
443, 627, 642 (battle at, 28-8-1826)
Deles, village (Kedhu)  513 (destroyed 
by Merapi eruption, 28-12-1822)
Delft, Indological Institute  67
Delimas, village (Pekalongan)  217
Demak  109, 116, 133-4, 230 (Chinese tax-
farmers attacked in, 1810), 231, 233-
6 (attack on Chinese tax-farmers in), 
250 (holy graves at), 563 (Pangéran 
Sérang’s campaigns in, Aug-Sept 
1825), 613-4, 616, 622-3, 624-5 (plate)
   great mosque at  132, 250
   famine in  756
   sultans of  116, 133, 585, 635
   apostles of Islam (wali)  133, 141  see 
also Maghribī
Demang, Pangéran (?1760-1817; son of 
HB I)  50 (links with bandits), 254, 340 
(advises HB II during British assault), 
406 (lustration ceremony at HB III’s 
deathbed), 507, 796  see also dhalang
demang (mantri-désa / supra village tax 
collectors)  17, 18 (plate), 67, 380-
1 (Raffles prefers to bekel during 
annexations), 458 (relieved of duties 
by European land-renters), 464, 584 
(instructions for during Java War)
Demangan (Kalasan)  209 (HB II meets 
Buyskes at)
Demarara (West Indies)  429
demography  see population
Denmark, king of (Hamlet)  368
Dèrèsan, village (Yogya)  281 
(Sumadiningrat’s apanage at)
Derpayuda, Kyai Ageng (patron of 
gamblers)  76, 190, 765 (family tree of)
Derpayuda, Nyai Ageng (wife of above; 
mother of  Ratu Ageng Tegalreja)  76 
(Bimanese ancestry of), 765 (family 
tree of), 782  see also Bima (Sumbawa)
désa  see village
Detelle, Lieutenant (commander Klathèn 
garrison, 1808)  186
Deux, F. (French land-renter Surakarta)  
532, 621
dew ponds  see Gunung Kidul
Dewar, Lieutenant-colonel J. (C.O. 
Bengal 4th Volunteer Battalion)  340 
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(kills Sumadiningrat)
Déwi, Radèn (patih of Ratu Kidul)  145
Déwi Sri (rice goddess)  45, 403
Dezentjé, J.A. (Eurasian land-renter 
Surakarta)  38, 56, 421, 531-2 (protests 
abolition of land-rent)  see also Ampèl
Dhadhapan, Kyai gedhé (father-in-
law of Dipanagara)  97-9  see also 
Madubrangta
Dhadhapan, pradikan village (Yogya)  97, 
99, 525
dhalang (wayang kulit puppeteers)  137, 
340 (Pangéran Demang as)  see also 
Widi Prayitna
dhampar (royal throne stool)  171, 207, 
209, 222, 309 (incident in throne room 
during Raffles’ 12-1811 visit), 525 
(Smissaert sits on)  see also throne 
room
dhèndhèng  (dried deer meat)  26, 44, 186
dhikr (repetitive short Muslim prayers)  
111 (Dipanagara’s fourfold dhikr), 
112 (plate), 337 (chanted by Amazon 
corps during British assault), 406, 485 
(taught by Kyai Sidulk Aku of Gresik), 
488-9 (Iman Sampurna’s dhikr, 1819), 
628-9, 638 (chanted by Maja’s troops 
after surrender), 745 (Dipanagara 
uses)
dhikr sir (‘wish’ dhikr)  485
Dhongkèlan (pathok negari/ centre of 
ulama learned in fiqh law)  90, 131 
(perhaps visited by Dipanagara on c. 
1805 pilgrimage)
dhukun (herbalist / healer)  117, 353 
(Mangkudiningrat I as in exile in 
Ambon), 406, 496 (role in Dipasana’s 
revolt), 659 (elderly female helps 
Dipanagara, 11-1829)  see also Nurngali
Dhuri (Wanaseraya), district (east Java)  
255, 265, 379 (annexation in 1812)
Diderot, Denis (1713-84) 465
diamonds  349 (looted by sepoys from 
Yogya kraton)
Diell, Lieutenant-colonel Johan (1776-
1827)  611 (in eastern Bagelèn)
Dieng plateau  466
diet  43-6 (of Surakarta inhabitants)
Dietrée, J.G. (1782-1826; Residency 
interpreter in Javanese, Yogya, 
1796-1825)  230-1 (on commission to 
Grobogan-Wirasari, 10-1810), 293, 439 
(sexual behaviour of), 536 (defends 
Pogung estate with cannon), 540, 
542, 543 (Dipanagara’s complaints 
about), 548-9 (sexual misconduct of), 
551 (treatment of Dipanagara), 552 
(died of wounds, 5-1826), 563, 620, 702 
(Dipanagara bitterness towards)
Dipakusuma, Pangéran (?1760-1822; 
born in Ceylon, son of Amangkurat IV; 
joint acting bupati wedana of Madiun, 
1811-22)  181, 216 (visits Batavia in 
early 1780s), 218, 233, 243 (reinforces 
Yogya expedition against Rongga, 
11-1810), 254 (appointed expedition 
commander),  267 (appointed joint 
acting bupati wedana Madiun with 
Prawirasentika, 1-1811), 324 (enmity 
towards Prince Regent / HB III), 372-
3, 374 (in negotiation with Crawfurd 
over 1812 treaty), 395-6 (considered 
for patih’s post), 408, 441 (to Batavia to 
greet Dutch Commissioners-general, 
7-1816), 710, 764, 773-4, 799
Dipakusuma, Pangéran (c. 1805-?; 
pre-1825, Radèn Dipaatmaja; son of 
Dipanagara)  80, 663 (in Bagelèn), 
682 (? joins Dipanagara at Magelang, 
3-1830), 711 (proposed quarters in 
Yogya kraton), 746 (exiled to Ambon, 
1840), 767 (family tree)
Dipanagara, Pangéran (son of PB I)  369, 
492, 587, 756
Dipanagara, Pangéran (son of Pangéran 
Ngabèhi Saloringpasar; husband of 
Ratu Bendara I)  369
Dipanagara, Pangéran (son of PB III)  
370
Dipanagara, Pangéran (1785-1855)  
xiv-xv, xxi, 62, 69-95 (birth and 
childhood), 72 (charisma), 78 
(as village dweller), 85 (gamelan 
at Tegalreja), 87 (retreats of), 88 
(appointed Radèn Antawirya), 98 
(kraton wedding, 25-2-1807), 99 
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(love of chess), 108 (skill in reading 
faces), 115 (appearance as young 
man), 116 (physical strength), 117 
(view of western doctors), 118 
(plate), 127-56 (pilgrimage to south 
coast), 170 (reaction to Daendels’ 
edicts, 7-1808), 177-8 (view of 
Daendels), 179 (at Rajawinangun 
review, 1-6-1808), 204, 208-9 (troop 
commander during Daendels’ 
visit, 30-7-1809), 233 (‘piling up’ 
of Rongga‘s affairs), 238, 263 
(describes Daendels 12-1810 visit), 
270 (on ridderorde for father/HB III), 
274 (view of Mangkudiningrat’s 
ambitions), 276, 291, 294-6 (advises 
father after death of Danureja II), 
313 (life in danger), 321, 323, 324-7 
(British plans to recognise as Crown 
Prince), 327, 352 (kasepuhan / karajan 
rivalries), 362-3, 381 (bupati dhongkol 
join), 406 (at death HB III), 421 
(collects Hindu-Buddhist statuary), 
428 (Bengali dhukun of), 437 
(contrasts Nahuys and Smissaert 
as Residents), 439 (anger at sexual 
behaviour of Dutch officials), 444-7, 
449 (view of treatment of Kyai 
Murma), 452-3 (issue of gunung), 
459-62 (view of land-rent), 502-3 
(deterioration in relations with 
court), 503 (reaction to death of HB 
IV), 505-6 (increasing prominence 
in Yogya), 507 (distaste for arcane 
magico-religious practices), 511 
(guardianship and contemplation 
of suicide), 512-3 (witnesses 
Merapi eruption), 555 (view of PB 
VI succession in Surakarta), 561 
(anger at lack of consultation over 
Jabarangkah), 578 (contemplates 
suicide), 
   adoption of Ngabdulkamit name  150, 
152, 511, 726 (in Manado), 745
   adviser of Hamengkubuwana III  
294-6, 315-6, 373-4
   army commanders  648-9 (criteria for 
selection), 670 (creative financing of)
   appointment of new patih  395-7
   archive at Tegalreja  62, 105 (at 
Selarong), 326, 502, 545 (secret 
contract with British)
   archive during Java War  651 (captured 
6-1829)
   as Arjuna   405
   assassination envisaged  595 (by 
MacGillivray), 666 (by Van den 
Bosch)
   attitude to money and allowances  78, 
710, 726, 746, 749, 752
   as author  725 (Babad Dipanagara), 
731-4 (Babad Dipanagara), 744-5 
(Makassar Notebooks)
   bandit links  48-50, 608
   in Batavia (4-1830)  702-13
   battle banners of  628
   bodyguard of  401
   British attack on Yogya  331-2, 336, 
339-40
   capture of  (28-3-1830)  660-99
   and Chevallier  550-1 (problems with 
treatment of selir)
   and Chinese  117 (affair with Chinese 
girl), 121 (wounded at Gawok, 
15-10-1826),  250-1, 606, 617-9 
(view of sexual relations with), 681 
(?cindhé edging on jubah sewn by 
mistress)
   ‘coming over’  679 (De Kock’s plans 
for)
   complaints about treatment  691 (at 
Magelang)
   conversations with  700-2 (in 
Semarang), 719 (with Knoerle on 
Pollux)
   and Crawfurd  109, 375-7, 380 
(negotiations over Kedhu), 713 
(ship’s doctor reminds him of)
   and Danureja IV  398, 448-53 (dispute 
over appointment of gunung), 450-1 
(slaps face with slipper), 461
   and Danurejan family  99-100, 372, 
762-3
   dress  131 (during south coast 
pilgrimage, 602 (during Java War), 
688, 705 (plate)
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   death and burial of (8-1-1855)  752-3
   education and literacy  107-10
   education of children (in exile)  733 
(anti-Dutch teachings), 743-6
   establishment of new kraton  389 (at 
Selarong), 631-3 (Maja’s complaint 
about)
   exile of  20, 699-759
   family of, 97-9, 727-34 (in Manado), 
743-55 (in Makassar), 766-9 (family 
tree)
   female influences on  72, 79, 117-8
   fiscal administration of  647-53
   gardens of  86-7 (at Tegalreja and 
Selarong), 728 (in Manado), 732
   grave of  711 (?pusaka kris buried in) 
740, 750-1 (plates), 753-5  see also 
Bandayuda
   during Java War  606-55
   as guardian  509-10 (views of Nahuys 
and Engelhard), 511-2 (failure 
to accord due respect to), 542-3 
(problems with Chevallier, Dietrée 
and Danureja IV), 544-52 (break 
with Ratu Ageng), 561 (anger over 
Jabarangkah lease)
   guarding of  700, 710, 722-4 (in 
Manado), 739-40 (in Makassar)  see 
also status as state prisoner 
   haj plans  114, 668, 693, 697, 701, 707, 
713, 718, 726
   health issues  116-7 (malaria), 659, 675 
(extreme weariness at Menorèh), 
699, 705 (plate), 717 (on board 
Pollux)
   horsemanship  377, 602, 660
   horses  122 (at Tegalreja), 722 
(provision of in Manado)  see also 
Githayu
   invulnerability powers  121
   Islamic faith  110-4
   Javanese-Islamic law  387 (annoyance 
at Raffles’ reforms)
   journey into exile  699-700 (to 
Semarang), 701-2 (to Batavia), 
713-21 (to Manado), 714-5 (map of 
sea voyages), 738 (to Makassar)
   jubah (tabard of)  681, 688, 705 (plate)
   kris and pusaka weapons  7, 124, 153-4, 
600, 636, 673, 711, 726, 813-5 (list of)
   and Kyai Maja  93-4, 632-9, 642, 723
   landholdings / apanage 11, 369
   land-rent issue  459-62, 537-42
   lelana name (Sèh Ngabdurahim)  128, 
150-1 (changed to Ngabdulkamit), 
   linguistic skills / knowledge of Malay  
107, 690, 711, 822 (style of written 
Javanese)
   as lover  117-9, 121, 728  see also 
Chinese, sexual relations with, 
wives of
   in Magelang (3-1830)  677-99
   Majapahit / Pajajaran division  167
   in Makassar (1833-55)  734-52
   in Manado (1830-33)  721-34  see also 
Fort New Amsterdam
   malarial fever of  see Dipanagara, 
health issues
   marriages  97-98 (to Radèn Ayu 
Retnakusuma), 401-7 (to Radèn Ayu 
Maduretna), 768
   meaning of name  369-70
   in Menorèh (2-1830)  675-8
   mobilisation for war  606-11
   mother of  see Mangkarawati
   Ngabdulkamit, name  see adoption of
   obstinacy and pride of  682, 726
   pahlawan nasional  755
   panakawan of  405, 659 (accompany 
on flight), 697, 729, 741, 746 (given 
care of Dipanagara’s sons), 816-7 
(list of)  see also Banthèngwarèng , 
Puthutlawa, Rata, Sahiman
   peace proposals (1829-30)  170, 206-7, 
663-4, 692-3  see also Munadi, 
Pengalasan, Salatiga, Stavers
   personal standard (flag)  622
   pilgrim staff of  116, 121, 727 (flung 
on ground in Manado to create 
earthquake)
   pilgrimage to south coast c.1805  105, 
125, 128-56, 130 (map), 157
   portraits of  118 (kraton sketch, c.1807), 
705 (Bik, 4-1830)
   pre-war visions  564-80
   preparations for rebellion  591-7
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   price put on head  646
   and Radèn Rongga  190, 245, 248 
(comparison with treatment of 
Chinese), 252, 257 (perhaps sees 
body), 259
   as raja agama  665, 691-2
   as Ratu Adil  492-3, 583-9, 650
   and Ratu Ibu  367-8
   and Ratu Kidul  140-8
   as regulator of religion  387, 663-5, 683, 
691-2
   at Rèmakamal meeting  (16-2-1830)  
670-3
   and Retnaningsih  701-2, 713, 717, 729 
(gives birth to son), 751 (plate of 
grave), 753-5
   retreats of  86-7, 728 (in Manado)
   seal of  580 (plate), 607, 622 (during 
Java War)
   in Semarang  (3/4-1830)  700-1
   and Smissaert  108, 522, 525-6
   song birds  87 (cockatoos), 121 (turtle 
doves)
   status as state prisoner  707, 710  see 
also guarding of
   suicide  511 (contemplates), 578
   table manners  110, 700
   and Tan Jin Sing  400-1
   temperament  75 (sudden rages)
   titles (during Java War)  580-1, 692
   in Ungaran (28/29-3-1830)  699
   view of courage  648
   wine consumption  122, 438, 524
   war tactics of  662
   wives of, 97-9, 766-9
Dipanagara II, Pangéran (c. 1803-?; 
son of above; pre-1825, Radèn 
Antawirya II; post-1830, takes 
alias Radèn Mantri Muhamad 
Ngarip; exiled to Sumenep, 7-1834; 
Ambon, 1851)  80, 93, 103, 115, 
131 (dresses as farmer post-Java 
War), 150, 152 (inherits Dipanagara 
name), 369, 403, 590, 626 (view of 
qualities of men of Mataram), 632 
(celebrates Garebeg Puwasa during 
Java War), 661, 663, 666, 678, 682, 
688, 697 (draws kris at Magelang 
meeting), 710 (Tegalreja suggested 
as residence for), 746 (exile of), 
767 (family tree), 813 (given pusaka 
weapons)
Dipaningrat, Pangéran (?1807-?; son 
of Dipanagara; pre-1825, Radèn 
Suryaatmaja; Pangéran Adipati 
Anom, 1825-30)  80, 586, 682, 711 (to 
be given Yogya kraton), 746 (exile 
of), 767 (family tree)
Dipaningrat I  see Pekih Ibrahim, pengulu 
of Yogya
Dipasana, Pangéran (?1778-?; son of HB 
I)  50 (Kedhu revolt, 1822), 53, 293, 
428, 466, 493, 496-9 (description 
of revolt), 502, 505, 796  see also 
dhukun
Dipawijaya I, Pangéran  see Abubakar
Dipawiyana, Pangéran (?1771-1815; 
pre-1812, Pangéran Panengah; son 
of HB II)  368, 374, 443 (died 1-1815), 
700, 796
Dipawiyana, Radèn Ayu (sister of 
Dipanagara, wife of below) 369, 370, 
701-2 (shares Dipanagara’s exile), 
713, 717, 726 (allowance in Manado), 
728-9 (quarrels with Dipanagara), 
816 (returns to Java)
Dipawiyana, Radèn Tumenggung 
(son of Pangéran Dipawiyana; 
husband of above)  369-70, 700-1 
(accompanies Dipanagara to 
Batavia), 717, 726 (allowance in 
Manado), 728-9 (returns to Java), 
733 (as possible amanuensis for 
Dipanagara’s babad), 799, 816 
(returns to Java)
Directory, Dutch regime (1797-9)  735
Diponegoro division (TNI Central Java 
division)  125
Dirgananda (army commander of 
Radèn Rongga)  247, 258 (killed in 
Panaraga)
division of Java  317-8, 441-3, 590  see also 
Edict on Ceremonial and Etiquette, 
Giyanti, Pakepung
divorces  46-7  see also women
dodol (Jabarangkah durian fruit cake)  
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561
diyat (blood money)  473
Djamhari, Saleh Asaad  xvii, 647 
(problems with work), 660 (quote)
dluwang (tree-bark paper)  469
Domis, H.J.(1782-1842; Assistant-
Resident Semarang, 1816-8; 
Resident Semarang, 1822-7; 
Pasuruan, 1827-31; Surabaya, 1831-
4)  439 (abuse of Javanese priyayi 
women)
Doornik (Tournai)  643
Dora Weca (‘The Mendacious 
Prophecy’), wayang lakon (plot)  405
Dordrecht  243
Dottignies  643  see also Gisignies, L.P.J. 
du Bus de
Douglas, Lieutenant Henry N. (Ross-
shire Buffs)  341 (captures HB II)
Douwes Dekker, Eduard (‘Multatuli’) 
(1820-87; Dutch author)  719 
(conversations with Cleerens about 
Dipanagara), 756
Douwes Dekker. E.F.E. (‘Setiabudi’) 
(1879-1950)  738 (exile in Holland)
dragoons (22nd Light Dragoon Regiment) 
297, 304, 333 (lose 18 men at 
Papringan ambush), 357 (in HB III 
investiture parade)
dress  46 (of coolies), 131 (of santri), 
243-4 (European influences on), 
333 (Abubakar adopts santri 
garb), 341, 348 (white robes of 
surrender), 357 (of regiments in HB 
III investiture parade), 481  (white 
tabards in Umar Mahdi revolt, 
1817), 589 (Javanese dress for 
Dutch prisoners), 602 (Dipanagara’s 
Arab-style dress), 616 (women 
in male battle dress / prajuritan), 
619-20 (Javanese dress for Dutch 
prisoners), 621 (Cleerens tries to 
prevent wearing of turban), 631 
(worn by Kyai Maja), 652 (holy war 
apparel), 655
Driessen, Bartholomeus Jacobus (clerk to 
Yogya Residency)  229, 809
Driessen, Lieutenant Willem 
(commander Yogya garrison, 1810)  
217, 229 (in charge of Residency), 
293
Droogstoppel  see Max Havelaar
dropsy  751  see also Mangkarawati
drought  43, 475 (of 1821-2), 495, 725 (in 
Minahasa, 4/11-1833)
dry crop fields  see tegal
Dudzeele, Comte Errembault de (1789-
1830)  xix
Dulkabli, Radèn Mas (son of Dipanagara 
born in Makassar, c. 1836)  80, 731
durian  561  see also dodol
Durrahman (Cirebon kraman / rebel)  187
Durromtollah Academy (Calcutta)  351 
(Sura-adimanggala’s sons study at)
Dutch colonial army  640 (inadequacies 
of), 641 (reinforcements sent from 
Holland)
Dutch Company troops  588 (conversion 
to Islam in VOC period), 606, 620-1 
(treatment as prisoners in Java War), 
664 (conversion to Islam as peace 
proposal, 1830)
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC)  
xi-xii (bankruptcy of), 61, 81, 159 
(British destruction of merchant 
fleet), 168, 199, 204, 266, 294 
(contract with HB II), 356, 375, 
433, 454-5 (pepper plantations in 
Lowanu / Pacitan), 492, 499-500 
(trial of Rijck van Prehn and J.W. 
Winter), 519, 712 (navy), 756
Dutch East Indies Company officials  
166-70, 174, 346 (post-1812 change in 
role of Residents), 375 (Dipanagara 
offered choice of), 588, 590, 807-10 
(list of)
Dutch
   accounting practices of  269, 727
   ambassador in Paris  742 (complaint at 
French press)
   bread  (white)  663, 700
   import paper  663
   language  290 (Captain Robison’s 
imperfect grasp of)
   military doctors  675 (Menorèh), 753 
(witnesses Dipanagara’s death 
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certificate)
   potatoes  700, 718
   rule in Java (Sultan Agung’s prophecy 
about)  71, 135, 590
   settlements on Malabar coast  706
   treasury  662 (problems of war 
finances), 759
Duymaer van Twist, A.J. (1809-87; 
governor-general, 1851-6)  754, 756, 
808
dwarves (palawija)  405
dwifungsi (dual function of army)  585, 
606, 650-1 (during Java War), 655
earthquakes  4 (Gunung Guntur 
eruption, 7-9-1803), 116 
(Dipanagara’s walking staff creates), 
184 (28-2-1808 in Yogya / Klathèn), 
515 (in Yogya), 727 (Dipanagara’s 
walking staff )
East India Company (English)  351 
(purchase of Mackenzie’s Indonesia 
MSS, 1822), 359 (military uniforms 
copied in MN), 385, 429
East Java  see mancanagara, eastern
Eastern Salient  see Oosthoek
East Timor, Indonesian occupation 
(1975-99)  xvii.xviii
eau-de-cologne  717
economic liberalism  see liberalism
Edict on Ceremonial and Etiquette (25-
2-1808 / 28-2-1808)  128, 166, 167-
70 (impact of)  see also Daendels, 
division of Java
education, Qur’ānic (for children)  47 (in 
villages), 75, 102
Eeg, Colonel (Kapitein-ter-zee)  120, 712, 
718, 724  see also Pollux
Eerens, D.J. de (1781-1840; governor-
general, 1836-40)  309, 808
Elba  423 (Napoleon’s escape from, 26-2-
1815), 717
élèves voor de Javaansche taal (pre-9-1811, 
élèves voor het civiele)  120, 278, 413  
see also Berg, C.L. van den, Cornets 
de Groot Jr
Ellinghuijsen, J.C. (Resident of Pasuruan, 
1818-26)  484-5
Elliott, The Hon. George (naval captain; 
second son of Lord Minto)  341, 364  
see also Modeste
Elout, C.Th. (1767-1841; commissioner-
general, 1814-8; Minister of marine 
and colonies, 1824-9)  xiii, 376, 427, 
429, 431, 517, 519, 526, 552, 628-9 
(assessment of Java War), 633, 
645 (dismisses giving Dipanagara 
independent principality), 807
Elout, Major C.P.J. (1795-1843; son of 
above)  634
empu (Javanese smith / kris maker)  7, 365 
(replace kris lost in British assault), 
491-2 (in Wanakerta)
Endeh (Flores)  720
Engelhard, Nicolaus (1761-1831; 
governor of Java’s northeast coast, 
1801-8)  160-5, 166 (post abolished, 
13-5-1808), 172 (plate), 173-4 (on 
PB IV’s cruelty), 177 (suggests 
favourable prophecies), 184, 237 
(analysis of Natakusuma’s political 
ambitions), 387, 435, 510 (view of 
Dipanagara), 552, 631, 758, 808
Engelhard, Pieter (1766-1812; cousin 
of above; Resident of Yogya, 1808, 
1810-11)  51, 166, 169, 171 (Swiss-
Dutch ancestry), 177, 178-80, 184, 
188-9, 195, 205-6 (debts to HB II), 
223, 227, 229-30 (returns to Yogya 
as Resident), 231, 232 (surprised 
by Rongga’s night-time visit), 233, 
234-6 (target of anti-European 
feelings), 236-7 (and Rongga affair), 
239 (Latin epigram), 244 (discovery 
of Rongga’s letters), 252 (refuses to 
arrest Sumadiningrat), 254, 262, 264, 
269, 271, 273-4 (poor health of), 275-
6, 277 (role in fate of Natakusuma / 
Natadiningrat), 279 (asked to secure 
loan from HB II for Jannsens), 285-
6, 291 (briefs Captain Robison), 292 
(reports ‘strange atmosphere’ in 
Yogya), 293 (informed of Danureja 
II’s ‘dismissal’), 294 (attacked in 
Jambu hills), 297 (hands over seal to 
Crawfurd), 298-9 (briefs Crawfurd), 
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301, 322 (on birds’ nest revenues), 
362, 809
Engelhard, Mrs Pieter (wife of above)  
236 (sent to Semarang)
England  332, 384 (textile exports to Java 
from), 665, 667 (De Kock as POW 
in)  see also Britain, British, English, 
textiles
Enlightenment, European  206, 283-4 
(Minto’s proclamation reflects 
values of, 26-8-1811)
English  665 (Cleerens’ fears of), 758 
(arrogance of)
English East India Company  see East 
India Company
environment, degradation of  211-3  see 
also teak, timber, mancanagara, 
eastern
epidemics  725 (in Minahasa) see also 
cholera
Èrucakra (title of ‘Just King’)  126, 151, 
251, 492, 571, 575, 580, 585, 587-8, 
628, 631, 635  see also Jayabaya, Ratu 
Adil
Ethical Policy (1901-c.1920)  431
Europe, industrial and political 
revolutions  xiii, 206 (post-French 
Revolution principles in)
Europeans in Java  xvii, 164 (garrisons), 
165, 2905 (contribute to Dandels’ 
war treasury), 215, 23 (relations 
with Danureja II), 236 (rise of 
anti-European sentiments), 249 
(Rongga’s wish to destroy), 323 (in 
Batavia), 331-2 (‘burgers’ in Yogya), 
346 (post-1812 land leases), 661 
(Dipanagara’s plans for, 1829-30)
   cultural influences on courts  173 
(dress styles), 180 (food and tea 
drinking with milk), 243-4 (clothes), 
297 (English-style horse races), 356 
(hand-shakes), 359 (Scottish sword 
dance), 409 (PA I use of hand-shake 
/ greeting), 655, 663 (tastes in food)
   education  364 (Sura-adimanggala IV’s 
sons receive in Calcutta)
   expatriate community  415-6 (threat 
during sepoy conspiracy, 1815), 424 
(plans to murder European officers), 
485 (movement against in Malang)  
see also British, Dutch, French, 
German 
   Government   317, 679 (described by 
De Kock as ‘just and mild’)  see also 
Netherlands Indies)
   land-renters  15, 19, 65, 108, 346 
(post-1812 land leases), 399 (estate 
interests in Yogya), 401, 413 
(Nahuys pushes economic influence 
of), 421, 431, 435-6 (Nahuys as 
advocate of), 449 (insensitivity 
to Javanese Islamic culture), 454 
(prohibition under Daendels and 
Raffles), 455-7 (post-1816 leases in 
Principalities), 458-60 (problems 
with), 462 (heavy labour demands), 
466 (corvée demands in Kedhu), 
499, 510, 527 (problems with), 534-
62 (in Yogya, 1816-22)
   merchants / retailers  243 (French 
textile retailer), 503 (corrupt HB V)
   military culture  184 (influence on 
MN Legion), 359 (Scottish sword 
dance), 413 (HB IV copies European 
uniforms)
   troops, line regiments  301, 304, 
331 (readied for attack on 
Yogya), 357-9 (at victory parade), 
365 (last troops leave Yogya)  
see also Buckinghamshires, 
Nottinghamshires, Ross-shire Buffs
Falck, A.R. (1777-1843; general secretary 
/ secretary of state to King William I, 
1813-8; Minister of public education, 
national industry and colonies, 
1818-24)  433
famines  43 (in Java), 107 (West Sumatra) 
fasting month  see Puwasa
Fatāh al-Muluk (‘Victory of Kings’), text  
104, 410
Fatima, daughter of The Prophet  492
fens  see rawa
ferry boats  608 (on Kali Praga during 
Java War)  see also prau pengluput
feudal system, fiefs  10, 197-8 (abolition 
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in Europe)
Fillietaz Bousquet, R. de (1801-78; 
Resident of Yogya, 1845-8)  85, 747, 
810
financial registers / account books  see 
Yogyakarta, accounts
fiqh law  223  see also pathok negari
firasat, ngèlmu (science of physiognomy)  
72, 108 (Dipanagara’s knowledge of)
firearms (during Java War)  609 
(Prussian infantry muskets)
firework displays (Chinese)  210 (for 
Daendels 7-1809 visit), 408, 411 (for 
marriage of HB IV, 13-5-1816)  see 
also Tan Jin Sing
fish (salted)  44, 45 (fish sauce / trasi), 87, 
610 (imports from Semarang)
Flores  590, 715 (map), 720
food consumption  see diet, palawija
food crops  23 (in Bagelèn)
foreign investment (in Principalities)  15
Forestry Administration (Administratie 
der Houtbosschen, 1808-11)  162, 
164, 277 (Nahuys as member of), 
435
Fort Lodewijk (Madura Straits)  186, 211
Fort New Amsterdam (Manado)  721 
(Dipanagara housed in), 723 (plate), 
724-5, 728, 731-3 (Dipanagara writes 
babad in), 738
Fort Rotterdam (Makassar)  676 
(Dipanagara’s movements restricted 
in), 736 (plate), 737 (ground plan), 
739-40, 743 (Dipanagara’s quarters 
in), 746, 749, 752 (Dipanagara’s 
death in), 755, 759
Fort Victoria (Ambon)  738
fortifications  177 (Daendels’ on pasisir), 
216 (in Yogya kraton), 345  see also 
Yogyakarta
Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-3)  xi
Fourth Anglo-Mysore War (1798-9)  347
Fourth Volunteer Battalion (sepoys)  424 
(in South Sulaewesi)
franc-tireurs (Vendée)  608
France, French  xii, 197 (invasion of 
Holland, 1794-5), 243-4 (textile 
merchants in Yogya), 276 
(annexation of Holland, 1810), 
283, 285 (fugitives from Meester 
Cornelis battle), 288-9 (gunboats 
attacked), 528 (as land-renters in 
Principalities), 536, 644, 711 (fear of 
French invasion of Holland, 1830-3), 
734 (army in Belgium), 736 (Army 
of North conquers Holland, 1794-5), 
742 (artists / 1848 Revolution)  see 
also French Revolution, French 
Revolutionary wars, Napoleon, 
Zeeland
Franco-Dutch administration in Java 
(1810-11)  xxii, 165, 250, 267, 275-
6 (ceremonial for establishment 
of), 279 (financial straits of), 281-
7 (collapse of), 290, 301 (forces 
of), 305, 439 (Pinket van Haak as 
supporter of)
Free Burghers  see Indo-Europeans
freemasons  695 (De Kock as head of)
French Revolution  157
French Revolutionary wars  xii, 68, 157, 
197, 323, 429, 644 (Du Bus and levée 
en masse), 736 (Army of the North)
frontier society (Java as)  17
Gabus, village (Grobogan-Wirasari)  230, 
233, 238, 564-5, 571, 575
Gabriel (Jibrail), archangel  569 
(dispensation of Holy Qur’ān)
Gadhing, market (Yogya)  225, 383
Gadhing, pesantrèn / pondhok (Yogya)  131
Gadhing Temahan, village (Yogya)  496 
(Dipasana’s revolt in)
Gadhung Mlathi, Nyai (female spirit)  
141
Gagatan, district  164, 265, 333 (provides 
troops for Yogya)
Gajahmati, people (prisoners from east 
Java during Sultan Agung’s reign)  
546
Gajali, Kyai (Dhadhapan; follower of 
Kyai Maja)  99, 525, 545, 548, 550-1 
(reports Chevallier’s treatment of 
Dipanagara), 589, 788
Gajali, Kyai (son of Kyai Musa, Kedhu)  
91, 788
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Galuh, district (Banyumas)  266-7, 269  
see also Cauwer Wwétan
gambir (plant)  18, 469
gamblers, gambling  76, 188 
(Sumadiningrat’s attachment to), 
265, 437-8
gambyong (dance performance)  411
gamel (grooms)  208  see also Trunasmara
Gamelan, sub-district (Gunung Kidul)  
137
gamelan (Javanese orchestra)  28-9 
(plate), 60 (Rongga’s theft of), 85 
(at Tegalreja), 128 (Kyai Kanyut-
mesèm), 171 (played at Surakarta 
after 28-7-1808 edict), 220-1 
(captured by Rongga in Panaraga), 
239 (played at Yogya Sitinggil), 350 
(captured by British from Yogya), 
365 (replacements for those looted 
by British), 411 (HB IV enjoys), 468 
(payment of tollgate dues on), 486 
(at Lodhaya)
gaming  see card games
Gamping, sub-district (Gunung 
Gamping; limestone quarries)  2 
(Chinese in), 36-7, 398 (Danureja 
IV’s seizure of), 535, 632 (pre-Yogya 
pesanggrahan of HB I at)
Gandadiwirya, Mas Ngabèhi (follower 
of Mangkudiningrat I)  352-5 (amok 
attack in Tan Jin Sing’s house)
Gandakusuma, Ali Basah (1810-?1885) 
79, 99, 661 (holds out in Rèma), 
686-7 (view of Dipanagara’s arrest), 
688, 698, 822-3 (Dipanagara’s 
3-5-1830 letter to)  see also Danureja 
V
Gandakusuma, Serat  744 (Dipanagara 
orders copy of)
Ganges Investment Co, British agency 
house  429
gara-gara (commotion in nature in 
wayang)  495
Garebeg ceremonies (Yogya)  9, 87-8 
(Dipanagara’s view of), 264, 373 
(Dipanagara attends post-6-1812), 
508 (problems with child sultan 
/ HB V), 525-6 (Smissaert sits 
on throne at, 1823-5), 591-2, 632 
(Dipanagara distributes largesse at)
Garebeg Besar  57, 88, 408 (25-11-1814), 
414  see also haji
Garebeg Mulud (The Prophet’s Birthday) 
5-6, 12, 14, 39, 57 (mancanagara 
bupati corvée duties at), 64, 88, 91, 
178 (8-5-1808), 190 (13-7-1802), 208 
(27-4-1809), 213 (27-4-1809), 218 
(18-4-1810), 220-1 (18-4-1810), 232 
(20-4-1811), 269 (20-4-1811), 390, 452 
(payment of taxes / tribute at), 475, 
526 (16-11-1823), 532 (16-11-1823), 
551 (4-11-1824), 591 (4-11-1824), 632 
(celebrated by Dipanagara during 
Java War), 642 (10-1826)
Garebeg Puwasa (Fasting Month 
celebration)  14, 39, 57 (mancanagara 
bupati corvée duties at), 88, 91, 216 
(13-11-1809), 234 (30-10-1810), 293 
(16-10-1811), 390, 452 (payment 
of taxes / tribute at), 461 (12-7-
1820 / 21-5-1825), 475, 525 (9-6-
1823) (Smissaert presides at), 551 
(18-5-1825), 575 (18-5-1825), 584 
(Dipanagara celebrates during 
Java War), 590 (18-5-1825), 632 
(celebrated at Alang-Alang Ombo 
by Dipanagara II), 634
Garendi, Radèn Mas (Sunan Kuning)  
372
Garèng, panakawan (wayang)  405
Garnham, Captain R.C. (1782-1827; 
Resident of Yogya, 1814-5)  361, 391 
(describes ‘new epoch’ under HB 
III), 392 (plate), 406-8 (at death HB 
III), 408-9 (concern over regency 
appointment of PA I), 411 (at 
circumcision of HB IV), 421, 508 
(letter to Raffles about regency), 809
garrotting  292, 497  see also cloth
Gawok, battle of (15-10-1826)  120-1 
(Dipanagara wounded at), 589, 634, 
642 (as turning point in war), 662
Gedhong Tengen (treasury department, 
Yogya)  242, 390  see also bupati 
gedhong
Gedhung Gubah, Nyai (wife of Haji 
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Imanraji; follower of Kyai Maja)  
627, 788
Gedhong Kuning (Yogya kraton pavilion) 
373 (Dipanagara’s temporary 
accommodation in, 7-1812), 410
Gedhung Putri, village (east Java)  414  
see also Muhammad, Sayyid
Geen, J.J. baron van (1775-1846; major-
general; post-1828, lieutenant-
general)  562-3 (expedition against 
Boné), 590 (serendipitous return 
from 8-1825), 595, 640, 643 (scorched 
earth tactics of), 648, 655
Geer, W.C.E. baron de (1809-56; Resident 
of Surakarta, 1846-50)  754
Gègèr, village (Kulon Praga)  609, 647 
(gunpowder manufacture at)
Gelderland  735  see also Loevestein
Genawati, Nyai (female spirit guardian)  
137  see also Guwa Séluman
Genilaya, village (Imagiri)  501
Gennet, Captain Lambertus (1793-?)  678
Gent (Belgium)  25 (textile production 
in), 646 (van Geen from)
George III, king (reigned, 1760-1820)  
423, 719
Gerlach, Colonel A.J.A. (Semarang 
cavalry regiment commander, 1808)  
186
Germans (in Java)  179, 528 (as land-
renters in Principalities)
German language  109  see also Knoerle
Gesikanreja, dam (Yogya)  36
Gezelschap, H.W. (Assistant-Resident 
Yogya, 1810-1)  199, 230, 238 
(mastery of Javanese), 275-6 
(at inauguration Franco-Dutch 
government)
Gidek (servant of Dipanagara in 
Makassar)  741
Gillespie, Colonel R.R. (1766-1814; 
British commander during Yogya 
assault)  263 (£75k prize money), 
275 (sails from Madras), 298 
(annoyance at Crawfurd), 318, 320, 
329, 333 (marches on Yogya), 334, 
338 (plate), 340 (wounded), 341 
(captures HB II), 346-7 (plunder of 
kraton), 357
Gilly de Montela, Second-lieutenant F.C. 
(1794-?)  678 (commands riflemen of 
6th mobile column at Dipanagara’s 
arrest)
ginggang (coarse striped linen cloth)  18, 
49
Giri, Sunan (spiritual lords / holy 
gravesite)  133, 250, 291, 571, 574, 
590, 635
Girilaya (Imagiri)  268 (mosque burnt, 
1-1813)
Giripurna (alias Gunung Bancak, 
Madiun; gravesite of Ratu 
Maduretna), pradikan village  191, 
219, 268 (change of name), 492
Gisignies, L.P.J. du Bus de (1780-1849; 
commissioner-general, 1826-30)  xv, 
114, 119, 387, 438 (unfavourable 
appearance of), 459, 549, 553, 
570, 588, 640-1 (fancies himself as 
general), 643-4 (quarrels with De 
Kock), 654, 692, 696, 807  see also 
Salatiga
Githayu, Kyai (Dipanagara’s horse)  122, 
602 (description of)
Giyanti, treaty of (13-2-1755)  14, 35, 
39-40, 132, 163, 266, 316, 381, 399, 
440 (Hartingh’s role at), 461, 468, 
645, 733, 756
Giyanti wars (1746-57)  13, 37, 70, 76, 
102, 243, 369, 587, 774
gladhag, porters’ guilds  23, 25-7, 38, 
44 (daily wages at), 46, 56, 371 
(head appointed), 383 (in Klathèn), 
479 (opium consumption at), 562 
(Bagelèn’s contribution to)
Gladhagan, doorless gateway (northern 
alun-alun)  336 (damaged by British 
artillery)
Godek (servant of Dipanagara in 
Makassar)  741
Goddess of the southern ocean  see Ratu 
Kidul
Goethe, J.W. von (1749-1832)  68 (quote 
after Valmy)
Goldbach, P.A. (1767-1815; landdrost 
Semarang and Demak, 1808-9)  157 
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(on Daendels), 160 (on Van Braam), 
230, 233
Goldberg, Johannes baron (1763-1828; 
Director-general of trade and 
colonies, 1815-8)  xiii
Goldman, J.C. (1765-1840; director-
general of Finances, 1820-7; Raad 
van Indië, 1826-39), 706
Gombong (Bagelèn)  24, 609 (attack of 
Dipanagara’s troops on), 647, 669  
see also Cochius, fort Kemit
Gondhang, village (Klathèn)  600 (road 
to Boyolali from)
Goranggarèng, district (east Java)  268 
(number of bupati increased in), 381
Gordon, Ridder colonel   186
Gorontalo  725 (effects of 9-1833 cholera 
epidemic in )
Gowa, sultanate (South Sulwesi)  307
Gowok, battle of  see Gawok
Gowong, district (northern Kedhu 
/ Wonosobo)  24-5, 45, 129, 652 
(Dipanagara’s near capture in, 11-
1829), 662, 677
Graaff, H.J. van de (1782-1827; Inspector 
of Finances / Raad van Indië, 
1820-6)  435, 455-6 (unfavourable 
view of land-rent), 517 (opposition 
to Nahuys), 521, 527-8 (report on 
land-rent abolition), 531
Grabag, district (northern Kedhu)  733, 
816  see also Tirtadrana
gravesites, royal  266 (on north coast), 
780-4  see also pilgrimages
Great Britain  352 (imperial grand 
larceny of)  see also British, asset 
strippers and looters
Greeve, Jan (governor of Java’s 
Northeast coast, 1787-9)  173
Gresik  2 (stone buildings at), 8, 72, 159 
(Admiral Pellew’s landing at), 181 
(Sultan Sepuh of Madura as titular 
head of), 185 (prau pengluput to), 
193, 216 (gun foundries at), 272, 414, 
485 (kauman at)
Gresik, Sunan  491
Gribeauval, J.B.V. de (1715-89; artillery 
general / inventor)  68
Grobogan, district  36, 38, 164, 214, 251, 
255, 265, 310 (promised apanage for 
Natakusuma in), 381 (revenue at 
1812 annexation), 484, 756 (famine 
in, 1849-50)  see also Sarakusuma, 
Sasranegara
Grobogan-Wirasari, district  230-1, 269, 
349 (daughter of bupati mistreated 
by British), 379 (annexed by British), 
614  see also Yudakusuma
Groenewoud, W. van (1803-42, painter 
and lithographer)  684-5 (plate)
Groenhoff von Woortmann, J. (Assistant 
Resident Yogya, 1808-10)  186
Grojogan, village (Pajang)  594-5 (demang 
rallies to Dipanagara at Tegalreja)
Grojogan, pesantrèn / pondhok  131
Groneman, Isaac (1832-1912; personal 
physician to HB VII)  31
Groot, A.D. Cornets de Jr  see Cornets de 
Groot
Groot, Hugo de (1583-1645)  735  see also 
Loevestein
Groote Oost  183
gugur gunung (village corvee duties / 
pegawéyan)  57
Guinea Coast  424 (Daendels as governor 
of)
Gunadanti (alias Trunadanti; principal 
female servant of Dipanagara in 
exile)  741, 818
Gunasemita, Ngabèhi  281 (involvement 
in secret correspondence)
gunpowder  49, 102, 234 (allocation 
from Yogya fort to kraton for 
salutes), 257 (magazine in fort 
blown up, 20-6-1812), 335-6, 363 
(firing of powder magazine), 536 
(given to European land-renters), 
609 (manufacture in Kulon Praga), 
610, 616-7, 627-8 (belief that 
amulets could turn to water), 647 
(manufactured in Java War), 719 
(supplies from Sumbawa suspected) 
see also Jayamenggala
gunung (police officials)  55, 390 
(Dipanagara sugggests dismissal 
to HB III), 444 (reforms of), 449-
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50 (dispute between Dipanagara 
and Danureja IV over), 454, 547 
(appointed by Smissaert)
Gunung Bancak   see Giripurna
Gunung Gamping  see Gamping
Gunung Guntur (west Java)  4 (eruption 
of, 7-9-1803)
Gunung Jatisari (east Java)  491
Gunung Kebo (western Bagelèn)  669
Gunung Kelir (Kulon Praga / Bagelèn)  
79, 98, 352, 652, 658 (Jayakusuma / 
Ngabèhi’s death in, 21-9-1829), 660
Gunung Kelut (east Java)  280 (eruption 
of, 27-6-1811), 393, 515
Gunung Kidul, district  11, 30, 38, 136, 
257, 398, 443, 571, 595  see also teak 
forests
Gunung Lawu (east Java)  12, 101, 184 
(Karangpandhan teak forest at), 213, 
423, 426, 491-2, 524 (Smissaert plans 
climbing holiday to), 587
Gunung Megamendhung (west Java)  
158
Gunung Menorèh (Kedhu / Bagelèn)  
482, 666, 675, 677  see also Menorèh
Gunung Merapi  37, 49, 83, 254, 352, 
426, 454, 456, 466, 495 (eruption, 
28-12-1822), 512-5 (description 
of eruption), 514 (plate), 515-6 
(millenarian expectations), 523, 535 
(coffee estates on), 568, 571, 603, 
633-4 (Kyai Maja surrenders on), 649
Gunung Merbabu  37, 49, 426, 454, 466
Gunung Ngebel (Panaraga)  220
Gunung Persada (Bagelèn)  616 
(Jayasundarga’s mother shot at), 663 
(Cleerens’ base at)
Gunung Pola (west Java)  198 (plate)
Gunung Prau (Dieng plateau)  466
Gunung Rasamuni (Gunung Kidul)  see 
Rasamuni, Ratu Adil
Gunung Sirnabaya (Bagelèn)  90, 368 
(Adisurya’s moksa death on), 663
Gunung Sumbing (Kedhu)  37, 83, 254, 
512
Gunung Sundoro (Kedhu)  37, 76, 83, 
254, 466
Gunung Tambora (Sumbawa)  393 
(eruption. 4/5-1815)
Gunung Tawang (Kedhu)  383  see also 
tobacco
Gunung Tidhar (Magelang)  380 (as 
‘navel’ of Java)
gunungan (rice mountain offerings at 
Garebeg)  234
Gupita, Kyai (pusaka kris)  341
guramé (carp)  24
Guru, Kyai (adviser of Dipanagara)  481
Guru, Radèn Ayu  496-8, 505  see also 
Kertamenggala
Gusti, Radèn Ayu (sister of Dipanagara)  
367 (married to Wiranagara)
Gusti, Radèn Ayu Basah (Radèn 
Ajeng Munthèng; daughter of 
Dipanagara; wife / widow of Radèn 
Tumenggung Natadirja / Gusti 
Basah)  73 (captured at Karangwuni, 
14-10-1829), 623, 659 (capture of), 
682 (joins Dipanagara in Magelang), 
752 (looks after Dipanagara’s 
mother), 767-8, 813 (given pusaka 
pike), 823
Guwa Kanigara (Gunung Kidul)  136
Guwa Langsé  78, 136, 140-1, 144-6, 150  
see also Cemara Tunggal, Déwi, 
Radèn, Ratu Kidul
Guwa Manganti (Kali Oyo, Gunung 
Kidul)  136 
Guwa Secang (Selarong; Dipanagara’s 
cave retreat)  87, 94, 116, 121, 155, 
575-6, 579, 595 (Dipanagara returns 
from, 5-1825), 602 (standard of 
revolt raised at), 641 (destroyed by 
Dutch, 10-1825)
Guwa Séluman (Gunung Kidul)  137  see 
also Genawati
Guwa Sigala-gala (Gunung Kidul)  137
Guwa Sirisik (Bantul)  144, 614  see also 
Sérang, Radèn Ayu
Guwa Song Kamal (Jejeran sub-district, 
Yogya)  132-3 (Dipanagara’s first 
vision at)
Guwa Songpati (Paliyan sub-district, 
Gunung Kidul)  136
Guwa Suracala (Gamelan sub-district, 
Gunung Kidul)  137, 144
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Guwa Suralanang (south coast)  144, 543, 
564, 713
Haak, D.W. Pinket van (1780-1840; 
Resident of Surakarta, 1816-7; 
Pekalongan, 1817-9; Surabaya, 
1827-30; inspector of finances, 
1819-26)  see Pinket van Haak
Haan, F. de (Landsarchivaris, 1905-
22)  169, 303 (collects materials on 
British period), 376, 435
Habāshi, Sayyid Hasan  see Hasan
Hadhramaut (South Yemen)  414
Hadīth (Prophetic traditions)  103, 545 
(Abuyamin’s lack of knowledge of), 
669 (Maja’s knowledge of)  see also 
Qur’ān
Hagar (mother of Ishmael)  702
Hageman, J. Jcz.  413
Hague  see The Hague
hair  129 (Dipanagara’s followers 
shave), 183-4 (MN II cuts short), 
222 (Daendels’ troops wear short), 
329 (Natakusuma / Natadiningrat 
wear long), 584 (shaving head as 
sign of Islamic faith), 615 (R.A. 
Yudakusuma shaves), 628, 670 
(Dipanagara asks Cleerens for 
scissors to cut)  see also paras Nabi
haj (pilgrimage to Mecca)  81 (Yogya 
court sponsors), 89, 91-2, 114 
(Dipanagara’s plans for), 129 
(Abubakar’s plans for), 273 (Yogya 
court plans to send, 1811), 333 
(Abubakar desires), 544 (wish 
for Kertadirja II to go on), 546 
(Rahmanudin wants to go on), 668, 
707  see also Dipanagara, haj plans
haji (returned Mecca pilgrims)  62, 92, 
152, 191 (at Tegalsari), 272 (pray 
for demise of Prince Regent / HB 
III), 273 (at Yogya court), 281, 331 
(give wrong information to HB II 
about British), 565 (as emissary of 
Ratu Adil), 569, 579, 589 (Wörmer 
dresses as), 627 (as supporters of 
Dipanagara), 702, 707, 725  see also 
Badarudin, Ngisa, Idris
Hakik al-Modin, text  104
Hamengkubuwana I, sultan (alias Sultan 
Mangkubumi, 1749-92)  10, 13, 36 
(dam projects), 65, 67, 70 (prophecy 
about Dipanagara), 71 (as satria 
lelana), 72 (mother of), 75, 79, 89, 99, 
101-2, 127, 135 (grave at Imagiri), 
151 (prophecy about Dipanagara), 
163 (Pakepung crisis, 1790), 168, 
178, 181, 187, 190, 209, 216, 222, 224, 
235, 243, 247-8 (inspiration during 
Rongga rebellion), 259-60, 293-4 
(legacy evoked), 322, 333, 342, 356, 
362, 369-70, 374 (judicial torture 
under), 390-1 (administrative 
precedents followed by HB III), 399, 
407, 412 (HB IV sexual congress 
with unofficial wives of), 440 (gives 
Hartingh favourite wife), 550, 581, 
587, 613-4, 618 (prohibition on 
Chinese links with court), 757, 761-
2, 764, 772, 774, 778 (pesanggrahan 
of), 795-8
Hamengkubuwana II, sultan (alias 
Sultan Sepuh, 1792-1810/1811-
2/1826-8)  xii, 4 (boating in Taman 
Sari), 42 (support for smallpox 
vaccination), 70, 75-6, 79, 81 
(religious observance), 82-3, 87, 
129, 134, 137, 141 (offerings rejected 
by Ratu Kidul), 160 (Daendels’ 
prejudice against), 163, 169, 174 
(Nicolaus Engelhard’s view of), 
178, 188 (appoints Sumadiningrat 
as army commander), 190, 193 
(kasepuhan party of), 199 (objection 
to vassal reference), 201 (and 
Rongga), 206-8 (issue of dhampar / 
throne), 216 (orders court bastions 
extended), 222-3, 223-4 (seeks 
dismissal of Danureja II), 227, 229 
(confrontation with Moorrees), 
233-4, 238-9 (reaction to Daendels’ 
letters), 243 (coachman), 244-5 
(Rongga’s appeal to), 271 (tensions 
with Prince Regent), 272 (raises new 
regiments), 273 (refuses apanage 
for new officials), 274-5, 279, 280 
(receives letter from Raffles in 
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Malaka), 281, 291, 297 (Dipanagara’s 
respect for), 298 (annoyance 
with Crawfurd), 299 (Crawfurd 
contemplates capture of), 303, 305, 
307-9 (Raffles 12-1811 visit), 313, 
317-9 (secret correspondence), 321-2, 
329 (description of, 5-1812), 331-2, 
335-7, 339-41 (behaviour during 
British assault), 352, 353 (exile of), 
363 (journey to Pinang), 370, 374 
(judicial torture under), 377 (love of 
English bloodstock), 386 (prevents 
subjects attending Semarang raad 
van justitie), 389 (pesanggrahan of), 
390-1, 394, 408, 412 (HB IV sexual 
congress with unofficial wives of), 
414 (meets Sayyid Kramat, 1814), 
441 (returns to Batavia, 3-1816), 
454 (leases land to Residents), 481, 
526 (restoration of, 17-8-1826), 
548-9, 560, 592-3 (contacted by 
Dipanagara, 7-1825), 618 (Chinese 
selir of), 645 (restoration of), 710, 
760, 762, 764, 770, 772-3, 778-9 
(pesanggrahan of), 780, 782-3, 787, 
795-8
Hamengkubuwana III, sultan (alias 
Sultan Raja, 1812-4)  11, 55, 58, 
62, 65, 70, 74, 83, 123, 154, 180 
(appearance and qualities), 193 
(karajan party of), 209 (during 
Daendels’ 7-1809 visit), 211, 224 
(as a womaniser), 227, 228 (pays to 
have father poisoned), 234, 237-8, 
258 (dislike of Purwadipura), 262-3 
(as Prince Regent), 264, 266-7, 
269-70 (gets ridderorde), 271-5 
(tensions with HB II), 273 (appoints 
new officials), 276, 278-9, 283 (at 
reception for Napoleon’s birthday, 
15-8-1811), 285, 291-2, 294-5 (plight 
after Danureja II’s murder), 299, 
303, 305, 307-9 (during Raffles 
12-1811 visit), 313, 315-6 (advised 
by Dipanagara), 321-3, 325, 329 
(description of, 5-1812), 331-2, 335-7, 
339-41 (during British assault), 
347-8 (financial problems), 349, 
352-3, 355-9 (appointed sultan), 
361-2 (at announcement of Kedhu 
annexation and PA I appointment), 
366, 370-2, 373-4 (Dipanagara as 
adviser of), 377 (gift of horse to 
Deans), 389 (eschews building 
projects), 390 (builds up treasury), 
397 (appoints Danureja IV), 397, 
399, 406-7 (contracts cold and dies), 
408 (burial), 412 (HB IV sexual 
congress with unofficial wife of), 
421 (orders sketches of Prambanan, 
11-1812), 444 (and Kyai Murma), 
446, 481, 502, 541 (friendship with 
Deans remembered), 558, 615, 757, 
760, 762, 765, 772, 779 (pesanggrahan 
of), 782, 795-8
Hamengkubuwana IV, sultan (alias 
Sultan Jarot, 1814-22)  43 (failed 
smallpox vaccination on), 50, 62, 
74, 154, 270 (wears ridderorde), 325, 
327, 356, 366, 367, 371, 397-8, 398 
(and clique around Ratu Ibu), 407, 
408-9 (line of succession discussed), 
410-1 (circumcision of, 22-3-1813), 
412 (marriage of, 13-5-1816), 421 
(rebuffs sepoys during conspiracy), 
452 (rescinds appointment of 
gunung), 456, 459 (love of European 
uniforms), 459, 460 (plate), 461 
(Dipanagara remonstrates with over 
land-rent), 462 (road constriuction 
mania of), 482 (Umar Mahdi 
demands abdication of, 1-1817), 
502-3 (death of, 6-12-1822), 504, 
506-7 (death and burial of), 519, 541, 
548 (court jewelry sold), 757, 760, 
762, 779 (pesanggrahan of)
Hamengkubuwana V, sultan (alias 
Sultan Ménol, 1822-6/1828-55)  62, 
74, 316 (Dipanagara as guardian 
of), 352 (kasepuhan / karajan 
rivalries during reign of), 363, 367-9, 
376, 398, 413, 440 (Valck steals 
favourite mistress of), 453, 461, 
502-3 (health destroyed by excess), 
507-9 (appointment of, 19-12-1822), 
510-2 (guardianship arrangements), 
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525 (Smissaert stands in at 
Garebegs for), 533 (and land-rent 
indemnities), 543, 558, 561, 578, 638, 
661, 681, 746 (parlous finances of), 
752, 760
Hamengkubuwana VI, sultan (1855-77)  
293, 368, 372
Hamengkubuwana VII, sultan (1877-
1920)  270 (wears ridderorde)
Hamengkubuwana IX, sultan (1939-88)  
xxi
Hamlet, play  367
Hanafi, law school (Mecca)  597
Hanbali, law school (Mecca)  597
haq (reality)  112
Harderwijk  108  see also Chevallier, 
Nahuys
Hardouin, Ernest (1820-54; artist)  704
Hardy, F.E. (Resident of Kedhu, 1818-21; 
Rembang, 1827-8; died 1828)  486, 
618
Hare, Alexander (Resident of 
Banjermasin, 1812-6)  379 (former 
Bugis / Balinese soldiers sent to 
work in estates of), 391
Hart, Colonel Alexander van der 
(1808-55; Civil and Military 
Governor of the Celebes, 1853-5)  
731,  741, 753-5, 755 (death)
Hart, Lieutenant R. (Assistant-Resident 
of Surakarta, 1812-6)  416, 808
Hartingh, N. (governor of Java’s 
northeast coast, 1754-61)  440 (wife 
swapping with HB I)
Hartsinck, A. (Resident of Surakarta, 
1788-90)  163 (duplicity of)
Hartsinck, Vice-Admiral Pieter  159, 179
Hasan, Nyai Muhamad (sister of Kyai 
Maja from Pulo Kadang)  627, 789
Hasan, Sayyid al-Habāshi (Surat-born 
Arab, tutor to HB V)  511, 676
Hasan Besari, Kyai (pradikan ageng of 
Tegalsari)  191, 220, 789  see also 
Tegalsari
Hasan Besari, Kyai (elder brother of Kyai 
Maja; died 1830)  481, 703, 789
Havinga, F (Dutch land-renter 
Surakarta)  532
Hejaz (Saudi Arabia)  xvi, 68  see also 
Mecca, Medina
Hendrik (‘de zeevaarder’), prince (1820-
79; son of King William II and Anna 
Paulowna)  23 (visit to Java, 1837)
Heutsz, J.B. van (1851-1924; governor-
general, 1904-9)  654
Hikayat Makutha Raja (Mirror of Princes)  
410
Hikayat Mareskalek (‘The Marshal’s 
Chronicle’)  278
Hikayat Tanah Jawa  see Makasar 
Notebooks
Hindu-Buddhist, archaeological / temple 
remains  86 (in Yogya), 418-9 (plate), 
421, 522 (report of Smissaert to 
Antiquities Commission)
Hindus, Hinduism (in Java)  417 (sepoy 
conspirators view of , 1815)
History of Java (1817)  41  see also Raffles
Hoadley, M.  62
Hobsbawm, E.  48
Hoche, General Lazare (1768-97)  611
Hoff, C.E. (Dutch land-renter Surakarta)  
532
Hoff, Frederik (Dutch land-renter 
Surakarta)  532
Hogendorp. G.K. van (1762-1834)  xv, 1, 
119
Hogendorp, Willem van (1795-1838)  
xv, 1-2, 4 (1828 visit to Yogya), 
34, 78, 119, 389, 414, 428, 435-7 
(favourable view of Nahuys), 
439 (on sexual conduct of Dutch 
officials), 459, 465, 467 (burden of 
Kedhu coffee cultivation), 518, 521 
(view of Smissaert), 532 (on land-
rent abolition), 552 (Yogya kraton as 
brothel), 621
Hokkien  399  see also Tan Jin Sing
Holland  152 (schutterij companies in), 
161 (royal government in), 166 
(kingdom under Louis Napoleon), 
276, 283 (annexed by Napoleon), 
323, 415 (liberation from French 
rule, 12-1813), 519 (Smissaert’s 
education in), 603, 740 (provinces 
of)
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Hollander, J.J. de (historian)  822
Holmberg de Beckfelt, O.C. (1794-1857; 
Assistant-Resident of Kendhal, 
1825; Pekalongan, 1825-8)  581
Holsman, Major-general G.J. (1771-1833)  
648
holy war  see prang sabil
Hooggerechtshof (High court, Batavia)  
500, 732, 735  see also Pietermaat, 
Rijck van Prehn
Hope, Hugh (Resident of Surakarta, 
1812-3)  51, 170, 378, 381
Horsburgh, James (1762-1836, map 
maker / hydrographer)  717-8
horses, horsemanship  37 (pack horses), 
85, 122 (Dipanagara as horseman), 
186 (cavalry), 297 (races in Yogya), 
376 (Crawfurd patronises), 377 
(English bloodstock), 501 (PB V’s 
love of), 649 (Senthot as expert 
rider)
Horsfield, Dr Thomas (1773-1859)  416
hulptroepen (Indonesian auxiliaries)  641
Hundred Days  429, 717  see also 
Napoleon, Waterloo
Hungary, Hungarians  21
Hurgronje, C. Snouck (1857-1936)  654
Husein, Arab trader  21
Ibnu Imam, pengulu of Tanggung 
(Bagelèn)  481
Ibrahim  see Pekih Ibrahim
Ibrahim, Haji Ali (Yogya kraton santri)  
76, 281 (contacts sultans of Bima / 
Tidore, 1812), 303 (missing papers 
about in Yogya archive)
Ibu, Ratu  see Ageng, Ratu
Idris, Haji Muhamad (pengulu landraad; 
head of Yogya haji under HB II)  100, 
272-3
Ijen plateau (east Java)  610 (sulphur 
supply from)
IJsseldijk  see p. 970
Île de France  see Mauritius
Imagiri, royal graveyard  78, 83 (burial 
of Ratu Ageng Tegalreja at), 91, 
133, 135, 137, 257, 268, 293, 297, 
336 (Yogya princes flee to during 
British asaault), 353, 383 (market 
at), 407-8 (HB III buried at), 443, 
501 (PB IV buried at), 559, 584, 692 
(Dipanagara asks for burial at), 768 
(R.A. Maduretna buried at), 741 
(Dipanagara intention to be buried 
at)
imām (heads of law schools in Mecca)  
597  see also Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, 
Shafi’i
imam (head of Islamic religion)  622, 635 
(Maja’s wish to be recognised as)
Imam Bonjol  see Bonjol
Imam Musbah, Ali Basah (Dipanagara’s 
commander in Ledhok, northern 
Kedhu)  663, 678, 682, 688, 693-4 
(imprisoned after Dipanagara’s 
capture)  see also Ledhok
Imamraji, Haji (former pupil of Kyai 
Maja; pengulu of Dipanagara, 1825-
8)  627, 635, 788-9
iman (faith)  112-3
Iman Ngali, Kyai  see Melangi, Kyai
Iman Sampurna, Kyai (Lodhaya)  xx, 
485-90 (movement), 494, 505 
(prophecies of, 1819)
Imhoff, G.W. baron van (1705-50; 
governor-general, 1743-50)  168, 178 
(visit to Surakarta, 5-1746), 287 (‘De 
Hersteller’ flagship), 757
Impun, Radèn Ajeng (daughter of 
Dipanagara)  682, (joins Dipanagara 
at Magelang), 768, 813 (given pusaka 
pike)
indemnities  see Yogyakarta
India  345, 347, 489  see also British Indian 
troops, Raj
Indian Ocean  140, 515
Indische Partij  738
indigo  15, 161 (in Lowanu, Bagelèn), 
346, 380 (exports from Pacitan), 
384 (exports from Yogya / Pacitan), 
455-7, 462-3 (hatred of local 
population for), 469 (dye used by 
tollgate keepers for receipts), 542 
(Rajawinangun), 610 (Tegalweru 
factory used for gunpowder 
manufacture in Java War)
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Indo-Europeans  3 (burgers in Yogya), 
3-4 (quarter in Yogya), 331-2 
(spread rumours about weakness 
of British), 356 (as troops of Yogya 
sultan), 358, 365 (profit from sale of 
kraton goods), 433 (in Batavia), 548 
(sale of court ornaments), 702 (at 
Dipanagara’s arrival in Batavia)
Indonesian Revolution (1945-9)  516, 626
Indonesian nationalist movement  757
Indo-Portuguese elite (Batavia)  67, 433  
see also Indo-Europeans
Indra, Bathara (Prabu Indragiri)  405, 571
Indramayu  288-9 (British attack on 
French gunboats, 31-7-1811)
Infreville, S.R. d’ (French land-renter 
Yogya)  535 (coffee estate at Sempu)
insan al-kamil (‘perfect man’)  110-1, 490  
see also Jīlī
Into-Into, gunpowder manufacturing 
village (Kali Praga)  609-10, 647
invulnerability (ngèlmu kaslametan)  48, 
619 (Dipanagara’s supposed powers 
of), 628  see also ngèlmu
iron imports  493 (for sugar factories)
iron workers  365 (in Yogya)  see also 
gamelan
irrigation systems  35-9, 59 (tax on water 
use / pamili toya)  see also pengulu 
banyu
Islam (agami Islam / Javanese Islam)  xiv-
xv, 10, 105, 124 (Dutch prisoners 
forced to embrace), 132 (spread 
by Sunan Kalijaga), 135 (five 
pillars), 171, 220 (Bathara Katong 
as inceptor of in Panaraga), 245 
(teachings of Java War), 259-60, 
294, 400 (Tan Jin Sing converts to), 
448-9 (Kyai  Jagakarya’s devotion 
to), 549 (Dietrée as convert to), 584, 
622 (Dipanagara as head of), 632 
(Dipanagara’s commitment to raise 
up), 636 (Maja wants settlement to 
preserve), 655, 664 (Pengalasan’s 
account of), 671-2 (Mecca as centre 
of world), 676 (Cleerens’ view of 
Dipanagara’s understanding of), 
683, 687 (Muslim view of surrender 
to overwhelming force), 691 
(forgiveness after end of fasting 
month), 696, 731, 740, 744-5
   conversion to  588-9, 619-21 (during   
        Java War)
   law  706
   legal texts  100  see also sharī’a 
   moral order  xv, 150, 245 (Rongga’s war 
aims compared to Dipanagara), 294, 
632, 661, 664
   mystical texts (tasawwuf)  9 
   piety and observance  70, 44 (of Ratu 
Kedhaton), 76 (of Ratu Ageng 
Tegalreja), 81-2 (in Yogya under HB 
II), 86 (at Tegalreja)
   surrender of the individual (doctrine 
of)  112-3
   wong Islam  129 (distinguished by 
shaven hair)
Israël, J.L. (Yogya kraton accountant, 
1911-?)  63
Jambu hills  36, 51 (attack on Pieter 
Engelhard in), 254, 294, 699 
(Dipanagara passes through)
jamu (traditional Javanese herbal 
medicine)  42 (plate), 117 
(Dipanagara’s use of), 407 
(administered to HB III on 
deathbed)
Jana, weaving centre (Bagelèn)  24, 
399, 482 (rich Chinese targeted), 
619 (during Java War), 617 (fate of 
Chinese in)  see also Chinese, traders
Jangga, Kyai (spirit guardian of Lipura)  
154
Janggrana, Tumenggung (Kyai 
Anggawangsa, Surabaya)  398 
(ancestor of Danureja IV)
Jangul Manik  491
Janissary regiments  152  see also Ardia, 
Bölüki, Oturaki, Ottoman
Janssens, Lieutenant-general J.W. 
(1762-1838; governor-general of 
Cape Colony, 1802-6; Java, 1811)  
174, 260, 275 (takes up post, 16-
5-1811), 274 (saves Natakusuma 
/ Natadiningrat), 282 (plate), 283 
(defeat at Meester Cornelis), 285-6 
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(defeat at Jati Ngalèh), 287 (Kali 
Tuntang surrender), 307
Japan (Majakerta), district (east Java)  
211-2 (teak trade in), 221-2, 230 
(camp for deserters in), 234-6, 238, 
265, 267, 354, 379 (1812 annexation), 
396 (Danureja IV’s ancestry in), 484, 
774, 805  see also Majakerta
Japan  71 (capitulation, 15-8-1945)
Japara  522 (Hindu-Buddhist Antiquities 
commission in), 718 (mountains of)
Jarot, Gusti Radèn Mas  see 
Hamengkubuwana IV
Jati Ngalèh, battle (16-9-1811)  286
Jatingarang, village (Kulon Praga)  593 
(apanage of Haji Amattakar at)
Jatinom, tollgate (Bantul)  475
Java, moral order in / cleansing of 
impurities  245-6 (during Rongga 
revolt), 414, 664
Java light cavalry  423
Java War  xi (impact of), xiv-xvi, xvii 
(bènthèng stelsel in), xix, 8 (Kutha 
Gedhé as weapons centre), 15, 19, 25 
(impact on Bagelèn cotton trade), 39 
(transformation of east Java after), 
44 (day labourers’ wages during), 
59 (regional aspects of), 64 (post-
war commission), 66, 72-3, 78-80, 
85-6, 90, 97, 101-2, 116, 133 (rule 
Dipanagara wishes to establish in), 
135, 144, 165, 191, 196, 204, 224, 244 
(European style dress in), 245-6 
(purification of Java), 260, 266 (post-
war settlement), 273 (HB II’s greater 
mosque attendance during), 279 
(currency circulation in), 310, 316, 
318, 327, 337 (Mangkubumi looks 
after women and children during), 
343, 345 (rebuilding Batavia and 
north coast town defences during), 
353 (kasepuhan / karajan loyalties 
during), 362-3, 367, 372, 380-1 
(disaffection of Jipang population), 
388, 395 (problems with PA I 
during), 399 (anti-Chinese feelings 
in), 405 (Dipanagara as fugitive / 
wife’s death in), 428 (sepoy role 
in), 43, 436 (Nahuys’ conduct in), 
448 (treatment of santri in), 461, 
464 (problems over land-rent), 467 
(effect of tollgates on), 480 (opium 
consumption during), 484 (Javanese 
/ Arabic names used in), 509-10, 
517, 533, 539, 544 (Kertadirja II as 
commander), 560, 563-4, 571, 578, 
580, 605-55, 623-4 (regional aspects 
of)
Javanese
   attitude to Chinese  196, 337 (post-
1812 sinophobia), 354 (after British 
attack), 385 (impact of tollgates on), 
399 (Tan Jin Sing’s appointment), 
478-80 (tollgate sinophobia, 1816-25) 
   attitude to Europeans  xiv, 174 (PB 
IV / Mangkubumi’s antagonism 
to), 180, 188-9 (Sumadiningrat), 
219 (anti-European sentiments in 
Yogya, 11-1809), 234-6 (at breaking 
point in Yogya, 10-1810), 276 
(at inauguration Franco-Dutch 
government, 28-2-1811), 303 (fear 
of mass uprising against), 323 
(Jayasentika’s contacts in Batavia), 
621 (during Java War)
   attitude to sepoys  303-4, 425 (during 
sepoy conspiracy)
   dwellings  45, 213 (effect of Daendels’ 
teak monopoly on)
   as guerrilla fighters  641
   High (language / krama)  xvi, 109 
(Crawfurd’s mastery of), 168, 297, 
318
   identity  xvi, 619-20 (during Java War)
   Islam as rallying point  343
   Islamic religion  661
   Islamic burials  218
   Islamic communities (east Java)  245 
(during Rongga’s revolt)
   Islamic education  102  see also 
education, Qur’ānic
   Islamic law  103-5 (Dipanagara’s 
knowledge of), 351 (Sura-
adimanggala IV’s expertise in), 374 
(abolition of judicial torture), 385-8 
(impact of Raffles’ 1812 treaties on), 
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387, 397 (Danureja IV’s acquaintance 
with), 583, 589, 655
   Islamic literature  70, 99, 371, 487, 501, 
544 (Kertadirja II’s interest in), 757 
(at court of PB II)  see also pégon
   Islamic mysticism  340   see also 
tasawwuf
   Islamic practices  414-5 (and Sayyid 
Kramat affair, 11-1814)
   Islamic texts  377
   language  107, 217, 243, 297, 396 
(Danureja IV’s east Javanese accent), 
427, 458 (European land-renters 
ignorance of), 551, 606 (during 
Java War), 619-21 (Dutch prisoners 
forced to speak), 655, 690, 711
   law-codes  see Angger Ageng, Angger 
Arubiru, Angger Sepuluh, Nawala 
Pradata
   laziness of   397 (Crawfurd’s view of)
   literature  501 (PB V’s love of)  see also 
babad, Centhini
   Low (language / ngoko)  xvi, 168, 
318, 551 (Dipanagara speaks to 
Smissaert in), 670 (Dipanagara 
sends letter to Dutch in), 670, 690 
(Dipanagara speaks to De Kock in), 
719 (Dipanagara speaks to Knoerle 
in), 744, 825 (Dipanagara writes to 
Cleerens in)
   medicine 41, 117, 122, 717 
(Dipanagara’s use of)  see also beras-
kencur, jamu
   Muslims  xvi, 364 (identity of)
   ‘nationalist’ feelings  xiv, 260, 364, 397, 
606, 619-21 (during Java War), 655
   peasant cultivators  457 (problems with 
land-rent), 470-8 (impact of tollgates 
on)
   timber merchants  211 (in eastern 
mancanagara)
   troops  283 (heavy losses at Meester 
Cornelis), 286-7 (turn on European 
officers at Jati Ngalèh), 304 
(‘colonial’ corps), 318-9, 335 (losses 
during British assault)  see also 
hulptroepen
Javasche Courant (Government Gazette) 
106, 695, 702, 753
Jāwah community (Mecca)  112
Jawi-kori, district (north coast)  129
Jaya Muhamad, Kyai (adviser of 
Dipanagara at Tegalreja)  97
Jaya Ngusman, Kyai  292 (participates 
in murder of Danureja II)  see also 
Ngusman, Kyai Amad
Jayabaya prophecies  69-70, 153, 251 
(during Rongga’s rebellion), 483, 
487-90 (before Java War), 498, 516-7, 
587-8, 603  see also Ratu Adil
Jayabrata, Radèn Ngabèhi (dismissed 
penatus of Tinggol, Menorèh)  496 
(during Dipasana revolt)
Jayadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung 
(post-1830, bupati of Karanganyar, 
northeastern Bagelèn; author 
‘Sketches on the Java War’)  547-
8 (description of Danureja IV’s 
corrupt rule), 591
Jayadipura, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya junior bupati, Kedhu)  233 
(commission to Panaraga), 800
Jayakarta  see Batavia
Jayakusuma I, Pangéran  (?1787-1829; 
son of HB II; post-1825, Pangéran 
Ngabèhi)  71, 98, 254 (on Yogya 
expedition against Rongga), 336 
(during British assault), 339 (refuses 
Dipanagara and father entry to 
kadhaton), 352, 481, 592-3 (joins 
Dipanagara), 618 (Chinese mother 
of), 637 (refuses Maja troops), 
639, 646 (killed), 650 (in dwifungsi 
debate), 653, 658 (description of 
death in Gunung Kelir, 21-9-1829), 
660, 796
Jayakusuma II, Pangéran (?1805-29; son 
of above)  658 (death in Gunung 
Kelir), 767
Jayakusuma, Radèn Ayu (daughter of 
Dipanagara; wife / widow of above)  
682 (referred to as ‘Radèn Ayu 
Basah’), 687, 700, 767, 813 (given 
pusaka kris / pike), 823
Jaya Lengkara Wulang, text  105 
(discovered at Selarong, 10-1825)
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Jayamenggala, demang (Samèn)  49, 
101, 609, 787  see also Amattakar, 
gunpowder
Jayaminarsa, Radèn (kadipatèn troop 
commander)  209
Jayamustapa (alias Sukbatuliman), Kyai 
(adviser of Dipanagara at Tegalreja)  
97, 139 (sent to Nusa Kambangan)
Jaya Ngusman, Kyai  see Ngusman, Kyai 
Amad
Jayasanta (retainer of MN II)  157
Jayasentika, Radèn Ngabèhi 
(commander of kadipatèn troops)  
242 (in expedition against Rongga), 
281 (role in secret correspondence), 
316, 321-2 (represents Crown Prince 
/ HB III to Crawfurd), 327, 332, 353-
4 (killed in amok attack, 20-6-1812), 
363, 774
Jayasurata, panakawan  see Rata
Jayawinata, Radèn Tumenggung (Yogya 
bupati)  79 (married to Ratu Timur, 
daughter of HB II and Ratu Kencana 
Wulan), 800 (joins Dipanagara in 
Java War)
Jayèngpati, Ngabèhi (Delimas, 
Pekalongan)  217
Jayèngrana, Radèn Panji  see 
Ranadiningrat
Jayasundarga, Ali Basah (troop 
commander of Dipanagara in 
Bagelèn)  616 (mother shot)
Jayèng Sekar (mounted constabulary)  
52 (plate), 53 (role in crushing 
Dipasana’s revolt), 318, 428, 497  see 
also police
Jébrès, hunting lodge (Surakarta)  537
Jeddah  81, 101, 627, 717-8 (sea route 
to), 726  see also Ansari, haj, Mecca, 
Medina
Jejeran, district (south of Yogya)  132-3  
see also Guwa Song Kamal
Jejeran, pesantrèn / pondhok  129, 340 
(Sumadiningrat interred at)
Jelegong, village (Kulon Praga)  50, 102  
see also tiger-hunters
jemblung, dance (Ménak cycle)  411
Jempon, Radèn Ajeng (daughter of 
Dipanagara)  see Impun, Radèn 
Ajeng
jenever (Dutch gin)  437 (imports into 
Principalities)  see also alcohol
jenggi , dance (Chinese masked)  411
Jenu, royal fruit orchard (Bantulan)  209
Jeruk Legi, district (Banyumas)  21
Jessen, Trail & Co (British agency house 
in Java)  429
Jetis, district (northern Kedhu)  120
Jesus Christ  110  see also Christianity
jewelry  537 (profits from sale of kraton 
items), 548 (sold by Dietrée)
jihad (holy war), mentality  / mind set  
595, 597
Jīlī, Άbd al-Karim bin Ibrāhim al-  111  
see also Insan al-Kamil
jimat,  jurukunci  (key keepers,  Imagiri)  
133
jimat, amulets / talisman / heirlooms 
(pusaka)  124, 536-7 (palm-leaf head 
protectors), 614, 627-8 (in Java War)
Jimatan, mosque (Imagiri)  133, 136, 692
Jingga, Kyai (kraton pusaka kris)  341
Jipang (Rajegwesi), district (east Java)  
51, 88 (Jipang-Kepanolan), 164, 211 
(teak trade in), 213, 255 (attitude of 
bupati during Rongga’s rebellion), 
265, 267, 325, 379 (annexation, 1812), 
379-80, 381 (disaffected population 
in), 581, 615, 619, 623, 642-3 
(Sasradilaga’s rebellion in, 1827)  see 
also Sasradiningrat, Sasradilaga
Johannes (Armenian head of opium tax 
farm in Kedhu)  733
Johnson, Major J.M. (Resident Surakarta, 
1813-6)  21, 348 (as prize agent), 
349 (gets large diamond), 351, 394, 
416-7, 426 (enquiry into sepoy 
conspiracy), 443
Jonèd, Radèn Mas (?1815-37, son of 
Dipanagara)  80, 682, 688, 746, 767, 
813 (given pusaka kris / pike)
Jong Celebes  755
Jong Java  755
Jowanto, demang (Kedhu)  382-3 
(attacks house of widow of F.W. 
Baumgarten, 1-1819)
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jubah (tabard)  see Dipanagara
judicial system (in Java)  385-8 (impact of 
Raffles’ 1812 treaties on)
Jugul Mudha, Javanese law code  104, 388
Jumadilakir, Javanese month  401 (as 
marriage month)
Jumagatan, coffee estate (Yogya)  533, 
535, 542  see also Tissot
Jumungah Wagé, Friday Wagé  69 
(significance as day of Dipanagara’s 
birth)
jung, unit of land measurement  27, 64  
see also cacah
Juni, demang (Karang Bolong)  17 
(corrupt practices of), 186  see also 
birds’ nest rocks
Jurisprudence, Javanese-Islamic  103  see 
also Javanese, law codes
jurukunci (key keepers), of holy 
sites  133, 627 (as supporters of 
Dipanagara in Java War), 780-3  see 
also jimat
Just king  see Ratu Adil
Juynboll, Th.W.  579
Kaap, Radèn (Radèn Mas Singgunkara; 
great-grandson of Pangéran Aria 
Mangkunagara)  423, 500, 710  see 
also Cape Colony
Ka’bah (Mecca, grave of The Prophet)  
597
kadhaton (inner kraton)  340, 348 (stormed 
by British)
Kadhawung, Kedhu enclave (Kendhal 
/ Pekalongan)  215-6, 560 (bandit 
raids from)
Kadhawung, district (Sragèn)  157 (Van 
den Bosch executes demang at), 164 
(teak forests at)
Kadilangu, grave of Sunan Kalijaga 
(north coast)  132, 250, 291  see also 
Kalijaga
kadipatèn (Crown Prince’s establishment, 
Yogya)  83, 88 (Suranatan corps in), 
94, 100, 177-8, 208 (Dipanagara takes 
command of troops from, 7-1809), 
242 (troops join expedition against 
Rongga), 264, 271, 275, 285, 292, 
294-6 (doors bolted after murder of 
Danureja II), 315, 332, 336, 339 (falls 
to British), 336 (damaged by British 
artillery), 349, 359-60 (designed 
as temporary kraton), 366 (Ratu 
Kedhaton put in charge of), 367 
(Ratu Ageng’s flight from), 398, 492, 
544 (Kertadirja I as patih of), 774 (list 
of patih of)
Kajèn, Embok  see Kertamenggala
Kajoran, religious dynasty / faction  588, 
630, 664
Kajoran, Panembahan  73, 588
Kajoran, village (Karanganyar, 
Banyumas)  663
kaki-tangan (‘arms-and-feet’ epithet, 
Bagelèn)  23, 26-7
Kalang, carpenters / artificers (Kutha 
Gedhé)  291 (PB IV asks for return 
of), 610
Kalangbrèt, district (east Java)  255, 490  
see Mangundirana
kalantaka, half-pounder (artillery)  8
Kalapa-aking, Mas Kertawangsa (dullah 
/ junior commander of Dipanagara, 
Bagelèn; post-1853, father-in-law of 
Radèn Salèh, artist)  742
Kalasan  37, 208 (Dipanagara greets 
Daendels at), 209, 421 (statuary 
taken from Candhi Sèwu temple 
complex at)
Kali Bagawanta  646, 649, 658, 660 
(Dipanagara crosses), 673 
(prescription over crossing)  see also 
Agung
Kali Bedhog  36 (dam built by HB I in), 
155, 611
Kali Brantas (Kedhiri river)  195, 385, 
474, 491
Kali Bujang (Cilacap / Nusa 
Kambangan)  164
Kali Cingcingguling (Banyumas)  23, 
87 (crocodiles in), 670  see also 
Rèmakamal
Kali Codhé (Yogya)  248 (Rongga asks 
for bridge to be broken over), 336 
(houses near undamaged by British 
artillery), 340
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Kali Elo (Kedhu)  249, 497 (after Merapi 
eruption, 28-12-1822), 673
Kali Gajahwong (Yogya)  333
Kali Grindulu (Pacitan)  37, 64
Kalijaga, Sunan  10, 132-4, 141, 150, 155, 
579, 613-4, 622  see also Kadilangu
Kalijengking, sub-district / village 
(Kedhu)  229, 640 (mobile columns 
in), 646 (Cochous’ first benthèng at)
Kali Lèrèng (Bagelèn)  617
Kali Madiun  385, 474, 615  see also 
Ketangga
Kalimantan  391  see also Borneo
Kali Musi (Palembang)  345
Kali Opak  24 (fish farms on), 137, 144, 
154, 478, 571, 584
Kali Oyo  24 (fish farms on), 137 (caves)
Kali Pabélan (Kedhu)  513 (flooding at 
time of Merapi eruption, 28-12-1822)
Kali Praga  23-4, 37, 49. 102, 124, 144 
(Dipanagara’s vision of Ratu 
Kidul near), 229, 514, 586, 608, 
611, 620, 632, 641-2, 646-7, 649, 
656, 658, 660-1, 677 (Dipanagara’s 
encampment at Metésih near), 684-5 
(plate)  see also Metésih
Kalireja, village (western Bagelèn)  670-
1, 673
Kali Saria (Manado)  728 (Dipanagara’s 
garden plot)
Kali Serayu (west Java)  20
Kalitan, Surakarta Resident’s country 
retreat at  435 (used by Nahuys), 
537, 634 (Maja’s aim to capture)
Kali Tuntang  248 (Rongga asks for 
bridge to be broken over), 287 
(capitulation of Janssens at, 18-9-
1811), 307
Kali Winonga  36, 78, 248 (Rongga asks 
for bridge to be broken over)
Kaliyah, Kyai (Pacitan)  193 (as teacher 
of Rongga)
kaliyuga (final age of disorder)  516
Kamal, village (Kulon Praga)  144 
(Dipanagara’s vision of Ratu Kidul 
at, 7-1826)
Kamalodiningrat (title of Yogya pengulu)  
see Abuyamin, Ketib
Kamalodiningrat, Radèn Ayu (wife of 
above; granddaughter of Pengulu 
Pekih Ibrahim)  765
Kamijara, village (on Kali Praga)  49 
(bandits in), 102, 608 (ferry boats at)
Kampung Jawa (Makassar)  742
Kampung Jawa Tondano, place of exile  
92, 635-8 (manuscript), 722-5  see also 
Maja, Tonsea Lama
Kampung Melayu (Makassar), 
Dipanagara family grave,  711 
(Dipanagara’s kris buried with him 
in), 740 (Dipanagara’s son buried 
in), 749-51 (plates), 753-4  see also 
Retnaningsih
Kanangan, coffee estate  542  see also 
Nogues
Kantiwati, Déwi (female spirit)  491
Kantor Baru, district (Batavia)  276 
(Natakusuma / Natadiningrat held 
in, 1810-11)
Kanyut-mèsem, Kyai (gamelan of MN 
I)  128
Kapilah, Radèn Ajeng (daughter of 
Danureja II)  371 (marries Pangéran 
Suryabrangta)
kapir (unbelievers)  245, 716, 725
kapir murtad (apostates)  245
Kapitan, Nyonyah (Chinese wife of Tan 
Jin Sing), 400  see also Tan Jin Sing
kapitan cina (captain of the Chinese)  468  
see also Tan Jin Sing
karajan, pro-HB III party (Yogya)  193, 
223-4, 227, 271-2 (origins of), 276, 
352 (intensification of rivalries 
with kasepuhan), 362, 397  see also 
kasepuhan
Karang, Kyai, pradikan of Karang 
(follower of Kyai Maja)  100
Karanganyar, district (Bagelèn)  23, 
396, 481, 591, 663, 669, 671  see also 
Jayadiningrat, Rèma
Karanganyar, coffee estate (Yogya)  542  
see also Ceuvelaire
Karang Bolong, district (Bagelèn)  17, 
186, 454  see also Juni, birds’ nest 
rocks
Karangjati, indigo factory (Pekalongan)  
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465  see also Thomson
Karangkobar, district (north coast)  45, 
553, 560-3 (annexation of, 1-1-1825), 
661
Karangnangka, village (Sokawati)  490-1  
see also Waliyullah, Sunan
Karang Lo, Kyai gedhé (ancestor of Ratu 
Kencana Wulan)  72, 225  see also 
Prampèlan, Kyai Ageng
Karangpandhan, estates / teak forest of 
MN II  184, 213, 426
Karangwuni, village (Wates Kulon 
Praga)  73, 481 (hiding place of 
Dipanagara’s mother and daughter 
in Java War), 659
Karna, wayang hero  572
kasektèn (inner spiritual power)  133-4, 
614 (of Radèn Ayu Sérang)
Kartasari, Kyai (Delanggu)  190 (killed 
by Rongga)
Kartasura  13, 36, 105, 112, 242, 335 
(example cited during British 
attack), 349 (raping of court women 
following fall of), 353 (during prang 
cina), 359 (Raffles meets Adams at), 
372, 388 (removal of kraton to new 
site), 410, 444, 492-3, 537, 587-8
Kartawijaya, Radèn Ngabèhi (demang of 
Menorèh)  496 (rallies to Dipasana)
Kasendhèr, Baron (Alexander of Macedon, 
text)  491
Kasepuhan, royal house (Cirebon)  280
kasepuhan, pro-HB II party (Yogya)  193, 
271-2 (origins of), 339 (Pangéran 
Jayakusuma as member of), 352-4 
(intensification of rivalries with 
karajan), 355 (supporters warned 
by Raffles), 362-3, 441, 592-3 
(Dipanagara seeks support from)  
see also karajan
Kasimun (alias Wangsadikrama 
/ Sadikrama; panakawan of 
Dipanagara in exile)  741, 817
Kasongan, pathok negari (Yogya)  90, 131
Kastuba, Kyai Muhamad (ulama of 
Prapak, Kedhu)  585 (instruction for 
tax collectors in wartime), 790 (as 
Tumenggung)
Kastuba, Kyai Muhamad (Bagelèn)  215 
(exiled, 2-4-1823)
Kastuba, Sèh (senior ulama and guru of 
pesantrèn of Alang-alang Ombo, 
Bagelèn) 790
Kasuran, ambush / battle of (28-7-1826)  
123, 129 (Dipanagara’s followers 
shave heads after), 628, 642
Katanggel, kraton infantry regiment  323
Katangga, river  see Ketangga
kaum (firm Islamic community / quarter, 
Yogya)  89, 91, 295, 336 (damaged 
by fires from British artillery), 365 
(repopulated after assault), 570, 
626 (origins of Dipanagara’s santri 
supporters), 630
kaum, village priests  47  see also 
education, Qur’ānic
kawin bathin (‘marriage of the inner’), 
dhikr  485
Kayumas, district (Grobogan-Wirasari)  
234 (deserters from Daendels’ army 
in)
Kebo Kemili, Kyai (Mataram pusaka 
pike)  135
Kebumèn, district (Bagelèn)  647, 665, 
667
Kadarèn, village (Delanggu)  117 
(Dipanagara’s liaison with Chinese 
girl in), 619 (description of affair)  
see also Chinese, sexual relations 
with, Dipanagara and Chinese
Kecawang, village (Karanganyar district, 
western Bagelèn)  663, 665, 669-71, 
673, 696
Kedhaton, Ratu (?1750-1820; post-1812, 
Ratu Ageng; consort of HB II, 
mother of HB III)  70, 74, 85 (rumour 
that might live at Tegalreja), 188-9, 
219, 224, 274, 286, 315 (imprisoned 
in Bangsal Kencana), 340 (death of 
sons-in-law), 365 (appointed Ratu 
Ageng), 396 (family relationship 
with Danureja IV), 760,762, 764, 780  
see also Ageng, Ratu
Kedhaton, Ratu (title given to 
Dipanagara’s principal wife in Java 
War)  see Maduretna, Radèn Ayu
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kedhawung,  herbal medicine / jamu  117 
(used by Dipanagara)
Kedhiri  251, 391 (Panji Suradiningrat’s 
uprising in, 1813), 485 (Chinese 
tollgate keeper killed at), 490-1, 493
Kedhu  11, 17, 19, 24, 27, 31, 34-5, 37, 
40-1, 44-5 (better diet in), 48, 50, 53, 
55, 78, 91 (pradikan villages in), 98, 
109, 120, 129, 131, 164 (proposed 
annexation of, 1808), 185, 210, 
215-6, 237, 244 (discarded European 
dress of peasants in), 249, 253-4, 
265, 286, 293, 345, 361, 364, 369 
(Dipanagara’s pre-1812 apanage 
lands in), 378-80 (annexed 1812), 
382 (Crawfurd leases lands in), 
383 (land-tax payments / tobacco 
exports in), 399 (Tan Jin Sing’s 
family as tax-farmers in), 405, 421, 
423-4, 425 (PB IV’s aim to get back 
apanage lands in, 1815), 463, 464-6 
(burden of land tax on inhabitants 
of), 466 (coffee plantations in), 
468 (tobacco warehouses in), 474 
(abolition of tollgates in, 1824), 480, 
482, 493, 496-9 (Dipasana’s revolt 
in, 1822), 512 (impact of Merapi 
eruption on, 1822-3), 515, 553, 560, 
562, 608, 610 (pradikan villages help 
Dipanagara in Java War), 613, 626 
(fighting qualities of men from), 
627 (followers of Dipanagara from 
pesantrèn in), 646, 652, 661, 666, 
668, 673, 675, 677-9 (Dipanagara 
arrives in, 3-1830), 682-3, 686, 693, 
699, 733, 746 (Dipanagara II in , 
1830-4), 786-94 (Dipanagara’s santri 
supporters in), 799-801,  see also 
Grabag, Magelang, Valck 
Kedhung Kebo (‘Buffaloes’ watering 
hole’; post-1830 Purwareja)  135, 
186, 662, 667, 691 (Pengalasan 
returns to), 694-5, 699  see also Buku 
Kedhung Kebo, Purwareja
kejawèn (Javanese-speaking heartland)  
167, 204, 443, 693
Kejiwan, battle (9-8-1826)  642
kelangenan-Dalem, royal retreats / 
pleasure gardens  137, 778-9
Kelir mountains (Kulon Praga / Bagelèn)  
see Gunung Kelir
kemadhuh, leaf (goad for tiger-buffalo 
fights)  184
Kemandhungan, pavilion (Yogya kraton)  
374
Kembangarum, coffee estate (Slèman 
district, Yogya)  463, 535-6, 634 (Kyai 
Maja at)  see also Bouwens, Shand
kembang cina, batik pattern  25
Kemit, bènthèng (Gombong district, 
Karanganyar)  669, 673
kemit siti, abdi-Dalem (royal site 
guardians)  137
Kemlaka, tollgate (Mataram)  262 
(Daendels at), 263
Kemp, P.H. van der  368, 375, 531
kemuning, tree  86 (at Sélareja)
Kemusuh, village (Kulon Praga)  525, 
631
Kenangsari, Déwi (female spirit)  496 
(advises Dipasana)
Kencana, Ratu (daughter of Panembahan 
Cakradiningrat IV of Pamekasan; 
consort of PB IV)  181, 416 (intrigues 
during sepoy conspiracy, 1815)
Kencana, Ratu (Ratu Ibu; mother of HB 
IV)  see Ageng, Ratu
Kencana, Ratu (?1802-?1827; daughter of 
Danureja II; consort of HB IV)  73, 
371, 411-2 (marriage to HB IV), 412 
(character assessed / psychosis of), 
507-9 (as guardian of HB V), 549 
(as guardian), 572-3 (marriage to 
Dipanagara foretold in dream), 762
Kencana Wulan, Ratu (consort of HB 
II; post-1812, Ratu Wétan)  79, 206 
(jewelry of), 218 (kinsman shot on 
Daendels’ orders), 221 (daughter 
promised to Rongga), 225 (enmity 
with Danureja II), 227 (character 
assessed), 237 (Daendels writes to 
HB II about), 244 (lends Rongga 
jewelry for Bogor journey), 265, 
267 (family graves in Jipang), 274, 
277, 349-50 (singled out by sepoy 
looters), 350, 397 (daughter marries 
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Danureja IV), 441 (joins HB II in 
Batavia, 8-1816), 700 (refuses to 
share HB II’s exile in Ambon), 755, 
760, 783
Kendhal, district (north coast) 215, 265, 
581, 781 (patih of)
Kenitèn, district (Madiun)  119, 268 
(created as kabupatèn, 1-1811), 381  
see also Sumaprawira, Retnaningsih
kepatihan (Surakarta)  see Surakarta
kepatihan (Yogya)  398 (Danureja IV’s 
incumbency of / abuse of power in), 
452 (gunung / police officials based 
at), 547-8
Kepundhung, pradikan village (Pajang)  
443-8  see also Murma Wijaya
Kepurun, village (Kulon Praga)  631 
(visit by Dipanagara to)
keputrèn (women’s quarters in kraton)  
see Yogyakarta
kerigaji (royal corvée)  57
kerigan (labour services)  463 (of 
Kembangarum coffee workers)
Kerja, district (Sokawati)  100, 543  see 
also Kertadirja II
Kertadirja I (?-1810; tumenggung Tamping 
/ head of police; patih kadipatèn, 
1807-10)  100, 243 (on expedition 
against Rongga), 544, 774
Kertadirja II, Mas Tumenggung (bupati 
Kerja, Sokawati; son of above)  100, 
251, 543-4 (dismissed by Danureja 
IV), 547 (joins Dipanagara at 
Tegalreja), 774
Kertadirjan family  100
Kertaleksana, Ngabèhi (official of 
Sumadiningrat)  281 (role in secret 
correspondence)
Kertamenggala, Embok (‘Radèn Ayu 
Guru’)  496-7 (supports Dipasana 
revolt)
Kertasana, district (east Java)  12, 51, 
195, 255 (cowardice of bupati), 268 
(bupati replaced, 1-1811)  see also 
Pringgalaya
Kertasiluman, commander (Kedhu)  694 
(placed in stocks in Magelang)
Kertawangsa Kalapa-aking, Mas  see 
Kalapa-aking
Kertayuda Wirapatih, sub-demang 
of Sumawana (Ambarawa)  584 
(murdered)
Ketangga, river / forest (Madiun)  251, 
484 (Ratu Adil expectations), 491-2  
see also Ratu Adil
Ketanggung, Yogya kraton regiment  275, 
281
Kew letters (of stadhouder Prince William 
V, 1795) xii
Khāttāb, Zayd bin al- (companion of The 
Prophet)  81 (tomb destroyed by 
Wahhābī)
Kidung Lalembut (song of the spirits), 
text  137
Kielstra, E.B.  686
Kilir, Nabi  491
Kindar, Radèn Mas Abdurrahman (son 
of Dipanagara born in Manado, 
1832-?)  80, 729-30 (birth), 731, 738, 
746, 754, 769
Kinthèlan, village (Yogya)  496
kitab (religious books)  191 (in Rongga’s 
mosque at Maospati)
Kitab Musarar (Jayabaya prophecies)  
488-90  see also Jayabaya
Kläring, Emmanuel (Yogya burger)  205
klasa pesantrèn (woven pandanus mats)  
469-70  see also Bendha, Pesantrèn
Klathèn, fort  4 (earthquake damage to), 
183-4 (garrison at), 208, 235, 292 
(attacks on house of retired sergeant 
at), 331 (British troops arrive at 
prior to Yogya assault)
Klathèn, town  34, 55 (law and order 
agreements signed in), 196 (Angger 
Gunung signed at), 197 (Angger 
Gladhag signed at), 201, 208, 248, , 
383 (market at), 423, 428, 600 (new 
road constructed at, 7-1825), 638
Klèca, lands at  454 (Surakarta Resident’s 
rent of) 
Klein, C.H. (Yogya burger)  205
Klepu, Book of (cadastral register, 1756)  
39-40, 61
Klerck, E.S. de  (1869-? ; military 
historian)  xvii, 106-7, 123, 436, 605  
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see also Louw
Klungkung (Bali)  623 (Dipanagara 
receives soldiers from)
Knoerle, Lieutenant J.H. (?-1833)  106-
8, 120, 370, 405, 510, 583, 660, 703, 
707, 711, 713, 716-24 (accompanies 
Dipanagara to Manado), 822
Kock, A.H.W. baron de (1808-91: 
Resident of Yogya, 1848-51; son of 
below)  1, 516, 751-2 (interviews 
Mangkarawati on Makassar 
voyage), 810
Kock, Lieutenant-general H.M. de 
(1779-1845; lieutenant-governor, 
1822-30; C-in-C Dutch forces 
during Java War; Baron, 1842) xviii, 
107, 116, 124, 247 (compared to 
Dasamuka / Rawana), 263 (receives 
SpD5,000 indemnity from Yogya), 
387, 397 (view of Danureja IV), 
428 (rejects offer of sepoys), 436-7 
(view of Nahuys), 509 (view of 
Dipanagara), 516, 523 (critical of 
Smissaert’s absences), 526, 530 
(plate), 534, 559 (assessment of 
PB VI), 563, 583-4, 586, 605-6, 612, 
618 (refuses to endorse shooting 
of Rembang Chinese), 639, 640 
(absences in Batavia), 642-6 (battle 
tactics of), 648 (issue of age), 654, 
662, 666-8 (confers with Van den 
Bosch), 669, 673, 675-99 (capture 
of Dipanagara), 695 (as head of 
freemasons in Indies), 700, 711 
(commands Dutch army in Zeeland, 
1831-6)
Kock, Mrs H.M. de (1788-1828; wife 
of above; née Luise Fredericke 
Wilhelmine Gertrud von Bilfinger) 
683
Kock van Leeuwen, Lieutenant-colonel 
A. de  (field artillery commander)  
689 (at Magelang during 
Dipanagara’s arrest)
Krakatau, volcano  393 (1883 eruption), 
515-6
krama (High Javanese)  see Javanese
kraman (rebels)  49 (in Cirebon)
kramat, supernatural power  49, 121, 290
Kraus, Werner (biographer of Radèn 
Salèh)  695-6, 698-9
Krawang (west Java)  454-5 (problems of 
land leases in)  see also Ciasem and 
Pamanukan
Kresna, wayang figure  411 (advice to 
Arjuna)
Kreteg, village tollgate / ferry crossing 
(Kali Praga)  478 (description of 
Chinese toll-keeper at)
Krijgsman, C.F. (official interpreter in 
Javanese, Semarang)  197, 211, 335 
(delivers British ultimatum to HB 
II), 336, 350 (goes through court 
MSS with Crawfurd), 355 (translates 
proclamation of HB III’s investiture), 
357, 361 (reads out proclamation of 
PA I’s appointment)
kris, stabbing daggers / blades  7, 77, 
155, 310, 341 (kraton pusaka taken), 
365 (replaced after British assault), 
388 (loss of as symbolic castration), 
607 (gold sheaths brought to fund 
Java War), 611, 620, 813-5  see also 
Abijaya, Bandayuda, Betha, Birawa, 
empu, Gupita, Jingga
Kroya (Bagelèn)  649 (destruction of 
Bushkens column at, 10-1828)
Kruseman, J.D. (1794-1861; Assistant-
Resident of Yogya, 1816-7)  353, 
412, 442 (plate), 444-8 (handling 
of Murma Wijaya affair), 457 
(transferred to Batavia), 482
Kudatirta, Mas Tumenggung (supporter 
of Dipanagara in Bagelèn)  661 
(interview with)
Kudhus, Sunan / grave site  133, 250 
(holy graves at), 291, 635
Kudhus, Ratu  162  see also Timur, Ratu
Kudur Brubuh (Kadisana), tollgate 
(Ngawi)  616 (Chinese woman 
organises security at)
kuduran (unpaid work by sikep)  60
Kuiper, F.M  (Dutch land-renter 
Surakarta)  532
Kulon Praga, district  38, 65, 144, 147, 
337, 367, 369 (Dipanagara’s apanage 
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lands in), 395, 463, 480, 525, 584, 
593, 595, 609, 619-20, 631, 641 
(Dipanagara’s military bases in), 
646-7, 650 (taxes demanded by 
Senthot in), 651, 678, 699
Kulur, Kyai (Cirebon rebel)  187
Kuncèn, market (Yogya)  383 (British 
take-over of taxes, 1812), 782  see also 
Derpayuda, Nyai Ageng
Kurawa  405
Kusèn, Kyai Muhamad (Dipanagara’s 
pengulu, 1828-30)  100, 790
Kusumareja, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati)  273 (appointed by 
Prince Regent / HB III)
Kusumayuda, Pangéran (son of PB IV; 
Surakarta army commander in 
Bagelèn, 1826-9)  591
Kutaarja (Panggungan), kabupatèn 
(Madiun)  268
Kutawinangun, district (Bagelèn)  481
Kutha Gedhé  8 (armaments 
manufacture in), 24 (fish farms at), 
78, 216 (arms), 244 (Ratu Kencana 
Wulan’s trade in opium / jewelry 
with), 272 (gun foundries at), 279, 
297 (burial of HB II at), 383 (market 
at), 582 (piagem to amad-Dalem / 
plate), 610 (armaments centre at), 
647 (wartime market taxes in)
Kutha Pethik  see Maospati
Kuwaron, Kyai (Pajang)  104, 570, 790
kyai (revered country gentlemen / 
religious teachers)  72, 76, 79, 85 
(Dipanagara’s marriage to daughter 
of), 99, 117, 627-8 (followers 
of Dipanagara), 786-94 (list of 
Dipanagara’s supporters)
labuhan (offering ceremony to Ratu 
Kidul, Parangkusuma)  141, 148-9 
(plate)  see also Ratu Kidul
Lagordt-Dillié, P.M.  610 (gunpowder 
manufacture in Mataram)
lailat al-kadar (night of the heavenly 
dispensation)  569 (Dipanagara’s 
vision of Ratu Adil during)  see also 
malem pitulikur
Lake, Gerard, 1st Viscount Lake of Delhi 
and Leswarree, general (1744-1808; 
C-in-C Indian army; conqueror of 
Scindia, 1803-5)  347
lalembut  see Kidung Lalembut
Lampung, district (Sumatra)  648, 810
Lancashire, cotton manufactures  25, 310  
see also textiles
lances (tumbak)  7, 333, 607 (used by 
Dipanagara during Java War)  see 
also pikes
landdrost (sheriffs)  385 (put in charge of 
police by Raffles)
landownership (in core regions / nagara 
agung)  33  see also tanah pusaka, 
tanah yasa
land registers (cadasters)  350 
(plundered by British)  see also 
Klepu, Serat Ebuk Anyar
land-rent (leases of estates to Europeans, 
1816-25)  457 (23-5-1823 abolition 
of), 499 (Nahuys influences 
Angger Sepuluh recodification 
to facilitate, 4-10-1818), 504, 510 
(abolition), 519, 527, 559-61 (Van der 
Capellen’s views on), 563 (impact of 
abolition), 603 (impact of land-rent 
indemnities) 
land-tax  25, 100, 380, 464-7 (burden on 
Kedhu population), 527  see also 
Raffles
land-renters  see Europeans
Lapro, Jan (Resident of Yogya, 1764-73)  
322 (builds attic for storing birds’ 
nests)
Lara Jonggrang  421  see also Prambanan
Lara Kidul, Nyai (patih of Ratu Kidul)  
140, 145  see also Ratu Kidul
Lasem, district (north coast)  164, 249-50 
(Rongga appeals to Chinese in), 256, 
617-9 (Chinese Muslim peranakan in 
during Java War), 718
Latif, Lieutenant Hasan Nur (Manado)  
119, 727 (refuses Dipanagara’s 
marriage proposal for daughter)
law  see Javanese-Islamic law codes, 
judicial system
Lawick van Pabst, P.H. baron van 
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(1780-1846; member of Forest 
Administration board, Rembang, 
1810-11; Assistant-Resident of 
Rembang, 1811-2; Resident of 
Rembang, 1823-7; Yogyakarta, 
1827; Semarang, 1827-9; Besuki and 
Banyuwangi, 1829-30; commissioner 
for the regulation of affairs in the 
Principalities, 1830-33) 234, 252, 
318-9 (on secret conspiracy between 
courts), 326, 425, 439 (sexual 
conduct / abuse of Javanese priyayi 
women), 523, 528, 547, 613, 628, 645 
(peace proposals during Java War), 
810  see also Rembang
Lawu, Sunan (mountain god)  486, 488-9, 
492, 571  see also Gunung Lawu
Leberveld, Lucas (1757-? ; coachman 
of HB II, sergeant; former VOC 
soldier)  243, 256-7 (commands 
flying column in expedition against 
Rongga)  see also Paulus
Le Bron de Vexela, Lieutenant-colonel 
Joseph (1793-? ; commandant 3rd 
mobile column)  611 (suspected 
cruelty of), 637 (captures Maja), 659
Le Clercq, Pieter (1787-1839; Resident of 
Kedhu, 1821-5; Preanger Regencies, 
1825-7, governor of Moluccas, 1827-
8; Resident of Semarang, 1829-34)  
497 (crushes Dipasana revolt in 
Kedhu)
Ledhok, district (Kedhu)  24, 45, 80, 129, 
474, 661, 663, 678  see also Imam 
Musbah, Wanasaba
Leiden, university of  67, 654, 661
Leipzig, battle (‘Battle of the Nations’, 
15/19-10-1813)  415
lelana (spiritual wanderings / pilgrimage) 
71, 105, 127-8, 487  see also satria 
lelana
Lengis (Bagelèn)  661  see also Kudatirta
Lèngkong (Slèman), battle (30-7-1826)  
642
Leopold I, king of the Belgians / Prince 
of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld (1790-1865; 
reigned 1831-65)  734
leprosy  140, 145  see also Ratu Kidul
Le Sueur, Lieutenant-colonel (Surakarta 
garrison commander, 1817-20)  499-
500
Lib Sing, Chinese land-renter (Wirasaba) 
478 (good landlord)
liberalism (economic)  431-3 (Van der 
Capellen’s view of), 435-6 (Nahuys 
as advocate of), 456 (Adam Smith)  
see also Wealth of Nations
Liebeherr, B.F. von (Resident of 
Surakarta, 1804-8)  160, 169, 519
Liebeherr, Clara Elisabeth von (daughter 
of above; wife of A.H. Smissaert)  
519, 524 (offers Dipanagara 
Constantia wine), 718
Lien Tjo Tjing (leading member of 
Yogya Chinese community)  524 
(testimonial for Smissaert, 1825)
Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion 
(Bengal)  297, 302 (plate), 303, 339, 
415-28 (during sepoy conspiracy, 
1815)  see also sepoys
Likupang, trading post (Bangka strait, 
Minahasa)  715 (map), 720
Lima Bugis (the five Bugis peninsulas)  
717  see also Bugis, Sulawesi
limestone ovens  see Gamping
linen  186  see also cloth, cotton piece 
goods, ginggang, textiles
Lingga (Riau)  21 (pirates)
Lion, Major J.T. (garrison commander, 
Makassar)  753
Lippe, H.F. (1783-1822; Assistant-
Resident Surakarta, 1817-22)  499
Lipura, village / holy site (Yogya)  154, 
496-7 (Dipasana’s revolt in)  see also 
Sénapati
Liverpool, Robert Banks 2nd Earl (1770-
1828; British prime minister, 1812-
27)  429
Lloyds of London, insurance brokers  
429
Lodhaya (Blitar)  485-7 (belief in were-
tigers / macan gadhungan), 490 
(Sunan Waliyullah in)  see also Iman 
Sampurna, Waliyullah
Loevestein (Gelderland), royal 
fortress  735 (proposal to transfer 
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Dipanagara to)  see also Groot, Hugo 
de, William I
Lombok  341, 590, 610, 719
Loro, Mbok (daughter of Embok 
Kertamenggala / Radèn Ayu Guru)  
496-8
Louis, M.J. (French land-renter 
Surakarta)  465
Louw, P.J.F. (1856-1924; military 
historian)  xvii, 106-7, 363, 436, 520, 
605, 615  see also Klerck
Lowanu, district (Bagelèn)  37, 161 
(indigo production in), 333 (troop 
reinforcements to Yogya from), 399 
(apanage of Tan Jin Sing in), 455 
(pepper plantations in)
Lumajang (east Java)  492 
(‘disappearance’ of Pangéran 
Dipanagara I at, 1723)
lungguh (‘seat’ / apanage)  9, 34  see also 
apanage system
lurik (Javanese cloth)  384
Maas river  735
macan gadhungan (were-tigers)  87, 485-6 
(in Lodhaya)  see also tigers
Macanan, police officials (Yogya)  53-5, 
452  see also gunung
MacGillivray, H.M. (1797-1835; 
Assistant-Resident of Surakarta, 
1822; Second Resident of Surakarta, 
1823-5, Resident, 1825-7, 1830-4; 
Resident of Sumatra’s West Coast, 
1829-30)  446 (plate), 471, 474-5 
(warning about tollgates), 532 
(participates in land-rent indemnity 
commission), 554-5, 591, 594 (warns 
Smissaert of Dipanagara’s plans 
for rebellion), 595 (plans to send 
assassins to Selarong), 645 (peace 
proposals), 809
Mackenzie, Colonel Colin (1754-1821; 
chief engineer officer to British 
forces in Java, 1811-3; surveyor-
general of Madras, 1813-21)  xviii, 
306 (plate), 308 (prepares plans for 
Yogya assault), 351 (Indonesian MSS 
collection)
Mackenzie Private collection (British 
Library)  351 (Indonesian MSS)
Mackenzie 1822 collection (British 
Library)  351 (Indonesian MSS)
Maclaine, Gillean (? –1840; Scots land-
renter Surakarta) 429, 532
Maclaine, Watson & Co, British agency 
house  429
Maclean, Lieutenant Hector (?-1812; 14th 
Regiment of Foot / Bucks)  210, 349 
(died of wounds, 25-6-1812), 615
Macleod, Lieutenant-colonel Alexander 
(C.O. 59th Regiment of Foot / 2nd 
Notts)  335 (during British assault 
on Yogya)
Macquoid, Thomas (Scots-Irish 
businessman and land-renter)  429
Macquoid, Davidson & Co, British 
agency house  429
madat (prepared opium / candhu)  479
Madiun  12-3, 39, 58-60, 91 (pesantrèn 
in), 101, 164, 177 (Rongga secures 
military levies from, 1808), 190-1 
(Rongga’s administration in), 192, 
195 (timber resources in), 219, 222, 
232 (Rongga returns to, 10-1810), 
233, 236, 242-4, 247, 248 (tollgate 
leases in), 250-1, 254, 256, 267-9 
(last royal vestiges of Rongga 
obliterated in), 269 (old bupati’s 
residence at Wanasari restored), 
372 (Dipakusuma’s influence in), 
381 (new kabupatèn post-1812, 405 
(bupati wedana in), 414-5 (Sayyid 
Kramat disturbances in, 1815), 438 
(local bupati’s addiction to alcohol), 
470 (tollgate rates in), 484, 490 
(Sunan Waliyullah in, 1817), 615l, 
623 (support for Dipanagara in), 
626 (fighting qualities of men of), 
628 (Banjarsari), 638, 755  see also 
Dipakusuma, Maospati, Rongga, 
Tegalsari
   bupati of  232, 268 (increase in numbers 
post-1-1811)
Madras  xii, 275 (horse artillery in Java 
expedition), 308 (military engineers 
from), 339 (horse artillery in assault 
on Yogya), 422  see also Mackenzie
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Madubrangta, Radèn Ayu (first wife 
of Dipanagara; daughter of Kyai 
Gedhé Dhadhapan)  97-9, 765-6
Madura  70, 74-5 (British capture of, 8-
1811), 183, 189, 219, 222 (Daendels’ 
troops from), 286, 318 (secret 
emissaries sent to Surakarta from), 
323 (Jaysentika’s ancestry), 324, 337, 
353, 372, 416, 461 (Ratu Kedhaton’s 
ancestry), 494-5 (cholera epidemic 
in), 629 (auxiliaries from), 630 
(Trunajaya), 644 (plate), 718, 746 
(Dipanagara II as exile in)  see also 
Cakradiningrat, Hamengkubuwana 
III, Kedhaton (Ratu), Pamekasan, 
Sampang, Sumenep, Trunajaya
Madura Straits  159 (British blockade of), 
186 (Fort Lodewijk guards entrance 
to)
Madurese troops  181, 283 (heavy losses 
at Meester Cornelis), 358-9 (praised 
as better than sepoys), 639 (chant 
dhikr during Java War), 641 (as 
auxiliaries), 644 (Sultan Madura 
agrees to send)
Madu Retna, residence of Trunajaya 
(Pacuran, West Madura)  219
Maduretna, Radèn Ayu (?1798-1828; 
principal wife of Dipanagara; 
daughter of Radèn Rongga)  86-7, 
121, 136 (buried at Jimatan), 154, 
401-5 (courtship and marriage), 
405 (support for Dipanagara), 
511-2 (persuades Dipanagara not 
to commit suicide), 513 (witnesses 
eruption of Merapi, 28-12-1822), 571, 
578, 581 (styled as Ratu Kedhaton 
during Java War), 619 (Dipanagara’s 
infidelity towards), 623, 683 
(Dipanagara’s bereavement), 692, 
(Dipanagara asks to be buried near), 
765, 766-8  see also Jimatan, Rongga
Maduretna, Ratu (?-1809; daughter of 
HB II and Ratu Kedhaton; wife of 
Rongga)  79, 191, 214, 219 (character 
and death, 13-11-1809), 236 (one-
year memorial for), 268 (gravesite 
renamed, 1-1811), 401-2 (as mother 
of Radèn Ayu Maduretna), 491, 761, 
764, 766  see also Gunung Bancak, 
Giripurna
madzhab (law schools in Mecca)  153
Magelang  53, 109, 124, 377, 380-1, 423, 
428, 467, 482, 497, 503, 516, 536, 
583-4, 586, 606, 608, 612-3, 617, 
632-4, 646, 653, 659, 662, 665, 667, 
669-70, 675, 677-9, 680-1 (plates 
of Residency House), 682-6, 691-3 
(Dipanagara’s arrest at), 702-3, 722, 
726 (Dipanagara orders saddles 
from), 729  see also Kedhu
Magetan, district (east Java)  50, 219, 
255 (Rongga’s battle at, 27-11-1810), 
255, 257-8 (Rongga’s commander 
Dasamuka killed at?), 268 (increase 
in number of bupati, 1-1811), 396, 
414  see also Prawiradiningrat, 
Sasradipura
Maghribī, Sèh Maulana  141 (site at 
Mancingan), 781
Mahabhrata, cycle of wayang plays  140, 
143, 404
Mahdi, beliefs in  516  see also Ratu Adil
Mahdi Sayyid (‘Pangéran Anom’)  426
Mahmud, Radèn Mas Hasan  see Sukur
mahouts, royal elephant drivers (srati)  
421
Mahratta War  see Second Mahratta War 
(1803-5)
maize  43, 464, 475  see also diet
Maja, Kyai (?1792-1849; alias Bagus 
Kalifah; guru and pradikan ageng 
of Maja, Delanggu)  73, 85, 90, 92 
(plate), 93-4 (knowledge of Qur’ān), 
99, 111, 114, 116, 152, 387, 436, 459, 
511, 546, 553, 559, 570, 581, 583-4, 
588-9, 606, 613 (Balinese wife of), 
617 (cruelty / xenophobia of), 
627, 631-5 (origins of break with 
Dipanagara), 636-9 (negotiations 
and surrender, 10-11-1828), 642 
(arguments over pre-Gawok battle 
tactics), 644 (peace negotiations at 
Salatiga, 8-1827), 648-9, 668 (capture 
of), 669, 676, 702-3 (in town gaol, 
Batavia), 706 (exile to Manado), 
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710, 722-3 (refusal of contact with 
Dipanagara in Manado), 725 
(wife), 791  see also Kampung Jawa 
Tondano, Tonsea Lama
Maja, Nyai (first wife of above, died 
1828)  623, 627
Maja, Radèn Ayu (Balinese wife of Kyai 
Maja; pre-1828, wife of Pangéran 
Mangkubumi) 613, 623, 632, 638, 725
Maja, pesantrèn  85, 116 (Dipanagara 
visits on foot, post-1816), 627, 637, 
786-94  see also Badhèran, Pulo 
Kadang
Maja-agung  see Wirasaba
Majakerta, town  552 (place of retirement 
of Danureja IV, 1847), 770, 774  see 
also Japan
Majangjati, burial site (pasaréyan) 
(Sragèn)  76 (grave of Kyai Ageng 
Derpayuda)
Majapahit, empire (1292-1527)  72, 109, 
140 (fall of), 167 (division of Java 
with Pajajaran), 415, 445, 490-1, 590 
(Dipanagara plans to recreate in 
outer islands), 733 (history)
Majapahit rood, unit of measurement  
64-5
Majapitu, sub-district (Sokawati)  491
Majasta, pradikan village (Tembayat)  
73 (birth place of Dipanagara’s 
mother), 593, 627 (Arab lurah of 
pondhok at), 791
Makassar  xv, xix, 72, 74, 87, 105, 121, 
152-3, 167, 183, 276 (plans to send 
Natakusuma / Natadiningrat 
to), 364, 411 (Dipanagara has 
texts copied in), 562 (Van Geen’s 
expedition to, 9-1824), 603, 606, 636, 
642 (reinforcements sent from), 648, 
652 (Dipanagara’s death in), 659-60, 
665, 674, 700, 711, 718, 724, 726, 730, 
732, 734-55 (Dipanagara as exile in), 
816-21, 824-7
Makassar Notebooks, texts (written by 
Dipanagara)  xx, 109, 112 (plate), 
113-4, 490, 579, 744-5 (composition 
of, 24-1-1838)
Makassarese  222 (Daendels’ troops), 740 
(attitude to Dipanagara), 754, 755 
(keep memory of Dipanagara alive)  
see also Bugis
Makincing, Rangga Daëng (Bugis 
commander of Dipanagara)  626  see 
also Maréwa
Malabar coast (southern India)  706
Malang  161, 251, 266, 484-5 (millenarian 
movement in, 11-1819)
Malangnegara, Kyai Tumenggung (army 
commander of HB I)  248, 623, 800  
see also Sumanegara
malar munga (bird of ill-omen, Imagiri)  
501, 597
malaria  116 (Dipanagara suffers from), 
277 (Natakusuma / Natadiningrat 
affected by), 653, 659, 675, 699, 703, 
716-7  see also Dipanagara, health 
issues
Malay
   battalions, regiments  424
   kampung Melayu  494 (Torbaya, 
Semarang), 749-51 (Makassar), 753
   language  xvi (Dienst Maleisch), 21, 67 
(Dienst Maleisch), 107 (Dipanagara’s 
knowledge of), 109, 175 (inability 
of HB II to speak), 180 (Crown 
Prince / HB III insists spoken at 
Rajawinangun review, 1-6-1808), 
201, 280 (Raffles’ Malay letters), 290 
(Captain Robison’s poor command 
of), 339 (John Deans’ fluency in), 
410 (tutor appointed for HB IV in), 
441 (HB IV’s lack of knowledge of), 
421, 427, 433 (Dutch government’s 
ignorance of, 1815), 458-9 (European 
land-renters partial knowledge 
of), 459 (Dipanagara’s disdainful 
view of), 478 (Chinese tollgate 
keepers’ lack of knowledge of), 487, 
552 (Dipanagara’s disgust at), 605 
(translation of Babad Dipanagara 
into, 1864-74), 619 (used during Java 
War), 634 (C.P.J. Elout’s knowledge 
of), 638 (Kyai Tirtadrana’s fluency 
in), 676, 690 (Valck’s mastery of 
/ Dipanagara’s facility in), 711 
(Dipanagara’s distaste for), 733 
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(Tirtadrana’s fluency in)
   peninsula  41  see also Melaka
Malays  222 (Daendels’ troops), 276 
(witness establishment Franco-
Dutch government, 28-2-1810)
malem pitulikur  576 (Dipanagara’s vision 
on)  see also lailat al-kadar
Maliabara, Jalan (Yogya)  309
Māliki, law school (Mecca)  597
Maluku  431, 563 (Van der Capellen’s 
voyage to, 7/10-1824), 676 (Cleerens 
as governor of), 719, 738, 741, 743
Manado  xvi, 74, 78, 87, 105-9, 115-7, 
119, 123, 151, 369-70, 376, 461 
(Dipanagara’s allowances in), 552, 
597, 606, 636 (Maja and followers 
sent to), 638-9, 659-60, 665, 668 
(Imam Bonjol as exile in), 682, 706 
Dipanagara exiled to, 30-4-1830), 
710, 713 (Resident of), 716-21 
(voyage to), 721 (description of), 
722-33 (Dipanagara’s exile in), 724 
(epidemic in, 8-1833), 735, 738-40, 
742, 816-21  see also Cambier, 
Christians, Minahasa, Pietermaat
Manado, Bay of  720 (plate), 721
mancanagara (outlying districts)
   bupati  12, 57 (corvée duties in Yogya 
kraton), 58, 175, 177-8, 191, 207-8, 
211-6 (crisis over timber trade), 
232, 255 (refuse to rally to Rongga), 
267-8 (personnel changes following 
Rongga rebellion), 269 (in Yogyas 
for Garebeg Mulud, 4-1811), 285 (at 
Serondhol), 372 (new appointments 
post-1812), 381 (loss of positions in 
1812), 405, 408, 521, 526, 613, 622 
(receive piagem from Dipanagara)
   eastern (Surakarta)  51, 60 (Panaraga), 
161 (Malang), 162 (annexations), 
164 (teak supplies in), 219-22, 321 
(troops arrive to protect PB IV, 7-
1812), 378 (British annexations in), 
391, 475-6 (effects of tollgates in), 
654 (1830 annexations in) see also 
Kedhiri, Panaraga
   eastern (Yogya)  5, 38-41, 47 
(unfaithfulness of women in), 53, 
57-9 (tax burdens on), 66, 164 (teak 
supplies in), 178, 183, 186, 193-4, 
195 (timber in), 211-4 (tension over 
timber supplies from), 216 (work 
force in Yogya to extend kraton 
bastions), 236, 249-50 (economic role 
of Chinese in), 267-8 (administrative 
changes after Rongga), 291 
(suffering of population of pasisir 
border regions under Daendels), 
372 (new appointments in), 379-
80 (British annexations in), 383 
(take-over of tollgates in, 1812), 384 
(rice prices during Java War), 408, 
415 (Sayyid Kramat disturbances 
in, 1815), 469 (scarcity of salt in), 
473, 526, 613, 614-5 (Radèn Ayu 
Yudakusuma’s campaign in, 9-1825), 
654 (1830 annexations in)  see also 
Madiun
   western  16, 40, 165, 333 (troop 
reinforcements to Yogya), 391 
(Baker’s survey of, 1815), 519-20 
(plans for annexation of, 1822-
3), 561, 654 (1830 annexations)  
see also Bagelèn, Banyumas, 
Gagatan, Gowong, Jabarangkah, 
Karangkobar, Ledhok, Rèma
Manchu court (Peking)  171
Mancingan  140-1, 254 (court valuables 
to be sent to, 12-1810), 587 (PB 
VI visits, 6-1830), 781  see also 
Parangkusuma, Parangtritis, 
Parangwédang, Ratu Kidul
Mandarsaha, bastion (Fort Rotterdam, 
Makassar)  736 (plate)
Mandura, Mas Aria (wedana gladhag / 
head of the porters’ guilds)  601 (sent 
on abortive mission to Tegalreja, 20-
7-1825)  see also Sindunagara II
Mangir, village (Kulon Praga)  608, 611 
(bandits help Dipanagara)
Mangiran, ferry crossing village (Kali 
Praga)  49 (bandits at), 50 (tiger 
hunters at), 102, 586, 632
Mangkarawati, Radèn Ayu (?1770-1852; 
mother of Dipanagara) 72, 581 
(given Ratu Ageng title during Java  
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War), 659 (capture of), 742, 747-52 
(corresponds with Dipanagara in 
Makassar, 1849), 760, 765, 823-4  see 
also Karangwuni, Majasta
Mangkubumi, Pangéran (Surakarta; 
younger brother of PB IV)  173 
(cruelty of), 181, 319 (involvement 
in sepoy conspiracy), 320 (exiled 
to Ambon), 416, 424, 426-7 (exiled 
for role in sepoy conspiracy), 498 
(? marries daughter of Dipasana in 
Ambon)
Mangkubumi, Pangéran (?1781-?; Yogya; 
son of HB II; post-1830 Panembahan 
Mangkurat)  61, 85, 108, 336-7 
(during British assault), 352 (joins 
Dipanagara), 409, 458 (view of 
land-rent), 508-10 (appointed 
guardian of HB V), 511 (failure to 
receive due respect as guardian), 
532 (reaction to land-rent abolition), 
533 (reaction to size of indemnities), 
537-42 (negotiation for Bedhaya 
indemnity), 549 (sister involved 
with Dietrée), 563, 572-3, 595, 600-2 
(joins Dipanagara at Tegalreja and 
flees to Selarong), 614 (Radèn Ayu 
Sérang lives in residence in 1830s), 
623, 632, 651, 653, 658, 711, 747, 757, 
796
Mangkumbumi, sultan  see 
Hamengkubuwana I
Mangkudiningrat I (?1778-1824; son 
of HB II by Ratu Mas; post-1817 
Panji Angon Asmara / dhukun)  163, 
193, 254, 271 (member of kasepuhan 
party), 272 (troop numbers of), 274, 
285 (HB II wants to send as Yogya 
commander to Serondhol), 295, 299, 
315, 322 (HB II wants to appoint as 
Crown Prince), 324, 331, 335 (warns 
HB II of fate of Amangkurat IV), 
332 (counsels against reinforcing 
kadipatèn), 342, 352, 353-4 (orders 
amok attack in Tan Jin Sing’s house), 
363 (exiled to Pinang), 414, 608, 760, 
774, 796
Mangkudiningrat II, Pangéran 
(son of above; pre-1824, Radèn 
Tumenggung Mangkuwijaya; 
post-1829, Pangéran Adipati 
Mangkudiningrat; exiled to Ambon, 
31-12-1831)  50, 133, 458 (view of 
European land-rent), 462 (report 
on renting land to Chinese), 526 
(complaint about Smissaert’s role 
in Garebeg), 542, 609, 637 (given 
barisan), 760, 801
Mangkukusuma, Pangéran (?1772-?; son 
of HB I)  550, 796
Mangkunagara, Pangéran Aria (son 
of  Amangkurat IV; exiled to Cape 
Colony via Ceylon)  423, 500  see also 
Kaap, Radèn Mas
Mangkunagara I, Pangéran Adipati 
(1726-95; Radèn Mas Said; reigned, 
1757-95)  14, 75, 128 (as satria lelana), 
163, 224 (estranged husband of Ratu 
Bendara), 260, 382, 629, 645, 654  see 
also Kanyut-mèsem
Mangkunagara II, Pangéran Adipati 
(1768-1835; reigned, 1796-1835)  14, 
157-60, 163 (Pakepung crisis), 182 
(plate), 183-4 (invested as colonel 
commandant MN Legion), 185, 188, 
207, 232 (links with Rongga), 243, 
253 (relations with Rongga), 258 
(equivocal attitude during Rongga 
rebellion), 285, 291, 329 (hair 
style), 331-3 (participates in British 
assault), 347 (prize money), 355 (at 
investiture of HB III), 356 (greets HB 
III European style), 364 (refuses sons 
to study in Calcutta), 377  (Raffles’ 
gift of horses to), 382 (apanage 
lands in Kedhu taken over), 426, 
436 (friendship with Nahuys), 438 
(teetotaller / handsome appearance), 
459, 531-2 (indebtedness of), 544, 
554 (cash advances to), 558, 646
Mangkunagara III, Pangéran Adipati 
(1803-53; reigned, 1835-53)  558
Mangkunagaran 
   landholdings  15, 213, 394, 522, 645
   Legion  13, 124, 182-3, 184 (Klathèn 
garrison), 207, 286 (horse artillery 
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at Jati Ngalèh), 331-3 (participates 
in British assault), 340 (in action 
against Sumadiningrat), 347 (prize 
money for), 359 (uniforms copied 
from EIC troops), 611 (soldiers 
killed with cudgels in Java War)
Mangkupraja, Radèn Adipati (patih of 
Surakarta, 1796-104)  558, 781
Mangkurat, Panembahan  see 
Mangkubumi, Pangéran
Mangkuwijaya, Radèn Tumenggung  273 
(appointed by Prince Regent / HB 
III), 801
Mangkuwijaya, Mas (jurukunci / jimat 
Imagiri)  501
Mangundirana, Radèn Tumenggung 
(bupati Kalangbrèt)  255 (during 
Rongga rebellion), 801
Mangunkusuma, Tumenggung (Dutch 
spy, Magelang)  683, 691
Mangunkusumo, Dr Tjipto (1886-1943)  
738, 757  see also Indische Partij
Manikmaya, text  105, 744
manta (crude opium)  479  see also madat
mantraps (borang)  609 (used during Java 
War)
mantri désa  see demang
mantri jurusawah (ricefield inspectors)  36
Maospati, residence (‘kraton’) of Radèn 
Rongga Prawiradirja III  8, 60 
(description of retainers at), 191 
(Rongga’s administration at), 194 
(Rongga’s royal style at), 219, 220 
(light cannon at), 233-4 (Rongga’s 
last visit to), 243, 247-8, 251, 253-6 
(during Rongga’s rebellion), 247 
(rebel kraton established), 253, 256 
(town and mosque looted), 267, 268 
(created as kabupatèn, 1-1811), 269, 
491, 615  see also Wanasari
Marcus, Louis (French textile merchant, 
Yogya)  243-4  see also Tulle 
(Corrèze)
marechaussée  see Jayèng Sekar
Maréwa, Rangga Daëng (Bugis 
commander of Dipanagara)  626  see 
also Makincing
Maria Reigersbergen, VOC naval frigate  
159 (captured by British)
ma’ripat (gnosis)  112-3
marital relationships  74  see also women
Maros  739
markets  533 (annexed by British, 1812), 
727 (in Manado), 834  see also pasar
market taxes  see pasar
marriages  41, 46-7 (in villages), 402 
(plate)  see also women
marriage diplomacy (at courts)  11, 73  
see also women
Marseilles  457, 753  see also Tissot
Mas, Ratu (?1770-1824; consort of HB II; 
mother of Mangkudiningrat I)  163, 
274, 412, 760
Mas, Ratu (consort of HB III; daughter of 
Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja I) 366, 
573, 765
Masaran, tollgate / ferry crossing 
(Bengawan Sala, Sokawati)  100, 
242 (Rongga crosses at / plate), 
255 (tollgate burnt), 832 (revenue 
returns from)
Maskumambang, metre  687 (sorrowful 
quality)
Mataram
   bupati  188, 803, 806  see also 
Cakradiwirya, Sumadiningrat
   coastal dependencies  757
   district  9 (military culture of), 11-2, 27, 
30-1, 37-8, 61, 65, 76, 129, 164-5, 237, 
394 (PA I landholdings in), 468, 586, 
623 (loyalty of levies to Dipanagara 
in), 626 (fighting qualities of men 
from), 627 (pesantrèn followers of 
Dipanagara in), 633 (Dipanagara’s 
regional loyalties to), 641-2 (fighting 
in Java War), 642 (Dipanagara’s 
forces in), 646, 677, 803, 806
   gravesites  495 (on north coast), 780-
3  see also Banyusumurup, Imagiri, 
pilgrimages
   kingdom  131, 135, 147, 167, 265-6, 356, 
386, 399, 490 (expectation of Ratu 
Adil from), 495-6, 505, 546, 553, 565, 
578, 588, 590, 654  see also Agung, 
Amangkurat, Sénapati
   princes of  660 (and Kali Bagawanta), 
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673
   tollgates  470, 831  see also Kemlaka
Mataram, Haji Muhamad (Yogya kraton 
santri)  89
Mataram, Pangéran Aria (Sunan 
Panutup / Radèn Mas Tapa; son of 
Amangkurat I)  137, 144  see also 
Guwa Séluman
Mauritius (Île de France)  43 (smallpox 
vaccination introduced from), 465, 
493 (sugar industry in)
Max Havelaar  756  see also Douwes 
Dekker, Eduard
Mecca  68, 81, 88-9, 91-2, 94, 112, 114, 
129, 152-3, 215, 272-3 (Yogya haji 
to), 281, 414-5 (Sayyid Kramat 
disturbances), 546, 569, 571, 589, 
597, 632, 671-3 (as centre of world), 
693, 697, 701, 702 (zemzem water 
from), 713, 726  see also Jāwah, 
Jeddah, haj, Hejaz, Medina, zemzem
medicines, Dutch/western  117 
(Dipanagara rejects), 675 
(Dipanagara treated for malaria 
with)
medicines, traditional Javanese  407 
(administered to HB III)  675 
(Dipanagara takes at Menorèh), 727 
(Dipanagara takes on Pollux)  see 
also jamu
Medina  68, 114, 414, 482, 672-3  see also 
Hejaz
Meester Cornelis (Jatinegara)  252 
(places of exile of Natakusuma / 
Natadiningrat), 276, 281 (Janssens 
at), 282-3 (fortress stormed by 
British, 26-8-1811), 285, 345 
(redoubts demolished by British), 
358 (Nahuys reflects on)
Megatsari, Radèn Tumenggung (bupati 
Pathi)  162 (mistreatment of 
daughters at Surakarta court)
Melaka  21 (British sea captains in), 
215 (British naval build up in), 269 
(British troops arrive in), 275, 280 
(Malay letters sent by Raffles from, 
12-1810), 299, 303, 489, 494 (cholera 
epidemic in, 1821)
Melangi, pathok negari  90, 98-9, 223, 293 
(Danureja II buried at), 313 (reburial 
of Danukusuma I at), 371, 627, 636-7 
(Maja’s negotiations at, 10/11-1828), 
781, 787, 791  see also Danurejan, 
Taptajani
Melangi, Kyai (Iman Ali; pradikan 
of Melangi)  100, 669 (advises 
Dipanagara on receipt of letters), 
681, 671 (Dipanagara refers to as 
‘Dullah’), 681 (Taqrīb text of), 787  see 
also Ngarip, Taptajani
Melangi, Kyai Haji (Muhamad Salim; 
guru and pradikan ageng of Melangi, 
killed 9-1825)  787
Melathèn (Surakarta)  454 (land leases 
at)
men of religion  see putihan
Ménak Amir Hamzah, text  105 (studied 
by Dipanagara), 483 (legends), 
744 (ordered by Dipanagara for 
children’s education)
Ménak cycle (wayang plays)  105, 411
Menayu, village (Barabadur)  497
Mendhut  see Candhi Mendhut
Menorèh  37, 496 (Dipasana revolt in), 
586, 609, 640 (mobile columns at), 
665-6, 670, 675, 677, 833  see also 
Gunung Menorèh
Ménot family (Manado)  119 (possible 
link with Dipanagara)
mental illness (psychosis)  412 (of HB 
IV’s consort)  see also Alip, Kencana, 
Murma Wijaya
Mérak Bay (Sunda Straits)  215 
(Daendels’ penal colony / 
fortifications at), 666 (Van den 
Bosch’s landing at, 2-1-1830)
Merapi  see Gunung Merapi
Merbung (Klathèn)  248 (Rongga asks 
destruction of bridge at)
Mergalunyu (Bagelèn)  609 (attack)
Merkus, Pieter (1787-1844; Governor of 
Moluccas, 1822-8; Raad van Indië, 
1829-35, 1838-40; commissioner 
for regulation of affairs in the 
Principalities, 1830; governor-
general, 1841-44)  59, 706, 808
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Mertadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung 
(joint Surakarta bupati of Sréngat, 
east Java)  486 (involvement with 
Kyai Iman Sampurna, 1819)
Mertadiwirya, Radèn Tumenggung 
(bupati Yogya; younger brother of 
Danureja II)  272 (troop commander 
of Prince Regent/HB III), 801
Mertalaya, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya nayaka; outer bupati), 242 
(in expedition against Rongga)  
292 (participates in Danureja II’s 
murder), 775-6, 801
Mertanagara, Radèn Tumenggung (post- 
8-1828, Ali Basah Ngabdulkamil II; 
post-1830, honorary colonel)  590, 
623, 661, 666, 673, 683, 687-9, 697, 
700, 747, 762, 767-8, 822-3
Mertanagara, Radèn Ayu (pre-1829, 
Radèn Ayu Basah; wife of above; 
daughter of Dipanagara; divorced 
1837)  682, 687, 762, 767-8, 813 
(given pusaka kris / pike), 823
Mertanagara, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Surakarta bupati of Blora)  319 
(imprisoned in Semarang)
Mertanagara II, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya nayaka, inner bupati; son of 
Pangéran Demang)  408 (appointed 
to HB IV’s regency council, 1815), 
776 (dismissed as), 801
Mertanagara, Radèn Ayu (wife of 
above)  550 (seduced by Chevallier 
/ Dietrée)
Mertasana, Pangéran (?1774-1826; son 
of HB II)  363 (exiled to Pinang with 
HB II), 414, 797
Mertawijaya, Radèn Tumenggung (son 
of Danukusuma I; post-1-1812, 
Danukusuma II; post-1825, basah 
of Rèma; post-1828, Radèn Adipati 
Abdullah Danureja,  patih of 
Dipanagara)  see Danukusuma II
Mertawijaya, Radèn Ngabèhi  see 
Wiryawijaya
Mesjid Ageng (Great Mosque, Yogya)  
81, 234, 273, 294, 320 (prayers 
said for safety of HB II), 327, 333 
(defended by priyayi pradikan during 
British assault), 336 (damaged by 
stray artillery), 365 (santri return to 
adjacent kauman), 570 (alignment / 
kiblat of)
messianic expectations   see  millenarian 
expectations
Metésih, village (Magelang), 
Dipanagara’s encampment 
at (March 1830)  586, 677-9 
(Dipanagara arrives in), 683, 684-5 
(plate of Dipanagara’s arrival in, 
8-3-1830), 689, 702
Michaelis, Dutch burger Surakarta  266 
(lends money to PB IV)
Michiels, Major A.V. (1797-1849; 
post-1843, major-general)  608, 652, 
662, 678, 686, 693
Middelburg, island (Baya of Batavia)  
159 (British capture of VOC ships 
at) 
Middle East  215
Mijil metre  733 (sadness of)
Mijèn, village (Yogya)  373 (Dipanagara’s 
temporary accommodation at)
military culture  see Yogya
military exercises  180 (Rajawinangun 
review, 1-6-1808), 272 (kasepuhan / 
karajan manoeuvres, 1811)
military forces  175 (Daendels’ scratch 
army), 283 (at Meester Cornelis)
military levies  see prajurit arahan
military tactics  640-6 (Dutch in Java 
War)  see also bènthèng stelsel, 
mobile columns
millenarian expectations  xiv-xv, 
153 (in Bagelèn, 1817), 250-1 (in 
Rongga’s rebellion), 480-93 (in 
1816-22 period), 515, 583-91  see also 
Èrucakra, Jayabaya, Ratu Adil 
Miln, Haswell & Co, British agency 
house  429
Minahasa  92, 613, 635, 720-35 
(Dipanagara’s exile in), 740 (pro-
Dutch / Christian culture of)  see also 
Manado, Tondano, Tonsea Lama
Minhaj, Kyai Haji (religious leader in 
Blora)  214
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‘Ministers’ (title of Residents at courts 
under Daendels, 1808-11)  166, 170-
1, 297 (title abolished by British)
Minto, Sir Gilbert Elliott, 1st Earl 
(1751-1814; governor-general 
of India, 1807-13)  160, 283-5 
(proclamation to inhabitants of Java, 
26-8-1811), 284 (plate), 285, 287, 
290-1, 301,312, 341 (receives HB II’s 
kris as token of submission), 342, 
346-8 (told of plunder of kraton), 
374, 377-8 (Raffles explains 1812 
treaty), 384, 435, 807 
mistresses (Javanese / Eurasian of 
Europeans)  439-40  see also women
mobile columns (Java War)  608, 640-1, 
654, 659
mobilization (Java War)  606-11
Modang (garden at Guwa Secang)  575, 
577
Modeste, H.M.S. (British naval frigate)  
347, 364  see also Elliott
modin (village priest)  47
Moira, Francis Rawdon-Hastings, 1st 
Marquis of Hastings and 2nd Earl 
of (1754-1826; governor-general of 
India, 1813-23)  417
moksa (remainderless death)  368, 663  see 
also Adisurya, Gunung Sirnabaya
Moluccas  see Maluku
moral order  632 (Dipanagara fights for)  
see also agami Islam
Moorrees, J.W. (Resident of Yogya, 1810)  
217 (brawny appearance of), 221, 
228-30 (forced to leave Yogya), 236, 
809
Moorrees, Mrs (wife of above)  218 
(mentioned in official toasts), 228 
(held up in carriage), 236
Mopid, Kyai (adviser of Dipanagara 
at Tegalreja)  97, 139 (sent to Nusa 
Kambangan), 791
Moses, Prophet  574
mountain dwellers  30, 46 (lifestyle of)
mountain gods  571  see also Lawu, 
Sunan
Mudha, Haji (adviser of Dipanagara at 
Tegalreja)  97, 791
Mughal dynasty  xiii, 425 (blow 
mutineers from mouth of cannon)
Muhamad, Sèh Sayidina  482 (title of 
assistant of Umar Mahdi)
Muhammad, The Prophet  110, 368, 488-
9, 492, 526 (birthday of), 569, 571, 
574-5, 579-80, 597 (Ka’bah)
Muhammad, Sayyid  414-5 (disturbances 
in Madiun, 11-1815)
Muhammadiyah (‘The Way of The 
Prophet’)  570
Muharrar, text   104  see also Jayabaya
Muhyi, Sheikh Abdul (1640-1715)  114
Mukidin, Haji (Bagelèn)  254 (advises 
HB II to move court, 12-1810)
Mukidin, Mas  100, 367  see also 
Wiranagara, Radèn Tumenggung
Multatuli  see Douwes Dekker
Mulud, Javanese month  579 (death 
of The Prophet)  see also Garebeg 
Mulud
Munadi, Kyai Haji Hasan (Tuwan 
Sarif Samparwedi; commander of 
Barjumungah regiment)  627, 661-2 
(gives advice to Dipanagara), 758, 
793  see also Barjumungah
Mundingsari, Prabu (king of Sigaluh)  
140, 150
Mundingwangi  see Mundingsari
Muneng, district (east Java)  613, 615
Munthèng, Radèn Ajeng  see Gusti, 
Radèn Ayu Basah
Muntinghe, H.W. (1773-1827; President 
of Board of Finances, 1816-8; 
Commissioner to Palembang and 
Bangka, 1818-9; Raad van Indië, 
1819-27) 307-8 (prepares Raffles’ 
visit to courts, 12-1811), 455-6
Muntok (Bangka)  345 (new defences 
built by British)
Murma Wijaya, Kyai (?1757-1824; 
pradikan ageng of Kepundhung, 
Delanggu)  253, 258, 443-8 (arrest, 
exile and death), 454, 794  see also 
Kepundhung
murti (name of Wisnu)  585
Musa, Kyai (pradikan of Bendhasari, 
Kedhu)  91, 791
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Musbah  see Imam Musbah
Musium Kota (Jakarta)  115-6, 703
Muslims (wong Islam)  see Javanese
Mustahar, Bendara Radèn Mas  see 
Dipanagara
Mustapa, Haji (Pekalongan) 215 (spreads 
rumours of British attack on Java, 
1810)
Mutamakim, Haji Ahmad (pasisir 
mystic)  112
Mutawaridin, Radèn Mas (Radèn 
Mas Dulkabli; ?1835-?; son of 
Dipanagara born in Makassar)  731, 
769
mystic synthesis in Java  114, 758
Naga Siluman, Kyai (Dipanagara’s kris)  
137 (presented to King William I)
Nagakusuma, Kyai (Yogya pusaka kris)  
273
nagara agung (core districts, Yogya)  5, 
16, 33, 59 (domicile of bupati in), 
60 (pancas tax revision in), 66, 194 
(Natakusuma’s designs on), 381-2 
(annexation of Kedhu), 444, 561
Nahuys van Burgst, H.G. (1782-1858; 
Resident of Yogya, 1816-22; 
Surakarta, 1820-2; 1827-30; Raad 
van Indië, 1836-41)  64, 94, 101, 108 
(Dipanagara’s view of), 120, 243, 
276 (reflection on Franco-Dutch 
government), 277-8 (helps save lives 
of Natakusuma / Natadiningrat), 
303, 346 (leases lands from HB 
IV), 350-1 (Crawfurd praises 
Natakusuma to), 358 (reflections 
on Meester Cornelis), 375-6 
(supposed selection by Crawfurd), 
384, 397, 400-1 (with Tan Jin Sing 
on Borneo commission, 1818-9), 
411, 413, 428-30 (at hand-over of 
Yogya), 431-2, 434 (plate), 435-6 
(character assessed), 437 (compared 
to Crawfurd as dinner party host), 
441-3 (problems of early Residency, 
1816-7), 445 (on Murma), 447-8 
(on treatment of ulama), 454-61 
(advocate of land-rent), 462-3 
(coffee estate at Bedhaya), 478 (on 
Chinese), 480 (on opium addicts 
during Java War), 484, 493 (report 
on sugar industry), 494-5 (1821 
cholera epidemic in Surakarta), 
497 (helps crush Dipasana revolt), 
499 (role in agrarian law-code 
recodification), 501 (deathbed of 
PB IV), 503 (encourages HB IV’s 
debauched lifestyle), 509-10 (view 
of Dipanagara), 511, 517 (forced to 
leave Surakarta post), 519 (return to 
Holland), 523, 528-9 (arranges land 
leases), 531, 535 (warns Smissaert 
on bandits), 537-42 (demands high 
indemnity for Bedhaya), 542 (sale of 
Bedhaya reported to), 548 (purchase 
of jewelry from court), 553-5 
(annexation issue), 589, 600, 638 
(disarms Maja’s Bulkios, 11-1828), 
671, 757, 809-10
Nahwu, text (Arabic grammar)  104
Nanggulon, district (Kulon Praga)  65, 
367 (Prabuningrat’s 1830 apanage 
in), 480, 631, 651 (bènthèng in), 658
Nantes  457, 465
Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)  
xiii, 159, 161, 270 (celebration of 
birthday, 15-8-1811), 275-6, 283, 285, 
415, 429, 717 (Dipanagara informed 
of exile)  see also Hundred Days, 
Waterloo
Napoleonic Wars (1799-1802, 1803-13, 
1815)  xii, 20, 209 (Daendels as 
marshal), 312, 429, 433 (ex-soldiers 
of fortune in Java), 641-2 (style of 
campaigns emulated by Du Bus), 
707, 712
Naqşhabāndiyya, tarekat (mystical 
brotherhood)  111-4, 485, 489, 745  
see also Shaţţārīyya, Qadiriyya
Naşīhat al-Muluk (Moral lessons for 
kings), text  104
Natadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung 
(1786-1858; post-1812, Pangéran 
Suryaningrat; reigned as Pakualam 
II, 1829-58)  79, 162, 188-9 
(character assessed), 194, 197 (in 
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Yogya delegation to Semarang, 
10-1808), 210-1, 225, 226 (plate), 
227, 231 (present in Engelhard’s 
audience with HB II), 233, 236-8 
(denounced by Daendels), 239 
(reappointed patih jero), 244, 252 
(exiled to Batavia / Cirebon), 254, 
264, 266 (leases of lands), 272 
(argument over distribution of 
chattels), 276-8 (escapes death in 
Cirebon), 286 (freed by Janssens), 
291 (held in Surabaya by British), 
299 (Crawfurd’s poor view of), 313, 
315, 329 (goes over to fort), 332, 
335-6 (during British assault), 361 
(appointment as pangéran), 375, 394, 
463, 761, 775, 802
Natadipura, Pangéran (?1801-?; son of 
HB II, also known as Natapura)  352 
(joins Dipanagara), 481, 797
Natadirja, Radèn Tumenggung 
(?1803-28; son of Radèn Rongga 
Prawiradirja III; post-1825, Iman 
Muhamad Ngabdulkamil Ali 
Basah alias ‘Gusti Basah’; army 
commander and son-in-law of 
Dipanagara)  403, 597, 623, 767  see 
also Mertanagara, Radèn Ayu
Natadiwirya, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati of Dhuri / 
Wanaseraya)  255, 802
Natakusuma, Pangéran (1764-1829; 
reigned as Pakualam I, 1812-29)  
11, 162-3, 194, 211, 225 (enemy 
of Danureja II), 227, 235, 236-8 
(denounced by Daendels), 252 
(exiled to Batavia / Cirebon), 
254, 264, 272 (arguments over 
distribution of chattels), 276-8 
(escapes death in Cirebon), 286 
(freed by Janssens and brought to 
Semarang), 291 (held in Surabaya by 
British), 299 (Crawfurd’s favourable 
view of), 305 (returns to Yogya), 
307 (resentment at Crown Prince / 
HB III), 310 (promised apanage in 
Grobogan), 311 (promised stipend), 
313, 315, 321-3 (negotiations with 
Crawfurd), 324, 327, 329 (goes 
over to fort), 335-7 (during British 
assault), 339 (refuses to speak to 
Crown Prince / HB III), 350 (goes 
through looted court MSS with 
Crawfurd), 355 (at investiture 
of HB III), 359, 361-2 (appointed 
as Pakualam), 375-6 (delighted 
at Nahuys’ appointment), 382 
(grievances over Kedhu apanage), 
394-5 (stinginess as landlord), 
408-10 (problems of appointment 
as regent) 427 (meets Raffles after 
sepoy conspiracy), 441 (refuses 
to accept return of HB II, 1816), 
445-7 (denounces Kyai Murma), 
507-9 (decision not to reappoint as 
regent), 526, 618, 629, 761, 797
 Natapraja, Pangéran (Radèn Mas Papak 
/ Radèn Tumenggung Mangkudirja; 
grandson of Radèn Ayu Sérang)  
73, 133, 438 (addiction to alcohol), 
614, 621, 624-5 (plate), 637 (given 
barisan), 760  see also Sérang family
Natapura, Pangéran (son of HB II)  see 
Natadipura
Natapura, Pangéran (Pangéran Abdul 
Arifin; son of PB IV)  129 (religious 
study in Yogya)
Natawijaya III, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati of Panolan, 1803-11; 
father-in-law of Dipanagara)  88, 
98, 115, 118, 179 (at Rajawinangun 
review, 1-6-1808), 195 (problem 
of logging in Panolan), 250, 255 
(attitude to Rongga rebellion), 256 
(?died), 802
Natawijaya IV, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati of Panolan, 1811-12; 
son of above)  256 (takes father’s 
place), 802
Natayuda I, Radèn Tumenggung (Yogya 
bupati of Kedhu / bupati Bumija, 
poisoned 11-1804)  98, 774-5 
Natayuda II (Yogya bupati of Kedhu / 
bupati Bumija, 1804-12; son of above) 
273 (appointed by Prince Regent / 
HB III), 802 (joins Dipanagara)
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National Archives (formerly General 
State Archives / Algemeen 
Rijksarchief, The Hague)  xviii
Nawala Pradata (Regulation of law 
courts), text  499
nayaka  see Council of State (Yogya)
nènèk penjaga tasik (grandmother 
guardian of the ocean)  see Ratu 
Kidul
Nes, J.F.Walraven van (1799-1874; 
Assistant-Resident of Surabaya, 
1826; acting Resident of Yogya, 
1827-30; Resident of Pasuruan, 
1831-9, Semarang, 1842-3; Raad van 
Indië, 1843-7, 1851-3)  61, 534, 540, 
550, 670, 692, 694, 810
Netherlands, kingdom of the United 
(1815-30)  xiii, 457, 654, 734, 759
Netherlands Indies, government 
(1819-42)  61, 68-9, 310 (fiscal 
oppression of), 563 (army strength, 
1825), 679 (praised as ‘just and mild’ 
by De Kock), 682
Netherlands Lion, order of  701 (De 
Stuers and Roeps recommended 
for), 704 (plate)
New Amsterdam, fort (Manado)  see Fort 
New Amsterdam
‘New Book’, cadaster  see Serat Ebuk 
Anyar
Ngabdani, Sayyid (pradikan ageng of 
Tembayat)  73  see also Tembayat
Ngabularipin, Pangéran  see Natapura, 
Pangéran 
Ngabdulkamil Ali Basah  see Natadirja
Ngabdulkamit  see Dipanagara
Ngabdulsamsu, Ali Basah  see 
Suryawijaya, Pangéran
Ngabdurahim, Sèh (pilgrimage / 
lelana name of Dipanagara)  see 
Dipanagara
Ngabèhi, Pangéran (title)  512
Ngabèhi Saloringpasar, Pangéran 
(grandson of Amangkurat IV; 
husband of Ratu Bendara I)  369
Ngabèhi, Pangéran (son of PB III)  558-9 
(at time of elevation of PB VI)
Ngabèhi, Pangéran (?1738-1822; eldest 
son of HB I by unofficial wife)  
50 (links with bandits), 169, 221, 
253, 271 (member of kasepuhan), 
348 (dysentery / transported in 
chair), 382 (complains at loss of 
Kedhu), 388 (loss of kris as symbolic 
castration), 797
Ngabèhi, Pangéran  see Jayakusuma I, 
Pangéran 
Ngampèl-Dentha, Sunan  72
Nganjuk, district (east Java)  12, 475 
(complaint of bupati about tollgates), 
478 (Nganjuk-Surakarta highway)  
see also mancanagara, eastern 
(Surakarta)
Ngarip, Kyai Abdul (pradikan ageng of 
Maja; father of Kyai Maja)  111
Ngarip, Kyai Muhamad (ulama pradikan 
of Melangi; adviser of Dipanagara 
at Tegalreja)  100, 791
Ngarip, Radèn Mantri Muhamad  see 
Dipanagara II, Pangéran 
Ngastina, kingdom (in wayang)  405
Ngawatreja (alias Pengawatreja), 
pesanggrahan (Yogya)  185, 210 
(visited by Daendels), 231, 782
Ngawèn  see Teras-Keras
Ngawi, district (east Java)  12, 256 
(Chinese tollgates destroyed in 
Rongga rebellion), 615 (massacre of 
Chinese community, 9-1825), 617
Ngebel, village (Panaraga)  219-20 (burnt 
by Rongga)
ngèlmu firasat (science of physiognomy)  
72, 586, 628 (Dipanagara’s powers)
ngèlmu kadigdayan  (science of warlike 
virtues)  627
ngèlmu kaslametan (science of 
invulnerability)  627
ngèlmu kawedukan (science of instilling 
fear)  627
ngindhung (close relations of sikep with 
no access to village lands) 30, 34
Ngisa, Haji (pradikan of Pulo Kadang; 
follower of Kyai Maja; post-1830, 
senior ulama in Senthot’s barisan)  
458 (view of European land-
renters), 676 (acts the court jester 
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at Menorèh), 677 (reconnoitres 
Metésih), 688 (accompanies 
Dipanagara to meeting with De 
Kock), 690 (acts as translator), 693 
(negotiates peaceful surrender of 
troops at Metésih), 697, 707, 725 
(refuses to join Dipanagara in 
Manado), 791
Nglèngkong (Lèngkong, Slèman), battle 
/ ambush (30-7-1826), 363, 592, 642
ngoko (low Javanese)  see Javanese
Nguning, kabupatèn (Madiun)  268 
(created 1-1811)
Ngusman, Kyai Amad (head of 
Suranatan corps, 1811-12)  292 
(witnesses Dipanagara’s oath to 
abjure Crown Prince’s position), 
325, 410 (appointed Arabic tutor to 
HB IV), 792  see also Jaya Ngusman, 
Kyai
Ngusman Ali Basah, Kyai Muhamad  see 
Bahwi
Nieuwkerken genaamd Nijvenheim, 
B.J. van  (Resident of Surakarta, 
1796-1803)  173, 808
Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant  753
Nitikrama, demang of Sempu (Boutet’s 
coffee estate) 536
Nitimenggala, Kyai (subordinate of 
Sumadiningrat)  281 (in secret 
correspondence), 314 (plate of letter)
Nizam-i-cedit (Ottoman New Order 
military reforms)  152  see also Selim 
III, sultan
Noah, Prophet  574
Nogues, N. (French land-renter, Yogya)  
542 (Kanangan estate)
Nolte, Christoffel (German land-renter, 
Surakarta)  532
northeast coast of Java  81, 161-
5 (proposed new boundary 
agreement with Principalities), 170, 
177 (Daendels’ inspects fortifications 
on), 211 (tension over timber 
supplies from), 266 (strandgeld 
payments for), 291 (suffering of 
inhabitants in border regions), 345 
(walls of cities rebuilt in Java War), 
465, 495 (Surakarta pilgrimage to 
clean graves on, 1821), 560, 588, 614, 
718 (passed on Dipanagara’s voyage 
to Manado)
   bupati  161-2 (plight of daughters 
in Surakarta kraton), 318 (PB IV’s 
contacts with, early 1812), 559
   government of  61, 160 (Daendels 
decides to abolish), 166 (abolition, 
13-5-1808), 169-71, 184, 304 (Raffles 
seen as equivalent of governor)
Nottinghamshires (59th Regiment of Foot 
/ 2nd Notts)  304, 335 (during British 
assault), 357 (in HB III investiture 
parade), 423
numpang (dependant lodgers)  14, 30-1, 
34, 48, 65, 67
Nurngali, Bengali dhukun / herbalist-
healer of Dipanagara  117, 428
Nurngaliman, Kyai (adviser of 
Dipanagara at Tegalreja)  117
Nur Samidin  see Portier
Nuryemangi, Sundanese pengulu of 
Rongga (Maospati)  256
Nusa Kambangan  20-1, 138, 164 
(proposed annexation of)  see also 
Cilacap
Nusa Srenggi (land of overseas ogres)  
588
nutmeg  712
Nyai (para Nyai corps, central Javanese 
kraton rulers’ personal female 
retainers)  134, 171 (Surakarta), 366 
(nyai keparak / spittoon carrier), 403 
(nyai keparak in Yogya)
oil, cooking  384 (internal trade in)  see 
also peanut oil
Old Testament Prophets  110
Olijve, J.N. (Batavia harbourmaster, 
1830)  703, 712
Onghokham  17
Oosthoek (eastern Salient)  5, 159, 
164, 170, 177, 183, 327, 440, 495 
(cholera epidemic in, 1821)  see also 
Blambangan
opium  10, 18, 51, 122-3 (Yogya princes 
addiction to), 160 (farms), 169 
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(VOC monopoly), 230, 244 (Ratu 
Kencana Wulan’s trade in), 250 
(role of Chinese as tax farmers), 
252, 354 (served in Tan Jin Sing’s 
house), 371, 381, 395 (use by PA 
corps), 397-8 (elite addiction and 
Danureja IV’s example), 468, 471, 
476-7 (plate / opium den), 478-80 
(retail trade, 1812-25), 522 (Danureja 
IV’s addiction to), 610 (during Java 
War), 617 (supplied by Chinese at 
Jana), 641 (addiction of local troops 
to), 662 (Pengalasan’s partiality for 
/ Cleerens’ supply of), 733 (Kedhu 
tax farm)  see also Johannes, madat, 
manta
Orde van de Unie ( Order of the Union; 
Napoleonic ridderorde / new Dutch 
nobility)  270, 283 (renamed Orde 
van de Reunie), 413, 460 (plate)
Ordnance on Ceremonial and Etiquette  
see Edict on Ceremonial and 
Etiquette
Ottoman empire  xvi (dress), 68, 89, 152, 
448, 482 (appeal to during Umar 
Mahdi disturbances, 1817), 570-1, 
588, 665 (Cleerens fears influence of) 
see also Άbd al-Hamid I, Janissary 
regiments, Nizam-e-cedit, Rum
Oturaki, Janissary regiment  152  see also 
Turkio
Overstraten, P.G. van (1755-1801; 
governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, 
1791-6; governor-general, 1796-1801) 
36, 168, 173 (view of PB IV), 358-9 
(view of Madurese as better than 
sepoys), 807-8
pacinan (Chinese quarter)  see Chinese
Pacitan  37, 44, 73, 91, 116 (Sudirman’s 
flight to), 161 (pepper gardens in), 
164-5, 248 (Balinese pirates in), 254, 
268 (Purwadipura threatened with 
exile in), 310 (annexed by Raffles, 
12-1811), 313 (Danukusuma I 
strangled on way to), 348 (annexed 
in lieu of indemnity from PB IV), 
378-9, 380-1 (Raffles’ description of), 
383 (market taken over by British), 
384 (indigo exports from), 449, 455-6 
(pepper plantations in), 470, 479, 
494 (drought in south, 1821), 515 
(earthquake in), 589, 620-1 (captured 
Portier assigned to), 834 (market tax 
returns)  see also birds’ nest rocks, 
indigo, pepper, Portier, Rongkob
pacumplèng (door tax)  14, 452 (levied by 
gunung)
Padang (west Sumatra)  120, 439, 
520 (d’Abo returns to), 620 
(reinforcements sent to Java from), 
648  see also d’Abo
Padhang Panolan, village (east Java)  491  
see also Panolan
Padhangan, district (east Java)  195, 
211 (timber crisis in), 255 (during 
Rongga’s rebellion), 265, 269, 379 
(1812 annexation of), 436, 572, 623  
see also Sumanegara, mancanagara 
(Yogya eastern)
padi (unhusked rice)   78, 461 (kept aside 
by Dipanagara in 1825), 607 (left 
behind by Dipanagara)
Padmanegara, Radèn Adipati Panji 
(bupati of Kudhus)  162
Padri War (1803-37)  114, 652, 668, 727  
see also Bonjol, West Sumatra
Pagebangan, sub-district (Karanganyar, 
Bagelèn)  671
Pager Watu, sub-district (Pacitan)  470 
(tollgate rates in)
Paine, Thomas (1737-1809)  756
Paine, Stricker & Co, British agency 
house  429
Paisley (Glasgow)  25, 310 (textile 
manufacture in)
Pajajaran (west Java)  109, 140, 167  see 
also division of Java, Sigaluh, Sunda
Pajang, Tumenggung (Bagus Élias; 
pradikan of Karang; nephew of Kyai 
Maja and army commander)  648, 
725, 788
Pajang, district  11-2, 27, 61, 73, 
91, 116, 129, 164-5, 333 (troop 
reinforcements to Yogya), 395 (PA 
apanage holdings in), 408, 443, 548 
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(wayang wong performances in), 
593-4, 619 (Dipanagara’s Chinese 
mistress from), 622 (Dipanagara’s 
commanders take battle to), 626 
(fighting qualities of men from), 
627 (followers of Dipanagara from 
pesantrèn in), 633 (Maja’s loyalties 
to), 636-7, 642 (Dipanagara’s forces 
in), 678 (former soldiers from join 
Dipanagara at Magelang)
pajeg (land tax / tribute)  56-7, 64, 561
Pakepung Crisis (1787-90)  163, 174, 317  
see also division of Java
Pakualam
   babad  see Babad Pakualam
   cavalry corps  361 (establishment of, 
22-6-1812), 395 (history of), 447 
(participates in attack on Kyai Maja 
in Kepundhung)
   landholdings  11, 361-2, 394-5 
(problems over 1813 settlement)  see 
also Adikarta
Pakualam I   see Natakusuma
Pakualam II  see Natadiningrat
Pakualam III  see Suryasasraningrat, 
Pangéran 
Pakualam, Ratu  see Anom, Ratu
Pakualaman  13, 278, 350, 359 (cultural 
styles at), 361-2 (appointment of PA 
I), 409 (extravagant lifestyle of PA 
I at)
Pakubuwana, Ratu (died 1732)  757
Pakubuwana I, Sunan (reigned 1704-19)  
237, 369
Pakubuwana II, Sunan (reigned 1721-49)  
161, 163, 266, 356, 757
Pakubuwana III, Sunan (reigned 1749-
88)  36, 162
Pakubuwana IV, Sunan (reigned 
1788-1820)  36, 58, 61, 63 (financial 
incompetence), 91, 129, 160, 
162-3. 170 (and Hugh Hope), 
171, 173 (character assessed), 
174 (Engelhard’s view of), 185 
(reunification aims of), 187, 194 
(enmity with Rongga), 199, 221 
(attitude to Rongga), 225, 228 
(appoints new patih), 233, 237, 
242, 244 (European sartorial 
influence on court), 245, 253, 258 
(equivocation during Rongga 
rebellion), 266 (debts paid by 
Daendels), 270 (given ridderorde), 
271, 280-1 (receives Raffles’ letters 
from Melaka), 285, 290-1 (meeting 
with Captain Robison), 298 (reports 
concerns about HB II to Crawfurd), 
301 (Raffles contemplates giving 
control of Yogya to), 311 (and 
12-1811 treaty), 317-9 (secret 
correspondence), 320 (santri 
instructed to resist), 348 (financial 
problems of), 359 (implicated in 
secret correspondence), 370, 377-8 
(Raffles decides to spare), 386, 
413 (contrasting views of), 415-28 
(during sepoy conspiracy), 443-8 
(involvement with Murma), 486 
(decides on Iman Sampurna), 500-1 
(death of), 506 (body prepared for 
burial), 519, 553 (debts of), 555, 558, 
591, 636 (Maja as secret emissary to 
Bali, 1812)
Pakubuwana V, Sunan (reigned 1820-3)  
416, 487 (and Serat Centhini), 495 
(orders pilgrimage to north coast 
during cholera), 531, 553 (financial 
difficulties of), 554 (money 
advanced to), 555 (death of), 558, 
591
Pakubuwana VI, Sunan (reigned 1823-
30)  26, 75, 135, 498 (supposed 
marriage to Dipasana’s daughter in 
Ambon), 512, 555-8, 556-7 (plate), 
558-9 (character), 643 (equivocation 
in Java War), 646
Pakubuwana VII, Sunan (reigned 
1830-58)  181, 416, 531 (indebtedness 
of), 558-9, 591, 658, 696, 744 
(assistance requested for text copies 
for Dipanagara)  see also Purbaya, 
Pangéran 
Pakubuwana, Ratu (consort of above)  
416 (during sepoy conspiracy)
Pakubuwana, Ratu (?-1732; consort of 
Pakubuwana II)  757
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palawija (non-rice) crops  23 (tubers), 43, 
494 (planted during 1821 drought)
Palembang  101, 301, 323 (British 
expedition against, 3-1812), 329, 445  
see also Άbd al-Samad al-Palimbāni
Paliyan, sub-district (Gunung Kidul)  136
Palm, W.A. (Resident of Surakarta, 1784-
88)  173
Palmer & Co, bankers (Calcutta)  428, 
756 (6 million Sicca Rupee loan to 
Dutch), 759
Paloe, islet (off north coast of Flores)  720
Pamancingan  see Mancingan
Pamekasan (west Madura)  181, 318, 644 
(plate)  see also Cakradiningrat
Pamenahan, Ki Ageng (founder of 
Mataram dynasty)  265
Pamot, Pangéran (?1775-?; son of HB II)  
50 (links with bandits)
pamrih (concealed / selfish personal 
motives)  131
pamutihan magersari  see Seséla
panakawan  190 (Rongga serves as), 208 
(in kadipatèn), 246 (plate), 321, 353, 
405, 483, 518 (Smissaert compared 
to), 568 (with Dipanagara at 
Tegalreja), 741 (with Dipanagara 
in Makassar), 816-7  see also 
Banthèngwarèng, Rata, Kasimun, 
Sahiman
Panambangan, district (east of 
Surakarta)  128
Panaraga  60, 140 (Bathara Katong as 
ruler of), 191 (Tegalsari), 219-20 
(Rongga’s incursions and bandits 
in), 222-3, 236, 256 (Rongga 
abandons plans to attack), 470, 
627 (followers of Dipanagara from 
pesantrèn in), 647 (bènthèng in)  
see also mancanagara (Surakarta 
eastern)
Panarukan (Oosthoek)  158
panatagama, dhikr  485
Pancaatmaja, Radèn Tumenggung 
(subordinate official of Senthot)  651
pancas (tax revision, 1802/1808-11)  60-6, 
391
Pancasura gate (Yogya)  339 (blown up 
by Madras horse artillery)
Pandhak, district (Yogya)  609
Pandhawa, brothers (wayang)  404-5
pandhé, abdi-Dalem (royal smiths)  see 
empu
pandhita-ratu (priest-king)  132-3 
(Dipanagara as)
Panengah, Pangéran  see Dipawiyana, 
Pangéran
Panepèn (retreat)  139 (Dipanagara’s at 
Tegalreja)  see also Sélareja 
paneteg panatagama (regulator of religion) 
488-90, 570 (Dipanagara as), 637 
(Maja craves role)
Pangéran Adipati, title  353, 361 (use in 
PA and MN), 409 (arrogated by PA 
I), 583
Pangéran Adipati Anom, Crown Prince’s 
title  151-2 (Dipanagara told to 
abjure), 292
Pangéran Adipati Anom (son of 
Dipanagara)  see Dipaningrat
Pangurakan, crossroads / doorless 
gateway of northern alun-alun  257 
(bodies of Rongga and Sumanegara 
displayed at, 12-1810), 336 
(damaged by stray artillery fire)
Paningran, village (Gunungpersada 
sub-distict, Bagelèn)  616 (mother of 
Jayasundarga shot at)
Paningset, Kyai (kraton pusaka kris)  341
Panjer (village, Kebumèn district, 
Bagelèn)  665 (Cleerens moves to), 
669 (Dipanagara’s patih surrenders 
to Cleerens at)
Panji, cycle (wayang plays)  105, 411  see 
also Angrèni
Panji, Pak (bandit leader from Tempèl)  
536 (attacks Babadan estate)
panji, unmarried noblemen / bachelor 
confidantes of ruler  179-80
Panolan, district (east Java)  85, 88, 98, 
115, 118, 127, 179, 195 (as regional 
mart for timber), 211 (timber crisis 
in), 213, 250, 255 (pro-Rongga 
sympathies in), 265, 269, 379 
(1812 annexation), 436  see also 
mancanagara (Yogya eastern), 
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Natawijaya
Panular, Pangéran (Adiwijaya I) 
(?1772-1826; son of HB I)  119, 254, 
268 (wife of exiled Purwadipura 
intercedes with), 295, 321, 336-
7 (during British assault), 355 
(during HB III investiture), 357, 369 
(replaces Dipanagara as guardian of 
HB V), 408 (dream after death of HB 
III), 757  see also Babad Bedhah ing 
Ngayogyakarta
Panutup, Sunan  see Mataram, Pangéran 
Aria
Papak, Radèn Mas  see Natapraja, 
Pangéran
paper  663 (Dutch import)
Papringan, pathok negari  90, 333 
(ambush of 22nd Dragoons at), 782
Parakan (northern Kedhu)  48 (bandit 
chief in) 
Parakan Salak (Preanger highlands, west 
Java)  719
Parangkusuma, prophecy (c. 1805)  
xxi, 70, 140-1, 145, 148-9 (plate of 
offerings at), 150-1, 153-4, 157, 245, 
260, 326, 342, 403, 506, 516, 587, 653, 
755  see also Dipanagara (pilgrimage 
to south coast)
parang rusak (batik pattern)  25, 
310 (copied by British textile 
manufacturers)
Parangtritis  140-4, 150, 781-2
Parangwédang (fresh water spring) 140-
1, 781-2
paras Nabi (cutting of hair as sign of holy 
war)  129  see also hair
parchment  98 (as wedding present)  see 
also dluwang, Dutch (import paper)
paréntah-désa (village administration)  
390 (under HB III)
Paris  120 (Passy), 644, 741-2 (press 
report on Dipanagara), 744  see also 
France
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)  755
pasar (market) taxes  250, 310, 369 
(annexed by British), 383-5 (Raffles’ 
take-over, 1812), 390 (Dipanagara’s 
idea of using for court upkeep), 651, 
834 (tax returns from)
Pasar Alam, village  491
Pasar Ngasem (Yogya)  339 (during 
British assault)
Pasar Payaman (rice mart Kedhu)  473
Paséban (meeting place)  see Yogyakarta
paséban (Sanèpa village, Bagelèn)  481 
(during Umar Mahdi disturbances)
pasisir  see northeast coast
pasukan Langenkusuma  see Amazon corps
Pasopati (arrow of Arjuna)  153-4  see also 
Sarutama
Pasundan (west Java)  167  see also Sunda
Pasuruan  161, 251, 484-5, 560
Patah, Radèn (Demak)  109
Pathi, district (north coast)  162  see also 
Megatsari, Radèn Tumenggung
pathok negari (centres for scholars of 
fiqh law)  90, 99, 780-4, 785 (map 
of locations)  see also Kasongan, 
Melangi, Papringan, Plasa Jené, 
Purwareja
patigeni (asceticism)  492
patih (first ministers at courts)  17, 168, 
196-7 (sign agreement at Klathèn), 
770-1 (list of)  see also Danuningrat, 
Danureja, Cakranegara, 
Sasradiningrat
patih jero (senior kraton post, Yogya)  
188  see also Natadiningrat, 
Sumadiningrat 
patola cloth (Surat)  98 (as bride wealth)
Patriot Revolt (1786-7)  157, 436 (Nahuys 
as product of)  see also Daendels, 
Holland
Paulus, Lieutenant Thomas (?1773-?; 
Dutch commander of expedition 
against Rongga)  243 (fluency in 
Javanese), 253 (messengers killed by 
Rongga / MN II)  see also Leberveld
Payen, A.A.J. (1792-1853; Belgian 
artist)  142-3 (plate of south coast), 
198 (plate of postweg), 367, 448 
(treatment of santri described), 
538, 540 (estimation of value of 
Bedhaya), 572, 601-2 (description 
of Dipanagara’s flight), 617 (reports 
Chinese massacres), 621
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payung (state parasols)  60, 141 (HB 
II’s gold parasol), 170 (Ministers 
allowed to carry), 173, 246-7 
(during Rongga rebellion), 256 
(bearers in Rongga’s final battle), 
339 (Crown Prince’s captured by 
sepoys), 506, 586 (as symbol of 
Dipanagara’s authority in holy war), 
632 (distributed by Dipanagara in 
Java War), 670 (Dipanagara asks 
Cleerens for)
peanut oil (lisah kacang)  469  see also oil, 
cooking
pearls  21 (trade in Jeruk Legi, 
Banyumas)
peasantry (Javanese)  8-45  see also sikep, 
ngindhung, numpang
Pedhalangan, village (Béji district, 
Klathèn)  34 (wealth of sikep in)
pedhang (heirloom swords)  128 (in MN), 
813-5 (Dipanagara’s)  see also kris
pedhati (ox-carts)  32
pégon, aksara (unvocalised Arabic 
script)  99-100, 371, 489, 580 
(plate), 670-1 (Dipanagara’s seal 
and letter, 14-2-1830), 672 (plate), 
732 (Babad Dipanagara), 744  see 
also  Babad Dipanagara, Cohen 
Stuart, Javanese-Islamic (literature), 
Makassar Notebooks
Pekalongan  26, 41, 44, 215-7, 464-5, 478, 
499 (Pinket van Haak transferred 
to), 553, 560, 563
pekarangan (yard / orchard / kitchen 
garden)  30
Pekih Ibrahim, Kyai (Dipaningrat I; 
pengulu of Yogya, 1755-98)  76, 82, 
765, 773
Pekih Ibrahim, Kyai / Mas Pangulu 
(Muhamad Kusèn; nephew of 
above; pengulu of Dipanagara, 
1828-30)  581, 633, 669, 675, 694 
(during Dipanagara’s capture), 697, 
700, 790
Peking  171  see also Manchu (court)
Pellew, Admiral Sir Edward, 1st Viscount 
Exmouth (1757-1833)  159 (Gresik 
landing, 12-1807)
Pemberton, Lieutenant G.R. (1789-1866; 
3rd Battalion Bengal Volunteers; 
Resident of Jipang, 1813-4)  51, 213, 
615 (takes over Grobogan-Wirasari)
pendhapa (pavilion / audience hall)  
85 (at Tegalreja), 631 (used by 
Dipanagara at Kepurun)  see also 
Bangsal Kencana, Kemandhungan, 
Srimenganti
Pendhawa, village (Yogya)  36
Pengalasan, Ali Basah Kerta (army 
commander in Bagelèn)  583-4, 
588-9, 662-5 (describes Dipanagara’s 
war aims / peace proposals), 671, 
673, 677 (reconnoitres Metésih), 
691 (Dipanagara asks for during 
negotiations), 749-50 (suggested 
as escort for Dipanagara’s mother 
during voyage to Makassar), 758  see 
also opium
Pengawatreja  see Ngawatreja
Pengging  36
pengulu (of Yogya)  91  see also 
Kamalodiningrat (Abu Yamin), 
Pekih Ibrahim, Sapingi
pengulu banyu (water overseers)  38
pépé (supplicants for justice)  544
pepper  161 (in Pacitan), 164, 380 
(exports from Pacitan), 398 (cubeb 
pepper estates, east Java), 455 
(plantations in Pacitan / Lowanu), 
494 (in Pacitan)
peranakan  see Chinese
Perez, P.J.B. de (1803-59; Governor 
of Moluccas, 1840-9)  743, 746-7 
(meeting with Dipanagara about 
mother), 754-5, 755 (death)
Perié, Major J.J. (1788-1853; 7th Hussar 
Regiment)  678, 689 (commands 
cavalry during Dipanagara’s arrest), 
698
Perron, Lieutenant-colonel Louis 
du (1793-?)  667 (‘iron patience’ 
with Javanese), 678 (commands 
Magelang garrison troops at 
Dipanagara’s arrest), 686, 689, 692-3 
(troops encircle Residency house)
personal services  14, 58-9 (eastern 
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mancanagara inhabitants perform for 
bupati)  see also kerigaji, kerigan 
pesanggrahan-Dalem, royal country 
retreats / pavilions  58-9 
(constructed by HB II), 185, 210, 389 
(built by HB II / HB III), 778-9 (list 
of)
Pesantrèn, pradikan village (Kedhu)  
469, 610 (provides assistance for 
Dipanagara)  see also Bendha
pesantrèn, Islamic religious boarding 
schools  103-4, 128-9, 448, 627 
(followers of Dipanagara from), 743  
see also education (Qur’ānic)
Petruk, panakawan in wayang  405
Phillips, Captain W.E.  307-8 (prepares 
Raffles’ visit to courts, 12-1811)  see 
also Sulawesi
physiognomy  see ngèlmu firasat
piagem, letters of authority / appointment 
622-3 (given out by Dipanagara in 
1825)
Pieneman, Nicolaas (1809-60, Dutch 
artist)  695 (painting of Dipanagara’s 
capture), 698-9
Pietermaat, D.F.W. (1790-1848; acting 
Resident of Manado, 1826-7, 
Resident, 1827-31; Deputy Governor 
of Makassar, 1833; Resident of 
Semarang, 1834; Batavia, 1834-7; 
Surabaya, 1840-8)  117, 639, 
707, 721-4, 726 (concern about 
Dipanagara’s savings), 730 (plate), 
731-3 (Dipanagara tells life story to 
as babad), 735 (returns to Manado to 
arrange Dipanagara’s transfer, 1833)
Pieters, Lieutenant (Yogya garrison 
second in command)  536 (killed 
in bandit attack, 9-1823)  see also 
Babadan, Bouwens
pikes, pikemen  7, 180, 333 (effectiveness 
during British assault), 611 (during 
Java War)
pilgrimages (in Java)  81 (to north coast), 
125, 127-56 (Dipanagara’s to south 
coast, c. 1805), 132 (Yogya court 
sends to Tegalarum / north coast), 
266 (to Seséla), 273 (to north coast, 
1811), 495 (PB V sends to north 
coast, 1821)
Pinang  xii, 159, 215, 257, 269 (British 
troop build up at, 1810-1), 275, 312, 
331 (Mangkudiningrat I’s exile in), 
353 (HB II’s  exile in), 354, 363-5 
(HB II sent to), 414, 441 (HB II in), 
465 (tobacco from), 489 (arrival of 
cholera from), 494 (cholera spread 
by sailors from), 718 (sea route to 
Jeddah through)
Pinggir, village (east Java)  491
pinggir, people (prisoners-of-war / slaves 
from Blambangan)  291 (PB IV asks 
for return of), 546
Pinket van Haak, D.F.W. (1779-1840; 
Resident of Surakarta, 1816-7)  215, 
439 (serial Eurasian mistresses of), 
499-500, 561, 808
pirates  165 (smuggling on south coast), 
380 (in Pacitan)  see also Balinese, 
smuggling, Timorese
Pisangan, village (Slèman)  262, 514, 607 
(ambush of Dutch treasure convoy 
at), 611  see also Le Bron de Vexela
Pitt, William, the Younger (1759-1806; 
British prime minister, 1783-1806)  
316
Plasa Kuning, Kyai  100  see also Plasa 
Kuning, village
Plasa Kuning, pradikan village and pathok 
negari  90, 782
Plassey, battle of (23-6-1757)  xiii, 342
Plérèd, kraton  216 (captured cannon 
from), 337, 349 (rape of attractive 
court women falling foul of), 388 
(removal of kraton to new site), 552 
(storming of, 6-1826), 571, 608, 630, 
642 (Cochius storms, 9-6-1826), 782 
(pradikan / graves at)
Pogang, village (Yogya)  536 (leased by 
Dietrée)
poisoning (at courts)  173  see also upas
pojok baluwerti (kraton battlements)  216  
see also Yogyakarta
Poland, Colonel Theodorus (‘Toontje’) 
(1795-1857)  576
Polanen, R.G. van  160 (view of Van 
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Braam), 168 (view of Van Ijsseldijk)
police 
   Actions (Politionele Acties), Dutch 
(1947, 1948)  71, 607
   force  616 (set up by Chinese peranakan 
woman at Ngawi, 9-1825)  see also 
gunung, Jayèng Sekar, landdrost, 
tamping
   officers (oppasser)  536 (investigate 
attack on Babadan, 9-1823), 560 
(problems with)  see also gunung, 
tamping
   regulations  see Angger Gunung
Poll, H.M. van der (1796-1833; chief 
magistrate / hoofd baljuw of Batavia, 
1826-8)  547, 551
Pollux, naval corvette  712 (description 
of), 713-21 (transports Dipanagara 
to Manado), 714-5 (map of voyage), 
724-5, 757, 822  see also Eeg, Schillet
Pomeranz, Kenneth  68
Poncakusuma, Radèn  see Suryabrangta
Pondhok Gedhé (Cilitan)  106 (Nicolaus 
Engelhard’s villa at)
Popper, Karl (1902-94; philosopher)  757
population  (in south-central Java)  1, 20, 
27, 31, 39-42, 465 (decline in Kedhu, 
1824-5), 521 (statistics compiled, 
1823), 522 (census)
porters  xiv, 31, 610 (help Dipanagara in 
Java War)  see also gladhag
porters’ guilds  see gladhag
Portier, Second-lieutenant P.D.  525 
(description of captivity, 1826), 
588, 614 (description of Radèn 
Ayu Sérang), 620 (captured by 
Dipanagara), 631 (brought to 
Dipanagara’s Kulon Praga base)
Portuguese  588 (conversion to Islam 
in VOC period)   see also Indo-
Europeans
post road (trans-Java)  see postweg 
postal service in Java  231, 236 (slowness 
of)  see also Chevallier, Yogyakarta
postweg (Daendels’ trans-Java post road)  
158 (plate), 186, 197, 198 (plate), 
215 (mortality of labourers on), 218 
(demang of Tersana shot on), 236, 265 
see also Daendels
potatoes  23, 494 (planted during 
1821 drought), 700 (eaten by 
Dipanagara), 718
Prabalingga, district (southern Kedhu)  
55, 466-7 (popular uprising in), 513 
(impact of Merapi eruption on)
Prabayeksa (private apartments of Yogya 
sultan)  70, 406
Prabu, Pangéran  see Prabuningrat
Prabuningrat, Pangéran (?1779-1829; 
pre-1825, Pangéran Wiramenggala; 
son of HB II)  352 (joins 
Dipanagara), 657 (killed at battle of 
Siluk, 17-9-1829), 798
Prabuningrat, Pangéran Adipati  see 
Wiranagara, Radèn Tumenggung
pradata (civil court, Yogya)  547-8 
(corrupt rule of Danureja IV 
influences decisions)  see also 
surambi
pradata (civil court, Surakarta)  485
pradikan, tax-free villages  61, 72-3, 
94 (Maja), 273, 333, 610 (help 
Dipanagara in Java War), 780-4 
(list of locations), 785 (map), 786-
94 (list of ulama from)  see also 
Kepundhung, Maja, pathok negari, 
pesantrèn 
Pragolamurthi, lakon (wayang plot)  568
prajurit arahan (military levies, Yogya)  
177, 195
prajurit èstri  see Amazon corps
prajuritan (fighting dress)  121, 208 (worn 
by Yogya courtiers during Daendels’ 
visit, 7-1809), 335 (kraton defenders 
wear during British assault), 616 
(women wear in siege of Yogya, 8/9-
1825), 629 (worn by female fighters)  
see also Amazon corps
Prambanan  86 (Dipanagara takes 
statuary from), 90, 209 (Daendels 
visits temple ruins, 30-7-1809), 298 
(Crawfurd met by HB II’s envoys 
at), 337, 418-9 (plate), 421 (statuary 
taken by Yogya princes)
Prampèlan, Kyai Ageng  72
prang Cina (Chinese War, 1741-3)  335, 
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349, 372  see also Garendi, Chinese
prang désa  see village (Javanese)
prang puputan (final battle / ending war)  
341
prang sabil (holy war)  xiv, 90, 333 (appeal 
to during British assault), 602, 617, 
622, 628 (Dipanagara’s war as), 631, 
632 (payung  as sign of), 635, 688 
(Dipanagara’s dress during)
Prangwedana  see Mangkunagara II
Praniti Kapa-Kapa, law code  104  see also 
Javanese-Islamic law
Prapak, village (southern Kedhu)  585
prau pengluput (customs free lighters on 
Bengawan Sala)  56, 185 (Daendels 
uses to travel to Surabaya via 
Gresik), 193 (plate)
Prawirabrata, Radèn  see Bratasena
Prawiradiningrat, Pangéran (younger 
brother of Dipanagara)  581, 623
Prawiradiningrat, Radèn Ayu (wife of 
above)  623
Prawiradiningrat, Pangéran Rongga  see 
Rongga Prawiradiningrat
Prawiradirjan family  82, 405  see also 
Rongga Prawiradirja
Prawiradiwirya, Radèn (brother of Ratu 
Kencana Wulan)  350 (forced to 
transport kraton booty to Residency)
Prawirapraja, Radèn Ngabèhi (younger 
brother of Radèn Rongga 
Prawiradirja III)  247 (given title 
during Rongga rebellion), 257 
(returns to Yogya)
Prawirasastra, Radèn Ngabèhi, carik-
Dalem (senior court scribe)  197
Prawirasentika, Radèn Rongga (pre-
1811, Yogya bupati of Bauwerna, 
east Java; acting joint bupati wedana 
of Madiun, 1811-26)  255 (during 
Rongga rebellion), 267 (appointed 
joint acting bupati wedana with 
Dipakusuma), 372, 408, 415 
(captures Sayyid Kramat), 773  see 
also Dipakusuma, Pangéran 
Prawirawinata, Radèn Tumenggung 
(brother of Ratu Kencana Wulan)  
292 (participates in murder 
of Danureja II), 350 (forced to 
transport kraton booty to Residency)
Prawirayuda, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati of Jipang-Pasekaran / 
Sekaran)  255 (equivocal behaviour 
during Rongga rebellion), 268 
(replaced, 1-1811)
Prayamenggala, Radèn Ngabèhi 
(Surakarta gandhèk / royal 
messenger)  228
Preanger Residency (west Java)  668 
(Bonjol exiled in), 676 (Cleerens as 
Resident of), 719  see also Cleerens
Prehn, Rijck van (1779-1843; Resident 
of Surakarta, 1818-9)  486, 499-500 
(trial and dismissal of, 1820), 528, 
537, 809
Priangan (west Java)  41, 45, 167, 198, 
527, 668  see also division of Java, 
Pajajaran, West Java
priest-king  see pandhita-ratu
primbon (divination manual texts)  113, 
495-6 (Dipasana’s augury skills)
Prince Regent (Yogya)  see 
Hamengkubuwana III
princes of the blood  see sentana
Principalities  see vorstenlanden
Pringgadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung  
see Pringgakusuma, Radèn 
Tumenggung
Pringgakususuma, Radèn Tumenggung 
(?-1815; Yogya bupati of Rawa, 
east Java; post-1812, Yogya nayaka 
with title of Radèn Tumenggung 
Pringgadiningrat)  181 (goes to 
Semarang with Yogya delegation to 
Daendels, 7-1808), 232, 248, 254-5, 
370-1 (appointed bupati nayaka), 396 
(Crawfurd backs as candidate for 
patih, 12-1813), 443 (dies)
Pringgakusuma, Radèn Ayu (wife of 
above; daughter of HB II)  370
Pringgalaya, Radèn Tumenggung (Yogya 
bupati of Kertasana, east Java)  
255 (equivocal behaviour during 
Rongga rebellion), 268 (replaced, 
1-1811)
Pringgodani, village (Yogya)  281
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Pringlegi, village (Kedhu)  513 
(destroyed in Merapi eruption, 28-
12-1822)
Prins, Bart de  644-5
Priyangan  see Priangan
priyayi
   post-1830 Dutch-appointed officials  67
   pradikan  271 (at Yogya court), 444 
(mobilised during British assault)
   in Yogya kraton  9, 50 (links with 
bandits), 141 (offerings at 
Parangtritis to obtain status of), 607 
(join Dipanagara in 1825), 622 (act 
as Dipanagara’s first commanders), 
648 (support for Dipanagara) 
prize money (taken by British after fall 
of Yogya)  347, 364  see also British, 
asset strippers and looters, Great 
Britain, imperial grand larceny
Procris, H.M.S. (British sloop of war)  
288-9 (attack on French gunboats)
Prophet’s birthday  see Garebeg Mulud
prostitutes  see ronggèng
Prussians  27, 68 (Goethe at Valmy), 609 
(standard model infantry flintlock 
used in Java War), 626 (men of 
Banyumas compared with)
public health  41-6
Pudhak, forest  251  see also Ratu Adil
Puger, Pangéran  see Pakubuwana I
Puja Kusuma, romance  496 (eulogy to 
Dipasana in text of)
Pulangyun, Mas Ayu (daughter of 
patih of Kendhal; unofficial wife 
of Danureja II; post-1812, wife 
of Radèn Ngabèhi Danuwijaya 
of Kalibeber)  762-3, 781, 823 (as 
mother of Ali Basah Ngabdulkamil 
Mertanagara)
Pulau Onrust (Bay of Batavia), VOC 
naval dockyard  140 (link with Ratu 
Kidul), 159 (British capture of ships 
at)
Pulau Pinang  see Pinang
Pulau Putri  140  see also Ratu Kidul
Pulau Toris  140  see also Ratu Kidul
Pulo Kadang, pradikan village  91, 131 
(visited by Dipanagara), 627, 676, 
786, 791  see also Badhèran, Maja
Pulo Waringin (waringin / banyan tree 
island)  87, 576  see also Sélareja
Purbakusuma, Radèn Tumenggung (son 
of Pangéran Ngabèhi, ?1738-1822; 
post-1822, Pangéran Purwanegara)  
221 (marries daughter of HB II and 
Ratu Kencana Wulan), 225, 624-5 
(plate), 803
Purbaya, Pangéran (son of PB IV; later 
Pakubuwana VII, reigned 1830-
58)  181, 416, 422, 424 (during 
sepoy conspiracy, 1815), 531 
(indebtedness), 555, 558 (passed 
over as successor to PB V), 559, 658, 
744 (facilitates copying of Surakarta 
texts for Dipanagara in Makassar)
Purwa cycle, wayang plays  105  see also 
Bratayuda
Purwadadi, new kabupatèn (Madiun)  268 
(created 1-1811), 381
Purwadadi, district (north coast)  614 
(Pangéran Sérang’s campaign in, 
9-1825), 615
Purwadiningrat, Kyai Adipati (?1750-
1810; Yogya bupati of Magetan, 
east Java, 1797-1810; pre-1797, Mas 
Tumenggung Sasrawinata)  50 (links 
with bandits), 219 (father of Ratu 
Kedhaton), 396, 760, 803
Purwadiningrat, Nyai Adipati (wife of 
above; mother of Ratu Kedhaton)  
396
Purwadipura, Radèn Tumenggung 
(?1760-1814; Yogya nayaka; wedana 
Gedhong Tengen / Treasury 
Department, 1797-1810)  10, 227 
(appointed to replace Danureja 
II, 1810), 231, 242-3 (heads Yogya 
expedition against Rongga), 
252 (dismissed for currency / 
opium deals), 254 (replaced as 
commander), 257, 268 (exiled to 
Sélamanik, 1-1811), 272 (goods / 
chattels distributed), 292-3 (recalled 
from exile / participates in murder 
Danureja II), 775, 803 
Purwadipura, Radèn Ayu (daughter 
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of HB I; wife of above)  268 (saves 
husband’s life)
Purwakusuma, Pangéran (?1802-?; post-
1827, Pangéran Abdul Karim Aria 
Bintara; son of HB II)  352 (joins 
Dipanagara), 797
Purwanegara, Pangéran  see 
Purbakusuma, Radèn Tumenggung
Purwareja (eastern Bagelèn; pre-1830, 
Kedhung Kebo)  27, 135, 481, 662, 
694, 699  see also Cakranegara I, 
Kedhung Kebo
Purwareja, pathok negari (Yogya)  90, 210, 
782
Purwaretna, pavilion (Yogya kraton)  292 
(Danureja II strangled in)
pusaka (heirlooms)  132 (Kadilangu 
and Demak as two indispensable 
heirlooms of Java), 250, 274, 292 
(kept in Purwaretna pavilion), 341 
(captured from Yogya, 20-6-1812), 
356 (great regalia), 365 (sale of and 
making of replacements), 445 (Kyai 
Birawa kris), 491, 506, 534, 548, 636 
(Maja accuses Dipanagara of too 
much interest in)  see also kris
Puspadiwirya, Mas Ngabèhi (patih of 
Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III)  247, 
256
Pusparana, Ngabèhi (mantri of Jaba 
Kiwa department)  244 (discovers 
letters in Rongga’s residence)
Puspitawati, Radèn Ayu (selir / unofficial 
wife of HB III; ‘nurse’ of HB IV)  412 
(sleeps with HB IV to instruct him 
in sexual matters)
Puthutguritna, Rongga (follower of 
Dipanagara)  568
Puthutlawa, panakawan of Dipanagara at 
Tegalreja  568
putihan (men of religion)  141, 144, 191, 
214-5 (Daendels’ ban on circulation 
of), 271 (priyayi pradikan), 333 
(mobilised during British assault)
Puwasa, fasting month  14, 39, 57, 87, 
94 (Dipanagara’ retreats during), 
136, 155, 232, 243, 495 (1821 cholera 
epidemic during), 564 (Dipanagara’s 
vision of Ratu Adil during), 594 
(Dipanagara remits taxes in), 606, 
638, 675 (Dipanagara observes 
at Menorèh), 679, 689 (end of, 
28-3-1830)  see also Garebeg Puwasa
Puy, Pieter du (?-1808; Resident of 
Banten)  600-1 (murdered)
Qadiriyya, tarekat (mystical brotherhood) 
111, 489 see also Naqşhabāndīyya, 
Shaţţāriyya
qiblah (prayer direction to Mecca)  579
Qué Bok Sing, leading member of 
Yogya Chinese community  524 
(testimonial for Smissaert)
Qué Hok Sing, leading member of 
Yogya Chinese community  524 
(testimonial for Smissaert)
Qur’ān  47, 92 (Maja’s knowledge of), 94, 
100, 102-4, 111, 122, 152 (inscription 
on Dipanagara’s battle banners), 
387, 406, 410 (tutor in study of 
appointed for HB IV), 490, 511, 
524 (prohibition on wine), 545 
(Abuyamin’s lack of knowledge 
of), 567 (as mandate for holy 
war), 569-70 (mandate), 573 (daily 
recital by Dipanagara), 575, 580, 
590 (Qur’ānic example cited), 603 
(mandate for holy war), 628, 633 
(Maja’s knowledge of), 638 (Maja’s 
troops chant verses from), 639, 
694, 701, 706  see also education 
(Qur’ānic), Hadīth
Qué Wi Kong, leading member of 
Yogya Chinese community  533 
(testimonial for Smissaert)
Raad van Indië  see Council of the Indies
Raad der Aziatische Bezittingen en 
Etablissementen (1800-6)  xii
Raad van justitite (high court) 385-6 (at 
Semarang)
Rach, Johannes (1720-83, artist)  2 (plate 
of Yogya kraton), 708-9 (plate of 
Stadhuis)
rad agama  see surambi
Raffles, T.S. (1781-1826; lieutenant-
governor, 1811-6)  xiii, xviii, 
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xx, 4-7 (view of Yogya military 
establishment), 15, 19-20, 27, 41, 
61, 104, 151, 154, 163, 168, 171 
(altercation with HB II in throne 
room), 213 (effects of Daendels’ 
timber policies), 260 (as Napoleonic 
philosopher), 280 (Malay language 
letters from Malaka), 281, 291, 
298, 300 (plate), 301 (censors 
Crawfurd), 303-5, 307-13 (first visit 
to Yogya and treaty of 28-12-1811), 
313, 320 (view of PB IV and 
secret correspondence), 324, 326 
(misunderstands status of ruler’s 
official and non-official wives), 327, 
331-2 (attack on Yogya), 335, 341-2, 
345-50 (in aftermath of assault), 
351-2 (collection of Javanese MSS 
and friendship with Natakusuma 
/ Sura-adimanggala IV), 355-9 
(invests HB III), 356-7 (umbrage at 
homage of older princes), 359-65 
(presides over key ceremonies), 
361-2 (formal annexation of Kedhu 
/ appointment of Pakualam), 373, 
380-7 (1812 treaty negotiations), 
407-9, 411 (meets with HB IV, 
1-1816), 412 (and wife Olivia 
Mariamne), 415-6 (view of sepoy 
conspiracy), 427 (visits Surakarta), 
435 (favourable view of Nahuys), 
443, 454, 464 (land tax in Kedhu), 
503, 508, 527 (land tax), 562-3, 583, 
615, 655, 757, 807
Raffles, Lady Sophia (1786-1858; second 
wife of above)  352 (presents 
husband’s Javanese / Indonesian 
MSS to Royal Asiatic Society), 
385 (comment on Raffles’ judicial 
reforms)
Raffles, Olivia Marianne (1771-1814; 
first wife of T.S. Raffles)  412 (age 
difference with husband)
Rahmanudin, Kyai (pengulu of Yogya, 
1812-23; confidante of Dipanagara)  
89, 325, 370, 545-7 (dismissal), 
573-5, 578, 595, 597 (departs on haj, 
7-1825), 773, 792
Raib, Radèn Mas (?1816-?; son of 
Dipanagara)  80, 103, 110, 682, 
688, 711, 746, 767 (family tree), 813 
(given pusaka kris / pike)
Raj, British (India)  xi  see also British 
Indian troops, India
Raja Datuk Namak, Bugis sea captain 
(pirate)  21  see also Bugis, pirates
raja Islam (title)  583, 587
rajah (sacred texts / amulets)  614, 627-8
Rajamenggala (panakawan of Radèn 
Tumenggung Dipawiyana)  729 
(returns to Java), 817
Rajawinangun (Arjawinangun), royal 
pesanggrahan, 9, 179-80 (military 
review at, 1-6-1808), 185 (as 
defensive position), 188, 208, 210 
(visited by Daendels), 383 (market 
taken over by British, 1812), 407, 
456, 461 (rented by Thomson), 
463 (indigo plantations at), 533 
(Thomson’s indigo plantation at), 
535 (indemnity for), 542, 782  see also 
Thomson, Dr Harvey
Rajegwesi, district (east Java)  see Jipang
Rajput (British Indian soldiers)  358  see 
also British-Indian (troops), sepoys
raksasa (monsters)  698 (De Kock and 
Dutch officers compared to)
Rama, Panembahan (Kajoran)  630  see 
also Kajoran
Rama, Serat (text)  105
Rama Badra, text  410 (legends from 
Adam to fall of Kartasura)
Ramayana, wayang cycle / epic  247  see 
also Dasamuka
rampog macan (tiger spearing)  50, 210 
(at the time of Daendels’ visit, 30-
7-1808)  see also tiger-and-buffalo 
fights
Ranadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung  
(pre-1811, Radèn Panji Jayèngrana; 
wedana gedhé prajurit / kraton troop 
commander, 1811-7)  254 (on 
expedition against Rongga), 408 
(member of regency council, 1814), 
776, 804
Ranawijaya, Ngabèhi (Surakarta 
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kepatihan official)  281 (carries secret 
correspondence to Yogya), 319 
(imprisoned by British)
Rangga, Pangéran Arya (younger 
brother of Dipanagara)  747 (exiled 
to Ternate, 1849), 752
Rangin, Bagus (leader of Cirebon 
rebellion, 1808-12)  185
Rānīrī, Nūrudīn ar-, Gujerati Muslim 
scholar (?-1666)  99  see also Bustān 
as-Salaţīn
rape  349 (at fall of Plérèd and 
Kartasura), 619 (Sasradilaga’s 
conduct with Chinese peranakan 
women in Lasem, 1827)  see also 
women
Rara Kidul, Nyai  see Lara Kidul
Rasamuni, mount (Gunung Kidul)  136 
(Dipanagara’s vision of Ratu Adil 
on), 566-8, 571
Rata (Jayasurata), panakawan of 
Dipanagara  405, 653, 688, 697 
(carries Dipanagara’s betelbox 
on coach to Bedono), 700 (pun 
on potatoes), 816 (transferred to 
Tondano, 1839)
Ratu Adil (‘Just King’)  xiv, 70, 90, 104, 
123, 136, 156, 251 (Rongga as), 414-
5, 481-4 (Umar Mahdi as, 1817), 
492-3, 495, 505 (Dipanagara as), 
516 (expectations after Merapi 
eruption), 517, 543, 563, 566-71, 574, 
578-9, 583-8, 603, 650, 757  see also 
Jayabaya, millenarian expectations
Ratu Kidul (goddess of the southern 
ocean)  17-8, 45, 109, 140-1, 144-8 
(appears to Dipanagara, 7-1826), 
156, 488-9, 496, 515, 559 (PB VI 
attempts to visit, 1830), 571, 579 
(water as element of), 758
ratu paneteg panatagama (royal protector 
of religion)  see paneteg panatagama
ratu pinarjurit (warrior kings)  
189 (Rongga’s view of), 245 
(Rongga’s references to), 248  
see also Hamengkubuwana I, 
Mangkunagara I
Rauws, Captain (artillery)  207  see also 
Baillard
rawa (fens)  24 (in Bagelèn)  see also Rawa 
Tambakbaya, Rawa Wawar
Rawa (Tulung-Agung), district (east 
Java)  8, 248, 254-5, 268 (number 
of bupati increased, 1-1811), 370, 
484, 490 (Sunan Waliyullah in)  
see also Pringgakusuma, Radèn 
Tumenggung
Rawa Tambakbaya (western Bagelèn)  
24, 669 (Dipanagara’s patih attempts 
to hide in)
Rawabangké (Meester Cornelis)  283
Rawa Wawar (eastern Bagelèn)  24
Rawana  see Dasamuka
rayat (village dependants)  33-4   see also 
ngindhung, numpang
rebels  see kraman
rebo wekasan  479
Rees, W.A. van (1820-98; Dutch military 
officer / author)  576 (visits 
Selarong)
regency  see Hamengkubuwana IV, 
Hamengkubuwana V, Pakualam I
Regret, The (British merchantman)  712
Rejasa, village (Kulon Praga)  337 (wives 
and children of Dipanagara and 
army commanders kept at), 620, 
631, 651 (lack of food, 1829)
Reksanegara, Kyai Tumenggung (wedana 
bandar / head of tollgates, ?1800-12)  
399, 776 804
religious communities (Yogya)  see 
putihan, santri
Rèma (Jatinegara), district (western 
Bagelèn / Banyumas)  396 
(Danurejan links with), 474, 586, 623 
(Ali Basah Mertanagara  hails from), 
653 (Dipanagara flees to, 1829), 661, 
664-5, 669, 686  see also Danukusuma 
II, Gandakusuma, Rèmakamal, 
Rèma Jatinegara
Rèma Jatinegara, bènthèng (northeastern 
Bagelèn / Banyumas)  670
Rèmakamal, village (northeastern 
Bagelèn / Banyumas)  665, 670-3 
(meeting between Dipanagara 
and Cleerens at, 16-2-1830), 740 
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(Dipanagara reminds Cleerens of 
meeting at), 824
Rembang  41, 164 (shipyards at), 234, 
249 (Rongga’s rebellion in), 381 
(Sasradilaga’s revolt in, 1827), 436, 
519 (Smissaert as Resident of), 
521, 527, 547 (Lawick van Pabst as 
Resident of), 618-9, 623 (regional 
response to Dipanagara), 640, 642-3 
(Sasradilaga’s revolt in), 648  see also 
Lawick van Pabst
Rembang, pengulu of   642
Renesse-Breidbach private collection 
(Algemeen Rijksarchief, Brussels)  
xix  see also Gisignies
Resagota, Kyai Tumenggung (bupati of 
Sokawati)  765
Resagota, Nyai Tumenggung (wife of 
above)  765
Resasentana, Amad Dullah Tumenggung 
582 (appointed bupati of Kutha 
Gedhé by Dipanagara)
Residents, Dutch  808-10  see also Dutch 
East Indies Company
Residency (law) courts  385 (established 
by Raffles, 1814)
Retna Déwati (name of Ratu Kidul in 
waxing moon) 144  see also Ratu 
Kidul
Retnadiluwih, Radèn (selir of 
Pakubuwana VII; mother of his 
surviving daughter)  416
Retnakumala, Radèn Ayu (wife of 
Dipanagara; daughter of Kyai 
Kasongan)  768
Retnakusuma, Radèn Ayu (official 
wife of Dipanagara; daughter of 
Yogya bupati of Panolan, Radèn 
Tumenggung Natawijaya III; pre-
1807, Radèn Ajeng Supadmi)  85, 97, 
618, 762, 766-7
Retnaningrum, Radèn Ayu (wife of 
Dipanagara; daughter of Pangéran 
Panengah / Dipawiyana I)  700 
(refuses to accompany Dipanagara 
to Batavia), 768
Retnaningsih, Radèn Ayu (official 
wife of Dipanagara; daughter of 
Yogya bupati of Kenitèn, Radèn 
Tumenggung Sumaprawira) 80, 
119 (description of), 660, 698, 
700-2 (accompanies Dipanagara 
to Batavia), 713, 717 (Knoerle’s 
description of during Manado 
voyage), 718 (serves food to 
Knoerle), 726 (allowance in 
Manado), 728-9, 731, 738, 749 (sends 
presents to Dipanagara’s aged 
mother), 751 (grave in Makassar), 
755 (death of), 765, 768, 816
Retna Suwida, Déwi  140  see also Ratu 
Kidul
revenue lists (Yogya)  62 (disorder of)
Revolutionary Wars (1792-9)  xii, 707
Rhijn, J.M. van (Resident of Yogya, 1773-
86)  70, 237
Rhine wine  718 (tasted by Dipanagara)
rhinoceros, Javanese  653 (Dipanagara 
follows tracks of)
Riau, archipelago  21 (pirates in)
rice  43, 57 (harvests), 78, 164 (supplies 
to eastern Indonesian garrisons), 
186 (supplies for Daendels’ 
troops), 258 (supplies from eastern 
mancanagara), 380 (Kedhu as 
granary), 384 (taxes levied on), 
465 (attacked by plagues of rats), 
473 (higher prices in Yogya than 
Surakarta), 474 (trade in), 493-4 
(high prices of, 1821-2), 516, 811-2 
(prices in Yogya and Java)  see also 
padi
rice trade  37, 380 (from Pacitan), 384 
(steep price rises)
ricefields  see sawah
Ricklefs, M.C.  40, 356
Rijck, Ambrosina Wilhelmina van  see 
Braam, Mrs van
Rijck van Prehn  see Prehn
Rijksmuseum (Amsterdam)  695
Rinia van Nauta, Captain Bavius 
Gijsbertus (1787-1860; commander 
6th mobile column; post-1830, circuit 
judge Semarang division)  678 (in 
Magelang for Dipanagara’s arrest), 
699
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roads  12 (poor condition of), 462 (HB 
IV’s construction mania), 608 
(ambushes on in Java War)
Robison, William (captain 24th dragoon 
regiment; aide-de-camp to Minto)  
199, 285-7, 290-2 (visit to courts, 9-
1811)
Rochussen, J.J. (1797-1871; governor-
general, 1845-51)  747, 752, 808
Roeps, Captain Johan Jacob (1805-40; 
Javanese-speaking infantry officer)  
114, 428 (owes life to Bengali troop 
sergeant), 503, 636 (negotiations 
with Maja at Melangi), 659-60 
(biography), 675, 688-90 (translates 
during De Kock’s meeting with 
Dipanagara), 693-4, 697-701 
(accompanies Dipanagara to 
Batavia), 703, 707, 711 (distributes 
Dipanagara’s pusaka  weapons to 
children), 712-3, 721, 724, 726
Roest, Lieutenant-colonel W.A. (former 
military adjutant of Governor-
general Van der Capellen) 648 (in 
command against Sasradilaga), 
689 (in Magelang for arrest of 
Dipanagara), 692 (relays orders 
from De Kock)
Rondhan, Kyai (Dipanagara’s pusaka 
pike)  652, 813 (given to Dipanagara 
II)
Rongga Prawiradiningrat, Pangéran  
(post-1830, Pangéran Adipati 
Prawiradiningrat; bupati wedana 
of Madiun, 1822-59; son of Radèn 
Rongga Prawiradirja III by Ratu 
Maduretna)  91, 267, 405, 761, 764, 
773
Rongga Prawiradirja I, Radèn (?-
1784; pre-1760, Kyai Rongga 
Wirasentika, army commander of 
Hamengkubuwana I; bupati wedana 
of Madiun, ?1760-84)  12, 190, 243, 
366, 405, 573, 581, 760, 764, 772
Rongga Prawiradirja II, Radèn  (?-
1796; pre-1784, Radèn Rongga 
Mangundirja; bupati wedana of 
Madiun, 1784-90/1794-6; son of 
above)  269, 496 (daughter married 
to Dipasana), 761, 764, 772
Rongga Prawiradirja II, Radèn Ayu 
(alias Radèn Ayu Sepuh; wife 
/ widow of above; daughter of  
Hamengkubuwana I)  247 (given 
title during Rongga rebellion), 257-8 
(brought back to Yogya, 12-1810), 
761, 764
Rongga Prawiradirja III, Radèn (?1779-
1810; bupati wedana of Madiun, 
1796-1810; son of above)  5, 10, 
12-3, 51, 53, 58, 60 (‘kraton’ at 
Maospati), 79, 82, 129, 151, 175, 
177-8 (summons prajurit arahan 
to Yogya), 181 (participates in 
delegation to Semarang), 183-4, 186, 
188, 189-94 (character assessed), 
192, 201 (incident with Van Braam), 
206, 214 (timber crisis and blame by 
Daendels), 216 (work-force extends 
Yogya fortifications), 219 (reaction 
to death of wife), 220 (captures 
Panaraga gamelan), 221, 225, 231-3, 
236-9 (in Yogya before rebellion), 
240-59 (rebellion and death), 240-1 
(map of flight), 241-60, 268-9, 272 
(distribution of goods), 312, 337, 
362, 370, 372, 401, 415, 492, 505, 572-
3, 581, 608, 623, 649, 761, 765-6, 773  
see also Maospati
Rongga Prawirasentika, Radèn  see 
Prawirasentika
ronggèng (dancing women / prostitutes)  
21-2, 22 (plate), 28-9 (tayuban 
dances), 187, 471  see also women
Rongkob, birds nest rocks (south coast)  
571, 588-9, 620-1  see also Portier
Ross-shire Buffs (78th Regiment of Foot; 
Fraser’s Own)  304, 341 (officer 
captures HB II), 357 (at investiture 
parade)  see also Douglas
Rothenbühler. F.J. (Gezaghebber of 
the Oosthoek, 1800-9; post-1809, 
Prefect)  183
Rotterdam  735
Rotterdam, fort (Makassar)  see Fort 
Rotterdam
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Rouffaer, G.P. (1860-1928)  13-4, 39, 65, 
317, 395 (on PA corps), 511, 555
Roux, H.M. le (acting Assistant-Resident 
of Semarang, 1834)  614 (cautions 
Radèn Ayu Sérang)
Royal Artillery  331, 333, 355  see also 
Colebrooke
Royal Asiatic Society (London)  352 
(receives Javanese / Indonesian MSS 
from Lady Raffles)
royal retreats / pleasure gardens  see 
kelangenan-Dalem
Rujakgadhung (alias Teplak/Fitpak, man 
servant of Dipanagara in Makassar)  
741, 817
rukun (five pillars of Islam)  136
Rum, sultan (Ottoman sultan)  152-3, 
251, 570-1  see also Άbd al-Hamid I, 
Ottoman, Turkey
Rupel, Z.M. (Dutch naval vessel / 
corvette)  666 (Van den Bosch 
arrives in Batavia on, 4-1-1830), 
667 (De Kock sails to Semarang on, 
25-2-1830)
rural gentry  see kyai
Rusche edition (Babad Dipanagara, 
Manado version)  xvii
Russians  665 (capture Adrianople / 
Edirne)
Rustenburg, fort (Yogya)  see Vredenburg
Sahiman (alias Rujakbeling), panakawan 
of Dipanagara in Makassar  741, 817
Said, Radèn Mas  see Mangkunagara I
St Just, Louis Antoine de (1767-94)  316
Sakondhar, Serat  see Serat Sakondhar
Sala River  see Bengawan Sala
salāt al-maghrib (evening prayer)  699 
(Dipanagara performs at Ungaran)
salat gaib (prayer for the dead)  297
Salatiga  51, 92 (Maja at), 114 (Maja’s 
negotiations with Du Bus at), 177, 
248, 287 (Janssens’ retreat to), 
448, 459, 470, 511, 531 (Boyolali-
Salatiga road), 553, 560, 570, 588, 
631, 638, 642 (De Kock defends 
Salatiga-Surakarta line), 644 (peace 
negotiations with Maja at), 692-3, 
696 (De Kock invites Dipanagara 
to go to)  see also Gisignies, Maja, 
Stavers
Salèh, Haji Muhamad  281
Salèh, Radèn Malikan  see Purbaya, 
Pangéran
Salèh, Radèn Mas (eldest son of Kyai 
Tumenggung Sura-adimanggala IV)  
364 (to Calcutta for education), 616 
(talks to mother about Sukur)  see 
also Sukur, Radèn Mas
Salèh, Radèn Syarif Bustaman (?1811-80; 
Javanese artist)  158, 364, 688, 695, 
698-9 (painting of Dipanagara’s 
arrest at Magelang), 742 (possible 
author of French press article on 
Dipanagara, 2-1848), 756 (view 
of Dutch Indies society)  see also 
Danudireja, Kalapa-aking, Kraus
Salis, A.M.Th. baron de (1788-1834; 
Resident of Surakarta, 1822-3; 
Kedhu, 1825-6; Surabaya, 1830-1; 
Raad van Indië, 1831-3)  119, 458, 
506-9 (in Yogya for investiture 
of HB V), 510 (critical view of 
Dipanagara), 511, 517 (replaces 
Nahuys in Surakarta), 519, 523, 529, 
531 (critical views on land-rent), 
554-5, 809
Saloringpasar, Pangéran (husband 
of Ratu Bendara I)  see Ngabèhi, 
Pangéran 
salt  24, 44 (daily consumption of), 45 
(south sea variety), 380 (Pacitan 
production of), 384 (internal trade 
in), 393 (Crawfurd’s failed south sea 
salt monopoly, 1814), 469 (scarcity 
in eastern mancanagara during war), 
515 (Sirisik as salt making village), 
608
Salya, Radèn Mas (son of Pakualam 
I)  361 (appointed as Pangéran 
Suryaningprang)
Samas, pesanggrahan-Dalem / royal retreat 
(south coast)  154, 229 (visited by 
HB II during confrontation with 
Moorrees), 782
Sambas (Borneo)  410 (5/6-1813 British 
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expedition against)
Sambirata, village (Nanggulon district, 
Kulon Praga)  480-1 (place of Ratu 
Adil), 584, 595
Samèn, village (south of Yogya)  49, 101, 
609 (gunpowder manufacture at)  
see also Jayamenggala
Sampang (west Madura)  359, 641 
(Dutch auxiliary troops from in Java 
War)
Sampang, village (western Bagelèn / 
Banyumas)  669 (Dipanagara in), 
673
Samparwedi, Tuwan Sarif / Kyai Haji  see 
Munadi, Hasan
Sampurna  see Iman Sampurna
Samuel, Armenian Jewish burger 
Surakarta  266 (lends to PB IV)
Sanapakis, pesanggrahan-Dalem / royal 
retreat (east of Yogya)  454 (land-
rent at), 779
Sancho Panza  518 (Smissaert compared 
to)
Sangkelat, Kyai (kraton pusaka kris)  341
Sanèpa, village (Karanganyar district, 
Bagelèn)  481-2 (Umar Mahdi 
disturbances in, 1817)
Santri, Bagus  132 (leader of 1832 
rebellion)
santri  61, 72, 76-7 (at Tegalreja), 89, 92-4, 
100, 115 (Dipanagara described as), 
117 (as advisers of Dipanagara), 129, 
131 (clothes worn by Dipanagara 
on south coast pilgrimage), 163 (as 
advisers of PB IV), 223 (Danureja 
II ridiculed as), 235 (Abubakar 
becomes), 239 (day of Rongga’s 
departure determined by), 271 (as 
priyayi pradikan), 273 (at court), 281 
(as court haji), 294, 320 (in Surakarta 
kraton), 333 (Abubakar in garb of 
during British assault), 336 (Yogya 
kauman damaged), 365 (return to 
Yogya of), 367, 387 (Dipanagara’s 
supporters), 426, 441 (court ulama 
to Batavia to greet HB II, 1816), 
448 (treatment during Java War), 
489, 495 (sent from Surakarta to 
clean north coast graves during 
1821 cholera epidemic), 525 (as 
supporters of Dipanagara), 583, 
589, 603, 606, 626-33 (role during 
Java War), 631 (political power 
questioned), 649 (Senthot’s refusal to 
be educated as), 654-5 (tension with 
kraton supporters of Dipanagara), 
669 (as advisers of Dipanagara), 676, 
707, 757 (Dipanagara as)  see also 
pradikan, putihan
Sapar, Javanese month (as time of 
appearance of Ratu Adil)  484, 579
Saperdan, Radèn Mas  see Pakubuwana 
VI
Sapingi, Mas Muhamad (pengulu of 
Yogya, 1798-1812)  129, 273, 370 
(replaced), 773
Sapu Jagad, Kyai (spirit guardian of 
Merapi)  496, 515, 571
Sarèn, village (Sragèn)  232 (possible 
meeting of Rongga and MN II at)
sarif   627 (as supporters of Dipanagara)
Sarkuma, Radèn Mas (1834-49; alias 
Radèn Mas Dulkabli; son of 
Dipanagara and Radèn Ayu 
Retnaningsih)  731, 740, 749 (death), 
750 (plate of grave), 753, 769
Sarutama, pusaka arrow (received by 
Dipanagara at Lipura) 150, 153-4, 
156, 403, 814
Sasi, Ratu (daughter of HB II and Ratu 
Kencana Wulan; wife of Danureja 
IV)  265
Sasmitaningsih, Mas Ajeng (unofficial 
wife of HB III; mother of Radèn Ayu 
Dipawiyana)  728
Sasradilaga, Radèn Tumenggung Aria 
(deputy commander of Yogya kraton 
troops; titular major; brother-in-law 
of Dipanagara) 381 (uprising in 
Rembang and Jipang, 1827-8), 436 
(Nahuys defeated by troops loyal 
to), 615, 617-8, 619 (rapes Chinese 
peranakan woman in Lasem), 640 
(uprising), 642-3, 648 (Holsman’s 
campaign against)
Sasradiningrat II, Radèn Adipati (patih 
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of Surakarta, 1812-46)  27, 75, 397 
(praises Danureja IV), 397, 435, 532, 
537, 555, 556-7 (plate), 558-9, 561
Sasradiningrat I, Radèn Tumenggung 
(?-1807; Yogya bupati of Jipang-
Rajegwesi, 1794-1807; father of Ratu 
Ibu / Ageng)  760, 804
Sasradiningrat II, Radèn Tumenggung 
(son of above; Yogya bupati of 
Jipang-Rajegwesi, 1807-12)  231 (as a 
nayaka), 255, 325, 804
Sasradipura, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati of Magetan, 1810-
2)  255 (during Rongga rebellion), 
804  see also Purwadiningrat, Kyai 
Adipati
Sasradiwirya, Radèn Ayu (sister 
of Dipanagara)  628 (marriage 
proposal from Kyai Banjarsari)
Sasrakusuma, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati of Grobogan, ?-1812)  
214, 231, 255 (during Rongga’s 
rebellion), 804
Sasrakusuma, Radèn Ayu (mother of 
PB VI; sister of Radèn Adipati 
Sasradiningrat II)  555
Sasranegara, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati of Grobogan-Wirasari, 
1807-12)  255 (during Rongga’s 
rebellion), 804
Sasrawirana, Mas Tumenggung 
(father-in-law of Danureja IV)  544 
(appointed to succeed Kertadirja II 
in Kerja, Sokawati)
sastra pégon  see Javanese-Islamic 
literature
satī (self-immolation of widows)  706
satria (knightly ideal)  403
satria lelana (wandering knight)  71, 
105, 127-8  see also Dipanagara 
(pilgrimage to south coast), lelana
Satruna, Kyai (alias Sataruna / Suranata)  
638, 733 (? helps Dipanagara with 
babad), 818
sawah (ricefields)  35, 37, 60 (extension 
of in 1755-1825 period), 75 (late 18th 
century expansion), 458 (planted to 
cash crops), 547 (taken by Danureja 
IV), 723 (Maja’s in Tondano)
sawah tadhahan  (rain-fed ricefields)  38
Sawangan (mouth of Kali Opak)  154 
(Dipanagara visits)
Sawunggaling, Mas Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati of eastern Bagelèn, 
?1790-1811)  9, 481-2, 621 (used as 
example of well-dressed Javanese 
by Cleerens), 805
Saxony  179
sayyid (descendants of The Prophet)  629 
(support Dipanagara in holy war)
Sayyid Kramat (disturbances, 11-1814)  
see Muhammad, Sayyid
Schillet, H. (surgeon-major on Pollux, 
expert on cholera)  712-3 (face 
reminds Dipanagara of Crawfurd)
Schimmelpenninck, R.J. (1761-1825; 
Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1805-
6; brother-in-law of Nahuys van 
Burgst)  435
Schnetz (Assistant-Resident of Kedhu, 
?-1822)  497 (killed in Dipasana 
revolt)
Schnetz, F.A.M. (health officer, 
Makassar)  753
Schoor, Justinus van (1795-1841; 
Secretary to the Netherlands-Indies 
Government, 1830-4; Raad van 
Indië, 1839-41)  712
schutterij (rifle companies, Holland)  152  
see also Turkije
science of physiognomy  see ilmu firasat
Scindia  see Lake
Scots  210, 359 (serving in British line 
regiments)   see also Crawfurd, 
Davidson, Maclaine, Maclean, 
MacQuoid, Ross-shire Buffs, Shand, 
Stavers
Scottish sword dance  359  see also 
Europeans in Java (military culture), 
Pakualaman
scribes  see carik-Dalem
seal  see Dipanagara, pégon
seating arrangements (kraton)  see 
dhampar
Sebada, village (Gowong)  659 
(Dipanagara treated by elderly 
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female dhukun in)  see also 
Asmaratruna
Secadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung  see 
Tan Jin Sing
Secadiningrat, Radèn Nganten (low-
born Javanese wife of above)  400
Secang (Kedhu)  210-1
Secawinangun, sub-demang  see 
Sumawana
Second Javanese War of Succession 
(1719-23)  369
Second Mahratta War (1803-5)  317  see 
also Lake, Scindia
sedhekah (religious meals / feasts)  236 
(for Ratu Maduretna’s death), 
272 (to accomplish death of 
Prince Regent / HB III), 479-80 (to 
celebrate end of coffee harvest in 
Pacitan), 488-9 (prescribed by Iman 
Sampurna to ward off sickness)
Segarawedhi (Zandzee)  21, 165  see also 
Rawa (Tulung-Agung)
sèh (sheikh)  627 (as supporters of 
Dipanagara)
Sejarah Sétan lan Jim (History of devils 
and spirits)  137 (in Ir Moens 
collection) 
Sekaran (Jipang-Pasekaran), district 
(east Java)  241, 248-9, 253, 256-7 
(Rongga killed at, 17-12-1810), 
265, 268 (bupati replaced in), 269 
(slated for handover to Dutch), 
337, 379 (1812 annexation of)  see 
also Prawiradiningrat, Radèn 
Tumenggung
Sekartaji, Radèn Ayu (sister of PB IV)  75
Sekedok, village (Gunung Ngebel sub-
district, Panaraga)  220
Séla   (Surakarta Resident’s hill station, 
Merapi-Merbabu saddle)  426, 454 
(land-rent of)
Séla, district (north coast)  see Seséla
séla gilang  86 (at Sélareja), 139, 154 (at 
Lipura), 564 (at Guwa Secang, 
Selarong), 573 (at Sélareja), 579
Sélagiri (Gunung Kidul irrigation 
channel)  38
Sélamanik, district (Rèma-Bagelèn / 
Wonosobo)  45, 268 (Purwadipura 
exiled to), 292  see also timber
Sélanangkul, village (Selarong hills, 
Yogya)  657 (inhabitants recognise 
dead Prabuningrat’s kris)
Sélareja (Dipanagara’s retreat at 
Tegalreja)  86, 138, 565, 573, 576
Selarong (Dipanagara’s retreat at)  87, 94, 
101, 104, 116, 121, 123, 155, 367, 369 
(part of Dipanagara’s 1812 apanage), 
389, 480 (opium addiction of prince 
at, 1825), 517, 534-5 (princes join 
Dipanagara at), 546, 564-5, 570, 572, 
578, 580, 585-6, 592, 595, 598-9 (plate 
of attack on, 9-1825), 600 (women 
and children sent to), 602 (standard 
of revolt unfurled at), 606-8, 621-2, 
626-7, 632, 634, 641 (Dutch destroy 
meditation cave at), 649, 656, 
657 (hills)  see also Guwa Secang, 
Sélanangkul, Siluk
Selim III, Ottoman sultan (reigned 1789-
1807)  152  see also Nizam-i-cedit
Séluman  see Guwa Séluman
Semar  405
Semarang  19, 24-5 (English cloth sales 
at), 35, 41, 61, 81, 101, 115, 165-6, 
169-70, 173, 177-8, 180-3 (Daendels 
in), 186 (military uniforms 
produced at), 195, 197 (Daendels at, 
1808), 206, 214 (Rongga summoned 
to), 216 (Dutch troops in), 218 
(demang of Tersana delivered to), 
223, 228 (Moorrees to), 230, 233-4 
(deserters from garrison regiment), 
236, 238-9 (Von Winckelmann’s 
troops at), 248 (troops marching 
from), 253-4 (arrival of Daendels’ 
force), 255, 262, 273-4 (robberies 
around), 276, 283, 285 (Yogya troops 
sent to assist Janssens at), 286, 294, 
297-8, 301, 303-4 (Raffles in), 308, 
313, 315, 318 (Raffles arrives in prior 
to Yogya assault), 319-20, 323-4, 
329, 331 (British forces in), 332, 335 
(Residency Interpreter in Javanese 
at), 339 (Deans, Scott & Co), 347 
(remittance of prize money from), 
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350-1 (Sura-adimanggala IV), 359 
(Raffles to), 363 (HB II and exile 
party sent to), 364, 378-9, 385 (raad 
van justitie at), 386, 410, 424-7, 435 
(British POWs in), 440-1, 448 (return 
of Kyai Murma from Ambon to), 466 
(Sukur’s disappearance from), 469 
(exchange of silver for Government 
notes in), 478, 482, 497, 500 (Van 
Prehn exiled to), 519 (Raffles 
warns Smissaert about hearing of 
cases in), 521 (postal service to), 
553, 560-1, 563 (Pangéran Sérang’s 
campaign in, 8/9-1825), 595, 597, 
610 (Semarang-based suppliers of 
gunpowder from), 614-7, 638, 642-3 
(communications with Surabaya 
cut, 11/12-1827), 646, 667 (De Kock 
returns to),  682 (Dipanagara’s 
family from to join him in 
Magelang), 686 (arrangements made 
to transport Dipanagara to), 693 (De 
Stuers and Roeps as Dipanagara’s 
escorts to), 694, 699-701 (Dipanagara 
stays at), 732, 747, 750, 755, 758 
(designated as place for Dutch), 767 
(supposed death of Jonèd at), 768 
(Retnaningrum deserts Dipanagara 
at)
Semarang, marine school / military 
college (1782-1826)  162, 308 (maps 
of Yogya sent to), 522, 632, 659 
(Roeps trained at)
Sembrani, jaran (winged mount)  491 (of 
Baron Kasendher), 571 (of Sultan 
Agung)
Sempu, coffee estate (Slèman, Gunung 
Merapi)  535-6  see also Boutet
Sénapati, Panembahan (first ruler of 
Mataram, 1575-1601)  72, 141, 147, 
154-5 (Dipanagara at Lipura), 565, 
579, 610  see also Lipura, Ratu Kidul
Sendhang Pitu, district (Kulon Praga)  
371
sentana (princes of the blood)  9
Senthot, Ali Basah Abdul Mustapa 
Prawiradirja (1808-55; pre-1825, 
Radèn Tumenggung Nataprawira; 
son of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja 
III by an unofficial wife; army 
commander of Dipanagara)  79, 
153, 190-1, 192 (plate), 259, 403, 581, 
590 (ideas for conquests outside 
Java), 606, 608, 620, 623 (regional 
jealousies of), 628 (red battle 
pennant of), 637 (given barisan by 
Dutch), 639 (death in Bengkulèn, 
1855), 642 (Java War victories), 
647 (problems of dwifungsi), 649 
(description of name and character), 
650-3 (problems of administration), 
658, 662 (jealousy of Pengalasan 
for), 669, 671, 678 (discouraged from 
bringing troops to Magelang), 693 
(Haji Ngisa as ‘priest’ of), 725, 746 
(barisan / troop at Ungaran), 764 
(family tree)
Sentolo, village (Kulon Praga)  601, 651
Sepikul, village (Dipanagara’s apanage 
land in Pajang)  594-5
sepoys
   bodyguards  473 (of tollgate keepers)
   conspiracy (1815)  21, 297, 320 
(Mangkubumi’s involvement with), 
382 (background to Surakarta 
support), 415-28, 759
   subadar (Junior Commissioned Officer 
/ captain)  420 (plate), 422 (chosen as 
new governor-general)
   troops  45 (in dairy trade), 151, 260, 275 
(mustered in Malaka), 283 (brutality 
at Meester Cornelis), 297 (deployed 
to Yogya), 303-4 (incidents with 
local Yogyanese), 323 (in attack 
against Yogya), 328 (plate of 
grenadier), 331, 339-42 (during 
British assault), 353 (guard Tan 
Jin Sing’s house), 357-8 (at HB III’s 
investiture parade), 359 (compared 
unfavourably with Madurese), 360 
(plate of havildar / sergeant), 365 
(main sepoy force leaves Yogya), 
367 (sniper fire of), 379 (as Yogya 
garrison ), 398 (wages advanced 
by Chinese businessman), 407 
(garrison commander in Yogya), 422 
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(anti-European views of), 498 (in 
Dipasana revolt), 759 (keep British 
in power)  see also Dalton, Light 
Infantry Volunteer Battalion
Sepuh, Sultan (Cirebon)  501
Sepuh, Radèn Ayu (favourite unofficial 
wife of Hamengkubuwana I)  370, 
440 
Sepuh, Sultan (Madura)  see 
Cakraningrat V
Sepuh, Radèn Ayu (eldest wife of 
Pangéran Mangkubumi, Yogya; 
daughter of Radèn Tumenggung 
Sumanegara of Padhangan)  119-
20 (ability to make jokes with 
Dipanagara), 572 (dispatched to 
Tegalreja)
Sérang, district (north coast)  134 (Radèn 
Ayu Sérang’s campaigns in, 8/9-
1825), 164 (proposed annexation of, 
1808), 265, 613-4, 622, 624-5 (plate)  
see also Sérang, Pangéran / Radèn 
Ayu
Sérang I, Pangéran (husband of Radèn 
Ayu Sérang)  613-4
Sérang II, Pangéran (?1794-1854; son of 
above and below)  73, 132, 613-4, 
622, 624-5 (plate)
Sérang, Radèn Ayu (?1769-1855; wife 
of Pangéran Sérang I)  132-3, 134 
(plate), 144, 613-4 (meditation on 
south coast), 637, 760
Sérang family  10, 73, 132-3, 613  see also 
Kalijaga, Natapraja
Serat Ambiya (lives of the prophets), text  
410
Serat Cabolang, text  487
Serat Centhini, text  487, 490
Serat Ebuk Anyar (New Book, 1773), 
cadaster  19, 40, 60-1, 310
Serat Kapa-Kapa, Javanese law code  388
Serat Ménak, text  410, 744 (Dipanagara 
requests copy)  see also Ménak Amir 
Hamza
Serat Rama, text  see Rama
Serat Sakondhar, text  167  see also 
Sembrani, jaran
Serat Suryaraja, text  167
Serayu River  see Kali Serayu
serimpi (dances)  210 (during Daendels’ 
visit, 30-7-1809)
Seringapatam  347  see also Tipu Sultan
Serondhol  286 (Janssens defeated at), 
425-7 (general courts martial of 
sepoys at, 1-1816)
Servatius, W.N. (1785-1827; Assistant-
Resident of Surakarta, 1808-11; 
Resident of Semarang, 1820-2; 
Assistant-Resident of Semarang, 
1822-7; Resident of Preanger, 1827)  
169, 242, 262, 291 (PB IV asks for 
removal of)
Seséla, Ki Ageng  (Javanese Prometheus) 
265
Seséla (Séla), district (north coast)  164, 
265-6 (annexed by Daendels), 
292 (holy flame from kept in 
Purwaretna pavilion), 561
Setoma, Kyai (pusaka cannon)  167
Setomi, Nyai (pusaka cannon)  167
Setonan (Saturday tournament on 
northern alun-alun)  208, 271 (Prince 
Regent / HB III fears to attend)
Setradipura, Radèn Tumenggung 
(younger brother of Pangéran 
Natapraja / Radèn Mas Papak)  
621 (orders killing of F.H. van 
Vlissingen)
Sevenhoven, J.I. van (1782-1841; 
Resident of Surakarta, 1824-5; acting 
Resident of Yogya, 1825-7/1830; 
commissioner for the regulation of 
affairs in the Principalities, 1830-
1; Raad van Indië, 1832-9)  2-3 
(description of Yogya, 1812), 58, 64, 
144, 327-9 (visit to Yogya, 5-1812), 
397 (view of Danureja IV), 406, 
470, 474  (enquiry into tollgates, 
1824), 478 (view of Chinese tollgate 
keepers), 479 (report on opium 
addiction), 511 (replaces Smissaert 
as Resident of Yogya), 526, 532 
(member of land-rent indemnity 
commission), 543, 549, 554, 561-
2, 591, 603, 739 (counsels against 
Dipanagara’s further transfer on 
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Dutch warships), 809-10
sexual relations / misconduct  548-51 
(of Danureja IV, Dietrée, Chevallier 
and Smissaert), 618-9 (relations 
with Chinese), 727-8 (Dipanagara 
in Manado)  see also rape, ronggèng, 
women
Sèwon, pamutihan jurukunci / pondhok  
129, 783
Shāfi’i, law school (Mecca)  579, 597
shahadat (confession of faith)  632
shahid (death as a martyr in holy war)  
595, 597
Shand, Robert (Scots land-renter, Yogya)  
535 (rents Kembangarum coffee 
estate with Bouwens)
sharī’a (Islamic law)  100, 112, 254, 589, 
636
Shaţţārīyya, tarekat  111-4, 112 (plate 
of daérah), 150, 485  see also 
Naqşhabāndīyya, Qadiriyya
shipyards  222, 258  see also Rembang, 
Teleng, timber
Sibebek (Kedhu), tobacco warehouse  
383, 834 (tax returns from)
Siberg, Johannes (1740-1817; governor-
general, 1801-5)  169, 807
Sidhayu  181, 249-50 (Rongga appeals 
to peranakan Chinese in), 256, 718 
(Dipanagara passes)
Sidul Aku, Kyai (Gresik)  485
Sigala-gala, cave  see Guwa Sigala-gala
Sigaluh, kingdom (west Java)  140  see 
also Mundingsari
sikep (‘landowning’ peasantry)  xiv, 14, 
30-1, 33-5 (golden age of?), 39, 45, 
59-61 (tax / corvée obligations), 63 
(registration of lands), 65-7 (pancas 
revisions)  see also peasantry
Silius Italicus, Roman author (?25/6-101)  
239 (quote from Punica)
silks  469
Siluk, battle of (17-9-1829)  352, 657, 
660, 657 (as decisive defeat for 
Dipanagara), 660
Sima, district (north coast)  265
Simatupang, General T.B. (1920-90) 116
Simpang, Residency House (Surabaya)  
730 (plate)
Sindujaya, Mas Ngabèhi (kliwon of 
Kaparak Kiwa)  231
Sindunagara I, Kyai Tumenggung 
(?1740-1814; bupati nayaka of 
Jaba Tengen; pre-1803, Mas Aria 
Mandura; post-1811 Danureja III) 
196, 210, 223, 227, 269, 293 (officially 
installed as patih), 299, 305, 332 
(abortive mission to greet Raffles in 
Semarang), 763, 770, 774-6  see also 
Danureja III
Sindunagara II, Mas Tumenggung (son 
of above; bupati nayaka of Keparak 
Tengen; pre-12-1811, Mas Aria 
Mandura)  371, 396, 601 (goes on 
abortive mission to Tegalreja, 20-7-
1825), 763, 776, 805
Sinduratmaja, ‘Bendara Radèn Mas’ 
(Surakarta adventurer)  496-8 (role 
in Dipasana rebellion), 505
Sindureja II, Radèn Ria (Yogya bupati 
nayaka of Gedhong Tengen)  242 (in 
expedition against Rongga), 333 
(lays clever ambush for British at 
Papringan, 18-6-1812), 774-6, 805
Singapore  437 (Crawfurd as Resident 
of), 742 (commercial competition 
from)
Singasari, Pangéran (?1797-?; son of HB 
II)  352 (joins Dipanagara), 798
Singgunkara, Radèn  see Kaap, Radèn 
Singh, Abdul Gang (sepoy deserter)  498 
(involved in Dipasana revolt)
Singir, skirmish in Gunung Kelir   352 
(Jayakusuma/Ngabèhi and two sons 
killed)
Singkili, Abdurrauf al- (1615-93)  113
Singosarèn, estate (Karangpandhan)  
532, 536  see also Stavers
sinophobia  18  see also Chinese, 
Crawfurd
Sirāt as-Salāţīn, text  103
sirih  see betelnut
Sirisik, village (mouth of Kali Praga)  515 
(salt manufacture at)
Sirnabaya  see Gunung Sirnabaya
Sitinggil (Yogya)  239
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Sitinggil (Surakarta) 171
Skelton & Co, British agency house  429
slamet bener, dhikr  485
slametan see sedhekah
slaughter tax (buffalo) see tugel gurung
slaves  183, 393 (effect of British abolition 
on status of)  see also Balinese
Slèman, district (Yogya)  37, 49, 65, 
97, 123, 463, 514, 592, 634  see also 
Nglèngkong, Témpèl
slingers  7, 607 (as weapons at start of 
Java War), 611 (effect on Dutch 
troops in Bagelèn)
smallpox  41, 42-3 (vaccinations against), 
46 (children exposed to), 393 
(vaccination encouraged by British)
Smissaert, A.H. (1777-1832; Resident 
of Rembang, 1819-23; Yogyakarta, 
1823-5; dismissed and expelled 
from Java, 20-12-1825)  86, 93, 103, 
108 (Dipanagara’s view of), 144, 232 
(?institutes postal service), 303, 439 
(sexual conduct of), 458, 466 (view 
of Sukur), 510-1, 518 (plate), 519-21 
(reasons for Yogya appointment), 
521 (character assessed), 523-4 (as 
absentee Resident), 532 (applauds 
land-rent abolition), 533-5 (on 
problems of abolition), 534 (receives 
pawned goods from princes), 537-42 
(negotiates Bedhaya indemnity), 
544 (reviews case of Kertadirja II’s 
dismissal), 549 (view of Chevallier), 
550 (sexual behaviour in Java), 564 
(summons Dipanagara from south 
coast), 572, 591-2, 594, 596 (plate), 
597 (plans attack on Dipanagara), 
600-1, 603, 718, 810  see also 
Liebeherr, Sancho Panza
Smith, Adam  see Wealth of Nations
smiths  see empu
smuggling 165, 380 (in Pacitan)  see also 
bandits, pirates
Smyrna (Izmir)  665
Snouck Hurgronje  see Hurgronje
Soeharto (1921-2007; President of 
Indonesia, 1967-98)  647 (as corporal 
at Fort Cochius)
Soekarno (1901-70, President of 
Indonesia, 1945-67)  69 (as child of 
the dawn)
Soemarsaid Moertono (historian)  127, 
131, 578
Soetomo, Dr (1888-1938; alias ‘Bung 
Tomo’; physician and early 
Indonesian nationalist)  757
Sokawati, district  11-2, 51, 100, 190, 
248, 369 (Dipanagara’s apanage 
lands in), 490, 492, 543-4 (Kertadirja 
II’s dismissal as bupati of), 622 
(Dipanagara’s commanders take 
rebellion to), 626 (source of soldiers)
Soljak, Kyai (son of Muhamad Besari, 
pengulu of Srèngat)  486 (during 
Iman Sampurna movement)
Sollewijn, Lieutenant-colonel Bernard 
J. (1785-1864; 1st mobile column 
commander)  247 (compared to 
overseas ogre / buta sabrang), 438, 
657
Sonder (Manado Residency, Minahasa)  
722
soybean cake (tempé)  24, 44, 475
Speelman, C.J. (1628-84; governor-
general, 1655-63)  738, 752
Sragèn  72, 76, 255 (tollgate burnt by 
Rongga)
Sri Katon incident (1888)  251 (meeting 
in Ketangga)
Sri Lanka  see Ceylon
Srimenganti pavilion (Yogya)  228, 230, 
335-6, 340-1 (HB II and entourage 
surrender to British in), 506 (HB IV’s 
body laid out in)
Srimenganti gate (Surakarta)  320 (attack 
on British cavalry post at)
Stadhouder  see William V
Stadhuis (Town House, Batavia)  115, 
659, 702-3 (Dipanagara held in), 704 
(Bik as guardian during stay in), 
708-9 (plate), 711 (Knoerle visits 
Dipanagara in)
Stargard (west Pomerania)  106  see also 
Knoerle
Stavers, William (Scots land-renter 
Surakarta; aide-de-camp to 
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Mangkunagara II; former sepoy 
captain)  387, 457, 459 (character 
and knowledge of Javanese), 
532 (Singosarèn estate), 536, 547 
(interviews Maja in Batavia), 551, 
553 (peace negotiations with Maja at 
Salatiga, 8-1827), 583, 588-9, 634, 644 
(Salatiga meeting)
steamships  750, 756  see also Capellen, 
S.S. van der
Steel, Lieutenant James (1792-1859; 
Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion 
garrison commander, Yogya)  425
Steijn Parvé, H.A. (acting Resident of 
Semarang, 1816-9)  484
Steinmetz, Lieutenant C.P.C. (1806-
?; adjutant to Colonel Cleerens)  
673 (at Rèmakamal meeting with 
Dipanagara)
Stoler, Ann  440 (on colonial sexual 
relationships), 550
strandgeld  (Dutch ‘rent’ for lease of 
north coast)  163, 266, 290-1 (PB IV 
complains about withdrawal of), 
310
Studzee, Dr (Swedish surgeon attached 
to British force in Yogya assault; 
later prize agent)  351
Stuers, F.V.H.A. Ridder de (1792-1881; 
major-adjutant, aide-de-camp 
and son-in-law of General H.M. 
de Kock)  110, 115, 124, 192, 325, 
436, 608 (on Dipanagara’s military 
tactics), 611, 612 (plate), 626, 632-3 
(reasons for Dipanagara / Maja 
split), 659, 667, 679, 682-3, 684-5 
(plate of Dipanagara’s entry to 
Metésih), 687-8, 689-90 (at capture 
of Dipanagara at Magelang), 693-5, 
697-700 (accompanies Dipanagara 
to Semarang), 701 (recommended 
for ridderorde), 701-2 (accompanies 
Dipanagara to Batavia)
Sturler, J.E. de (Resident of Banyumas, 
1830-5)  267
Subah-Weleri, teak forest (north coast)  
265
Sudama, Radèn Mas (Jarot)  see 
Hamengkubuwana IV
Sudik Iman  497 (ringleader of Dipasana 
revolt, later hung)
Sudirman, General  (?1915-50; Panglima 
Besar / commander-in-chief of TNI, 
1948-9)  116, 607, 626 (Banyumas 
origins of)
Sufi teachings  110, 757 (literature)  see 
also tarekat
sugar  279, 463 (as cash crop in south-
central Java), 465, 493-4 (problems 
of sugar industry, 1819-20), 527, 663 
(refined white)
suicide  511 (Dipanagara contemplates), 
578
Sukapura, village (Singaparna, west 
Java)  256 (Rongga’s pengulu returns 
to)
Sukuh, candhi (Gunung Lawu)  see 
Candhi Sukuh
Sukur, Radèn Mas (post-1825, Radèn 
Hasan Mahmud, son of Sura-
adimanggala IV of Semarang)  364 
(to Calcutta for education), 466 
(report on situation in Kedhu, 1822), 
607 (joins Dipanagara but complains 
of lack of pay), 616 (persuaded by 
mother)  see also Salèh, Radèn, Sura-
adimanggala
Sulawesi  116, 165 (smuggling to), 307 
(Capt Phillips scholarship on), 424, 
562 (Van Geen expedition against 
Boné), 590 (return of Van Geen 
from), 595 (reinforcements from 
during Sasradilaga crisis, 1-1828), 
613, 623-4 (soldiers from fight for 
Dipanagara), 659 (place of exile), 
717, 721-55 (Dipanagara as exile 
in)  see also Boné, Bugis, Makassar, 
Manado, Minahasa, pirates, 
Tondano
Sulawesi (North)  635-6, 638-9  see also 
Manado, Minahasa, Tondano
Suleiman, Haji  281
Sultan, Ratu  see Andayaningrat
sultan séda besiyar (the sultan who 
died on a pleasure trip)  see 
Hamengkubuwaa IV
Index 957
suluk (Javanese-Islamic devotional 
songs/chants)  103
Sumadilaga, Dullah (junior army 
commander Kedhu)  694 (placed in 
stocks in Magelang)
Sumadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung 
(?1760-1812; Yogya bupati nayaka, 
1794-1812 / patih jero, 1808-12; 
Yogya army commander)  79, 82, 
188 (appointed patih jero), 222, 228-9 
(accompanies HB II to Samas during 
confrontation with Moorrees), 236 
(urges HB II on against Europeans), 
244, 252 (Daendels demands arrest 
of), 254, 263 (urges resistance 
against Daendels), 272 (raises 
new regiments), 280-1 (secret 
correspondence with Surakarta), 
305 (reports Crown Prince’s attitude 
to HB II), 292-3 (participates in 
murder of Danureja II), 295 (reports 
murder to Surakarta), 314 (plate 
of correspondence), 316-9 (role in 
correspondence), 324, 331 (urges 
attack on British), 335-6 (conduct 
during assault), 340 (death of), 369, 
403 (widow of), 774-6, 805
Sumadipura, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati of Japan / Majakerta)  
see Danureja IV
Sumadirja, Mas Tumenggung (patih 
of Kadipatèn, 1807-10; father of 
Danureja IV)  396, 776
Sumadiwirya, Radèn Ngabèhi (Yogya 
magang / aspirant bupati; post-1-
1811, confirmed as bupati)  232 
(as go-between in Rongga/MN 
II correspondence), 257 (wounds 
Rongga at Sekaran, 17-12-1810), 272-
4, 337 (fires powder magazine in 
fort), 363 (exiled with HB II)
Sumanagara, Ali Basah (army 
commander of Dipanagara)  590
Sumanegara, Mas Tumenggung (Yogya 
bupati of Padhangan / Jipang-
Kepadhangan)  195, 248-57 (during 
Rongga’s rebellion), 250, 255-7 
(rallies to Rongga and killed), 572, 
623, 806
Sumaprawira, Radèn Ngabèhi 
(younger brother of Radèn Rongga 
Prawiradirja III; ? later Yogya bupati 
of Kenitèn)  257 (returns to Yogya), 
768
Sumaprawira, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati of Kenitèn, east Java; 
father of Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih; 
 ? same as above)  119, 768
Sumarsonowati, Mas Ayu (Chinese 
peranakan selir of HB II; mother of 
Pangéran Jayakusuma / Ngabèhi)  
88, 98, 618
Sumatra  xv, 90, 114 (Padris), 273, 
445, 520 (West Sumatra), 648, 
652 (Senthot’s barisan in), 676 
(Cleerens and West Sumatra 
military command)  see also Aceh, 
Bengkulèn, Padang, Palembang 
Sumawana, demang of sub-district 
(Ambarawa)  584 (administrative 
instructions to during Java War)
Sumawijaya, Radèn  see Adinagara, 
Pangéran 
Sumbawa  76, 281, 383 (eruption of 
Gunung Tambora, 1815), 590, 610, 
719, 765  see also Ageng, Ratu 
(Tegalreja), Derpayuda, Bima, 
gunpowder
Sumedang (west Java)  198, 276
Sumendi, Pangéran (‘spiritual’ prince; 
relative of Sérang family)  73
Sumenep, Panembahan of  286 
(appointed sultan by British 8-1811), 
641 (provides troops during Java 
War)
Sumenep (east Madura)  80, 115, 222 
(Daendels’ troops from), 286, 562 
(troops sent on Van Geen’s Boné 
expedition), 641, 746 (Dipanagara 
II’s exile in), 767
Sumiyah, Radèn Ayu (younger sister of 
PB IV)  173 (poisoned)
Sumptuary laws (awisan-Dalem)  310 
(and British textile imports), 384 
(1812 treaty forbids), 548
Sunan Lawu (wind god)  see Lawu, 
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Sunan
Sunda, Sundanese (west Java)  167, 
256 (Rongga’s pengulu from), 370, 
668 (and Imam Bonjol)  see also 
Bandung, Paṙ   ahyangan, Preanger, 
Priangan, West Java
Sunda Kelapa (Jayakarta)  167
Sunda Straits  xii, 158, 516, 666 (?Van den 
Bosch landing in)  see also Mérak
Sundoro, Radèn Mas  see 
Hamengkubuwana II
Supadmi, Radèn Ajeng  see 
Retnakusuma, Radèn Ayu
supitan  see circumcision
Suppa, kingdom of (south Sulawesi)  562
Sura, Javanese month  69, 484 (time for 
Ratu Adil to appear)
Sura-adimanggala IV, Kyai Tumenggung 
(?1760-1827; bupati of Torbaya 
/ Semarang, 1809-22; friend of 
Raffles)  351, 364 (sons to Calcutta 
for education), 616 (wife of), 466  see 
also Salèh, Sukur
Sura-adimanggala IV, Radèn Ayu (wife 
of above)  616
Surabaya  12, 164, 177-8, 181 (Ratu 
Kencana, consort of PB IV’s, 
education at), 182, 185-6 (Fort 
Lodewijk), 235, 251, 279, 286 
(regiment fights well at Jati Ngalèh), 
291 (Natakusuma / Natadiningrat 
taken to), 298, 304 (Raffles in), 318-9 
(Cakranagara exiled to), 353 (exiled 
HB II arrives in), 378, 385, 398 
(Balinese bupati of), 408, 423-4, 439 
(Pinket van Haak’s death in), 465, 
468, 485, 491, 494 (cholera epidemic 
in, 1821), 498, 560, 592-3 (HB II in, 
1825), 643 (communications cut 
with Semarang, 11-1827), 646, 712 
(Dipanagara passes), 718, 724, 730, 
732, 749, 771
Suracala  see Guwa Suracala
Suradiningrat, Radèn Panji (Surakarta)  
391 (Kedhiri uprising, March-April 
1813)
Suradirja, Radèn (patih of Pangéran 
Adipati Prawiradiningrat)  91
Surakarta
   archive (Residency)  485, 487
   fort  185-7, 426
   kepatihan 559, 771 (list of patih)
   kraton  3-4, 59 (fiscal demands of), 102, 
105 (copying of texts for Dipanagara 
in), 147, 161, 168, 185, 225 (Danureja 
II procuring women from for Crown 
Prince / HB III), 254 (lands traversed 
by Rongga), 266-7 (and 1-1811 
treaties), 280 (Raffles promises 
help to), 287 (troops collapse at Jati 
Ngalèh), 320 (‘priests’ and Arabs in), 
357 (criticised in HB III investiture 
parade), 377-8 (Raffles decides not 
to attack), 381-2 (apanage lands 
taken over), 397, 424-5, 427 (Raffles’ 
visit to, 1-1816), 436-7 (Nahuys’ 
popularity at), 444-7 (relations 
with Kyai Murma), 462-3 (coffee 
plantations leased from), 536, 553, 
555 (Van der Capellen’s annexation 
plans and), 560 (Tingkir land swap 
with), 561, 630 (Buminata as patron 
of santri in), 634 (little sympathy for 
Dipanagara in), 658 (Dipanagara’s 
views of), 661 (Dipanagara wants 
subordination of Sunan), 744-5 
(MSS copied for Dipanagara in)
   land-rent in  454, 464
   maps  61
   town / general  xviii, 3-4 (unfavourable 
comparison with Yogya), 26, 30 
(report of village society, 1832), 
39 (population), 41, 44 (food 
consumption in), 45 (lifestyle of day 
labourers in), 63 (PB IV’s financial 
incompetence), 90 (Taptajani flees 
to), 160 (opium / tobacco farms 
in), 169, 178, 185, 193, 195, 187 
(provision of labourers for postweg), 
207 (military exercises in), 249, 290 
(14th Regiment of Foot arrives in), 
298 (Crawfurd told to spend time 
in), 304 (Raffles in), 308 (Crawfurd 
meets Raffles in), 331 (British troops 
in), 332 (Surakarta patih’s mission 
to Raffles expected), 394 (bumper 
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harvest after Tambora eruption, 
1815), 589 (battle of Gawok outside, 
15-10-1826), 594 (Dipanagara’s lands 
prepare for rebellion), 608
Suralanang  see Guwa Suralanang
surambi (mosque verandah, Tegalreja)  
573-5
Surambi court (Surakarta)  485, 655
Surambi court (Yogya)  104, 386-7 
(jurisdiction impaired by Raffles’ 
legal reforms), 544
Suranatan corps (Yogya)  89, 132, 208, 
292, 295, 325, 327, 370, 410, 545 
(Rahmanudin as head of), 593, 626 
(santri supporters of Dipanagara 
from), 733, 787-8, 792, 818  see also 
Badarudin, Ngusman (Ali Basah), 
Rahmanudin
Suranatan mosque (Yogya)  81, 340 
(Gillespie wounded at)
Surapati, Untung (?1645-1706)  109, 161, 
367, 398
Surat (western India / Gujerat)  98, 195 
(cloth stolen in Bunder raid), 511  see 
also Hasan, Sayyid, patola
Suratmi, Radèn Ajeng (daughter of HB 
II and Ratu Kencana Wulan)  see 
Anom, Ratu
Suryaatmaja, Radèn (son of Dipanagara 
and Radèn Ayu Retnakusuma; post-
1825, Pangéran Adipati Anom; post-
1830, Pangéran Dipaningrat)  see 
Dipaningrat
Suryabrangta, Pangéran (?1788-?; son 
of HB III; post-1830, Pangéran 
Purwadiningrat)  88, 208 (to Kalasan 
to greet Daendels), 368 (appointed 
pangéran), 371, 512 (supitan / 
circumcision of son, 26-12-1822), 798
Suryadi, Pangéran (son of HB III)  481
Suryadipura, Pangéran  481
Suryagama, ‘priestly’ kraton regiment  
626 (Dipanagara’s supporters from), 
790-1, 793
Suryanagara, Pangéran (1822-86; son 
of HB IV and daughter of court 
dhalang; Yogya litterateur and 
historian)  79
Surya Ngalam, legal digest / law code  
104, 388
Suryaningprang, Pangéran  see Salya, 
Radèn Mas
Suryaningrat, Pangéran  see 
Natadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung
Suryaningrat, Radèn Ayu Pangéran Panji 
(daughter of Pakubuwana VII; wife 
of Pangéran Panji Suryaningrat)  416
Suryaningrat  see Suwardi Suryaningrat 
Suryaputra, Pangéran (pre-1829, Radèn 
Mas Mahmud; son of Radèn 
Tumenggung Natadiningrat and 
Ratu Anom)  227
Suryaraja, Serat  see Serat Suryaraja
Suryasasraningrat, Pangéran (1827-64; 
post-1858, Pakualam III)  225, 761
Suryawijaya, Pangéran (?1805-?; son 
of HB III; post-1825, Ali Basah 
Ngabdulsamsu)  294, 798
Suryawinata, Basah  688 (at Magelang 
with Dipanagara)
Suryèngalaga, Pangéran  see Adinagara, 
Pangéran 
Suryèngrana, Radèn Panji (lurah prajurit 
/ royal troop commander)  242 
(expedition against Rongga)
Sutrasna, carik / scribe  487 (copyist / 
author of Serat Cabolang)
Suwardi Suryaningrat, Radèn Mas (1889-
1959; alias Ki Hajar Dewantara, 
early Indonesian nationalist and 
educationalist)  738, 757
Swiss  171 (Engelhard family origins)
Syria (Ajam)  410
tahlil (confession of the faith)  488-9
Tāj as-Salāţīn, text  103, 410
Tajib, Haji  (also referred to as ‘Sèh Kyai’; 
follower of Kyai Maja; dullah of 
Dipanagara’s Suryagama regiment’; 
exiled to Tondano)  639, 723 (refuses 
to join Dipanagara in Manado), 787, 
793
takbīr (prayer for the glorification of 
Allah)  577
taker tedhak, tax  57, 66
talèdhèk (dancing girls, prostitutes)  see 
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ronggèng
Taman Sari (‘Water Palace’, Yogya)  4, 
272 (gun foundry at), 339, 425 
(oath administered during sepoy 
conspiracy at)
Tambakbaya  see Rawa Tambakbaya
tamping, police officials (Surakarta)  55
tamping, police officials (Yogya)  see 
gunung
Tan Jin Sing  (?1770-1831; kapitan cina 
of Yogya, 1803-13; post-1813, 
Radèn Tumenggung Secadiningrat; 
post-1830, Radèn Tumenggung 
Purwa)  24, 169, 205 (contributes 
to Daendels’ war treasury), 210 
(organises firework display for 
Daendels), 311 (given stipend by 
British), 324 (role in negotiations 
with Crawfurd), 326, 337, 339 
(assists Crown Prince / HB III and 
Dipanagara at time of capture), 349, 
353-4 (amok attack in house of), 
373, 383 (enmity of PA I for), 396 
(sent to Tegalreja to discuss patih 
appointment), 398-401 (elevated as 
Secadiningrat), 408, 411 (organises 
firework display at marriage of HB 
IV, 13-5-1816), 523 (Smissaert moves 
into house in Kampung Cina), 524 
(testimonial for Smissaert), 777
Tan Jun Kam, leading member of 
Yogya Chinese community  524 
(testimonial for Smissaert, 1825)
tanah pusaka (‘heirloom’ lands)  33-4, 266 
(holy grave at Seséla)  see also tanah 
yasa
Tanah Sulastri (‘Land of the Pikes’)  8  see 
also Bagelèn 
tanah yasa  (privately developed lands)  
33  see also tanah pusaka
tandhak (dance)  602  see also ronggèng
tandhu (sedan-chair, palanquin, litter)  
363 (HB II carried from Yogya in, 
3-7-1812), 699 (Dipanagara carried 
through Jambu hills in)
Tanete, kingdom of (south Sulawesi)  562 
see also Boné, Bugis, Suppa
Tanggung, weaving centre (eastern 
Bagelèn)  161, 186 (cloth for 
Daendels’ troops uniforms), 481-2 
(during Umar Mahdi revolt)  see also 
Jana
tapa (holy men / ascetics)  177 (Engelhard 
suggests paying for favourable 
prophecies), 614
Tapa, Radèn Mas  see Mataram, 
Pangéran Aria
Taptajani, Kyai (pradikan ageng of 
Melangi until 1805)  90, 93, 100, 223, 
627, 793
Taqarrub, text (Muslim jurisprudence; 
commentary on Taqrīb)  104
Taqrīb, text (Muslim jurisprudence)  
104, 681 (in Magelang Residency 
museum)
Taragnyana, spirit  488-9 (as bringer of 
epidemic disease)
tarekat (mystical brotherhoods)  111, 114, 
485, 489  see also Naqşhabāndīyya, 
Shaţţāriyya, Qadiriyya
tasawwuf (Javanese-Islamic mystical 
texts)  100, 103, 223 (Danureja II’s 
interest in)
Tasso, Torquato (1544-95; author of 
Gersusaleme Liberata, 1581-93)  110 
(Dipanagara looks at)
Tawangsari, mint (established by 
Daendels, Surabaya, 1808)  279, 469
tax collectors  see bekel, demang
tax system (Yogya)  56-66
taxation (during Java War)  584-5, 606, 
650-2  see also dwifungsi
Taylor, Jean Gelman  67
tayuban (dance parties)  28-9 (plate), 86  
see also ronggèng, tandhak
tea  180 (drunk Dutch style with milk), 
279 (as export crop), 663 (European 
tastes in)
teak roofing tiles  390
teak, teak forests  30, 46, 164 (sharp 
decline in), 186 (felling in eastern 
mancanagara), 194 (Daendels’ 
incursions in), 194 (Panolan as 
regional mart for), 211-6 (tensions 
over Daendels’ demands for), 
221-2 (teak trade), 380-1 (eastern 
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mancanagara annexed because 
of), 398 (Danureja IV’s abuse of), 
475 (in eastern mancanagara)  see 
also blandhong, Gunung Kidul, 
Karangpandhan, timber
Tegal  81, 185, 215, 553, 560
tegal (dry crop fields)  31, 38, 383 (in 
Kedhu), 464 (planted to maize in 
Kedhu)
Tegalarum, gravesite of Amangkurat I 
(north coast)  132, 250, 290-1, 495
Tegalbener, pondhok / pavilion of Ratu 
Ageng Tegalreja  80 (during 
Tegalreja construction)  
Tegalreja  48, 68, 74, 77-8, 80, 84 (plan 
of estate), 85 (description of), 
86 (mosque at), 88 (kaum at), 94 
(Maja’s visit to), 97-8, 101-2, 115-7, 
119, 127-9, 138, 154-5, 157, 190, 223, 
294 (Dipanagara summoned from 
after Danureja II murder), 315, 369, 
373, 375, 377, 396, 403, 405, 410, 
444 (possible links with Murma), 
461, 502, 505-6, 510-1, 524, 543-4 
(dismissed Kertadirja II comes to 
reside at), 546 (dismissed Yogya 
pengulu resides at), 550-1, 564-5, 
572-3 (mosque at), 591, 593, 595, 
596 (plate), 597, 600-2 (attacked and 
burnt), 605-7, 622, 640, 635, 710-1 
(Dipanagara’s family to be allowed 
to return to), 743, 747 (turned into 
grazing land for Yogya Resident’s 
horses), 757, 766-7 (Dipanagara’s 
family at)  see also Ageng, Ratu 
(Tegalreja), Dipanagara, Sélareja
Tegalsari, pesantrèn (Panaraga)  91, 191, 
220, 470  see also Hasan Besari, Kyai
Tegalweru, indigo factory (Bantul, 
Yogya)  610 (manufactures 
gunpowder)
Téjawati, Mas Ayu (mother of 
Hamengkubuwana I)  72, 444  see 
also Kepundhung, Murma Wijaya, 
Kyai
Tegalmandiri  491
Teleng, Dutch shipyard (on Bengawan 
Sala)  249 (destroyed by Rongga)  
see also Verhaagen
Temanggung, district (northern Kedhu)  
497
Tembayat, gravesite / pradikan  73, 136, 
571, 627, 630  see also Ngabdani, 
Sayyid
Témpèl, village (Slèman, Yogya)  49, 97, 
262, 536, 607, 634
Tengger highlands  485
Teresa of Avila, Saint (1515-82)  566 
(vision of Hands of Christ)
Ternate  116, 710 (Sultan Mahmud 
Badaruddin of Palembang’s exile 
in), 724, 738
Tersana, district (Kadhawung / 
Pekalongan)  217, 221, 233
Texel  106, 424, 429
textiles  24-5 (British imports), 243 
(French textile sales in Yogya), 310 
(British designed imports for Java), 
346, 384 (exports to pasisir), 399 
(at Jana), 421 (ex-sepoys involved 
in trade in), 469 (trade in foreign 
textile imports)  see also cloth, 
Crawfurd, Marcus, weaving
The Hague  xviii, 166, 433, 504, 518-9 
(Smissaert dies in disgrace in), 552, 
678, 736
Thierry, Jean Nicolaas de (1783-1825; 
lieutenant 7th Hussar Regiment)  
601-2 (leads cavalry in attack on 
Tegalreja)
Third Javanese Succession War (1746-55)  
see Giyanti wars
Thompson, Robert & Co, British agency 
house  429, 701
Thomson, Dr Harvey (1790-1837; 
Scots assistant surgeon to British 
expeditionary force, 1811; 
Yogya Residency doctor, 1814-6; 
indigo planter in Yogya, 1817-23; 
Pekalongan, 1828-37)  406-7 
(biography), 456-7 (as indigo 
planter in Yogya), 463, 465, 533, 
535, 542 (indemnity negotiated 
for Rajawinangun)  see also 
Rajawinangun
Thorn, Major William (quartermaster-
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general to British forces in Java)  349 
(plate of British attack on Yogya)
Thornton, West & Co, British agency 
house  429
‘throne room’ (Yogya Residency House)  
171, 309 (incident during Raffles’ 12-
1811 visit), 321 (Jaysasentika hides 
in loft space)  see also dhampar
Tian Hok, leading member of Chinese 
community in Yogya  524 
(testimonial for Smissaert, 1825)
Tidore, sultan of  76, 281 (contacted by 
Haji Ali Ibrahim, 1811)
Tiedeman, Jan (Dutch-Indies landowner; 
business partner of Hendrik 
Veeckens) 375-6 (nominated as 
Resident of Yogya, 1816)
tiger-and-buffalo fights  xiii, 175 
(extraordinary events during Van 
Braam’s visit, 16-10-1808), 184, 200-
1 (at Yogya court for Van Braam), 
202-3 (plate)  see also tiger spearing 
(rampog macan)
tigers (tiger-infested forests)  12, 36, 50, 
87, 374 (in trial by ordeal), 486 (in 
Lodhaya)  see also macan gadhungan 
(were-tigers)
timber trade  165, 186 (felling in eastern 
mancanagara), 211-6 (tension 
over supplies), 258 (from eastern 
mancanagara), 268 (high-quality 
wood from Sélamanik)  see also 
blandhong, Gunung Kidul, 
Karangpandhan, teak
Timmerman-Thyssen (post-1830 Dutch 
land-renter in Slèman, Yogya)  65
Timorese pirates  20-1  see also Balinese, 
Bugis, pirates
Timur, Ratu (Ratu Kudhus; daughter of 
Pakubuwana III)  162
Timur, Ratu (daughter of 
Hamengkubuwana II and Ratu 
Kencana Wulan)  79
Tinggol, sub-district (Menorèh)  496
Tingkir, district (Salatiga)  560 (land 
swap with Surakarta, 1822/3)
Tipu Sultan (ruler of Mysore, 1782-99)  
347
tirakat (ascetic withdrawal from the 
world)  116, 154, 492, 578  see also 
patigeni
Tirtadirana  see Tirtadrana
Tirtadiwirya, Radèn Tumenggung  (son 
of Danureja I; post-12-1811, Radèn 
Tumenggung Danunagara, kliwon 
of Danureja III)  273 (appointed by 
Prince Regent / HB III), 763, 776, 806
Tirtakrama, Radèn  491
Tirtanegara, Radèn Tumenggung (bupati 
of Tanggung, Bagelèn)  481
Tirtadrana, Kyai (pre-1825, head demang 
of Grabag, northern Kedhu; Dutch 
spy, Magelang; later in Manado 
and Tondano)  114, 547 (translates 
interview with Maja, 1829), 551, 
638, 726 (reports on Dipanagara’s 
finances, 733 (?helps Dipanagara 
with babad), 794, 816
Tirtamaya, lake  153
Tirtawangsa, bekel (of Gedhung Putri 
village)  414 (during Sayyid Kramat 
disturbances)
Tirtawijaya, Radèn (demang of Tersana; 
relative of Ratu Kencana Wulan)  
218 (shot), 221, 233
Tirtodiningrat, Kangjeng Radèn Mas 
Tumenggung (Surakarta)  320 
(copyist of Babad Dipanagara, 1946)  
320
Tissot, J.M. (French land-renter, Yogya)  
457, 533, 535, 542  see also Jumagatan
Tjoa In Yoe, leading member of 
Yogya Chinese community  524 
(testimonial for Smissaert, 1825)
Tlogo (Bagelèn)  25-6 (produces shad 
roe / Javanese caviar for Surakarta 
kraton)  see also trubu
tobacco  44, 122 (Dipanagara smokes), 
160 (tax-farms), 383 (warehouses), 
465 (failure of Kedhu harvest, 1823), 
467 (failure of Prabalingga harvest, 
1822/3), 469 (trade in), 515 (after 
Merapi eruption, 28-12-1822)  see 
also tobacco warehouses
tobacco warehouses (gedhong tembakau)  
468, 833 (tax returns from, 1808-25)  
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see also Gunung Tawang, Sibebek
tokid (profession of Allah’s unity)  111-3
Tokugawa Japan (1603-1867)  10  see also 
Japan
tollgates (bandar)  12, 48, 50, 66, 196 
(Angger Gunung and), 250 (in 
eastern mancanagara during Rongga 
rebellion), 255 (burnt by Rongga), 
310 (Raffles’ take-over of), 369, 
383 (in Yogya territories), 385-6 
(Chinese-run), 399, 467-8 (pre-1825 
working of), 504 (Java as powder 
keg because of), 543 (commission of 
enquiry into, 1824), 560, 562, 831-6 
(tax returns from, 1808-25)
tollgates and markets (British 
annexation, 1812)  310, 369, 424, 473
Tomohon (Manado Residency, 
Minahasa)  722
Tondano (Maja’s place of exile, Minahasa 
/ North Sulawesi)  92, 635, 638-9, 
722-5, 741, 746, 816-21  see also Maja, 
Tonsea Lama
Tonsawang (Manado Residency, 
Minahasa)  722
Tonsea Lama (pre-1839 settlement 
of Kyai Maja and party on Lake 
Tondano)  638-9, 710, 722-5, 733, 
816-21  see also Maja, Tondano
topèng (masked dances)  367 (dancer 
lover of Ratu Ibu / Ageng), 411
Torbaya (Semarang)  494 (first 
manifestation of  cholera epidemic 
in, 1821)  see also Sura-adimanggala 
IV
torture, judicial (mutilation)  53, 374 (HB 
III’s abolition of), 385
trade  474 (importance of river networks 
for)
traders, women (bakul)  44-6  see also 
women
trasi (fish paste)  18 (Bagelèn)
trawèh (clamorous prayers)  576
Trayem (Kedhu), bènthèng  646  see also 
Bast, Eduard Marie de
treaties  266-9 (with Daendels, 1-1811), 
307-12 (with Raffles, 12-1811), 
326 (secret treaty between Raffles 
and Crown Prince / HB III, 18-6-
1812), 345, 369 (Raffles, 1812), 374 
(abolition of judicial torture), 377-
89 (1812 treaties and courts), 424 
(1812), 502 (burning of contract 
recognising Dipanagara’s rights), 
545 (secret contract with British 
kept by Dipanagara / burnt by Ratu 
Ageng)  see also Giyanti
Trengganu  21
trial by jury  386 (introduced by Raffles)
trial by ordeal  53  see also torture, 
judicial
Trinity, doctrine of  110  see also 
Christians, Christianity
Trisik (south coast)  144  see also Guwa 
Sirisik
trisula (three-pronged pike)  132  see also 
Kalijaga, Sunan
Trowbridge, Admiral Sir Thomas 
(1760-1807; commander-in-chief, 
East Indies station, 1805-7)  159
trubu (salt roe / shad / Javanese caviar)  
26  see also Tlogo
Trunajaya, Radèn (?1649-80; Madurese 
prince / rebel)  219, 337, 349, 630, 654 
see also Madura, Madu Retna
Trunasmara, Kadipatèn grooms’ regiment 
208
Tuban  164, 249-50 (Rongga appeals 
to Chinese in), 250 (holy graves 
at), 256, 291, 491, 617-8 (peranakan 
Chinese at during Java War)
tubers  see palawija, potatoes
tugel gurung (buffalo slaughtering tax)  
59
Tuhfa  (al-Tuhfa al-musala ilā rūh al-Nabi), 
Sufi ontology  100, 103
Tulle (Corrèze)  243  see also Marcus
Tulung-Agung  see Rawa
tumbak (lance length), land measurement 
9
tumpang paruk (mixing up of lands at 
Giyanti settlement, 1755)  13  see also 
Giyanti, treaty
tumenggung (military title during Java 
War)  649
Tunggil-Wanakerta, kabupatèn (Madiun)  
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268 (created, 1-1811)
Turi, pesantrèn / pondhok  129
Turkey  see Ottoman empire
Turkio, regiment (Java War)  152, 634  see 
also Janissary regiments, Turkiye
Turkiye, schutterij company (Holland)  
152
tuwa buru (tiger trappers)  50  see also 
Jelegong, Mangiran
Turi, sub-district (Slèman)  97
turtles  87
turtle doves  87 (Dipanagara’s love of)
Twenthe, cotton industry (Netherlands)  
25
ulama, religious scholars (Yogya / 
Surakarta)  89-90, 94 (around Maja 
in Surakarta), 97, 102-3, 117, 357 
(criticised as materialistic),  387 
(impact of Raffles’ legal reforms 
on), 448 (brusque treatnment by 
Nahuys), 511 (as followers of Sayyid 
Hasan), 546, 551, 622 (as supporters 
of Dipanagara), 628-9, 632 (Garebeg 
largesse distributed by Dipanagara 
to), 634 (join Dipanagara’s 
bodyguard regiments from Maja’s 
entourage), 677 (judgement on 
fasting month activities), 786-94 (list 
of Dipanagara’s supporters)  see also 
Banjarsari, pathok negari, pesantrèn, 
Tegalsari
Ulujami, district (Pekalongan)  478
Umar Mahdi / Umar Maya  see Ménak 
Amir Hamza
Umar Mahdi disturbances (Nagelen, 1-
1817)  415, 480-4, 493, 498, 505
umbul-umbul (flags)  481
ummat (international community of 
Muslims)  xvi
Ungaran  187 (cavalry regiment sent 
from), 262, 331 (British forces in 
prior to Yogya assault), 614 (Radèn 
Ayu Sérang cautioned at), 699 
(Dipanagara overnights at), 725 
(Senthot’s barisan at)
Ungaran, weaving village (eastern 
Bagelèn)  497 (ringleader of 
Dipasana revolt hung in)
Unitarian Party (Holland)  157  see also 
Daendels 
United Provinces, Republic of  199  see 
also Holland
Untung Surapati  see Surapati
upacara (official state clothes)  349, 356  
see also Wandhan, Ratu
upas (poison tree)  173
Upham, Edward (author of History and 
Doctrine of Buddhism, 1829)  109-10 
(Dipanagara looks at)
Urawan, Tumenggung (army 
commander in Java War)  638
Urub, Kyai (kraton pusaka kris)  341
Urutsèwu, district (eastern Bagelèn)  27, 
465
Usali (prayer for dead)  506
Uşul, treatise on Islamic theology  103
Utrecht  735  see also Woerden
vaccination  see smallpox
vagabonds  31
Valck, F.G. (1799-1842; Resident of 
Krawang, 1823-6; Pasuruan, 
1826; Kedhu, 1826-30; Yogya, 
1831-41)  xiv-xv (quote on 
Javanese ‘nationalism’), 45, 80, 109 
(Dipanagara’s attitude to), 295, 303 
(purloining of Yogya Residency 
letters), 316. 326, 329, 332, 335, 
375, 413, 415 (comment on sepoy 
conspiracy), 439-40 (Javanese 
mistresses of), 461 (historical survey 
of Yogya, 1755-1830), 487, 533 (on 
land-rent indemnities), 540, 613, 655 
(‘nationalist’ feelings of Javanese), 
677 (reconnoitres Metésih), 679 
(escorts Dipanagara to Metésih), 
682-3 (annoys Dipanagara with 
‘stupid’ questions), 688 (at De 
Kock’s meeting with Dipanagara), 
690 (acts as Malay translator), 697, 
727 (and Dipanagara’s finances in 
exile), 729, 733, 810
Valmy, battle of (20-9-1792)  68  see also 
Goethe
Veeckens, Hendrik (?-1815; 
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Secretary-General of Daendels’ 
administration, 1808-11)  197, 375  
see also Tiedeman
Vendée revolt (1793-5, 1797)  611, 640
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie 
(VOC)  see Dutch East Indies 
Company
Verhaagen, Dutch shipyard manager 
(Teleng, Bengawan Sala)  249 (house 
and dockyard destroyed by Rongga)
Versailles  1 (Yogya compared to)
Veth, P.J. (1814-95)  457
Vexela, Lieutenant-colonel Joseph Le 
Bron de  see Le Bron de Vexela
Vienna, congress of (1815)  393 (abolition 
of slavery agreed at), 423, 427, 429 
(return of Java to Dutch under terms 
of)
village (Javanese)
   administration  see paréntah-désa
   community corvée (gugur gunung)  57
   social classes in  14, 30-1, 35  see also 
sikep, ngindhung, numpang
   stone wall defences  49, 55 (in Kedhu)
   taxes in  33
   tax-cllectors  see bekel
   wars (prang désa)  15, 48, 61, 165, 548 
(caused by perverse legal decisions 
of Danureja IV)
Vinne, J. van der (Vice-president of 
Bataviaasch Genootschap and 
chief magistrate of Batavia)  703, 
712-3, 729  see also Bataviaasch 
Genootschap
Virgil (70-19 BC)  239 (quote from 
Aeneid)
Vlissingen, F. Hartmann van (?-1826; 
Dutch land-renter Surakarta)  532, 
621 (as inspector of cultures in 
Pacitan / death of)
Vorstenlanden, annexations in  9, 161-
5 (proposals for new boundary 
with pasisir)  see also Surakarta, 
Yogyakarta
Vredenburg, fort (Yogya)  3, 57 (eastern 
mancanagara bupati carry out 
building work on), 187 (Ambonese 
garrison in, 1808), 216 (model for 
kraton fortification extensions, 1809), 
244 (mentioned by Rongga in final 
letters), 327 (Dipanagara refuses to 
take refuge in), 332 (Natakusuma / 
Natadiningrat go over to), 336, 523, 
543
Waal river  735
Wahhāb, Muhammad ibn Άbd al- 
(Muslim legal scholar, fl. 1740-60)  
114
Wahhābī  81, 114 (conquer Mecca and 
Medina), 163 (supposed influence in 
Pakepung affair), 414
wali (apostles of Islam)  10, 72, 132-3, 
155, 368 (Dipanagara as), 573, 613-
4 (Kalijaga as ancestor of Sérang 
family), 622, 627 (Sérang family 
and supporters of Dipanagara 
as descendants of), 635-6  see also 
Demak, Giri, Kalijaga, Kudhus
Walikukun, district  164 (teak forests in)
wali wudhar (wali with a dual spiritual / 
temporal function)  133, 569, 572-5, 
578-80, 586, 603
waliyullah (messenger of Allah)  483
Waliyullah, Sunan (Kedhiri)  487, 490-3, 
505
Waliyullah, Sèh Rahman (title of Umar 
Mahdi)  482  see also Umar Mahdi
Wallace, Alfred Russel (1823-1913)  721 
(description of Manado)
Walraven van Nes  see Nes
Wanacatur, pesanggrahan-Dalem / 
royal retreat  185, 210 (visited by 
Daendels, 7-1809), 778
Wanakerta, village (east Java)  491-2 
(empu / kris maker; blacksmith at)
Wanasaba (Wonosobo, northern Kedhu)  
28, 268, 617, 678  see also Ledhok
Wanasari, village (Yogya)  281
Wanasari (Madiun), residence of bupati 
wedana  60, 269  see also Maospati
Wanaseraya  see Dhuri
Wandhan, Radèn Ayu (post-1812, 
Ratu; daughter of Radèn 
Tumenggung Yudakusuma II of 
Grobogan-Wirasari; consort of 
Hamengkubuwana III; divorced 
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?1813)  349 (?kills British officer), 
760
wang bekti pasumbang (additional 
tributary payments)  66
wang peniti (‘pin money’ payments at 
tollgates)  469
wang pesangon (journey money)  58
Wangsasetra, Kyai (Bagelèn)  621 (ulama 
in Cleerens’ entourage)
wangsit (interior prompting / inner 
voice)  150  see also Parangkusuma
War of the First Coalition (1792-7)  xii  
see also French Revolutionary Wars
war treasury  205-7 (Daendels, 1808)
Wardenburg, Colonel (commander of 
the Netherlands Indies navy)  712, 
717
waringin kurung (boxed waringin trees, 
Yogya)  565
Waru, district (north coast)  164
Warung, district (north coast)  265
Washington, George (1732-99)  xvii
‘water line’ (Nieuwe Hollandse 
waterlinie / New Dutch Water Line; 
post-1830, frontier defence system)  
736
Waterloo, Matthijs (1769-1812; Second 
Resident of Yogya, 1798-1803; 
Resident of Yogya, 1803-8; Forest 
Administration Board, 1808-9; 
Resident of Cirebon, 1809-12)  30, 
35, 93, 98, 160-1, 162 (biography), 
163-5, 206, 237, 276-7 (jailer of 
Natakusuma / Natadiningrat in 
Cirebon), 326, 473, 809
Waterloo, battle of (15-6-1815)  520, 643  
see also Hundred Days, Napoleon
Wates, village (Kulon Praga)  38
Watson, Lieutenant-colonel James 
(C. O. 14th Regiment of Foot / 
Buckinghamshires)  351
Wattendorf, A.J.B. (Resident of Yogya, 
1873-8)  686-7 (conversation with 
Gandakusuma / Danureja V about 
Dipanagara’s arrest)
Wawu, Javanese year  251 (as time for 
proclamation of Ratu Adil)
wayang  xiv, 104-5, 117, 145 (Ratu Kidul 
in costume of), 247 (images during 
Rongga rebellion), 340 (dhalang), 
350 (court collections captured by 
British), 403-4,l 486 (at Lodhaya)  see 
also dhalang
    gedhog (Panji cycle)  411
   krucil (Damar Wulan cycle)  411
   wong (dance dramas)  548
Wealth of Nations (1776)  456 (Nahuys 
quotes from)
weapons  see armaments
weaving industry  17, 32 (plate), 42 
(plate), 161 (at Tanggung), 186 
(at Karang Bolong)  see also cloth 
production, Jana, Tanggung, 
textiles, Wedhi
wedana bumi sèwu (Bagelèn)  27
Wedhi, weaving centre (Bagelèn)  24, 497 
(during Dipasana revolt), 617 (fate 
of Chinese in during Java War)
Wéjasena (Bima Raré series of plays) 137
Weleri, district (north coast)  218, 265  see 
also Subah-Weleri (forest)
Wellesley, Richard Colley, 2nd Earl of 
Mornington and Marquis Wellesley 
(1760-1842; governor-general of 
India, 1797-1808)  347
Weltevreden (Gambir)  281, 287, 423 
(attitude of sepoy garrison in during 
1815 conspiracy)
West Java  140, 167, 170, 279 (collapse of 
crop payments, 1811), 285 (captured 
by British), 415 (sepoy to be 
appointed governor-general in), 454, 
588, 590  see also Bandung, Banten, 
Batavia, Preanger, Priangan, Sunda
Wétan, Ratu  see Kencana Wulan, Ratu
Widi Prayitna, dhalang of Yogya 
court (grandfather of Pangéran 
Suryanagara)  137
Wiese, A.H. (1761-1810; governor-
general, 1805-8)  195, 435
Wiese, G.W. (1771-1811; brother of 
above; Resident of Yogya, 1808-9) 
169, 195 (as Inspector General of 
Forests), 205 (installed as Yogya 
Resident), 206-10 (and Daendels 
7-1809 visit), 216, 262, 264, 269, 809
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Wiese, Mrs G.W. (1776-1821; née 
Catharina Gasparina Beijlon, also 
spelt Beijlen)  217
wilah-welit (tribute in lieu of building 
materials)  59
William I, king of the Netherlands 
(reigned 1813-40; as king of the 
United Netherlands, 1815-30)  xv, 
114, 137 (receives Dipanagara’s kris), 
182, 376, 415, 423, 433, 500, 517, 519, 
528, 551, 592, 628, 666 (Dipanagara’s 
unconditional surrender 
demanded), 707, 718 (portrait of), 
719, 732, 736 (rejects proposal to 
send Dipanagara to Holland)  see 
also Loevestein, Woerden
William II, king of the Netherlands 
(reigned 1840-9)  536 (and 
Bouwens), 742 (French press article 
on Dipanagara’s treatment)
William III, king of the Netherlands 
(reigned, 1849-90)  698 (given Salèh’s 
painting of Dipanagara’s capture)
William V, Stadhouder of Holland 
(reigned 1766-85/1787-95)  xii, 415
Winckelmann, Carl von (1772-1841; 
Inspector-General of Coffee Culture, 
1810-11; Deputy Inspector, 1815-16; 
Inspector, 1816-22)  211 (negotiates 
timber contracts), 463 (as Inspector 
of coffee culture)
Winckelmann, Colonel F.C.P. von 
(1767-1820; Semarang divisional 
commander, 1809-11)  179-80, 235, 
238-9, 283
wine  122 (Dipanagara’s consumption 
of), 718 (Dipanagara’s tasting)  see 
also alcohol, Constantia, jenever, 
Rhine
Winter, C.F. Sr (1799-1859; acting 
Residency Translator, Surakarta, 
1820-5; Translator, 1825-59)  744 
(deals with copying of MSS for 
Dipanagara in Surakarta, 1844-7)
Winter, J.W. (Residency Translator, 
Yogya, 1799-1806; Surakarta, 
1806-20)  43-6 (report on Javanese 
lifestyles), 47, 102, 186, 213, 499-500 
(trial and dismissal)
Wiraguna I, Mas Tumenggung 
(?1730-1807; patih of the Kadipatèn, 
?1780-1807)  100, 216 (in Batavia 
sees fortifications of Dutch military 
HQ as model for kraton), 367, 774
Wiragunan family  100 (Dipanagara’s 
connections with)
Wiramenggala, Pangéran  see 
Prabuningrat, Pangéran 
Wiranagara, Radèn Tumenggung (?1790-
?; pre-1807, Mas Mukidin; post-
1807, Radèn Tumenggung Wiraguna 
II; wedana gedhé prajurit / Yogya 
army commander, 1819-29; titular 
major; post-1828, colonel; post-1830, 
Pangéran Adipati Prabuningrat; 
exiled to Banda 1832)  100 (links 
with Dipanagara), 367-8 (romantic 
links with Ratu Ibu / Ageng), 398, 
440 (procurer of kraton women for 
European officials), 449-53 (quarrels 
with Dipanagara over appointment 
of gunung), 534 (and land-rent 
indemnities), 537 (accompanies 
Dipanagara / Mangkubumi to 
Bedhaya), 542-3, 551-2 (death in 
Banda), 553, 579, 594, 596 (plans 
attack on Dipanagara in Tegalreja / 
plate), 636, 670, 776, 806
Wirapati, robber chief (Kedhu)  102 
(joins Dipanagara)
Wiraprana, Mas Ngabèhi (secretary 
of Danureja IV)  600 (reports on 
concentration of Dipanagara’s 
followers at Tegalreja)
Wirasaba (Maja-Agung), district 
(Surakarta eastern mancanagara)  
265, 378 (annexed by Raffles 
as war reparation, 1812), 379 
(annexed1812), 381 (revenue at 
annexation), 478 (Chinese land-
renter as benign landlord)
Wirasari, district (east Java)  164, 255, 
257, 265, 381  see also Grobogan-
Wirasari, Yudakusuma
Wirata  247
Wiriadipura, Radèn Tumenggung  273 
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(appointed by Prince Regent / HB 
III)
Wiryadiningrat, Radèn Mas Aria 
(Surakarta bupati wedana Panaraga) 
219-20
Wiryakusuma, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati miji; post-1812, bupati 
of Lowanu) 254 (on expedition 
against Rongga), 806
Wiryakusuma, Mas Tumenggung 
(associate of Dipanagara at 
Tegalreja)  97
Wiryapuspita, Radèn (Kadipatèn troop 
commander)  209
Wiryataruna, Radèn Ayu (sister of 
Pangéran Mangkubumi)  549 
(supposed liaison with Dietrée)
Wiryawijaya (alias Mertawijaya), Radèn 
Ngabèhi (bekel of Bendha, southern 
Kedhu)  486 (rallies to Dipasana, 
1822)
Wiryawinata, Radèn Ayu  549
Wisnu  132, 403, 492, 585
Woerden, royal fortress (Utrecht)  735 
(proposal to send Dipanagara to)
Wolo (Ambal, Bagelèn)  25-6 (produces 
dhèndhèng / dried deer meat for 
Surakarta kraton)
Wolzogen, Lieutenant-colonel Karel von  
184
women  32 (plate), 44 (as traders), 46 
(as money changers), 47 (weaving 
skills of), 72 (female relations 
of Dipanagara), 74 (marital 
relationships), 117-8 (Dipanagara’s 
relations with), 210 (mounted 
Amazon corps impress Daendels, 
7-1809), 218 (Daendels’ views of), 
224 (HB III’s love of), 227 (Ratu 
Kencana Wulan as only woman 
in Java Daendels afraid of), 252 
(as currency dealers), 268 (saving 
husbands), 315 (imprisonment 
of Ratu Kedhaton), 326 (official 
/ unofficial wife distinction), 349 
(rape of at Plérèd / Kartasura), 
367 (act ‘like men’), 397 (attitude 
of Danureja IV to), 439 (divorces), 
439-40 (as sex objects), 440 (wife 
swapping), 478 (body searches of 
for jewelry at tollgates), 501 (PB 
V as lover of), 522 (Danureja IV’s 
involvement with), 547 (Danureja 
IV demands sexual favours in 
legal judgements), 581 (titles 
accorded in Java War), 606, 613-6 
(as commanders during Java War), 
618-9 (attitude to Chinese women), 
629 (as fighters)  see also Amazon 
corps, rape, ronggèng, sexual 
relations
wong cilik (‘little people’; commoners)  
212 (plate), 213 (elite concerns for), 
222, 258, 471 (impact of tollgates 
on), 492 (Dipanagara concern to 
popularise chiefs with people)
wong durjana  see bandits
wong jahil (idol worshippers)  486
wong putihan (men of religion)  see 
putihan
Wonodadi, village (Batang, Pekalongan)  
217
Wonosobo  see Wanasaba
Wood, Colonel William (chief-of-staff to 
British forces in Java, 1811)  290
Woodbury & Page, photographers 
(Batavia)  179, 720 (plate of roads of 
Manado)
World War I  xvii, 738
Wörmer, J. (Inspector of Government 
pepper and coffee estates in Pacitan) 
589
Wringin Pitu, village (Kali Brantas, east 
Java)  491
Württemberg Regiment  175  see also 
Winckelmann, F.C.P. von
xenophobia  617-8
Yamin, Muhammad (1903-63)  320
Yogyakarta
   abdi-Dalem (royal retainers)  4 
(dwellings of)
   accounting systems (court treasury)  
61-2  see also Israël, J.L.
   administration in  398 (problems under 
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Danureja IV)
   alun-alun (northern)  180 (troops leave 
for Rajawinangun review from), 257 
(Rongga’s body displayed at), 271 
(Setonan tournaments on), 336, 411 
(firework display on), 545 (pépé on), 
565
    alun-alun (southern)  4, 83, 200-1 (tiger-
and-buffalo fight on, 10-1808), 210 
(rampog macan on for Daendels’ 
visit, 7-1809), 236 (troops mustered 
at), 272 (military exercises on), 283 
(Amazon corps exercised on), 329, 
340 (overrun by British)
   archive of  62, 151 (plundered 
by British), 311 (?intentional 
disappearance of 28-12-1811 treaty 
from), 319, 326 (copy of secret 
contract in), 350 (plundered by 
British), 351 (Javanese MSS taken), 
359, 388, 502, 522, 545 (in disarray 
under HB IV), 609
   armaments foundry  4, 8 (artillery 
cast), 216, 272 (new weaponry 
acquired)
   battlements  4, 216 (corner bastions 
extended), 406 (dying HB III tours)
   British attack on (20-6-1812)  7-8, 61, 
151, 331-42, 334 (map of), 388-9 
(legacy of humiliation from)
   as brothel  414, 439-40
   cap ageng (great seal)  410
   Chinese in  399 (Tan Jin Sing leases 
land)
   and Daendels  159-60 (treasure attracts 
attentions of), 263-5 (bankruptcy 
of Yogya), 269-70 (cash indemnity 
demanded)
   dance performances in  411
   disturbances to peace in  508-9 (during 
appointment HB V)
   dragoon bodyguard detachment in  
427 (set up after sepoy conspiracy)
   Dutch garrison  183, 187, 235  see also 
Ambonese
   food consumption in  44
   fort  see Vredenburg
   impoverishment of elite  263
   indigo production in  384 (high quality 
exports)
   kadhaton (inner court)  340-1 (last 
defence during British attack), 348 
(Ngabèhi leaves)
   keputrèn (women’s quarters)  70, 265, 
349 (Lt Maclean mortally wounded 
in), 350 (Ratu Kencana Wulan’s 
brothers take refuge in), 403
   kraton  4 (description in 1812), 80 
(intrigues in), 208-10 (Daendels’ 
visit to), 216 (fortifications 
extended), 346-52 (plunder of), 
361 (reoccupation of), 388 (lustre 
tarnished)
   land-rent  454-60, 532-43 (problems 
over indemnities)
   maps of  61, 308 (sent to Semarang 
naval college), 334, 522
   markets  3, 383 (British take-over of tax 
farm)  see also Beringharjo, Gadhing. 
Kuncèn, Rajawinangun
   mosque  see mesjid ageng
   military culture  5, 6 (plate of 
bodyguard), 7, 5-8 (military 
establishment in), 8-14 (landed 
base), 14-9 (tax collection), 187, 
272 (new cavalry squadrons), 
323 (Yogya force sent to Batavia, 
1793), 379 (Raffles’ decision to 
disband bodyguard), 391 (service 
requirements return to HB I’s reign), 
411, 421 (sepoys take service in 
bodyguard), 459 (HB IV’s love of 
European uniforms)
   mobile columns in  640
   Pangéran Adipati Anom (Crown 
Prince)  5, 150
   paséban (meeting place)  4, 201, 409
   police force  3  see also gunung
   population  39-41
   postal service  521  see also Chevallier, 
Smissaert
   and Raffles’ visit  304, 308-12
   regency council  408 (for HB IV), 461 
(for HB V)
   Residency archive   303 (problems with 
letters), 346 (Valck purloins), 508, 
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522, 525, 605
   Residency House  523 (repair of)
   roads  12, 462 (HB IV’s construction 
mania)
   supporters of Dipanagara from 626-33 
(tensions with santri), 654-5
   town  1-4 (description in 1812)
   trade to north coast  101, 244 (Ratu 
Kencana Wulan)
   treasure  363 (shipped to Bengal)
   throne room  see ‘Throne Room’
   village surveyors  63-4, 66
yoni (at Sélareja)  86  see also Hindu-
Buddhist, archaeological / temple 
remains
IJsseldijk, W.H. van (1757-1817; Resident 
of Yogya, 1786-98; Raad van Indië, 
1799-1808; Resident of Surakarta, 
1817)  63, 168 (character assessed), 
188, 223-4, 237, 299 (Crawfurd 
reads his memorial on court), 372, 
382, 391, 441 (mission to courts, 
9-1816), 445, 499-500 (dies in post, 
12-5-1817), 554 (gives undertakings 
to courts about frontiers), 618
Yudakusuma, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Yogya bupati of Grobogan-Wirasari, 
?1790-1812; post-1812, bupati of 
Muneng; father of Radèn Ayu / Ratu 
Wandhan)  255 (during Rongga 
rebellion), 257, 269 (told to place 
himself at disposal of Dutch), 349, 
613-4, 760, 806
Yudakusuma, Radèn Ayu (wife of above; 
daughter of Hamengkubuwana I)  
613-4, 616-7
Yudanagara, Radèn Tumenggung 
(Surakarta bupati of Banyumas, 
dismissed 1815)  21 (outrageous 
behaviour of), 426 (dismissed after 
sepoy conspiracy)
Yudanegaran family  see Danurejan
yudanegari (Javanese administrative tact)  
191
Yule, Colonel (post-1875, Sir) Henry 
(1820-89; orientalist)  157
zakat (tithe payments)  89
Zandzee  see Segara Wedhi
Zeeland  667 (De Kock in command of 
Dutch army in), 711 (Roeps posted 
in), 734
zemzem water (from Mecca)  702
ziarah  see pilgrimages
